TREATY ON THE NON-PROLIFERATION OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS
The need to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons was evident from the first days of the
nuclear era. On November 15, 1945, the United States, the United Kingdom, and Canada
proposed the establishment of a U.N. Atomic Energy Commission for the purpose of "entirely
eliminating the use of atomic energy for destructive purposes." The Baruch plan of 1946, offered
by the United States, sought to forestall nuclear arms proliferation by placing all nuclear
resources under international ownership and control.
But the early postwar efforts to achieve agreement on nuclear disarmament failed. The Soviet
Union in 1949, the United Kingdom in 1952, France in 1960, and the Peoples Republic of China
in 1964, became nuclear-weapon states. And increasingly it was becoming apparent that earlier
assumptions about the scarcity of nuclear materials and the difficulty of mastering nuclear
technology were inaccurate.
Other developments and prospects further underscored the threat of nuclear proliferation. In the
early 1960s the search for peaceful applications of nuclear energy had brought advances in the
technology of nuclear reactors for the generation of electric power. By 1966 such nuclear
reactors were operating or under construction in five countries. It was estimated that by 1985
more than 300 nuclear power reactors would be operating, under construction, or on order.
Nuclear reactors produce not only power, but plutonium -- a fissionable material which can be
chemically separated and used in the manufacture of nuclear weapons. By 1985 it was estimated
that the quantity of plutonium being produced worldwide would make possible the construction
of 15 to 20 nuclear bombs daily, depending upon the level of the technology employed.
If the diversion of nuclear materials from peaceful purposes was not prevented by an
international nuclear nonproliferation regime, and if a growing number of nations came to
possess nuclear weapon arsenals, it was believed that the risks of nuclear war as a result of
accident, unauthorized use, or escalation of regional conflicts would greatly increase. The
possession of nuclear weapons by many countries would add a grave new dimension of threat to
A succession of initiatives beginning in the 1950s by both nuclear and non-nuclear powers
sought to check proliferation. Indeed the effort to achieve a nuclear test ban -- culminating in the
Treaty of 1963 -- had as one of its main purposes inhibiting the spread of nuclear weapons. But
much before that, in August 1957, the Western powers (Canada, France, the United Kingdom,
and the United States) submitted a "package" of measures in the Subcommittee of the United
Nations Disarmament Commission, which included a commitment "not to transfer out of its
control any nuclear weapons, or to accept transfer to it of such weapons," except for self-defense.
Although the Soviet Union opposed proliferation, it claimed that this Western formula would
allow an aggressor to judge his own actions, and to use nuclear weapons "under cover of the
alleged right of self-defense." It therefore sought to couple a ban on transfer of nuclear weapons
to other states with a prohibition on stationing nuclear weapons in foreign countries.
In 1961 the UN General Assembly unanimously approved an Irish resolution calling on all
states, particularly the nuclear powers, to conclude an international agreement to refrain from
transfer or acquisition of nuclear weapons. In addition, the general disarmament plans which had
been submitted by the United States and the Soviet Union during the period 1960 -1962 included
provisions banning the transfer and acquisition of nuclear weapons.
The United States, on January 21, 1964, outlined a program to halt the nuclear arms race in a
message from President Johnson to the Eighteen-Nation Disarmament Committee (ENDC). This
program, unlike the 1957 proposal, was not a "package." It included a nondissemina-tion and
nonacquisition proposal -- based on the Irish resolution -- and safeguards on international
transfers of nuclear materials for peaceful purposes, combined with acceptance by the major
nuclear powers that their peaceful nuclear activities undergo increasingly "the same inspection
they recommend for other states."
An issue that was to be the principal stumbling block for the next three years was the proposed
multilateral nuclear force (MLF) then under discussion by the United States and its NATO allies.
The Soviet Union strongly objected to this plan and maintained that no agreement could be
reached on nonproliferation so long as the United States held open the possibility of such
nuclear-sharing arrangements in NATO. These arrangements would constitute proliferation, the
Soviet Union contended, and were devices for giving the Federal Republic of Germany access to
or control of nuclear weapons.
On August 17, 1965, the United States submitted a draft nonproliferation Treaty to the ENDC.
This draft obliged the nuclear-weapon powers not to transfer nuclear weapons to the national
control of any non-nuclear country not having them. Non-nuclear nations would undertake to
facilitate the application of International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) or equivalent
safeguards to their peaceful nuclear activities.
