ARTICLE-BY-ARTICLE ANALYSIS
OF THE TREATY TEXT

bbbbb The Treaty Between the United States of America and the Russian Federation on Further Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms (the START II Treaty) consists of the main Treaty text and three documents which are integral parts thereof:

the Protocol on Procedures Governing Elimination of Heavy ICBMs and on Procedures Governing Conversion of silo Launchers of Heavy ICBMs Relating to the Treaty Between the United States of America and the Russian Federation on Further Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms (the Elimination and Conversion Protocol);

the Protocol on Exhibitions and Inspections of Heavy Bombers Relating to the Treaty Between the United States of America and the Russian Federation on Further Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms (the Exhibitions and Inspections Protocol); and

the Memorandum of Understanding on Warhead Attribution and Heavy Bomber Data Relating to the Treaty Between the United States of America and the Russian Federation on Further Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms (the Memorandum on Attribution).

bbbbbThe START II Treaty shall enter into force upon the exchange of instruments of ratification between the United States and the Russian Federation, but Article VI of the START II Treaty specifically provides that it shall not enter into force prior to entry into force of the START Treaty.

bbbbb In addition to the documents that are integral parts of the START II Treaty, there are three exchanges of letters associated with START II. The first exchange of letters relates to the ongoing negotiation of an agreement between Russia and Kazakhstan regarding SS-18 missiles and launchers now on the territory of Kazakhstan. In his December 29, 1992, response to Russian Foreign Minister Kozyrev's commitment of December 29, 1992, to spare no effort to conclude such an agreement, Secretary of State Eagleburger confirmed that the START II Treaty would be submitted to the United States Senate for its advice and consent on the understanding that the agreement referred to by Minister Kozyrev (providing for the movement to Russia and elimination of heavy ICBMs from Kazakhstan) would be signed and implemented, and that, not later than seven years after entry into force of the START Treaty, all deployed and non-deployed heavy ICBMs now located on the territory of Kazakhstan will have been moved to Russia where they and their launch canisters will have been destroyed.

bbbbbThe second exchange of letters of December 29, 1992, and December 31, 1992, between Secretary of State Eagleburger and Russian Foreign Minister Kozyrev, relates to heavy bombers, and constitutes the assurance of the United States of America, during the duration of the START II Treaty, never to have more nuclear weapons deployed on any heavy bomber than the number specified in the Memorandum on Attribution for that type or variant. This letter creates no new legal obligation for the United States but merely reiterates the obligation already assumed under paragraph 3 of Article IV of the START II Treaty.

bbbbb The third exchange of letters of December 29, 1992, and January 3, 1993, between Russian Minister of Defense Grachev and Secretary of Defense Cheney, sets forth a number of assurances on Russian intent regarding the conversion and retention of 90 silo launchers of RS-20 (referred to by the U.S. as SS-18) heavy ICBMs. In his letter, which is politically binding on Russia, Minister Grachev reaffirms the steps that Russia will take to convert these silos and assures the Secretary of Defense that missiles of the SS-25 type will be deployed in these converted silos.

TITLE AND PREAMBLE

bbbbb The title of the START II Treaty is the "Treaty Between the United States of America and the Russian Federation on the Further Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms."

bbbbb Of primary importance is the word "further," which establishes from the outset the integral relationship between the START Treaty and the START II Treaty. As will become evident as this analysis progresses, without entry into force of the START Treaty there can be no entry into force or implementation of the START II Treaty. This is true not only with respect to the formalities of the entry into force of the two Treaties, but also with respect to every aspect of implementation of the START II Treaty. Indeed, paragraph 1 of Article V states that except as otherwise specifically provided for, "the provisions of the START Treaty, including the verification provisions, shall be used for implementation of this Treaty." Thus, whenever a question arises, reference must be made to the START Treaty. It is on this basis that the terms used throughout the START II Treaty have their meaning, beginning with Article I. This means that terms such as "reduction and limitation" and "strategic offensive arms" are to be understood in precisely the same manner as in the START Treaty.]

bbbbb As in the START Treaty, the term "reduction and limitation" highlights the fact that START II also calls for elimination of arms, not merely the imposition of ceilings. The arms subject to "further" reductions beyond those of the START Treaty are "strategic," in the same sense that the term is used in the START Treaty. There, it should be noted, the term itself is undefined, but as explained in the Article-by-Article Analysis of the START Treaty, the term refers to ICBMs and their associated launchers, SLBMs and their associated launchers, and heavy bombers. These strategic offensive arms covered by the Treaty are systems of intercontinental range, in contrast to shorter-range and intermediate-range systems covered by the 1987 Treaty Between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the Elimination of Their Intermediate-Range and Shorter-Range Missiles. Similarly, the term "offensive" is used in contrast to "defensive" arms, such as anti-ballistic missile systems covered by the 1972 Treaty Between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the Limitation of Anti-Ballistic Missile Systems and under discussion in the talks on a Global Protection System.

bbbbb The Preamble commences with the designation of the United States of America and the Russian Federation as "the Parties," to obviate the use of their full names throughout the Treaty. The Parties to the START II Treaty are different from the Parties to the START Treaty. While the Republic of Belarus, the Republic of Kazakhstan, and Ukraine are Parties to the START Treaty, they are not Parties to the START II Treaty. It was not necessary to involve these three states because, within seven years after entry into force of the START Treaty, all nuclear weapons and deployed strategic offensive arms are to be eliminated from their territories. The second and third paragraphs of the Preamble contain a reaffirmation of commitment to the START Treaty and the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT). The fourth paragraph calls attention to the commitment of Belarus, Kazakhstan, and Ukraine, as set forth in the Lisbon Protocol, to accede to the NPT as non-nuclear-weapon States Parties. The fifth paragraph of the Preamble is similar to the fifth paragraph of the Preamble to the START Treaty, but adds to the list of undertakings of which the Parties are mindful two documents signed since the conclusion of the START Treaty: the Joint Understanding on Further Reductions in Strategic Offensive Arms and the Joint Statement on a Global Protection System signed by President Bush and President Yeltsin on June 17, 1992, in Washington, that relate to START II and the creation of a global system against ballistic missile attack. The sixth through tenth paragraphs parallel paragraphs two through four of the Preamble to the START Treaty. There is also a reference to UN General Assembly resolution 47/52K of December 9, 1992, which specifically welcomes the Joint Understanding on Further Reductions in Strategic Offensive Arms Between the United States of America and the Russian Federation of June 17, 1992, and urges the early conversion of this Joint Understanding into a formal treaty.

