RELATED AGREEMENTS

AGREEMENT BETWEEN THE GOVERNMENT OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA AND THE GOVERNMENT OF THE UNION OF SOVIET SOCIALIST REPUBLICS ON EARLY EXHIBITIONS OF STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE ARMS RELATING TO THE TREATY BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA AND THE UNION OF SOVIET SOCIALIST REPUBLICS ON THE REDUCTION AND LIMITATION OF STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE ARMS

The Government of the United States of America and the Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, hereinafter referred to as the Parties,

Desiring to facilitate the implementation of the Treaty Between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms, hereinafter referred to as the Treaty,

Recognizing the advantages of providing each Party the opportunity, prior to the commencement of baseline data inspections, to conduct exhibitions and inspections for the purposes provided for in paragraphs 11 and 12 of Article XI of the Treaty, in accordance with the procedures provided in the Protocol Regarding Inspections and Continuous Monitoring Activities Relating to the Treaty Between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms, hereinafter referred to as the Inspection Protocol,

Have agreed as follows:

Article I

Each Party shall conduct exhibitions, and shall have the right during such exhibitions by the other Party to conduct inspections, as provided for in paragraphs 11 and 12 of Article XI of the Treaty.

The exhibiting Party shall provide necessary assistance to the inspectors in the conduct of inspections during such exhibitions.

Article II

The exhibitions and inspections provided for in Article I of this Agreement shall be conducted at locations chosen by the exhibiting Party on dates agreed upon through diplomatic channels. These exhibitions and inspections shall be completed no later than 240 days after signature of the Treaty. Except as provided for in Articles III and IV of this Agreement, such exhibitions and inspections shall be carried out in accordance with the procedures provided for in the Inspection Protocol, including the provisions concerning inspection reports and non-disclosure of information obtained as a result of these exhibitions and inspections.

An inspection team conducting an inspection during exhibitions in accordance with this Agreement shall include no more than 15 inspectors.

Article III

  1. No less than 30 days prior to each exhibition, the inspecting Party shall provide to the exhibiting Party, for the purpose of such exhibition, a list of its proposed inspectors, which shall consist of no more than 25 individuals, and a list of its proposed aircrew members, which shall consist of no more than 25 individuals. The list of proposed inspectors and list of proposed aircrew members for each exhibition shall not be considered to be the lists provided in fulfillment of the obligations under the Agreement Between the Government of the United States of America and the Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the Early Exchange of Lists of Inspectors, Monitors, and Aircrew Members of July 31, 1991. However, if the exchange of lists of proposed inspectors and aircrew members takes place in accordance with the aforementioned Agreement prior to such exhibitions, inspectors and aircrew members may be chosen from these lists for the purposes of such exhibitions. The lists for each exhibition shall contain first name, patronymic or middle name, and last name; day, month, and year of birth; city, state or oblast, and country of birth; and passport number, if available, for each inspector and aircrew member proposed.
  2. For each exhibition, the exhibiting Party shall notify the inspecting Party, no less than 10 days prior to each exhibition, of its agreement with, or objection to, the designation of each inspector and aircrew member proposed in connection with the exhibition. The exhibiting Party may object to an individual on the list only in accordance with paragraph 6 of Section II of the Inspection Protocol. The exhibiting Party shall provide visas and, where necessary, such other documents to each individual to whom it has agreed as may be required to ensure that each such inspector or such aircrew member may enter and remain in its territory throughout the in-country period established for the exhibition.

Article IV

Arrangements for air transportation in connection with each exhibition shall be made in accordance with the provisions provided for in Section IV of the Inspection Protocol, except as provided for below:

(a) Diplomatic clearance numbers for airplanes transporting the inspectors, and airplane routings to and from the point of entry, shall be provided by the exhibiting Party no less than 30 days prior to each exhibition.

(b) Points of entry under this Agreement shall be: for the United States of America, Washington, D.C., and for the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, Moscow.

Article V

The exhibiting Party shall treat with due respect the inspectors and aircrew members of the inspecting Party in its territory in connection with the conduct of these exhibitions and inspections, and shall take all appropriate steps to prevent any attack on the person, freedom, and dignity of such persons.

Article VI

This Agreement shall not be construed to prejudice the rights of the Parties in any way or to impose additional obligations on the Parties under the Treaty.

Article VII

This Agreement shall enter into force on the date of its signature, and shall terminate upon completion of the exhibitions and inspections provided for herein. The termination of this Agreement shall not prejudice the validity of the information obtained as a result of such exhibitions and inspections, and contained in the inspection reports, for the exercise of the rights of the Parties and the fulfillment of the obligations of the Parties under the Treaty after its entry into force.

IN WITNESS WHEREOF the undersigned, being duly authorized by their respective Governments, have signed this Agreement.

DONE at Moscow, on July 31, 1991, in duplicate, each in the English and Russian languages, both texts being equally authentic.

For the Government of the United States of America:

James A. Baker, III

For the Government of the Union of the Soviet Socialist Republics:

A. A. Bessmertnykh

AGREEMENT BETWEEN THE GOVERNMENT OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA AND THE GOVERNMENT OF THE UNION OF SOVIET SOCIALIST REPUBLICS ON THE EARLY EXCHANGE OF LISTS OF INSPECTORS, MONITORS, AND AIRCREW MEMBERS PROPOSED FOR INSPECTIONS AND CONTINUOUS MONITORING ACTIVITIES CONDUCTED PURSUANT TO THE TREATY BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA AND THE UNION OF SOVIET SOCIALIST REPUBLICS ON THE REDUCTION AND LIMITATION OF STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE ARMS

The Government of the United States of America and the Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, hereinafter referred to as the Parties,

Desiring to facilitate the implementation of the Treaty Between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms, hereinafter referred to as the Treaty, including the Protocol Regarding Inspections and Continuous Monitoring Activities, hereinafter referred to as the Protocol,

Recognizing the advantages of providing both Parties ample time to review the lists of proposed inspectors, monitors, and aircrew members in order to inform the other Party of agreement with, or objection to, the names on such lists within the time period provided for in the Treaty,

Considering their common interest in providing a mechanism for an exchange of such lists prior to entry into force of the Treaty,

Have agreed as follows:

Article I

On a date agreed upon by the Parties, which shall be no later than 30 days before entry into force of the Treaty, each Party shall provide to the other Party the lists of its proposed inspectors, monitors, and aircrew members as provided for in Section II of the Protocol. The date of exchange of such lists shall be agreed upon by the Parties through diplomatic channels.

Article II

Each Party shall have the right to amend the lists of its proposed inspectors, monitors, and aircrew members, provided that each Party may make a change to these lists no more than one time within any 21-day period commencing from the date of exchange of such lists. With each change, the number of inspectors whose names are entered in the list of inspectors shall not exceed 30, the number of monitors whose names are entered in the list of monitors shall not exceed 25, and the number of aircrew members whose names are entered in the list of aircrew members shall not exceed 25. The lists of proposed inspectors, monitors, and aircrew members shall constitute the initial lists provided for in paragraph 2 of Section II of the Protocol, upon entry into force of the Treaty.

Article III

Each Party shall provide to the other Party the lists required by Article I of this Agreement, and amendments to such lists, through the Nuclear Risk Reduction Centers established by the Agreement Between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the Establishment of Nuclear Risk Reduction Centers of September 15, 1987.

Article IV

This Agreement shall not be construed to prejudice the rights of the Parties in any way or to impose additional obligations on the Parties under the Treaty except as stated in Articles I and II of this Agreement.

Article V

This Agreement shall enter into force upon signature, and shall terminate upon entry into force of the Treaty.

IN WITNESS WHEREOF the undersigned, being duly authorized by their respective Governments, have signed this Agreement.

DONE at Moscow, in two copies, on July 31, 1991, in the English and Russian languages, both texts being equally authentic.

For the Government of the United States of America:

James A. Baker, III

For the Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics:

A.A. Bessmertnykh

AGREEMENT BETWEEN THE GOVERNMENT OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA AND THE GOVERNMENT OF THE UNION OF SOVIET SOCIALIST REPUBLICS ON RECIPROCAL ADVANCE NOTIFICATION OF MAJOR STRATEGIC EXERCISES

bbbbbThe Government of the United States of America and the Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, hereinafter referred to as the Parties,

Affirming their desire to reduce and ultimately eliminate the risk of outbreak of nuclear war, in particular as a result of misinterpretation, miscalculation, or accident,

Believing that a nuclear war cannot be won and must never be fought,

Recognizing the necessity to promote the increase of mutual trust and the strengthening of strategic stability,

Acknowledging the importance of exchanging advance notification of major strategic exercises on the basis of reciprocity,

Reaffirming their obligations under the Agreement between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the Establishment of Nuclear Risk Reduction Centers of September 15, 1987,

Have agreed as follows:

Article I

On the basis of reciprocity, each Party shall notify the other Party no less than 14 days in advance about the beginning of one major strategic forces exercise which includes the participation of heavy bomber aircraft to be held during each calendar year.

Article II

  1. Each Party shall provide to the other Party the notifications required by Article I through the Nuclear Risk Reduction Centers established by the Agreement between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the Establishment of Nuclear Risk Reduction Centers of September 15, 1987.
  2. The notifications required by Article I shall be provided no less than 14 days prior to the date in Coordinated Universal Time (UTC) during which the relevant exercise will commence.

Article III

The Parties shall undertake to hold consultations, as mutually agreed, to consider questions relating to implementation of the provisions of this Agreement, as well as to discuss possible amendments thereto aimed at furthering the implementation of the objectives of this Agreement. Amendments shall enter into force in accordance with procedures to be agreed upon.

Article IV

This Agreement shall not affect the obligations of either Party under other agreements.

Article V

  1. This Agreement shall be of unlimited duration.
  2. This Agreement may be terminated by either Party upon 12 months written notice to the other Party.

Article VI

This Agreement shall enter into force on January 1, 1990, and notifications pursuant to this Agreement shall commence with the calendar year 1990.

IN WITNESS WHEREOF the undersigned, being duly authorized by their respective Governments, have signed this Agreement.

DONE at Jackson Hole, Wyoming, in duplicate, this 23rd day of September, 1989, in the English and Russian languages, each text being equally authentic.

For the Government of the United States of America:

James A. Baker, III

For the Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics:

E. A. Shevardnadze

AGREEMENT BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA AND THE UNION OF SOVIET SOCIALIST REPUBLICS ON NOTIFICATIONS OF LAUNCHES OF INTERCONTINENTAL BALLISTIC MISSILES AND SUBMARINE-LAUNCHED BALLISTIC MISSILES

Signed at Moscow May 31, 1988
Entered into Force May 31, 1988

The United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, hereinafter referred to as the Parties,

Affirming their desire to reduce and ultimately eliminate the risk of outbreak of nuclear war, in particular, as a result of misinterpretation, miscalculation, or accident,

Believing that a nuclear war cannot be won and must never be fought,

Believing that agreement on measures for reducing the risk of outbreak of nuclear war serves the interests of strengthening international peace and security,

Reaffirming their obligations under the Agreement on Measures to Reduce the Risk of Outbreak of Nuclear War between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics of September 30, 1971, the Agreement between the Government of the United States of America and the Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the Prevention of Incidents on and over the High Seas of May 25, 1972, and the Agreement between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the Establishment of Nuclear Risk Reduction Centers of September 15, 1987,

Have agreed as follows:

Article I

Each Party shall provide the other Party notification, through the Nuclear Risk Reduction Centers of the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, no less than twenty-four hours in advance, of the planned date, launch area, and area of impact for any launch of a strategic ballistic missile: an intercontinental ballistic missile (hereinafter "ICBM") or a submarine-launched ballistic missile (hereinafter "SLBM").

Article II

A notification of a planned launch of an ICBM or an SLBM shall be valid for four days counting from the launch date indicated in such a notification. In case of postponement of the launch date within the indicated four days, or cancellation of the launch, no notification thereof shall be required.

Article III

BBBBB 1. For launches of ICBMs or SLBMs from land, the notification shall indicate the area from which the launch is planned to take place.

BBBBB2. For launches of SLBMs from submarines, the notification shall indicate the general area from which the missile will be launched. Such notification shall indicate either the quadrant within the ocean (that is, the ninety-degree sector encompassing approximately one-fourth of the area of the ocean) or the body of water (for example, sea or bay) from which the launch is planned to take place.

BBBBB3. For all launches of ICBMs or SLBMs, the notification shall indicate the geographic coordinates of the planned impact area or areas of the reentry vehicles. Such an area shall be specified either by indicating the geographic coordinates of the boundary points of the area, or by indicating the geographic coordinates of the center of a circle with a radius specified in kilometers or nautical miles. The size of the impact area shall be determined by the notifying Party at its discretion.

Article IV

The Parties undertake to hold consultations, as mutually agreed, to consider questions relating to implementation of the provisions of this Agreement, as well as to discuss possible amendments thereto aimed at furthering the implementation of the objectives of this Agreement. Amendments shall enter into force in accordance with procedures to be agreed upon.

Article V

This Agreement shall not affect the obligations of either Party under other agreements.

Article VI

This Agreement shall enter into force on the date of its signature.

The duration of this Agreement shall not be limited.

This Agreement may be terminated by either Party upon 12 months written notice to the other Party.

DONE at Moscow on May 31, 1988, in two copies, each in the English and Russian languages, both texts being equally authentic.

FOR THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA:

George P. Shultz

FOR THE UNION OF SOVIET SOCIALIST REPUBLICS:

Eduard A. Shevardnadze

LETTERS SIGNED BY U.S. AND SOVIET REPRESENTATIVES

PHASED REDUCTIONS OF HEAVY ICBMS

July 30, 1991

Ambassador Linton F. Brooks
Head of Delegation of the
United States of America to the
Negotiations on Nuclear and Space Arms

Dear Mr. Ambassador:

On behalf of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, I am instructed to state the following:

In connection with the agreement on the phasing of the reductions of strategic offensive arms reached within the framework of the Treaty Between the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the United States of America on the Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms, the Soviet Union provides formal assurances to the effect that, in the course of implementing the reductions in accordance with paragraph 2 of Article II of the Treaty, the number of deployed heavy ICBMs and their associated launchers of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics shall be reduced evenly during all phases. In order to implement this assurance in the most effective manner, it is agreed that deployed heavy ICBMs and their associated launchers shall be reduced by no less than 22 each year until the limits on the aggregate numbers for deployed heavy ICBMs and their associated launchers and for warheads attributed to deployed heavy ICBMs, as provided for in paragraph 1 of Article II of the Treaty, are reached.