A Soviet draft Treaty was submitted to the General Assembly on September 24. In an
accompanying memorandum, the Soviet Union declared that the greatest danger of proliferation
was posed by the MLF and the alternative British proposal for an Atlantic nuclear force (ANF).
The Soviet draft prohibited the transfer of nuclear weapons "directly or indirectly, through third
States or groups of States not possessing nuclear weapons." It also barred nuclear powers from
transferring "nuclear weapons, or control over them or their emplacement or use" to military
units of non-nuclear allies, even if these were placed under joint command. The draft included no
In March 1966, the United States tabled amendments to its draft Treaty in the ENDC, seeking
to clarify and emphasize the Western view that collective defense arrangements would not
violate the principle of nonproliferation. The U.S. representative stressed that the United States
would not relinquish its veto over the use of U.S. weapons. The Soviet Union objected that the
amendments did not prevent the transfer of nuclear weapons through such alliance arrangements
as the MLF, the ANF, or units placed under joint command. The U.S. retention of a veto, the
Soviet representative argued, did not provide security against dissemination.
Despite strong disagreement on the issue of collective defense arrangements, it was apparent
that both sides recognized the desirability of an agreement on nuclear nonproliferation.
Moreover, the interest of non-nuclear powers in such a Treaty was increasingly manifest. It was
shown in 1964 at the African summit conference and at the Cairo conference of nonaligned states
and expressed in a series of resolutions in the General Assembly urging that nuclear non-
proliferation receive priority attention. In May 1966, the U.S. Senate unanimously passed a
resolution sponsored by Senator Pastore of Rhode Island and 55 other Senators commending
efforts to reach a nuclear nonproliferation agreement and supporting continued efforts.
In the fall of 1966 the U.S. and Soviet co-chairmen of the ENDC began private talks, and by
the end of the year they had reached tentative agreement on the basic nontransfer and
nonacquisition provisions of a Treaty, as well as on a number of other aspects.
There followed a long and arduous series of consultations between the United States and its
allies. The allies raised a number of questions regarding the effect of the Treaty on NATO
nuclear defense arrangements, and the United States gave its interpretations. The United States
considered that the Treaty covered nuclear weapons and/or nuclear explosive devices, but not
delivery systems. It would not prohibit NATO consultation and planning on nuclear defense, nor
ban deployment of U.S.-owned and -controlled nuclear weapons on the territory of non-nuclear
NATO members. It would not "bar succession by a new federated European state to the nuclear
status of one of its members." The allies questions and the United States answers were provided
to the Soviet Union, which did not challenge the U.S. interpretations.
On August 24, 1967, the United States and the Soviet Union were able to submit separate but
identical texts of a draft Treaty to the ENDC. Other ENDC members proposed numerous
amendments, largely reflecting the concerns of the non-nuclear states. In response to these, the
drafts underwent several revisions, and the co-chairmen tabled a joint draft on March 11, 1968.
With additional revisions, the joint draft was submitted to the U.N. General Assembly, where it
was extensively debated. Further suggestions for strengthening the Treaty were made, and in the
light of these, the United States and the Soviet Union submitted a new revised version, the
seventh, to the First Committee of the General Assembly on May 31. The General Assembly on
June 12 approved a resolution commending the text and requesting the depositary governments
(the U.S., U.K., and Soviet Union) to open it for signature. France abstained in the General
Assembly vote, stating that while France would not sign the Treaty, it "would behave in the
future in this field exactly as the States adhering to the Treaty."
In the course of these extended negotiations, the concerns of the non-nuclear powers centered
particularly on three main issues:
Safeguards. There was general agreement that the Treaty should include provisions designed to
detect and deter the diversion of nuclear materials from peaceful to weapons use. Two problems
were involved. One was to reconcile the Soviet insistence that all non-nuclear parties accept
IAEA1 safeguards with the desire of the non-nuclear members of EURATOM2 (Belgium, the
Federal Republic of Germany, Italy, Luxembourg, and the Netherlands) to preserve their regional
system. To meet this concern, the final draft provided that non-nuclear parties could negotiate
safeguards agreements with IAEA either individually or together with other states.3
The other problem was to satisfy the widespread concern among non-nuclear states that IAEA
safeguards might place them at a commercial and industrial disadvantage in developing nuclear
energy for peaceful use, since the nuclear powers would not be required to accept safeguards. To
help allay these misgivings, the United States offered, on December 2, 1967, to permit the IAEA
to apply its safeguards, when such safeguards were applied under the NPT, in all nuclear
facilities in the United States, excluding only those with "direct national security significance."