ARTICLE I

bbbbb Paragraph 1 of Article I obligates the United States and Russia each to reduce its ICBMs and ICBM launchers, SLBMs and SLBM launchers, and heavy bombers, along with ICBM and SLBM warheads and heavy bomber nuclear armaments, so that by seven years after entry into force of the START Treaty neither Party has more than a total of 4250 warheads attributable to deployed ICBMs, deployed SLBMs, and deployed heavy bombers, as counted pursuant to Articles III and IV of this Treaty (importantly, not the START Treaty, whose counting rules differ in some respect from those of the START II Treaty). The paragraph underscores through repetition that the aggregate number must never exceed 4250, and adds that a Party may establish a lesser aggregate number for itself. The reference to the number 3800 implies no legal constraint but rather represents the lower end of a range of deployments contemplated by the Parties.

bbbbb Paragraph 2 sets forth the sublimits within the overall 4250 limit that each Party must observe. It does so by reference to the numbers of warheads that are attributed to deployed SLBMs, deployed ICBMs of types of ICBMs to which more than one warhead is attributed, and deployed heavy ICBMs in the Memorandum on Attribution or, if the data are not present in the categories contained in the Memorandum on Attribution, in the Memorandum of Understanding to the START Treaty. In order to understand precisely what is meant by, inter alia, "warhead," "deployed SLBM," "deployed," "heavy ICBMs," etc., reference must be made to the START Treaty, its counting rules, and its Annex on Terms and Their Definitions. The discussion of such terms and their application, set forth in the Article-by-Article Analysis of the START Treaty, will not be repeated here. But it is worth calling special attention to the fact that, for the purposes of the START Treaty and therefore START II, a "warhead" is not a physical object, but a unit of account. The sublimits set forth in paragraph 2, described in terms of the total number of warheads attributed to certain missiles, are: (a) 2160 for deployed SLBMs, (b) 1200 for those types of ICBMs to which more than one warhead is attributed, and (c) 650 for deployed heavy ICBMs.

bbbbb Paragraph 3 provides that, once a Party has fulfilled its obligations pursuant to paragraph 1, it shall continue the reductions process so that by January 1, 2003, it does not have more than a total of 3500 warheads attributable to its deployed ICBMs, deployed SLBMs, and deployed heavy bombers. As in the case of the first phase of further reductions set forth in paragraph 1, a Party is free to establish a lower aggregate number for itself. Also, as in the first phase of further reductions, there is mention made of a number, in this case 3000, that implies no legal constraint, but which represents the lower end of a range of deployments contemplated by the Parties.

bbbbb Paragraph 4 establishes the sublimits applicable to the aggregate of 3500 or less as follows: (a) 1750 for warheads attributed to deployed SLBMs; (b) zero for warheads attributed to deployed ICBMs of types to which more than one warhead is attributed; and (c) zero for warheads attributed to deployed heavy ICBMs.

bbbbb The effect of these reductions is that by January 1, 2003, the aggregate number for deployed warheads must not exceed 3500 (no more than 1750 of which can be attributed to deployed SLBMs) and neither Party may have a deployed launcher of an ICBM to which more than one warhead is attributed nor a deployed launcher of heavy ICBMs or any heavy ICBMs. Note that, in a sense, subparagraph 4(c) is redundant. The only deployed heavy ICBM (the SS-18) is in fact a deployed ICBM of a type to which more than one warhead is attributed, and under the terms of both the START and the START II Treaties, the number of warheads attributed to heavy ICBMs may not be reduced through downloading. However, in light of the separate reference to heavy ICBMs that is maintained throughout the START Treaty and in the START II Treaty for other purposes, the separate treatment in subparagraph 4(c) leaves no room for doubt that the complete elimination of heavy ICBMs is necessary and recognizes that their elimination has great military and political significance. Also, under START rules for eliminations, launchers may either be destroyed or converted and, in most cases, the missiles need not be destroyed. The START II Treaty, like the START Treaty, is more severe on heavy ICBMs than on other strategic offensive arms. Under START II, all heavy ICBM silo launchers must be destroyed (except for 90 that may be converted under stringent procedures) and all heavy ICBMs must also be destroyed.

bbbbb Paragraph 5 establishes that the Parties have committed to a sustained rate of reductions throughout the entire period of reductions. It makes it clear that the Parties may not delay commencing their reductions, and repeats the obligation set forth in paragraph 3 that, upon the completion of the first phase of further reductions, the second phase of reductions must be commenced.