Reductions of launchers of heavy ICBMs shall be implemented by means of elimination in accordance with the procedures specified in Section II of the Protocol on Procedures Governing the Conversion or Elimination of the Systems Subject to the Treaty.

If this statement is acceptable, I propose that this letter, together with your response, be included in the official records of the negotiations in the form of statements reflecting the official positions of the Soviet Union and United States.

Mr. Ambassador, please accept the renewed assurances of my highest consideration.

[s]

Ambassador Youri K. Nazarkin

Head of Delegation of the
Union of Soviet Socialist Republics
to the Negotiationson Nuclear and Space Arms




UNITED STATES DELEGATION TO THE NEGOTIATIONS
ON NUCLEAR AND SPACE ARMS

July 30, 1991

Ambassador Youri K. Nazarkin

Head of Delegation of the
Union of Soviet Socialist Republics
to the Negotiationson Nuclear and Space Arms

Dear Mr. Ambassador:

BBBBBOn behalf of the United States of America, I am authorized to state that the United States accepts the formal assurances set forth in your letter of this date, the substantive portion of which reads as follows:

In connection with the agreement on the phasing of the reductions of strategic offensive arms reached within the framework of the Treaty Between the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the United States of America on the Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms, the Soviet Union provides formal assurances to the effect that, in the course of implementing the reductions in accordance with paragraph 2 of Article II of the Treaty, the number of deployed heavy ICBMs and their associated launchers of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics shall be reduced evenly during all phases. In order to implement this assurance in the most effective manner, it is agreed that deployed heavy ICBMs and their associated launchers shall be reduced by no less than 22 each year until the limits on the aggregate numbers for deployed heavy ICBMs and their associated launchers and for warheads attributed to deployed heavy ICBMs, as provided for in paragraph 1 of Article II of the Treaty, are reached.

Reductions of launchers of heavy ICBMs shall be implemented by means of elimination in accordance with the procedures specified in Section II of the Protocol on Procedures Governing the Conversion or Elimination of the Systems Subject to the Treaty.

BBBBBThe United States agrees that this response, together with your letter, shall be included in the official records of the negotiations in the form of statements reflecting the official positions of the United States and Soviet Union.

BBBBBThis reply, together with your letter, shall constitute an agreement between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, which shall enter into force on the date of entry into force of the Treaty and shall remain in force as long as the Treaty remains in force.

BBBBBMr. Ambassador, please accept the renewed assurances of my highest consideration.

Sincerely,

[s]

Ambassador Linton F. Brooks

Head of Delegation of the
United States of America
to the Negotiations on
Nuclear and Space Arms

Moscow, July 1991

His Excellency
James A. Baker III
Secretary of State of the United States

Dear Mr. Secretary,

On behalf of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, I should like to confirm that the provisions set forth in the letter signed on July 30, 1991 by our ambassador concerning the stage-by-stage reduction of deployed heavy ICBMs in connection with the Treaty Between the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the United States of America on the Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms are legally binding.

Respectfully,

[s]Bessmertnykh

His Excellency

BEAR D

July 31, 1991

Ambassador Linton F. Brooks

Head of Delegation of the

United States of America to the

Negotiations on Nuclear and Space Arms

Dear Mr. Ambassador:

On behalf of the Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, in connection with the Treaty Between the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the United States of America on the Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms, hereinafter referred to as the Treaty, I have the honor to propose an agreement between our Governments on airplanes designated by the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics as Tu-95RTs, which are known to the United States of America as Bear D.

I have the honor to inform you of the following. From the outset, Tu-95RTs airplanes were tested, equipped, and configured exclusively for maritime operations.

These airplanes have not been and are not heavy bombers, nor have they been equipped with air-to-surface weapons or undergone conversion. Tu-95RTs airplanes have external features distinguishing them from heavy bombers of the Tu-95 type: they have no bomb bays, no external carrier beams to suspend or carry aerial bombs or missiles, and no equipment necessary for control of such weapons. Other differences characteristic of these airplanes are the additional three-dimensional radomes of the surface situation surveillance equipment under the fuselage and on the sides of the airplane. The Union of Soviet Socialist Republics currently has 37 Tu-95RTs airplanes, which are based only at naval air bases.

Under the proposed agreement, our Governments would agree as follows:

(a) No later than 240 days after signature of the Treaty, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics shall provide photographs for the purpose of aiding in the identification of Tu-95RTs airplanes, and shall conduct, concurrently with a distinguishability exhibition of heavy bombers and long-range nuclear ALCMs, an exhibition of one Tu-95RTs airplane, displaying its distinguishing features. The Union of Soviet Socialist Republics shall bear all costs for the stay of the group of visitors.

(b) The United States of America shall have the right to request the exhibition of all the other 36 Tu-95RTs airplanes. Such exhibition shall be conducted by the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics at two airfields (in the European and Asian parts of the country) no later than 240 days after signature of the Treaty and no later than 60 days after the request. The United States of America shall bear all costs for the transportation and stay of the group of visitors, which shall include no more than 10 persons. The currency of payment shall be agreed between the sides before the visit.

(c) The 37 Tu-95RTs airplanes shall not be based at facilities where heavy bombers or former heavy bombers are based, that is, at air bases for heavy bombers, air bases for former heavy bombers, heavy bomber flight test centers, or training facilities for heavy bombers.

(d) The 37 Tu-95RTs airplanes shall not be considered to be former heavy bombers, and shall not be accountable under the 75 aggregate limit on heavy bombers equipped for non-nuclear armaments, training heavy bombers, and former heavy bombers pursuant to the provisions of paragraph 3(a) of Article IV of the Treaty.

(e) The Union of Soviet Socialist Republics has no plans to continue production of Tu-95RTs airplanes. In case of the production of such airplanes, they would be treated as former heavy bombers under the Treaty. As such, each new airplane would be subject to inspection to confirm that it is not equipped for air-to-surface weapons.

If the foregoing is acceptable, this letter together with your reply shall constitute an agreement between the Governments of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the United States of America. This agreement shall enter into force on the date of entry into force of the Treaty, except for subparagraphs (a) and (b) which shall enter into force on the date of signature of the Treaty and shall remain in force for 240 days. Upon entry into force of the Treaty, the other subparagraphs of this agreement shall remain in force as long as the Treaty remains in force.

Mr. Ambassador, please accept the renewed assurances of my highest consideration.

[s]

Ambassador Youri K. Nazarkin Head of Delegation of the

Union of Soviet Socialist

Republics to the Negotiations

on Nuclear and Space Arms

July 31, 1991

Dear Mr. Ambassador:

On behalf of the Government of the United States of America, in connection with the Treaty Between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms, hereinafter referred to as the Treaty, I have the honor to accept your proposal that an agreement be concluded between our Governments on airplanes designated by the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics as Tu-95RTs, which are known to the United States of America as Bear D.

I have the honor to acknowledge the information set forth in your letter of this date, the substantive portion of which reads:

From the outset, Tu-95RTs airplanes were tested, equipped, and configured exclusively for maritime operations.

These airplanes have not been and are not heavy bombers, nor have they been equipped with air-to-surface weapons or undergone conversion. Tu-95RTs airplanes have external features distinguishing them from heavy bombers of the TU-95 type: they have no bomb bays, no external carrier beams to suspend or carry aerial bombs or missiles, and no equipment necessary for control of such weapons. Other differences characteristic of these airplanes are the additional three-dimensional radomes of the surface situation surveillance equipment under the fuselage and on the sides of the airplane. The Union of Soviet Socialist Republics currently has 37 Tu-95RTs airplanes, which are based only at naval air bases.

Under this Agreement, our Governments shall agree as follows:

(a) No later than 240 days after signature of the Treaty, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics shall provide photographs for the purpose of aiding in the identification of Tu-95RTs airplanes, and shall conduct, concurrently with a distinguishability exhibition of heavy bombers and long-range nuclear ALCMs, an exhibition of one Tu-95RTs airplane, displaying its distinguishing features. The Union of Soviet Socialist Republics shall bear all costs for the stay of the group of visitors.

(b) The United States of America shall have the right to request the exhibition of all the other 36 Tu-95RTs airplanes. Such exhibition shall be conducted by the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics at two airfields (in the European and Asian parts of the country) no later than 240 days after signature of the Treaty and no later than 60 days after the request. The United States of America shall bear all costs for the transportation and stay of the group of visitors, which shall include no more than 10 persons. The currency of payment shall be agreed between the sides before the visit.

(c) The 37 Tu-95RTs airplanes shall not be based at facilities where heavy bombers or former heavy bombers are based, that is, at air bases for heavy bombers, air bases for former heavy bombers, heavy bomber flight test centers, or training facilities for heavy bombers.

(d) The 37 Tu-95RTs airplanes shall not be considered to be former heavy bombers, and shall not be accountable under the 75 aggregate limit on heavy bombers equipped for non-nuclear armaments, training heavy bombers, and former heavy bombers pursuant to the provisions of paragraph 3(a) of Article IV of the Treaty.

(e) The Union of Soviet Socialist Republics has no plans to continue production of Tu-95RTs airplanes. In case of the production of such airplanes, they would be treated as former heavy bombers under the Treaty. As such, each new airplane would be subject to inspection to confirm that it is not equipped for air-to-surface weapons.

This reply together with your letter shall constitute an agreement between the Governments of the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics to the terms set forth above. This agreement shall enter into force on the date of entry into force of the Treaty, except for subparagraphs (a) and (b) which shall enter into force on the date of signature of the Treaty and shall remain in force for 240 days. Upon entry into force of the Treaty, the other subparagraphs of this agreement shall remain in force as long as the Treaty remains in force.

Mr. Ambassador, please accept the renewed assurances of my highest consideration.

Sincerely,

[s]

Ambassador Linton F. Brooks

Head of Delegation of the

States of America

to the Negotiations on

Nuclear and Space Arms

Ambassador Youri K. Nazarkin

Head of Delegation of the

Union of Soviet Socialist

Republics to the Negotiations

on Nuclear and Space Arms

B-1

July 31, 1991

Dear Mr. Ambassador:

On behalf of the Government of the United States of America, I have the honor to propose an agreement between our Governments on the distinguishability of heavy bombers of the type designated by the United States of America as, and known to the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics as, B-1, pursuant to the Treaty Between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms, hereinafter referred to as the Treaty.

Under this agreement, our Governments would agree that upon entry into force of the Treaty:

(a) B-1 heavy bombers equipped for nuclear armaments other than long-range nuclear ALCMs are distinguishable from B-1 heavy bombers equipped for long-range nuclear ALCMs by a bomb bay configuration involving a bulkhead that, without change, does not permit a long-range nuclear ALCM to be loaded internally.

(b) B-1 heavy bombers equipped for nuclear armaments other than long-range nuclear ALCMs shall be made distinguishable from B-1 heavy bombers equipped for long-range nuclear ALCMs by the covering, using a process equivalent to welding, of all but the two pylon attachment joints that serve as jacking points for the airplane.

(c) The two extra sets of B-1 heavy bomber attachment joints, for which no unique pylons exist, shall not be considered in determining the number of long-range nuclear ALCMs for which a B-1 heavy bomber is actually equipped. These attachment joints have not been used to mount armaments, and the United States of America has no plans for them to be used to mount armaments. These attachment joints shall be covered by a process equivalent to welding, and shall remain covered in the event that a B-1 heavy bomber is later converted into a heavy bomber equipped for long-range nuclear ALCMs.

(d) The unique equipment required to move the weapons bay bulkhead in B-1 heavy bombers and the equipment required to load B-1 pylons for long-range nuclear ALCMs onto such heavy bombers shall not be located at air bases for B-1 heavy bombers equipped for nuclear armaments other than long-range nuclear ALCMs.

(e) All B-1 heavy bombers equipped for nuclear armaments other than long-range nuclear ALCMs shall be subject to inspection during the period provided for baseline data inspections.

(f) B-1 pylons for long-range nuclear ALCMs and B-1 rotary launchers that carry long-range nuclear ALCMs shall not be located at air bases for B-1 heavy bombers equipped for nuclear armaments other than long-range nuclear ALCMs or air bases for B-1 heavy bombers equipped for non-nuclear armaments, except for such items on visiting heavy bombers for which notification is provided in accordance with paragraph 2 of Section II of the Protocol on Notifications Relating to the Treaty.

(g) Provided that no deployed B-1 heavy bombers are equipped for long-range nuclear ALCMs, there shall be no requirement for the United States of America to provide technical characteristics for such heavy bombers in the Memorandum of Understanding on the Establishment of the Data Base Relating to the Treaty. The United States of America shall, however, provide distinguishing features for B-1 heavy bombers equipped for nuclear armaments other than long-range nuclear ALCMs. In the event that the United States of America converts B-1 heavy bombers into heavy bombers equipped for long-range nuclear ALCMs, then technical characteristics for such heavy bombers would be provided. Although the United States of America has no B-1 heavy bombers equipped for long-range nuclear ALCMs, the United States of America shall exhibit a B-1 test heavy bomber that is equipped with long-range nuclear ALCMs during appropriate distinguishability exhibitions pursuant to paragraph 12 of Article XI of the Treaty.

(h) Similar provisions shall apply, as appropriate, to the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics for heavy bombers of a type from any of which a long-range nuclear ALCM has been flight-tested, but some of which are not equipped for long-range nuclear ALCMs.

If the foregoing is acceptable, this letter together with your reply shall constitute an agreement between the Governments of the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, which shall enter into force on the date of entry into force of the Treaty and shall remain in force as long as the Treaty remains in force.

Mr. Ambassador, please accept the renewed assurances of my highest consideration.

Sincerely,

[s]

Ambassador Linton F. Brooks

Head of Delegation of the

United States of America

to the Negotiations on

Nuclear and Space Arms

Ambassador Youri K. Nazarkin

Head of Delegation of the

Union of Soviet Socialist

Republics to the Negotiations

on Nuclear and Space Arms

July 31, 1991

Ambassador Linton F. Brooks

Head of Delegation of the

United States of America to the

Negotiations on Nuclear and Space Arms

Dear Mr. Ambassador:

On behalf of the Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, I have the honor to accept your proposal, set forth in your letter of this date, that an agreement be concluded between our Governments on the distinguishability of heavy bombers of the type designated by the United States of America as, and known to the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics as, B-1, pursuant to the Treaty Between the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the United States of America on the Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms, hereinafter referred to as the Treaty.

