ARTICLE-BY-ARTICLE ANALYSIS OF THE
PROTOCOL FOR THE ELIMINATION OF HEAVY ICBMS
AND THE CONVERSION OF THEIR SILO LAUNCHERS

STRUCTURE AND OVERVIEW OF THE PROTOCOL

bbbbb The Elimination and Conversion Protocol consists of two Sections. The first Section sets forth procedures for the elimination of heavy ICBMs and their launch canisters. The second Section establishes procedures for the conversion and confirmation of conversion of silo launchers, silo training launchers, and silo test launchers of heavy ICBMs. Although written as general procedures, these procedures were designed for Russian SS-18 silo launchers.

SECTION I
PROCEDURES FOR ELIMINATION OF HEAVY ICBMs
AND THEIR LAUNCH CANISTE
RS

bbbbb Paragraph 1 of Section I provides two alternatives for eliminating heavy ICBMs. A Party may either use the procedures set forth in Section I, which are to take place at elimination facilities for ICBMs specified in the START Treaty, or it may eliminate heavy ICBMs by using them for delivering objects into the upper atmosphere or outer space. For the former, notice of elimination must be provided to the other Party, via the Nuclear Risk Reduction Centers (NRRCs), 30 days in advance of the initiation of the elimination process at the particular facility involved. If, however, the elimination of a heavy ICBM is to be accomplished by the "space launch" alternative, notification thereof shall be governed by the provisions of the Agreement Between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on Notifications of Launches of Intercontinental Ballistic Missiles and Submarine-Launched Ballistic Missiles of May 31, 1988, which requires notification 24 hours in advance through the NRRCs.

bbbbb Paragraph 2 lists several steps that either shall or may be taken, in any order, by the inspected Party before the confirmatory inspection provided for in paragraph 3 of Section I. The inspected Party shall remove the missile's reentry vehicles; may remove the electronic and electro-mechanical devices of the missiles's guidance and control system from the missile and its launch canister, as well as other elements that are not ("shall not be" in the text is used in the sense of "are not") subject to elimination pursuant to paragraph 4 of Section I (which addresses the elimination process for heavy ICBMs); shall remove the missile from its launch canister and disassemble the missile into stages; shall remove liquid propellant from the missile; may remove or actuate auxiliary pyrotechnic devices installed on the missile and its launch canister; may remove penetration aids, including devices for their attachment and release; and may remove propulsion units from the self-contained dispensing mechanism.

bbbbb Paragraph 3 describes the confirmatory inspection, which is to take place after arrival of the inspection team and prior to the initiation of the actual destruction. During the confirmatory inspection, the inspectors are to confirm the type and number of missiles to be eliminated. Inspectors have the right to both visually observe and measure items (including missiles outside of their launch canisters) presented for elimination to confirm that they are SS-18 missiles and missile canisters. The elimination process for the missiles and the launch canisters may begin once the above procedures have been carried out. Paragraph 3 requires that inspectors observe the elimination process. On-site observation is necessary since NTM cannot confirm that the objects presented for destruction are real. Other provisions governing the inspection team and the inspection are found in the START Treaty.

bbbbb Paragraph 4 specifies the elimination process to be followed for destruction of heavy ICBMs. Missile stages, nozzles, and missile interstage skirts are to be cut into two pieces of approximately equal size; and the self-contained dispensing mechanism (as well as the front section), including the reentry vehicle platform and the front section shroud, is to be cut into two pieces of approximately equal size and crushed. In the negotiations, the Russian side assured the U.S. side that this process would ensure the destruction of all of the critical elements of the missile system­stages, including propellant tanks; engines (since the nozzle, which is destroyed, is the most critical engine element); interstage skirts; and self-contained dispensing mechanisms and their elements.