bbbbb The effect of this provision is to provide significant additional reductions, as compared to the phased reductions provided in the START Treaty. For example, in the seven-year reduction period set forth in the START Treaty, Russia and Kazakhstan are required to destroy deployed heavy ICBM launchers at the rate of no fewer than 22 a year, in order to reach the requisite reduction of 154 no later than at the end of seven years. Under this Treaty, Russia is to reach the level of 65 deployed heavy ICBM launchers at the end of the seven-year START reduction period (650 attributed warheads, 10 warheads per missile). Thus, to reach this level at a "sustained" rate, Russia will have to destroy or convert (conversion being permitted under the START II Treaty up to a level of 90 heavy ICBM silo launchers) at a rate significantly greater than that to which it is obligated under the START Treaty. Whereas the START Treaty rate of 22 per year is a specific obligation to a minimum rate of reductions, the requirement of paragraph 5 of Article I for sustained reductions throughout the reductions period is a more generalized commitment and not a specific legal obligation to reduce at a given rate. Thus, Russia is not obligated to eliminate or convert exactly 35 SS-18 silo launchers a year, but eliminating or converting substantially fewer over a sustained period could cause concern with regard to compliance with the commitment contained in paragraph 5 of Article I. It is important to note that, while the Parties agreed to sustained reductions, they did not agree to "straight-line" or annual reduction rates. The Parties understood that sustained reductions refer to the continual decline of the strategic offensive arms associated with the aggregate number of warheads and are not necessarily related to specific systems. Straight-line reductions, or the reduction of warheads at a constant annual rate, are not practical due to the "step" nature of many reductions. For example, a Party cannot take credit for ICBM downloading until all ICBMs at a base have been downloaded. Similarly, SLBM downloading is not credited until all the SLBMs on submarines based adjacent to one ocean have been downloaded. On the other hand, partial steps in the conversion or elimination process, such as the notification that a single launcher was being converted or that a few heavy bombers were being eliminated, will provide confidence that the reductions are being sustained.

bbbbb Paragraph 6 sets forth the agreement of the Parties, that if they reach a separate agreement within one year after entry into force on a program of assistance to promote the implementation of these reductions, then the time frame for accomplishment of the second phase of further reductions, as well as meeting additional constraints contained in Article II, will not extend beyond December 31, 2000. Bearing in mind that seven years after entry into force of the START II Treaty will probably closely approach the end of the year 2000, it becomes apparent that the Parties must be prepared to complete their reductions in less time than the periods in which they are originally obligated to complete such reductions. The qualification of this obligation that agreement on such a program of assistance must be achieved by one year after entry into force was added at Russian request. The Parties wanted to make it clear that such an agreement must be reached long before the accelerated completion date for the second phase of reductions, in order to give Russia the requisite time to meet this revised obligation.

ARTICLE II

bbbbb Article II consists of nine paragraphs.

bbbbb Paragraph 1 contains several different undertakings that are at the heart of the START II Treaty. Foremost is the requirement that each Party, no later than January 1, 2003, will have either eliminated all of its deployed and non-deployed launchers of ICBMs to which more than one warhead is attributed under Article III of this Treaty (including test launchers and training launchers), or else will have converted them to launchers of ICBMs to which one warhead is attributed, and will not thereafter have launchers of ICBMs to which more than one warhead is attributed. An exception to this requirement is made for those launchers, other than launchers of heavy ICBMs, that are allowed under the START Treaty at space launch facilities. Paragraph 1 goes on to state the agreement of the Parties that ICBM launchers that have been converted to launch an ICBM of a different type shall not be capable of launching an ICBM of the former type. Thus, for example, converted SS-18 silos must not be capable of launching SS-18s. The Parties also agree to carry out such elimination or conversion using the procedures provided for in the START Treaty, except as otherwise provided in paragraph 3 of this Article.

bbbbb Paragraph 2 excepts from the obligations of paragraph 1 silo launchers of ICBMs on which the number of warheads has been reduced to one pursuant to paragraph 2 of Article III of the START II Treaty. Thus, for example, the launchers of all Minuteman III ICBMs and the 105 launchers of SS-19 ICBMs that have been downloaded to one warhead pursuant to Article III of the START II Treaty need not be eliminated, even though under the START Treaty they would be attributed with more than one warhead at entry into force.

bbbbb Paragraph 3 sets forth the means by which silo launchers of heavy ICBMs, including test launchers and training launchers, are to be eliminated or converted. Eliminations are to be carried out in accordance with the procedures provided for in Section II of the Conversion or Elimination Protocol to the START Treaty. Not more than 90 silo launchers of heavy ICBMs may be converted in accordance with the procedures provided for in the Elimination and Conversion Protocol to the START II Treaty; the remainder must be physically destroyed.

bbbbb Paragraph 4 sets forth the undertaking of the Parties not to emplace an ICBM launch canister which has a diameter greater than 2.5 meters in any silo launcher of heavy ICBMs that has been converted in accordance with subparagraph (b) of paragraph 3 of Article II. This is one of the constraints placed on the 90 SS-18 heavy ICBM silo launchers that may be converted rather than eliminated pursuant to paragraph 3. Although this paragraph, standing alone, would not preclude the subsequent installation of a new type of single-warhead ICBM different from the SS-25, its purpose is to reinforce the assurance from Defense Minister Grachev, during the negotiations, that only ICBMs of the SS-25 type will be installed in converted heavy ICBM launchers. The U.S. interpretation of this Russian political commitment would preclude such subsequent installation.

bbbbb The political commitment is contained in a letter, dated December 29, 1992, from Defense Minister Grachev to Secretary of Defense Cheney, which offers five assurances with respect to the conversion of 90 silo launchers of RS-20 (SS-18) heavy ICBMs under the Elimination and Conversion Protocol in order to install single-warhead missiles other than heavy ICBMs into such silo launchers.

bbbbbThe first assurance is the Russian commitment to install in the upper portion of each converted SS-18 silo launcher a restrictive ring with a diameter of not more than 2.9 meters, so as to preclude loading of a heavy ICBM in the silo launcher.

bbbbb The second assurance is that each such converted silo launcher will be filled with concrete to a depth of five meters, thereby making the usable depth of the silo too short to contain a heavy ICBM.