Under this agreement, our Governments shall agree that upon entry into force of the Treaty:

(a) B-1 heavy bombers equipped for nuclear armaments other than long-range nuclear ALCMs are distinguishable from B-1 heavy bombers equipped for long-range nuclear ALCMs by a bomb bay configuration involving a bulkhead that, without change, does not permit a long-range nuclear ALCM to be loaded internally.

(b) B-1 heavy bombers equipped for nuclear armaments other than long-range nuclear ALCMs shall be made distinguishable from B-1 heavy bombers equipped for long-range nuclear ALCMs by the covering, using a process equivalent to welding, of all but the two pylon attachment joints that serve as jacking points for the airplane.

(c) The two extra sets of B-1 heavy bomber attachment joints, for which no unique pylons exist, shall not be considered in determining the number of long-range nuclear ALCMs for which a B-1 heavy bomber is actually equipped. These attachment joints have not been used to mount armaments, and the United States of America has no plans for them to be used to mount armaments. These attachment joints shall be covered by a process equivalent to welding, and shall remain covered in the event that a B-1 heavy bomber is later converted into a heavy bomber equipped for long-range nuclear ALCMs.

(d) The unique equipment required to move the weapons bay bulkhead in B-1 heavy bombers and the equipment required to load B-1 pylons for long-range nuclear ALCMs onto such heavy bombers shall not be located at air bases for B-1 heavy bombers equipped for nuclear armaments other than long-range nuclear ALCMs.

(e) All B-1 heavy bombers equipped for nuclear armaments other than long-range nuclear ALCMs shall be subject to inspection during the period provided for baseline data inspections.

(f) B-1 pylons for long-range nuclear ALCMs and B-1 rotary launchers that carry long-range nuclear ALCMs shall not be located at air bases for B-1 heavy bombers equipped for nuclear armaments other than long-range nuclear ALCMs or air bases for B-1 heavy bombers equipped for non-nuclear armaments, except for such items on visiting heavy bombers for which notification is provided in accordance with paragraph 2 of Section II of the Protocol on Notifications Relating to the Treaty.

(g) Provided that no deployed B-1 heavy bombers are equipped for long-range nuclear ALCMs, there shall be no requirement for the United States of America to provide technical characteristics for such heavy bombers in the Memorandum of Understanding on the Establishment of the Data Base Relating to the Treaty. The United States of America shall, however, provide distinguishing features for B-1 heavy bombers equipped for nuclear armaments other than long-range nuclear ALCMs. In the event that the United States of America converts B-1 heavy bombers into heavy bombers equipped for long-range nuclear ALCMs, then technical characteristics for such heavy bombers would be provided. Although the United States of America has no B-1 heavy bombers equipped for long-range nuclear ALCMs, the United States of America shall exhibit a B-1 test heavy bomber that is equipped with long-range nuclear ALCMs during appropriate distinguishability exhibitions pursuant to paragraph 12 of Article XI of the Treaty.

(h) Similar provisions shall apply, as appropriate, to the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics for heavy bombers of a type from any of which a long-range nuclear ALCM has been flight-tested, but some of which are not equipped for long-range nuclear ALCMs.

This reply together with your letter shall constitute an agreement between the Governments of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the United States of America, which shall enter into force on the date of entry into force of the Treaty and shall remain in force as long as the Treaty remains in force.

Mr. Ambassador, please accept the renewed assurances of my highest consideration.

[s]

Ambassador Youri K. Nazarkin

Head of Delegation of the

Union of Soviet Socialist

Republics to the Negotiations

on Nuclear and Space Arms

SILO LAUNCH CONTROL CENTERS

July 31, 1991

Ambassador Linton F. Brooks

Head of Delegation of the

United States of America to the

Negotiations on Nuclear and Space Arms

Dear Mr. Ambassador:

On behalf of the Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, I have the honor to propose an agreement between our Governments on conversion and elimination of launch control centers in connection with the obligation of the Parties, pursuant to paragraph 11 of Article V of the Treaty Between the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the United States of America on the Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms, hereinafter referred to as the Treaty, not to convert silos used as launch control centers into silo launchers of ICBMs.

Under this agreement, our Governments would agree that upon entry into force of the Treaty:

In cases of elimination of a group or groups of silo launchers of ICBMs, each Party shall:

(a) eliminate the launch control centers that are associated with the eliminated silo launchers, including silos used as launch control centers, by any method of its choice;

(b) convert those launch control centers by any method of its choice, for other purposes not inconsistent with the Treaty; or

(c) retain such launch control centers for their original purposes.

If a Party that possesses a silo used as a launch control center decides to convert it for other purposes not inconsistent with the Treaty by a method that involves opening the silo, that Party shall provide a notification to the other Party no less than 30 days in advance of initiation of such conversion through the Nuclear Risk Reduction Centers or through diplomatic channels.

The Party that receives such a notification shall have the right to conduct a visit to the silo being converted in order to confirm that it is not being converted into a silo launcher of ICBMs pursuant to paragraph 11 of Article V of the Treaty. The Parties shall agree within the framework of the Joint Compliance and Inspection Commission, established pursuant to Article XV of the Treaty, on the timing and procedures for conducting such a visit.

If the foregoing is acceptable, this letter together with your reply shall constitute an agreement between the Governments of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the United States of America, which shall enter into force on the date of entry into force of the Treaty, and shall remain in force as long as the Treaty remains in force.

Mr. Ambassador, please accept the renewed assurances of my highest consideration.

[s]

Ambassador Youri K. Nazarkin Head of Delegation of the

Union of Soviet Socialist

Republics to the Negotiations

on Nuclear and Space Arms

July 31, 1991

Dear Mr. Ambassador:

On behalf of the Government of the United States of America, I have the honor to accept the proposal, set forth in your letter of this date, that an agreement be concluded between our Governments on conversion and elimination of launch control centers in connection with the obligation of the Parties, pursuant to paragraph 11 of Article V of the Treaty Between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms, hereinafter referred to as the Treaty, not to convert silos used as launch control centers into silo launchers of ICBMs.

Under this agreement, our Governments shall agree that upon entry into force of the Treaty:

In cases of elimination of a group or groups of silo launchers of ICBMs, each Party shall:

(a) eliminate the launch control centers that are associated with the eliminated silo launchers, including silos used as launch control centers, by any method of its choice;

(b) convert those launch control centers by any method of its choice, for other purposes not inconsistent with the Treaty; or

(c) retain such launch control centers for their original purposes.

If a Party that possesses a silo used as a launch control center decides to convert it for other purposes not inconsistent with the Treaty by a method that involves opening the silo, that Party shall provide a notification to the other Party no less than 30 days in advance of initiation of such conversion through the Nuclear Risk Reduction Centers or through diplomatic channels.

The Party that receives such a notification shall have the right to conduct a visit to the silo being converted in order to confirm that it is not being converted into a silo launcher of ICBMs pursuant to paragraph 11 of Article V of the Treaty. The Parties shall agree within the framework of the Joint Compliance and Inspection Commission, established pursuant to Article XV of the Treaty, on the timing and procedures for conducting such a visit.

This reply together with your letter shall constitute an agreement between the Governments of the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics which shall enter into force on the date of entry into force of the Treaty and shall remain in force as long as the Treaty remains in force.

Mr. Ambassador, please accept the renewed assurances of my highest consideration.

Sincerely,

[s]

Ambassador Linton F. Brooks

Head of Delegation of the

United States of America to the Negotiations on

Nuclear and Space Arms

Ambassador Youri K. Nazarkin

Head of Delegation of the

Union of Soviet Socialist Republics to the

Negotiations on Nuclear and Space Arms

LAUNCH CANISTERS

July 31, 1991

Ambassador Linton F. Brooks

Head of Delegation of the

United States of America to the

Negotiations on Nuclear and Space Arms

Dear Mr. Ambassador:

On behalf of the Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, in connection with the Treaty Between the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the United States of America on the Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms, hereinafter referred to as the Treaty, I have the honor to propose an agreement between our Governments on launch canisters for ICBMs for mobile launchers of ICBMs.

Under this agreement, our Governments would agree that upon entry into force of the Treaty:

(a) In accordance with the existing practice in the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, unfinished launch canisters for ICBMs for mobile launchers of ICBMs, which are empty tubes, shall be transported from locations where they are manufactured only to final assembly facilities for such ICBMs. Launch canisters for ICBMs for mobile launchers of ICBMs assembled as a unit with a missile without a front section shall have external differences from such unfinished launch canisters.

(b) With respect to launch canisters for ICBMs for mobile launchers of ICBMs remaining after launches, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics shall proceed as follows. A launch canister remaining after the launch of an ICBM for mobile launchers of ICBMs shall either remain for an indefinite period of time in the open at the launch site, that is, at a test range or an ICBM base, with the front end open, or shall be eliminated. Elimination of such a launch canister shall be carried out in the open either in situ or at a conversion or elimination facility in accordance with the procedures provided for in paragraph 5 of Section I of the Protocol on Procedures Governing the Conversion or Elimination of the Systems Subject to the Treaty. Elimination of each such launch canister shall be subject to verification by national technical means of verification. If the elimination is to be carried out at a conversion or elimination facility, then such a launch canister shall be transported to such a facility directly from the relevant test range or ICBM base, and a notification of the movement of the launch canister for ICBMs for mobile launchers of ICBMs shall be provided in accordance with paragraph 1 of Section II of the Protocol on Notifications Relating to the Treaty. After the elimination of such a launch canister has been completed, the remains of such a launch canister shall remain in the open for no less than 45 days and afterwards may be removed and used for any purpose.

(c) Notifications shall not be provided in connection with the above-mentioned operations involving launch canisters, except for notifications of their movement to conversion or elimination facilities. Data on the number of empty launch canisters shall not be specified in the Memorandum of Understanding on the Establishment of the Data Base Relating to the Treaty.

If the foregoing is acceptable, this letter together with your reply shall constitute an agreement between the Governments of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the United States of America, which shall enter into force on the date of entry into force of the Treaty and shall remain in force as long as the Treaty remains in force.

Mr. Ambassador, please accept the renewed assurances of my highest consideration.

[s]

Ambassador Youri K. Nazarkin Head of Delegation of the

Union of Soviet Socialist

Republics to the Negotiations

on Nuclear and Space Arms

July 31, 1991

Dear Mr. Ambassador:

On behalf of the Government of the United States of America, in connection with the Treaty Between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms, hereinafter referred to as the Treaty, I have the honor to accept the proposal, set forth in your letter of this date, that an agreement be concluded between our Governments on launch canisters for ICBMs for mobile launchers of ICBMs.

Under this agreement, our Governments shall agree that upon entry into force of the Treaty:

(a) In accordance with the existing practice in the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, unfinished launch canisters for ICBMs for mobile launchers of ICBMs, which are empty tubes, shall be transported from locations where they are manufactured only to final assembly facilities for such ICBMs. Launch canisters for ICBMs for mobile launchers of ICBMs assembled as a unit with a missile without a front section shall have external differences from such unfinished launch canisters.

(b) With respect to launch canisters for ICBMs for mobile launchers of ICBMs remaining after launches, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics shall proceed as follows. A launch canister remaining after the launch of an ICBM for mobile launchers of ICBMs shall either remain for an indefinite period of time in the open at the launch site, that is, at a test range or an ICBM base, with the front end open, or shall be eliminated. Elimination of such a launch canister shall be carried out in the open either in situ or at a conversion or elimination facility in accordance with the procedures provided for in paragraph 5 of Section I of the Protocol on Procedures Governing the Conversion or Elimination of the Systems Subject to the Treaty. Elimination of each such launch canister shall be subject to verification by national technical means of verification. If the elimination is to be carried out at a conversion or elimination facility, then such a launch canister shall be transported to such a facility directly from the relevant test range or ICBM base, and a notification of the movement of the launch canister for ICBMs for mobile launchers of ICBMs shall be provided in accordance with paragraph 1 of Section II of the Protocol on Notifications Relating to the Treaty. After the elimination of a launch canister has been completed, the remains of such a launch canister shall remain in the open for no less than 45 days and afterwards may be removed and used for any purpose.

(c) Notifications shall not be provided in connection with the above-mentioned operations involving launch canisters, except for notifications of their movement to conversion or elimination facilities. Data on the number of empty launch canisters shall not be specified in the Memorandum of Understanding on the Establishment of the Data Base Relating to the Treaty.

This reply together with your letter shall constitute an agreement between the Governments of the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, which shall enter into force on the date of entry into force of the Treaty and shall remain in force as long as the Treaty remains in force.

Mr. Ambassador, please accept the renewed assurances of my highest consideration.

Sincerely,

[s]

Ambassador Linton F. Brooks

Head of Delegation of the

United States of America

to the Negotiations on

Nuclear and Space Arms

Ambassador Youri K. Nazarkin

Head of Delegation of the

Union of Soviet Socialist

Republics to the Negotiations

on Nuclear and Space Arms

ENGINEERING SITE SURVEYS

July 31, 1991

Ambassador Linton F. Brooks

Head of Delegation of the

United States of America to the

Negotiations on Nuclear and Space Arms

Dear Mr. Ambassador:

On behalf of the Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, I have the honor to propose an agreement between our Governments to ensure effective engineering site surveys conducted at facilities subject to continuous monitoring under the Treaty Between the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the United States of America on the Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms, hereinafter known as the Treaty.

Under this agreement, our Governments would agree as follows:

No later than 60 days after signature of the Treaty, each Party shall provide through diplomatic channels the following information on such facilities, including data on logistical resources and local topography:

(a) a plan of the facility perimeter showing the location of the portal and exits;

(b) diagrams of underground utilities, including cabling, in the proposed perimeter continuous monitoring area;

(c) locations of proposed termination point(s) for water, sewage, and electrical supply lines;

(d) data on power supply fluctuations, including maximum, minimum, and average voltage; data on maximum, minimum, and average kilowatts of power; data on maximum, minimum, and average time (in milliseconds) of electrical power disruptions in the perimeter continuous monitoring area over a period of seven consecutive days;

(e) whether the electrical current to be supplied is one-phase or three-phase;

(f) a short description of the topography of the area in which the facility subject to continuous monitoring is located and of the available logistical resources for the construction and installation of the perimeter and portal continuous monitoring system; and

(g) statistical data giving the maximum, minimum, and average number of vehicles exiting the portal and the road exits on an hourly and daily basis.