The United Kingdom announced that it would take similar action. Its safeguards agreement with
the IAEA was concluded in 1976 and is now in force. The U.S.-IAEA agreement, signed on
November 18, 1977, was submitted by the President to the Senate for its advice and consent to
ratification on February 9, 1978, and entered into force on December 9, 1980. In 1977, France
opened negotiations with the IAEA, and a safeguards agreement entered into force on September
12, 1981. In June 1982, the Soviet Union announced its readiness to put some of its nuclear
installations under IAEA safeguards, and on June 10, 1985, its safeguards agreement with the
IAEA entered into force. In September 1985 China declared at the IAEA that it would place
some of its civil nuclear facilities under international safeguards, and a safeguards agreement was
approved by the IAEA Board of Governors in September 1988.
Balanced Obligations. Throughout the negotiations most non-nuclear states held that their
renunciation of nuclear weapons should be accompanied by a commitment on the part of the
nuclear powers to reduce their nuclear arsenals and to make progress on measures toward
comprehensive disarmament. General provisions were included in the Treaty affirming the
intentions of the parties to negotiate in good faith to achieve a cessation of the nuclear arms race,
nuclear disarmament, and general and complete disarmament.
Further, to meet objections about possible discriminatory effects, the Treaty stipulated that
parties were to participate in, and have fullest access to materials and information for, peaceful
uses of nuclear energy. The Treaty also provided that any potential benefits of nuclear explosions
for peaceful purposes would be made available to non-nuclear weapon parties on a
Security Assurances. Non-nuclear-weapon states sought guarantees that renunciation of nuclear
arms would not place them at a permanent military disadvantage and make them vulnerable to
nuclear intimidation. But, it was argued, the security interests of the various states, and groups of
states, were not identical; an effort to frame provisions within the Treaty that would meet this
diversity of requirements for unforeseeable future contingencies would create inordinate
complexities. To resolve the issue, the United States, the Soviet Union, and the United Kingdom
submitted in the ENDC, on March 7, 1968, a tripartite proposal that security assurances take the
form of a U.N. Security Council resolution, supported by declarations of the three powers. The
resolution, noting the security concerns of states wishing to subscribe to the Non-Proliferation
Treaty, would recognize that nuclear aggression, or the threat of nuclear aggression, would create
a situation requiring immediate action by the Security Council, especially by its permanent
Following submission of the Treaty itself to the U.N. General Assembly, the tripartite
resolution was submitted to the Security Council. In a formal declaration, the United States
asserted its intention to seek immediate Security Council actions to provide assistance to any
non-nuclear-weapon state party to the Treaty that was the object of nuclear aggression or threats.
The Soviet Union and the United Kingdom made similar declarations. France abstained from
voting on the Security Council resolution; the French representative said that France did not
intend its abstention to be an obstacle to adoption of the tripartite proposal, but that France did
not believe the nations would receive adequate security guarantees without nuclear disarmament.
In addition to this "positive" security assurance, the United States in 1978 issued a policy
statement on "negative" security assurances in connection with the U.N. Special Session on
Disarmament. Secretary of State Vance made the following statement on June 12, 1978:
After reviewing the current status of the discussions in the United Nations Special
Session on Disarmament, after consultations with our principal allies, and on the
basis of studies made in preparation for the Special Session, the President has
decided to elaborate the U.S. position on the question of security assurances. His
objective is to encourage support for halting the spread of nuclear weapons, to
increase international security and stability, and to create a more positive
environment for success of the Special Session. To this end, the President
"The United States will not use nuclear weapons against any non-nuclear weapon
state party to the NPT or any comparable internationally binding commitment not
to acquire nuclear explosive devices, except in the case of an attack on the United
States, its territories or armed forces, or its allies, by such a state allied to a
nuclear weapon state, or associated with a nuclear weapon state in carrying out or
sustaining the attack."