bbbbb The third assurance is that Russia will not install in a converted silo launcher a missile launch canister with a diameter exceeding 2.5 meters.

bbbbb The fourth assurance is that a single-warhead ICBM of the RS-12M (SS-25) type missile will be installed in such converted silo launcher. The word "type" is understood to refer to an ICBM in the sense that the term is described in the START Treaty. During the negotiations the Defense Minister stated that "only single-warhead ICBMs of the RS-12M (SS-25) type would be installed in such a converted launcher of heavy ICBMs." The United States, therefore, understands the political commitment contained in the letter to be a permanent commitment not to install any missile other than an SS-25 type in these converted silos.

bbbbb The fifth assurance is that such a conversion of silo launchers of heavy ICBMs (including filling with concrete) will be verified in accordance with the agreement reached between the Parties.

bbbbb Except for the fourth assurance, all of the assurances in the letter are obligations included in either the main body of the START II Treaty or its Elimination and Conversion Protocol. Thus, the 90 converted heavy ICBM silos must never again contain heavy ICBMs or ICBMs equipped with MIRVs, and may contain only an SS-25 type missile.

bbbbb Paragraph 5 requires that elimination of launchers of heavy ICBMs at space launch facilities be carried out only in accordance with subparagraph 3(a) of Article II. Thus, such launchers may not be converted but must be destroyed. There are no such launchers in Russia at the present time and, during the negotiations, the Russians said they had no plans for such launchers. Should, however, Russian plans change such that any be designated as part of a space launch facility, they must be destroyed by January 1, 2003, pursuant to this paragraph and paragraph 1 of this Article (which does not exempt such launchers used at space launch facilities).

bbbbb Paragraph 6 addresses the elimination of deployed and non-deployed heavy ICBMs and their launch canisters. All such missiles must be eliminated no later than January 1, 2003, either accordance with the procedures provided for in the Elimination and Conversion Protocol, or by using such missiles for delivering objects into the upper atmosphere or space. The Parties also agree not to have such missiles or launch canisters thereafter. The heavy ICBMs must be removed from their canisters before they are eliminated. The United States has the right to observe these eliminations. The provisions of this Article were not meant to exclude elimination through test flights during the period of reductions.

bbbbb In this context the exchange of letters on Kazakhstan is important. Russia pledges its best efforts to reach agreement with Kazakhstan, as contemplated by the Lisbon Protocol, on the movement of the SS-18 heavy ICBMs and their launch canisters, which are now located in Kazakhstan, to Russia, where they will be destroyed. The United States asserts for its part that it is entering into the START II Treaty regime on the understanding that this agreement will be signed and implemented, and all the SS-18 missiles in Kazakhstan will be returned to Russia and destroyed along with their launch canisters.

bbbbb Paragraph 7 gives each Party the right to conduct inspections in connection with the elimination of heavy ICBMs and their launch canisters, as well as inspections in connection with the conversion of silo launchers of heavy ICBMs. Except as otherwise provided in the Elimination and Conversion Protocol, such inspections must be conducted subject to the applicable provisions of the START Treaty.

bbbbb Paragraph 8 sets forth the commitment of each Party not to transfer heavy ICBMs to any recipient whatsoever, including any other Party to the START Treaty. Pursuant to paragraph 2 of Article VI, this obligation is to be applied provisionally from the date of signature of the Treaty. This provides a useful collateral constraint since there are SS-18 silo launchers located outside Russia, and such transfers by Russia to the other Parties to the START Treaty -- Belarus, Kazakhstan, and Ukraine­are not prohibited by the START Treaty.

bbbbb Paragraph 9 requires that, beginning on January 1, 2003, and thereafter, neither Party will produce, acquire, flight-test (except for flight tests from space launch facilities conducted in accordance with the provisions of the START Treaty), or deploy an ICBM to which more than one warhead is attributed under Article III of the START II Treaty. This provision adds to the START Treaty prohibition "not to produce, flight-test, or deploy," an explicit ban on acquisition of such systems from a third state­a relevant concern since other countries (particularly Ukraine) presently have sophisticated ballistic missile production facilities. The practical impact of Paragraph 9 is that, after the specified date, Peacekeeper and the SS-24 ICBMs can be launched only from space launch facilities to deliver objects into the upper atmosphere or space.

ARTICLE III

bbbbb Article III sets forth the specific Treaty provisions regarding the attribution of warheads to deployed ICBMs and SLBMs.

bbbbb Paragraph 1 of Article III specifies that the number of nuclear warheads attributed to an ICBM or SLBM will be determined in accordance with START procedures, except as otherwise provided for in paragraph 2 of Article III. Since paragraph 2 covers only downloading, this means that the warhead attribution of existing ICBMs and SLBMs is that listed in Section I of the START Memorandum of Understanding, unless they are downloaded in accordance with the START Treaty or in accordance with paragraph 2 of this Article, and that the provisions for determining the warhead attribution of new types of ICBMs and SLBMs set forth in paragraph 4 of Article III of the START Treaty apply with equal force to the START II Treaty.

bbbbb Paragraph 2 of Article III sets forth rules for reducing the warhead attribution (downloading) of existing types of ICBMs and SLBMs other than heavy ICBMs. The actual number of reentry vehicles on any given ballistic missile may be less than the attributed number of warheads, but that missile still counts at the attributed number. Like the START Treaty, the START II Treaty bans downloading of heavy ICBMs and of new types of ICBMs or SLBMs. Downloading under this Treaty follows the same rules as downloading under the START Treaty, except that the following provisions apply only to downloading for the purposes of the START II Treaty:

­ Subparagraphs 2(a) and 2(b) allow a Party to exceed the 1250 START Treaty total warhead down-loading limit and the 500 START Treaty warhead limit on downloading ICBMs and SLBMs other than the U.S. Minuteman III ICBM and the Russian SS-N-18 SLBM. This provision would allow the United States to maintain the viability of the sea-based component of the Triad while meeting the limit of 1750 SLBM warheads found in subparagraph 4(a) of Article I of the Treaty by, for example, downloading each of the 432 Trident SLBMs on 18 Trident ballistic missile submarines from eight to four warheads.