Each Party shall, whenever possible, provide additional information necessary to establish a perimeter and portal continuous monitoring system, when that Party receives a request for such information.

If the foregoing is acceptable, this letter together with your reply shall constitute an agreement between the Governments of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the United States of America, which shall enter into force on the date of signature of the Treaty, and shall remain in force for a 12-month period, unless, before the expiration of this period:

(a) a Party communicates to the other Party its decision to terminate this agreement; or

(b) the Treaty enters into force. In such event, this agreement shall remain in force as long as the Treaty remains in force.

Prior to entry into force of the Treaty, the Parties may agree to extend this agreement for additional periods, subject to the same conditions specified in subparagraphs (a) and (b) of this paragraph.

Mr. Ambassador, please accept the renewed assurances of my highest consideration.

[s]

Ambassador Youri K. Nazarkin

Head of Delegation of the

Union of Soviet Socialist

Republics to the Negotiations

on Nuclear and Space Arms

July 31, 1991

Dear Mr. Ambassador:

On behalf of the Government of the United States of America, I have the honor to accept the proposal, set forth in your letter of this date, that an agreement be concluded between our Governments to ensure effective engineering site surveys conducted at facilities subject to continuous monitoring under the Treaty Between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms, hereinafter known as the Treaty.

Under this agreement, our Governments shall agree as follows:

No later than 60 days after signature of the Treaty, each Party shall provide through diplomatic channels the following information on such facilities, including data on logistical resources and local topography:

(a) a plan of the facility perimeter showing the location of the portal and exits;

(b) diagrams of underground utilities, including cabling, in the proposed perimeter continuous monitoring area;

(c) locations of proposed termination point(s) for water, sewage, and electrical supply lines;

(d) data on power supply fluctuations, including maximum, minimum, and average voltage; data on maximum, minimum, and average kilowatts of power; data on maximum, minimum, and average time (in milliseconds) of electrical power disruptions in the perimeter continuous monitoring area over a period of seven consecutive days;

(e) whether the electrical current to be supplied is one-phase or three-phase;

(f) a short description of the topography of the area in which the facility subject to continuous monitoring is located and of the available logistical resources for the construction and installation of the perimeter and portal continuous monitoring system; and

(g) statistical data giving the maximum, minimum, and average number of vehicles exiting the portal and the road exits on an hourly and daily basis.

Each Party shall, whenever possible, provide additional information necessary to establish a perimeter and portal continuous monitoring system, when that Party receives a request for such information.

This reply together with your letter shall constitute an agreement between the Governments of the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, which shall enter into force on the date of signature of the Treaty, and shall remain in force for a 12-month period, unless, before the expiration of this period:

(a) a Party communicates to the other Party its decision to terminate this agreement; or

(b) the Treaty enters into force. In such event, this agreement shall remain in force as long as the Treaty remains in force.

Prior to entry into force of the Treaty, the Parties may agree to extend this agreement for additional periods, subject to the same conditions specified in subparagraphs (a) and (b) of this paragraph.

Mr. Ambassador, please accept the renewed assurances of my highest consideration.

Sincerely,

[s]

Ambassador Linton F. Brooks

Head of Delegation of the

United States of America to the Negotiations on Nuclear and Space Arms

Ambassador Youri K. Nazarkin

Head of Delegation of the

Union of Soviet Socialist Republics to the

Negotiations on Nuclear and Space Arms

PROVIDING PHOTOGRAPHS

July 31, 1991

Dear Mr. Ambassador:

On behalf of the Government of the United States of America, I have the honor to propose an agreement between our Governments on the provision of photographs of items subject to the Treaty Between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms, hereinafter referred to as the Treaty.

Under this agreement, our Governments would agree that:

(a) Photographs of items listed in Annex 1 to this letter be exchanged prior to signature of the Treaty.

(b) In connection with paragraph 10 of Annex J to the Memorandum of Understanding on the Establishment of the Data Base Relating to the Treaty, photographs of items listed in Annex 2 to this letter be exchanged on the date of signature of the Treaty.

(c) Photographs of items listed in Annex 3 to this letter be provided after signature of the Treaty either during an elimination or during the initial technical exhibitions in the course of confirming technical data and distinguishing features. Such photographs shall be in addition to those required under paragraph 4 of Section XIV and paragraph 10 of Section XV of the Protocol on Inspections Relating to the Treaty.

(d) The criteria for producing the photographs of items on the lists shall be the criteria provided for in paragraph 10 of Annex J to the Memorandum of Understanding on the Establishment of the Data Base Relating to the Treaty.

(e) The Parties shall have the right to raise, within the framework of the Joint Compliance and Inspection Commission, questions concerning the provision of photographs pursuant to this agreement.

If the foregoing is acceptable, this letter together with your reply shall constitute an agreement between the Governments of the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, which shall enter into force on this date and shall remain in force for a 12-month period, unless, before the expiration of this period:

(a) a Party communicates to the other Party its decision to terminate this agreement; or

(b) the Treaty enters into force. In such event, this agreement shall remain in force as long as the Treaty remains in force.

Prior to entry into force of the Treaty, the Parties may agree to extend this agreement for additional periods, subject to the same conditions specified in subparagraphs (a) and (b) of this paragraph.

Mr. Ambassador, please accept the renewed assurances of my highest consideration.

Sincerely,

[s]

Ambassador Linton F. Brooks

Head of Delegation of the

United States of America to the Negotiations on Nuclear and Space Arms

Ambassador Youri K. Nazarkin

Head of Delegation of the

Union of Soviet Socialist Republics to the

Negotiations on Nuclear and Space Arms

Annex 1

List of photographs to be provided prior to signature of the Treaty:

For the United States of America:

ICBM Emplacement Equipment

B-1 unique support equipment, pylons, and rotary launchers

For the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics:

ICBM Emplacement Equipment

Driver Training Vehicles

Launch-Associated Support Vehicles

Launch-Associated Railcars

Annex 2

List of photographs to be exchanged on the date of signature of the Treaty:

For the United States of America:

ICBMs and Their Associated Systems:

MMII without front section and without SCDM

MMIII without front section and without SCDM

MMII first stage

MMIII first stage

PK first stage

PK second stage

PK third stage

PK SCDM

SLBMs and Their Associated Systems:

POSEIDON as a unit with front section (inert missile)

TRIDENT I as a unit with front section (inert missile)

TRIDENT II as a unit with front section (inert missile)

POSEIDON first stage

TRIDENT I first stage

TRIDENT II first stage

Heavy Bombers and Long-Range Nuclear ALCMs:

B-52H equipped for long-range nuclear ALCMs-AGM-86B

B-52H equipped for long-range nuclear ALCMs-AGM-129

B-52G equipped for long-range nuclear ALCMs-AGM-86B

B-52G equipped for nuclear armaments other than long-range nuclear ALCMs

B-1Bequipped for nuclear armaments other than long-range nuclear ALCMs

B-2 equipped for nuclear armaments other than long-range nuclear ALCMs of a type that does not include the category heavy bombers equipped for long-range nuclear ALCMs

Long-range nuclear ALCM AGM-86B

Long-range nuclear ALCM AGM-129

For the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics:

ICBMs and their Associated Systems:

SS-11 in launch canister without front section

SS-13 first stage

second and third stages as a unit

SS-17 in launch canister without front section

SS-18 in launch canister without front section

as a unit without front section and without self- contained

dispensing mechanism (outside launch canister)

first stage

SS-19 in launch canister without front section

SS-24 (for silo launcher) in launch canister without front section

(for silo launcher) first stage

SS-24 (for rail-mobile launcher) in launch canister without front

section

(for rail-mobile launcher) first stage

SS-25 in launch canister without front section first stage

Road-mobile launcher of SS-25 ICBMs without missile, version "A"

Road-mobile launcher of SS-25 ICBMs without missile, version "B"

Rail-mobile launcher of SS-24 ICBMs

Fixed structure for road-mobile launchers

Fixed structure for rail-mobile launchers

SLBMs and Their Associated Systems:

SS-N-6 as a unit without front section

SS-N-8 as a unit with front section

SS-N-18 as a unit with front section

SS-N-20 as a unit with front section

SS-N-23 as a unit with front section

Heavy Bombers and Long-Range Nuclear ALCMs:

Blackjack equipped for AS-15 Mod B long-range nuclear ALCMs

Bear H6 equipped for AS-15 Mod A long-range nuclear ALCMs

Bear H16 equipped for AS-15 Mod A long-range nuclear ALCMs

Bear G equipped for nuclear armaments other than long-range nuclear ALCMs

Bear B equipped for nuclear armaments other than long-range nuclear ALCMs

Bear T training heavy bomber

Bison A former heavy bomber

AS-15 Mod A long-range nuclear ALCM

AS-15 Mod B long-range nuclear ALCM

Annex 3

List of photographs to be provided after signature of the Treaty either during an elimination or during the initial exhibitions in the course of confirming technical data and distinguishing features:

For the United States of America:

Heavy Bombers and Long-Range Nuclear ALCMs:

B1-B equipped for long-range nuclear ALCMs

For the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics:

ICBMs and their Associated Systems:

SS-11* as a unit without front section (outside launch canister) first stage

SS-17* as a unit without front section (outside launch canister) first stage

SS-19* as a unit without front section and without SCDM (outside launch canister) first stage

SS-24** (for silo launcher) as a unit without front section (outside launch canister)

SS-24** (for rail-mobile launcher) as a unit without front section (outside launch canister)

SS-25** as a unit without front section (outside launch canister)

__________

SLBMs and Their Associated Systems: *

SS-N-8 first stage

SS-N-18 first stage

SS-N-20 first stage

SS-N-23 first stage

__________

* To be provided as part of the confirmation of dimensions of the first stage during elimination.

July 31, 1991

Ambassador Linton F. Brooks

Head of Delegation of the

United States of America to the

Negotiations on Nuclear and Space Arms

Dear Mr. Ambassador:

On behalf of the Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, I have the honor to accept the proposal set forth in your letter of this date, that an agreement be concluded between our Governments on the provision of photographs of items subject to the Treaty Between the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the United States of America on the Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms, hereinafter referred to as the Treaty.

Under this agreement, our Governments shall agree that:

(a) Photographs of items listed in Annex 1 to this letter be exchanged prior to signature of the Treaty.

(b) In connection with paragraph 10 of Annex J to the Memorandum of Understanding on the Establishment of the Data Base Relating to the Treaty, photographs of items listed in Annex 2 to this letter be exchanged on the date of signature of the Treaty.

(c) Photographs of items listed in Annex 3 to this letter be provided after signature of the Treaty either during an elimination or during the initial technical exhibitions in the course of confirming technical data and distinguishing features. Such photographs shall be in addition to those required under paragraph 4 of Section XIV and paragraph 10 of Section XV of the Protocol on Inspections Relating to the Treaty.

(d) The criteria for producing the photographs of items on the lists shall be the criteria provided for in paragraph 10 of Annex J to the Memorandum of Understanding on the Establishment of the Data Base Relating to the Treaty.

(e) The Parties shall have the right to raise, within the framework of the Joint Compliance and Inspection Commission, questions concerning the provision of photographs pursuant to this agreement.

This reply together with your letter shall constitute an agreement between the Governments of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the United States of America, which shall enter into force on this date and shall remain in force for a 12-month period, unless before the expiration of this period:

(a) a Party communicates to the other Party its decision to terminate this agreement; or

(b) the Treaty enters into force. In such event, this agreement shall remain in force as long as the Treaty remains in force.

Prior to entry into force of the Treaty, the Parties may agree to extend this agreement for additional periods, subject to the same conditions specified in subparagraphs (a) and (b) of this paragraph.

Mr. Ambassador, please accept the renewed assurances of my highest consideration.

Ambassador Youri K. Nazarkin

Head of Delegation of the

Union of Soviet Socialist

Republics to the

Negotiations on Nuclear and

Space Arms

Annex 1

List of photographs to be provided prior to signature of the Treaty:

For the United States of America:

ICBM Emplacement Equipment

B-1 unique support equipment, pylons, and rotary launchers

For the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics:

ICBM Emplacement Equipment

Driver Training Vehicles

Launch-Associated Support Vehicles

Launch-Associated Railcars

Annex 2

List of photographs to be exchanged on the date of signature of the Treaty:

For the United States of America:

ICBMs and Their Associated Systems:

MMII without front section and without SCDM

MMIII without front section and without SCDM

MMII first stage

MMIII first stage

PK first stage

PK second stage

PK third stage

PK SCDM

SLBMs and Their Associated Systems:

POSEIDON as a unit with front section (inert missile)

TRIDENT I as a unit with front section (inert missile)

TRIDENT II as a unit with front section (inert missile)

POSEIDON first stage

TRIDENT I first stage

TRIDENT II first stage

Heavy Bombers and Long-Range Nuclear ALCMs:

B-52H equipped for long-range nuclear ALCMs-AGM-86B

B-52H equipped for long-range nuclear ALCMs-AGM-129

B-52G equipped for long-range nuclear ALCMs-AGM-86B

B-52G equipped for nuclear armaments other than long-range nuclear ALCMs

B-1Bequipped for nuclear armaments other than long-range nuclear ALCMs

B-2 equipped for nuclear armaments other than long-range nuclear ALCMs of a type that does not include the category heavy bombers equipped for long-range nuclear ALCMs

Long-range nuclear ALCM AGM-86B

Long-range nuclear ALCM AGM-129

For the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics:

ICBMs and their Associated Systems:

SS-11 in launch canister without front section

SS-13 first stage

second and third stages as a unit

SS-17 in launch canister without front section

SS-18 in launch canister without front section

as a unit without front section and without self- contained

dispensing mechanism (outside launch canister)

first stage

SS-19 in launch canister without front section

SS-24 (for silo launcher) in launch canister without front section

(for silo launcher) first stage

SS-24 (for rail-mobile launcher) in launch canister without front

section

(for rail-mobile launcher) first stage

SS-25 in launch canister without front section first stage

Road-mobile launcher of SS-25 ICBMs without missile, version "A"

Road-mobile launcher of SS-25 ICBMs without missile, version "B"

Rail-mobile launcher of SS-24 ICBMs

Fixed structure for road-mobile launchers

Fixed structure for rail-mobile launchers

SLBMs and Their Associated Systems:

SS-N-6 as a unit without front section

SS-N-8 as a unit with front section

SS-N-18 as a unit with front section

SS-N-20 as a unit with front section

SS-N-23 as a unit with front section

Heavy Bombers and Long-Range Nuclear ALCMs:

Blackjack equipped for AS-15 Mod B long-range nuclear ALCMs

Bear H6 equipped for AS-15 Mod A long-range nuclear ALCMs

Bear H16 equipped for AS-15 Mod A long-range nuclear ALCMs

Bear G equipped for nuclear armaments other than long-range nuclear ALCMs

Bear B equipped for nuclear armaments other than long-range nuclear ALCMs

Bear T training heavy bomber

Bison A former heavy bomber

AS-15 Mod A long-range nuclear ALCM

AS-15 Mod B long-range nuclear ALCM

Annex 3

List of photographs to be provided after signature of the Treaty either during an elimination or during the initial exhibitions in the course of confirming technical data and distinguishing features:

For the United States of America:

Heavy Bombers and Long-Range Nuclear ALCMs:

B1-B equipped for long-range nuclear ALCMs

For the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics:

ICBMs and their Associated Systems:

SS-11* as a unit without front section (outside launch canister) first stage

SS-17* as a unit without front section (outside launch canister) first stage

SS-19* as a unit without front section and without SCDM (outside launch canister) first stage

SS-24** (for silo launcher) as a unit without front section (outside launch canister)

SS-24** (for rail-mobile launcher) as a unit without front section (outside launch canister)

SS-25** as a unit without front section (outside launch canister)

__________

SLBMs and Their Associated Systems: *

SS-N-8 first stage

SS-N-18 first stage

SS-N-20 first stage

SS-N-23 first stage

__________

* To be provided as part of the confirmation of dimensions of the first stage during elimination.