In 1982, then-ACDA Director Eugene Rostow reaffirmed the assurance in the Geneva-based
Committee on Disarmament. It is the U.S. view that this formulation preserves U.S. security
commitments and advances U.S. collective security, as well as enhances the prospect for more
effective arms control and disarmament.
This declaration has been reaffirmed by every successive Administration, most recently at the
1990 NPT Review Conference.
The Treaty was opened for signature on July 1, 1968, and signed on that date by the United
States, the United Kingdom, the Soviet Union, and 59 other countries. On July 9, President
Johnson transmitted it to the Senate, but prospects for early U.S. ratification dimmed after the
Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia in August. The Senate adjourned without voting on the
Treaty. In February, 1969, President Nixon requested Senate approval of the Treaty, and in
March the Senate gave its advice and consent to ratification. The Treaty entered into force with
the deposit of U.S. ratification on March 5, 1970. In broadest outline, the basic provisions of the
Treaty are designed to:
-- prevent the spread of nuclear weapons (Articles I and II);
-- provide assurance, through international safeguards, that the peaceful nuclear activities of
states which have not already developed nuclear weapons will not be diverted to making such
weapons (Article III);
-- promote, to the maximum extent consistent with the other purposes of the Treaty, the
peaceful uses of nuclear energy, to include the potential benefits of any peaceful application of
nuclear explosion technology being made available to non-nuclear parties under appropriate
international observation (Articles IV and V);
-- express the determination of the parties that the Treaty should lead to further progress in
comprehensive arms control and nuclear disarmament measures (Article VI).
Article VIII provides for a conference to be held five years after entry into force of the Treaty
to review the operation of the Treaty with a view to assuring that the purposes of the Preamble
and the provisions of the Treaty are being realized. Four such review conferences have been held
since the Treaty entered into force. The first review conference, held in Geneva in May 1975,
produced a strong reaffirmation of support for the Treaty by the parties thereto. It also expressed
solid support for IAEA safeguards and recommended that greater efforts be made to make them
universal and more effective. The 1975 conference urged common export requirements designed
to extend safeguards to all peaceful nuclear activities, so-called "comprehensive safeguards" in
importing non-nuclear-weapon states not party to the Treaty, and urged all suppliers and
recipients to accept these requirements. It also concluded that NPT adherence should facilitate
access to peaceful nuclear assistance and credit arrangements.
At the second review conference, which was held in Geneva August 11 - September 7, 1980, a
thorough exchange of views on progress toward fulfillment of the Treatys objectives was heard.
Although the participants failed to agree on a final document, the national statements of the
parties present and the ensuing debate revealed continued strong support for the NPT and its
The third review conference was held August 27 - September 21, 1985, in Geneva. The
conference adopted by consensus a Final Declaration which reaffirmed the parties support for
the NPT and their appreciation of its essential contribution to international peace and security.
The 1985 conference reaffirmed the importance of preventing the further spread of nuclear
weapons and concluded that the Treaty continued to meet this basic objective. It also affirmed
that the nonproliferation and safeguards commitments of the NPT provide an essential
framework for peaceful nuclear cooperation and acknowledged that there has been appreciable
bilateral cooperation and multilateral technical assistance in the area of peaceful nuclear uses.
Ways to strengthen peaceful nuclear cooperation were identified. The conference also strongly
endorsed the IAEA and its safeguards system, as well as efforts to enhance further their
effectiveness. Although it was unable to agree that comprehensive safeguards should be a
precondition for significant nuclear exports to non-NPT, non-nuclear-weapon states, the
conference agreed not only on the desirability of such safeguards in non-nuclear-weapon states,
but also that effective steps should be taken to achieve them.
As expected, evaluation of the progress made since 1970 in achieving the arms control and
disarmament goals of Article VI evoked great disappointment and produced the most criticism.
In particular, virtually all parties present supported immediate negotiations on and urgent
conclusion of, a comprehensive nuclear test ban (CTB). The United States, while stating its
commitment to the long-term goal of a CTB, stressed its conviction that deep reductions in
existing nuclear arsenals should have the highest priority, and that it would continue to negotiate
seriously and flexibly to this end in the Geneva negotiations. Both views were set out in the Final
The NPT emerged from the 1985 review conference widely recognized as an arms control
success, and the results of the conference reinforced the international norm of nonproliferation.