­ Subparagraph 2(c) allows downloading no more than 105 ICBMs of one type of existing ICBM by more than four, but not more than five, warheads. (Downloading otherwise is limited to no more than four warheads per missile by subparagraph 5(c)(iii) of Article III of the START Treaty.) The ICBM so downloaded must be one of the two types of ICBM or SLBM whose downloading is permitted by subparagraph 5(c)(ii) of Article III of the START Treaty. This provision has the practical effect of allowing Russia to download 105 SS-19 ICBMs from six warheads to one warhead, and thus to retain them past January 1, 2003, when all MIRVed ICBMs are banned. The 105 downloaded SS-19 ICBMs must be deployed only in silos in which an SS-19 ICBM was deployed on July 31, 1991, the date of signature of the START Treaty.

­ Subparagraph 2(d) allows downloading of a ballistic missile type by more than two warheads without destroying the reentry vehicle platform and replacing it with a new reentry vehicle platform. Such destruction and replacement would otherwise be required by subparagraphs 5(b)(iii) and 5(c)(vi) of Article III of the START Treaty, in order to take advantage of that Treaty's downloading provisions. Not requiring reentry vehicle platform destruction will allow the Parties to restructure their forces under START II to meet the START II Treaty's lower limits in a more economical manner.

bbbbb All other downloading provisions of the START Treaty apply to this Treaty as well. In particular, downloading of ICBMs must be accomplished base-by-base, while downloading of SLBMs must include all SLBMs at bases adjacent to the same ocean. Neither Party may download more than two existing types of ballistic missiles, either ICBMs or SLBMs, in addition to the Minuteman III and the SS-N-18.

bbbbb As a result of the differences in the provisions of the two Treaties, the warhead attribution of a given ICBM or SLBM may differ under START and under the START II Treaty. For example, if the United States were to elect to download the Trident II (D-5) SLBM from eight to four warheads, without replacing the reentry vehicle platform, it could be attributed with four warheads under this Treaty, while it could continue to be attributed with eight warheads under START (or a number of seven or six consistent with START Treaty downloading rules). The United States would not be in violation of the 1250 or 500 warhead downloading limit in START. As noted above, there are no numerical limits on the aggregate number of reentry vehicles that may be downloaded under this Treaty, except as implied by other constraints, e.g., the limits on the number of existing types of missiles and the number of warheads per missile that can be downloaded.

bbbbb In a similar fashion, the United States could elect to download the Minuteman III to one warhead for purposes of the START II Treaty without destroying the reentry vehicle platform. Since this Treaty cannot amend the START Treaty, in this case the Minuteman III would continue to be attributed with three warheads for purposes of the START Treaty.

bbbbb Paragraph 3 of Article III of the START II Treaty contains two requirements that parallel similar require- ments in paragraph 12 of Article V of the START Treaty. Subparagraph 3(a) translates the warhead attribution rule into a physical prohibition by banning production, flight-testing, or deployment of an ICBM or SLBM with more reentry vehicles than the number of warheads attributed to it. Subparagraph 3(b) bans uploading of ICBMs or SLBMs that have been downloaded.

bbbbb The provisions of subparagraph 3(a) do not preclude production of Trident SLBMs for transfer to the United Kingdom, regardless of the number of reentry vehicles with which the United Kingdom subsequently equips them. As the Article-by-Article Analysis of the First Agreed Statement in the Agreed Statements Annex to the START Treaty makes clear: " ... as a sovereign nation, the United Kingdom has the right to test and deploy the Trident II missile with any warhead configuration the UK deems appropriate."

bbbbb Paragraph 3 is necessary, even though similar provisions exist in the START Treaty, since the warhead attribution under START and under the START II Treaty may differ. For example, if all Trident II (D-5) SLBMs were downloaded to four warheads under this Treaty, while continuing to be attributed with eight warheads under START, there would, absent this paragraph, be no legal bar to continuing to test and deploy them with eight reentry vehicles. Similarly, without the provisions of paragraph 3 of this Treaty, there would be no bar to uploading. For example, START provisions against uploading would not preclude returning the Trident II (D-5) SLBMs to an attribution of eight warheads under the START II Treaty, since, in terms of START accountability, its accountability would always have been eight.

ARTICLE IV

bbbbbArticle IV establishes the constraints on heavy bombers. Paragraphs 1 through 6 deal with attributing warheads to heavy bombers; paragraphs 7 through 14 regulate nuclear-armed heavy bombers reoriented to a conventional role. Article IV is complemented by the Exhibitions and Inspections Protocol.

bbbbb Paragraphs 1, 2, and 3 of Article IV provide the basic counting rules for heavy bomber nuclear armaments. Paragraph 1 specifies that the number of nuclear warheads attributed to a deployed heavy bomber (other than heavy bombers reoriented to a conventional role) shall be equal to the number of nuclear weapons (including long-range nuclear ALCMs, nuclear gravity bombs, and short-range nuclear missiles) with which any bomber of that type or variant is actually equipped. This is a significant departure from the START Treaty, under which 150 U.S. and 180 Soviet ALCM-equipped heavy bombers were discounted up to 50 percent and heavy bombers equipped for nuclear weapons other than long-range nuclear ALCMs were attributed with only one warhead. Paragraph 2 provides that the number of nuclear weapons for which a heavy bomber is actually equipped shall be the number listed in the Memorandum on Attribution, while paragraph 3 prohibits heavy bombers from being equipped with more nuclear weapons than are attributed to it.