CORRESPONDENCE RELATED TO THE TREATY

THIRD COUNTRY BASING

July 31, 1991

Dear Mr. Minister:

Our strategic arms control negotiators in Geneva have continued the discussions which Foreign Minister Shevardnadze and I began in New York last year on prohibiting the basing of strategic offensive arms in third countries. I believe a solution to this problem is possible, and would like to offer some concrete thoughts on how this issue could be resolved.

Let me remind you of the many steps that we have already taken to meet your concerns:

First, we have agreed to your proposal to ban the basing of strategic offensive arms outside national territory. That ban will take effect immediately upon entry into force of the START Treaty.

Second, while we do not regard our operations in Holy Loch, Scotland as basing, we are prepared to commit that ballistic missile submarines will be withdrawn from Holy Loch within five months after entry into force of the Treaty.

Third, I can reaffirm our commitment, which I gave to Foreign Minister Shevardnadze orally, that no arrangement involving ballistic missile submarines, such as that currently in Holy Loch, will be carried out in the future.

Finally, I can formally reaffirm that the United States does not base strategic offensive arms outside its national territory.

But, as I explained in New York, we cannot accept a Provision in the START Treaty for inspections outside national territory. At the same time, with respect to our Agreed Statement on this subject, incorporated in the Agreed Statement Annex to the Treaty, I can cite the following paragraph thereof:

The Parties agreed that . . . the Parties have the obligation, if concerns arise under this Agreed Statement, to discuss any ambiguity and, if necessary, to provide each other with information to resolve concerns. Such discussions could occur through diplomatic channels, as well as in the Joint Compliance and Inspection Commission. The Parties do not rule out the possibility that clarifications provided in the Joint Compliance and Inspection Commission might, in certain cases, include inspections or visits.

In this connection, the sides should use, as appropriate, relevant procedures provided for in the Treaty or measures worked out by the Joint Compliance and Inspection Commission under provisions of Article XV of the Treaty.

I believe that, with the clarifications and assurances in this letter and your response, the Agreed Statement and the relevant Treaty provisions, all questions associated with third country basing have been resolved to our mutual satisfaction.

Sincerely,

[s]

James A. Baker, III

His Excellency

Aleksandr Bessmertnykh,

Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Union of

Soviet Socialist Republics,

Moscow.

July 31, 1991

Dear Mr. Secretary:

I agree that your letter of this date provides a basis for solving the problem of prohibiting the basing of strategic offensive arms in third countries. I accept the proposals which you made in that letter.

We note that the arrangement which you have in Holy Loch, Scotland will be terminated and that all your ballistic missile submarines will be withdrawn from Holy Loch within five months after entry into force of the Treaty. For our part, I would like to state that, as we have indicated in the past, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics does not base strategic offensive arms outside its national territory, and does not carry out any arrangement involving ballistic missile submarines similar to that currently existing in Holy Loch and commits itself not to carry out such arrangements in the future.

With respect to our Agreed Statement on this subject incorporated in the appropriate Annex to the Treaty, I can cite the following provision:

"The Parties agree that. . . the Parties have the obligation, if concerns arise under this Agreed Statement, to discuss any ambiguity and, if necessary, to provide each other with information to resolve concerns. Such discussions could occur through diplomatic channels, as well as in the Joint Compliance and Inspection Commission. The Parties do not rule out the possibility that clarifications provided in the Joint Compliance and Inspection Commission might, in certain cases, include inspections or visits."

In this connection, the sides should use, as appropriate, relevant procedures provided for in the Treaty or measures worked out by the Joint Compliance and Inspection Commission under the provisions of Article XV of the Treaty.

I agree that, with the clarifications and assurances contained in your letter and this response, the Agreed Statement and the agreed Treaty provisions, all questions associated with third country basing have been resolved to our mutual satisfaction.

Mr. Secretary, please accept the renewed assurances of my highest consideration.

[s]

Alexander A. Bessmertnykh

Minister of Foreign Affairs of the

Union of Soviet Socialist Republics

His Excellency

Mr. James A.Baker, III

Secretary of State of the

United States of America

ALCMs WITH MULTIPLE WEAPONS

December 6, 1990

Dear Eduard,

Our arms control experts have been discussing the subject of long-range air-launched cruise missiles (ALCMs) with multiple weapons. As you recall, we agreed in May to ban long-range nuclear ALCMs with multiple weapons. I understand from my experts that the Soviet side believes such a ban must be extended to include long-range non-nuclear ALCMs as well.

As I have told you in the past, we cannot permit the START Treaty to limit our conventional capabilities. In our view, the recent events in the Gulf underscore the importance of preserving non-nuclear options. At the same time, I would like to address your concerns over the possible circumvention of a ban on long-range nuclear ALCMs with multiple weapons. Thus, let me make the following points:

First, under the START Treaty, the United States will comply with its obligation not to produce, test, or deploy long-range nuclear ALCMS with multiple weapons.

Second, in abiding by this obligation, the United States will not produce, test or deploy long-range non-nuclear ALCMs with multiple weapons for the purpose of acquiring the capability in the future to deploy long-range nuclear ALCMs with multiple weapons. Nor would the United States convert any long-range non-nuclear ALCMs with multiple weapons into long-range nuclear ALCMs with multiple weapons. Any such action by either side would be inconsistent with its Treaty obligations.

Third, any long-range non-nuclear ALCMs with multiple weapons which might be deployed would, of course, be distinguishable from long-range nuclear ALCMs in accordance with the procedures, including appropriate exhibitions and inspections, which are now being worked out in Geneva for distinguishing long-range nuclear ALCMs from long-range non-nuclear ALCMs.

Finally, in accordance with Article XII* of the START Treaty, each side will be obliged to meet within the framework of the Joint Compliance and Inspection Commission to respond to any questions raised by the other side's compliance with its Treaty obligation to ban long-range nuclear ALCM with multiple weapons.

Naturally, these assurances are premised on the assumption that the Soviet side interprets its obligations toward the United States under the Treaty with regard to long-range ALCMs with multiple weapons in the same way.

I believe that these points should alleviate your concerns. You should feel free to share them with your colleagues if you think this would be helpful. Of course, I am ready to meet with you to finalize this or any other issues.

Eduard, with these responses, and with the constructive steps your side took recently in Moscow on ALCMs, we should be able to resolve all remaining ALCM issues. Let's do so now.

Sincerely,

[s]

James A. Baker, III

The Honorable Eduard Shevardnadze,

Minister of Foreign Affairs of the

Union of Soviet Socialist Republics,

New York

Moscow, December 6, 1990

Dear James,

In response to your letter on long-range ALCMs with multiple weapons, please allow me to inform you that desiring to rapidly reach agreement on the START Treaty, we are ready to accept the solution, which you propose in your letter. For its part the Soviet Union will adhere to the following:

Under the START Treaty, the USSR will comply with the obligation not to produce, test or deploy long-range nuclear ALCMs with multiple weapons.

Under this obligation, neither the Soviet Union, nor the United States will produce, test or deploy long-range non-nuclear ALCMs with multiple weapons for the purpose of acquiring in the future the capability to deploy long-range nuclear ALCMs with multiple weapons. Nor will the Soviet Union convert any long-range non-nuclear ALCMs with multiple weapons into long-range nuclear ALCMs with multiple weapons. Any such action by either side would be inconsistent with its Treaty obligations.

The START Treaty must contain provisions on how to distinguish long-range nuclear and long-range non-nuclear ALCMs, including appropriate exhibitions and inspections. As I understand it, the two sides agree that those provisions be applied to long-range non-nuclear ALCMs with multiple weapons. Thus, each side would be confident that the other side is complying with the ban on long-range nuclear ALCMs with multiple weapons.

Finally, I note our common understanding that in accordance with Article XII* of the START Treaty each side will be obliged to meet within the framework of the Joint Compliance and Inspection Commission to respond to questions raised by the other side regarding ambiguity or concerns related to the other sides compliance with its Treaty obligations regarding the ban on long-range nuclear ALCMs with multiple weapons.

In conclusion, I would like to express my satisfaction with the solution we have found to this problem. I hope that an equally constructive and mutually acceptable solution will be found for all other outstanding questions related to the preparation of the START Treaty for signature.

There is not much time left until that signing, therefore it is very important that everything necessary be done now to conclude this historic agreement.

Respectfully,

[s]

E. Shevardnadze

His Excellency James A. Baker, III

Secretary of State

United States of America

Washington, D.C.

* As written, should be "XV"

TACIT RAINBOW

May 19, 1990

Dear Eduard,

I have just finished meeting with my arms control experts, who tell me that we are still some distance from completing an overall agreement on the question of air-launched cruise missiles because of continuing differences over the issue of Tacit Rainbow. In particular, my experts have reported your concerns and the three elements of your proposal.

I have had an opportunity to study your ideas, and am persuaded that Tacit Rainbow need not be an obstacle to resolving the ALCM issue. In this message, I would like to give you a response that I believe offers a constructive means of resolving this matter. Let me make the following points:

First, the December 31, 1988 cutoff date to distinguish between current and future ALCMs is of course acceptable to me. This makes clear (as President Gorbachev agreed) that Tacit Rainbow will be treated as a future non-nuclear ALCM -- which it is -- and will thus be subject to the provisions in the Treaty that will enable both sides to distinguish between nuclear and non-nuclear ALCMs.

Second, I am able to confirm that Tacit Rainbow is a non-nuclear ALCM, and as such would be covered by our proposals of May 12, 1990 on how the START Treaty would identify non-nuclear ALCMs and distinguish them from nuclear ALCMs. In particular, I want to draw your attention to the language we proposed in the Notification Annex* we recently presented in Geneva. (A copy is attached.) Under this provision we would formally notify you at least six months in advance that Tacit Rainbow is a non-nuclear ALCM, would tell you about its distinguishing features and would propose a date on which you could come for an exhibition of this missile.

We have no plans to convert Tacit Rainbow to a nuclear ALCM. But if a non-nuclear ALCM were ever converted to a nuclear ALCM, that missile would then become subject to all of the START Treaty restrictions on nuclear long-range ALCMs.

Third, on your concern about range. I am advised that its range is less than 800 km. As you know Tacit Rainbow only became an issue when we considered accepting your proposal for a 600 km ALCM range threshold. Under our preferred position of 800 km, Tacit Rainbow was not an issue.

I believe that these points are responsive to your questions. You should feel free to share these points with your colleagues if you think this would be helpful. Of course, I am ready to come over to meet with you now to finalize this and any other issues.

Eduard, I would like to conclude by reminding you that you gave me every reason to believe that if I could move to your position on ALCM range, we would finally put the ALCM issue behind us. Let's do so now.

Sincerely,

[s]

James A. Baker, III

The Honorable Eduard Shevardnadze,

Minister of Foreign Affairs of the,

Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, Moscow.

*As written, should read "Protocol"

RELOCATION OF HEAVY ICBM SILOS

[No Date]

Dear Mr. Secretary,

I received information from the head of our START Delegation in Geneva that the US Delegation had been instructed by Washington to suspend work which involves introducing changes into the Treaty in accordance with the agreement on heavy ICBMs reached in New York. In this context, the US side refers to the fact that allegedly I, in my conversation with you, said that the Soviet side did not intend to construct new silo launchers for heavy missiles.

I believe there is a misunderstanding here. In this connection, I would like to once again set forth the Soviet position, on the basis of which agreement was reached in New York. The essence of the matter is that in modernizing its heavy ICBMs the Soviet Union will construct new silo launchers for heavy ICBMs simultaneously with the elimination of such silo launchers, i.e., staying within the 154 limit. Thus, the Soviet side does not have plans of constructing an additional number (in excess of 154) of heavy ICBM silo launchers.

I wish to emphasize that our position is part of the New York agreement on heavy ICBMs, which we reaffirm in its entirety.

In conclusion, I would like once again to assure you, Mr. Secretary, that our meetings and discussions have given me a feeling of profound satisfaction, and express confidence that our useful dialogue and contacts will be continued in the interests of our two countries.

Respectfully,

[s]

D. Yazov

Minister of Defense of the USSR

Marshal of the Soviet Union

The Honorable Richard Cheney

Secretary of Defense of the

United States

Washington, D.C.