bbbbb Paragraph 5 states that during the process of destruction of launch canisters of heavy ICBMs, the launch canister shall be cut into two pieces of approximately equal size or, alternatively, into three pieces such that pieces no less than 1.5 meters long are cut from the ends of the body of the launch canister. These procedures apply to launch canisters eliminated with their heavy ICBMs, as well as to launch canisters for missiles eliminated through flight-testing, or through launching into the upper atmosphere or space. They also apply to empty launch canisters existing at the time of entry into force of the Treaty.

bbbbb Paragraph 6 requires that the inspection team leader and a member of the in-country escort confirm that the inspection team has completed its inspection. Such confirmation shall be included in a factual written report by them that contains the results of the inspection team's observation of the elimination process. Such confirmation shall be made upon completion of the requirements set forth in Section I.

bbbbb Paragraph 7 states that heavy ICBMs will no longer be subject to the limitations of this Treaty upon completion of the procedures set forth in Section I. Notification thereof shall be provided in accordance with paragraph 3 of Section I of the Notification Protocol to the START Treaty.

SECTION II
PROCEDURES FOR CONVERSION OF SILO LAUNCHERS,
SILO TRAINING LAUNCHERS, AND SILO TEST LAUNCHERS OF
HEAVY ICBMs

bbbbbParagraph 1 requires that conversion of silo launchers of heavy ICBMs (including silo training launchers of heavy ICBMs and silo test launchers of heavy ICBMs) be carried out in situ and be subject to inspection. Pursuant to paragraph 5 of Article II of the Treaty, launchers of heavy ICBMs at space launch facilities may not be converted, but must be destroyed. Silo elimination, as opposed to conversion, follows START Treaty rules.

bbbbb Paragraph 2 provides that, prior to the initiation of the conversion process for any of the silo launchers described in paragraph 1, the missile and launch canister must be removed from the silo launcher.

bbbbb Paragraph 3 states that a Party shall be considered to have initiated the conversion process for silo launchers of heavy ICBMs (including silo training launchers of heavy ICBMs and silo test launchers of heavy ICBMs) as soon as the silo door has been opened and a missile and its canister have been removed from the silo launcher. Notification thereof is to be provided in accordance with paragraphs 1 and 2 of Section IV of the Notification Protocol to the START Treaty.

bbbbb Paragraph 4 sets forth steps to be included in the conversion process for silo launchers of heavy ICBMs (including silo training launchers of heavy ICBMs and silo test launchers of heavy ICBMs). They are: opening of the silo door and removal of the missile and the launch canister from the silo launcher; pouring of concrete into the base of the silo launcher up to the height of five meters from the bottom of the silo launcher; and installing a restrictive ring with a diameter of no more than 2.9 meters into the upper portion of the silo launcher in a manner that precludes removal without destruction of the ring and its attachment to the silo wall.

bbbbb Paragraph 5 provides each Party the right to confirm that the procedures specified in paragraph 4 of Section II have been carried out. For purposes of confirming that such procedures have been carried out, the Party doing the conversion is required to notify the other Party (through the NRRCs) (a) no later than 30 days in advance of the date when the process of pouring concrete will commence, and (b) upon completion of all of the procedures specified in paragraph 4 of Section II. Once it receives the first notification, the inspecting Party has two options for confirming compliance with the conversion procedures. These are set forth in paragraph 6 and paragraph 7 of Section II. The primary difference between paragraphs 6 and 7 is whether a Party chooses to observe the concrete being poured into the silo (paragraph 6) or not (paragraph 7).

bbbbb Paragraph 6 confers upon the Parties the right to observe the entire process of pouring concrete into each heavy ICBM silo launcher that is to be converted and to measure the diameter of the restrictive ring. Subparagraph 6(a) requires the other Party to inform the Party converting the heavy ICBM silo no later than seven days in advance of the commencement of the pouring that it will observe the filling of the silo in question.

bbbbbSubparagraph 6(b) requires the Party converting a silo to take such steps as are necessary to ensure that the base of the silo launcher is visible to the inspecting Party and that the depth of the silo can be measured by the inspecting Party. This must be done immediately prior to the commencement of the process of pouring concrete. The purpose of these requirements is to ensure that the inspecting Party can view the bottom of the silo and accurately measure its depth prior to the concrete being poured.