bbbbbOne of the most difficult issues during the START II negotiations was what was meant by the number of nuclear weapons for which a heavy bomber is actually equipped. The Russian delegation initially asserted that any approach other than one based on counting attachment points (i.e., the physical devices used to attach weapons to heavy bombers or weapons racks), and the subsequent calculation of the maximum number of weapons that could physically be loaded on the aircraft given those attachment points, would not result in a "real" counting rule. The design of U.S. heavy bombers makes counting attachment points an inappropriate and misleading measure that could greatly overstate the realistic operational load that a U.S. heavy bomber could carry on a strategic mission. The United States successfully rejected this approach, arguing in favor of an approach that would count all bombers of any type or variant with the largest number of nuclear weapons for which any bomber of that type or variant would be actually deployed.

bbbbb In support of the U.S. position, the December 29, 1992 letter from Secretary of State Eagleburger to Russian Foreign Minister Kozyrev provided assurances that the United States has an "absolute legal and political requirement" to have no more nuclear weapons deployed on a heavy bomber than the number specified in the Memorandum on Attribution. The letter does not create a new U.S. obligation, but simply notes a series of provisions set forth in the Treaty. The word "type," as used in the letter, as in the Treaty, to refer to heavy bombers, is used in the same sense as the term is used in the START Treaty.

bbbbb Russian Foreign Minister Kozyrev, in his response to Secretary of State Eagleburger's letter of December 29, 1992, agreed that, on the basis of the U.S. letter, "all questions associated with heavy bombers have been resolved for the purposes of [the START II] Treaty to our mutual satisfaction." This provides formal assurance that Russia no longer insisted on counting attachment points to determine the number of nuclear weapons for which a heavy bomber is actually equipped or on eliminating "excess" attachment points that would allow the aircraft to carry a larger number of nuclear weapons than listed. Instead, the Parties agreed that the number of warheads attributed to a heavy bomber of a given type or variant of a type would be the number listed in the Memorandum on Attribution. This agreement paved the way for agreement on the heavy bomber portions of the Treaty.

bbbbb Paragraph 4 of Article IV requires a one-time exhibition of one heavy bomber of each type and variant specified in the Memorandum on Attribution for the purpose of demonstrating the number of nuclear weapons for which such bombers are actually equipped. No distinction is made between heavy bombers equipped for long-range nuclear ALCMs and those that are not so equipped. In a significant departure from the procedures of the START Treaty, these exhibitions will include the U.S. B-2 heavy bomber. The exhibitions are to be conducted no later than 180 days after entry into force of the START II Treaty. This date was selected for two reasons: to allow adequate time to prepare for the exhibitions, especially for shrouding of the B-2 (and, if necessary, shrouding other heavy bombers) permitted by paragraph 2 of Section II of the Exhibition and Inspection Protocol, and to avoid conflict with START Treaty baseline inspections in the event that the START and START II Treaties enter into force at approximately the same time.

bbbbb The START II Treaty allows each Party to increase or decrease the number of warheads for which a heavy bomber is actually equipped. Paragraph 5 of Article IV requires exhibitions similar to those required by paragraph 4 in the event the number of nuclear weapons for which a heavy bomber is actually equipped is changed. This paragraph also provides for the timing of any change in attribution. Both the exhibition and the accountability change are triggered by a notification of intent. Ninety days after such notification both the change in accountability and the exhibition occur. While the Parties may, by agreement, delay the exhibition, this does not delay the change in accountability.

bbbbb In practical terms, the application of paragraph 5 will vary according to circumstances:

­ If a Party intends to decrease the number of nuclear weapons for which a heavy bomber of a given type and variant is actually equipped, but without the intent to create a new variant, the last heavy bomber would have to be modified before one is exhibited. This is necessary since otherwise a Party would still have one or more heavy bombers equipped for more nuclear weapons than the number listed in the Memorandum on Attribution, which would be in violation of paragraph 3 of Article IV.

­ If a Party intends to increase the number of nuclear weapons for which a heavy bomber of a given type and variant is actually equipped, but without the intent to create a new variant, the first heavy bomber to be modified would have to be exhibited. Once again, this is necessary to avoid having any heavy bomber equipped for more nuclear weapons than the number listed in the Memorandum on Attribution for heavy bombers of that type and variant.

­ If a Party intends to increase or decrease the number of nuclear weapons for which a heavy bomber is actually equipped through creation of a new variant (for example, by removing external ALCM carriage from some, but not all, of a particular type of heavy bomber), the first aircraft of that variant would have to be exhibited. The new variant would, under the START Treaty, need to be made distinguishable (as that term is used in the START Treaty) and to be exhibited in accordance with paragraph 12 of Article XI of the START Treaty. The exhibitions required under START and those required under paragraph 5 of Article IV of the START II Treaty may be combined, but there is no legal requirement to do so. Additional aircraft would count at the changed number of weapons as they were modified to become bombers of the newly declared variant.

­ If a Party intends to increase or decrease the number of nuclear weapons for which a heavy bomber is actually equipped, incident to converting heavy bombers from heavy bombers equipped for long-range nuclear ALCMs to heavy bombers equipped for nuclear armaments other than long-range nuclear ALCMs or to heavy bombers equipped for non-nuclear armaments, the procedures set forth in Section VI of the Conversion or Elimination Protocol to the START Treaty would be followed, including the inspections provisions associated therewith. Once again, the conversion inspection required under the START Treaty and the exhibition required under paragraph 5 of Article IV of the START II Treaty may be combined, but there is no legal requirement to do so.