New Heavy ICBM Construction

Moscow, December 6, 1990

Dear Sirs,

In view of the doubts you had with regard to the issue of constructing new silo launchers for heavy ICBMs - in the context of the broader agreement on heavy ICBMs reached in New York in October 1990 - we deem it expedient to provide the following additional clarifications.

First of all, we would like to reiterate with full clarity that under that agreement new silo launchers for heavy ICBMs would be constructed solely for replacing silo launchers of heavy ICBMs eliminated according to the Protocol on Conversion or Elimination Procedures to the START Treaty, which means that their number will remain within the Treaty limits. As we understand it, you may have a question as to what would require such construction. An answer to this question should be sought in situations which might arise in real life.

We hope you agree with us that such accidents unfortunately cannot be fully ruled out, where - in particular, due to long period of operation of silo launchers - their further operation would be impossible. Incidentally, this has been taken into account in the Protocol on Conversion or Elimination Procedures to the START Treaty, which as the two sides have already agreed upon, provides for a special procedure for notifying and removing from Treaty accountability strategic offensive arms, including ICBM silo launchers, in case of their accidental loss or disablement beyond repair. Naturally each side would have the right in such cases to compensate for the systems removed from accountability - within the appropriate Treaty limits. This of course, applies to heavy ICBMs as well. At least for this reason, the possibility to construct new silo launchers for them should not be precluded.

Also, situations must not be ruled out where it would be necessary to relocate silo launchers, including those for heavy ICBMs, which means that they would be closed in one area of the country and constructed in another, for non-military considerations, particularly in connection with the internal political developments that are taking place in our country. Relocations of silo launchers might be required either during or after the period of reductions under the Treaty. A timely consideration of non-military factors by simply changing our current plans is difficult to realize.

At present we have no plans to relocate silo launchers for heavy ICBMs. Although such relocation, if required in the future, would incur additional great expenses and would be a hard step to take, we cannot, as you may understand, exclude such a possibility.

We hope these additional explanations remove completely the misunderstanding that has arisen and make it possible, at least, to reaffirm the New York agreements on heavy ICBMs and finally close this issue.

Respectfully,

[s]E. Shevardnadze [s] D. Yazov

His Excellency His Excellency

James A. Baker, III Richard B. Cheney

Secretary of State Secretary of Defense

United States of America United States of America

Washington, D.C.

JOINT STATEMENTS : EXCHANGED AT THE FINAL PLENARY (JULY 29)

JOINT STATEMENT ON NEW MISSILE PRODUCTION TECHNOLOGY PROCESSES

July 29, 1991

The Parties agree that:

(a) Procedures for elimination of ICBMs for mobile launchers of ICBMs specified in the Protocol on Procedures Governing the Conversion or Elimination of the Systems Subject to the Treaty on the Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms have been agreed upon taking into account the fact that, in manufacturing stages for such missiles, both Parties currently use the technology of casting the solid propellant directly in the case of the solid rocket motor so that the cured propellant cannot be removed non-destructively.

(b) If in the future either Party begins to produce stages of ICBMs for mobile launchers of ICBMs, employing so-called "insertable cartridges" or any other technology that allows non-destructive removal of solid propellant from motor cases, that Party shall inform the other Party thereof at the next session of the Joint Compliance and Inspection Commission. The Parties shall decide within the framework of the Joint Compliance and Inspection Commission what, if any, additional verification and elimination procedures are necessary, taking into account the new technology for manufacturing missiles.

JOINT STATEMENT REGARDING DATA UPDATES WITH RESPECT TO CATEGORIES OF DATA CONTAINED IN THE MEMORANDUM OF UNDERSTANDING

July 29, 1991

The Parties agree that, for any facility or item not listed in the Memorandum of Understanding under paragraph 1 of Article VIII of the Treaty on the Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms, a notification, in accordance with paragraph 1, 2, or 3 of Section I of the Notifications Protocol Relating to this Treaty, shall be provided according to the complete list of the appropriate categories of data set forth in the Memorandum of Understanding or in the Agreement on Exchange of Geographic Coordinates and Site Diagrams Relating to the Treaty, regardless of the Party to which such categories pertain. In this connection, due consideration shall be given to those changes that may be made in the above-mentioned categories of data pursuant to the relevant procedure provided for in the Memorandum of Understanding.

JOINT STATEMENT ON COSTS RELATED TO THE CONVENING OF A SESSION OF THE JCIC ON THE TERRITORY OF ONE OF THE PARTIES

July 29, 1991

In connection with paragraph 3 of Section II, Section VI, and paragraph 1 of Section VIII of the Protocol on the Joint Compliance and Inspection Commission Relating to the Treaty on the Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms, the Parties agree that if they decide to convene a session of the Commission on the territory of one of the Parties, questions that may arise concerning the settlement of costs that may be incurred in connection with such a session shall be resolved prior to the convening of that session.

JOINT STATEMENT ON THE BAN ON SUPPORT EQUIPMENT AT ELIMINATED FACILITIES

July 29, 1991

The Parties agree that, with respect to the ban on support equipment at eliminated facilities in Paragraph 27 of Article V of the Treaty on the Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms, support equipment includes, but is not limited to, ICBM emplacement equipment, training models of missiles, transporter-loaders of mobile ICBMs, storage cranes, launch-associated support vehicles, and driver training vehicles.

JOINT STATEMENT ON NARROW DIRECTIONAL BEAMING

July 29, 1991

The Parties agree that the ban on broadcasting telemetric information from ICBMs or SLBMs using narrow directional beaming, pursuant to subparagraph 2(c) of Article X of the Treaty on the Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms, is established in order to ensure near-omnidirectional radiation of broadcast signals.

JOINT STATEMENT ON THE TERM "TON"

July 29, 1991

The Parties agree that the English words "metric ton" and the Russian word "ton" mean 1,000 kilograms.

JOINT STATEMENT ON CHARTER FLIGHTS

July 29, 1991

The Parties agree that in order to facilitate the conduct of inspections and continuous monitoring activities pursuant to the Treaty on the Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms, questions concerning the use of chartered flights, if necessary for the transport of inspectors, monitors, equipment for the conduct of inspections, and equipment and supplies for the conduct of continuous monitoring activities shall be considered in the framework of the Joint Compliance and Inspection Commission.

JOINT STATEMENT CONCERNING CURRENCY OF PAYMENT FOR COSTS RELATING TO IMPLEMENTATION OF THE START TREATY

July 29, 1991

The Parties note that the issue of currency of payment for costs relating to implementation of the Treaty on the Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms is not yet resolved and shall be deferred, without prejudice to the position of either Party, for subsequent consideration in a broader context with respect to both the Treaty and to other U.S.- Soviet agreements in the area of arms limitations.

JOINT STATEMENT CONCERNING INTERPRETIVE DATA

July 29, 1991

The Parties understand that the interpretive data specified in subparagraphs 1(a) and 1(b) of Section II of the Telemetry Protocol relating to the Treaty on the Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms are necessary to verify compliance with provisions of the Treaty.

The Parties also understand that the interpretive data specified in subparagraph 1(b) of Section II of the Telemetry Protocol shall not apply to parameters not specified in that subparagraph.

JOINT STATEMENT ON WEAPON STORAGE AREAS

July 29, 1991

The Parties agree that the formulation "weapon storage area" as used in the Treaty on the Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms means a location, shown on a site diagram, for the long-term and short-term storage of nuclear and non-nuclear armaments. Such locations shall be depicted on site diagrams of facilities subject to inspection pursuant to subparagraph 14(f) of Section VII of the Inspection Protocol.

JOINT STATEMENT ON EXCHANGE OF SITE DIAGRAMS

July 29, 1991

Recognizing the importance of the exchange of site diagrams to guarantee reciprocal rights in respect to suspect site inspections pursuant to Article XI of the Treaty on the Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms, the Parties agree that the site diagrams for facilities listed in Annex I to the Memorandum of Understanding on the Establishment of a Data Base Relating to this Treaty that are subject to suspect site inspection shall meet the criteria in Annex J to the Memorandum of Understanding. The Parties agree that facilities or portions of facilities that are involved in the production of solid rocket motors shall not be subject to inspection. The Parties agree that the site diagrams for facilities subject to suspect site inspection shall be exchanged no later than 30 days after the date of signature of the Treaty.

JOINT STATEMENT IN CONNECTION WITH PROCEDURES

FOR CONFIRMING LAUNCH WEIGHT

July 29, 1991

The sides understand that, in accordance with paragraph 10 of Section XIV of the Inspection Protocol, they assume the obligation to agree within the JCIC on procedures for weighing or determining by other means the weight of ICBMs or SLBMs with the purpose of confirming the launch weight of ICBMs or SLBMs of a new type declared on the basis of a change in launch weight before the beginning of deployment of any such new type of ICBM or SLBM. The Parties further understand that they are obligated to negotiate such procedures in good faith, and without efforts to artificially hinder agreement on such procedures so as not to delay the deployment of such an ICBM or SLBM.

OTHER STATEMENTS

UNILATERAL STATEMENT BY THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA CONCERNING THE B-2 HEAVY BOMBER

The United States of America makes the following statement concerning its plans with respect to the B-2 heavy bomber. This statement will remain in force for the duration of the Treaty on the Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms and will be politically binding.

The United States of America has no plans to equip deployed B-2 heavy bombers for long-range nuclear ALCMs until such an ALCM has been flight-tested from a B-2 heavy bomber.

The United States of America recognizes that the first flight test of a long-range ALCM from a B-2 heavy bomber will require that : B-2 heavy bombers be exhibited pursuant to paragraph 12 of Article XI of the Treaty; B-2 heavy bombers be subject to inspection pursuant to the provisions of the Treaty; and all other provisions of the Treaty that pertain to heavy bombers of a type from any of which a long-range nuclear ALCM has been flight-tested apply to B-2 heavy bombers.

The United States of America recognizes that requirements under the Treaty referred to in this statement will also apply with equal force to heavy bombers, both of the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, of any new type from none of which a long-range nuclear ALCM has been flight-tested

STATEMENT OF POLICY BY THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA CONCERNING ENCRYPTION AND JAMMING

July 29, 1991

The United States of America, as a gesture of its goodwill and recognizing the value of the Treaty on the Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms, declares its intention not to use encryption and not to use jamming during flight tests of ICBMs and SLBMs beginning 120 days after signature of the Treaty. The United States of America declares its intention to continue this goodwill restraint for one year or until entry into force of the Treaty, whichever is sooner.

STATEMENT OF POLICY BY THE UNION OF SOVIET SOCIALIST REPUBLICS CONCERNING ENCRYPTION AND JAMMING

July 29, 1991

The Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, as a gesture of its goodwill and recognizing the value of the Treaty on the Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms, declares its intention not to use encryption and not to use jamming during flight tests of ICBMs and SLBMs beginning 120 days after signature of the Treaty. The Union of Soviet Socialist Republics declares its intention to continue this goodwill restraint for one year or until entry into force of the Treaty, whichever is sooner.

U.S. STATEMENT ON CONSULTATIONS RELATING TO THE RELEASE TO THE PUBLIC OF DATA AND OTHER INFORMATION

July 29, 1991

The U.S. side understands that, pursuant to paragraph 6 of Article VIII of the Treaty on the Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms, hereinafter referred to as the Treaty, the Parties shall hold consultations on the release to the public of data and other information provided pursuant to Article VIII of the Treaty or received otherwise in fulfilling the obligations provided for in the Treaty. In this connection, the U.S. side agrees that it intends to follow, on the basis of reciprocity, the precedent established by the Agreement between the Governments of the U.S.A. and the U.S.S.R. through an exchange of notes between the Embassy of the U.S.A. in the U.S.S.R. and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the U.S.S.R. dated April 20-23, 1990, concerning the release to the public of information which is contained in notifications provided pursuant to the Treaty Between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the Elimination of Their Intermediate-Range and Shorter-Range Missiles of December 8, 1987, including data updates with respect to the categories of data contained in the Memorandum of Understanding Regarding the Establishment of the Data Base for the Treaty of December 8, 1987. The U.S. Side further understands that such consultations shall be concluded prior to entry into force of the Treaty.

SOVIET STATEMENT ON CONSULTATIONS RELATING TO THE RELEASE TO THE PUBLIC OF DATA AND OTHER INFORMATION

July 29, 1991

The Soviet side understands that, pursuant to paragraph 6 of Article VIII of the Treaty on the Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms, hereinafter referred to as the Treaty, the Parties shall hold consultations on the release to the public of data and other information provided pursuant to Article VIII of the Treaty or received otherwise in fulfilling the obligations provided for in the Treaty. In this connection, the Soviet side agrees that it intends to follow, on the basis of reciprocity, the precedent established by the Agreement between the Governments of the U.S.S.R. and the U.S.A. and through an exchange of notes between the Embassy of the U.S.A. in the U.S.S.R. and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the U.S.S.R. dated April 20-23, 1990, concerning the release to the public of information which is contained in notifications provided pursuant to the Treaty Between the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the United States of America on the Elimination of Their Intermediate-Range and Shorter-Range Missiles of December 8, 1987, including data updates with respect to the categories of data contained in the Memorandum of Understanding Regarding the Establishment of the Data Base for the Treaty of December 8, 1987. The Soviet Side further understands that such consultations shall be concluded prior to entry into force of the Treaty.

U.S. STATEMENT ON LAUNCH-ASSOCIATED SUPPORT VEHICLES

AND DRIVER TRAINING VEHICLES

July 29, 1991

The U.S. side has taken note of the Soviet sides statement and believes that such information would be helpful in discussing compliance concerns when and if such concerns are considered in the Joint Compliance and Inspection Commission.

STATEMENT BY THE SOVIET SIDE ON LAUNCH-ASSOCIATED SUPPORT VEHICLES AND DRIVER TRAINING VEHICLES

July 29, 1991

The Union of Soviet Socialist Republics has vehicles in its inventory that resemble launch-associated support vehicles and driver training vehicles. In the event that a compliance concern arises because of the presence of such a vehicle at an eliminated facility, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics will either provide information on the features of such vehicles that distinguish them, by national technical means of verification, from launch-associated support vehicles and driver training vehicles, or provide clarification about what the vehicle is and the reason for its presence at the eliminated facility.