The fourth NPT review conference was held August 1990, in Geneva. A comprehensive and
thorough review of the operation of the NPT over the previous five years was conducted during
the conference, which once again affirmed that the NPT was a vital instrument for preserving
global stability and security. The conference made progress on some important issues on which
there was consensus, including the need for full-scope IAEA safeguards as a condition of
significant nuclear supply, tighter export controls on nuclear technology transfers, and the need
for scrupulous adherence to the obligations of the Treaty. Consensus was also achieved on such
issues as negative security assurances and positive security assurances, prohibition of attacks on
nuclear facilities, cooperation in the peaceful uses of nuclear energy, the importance of IAEA
safeguards and effective export controls, and on nuclear safety. A very important result of the
conference was the strong commitment by a clear majority of participating states to the
importance of extending the life of the NPT in 1995. Unfortunately, this conference also
demonstrated that a small number of states might be willing to risk damage to the Treaty by
linking its extension to negotiations of other arms control measures, such as a Comprehensive
Test Ban Treaty (CTB).
Article X (2). In accordance with the terms of the NPT, a conference was held in 1995 to
decide whether the NPT should continue in force indefinitely or be extended for an additional
fixed period or periods. On May 11, more than 170 countries attending the 1995 NPT Review
and Extension Conference in New York decided to extend the Treaty indefinitely and without
The NPT remains the cornerstone of international efforts to prevent the further spread of
nuclear weapons. With over 180 parties, it is the most widely adhered to arms control agreement
in history. This impressive membership, which continues to grow, is a concrete reflection of the
growing international support for nuclear nonproliferation.
1 International Atomic Energy Agency, a U.N.-sponsored agency headquartered at Vienna.
2 European Atomic Energy Community, an organization established by the original European
Common Market partners for cooperation in nuclear energy matters.
3 EURATOM and the IAEA began negotiations in 1971. An IAEA-EURATOM safeguards
agreement was signed in April 1973 and entered into force on February 21, 1977.
TREATY ON THE NON-PROLIFERATION OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS
Signed at Washington, London, and Moscow July 1, 1968
Ratification advised by U.S. Senate March 13, 1969
Ratified by U.S. President November 24, 1969
U.S. ratification deposited at Washington, London, and Moscow March 5, 1970
Proclaimed by U.S. President March 5, 1970
Entered into force March 5, 1970
The States concluding this Treaty, hereinafter referred to as the "Parties to the Treaty",
Considering the devastation that would be visited upon all mankind by a nuclear war and the
consequent need to make every effort to avert the danger of such a war and to take measures to
safeguard the security of peoples,
Believing that the proliferation of nuclear weapons would seriously enhance the danger of
In conformity with resolutions of the United Nations General Assembly calling for the
conclusion of an agreement on the prevention of wider dissemination of nuclear weapons,
Undertaking to cooperate in facilitating the application of International Atomic Energy Agency
safeguards on peaceful nuclear activities,
Expressing their support for research, development and other efforts to further the application,
within the framework of the International Atomic Energy Agency safeguards system, of the
principle of safeguarding effectively the flow of source and special fissionable materials by use
of instruments and other techniques at certain strategic points,
Affirming the principle that the benefits of peaceful applications of nuclear technology, including
any technological by-products which may be derived by nuclear-weapon States from the
development of nuclear explosive devices, should be available for peaceful purposes to all
Parties of the Treaty, whether nuclear-weapon or non-nuclear weapon States,
Convinced that, in furtherance of this principle, all Parties to the Treaty are entitled to participate
in the fullest possible exchange of scientific information for, and to contribute alone or in
cooperation with other States to, the further development of the applications of atomic energy for
Declaring their intention to achieve at the earliest possible date the cessation of the nuclear arms
race and to undertake effective measures in the direction of nuclear disarmament,
Urging the cooperation of all States in the attainment of this objective,
Recalling the determination expressed by the Parties to the 1963 Treaty banning nuclear weapon
tests in the atmosphere, in outer space and under water in its Preamble to seek to achieve the
discontinuance of all test explosions of nuclear weapons for all time and to continue negotiations
to this end,
Desiring to further the easing of international tension and the strengthening of trust between
States in order to facilitate the cessation of the manufacture of nuclear weapons, the liquidation
of all their existing stockpiles, and the elimination from national arsenals of nuclear weapons and
the means of their delivery pursuant to a Treaty on general and complete disarmament under
strict and effective international control,
Recalling that, in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations, States must refrain in their
international relations from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political
independence of any State, or in any other manner inconsistent with the Purposes of the United
Nations, and that the establishment and maintenance of international peace and security are to be
promoted with the least diversion for armaments of the worlds human and economic resources,
Have agreed as follows:
Each nuclear-weapon State Party to the Treaty undertakes not to transfer to any recipient
whatsoever nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices or control over such weapons or
explosive devices directly, or indirectly; and not in any way to assist, encourage, or induce any
non-nuclear weapon State to manufacture or otherwise acquire nuclear weapons or other nuclear
explosive devices, or control over such weapons or explosive devices.