­ In any of these cases, a 90-day advance notification would be required.

bbbbb Paragraph 6 of Article IV specifies that exhibitions and inspections referred to in paragraphs 4 and 5 of Article IV will be conducted in accordance with the provisions of the Exhibitions and Inspections Protocol and, to the extent not modified by that Protocol, with the provisions of the START Treaty, as provided for in paragraph 1 of Article V of the START II Treaty.

bbbbb Under the START Treaty, older U.S. heavy bombers awaiting elimination at the Davis-Monthan conversion or elimination facility are included in the Memorandum of Understanding, since such bombers count against the START Treaty delivery vehicle and warhead totals. Since these older bombers will be eliminated before the expiration of the seven-year reductions period, when the first limits under START II must be reached, it was agreed that the number of nuclear weapons for which they are actually equipped would not be included in the START II Memorandum on Attribution and, in such case, they will not be exhibited.

bbbbb The United States declared two different categories of the B-52G heavy bomber under the START Treaty: a B-52G equipped for long-range nuclear ALCMs and a B-52G equipped for nuclear armaments other than long-range nuclear ALCMs. At the time of signature of the START II Treaty, all B-52Gs equipped for long-range nuclear ALCMs had been removed from operational service and were awaiting elimination at the Davis-Monthan Air Force Base elimina- tion facility. Therefore, the United States listed only one category of B-52G in the Memorandum on Attribution.

bbbbb The United States informed Russia during the negotiations that, since the only deployed B-52G heavy bombers Russian inspectors will actually encounter at operational air bases will be B-52Gs that are not equipped for long-range nuclear ALCMs, that is the configuration of the heavy bomber that the United States will exhibit. The United States further noted that, if U.S. plans were to change and the United States were to return any B-52Gs equipped for long-range nuclear ALCMs to operational status, we would conduct an additional exhibition of the ALCM-configured B-52G in order to avoid any confusion during subsequent data update inspections.

bbbbb Paragraph 7 of Article IV gives each Party the right to reorient to a conventional role -- without undergoing any conversion procedures -- heavy bombers that have never been accountable under the START Treaty as heavy bombers equipped for long-range nuclear ALCMs. This provision is applied on an airplane-by-airplane basis; for example, the fact that B-1 test heavy bombers have been tested with long-range nuclear ALCMs is not a bar to reorienting heavy bombers of that type to a conventional role. Note that the right to reorient without any physical conversion is modified by the requirement in subparagraph 8(d) of this Article that such reoriented bombers have differences, observable to national technical means of verification (NTM) and visible during inspection, from other heavy bombers that have not been reoriented, so that they can be differentiated from other heavy bombers of the same type and variant with a nuclear role (if any).

bbbbb The right to reorient heavy bombers to a conventional role is in addition to the right under START to convert, using specified procedures, no more than 75 heavy bombers to heavy bombers equipped for non-nuclear armaments. A Party could, if it chose, have both 75 converted non-nuclear heavy bombers and 100 heavy bombers reoriented to a conventional role that did not require conversion procedures. Heavy bombers reoriented to a conventional role will not count against the START II warhead limits. However, since heavy bombers reoriented to a conventional role need not undergo any conversion, they remain fully accountable under the START Treaty as heavy bombers equipped for nuclear armaments other than long-range nuclear ALCMs (i.e., each counts as one delivery vehicle and as one warhead towards the START Treaty's ceilings).

bbbbb Paragraph 8 of Article IV sets forth specific restrictions on heavy bombers reoriented to a conventional role. Subparagraph 8(a) limits the number of reoriented bombers to 100 at any one time, while subparagraph 8(b) mandates segregated basing for such bombers. Subparagraph 8(c) bans use of reoriented heavy bombers for nuclear missions or in nuclear exercises and bars their crews from training or exercising for nuclear missions. This prohibition does not ban such training or exercising by crews of bombers of the same type and variant that have not been reoriented.

bbbbb Subparagraph 8(d) requires that heavy bombers reoriented to a conventional role have differences observable to national technical means (NTM) from heavy bombers of that type and variant that have not been reoriented. This provision aids in confirming adherence to the requirements of subparagraph 8(b) for segregated basing. The specific differences are listed in the Memorandum on Attribution. While these observable differences are primarily an aid to NTM, they are also required to be visible during on-site inspections. Alternately, if all heavy bombers of a type have been reoriented to a conventional role, the requirement to have differences observable to NTM is unnecessary since these aircraft are observably different from other types or variants and it would be clear in which category they fell. In addition, there would be no need or purpose in exhibiting an aircraft if all heavy bombers of that type and variant fell into the same category.

bbbbb The observable differences referred to in subparagraph 8(d) need not be functional. As a result, they need not necessarily make heavy bombers reoriented to a conventional role "distinguishable" (as that term is defined in the START Treaty) from other heavy bombers. Paragraph 9 of Article IV provides each Party the right, following 90-day advance notification to the other Party, to return to a nuclear role heavy bombers that have been reoriented to a conventional role. This right is important to the United States. We currently plan to reorient B-1 heavy bombers to a conventional role, but need to preserve the option to return these bombers to a nuclear role if and when B-52H heavy bombers are retired. Once returned to a nuclear role, such heavy bombers will count "as actually equipped" and may not subsequently be reoriented to a conventional role a second time.

bbbbb Paragraph 9 also requires observable differences if only some, but not all, reoriented heavy bombers of a given type or variant of a type are returned to a nuclear role. These differences aid in enforcing the prohibition on a subsequent reorientation to a conventional role. As a result of the combination of paragraphs 8 and 9, a Party may be obligated to allow the other Party to identify, both through its NTM and through inspections, three separate groups of heavy bombers within a given variant: those that have never been reoriented to a conventional role, those that are currently reoriented to a conventional role, and those that were once reoriented to a conventional role but have subsequently been returned to a nuclear role.