U.S. STATEMENT ON NON-CIRCUMVENTION OF THE START TREATY

July 29, 1991

The United States has no existing patterns of cooperation involving the transfer of strategic offensive arms subject to the limitations of the Treaty on the Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms, except with the United Kingdom. The United States attaches great importance to the role played by the United Kingdom's independent nuclear deterrent in helping maintain world peace. As a result, the United States has, for many years, helped maintain and modernize that deterrent. This is what we have referred to as "the existing pattern of cooperation" between the United States and the United Kingdom. It currently includes agreement by the United States to sell the United Kingdom the Trident II weapons system. In this regard, the United States endorses the statement made by U.K. Foreign Secretary Hurd that "the British strategic force will remain a minimum one in no way comparable to the nuclear forces of the Soviet Union and the United States."

SOVIET STATEMENT ON NON-CIRCUMVENTION OF THE START TREATY

July 29, 1991

The Soviet side takes note of the statement, made by the United States in connection with the Treaty on the Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms concluded between the USSR and the U.S., to the effect that the United States has no existing patterns of cooperation involving the transfer of strategic offensive arms subject to the limitations of the START Treaty, except with the United Kingdom.

It also notes the statement made by the U.S. side to the effect that the existing pattern of cooperation between the United States of America and the United Kingdom in the area of strategic offensive arms currently consists of the provision by the United States of Trident-II SLBMs to the United Kingdom. The Soviet Union also takes into account the fact that the United States of America endorses the statement made by U.K. Foreign Secretary Hurd that "the British strategic force will remain a minimum one in no way comparable to the nuclear forces of the Soviet Union and the United States."

If the United States were to alter its existing pattern of cooperation with the United Kingdom on strategic offensive arms in such a way that the terms and purposes of the START Treaty would be circumvented and the strategic balance altered, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics would consider its supreme interests jeopardized. In that case, in accordance with Article XVII of the Treaty, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics would consider that it has the right to withdraw from the Treaty.

STATEMENT BY THE SOVIET SIDE CONCERNING PATTERNS OF COOPERATION

July 31, 1991

In connection with the Treaty Between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics hereby confirms that it does not have existing commitments or patterns of cooperation that include the transfer of strategic offensive arms subject to the limitations of the Treaty on the Strategic Offensive Arms.

U.S. STATEMENT ON THE SS-N-23

July 29, 1991

Paragraph 1(a) of Section I of the Throw-weight Protocol describes the method for determining the throw-weight of ICBMs or SLBMs, the final stage of which executes a procedure for dispensing reentry vehicles. The U.S. side understood that this method for determining throw-weight was negotiated specifically to address design characteristics that are unique to the RSM-54 SLBM, known to the U.S. side as the SS-N-23. However, the Soviet side now asserts that the throw-weight of the SS-N-23 should be determined on the basis of the method described in paragraph 1(b) of the Throw-weight Protocol.

The Soviet side also informed the U.S. side that the accountable throw-weight of the SS-N-23, 2800 kg, was determined on the basis of the 1(b) method. While the U.S. side believes the SS-N-23 is of 1(a), not 1(b), design; for purposes of calculating throw-weight, the U.S. side accepts the SS-N-23 as a type 1(b) SLBM. However, the U.S. side stresses that this acceptance is without prejudice to our right to contest in the Joint Compliance and Inspection Commission the throw-weight values of any new type of ICBM or SLBM or modified existing type of ICBM or SLBM that incorporates a design similar to the SS-N-23, if such throw-weight values are based on the 1(b) method.

SOVIET STATEMENT ON THE SLBM SS-N-23

July 29, 1991

In connection with the U.S. Statement on the SLBM SS-N-23 (RSM-54) the Soviet side confirms that the throw-weight of that missile should be determined on the basis of the method described in paragraph 1(b) of Section I of the Throw-weight Protocol to the Treaty on the Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms, since in terms of its design the SLBM SS-N-23 does not belong to missiles, the final stage of which executes a procedure for dispensing reentry vehicles.

In this connection, the Soviet side states that there is no ground for raising an issue related to determining the throw-weight pursuant to paragraph 1(a) of Section I of the Throw-weight Protocol for any new type of ICBM or SLBM or modified existing type of ICBM or SLBM that incorporated a design similar to the SLBM SS-N-23 (RSM-54).

U.S. STATEMENT ON ATTACHMENT JOINTS

July 29, 1991

With respect to the inclusion of the distance between joints for attaching long-range nuclear ALCMs in Annex G and H to the Memorandum of Understanding, the attachment joints used on bombers belonging to the United States of America are of a design that allows the attachment of a variety of nuclear and non-nuclear weapons. In the U.S. view, such armament attachment joints are inappropriate for use as specified features that make heavy bombers belonging to the United States of America equipped for long-range nuclear ALCMs distinguishable from heavy bombers belonging to the United States of America not equipped for long-range nuclear ALCMs. Further, since such armament attachment joints are installed on airplanes belonging to the United States of America other than heavy bombers, their presence is not sufficient to consider an airplane to be a heavy bomber.

SOVIET STATEMENT CONCERNING THE PURPOSES OF INCLUSION IN THE MEMORANDUM OF UNDERSTANDING OF DATA ON THE DISTANCE BETWEEN JOINTS FOR ATTACHING LONG-RANGE NUCLEAR ALCMs

July 29, 1991

The Soviet side makes the following statement concerning the purposes of inclusion in the Memorandum of Understanding of data on the distance between joints for attaching long-range nuclear ALCMs. Noting the importance of verification of the provisions of the Treaty relating to counting the number of warheads attributed to heavy bombers, the Soviet side states that the technical data distance between joints for attaching long-range nuclear ALCMs to pylon, measured on pylon and distance between joints for attaching long-range nuclear ALCM to launcher are included in Annexes G and H to the Memorandum of Understanding in order to confirm the number of long-range nuclear ALCMs for which a heavy bomber of a type, category, and, if applicable, variant, is equipped. The Soviet side agrees that, since the design of attachment joints used on heavy bombers of the United States of America is such that it permits the suspension of a variety of nuclear and non-nuclear arms, joints for attaching weapons shall be considered as a non-mandatory distinguishing feature for categories of heavy bombers listed in Sections (ii) and (iii) of Annex G to the Memorandum of Understanding.

U.S. STATEMENT ON UNDERGROUND STRUCTURES

July 29, 1991

The U.S. side believes that construction of any additional underground structures adjacent to waters in which ballistic missile submarines operate and comparable in size and configuration to the ones located in the immediate vicinity of the Ara Inlet, the Yagelnaya Submarine Base, and the Pavlovskoye Submarine Base, would raise concerns regarding compliance with the obligation provided for in Article V, paragraph 26 of the Treaty on the Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms. For its part, the United States does not have such underground structures, does not plan to construct and will not construct any such underground structures while the START Treaty remains in force. The U.S. side proceeds from the premise that the Soviet side will exercise similar restraint.

UNILATERAL STATEMENT OF THE SOVIET SIDE REGARDING UNDERGROUND STRUCTURES ADJACENT TO WATERS IN WHICH BALLISTIC MISSILE SUBMARINES OPERATE

July 29, 1991

Since the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics has underground structures located in the immediate vicinity of the Ara inlet (Kola peninsula), the Yagelnaya submarine base (Kola peninsula), and the Pavlovskoye submarine base (Primorskiy kray), in connection with the Treaty on the Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms and in order to settle the issue of these underground structures once and for all, the Soviet side states that these underground structures have no adits that make them accessible to waterborne craft of any displacement from adjacent waters and that the Soviet Union has no plans to construct and will not construct such adits as long as the Treaty remains in force. Effective verification of this shall be ensured by national technical means.

The Soviet side proceeds from the premise that the United States of America does not have and will not construct similar underground structures as long as the Treaty remains in force.

STATEMENTS ON THE RELATIONSHIP OF START AND ABM READ AT A MEETING BETWEEN U. S. AMBASSADOR BROOKS AND

DEPUTY FOREIGN MINISTER OBUKHOV ON JUNE 13, 1991.

STATEMENT BY THE U.S. SIDE AT THE U.S.-SOVIET NEGOTIATIONS ON

NUCLEAR AND SPACE ARMS

While the United States cannot circumscribe the Soviet right to withdraw from the START Treaty if the Soviet Union believes its supreme interests are jeopardized, the full exercise by the United States of its legal rights under the ABM Treaty, as we have discussed with the Soviet Union in the past, would not constitute a basis for such withdrawal. The United States will be signing the START Treaty and submitting it to the United States Senate for advice and consent to ratification with this view. In addition, the provisions for withdrawal from the START Treaty based on supreme national interests clearly envision that such withdrawal could only be justified by extraordinary events that have jeopardized a Party's supreme interest. Soviet statements that a future, hypothetical U.S. withdrawal from the ABM Treaty could create such conditions are without legal or military foundation. The ABM Treaty, as signed on May 26, 1972, has already been substantially amended and clarified by subsequent agreements between the Parties. Moreover, current and future negotiations, to which the Soviet Union committed in the June 1990 Summit Joint Statement, could lead to significant additional changes in the ABM Treaty, or its replacement. Changes in the ABM Treaty agreed to by the Parties would not be a basis for questioning the effectiveness or viability of the Treaty on the Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms.

STATEMENT BY THE SOVIET SIDE AT THE U.S.-SOVIET NEGOTIATIONS ON NUCLEAR AND SPACE ARMS CONCERNING THE INTERRELATIONSHIP BETWEEN REDUCTIONS IN STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE ARMS AND COMPLIANCE WITH THE TREATY BETWEEN THE U.S AND THE USSR ON THE LIMITATION OF ANTI-BALLISTIC MISSILE SYSTEMS

In connection with the Treaty Between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms, the Soviet side states the following:

This Treaty may be effective and viable only under conditions of compliance with the Treaty between the U.S and the USSR on the Limitation of Anti-Ballistic Missile Systems, as signed on May 26, 1972.

The extraordinary events referred to in Article XV1 of this Treaty also include events related to withdrawal by one of the Parties from the Treaty on the Limitation of Anti-Ballistic Missile Systems, or related to its material breach.

1 As written, understood to mean "Article XVII". Two Treaty Articles were included after the statement was made, but before the Treaty was signed.

STATEMENTS EXCHANGED AT A MEETING BETWEEN U.S. AMBASSADOR BROOKS AND SOVIET AMBASSADOR NAZARKIN ON JULY 27, 1991.

STATEMENT OF THE U.S. SIDE CONCERNING

THE STATEMENT OF THE SOVIET SIDE ON

THE TSSAM CRUISE MISSILE

The U.S. side notes the statement of the Soviet side and believes that the concern it expresses about the impact of the new Tri-service Standoff Attack Missile (TSSAM) on the Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START) is totally unfounded.

The TSSAM is a non-nuclear, short range cruise missile that is not subject to START and that will have no impact on the integrity, stability, or durability of that agreement. The U.S. side stands by the Houston Agreement, which emphasized that the United States of America has no plans to equip deployed B-2 heavy bombers for long range nuclear ALCMs until such an ALCM has been flight tested from a B-2 heavy bomber. The TSSAM is not a long-range nuclear ALCM, and the Treaty is clear that its potential use on a B-2 would in no way imply that a B-2 is equipped for long-range nuclear ALCMs or alter the status of the B-2 under START.

The U.S. believes that no START provisions will apply based on the potential equipage of the B-2 with TSSAM.

STATEMENT OF THE SOVIET SIDE CONCERNING

THE INFORMATION OF THE U.S. SIDE ABOUT

THE TSSAM CRUISE MISSILE FOR

INCLUSION IN THE NEGOTIATING RECORD

The Soviet side is gravely concerned over the plans to develop and mass produce in the United States of America a new TSSAM cruise missile, which follows from the information about the cruise missile presented by the U.S. side at the START negotiations on June 14, 1991. The concern of the Soviet side is due to the fact that deployment of large numbers of such missiles will have adverse implications for the durability of the START Treaty, confidence in its integrity and stability that it provides.

Among our concerns is the fact that the multi-purpose suspension joints will be used for that missile on B-52 and B-2 heavy bombers, as follows from the explanations provided by the U.S. side. Because of that, in case of testing of TSSAM missiles from a B-2 heavy bomber the bomber might be used as a carrier of long-range nuclear ALCMs. Our concern increases in view of the fact that under certain circumstances B-2 heavy bombers are not subject to exhibitions and inspections.

The Soviet side reserves the right to return to these questions subsequently.

DECLARATIONS

DECLARATION OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA REGARDING ITS POLICY CONCERNING NUCLEAR SEA-LAUNCHED CRUISE MISSILES

July 31, 1991

The United States of America, recognizing the value of the Treaty on the Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms, and in the interests of enhancing stability and confidence, will provide the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics with annual declarations concerning the deployments of nuclear sea-launched cruise missiles planned by the United States of America for the duration of the Treaty. This declaration and subsequent annual declarations will be politically binding.

The first such declaration and all subsequent declarations are provided on the understanding that the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics will make comparable declarations. The first such declaration will be provided on the date of entry into force of the Treaty. Subsequent declarations will be provided annually thereafter.

The United States of America will specify the maximum number of deployed nuclear sea-launched cruise missiles for each of the following five years that the Treaty is in force.

The number of deployed nuclear sea-launched cruise missiles declared during the term of the Treaty will not exceed 880 in any one year.

Cruise missiles other than nuclear sea-launched cruise missiles will not be included in the declarations.

Declarations will apply to nuclear sea-launched cruise missiles of a range greater than 600 kilometers.

The United States of America will provide the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics information on which particular types of surface ships and submarines are capable of carrying deployed nuclear sea-launched cruise missiles. Such information will be confidential and will be provided on the date of entry into force of the Treaty.

The United States of America will not produce or deploy sea-launched cruise missiles armed with two or more nuclear weapons.

The United States of America will make these declarations for the duration of the Treaty on the Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms and invites the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics to make comparable declarations. These declarations may be supplemented by any cooperative measures that may be agreed upon by the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics in the future.

For the duration of the Treaty, the United States of America will also provide the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics annually confidential information on the number of nuclear sea-launched cruise missiles with a range of between 300 and 600 kilometers, deployed on surface ships and submarines. This information will be provided on the date of entry into force of the Treaty and annually thereafter.

The United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics will continue to seek, as stated in the 1987 Washington Summit Joint Statement, mutually acceptable and effective methods of verification.