Each non-nuclear-weapon State Party to the Treaty undertakes not to receive the transfer from
any transferor whatsoever of nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices or of control
over such weapons or explosive devices directly, or indirectly; not to manufacture or otherwise
acquire nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices; and not to seek or receive any
assistance in the manufacture of nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices.
1. Each non-nuclear-weapon State Party to the Treaty undertakes to accept safeguards, as set
forth in an agreement to be negotiated and concluded with the International Atomic Energy
Agency in accordance with the Statute of the International Atomic Energy Agency and the
Agencys safeguards system, for the exclusive purpose of verification of the fulfillment of its
obligations assumed under this Treaty with a view to preventing diversion of nuclear energy
from peaceful uses to nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices. Procedures for the
safeguards required by this article shall be followed with respect to source or special fissionable
material whether it is being produced, processed or used in any principal nuclear facility or is
outside any such facility. The safeguards required by this article shall be applied to all source or
special fissionable material in all peaceful nuclear activities within the territory of such State,
under its jurisdiction, or carried out under its control anywhere.
2. Each State Party to the Treaty undertakes not to provide: (a) source or special fissionable
material, or (b) equipment or material especially designed or prepared for the processing, use or
production of special fissionable material, to any non-nuclear-weapon State for peaceful
purposes, unless the source or special fissionable material shall be subject to the safeguards
required by this article.
3. The safeguards required by this article shall be implemented in a manner designed to comply
with article IV of this Treaty, and to avoid hampering the economic or technological
development of the Parties or international cooperation in the field of peaceful nuclear activities,
including the international exchange of nuclear material and equipment for the processing, use or
production of nuclear material for peaceful purposes in accordance with the provisions of this
article and the principle of safeguarding set forth in the Preamble of the Treaty.
4. Non-nuclear-weapon States Party to the Treaty shall conclude agreements with the
International Atomic Energy Agency to meet the requirements of this article either individually
or together with other States in accordance with the Statute of the International Atomic Energy
Agency. Negotiation of such agreements shall commence within 180 days from the original entry
into force of this Treaty. For States depositing their instruments of ratification or accession after
the 180-day period, negotiation of such agreements shall commence not later than the date of
such deposit. Such agreements shall enter into force not later than eighteen months after the date
of initiation of negotiations.
1. Nothing in this Treaty shall be interpreted as affecting the inalienable right of all the Parties to
the Treaty to develop research, production and use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes
without discrimination and in conformity with articles I and II of this Treaty.
2. All the Parties to the Treaty undertake to facilitate, and have the right to participate in, the
fullest possible exchange of equipment, materials and scientific and technological information
for the peaceful uses of nuclear energy. Parties to the Treaty in a position to do so shall also
cooperate in contributing alone or together with other States or international organizations to the
further development of the applications of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes, especially in the
territories of non-nuclear-weapon States Party to the Treaty, with due consideration for the needs
of the developing areas of the world.
Each party to the Treaty undertakes to take appropriate measures to ensure that, in accordance
with this Treaty, under appropriate international observation and through appropriate
international procedures, potential benefits from any peaceful applications of nuclear explosions
will be made available to non-nuclear-weapon States Party to the Treaty on a nondiscriminatory
basis and that the charge to such Parties for the explosive devices used will be as low as possible
and exclude any charge for research and development. Non-nuclear-weapon States Party to the
Treaty shall be able to obtain such benefits, pursuant to a special international agreement or
agreements, through an appropriate international body with adequate representation of
non-nuclear-weapon States. Negotiations on this subject shall commence as soon as possible
after the Treaty enters into force. Non-nuclear-weapon States Party to the Treaty so desiring may
also obtain such benefits pursuant to bilateral agreements.