bbbbb Paragraph 10 of Article IV requires at least 100 kilometers separation between air bases for heavy bombers reoriented to a conventional role and storage areas for heavy bomber nuclear armaments. This restriction is based on a similar restriction in subparagraph 11(e) of Article IV of the START Treaty. Note that this restriction would not preclude nuclear weapons for other strategic or tactical systems (e.g., ICBM reentry vehicles or weapons for tactical aircraft) from being stored within the 100 kilometers specified, nor would it preclude deployment of nuclear warheads on ICBMs at ICBM bases co-located with air bases for heavy bombers reoriented to a conventional role. There are no specific verification provisions specified in the START II Treaty for this restriction.

bbbbb Paragraph 11 provides that reoriented heavy bombers remain subject to the provisions of the START Treaty, including the inspection provisions. Such heavy bombers are accountable under the START Treaty as heavy bombers equipped for nuclear armaments other than long-range nuclear ALCMs.

bbbbb Paragraphs 12 and 13 of Article IV provide for exhibitions related to observable differences. In the case where only some bombers of a given type and variant have been reoriented to a conventional role, while others of the same type and variant continue to have a nuclear role, there is a requirement for the former to have a difference observable to NTM from the latter. This obligation is provided for in subparagraph 8(d) of Article IV. Similarly, if only some bombers of a given type and variant are returned to a nuclear role after having been reoriented to a conventional role, and there are other bombers of the same type and variant that have a conventional role, or have a nuclear role but that have never been reoriented to a conventional role, then the bombers in the first "category" (the word "category" is not used in this Analysis in the sense of the term as used in the START Treaty) must be observably different to NTM from bombers in the latter two categories. This obligation is recorded in paragraph 9 of the START II Treaty.

bbbbb The purpose of these obligations is to allow the other Party to determine into which category a particular aircraft falls (i.e., original nuclear, reoriented to a conventional role, or nuclear that had once been reoriented to a conventional role). This is required not only for the purposes of warhead counting (heavy bombers reoriented to a conventional role are not attributed with warheads; other deployed heavy bombers count as actually equipped), but also to confirm adherence to the ban on reorienting a heavy bomber to a conventional role for a second time. Of course, such observable differences are not necessary in the case in which all the aircraft of a given type or variant are reoriented to a conventional role, or are returned to a nuclear role from a conventional role. Since these aircraft are already observably different from aircraft of other types or variants, it would already be clear into which category they fell.

bbbbb Paragraphs l2 and l3 of Article IV of the START II Treaty record the obligations for an exhibition of an aircraft for the purpose of demonstrating, and allowing the inspection of, the observable difference identified. As noted above, there would be no need or purpose in exhibiting an aircraft if all aircraft of that type and variant fell into the same category. However, if a Party has two different types or variants that have changed categories, e.g., B-1s and B-52s, and only one of them falls into more than one category (and has been given a difference observable to NTM), the use of the phrase "each type" in these paragraphs does not mean that a requirement exists to exhibit an aircraft of the second type or variant whose status could not be confused since all aircraft of that type or variant fall into the same category. This was clearly not the intent of the Parties, since there would be no purpose in exhibiting an aircraft of the second type or variant, because all of them had been reoriented.

bbbbbParagraph 14 of Article IV specifies that exhibitions and inspections referred to in the preceding two paragraphs will be conducted in accordance with the provisions of the Exhibitions and Inspections Protocol.

ARTICLE V

bbbbb Article V sets forth provisions for the implementation of the Treaty. Paragraph 1 of Article V specifies that, except as provided for in the START II Treaty, the provisions of the START Treaty, including its verification provisions, shall be used for implementing START II. As noted above, this includes, for example, the counting rules, the definitions in the Definitions Annex and elsewhere in the START Treaty, as well as the various inspection procedures and related notification requirements and agreed statements.

bbbbb Paragraph 2 of Article V establishes the Bilateral Implementation Commission (BIC). The BIC will meet at the request of either Party and will serve as the framework within which the Parties will seek to resolve any questions related to compliance with the START II Treaty and agree on any additional measures that might be necessary to improve the viability and effectiveness of the START II Treaty. The language establishing the BIC is identical to that establishing the START Treaty's Joint Compliance and Inspection Commission. Both Parties envision that the two Commissions would work together closely.

ARTICLE VI

Article VI consists of four paragraphs covering ratification, entry into force, provisional application, duration, and withdrawal. Paragraph 1 of Article VI provides that the two Protocols and the Memorandum on Attribution are integral parts of the Treaty. Paragraph 1 also specifies that the Treaty is subject to ratification prior to entering into force, and will not enter into force prior to entry into force of the START Treaty.

bbbbbParagraph 2 of Article VI specifies that paragraph 8 of Article II, the ban on the transfer of heavy ICBMs to a third state or states, shall be provisionally applied as of the date of signature of the START II Treaty.

bbbbbParagraph 3 of Article VI provides that the START II Treaty shall remain in force for the duration of the START Treaty.

bbbbb Paragraph 4 of Article VI, identical in content to paragraph 3 of Article XVII of the START Treaty, provides each Party the right to withdraw from the Treaty on six months notice if extraordinary events related to the subject matter of this Treaty have jeopardized its supreme interests.

ARTICLE VII

bbbbb Article VII, identical in content to Article XVIII of the START Treaty, provides for amendments to the START II Treaty. Such amendments would be subject to ratification as specified in Article VI of the Treaty.

ARTICLE VIII

bbbbbArticle VIII, identical in content to Article XIX of the START Treaty, provides for registration with the United Nations in accordance with Article 102 of the Charter of the United Nations. The entire Treaty, including the two Protocols and the Memorandum on Attribution, are to be so registered.

FINAL PROVISION

bbbbb The final paragraph of the START II Treaty records that the Treaty was done at Moscow on January 3, 1993, in two copies, each in the English and Russian languages, and each being equally authentic.