bbbbbSubparagraph 6(c) states that the inspecting Party shall have the right to observe the entire process of concrete pouring from a location providing an unobstructed view of the silo interior, and to confirm by measurement that concrete has been poured into the base of the launcher to a depth of five meters. Measurements are to be taken from the level of the lower edge of the closed silo door to the base of the silo launcher, prior to the pouring of the concrete, and from the level of the lower edge of the closed silo door to the top of the concrete fill, after the concrete has hardened.

bbbbbSubparagraph 6(d) states that following notification of completion of the procedures specified in paragraph 4 of Section II, the inspecting Party may measure the diameter of the restrictive ring, that during such inspection the ring shall not be shrouded, and that the Parties shall agree on the date for such inspections.

bbbbbSubparagraph 6(e) requires that the results of the measurements conducted to subparagraphs 6(c) and 6(d) above be recorded in written, factual inspection reports and signed by the inspection team leader and a member of the in-country escort.

bbbbbSubparagraph 6(f) states that inspection teams are to consist of no more than ten inspectors, all of whom are to be drawn from the list of inspectors under the START Treaty. The list referred to is that specified by Section II of the Inspection Protocol to the START Treaty, which also sets forth the legal status of such inspections.

bbbbbSubparagraph 6(g) states that such inspections shall not count against any inspection quotas established by the START Treaty. In addition, heavy ICBM elimination inspections do not count against START Treaty quotas..

bbbbbParagraph 7 provides an alternative method for confirming conversion. It provides for the right to measure the depth of each heavy ICBM silo launcher that is to be converted before the concrete has been poured, and to return and remeasure the silo depth after the concrete has hardened. This alternative was suggested by the Russian side as a cost-reduction measure since the on-site presence required by it could be considerably lower than that required by the first method. The U.S. indicated an interest if appropriate equipment to confirm the integrity of the concrete fill could be identified. In addition, paragraph 7 provides for the right to measure the diameter of the restrictive ring.

bbbbbSubparagraph 7(a) requires the other Party to inform the Party converting the heavy ICBM silo no later than seven days in advance of the commencement of the pouring that it will measure the depth of the silo in question both before and after the concrete has been poured.

bbbbb Subparagrph 7(b) requires the Party converting a silo to take such steps as are necessary to ensure that the base of the silo launcher is visible and that the depth of the silo can be measured. This must be done immediately prior to the commencement of the process of pouring concrete. The purpose of these requirements is to ensure that the inspecting Party can view the bottom of the silo and accurately measure its depth.

bbbbbSubparagraph 7(c) states that the inspecting Party shall measure the depth of the silo launcher prior to the commencement of the process of pouring concrete.

bbbbbSubparagraph 7(d) states that, following notification of completion of the procedures specified in paragraph 4 of Section II, the inspecting Party may measure the diameter of the restrictive ring, and remeasure the depth of the silo launcher, and that the Parties shall agree on the date for such inspections. The restrictive ring may not be shrouded during such inspections.

bbbbbSubparagraph 7(e) states that, for purposes of measuring the depth of the concrete in the silo, measurements are to be taken from the level of the lower edge of the closed silo door to the base of the silo launcher, prior to the pouring of the concrete, and from the level of the lower edge of the closed silo door to the top of the concrete fill, after the concrete has hardened.

bbbbb Subparagraph 7(f) requires that the results of the measurements conducted to subparagraphs 7(c), 7(d), and 7(e) above be recorded in written, factual inspection reports and signed by the inspection team leader and a member of the in-country escort.

bbbbb Subparagraph 7(g) states that inspection teams are to consist of no more than ten inspectors, all of whom are to be drawn from the list of inspectors under the START Treaty.