Each of the Parties to the Treaty undertakes to pursue negotiations in good faith on effective
measures relating to cessation of the nuclear arms race at an early date and to nuclear
disarmament, and on a Treaty on general and complete disarmament under strict and effective
Nothing in this Treaty affects the right of any group of States to conclude regional treaties in
order to assure the total absence of nuclear weapons in their respective territories.
1. Any Party to the Treaty may propose amendments to this Treaty. The text of any proposed
amendment shall be submitted to the Depositary Governments which shall circulate it to all
Parties to the Treaty. Thereupon, if requested to do so by one-third or more of the Parties to the
Treaty, the Depositary Governments shall convene a conference, to which they shall invite all the
Parties to the Treaty, to consider such an amendment.
2. Any amendment to this Treaty must be approved by a majority of the votes of all the Parties to
the Treaty, including the votes of all nuclear-weapon States Party to the Treaty and all other
Parties which, on the date the amendment is circulated, are members of the Board of Governors
of the International Atomic Energy Agency. The amendment shall enter into force for each Party
that deposits its instrument of ratification of the amendment upon the deposit of such instruments
of ratification by a majority of all the Parties, including the instruments of ratification of all
nuclear-weapon States Party to the Treaty and all other Parties which, on the date the amendment
is circulated, are members of the Board of Governors of the International Atomic Energy
Agency. Thereafter, it shall enter into force for any other Party upon the deposit of its instrument
of ratification of the amendment.
3. Five years after the entry into force of this Treaty, a conference of Parties to the Treaty shall be
held in Geneva, Switzerland, in order to review the operation of this Treaty with a view to
assuring that the purposes of the Preamble and the provisions of the Treaty are being realized. At
intervals of five years thereafter, a majority of the Parties to the Treaty may obtain, by submitting
a proposal to this effect to the Depositary Governments, the convening of further conferences
with the same objective of reviewing the operation of the Treaty.
1. This Treaty shall be open to all States for signature. Any State which does not sign the Treaty
before its entry into force in accordance with paragraph 3 of this article may accede to it at any
2. This Treaty shall be subject to ratification by signatory States. Instruments of ratification and
instruments of accession shall be deposited with the Governments of the United States of
America, the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and the Union of Soviet
Socialist Republics, which are hereby designated the Depositary Governments.
3. This Treaty shall enter into force after its ratification by the States, the Governments of which
are designated Depositaries of the Treaty, and forty other States signatory to this Treaty and the
deposit of their instruments of ratification. For the purposes of this Treaty, a nuclear-weapon
State is one which has manufactured and exploded a nuclear weapon or other nuclear explosive
device prior to January 1, 1967.
4. For States whose instruments of ratification or accession are deposited subsequent to the entry
into force of this Treaty, it shall enter into force on the date of the deposit of their instruments of
ratification or accession.
5. The Depositary Governments shall promptly inform all signatory and acceding States of the
date of each signature, the date of deposit of each instrument of ratification or of accession, the
date of the entry into force of this Treaty, and the date of receipt of any requests for convening a
conference or other notices.
6. This Treaty shall be registered by the Depositary Governments pursuant to article 102 of the
Charter of the United Nations.
1. Each Party shall in exercising its national sovereignty have the right to withdraw from the
Treaty if it decides that extraordinary events, related to the subject matter of this Treaty, have
jeopardized the supreme interests of its country. It shall give notice of such withdrawal to all
other Parties to the Treaty and to the United Nations Security Council three months in advance.
Such notice shall include a statement of the extraordinary events it regards as having jeopardized
its supreme interests.
2. Twenty-five years after the entry into force of the Treaty, a conference shall be convened to
decide whether the Treaty shall continue in force indefinitely, or shall be extended for an
additional fixed period or periods. This decision shall be taken by a majority of the Parties to the
This Treaty, the English, Russian, French, Spanish and Chinese texts of which are equally
authentic, shall be deposited in the archives of the Depositary Governments. Duly certified
copies of this Treaty shall be transmitted by the Depositary Governments to the Governments of
the signatory and acceding States.
IN WITNESS WHEREOF the undersigned, duly authorized, have signed this Treaty.
DONE in triplicate, at the cities of Washington, London and Moscow, this first day of July one
thousand nine hundred sixty-eight.