bbbbbSubparagraph 7(h) states that such inspections shall not count against any inspection quotas established by the START Treaty.

bbbbb Paragraph 8 gives the Party converting a silo the right to carry out further conversion measures after the completion of the procedures specified in paragraph 6 or 7 of Section II or, if such procedures are not conducted, upon expiration of 30 days after notification of completion of the procedures specified in paragraph 4 of Section II.

bbbbbIn addition to the reentry vehicle inspections provided for in the START Treaty, paragraph 9 authorizes four additional reentry vehicle inspections each year of ICBMs deployed in silo launchers of ICBMs that have been converted pursuant to Section II. Procedures set forth in the Inspection Protocol to the START Treaty will be used during these inspections. In addition to confirming that the missile installed in the converted silo has only one reentry vehicle, these inspections permit the inspecting Party visually to confirm the continued presence of the restrictive ring and of the launch canister (and missile) that the inspected Party has placed in the silo. Towards this end, the inspectors have the right visually to confirm both the presence of the ring and that the observable portions of the launch canister of the deployed ICBM do not differ externally from that of the launch canister that was exhibited pursuant to paragraph 11 of Article XI of the START Treaty. While the sides agreed that launch- related equipment and instrumentation could be placed on the ring and could be shrouded, they further agreed that any shrouding of the upper portion of the silo launcher shall not obstruct observation of the upper portion of the launch canister and the restrictive ring. To further ensure that the necessary observations could be made, the Parties also agreed that, if requested by the inspecting Party, the inspected Party must partially remove any shrouding of the restrictive ring, except for shrouding of instruments installed thereon, to confirm its presence. In discussions of this provision, the Russian side assured the U.S. that there would be places on the ring where equipment or instruments would not be emplaced and inspectors could see the integrity of the ring and that the ring was permanently attached to the sides of the launcher. These additional rights apply only to the four extra inspections authorized by this paragraph and do not apply to reentry vehicle inspections which are conducted solely pursuant to the START Treaty.

bbbbb Paragraph 10 states that, upon completion of the procedures specified in paragraphs 6 or 7 of Section II (or, if such procedures are not conducted, upon expiration of 30 days after notification of completion of the procedures specified in paragraph 4 of Section II), the silo launcher of heavy ICBMs being converted shall, for purposes of this Treaty, be considered to contain a deployed ICBM to which one warhead is attributed. Without this provision, the silo would continue to be considered to contain a heavy ICBM until the installation of a new missile or a new training model of a missile (which will remain the case with respect to accountability under the START Treaty). This provision was included at the Russians request to avoid exceeding START II Treaty limits in the event of delay in the installation of the replacement single-warhead ICBM.

SECTION III
EQUIPMENT; COSTS

bbbbb Paragraph 1 provides the right to use agreed equipment to support the inspection activities of the Protocol and requires the Parties to agree in the Bilateral Implementation Commission on such equipment, including but not limited to equipment for the measurement of the concrete fill in silo launchers of heavy ICBMs.

bbbbbParagraph 2 addresses costs for inspections conducted pursuant to Section II of this Protocol. Such costs shall be handled in accordance with paragraph 19 of Section V of the Inspection Protocol to the START Treaty. For practical purposes, this means that the United States will bear almost all of the costs of inspections under this Protocol, since there are no U.S. heavy ICBMs to inspect. The United States accepted this provision because of the great importance we place on verification of heavy ICBM silo conversion.

bbbbb This Protocol concludes with a statement that it is an integral part of the Treaty, shall enter into force on the date of entry into force of the Treaty, and shall remain in force as long as the Treaty remains in force. The Parties agree that they may agree upon such additional measures as may be necessary to improve the viability and effectiveness of the Treaty. They agree that, if it becomes necessary to make changes in this Protocol that do not affect substantive rights or obligations under the Treaty, they shall use the Bilateral Implementation Commission to reach agreement on such changes, without resorting to the procedure for making amendments set forth in Article VIII of the Treaty.