DECLARATION OF THE UNION OF SOVIET SOCIALIST REPUBLICS REGARDING ITS POLICY CONCERNING NUCLEAR SEA-LAUNCHED CRUISE MISSILES

July 31, 1991

The Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, recognizing the value of the Treaty on the Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms, and in the interests of enhancing stability and confidence, will provide the United States of America with annual declarations concerning the deployments of nuclear sea-launched cruise missiles planned by the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics for the duration of the Treaty. This declaration and subsequent annual declarations will be politically binding.

The first such declaration and all subsequent declarations are provided on the understanding that the United States of America will make comparable declarations. The first such declaration will be provided on the date of entry into force of the Treaty. Subsequent declarations will be provided annually thereafter.

The Union of Soviet Socialist Republics will specify the maximum number of deployed nuclear sea-launched cruise missiles for each of the following five years that the Treaty is in force.

The number of deployed nuclear sea-launched cruise missiles declared during the term of the Treaty will not exceed 880 in any one year.

Cruise missiles other than nuclear sea-launched cruise missiles will not be included in the declarations.

Declarations will apply to nuclear sea-launched cruise missiles of a range greater than 600 kilometers.

The Union of Soviet Socialist Republics will provide the United States of America information on which particular types of surface ships and submarines are capable of carrying deployed nuclear sea-launched cruise missiles. Such information will be confidential and will be provided on the date of entry into force of the Treaty.

The Union of Soviet Socialist Republics will not produce or deploy sea-launched cruise missiles armed with two or more nuclear weapons.

The Union of Soviet Socialist Republics will make these declarations for the duration of the Treaty on the Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms and invites the United States of America to make comparable declarations. These declarations may be supplemented by any cooperative measures that may be agreed upon by the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the United States of America in the future.

For the duration of the Treaty, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics will also provide the United States of America annually confidential information on the number of nuclear sea-launched cruise missiles with a range of between 300 and 600 kilometers, deployed on surface ships and submarines. This information will be provided on the date of entry into force of the Treaty and annually thereafter.

The Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the United States of America will continue to seek, as stated in the 1987 Washington Summit Joint Statement, mutually acceptable and effective methods of verification.

DECLARATION BY THE UNION OF SOVIET SOCIALIST REPUBLICS CONCERNING

THE TU-22M MEDIUM BOMBER

July 31, 1991

The Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, recognizing the importance of the Treaty on the Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms, and acting in the interest of strengthening stability and enhancing confidence, makes the following declaration concerning its plan with respect to the Tu-22M bomber, which is known to the United States as the Backfire. This declaration will remain in force for the duration of the Treaty and will be politically binding.

The Tu-22M airplane is a medium bomber and is not a strategic offensive arm. At the same time, taking into account the need to remove all concerns standing in the way of the agreements, the Soviet side declares that it will not give the Tu-22M airplane the capability of operating at intercontinental distances in any manner, including by in-flight refueling.

The Soviet Union will not have more than 300 Tu-22M airplanes at any one time, not including naval Tu-22M airplanes. The number of naval Tu-22M airplanes will not exceed 200.

In view of the fact that there must be no constraints in the START Treaty on arms that are not strategic offensive arms, Tu-22M airplanes will not be subject to that Treaty.

JOINT STATEMENT ON DESIGNATIONS FOR PARKING SITES(3)

The Parties note that subparagraph 1(b) of Article XII of the Treaty Between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms, hereinafter referred to as the Treaty, refers to designations for parking sites that are provided for in Annex A to the Memorandum of Understanding on the Establishment of the Data Base Relating to the Treaty, hereinafter referred to as the Memorandum of Understanding. The Parties agree that, in the first data update of the Memorandum of Understanding after entry into force of the Treaty, the format for the category of data for parking sites at ICBM bases for rail-mobile launchers of ICBMs in Annex A to the Memorandum of Understanding shall be changed by introducing the designation for each parking site.

Official Translation

[SEAL OF THE USSR]

Soviet Component

of the Joint Compliance

and Inspection Commission

Geneva, Switzerland

December 19, 1991

JCIC CORRESPONDENCE

TELEMETRIC PLAYBACK DEMONSTRATION

Geneva, Switzerland

November 26, 1991

Mr. Gennadiy Shabannikov

Representative of the

Union of Soviet Socialist Republics to the

Joint Compliance and Inspection Commission

Dear Mr. Representative:

On behalf of the United States of America, I have the honor to accept your proposal that an agreement be concluded pursuant to paragraph 4 of Section I and paragraph 3 of Section II of the Protocol on Telemetric Information (hereinafter referred to as the Telemetry Protocol) Relating to the Treaty Between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms of July 31, 1991 (hereinafter referred to as the Treaty). The substantive portion of this agreement follows:

The purpose of this agreement is to:

(a) make it possible to play back the tapes to be provided after entry into force of the Treaty in accordance with the Telemetry Protocol; and

(b) provide confidence that the interpretive data and acceleration profiles to be provided after entry into force of the Treaty will contain all the information necessary to meet the requirements of paragraphs 1 and 2 of Section II of the Telemetry Protocol.

Under this agreement, the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, hereinafter referred to as the Parties, agree to conduct the initial demonstrations, provided for in paragraph 4(a) of Section I and paragraph 3 of Section II of the Telemetry Protocol, in accordance with the following:

1. During the demonstration, the demonstrating Party shall:

(a) Demonstrate each type of tape to be provided to the other Party after entry into force of the Treaty in accordance with paragraph 1 of Section I of the Telemetry Protocol. Each such demonstrated tape shall contain a recording of telemetric information that either:

(i) is broadcast during a flight text of an ICMB or SLBM. Such a recording shall contain: actual telemetric information representative of an entire flight text from launch to impact of the reentry vehicles; or telemetric information containing characteristic features that fully represent all telemetric information that is obtained during an actual flight test from launch to impact of the reentry vehicles; or

(ii) was encapsulated during an actual flight test of an ICBM or SLBM, for an entire encapsulation period.

(b) Describe each type of tape, as well as the recording methods and formats for each type of tape. The demonstrating Party shall also describe the telemetry signal conversion process from reception to recording.

(c) Demonstrate all equipment used to play back telemetric information recorded on tapes. Such equipment shall be demonstrated in operation using all the types of tapes demonstrated in accordance with subparagraph 1(a) of this agreement.

(d) Answer all questions of the observing Party pertaining to its ability to play back the telemetric information recorded on the demonstrated tapes.

(e) Provide an example of interpretive data illustrative of the information necessary to meet the requirements specified in paragraph 3 of Section II of the Telemetry Protocol. Such an example need not be related to the tapes being demonstrated. The demonstrating Party shall have the right to select the specific parameters to be provided pursuant to subparagraph 1(b) of Section II of the Telemetry Protocol.

(f) Provide an example of an acceleration profile illustrative of the information necessary to meed the requirements specified in paragraph 3 of Section II of the Telemetry Protocol. Such an example shall be presented in table form and need not be related to the tapes being demonstrated.

2. Prior to conclusion of the demonstration, the demonstrating Party shall provide all the demonstrated tapes to the observing Party.

3. The demonstration shall be sufficient for the observing Party to fully understand all technical requirements that are necessary for playing back the demonstrated tapes. Ambiguities and unresolved questions in connection with the demonstration shall be considered within the framework of the Joint Compliance and Inspection Commission.

4. Any demonstrated playback equipment that the observing Party requests, and all technical documentation necessary to play back the tapes using such equipment, shall be provided by the demonstrating Party. The date of delivery and method of payment for such equipment and documentation shall be agreed upon within the framework of the Joint Compliance and Inspection Commission as soon as possible following conclusion of both Parties' demonstrations.

5. The demonstration shall be conducted in accordance with the Telemetry Protocol and the arrangements and procedures used to implement the Agreement Between the Government of the United States of America and the Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on Early Exhibitions of Strategic Offensive Arms Relating to the Treaty, including the provisions on inspection reports, non-disclosure of information, and status of inspectors and aircrew members. The following exceptions shall apply:

(a) Both Parties' demonstrations shall be completed as soon as possible following entry into force of this agreement. The dates of such demonstrations shall be agreed upon through diplomatic channels.

(b) The observing Party shall have the right to have no more than 17 observers take part in the demonstration.

(c) The observing Party shall provide the list of its observers no less than three days prior to their arrival in the territory of the demonstrating Party. There shall be no requirement to provide notification of the demonstrating Party's agreement with the designation of each individual on the list.

For the purposes of the demonstration, the Parties shall have the right to agree on additional specific exceptions to the provisions of the Agreement Between the Government of the United States of America and the Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republic on Early Exhibitions of Strategic Offensive Arms Relating to the Treaty.

This reply, together with your letter, shall constitute an agreement between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics. This agreement shall enter into force upon the date of this reply and shall terminate upon completion of all activities provided for herein.

Sincerely,

[S]

Ambassador Steven E. Steiner

Representative of the

United States of America

to the Joint Compliance and

Inspection Commission

TELEMETRIC PLAYBACK DEMONSTRATION

Geneva, Switzerland

November 26, 1991

Ambassador Steven E. Steiner

Representative of the united States of America

to the Joint Compliance and Inspection Commission

Dear Mr. Ambassador:

On behalf of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, I have the honor to propose an agreement pursuant to paragraph 4 of Section I and paragraph 3 of Section II of the Protocol on Telemetric Information (hereinafter referred to as the Telemetry Protocol) Relating to the Treaty Between the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the United States of America on the Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms of July 31, 1991 (hereinafter referred to as the Treaty). The substantive portion of this proposed agreement follows:

The purpose of this agreement is to:

(a)make it possible to play back the tapes to be provided after entry into force of the Treaty in accordance with the Telemetry Protocol; and

(b)provide confidence that the interpretive data and acceleration profiles to be provided after entry into force of the Treaty will contain all the information necessary to meet the requirements of paragraphs 1 and 2 of Section ii of the Telemetry Protocol.

Under this agreement, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the United States of America, hereinafter referred to as the Parties, agree to conduct the initial demonstrations, provided for in subparagraph 4(a) of Section I and paragraph 3 of Section II of the Telemetry Protocol, in accordance with the following:

l. During the demonstration, the demonstrating Party shall:

(a)Demonstrate each type of tape to be provide to the other Party after entry into force of the Treaty in accordance with paragraph l of Section I of the Telemetry Protocol. Each such demonstrated tape shall contain a recording of telemetric information that either:

(i)is broadcast during a flight test of an ICBM or SLBM. Such a recording shall contain: actual telemetric information representative of an entire flight test from launch to impact of the reentry vehicles; or telemetric information containing characteristic features that fully represent all telemetric information that is obtained during an actual flight test from launch to impact of the reentry vehicles; or

(ii)was encapsulated during an actual flight test of an ICBM or SLBM, for an entire encapsulation period.

(b)Describe each type of tape, as well as the recording methods and formats for each type of tape. The demonstrating Party shall also describe the telemetry signal conversion process from reception to recording.

(c)Demonstrate all equipment used to play back telemetric information recorded on tapes. Such equipment shall be demonstrated in operation using all the types of tapes demonstrated in accordance with subparagraph 1(a) of this agreement.

(d)Answer all questions of the observing Party pertaining to its ability to play back the telemetric information recorded on the demonstrated tapes.

(e)Provide an example of interpretive data illustrative of the information necessary to meet the requirements specified in paragraph 3 of Section II of the Telemetry Protocol. Such an example need not be related to the tapes being demonstrated. The demonstrating Party shall have the right to select the specific parameters to be provided pursuant to subparagraph 1(b) of Section II of the Telemetry Protocol.

(f)provide an example of an acceleration profile illustrative of the information necessary to meet the requirements specified in paragraph 3 of Section II of the Telemetry Protocol. Such an example shall be presented in table form and need not be related to the tapes being demonstrated.

2. Prior to conclusion of the demonstration, the demonstrating Party shall provide all the demonstrated tapes to the observing Party.

3. The demonstration shall be sufficient for the observing Party to fully understand all technical requirements that are necessary for playing back the demonstrated tapes. Ambiguities and unresolved questions in connection with the demonstration shall be considered within the framework of the Joint Compliance and Inspection Commission.

4. Any demonstrated playback equipment that the observing Party requests, and all technical documentation necessary to play back the tapes using such equipment, shall be provided by the demonstrating Party. The date of delivery and method of payment for such equipment and documentation shall be agreed upon within the framework of the Joint Compliance and Inspection Commission as soon as possible following conclusion of both Parties' demonstrations.

5. The demonstration shall be conducted in accordance with the Telemetry Protocol and the arrangements and procedures used to implement the Agreement Between the Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the Government of the United States of America on Early Exhibitions of Strategic Offensive Arms Relating to the Treaty, including the provisions on inspection reports, non-disclosure of information, and status of inspectors and aircrew members. The following exceptions shall apply:

(a)Both Parties' demonstrations shall be completed as soon as possible following entry into force of this agreement. The dates of such demonstrations shall be agreed upon through diplomatic channels.

(b)The observing Party shall have the right to have no more than 17 observers take part in the demonstration.

(c)The observing Party shall provide the list of its observers no less than three days prior to their arrival in the territory of the demonstrating Party. There shall be no requirement to provide notification of the demonstrating Party's agreement with the designation of each individual on the list.

For the purposes of the demonstration, the Parties shall have the right to agree on additional specific exceptions to the provisions of the Agreement Between the Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the Government of the United States of America on Early Exhibitions of Strategic Offensive Arms Relating to the Treaty.

If the foregoing is acceptable, this letter, together with your reply, shall constitute an agreement between the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the United States of America. This agreement shall enter into force on the date of your reply and shall terminate upon completion of all activities provided for herein.

Sincerely,

Gennadiy Shabannikov

Representative of the

Union of Soviet Socialist

Republics to the

Joint Compliance and

Inspection Commission

Geneva, Switzerland

December 19, 1991

Mr. Gennadiy I. Shabannikov

Representative of the

Union of Soviet Socialist Republics to the

Joint Compliance and Inspection Commission

Dear Mr. Representative:

I have the honor to refer to the Treaty Between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms, hereinafter referred to as the Treaty, signed in Moscow on July 31, 1991.

I have the honor to propose that the corrections set forth in the Corrigenda attached to this letter be made in the texts of the Agreed Statements Annex to the Treaty, the Protocol on Inspections and Continuous Monitoring Activities Relating to the Treaty, and the Memorandum of Understanding on the Establishment of the Data Base Relating to the Treaty. I have the further honor to propose that this letter, and your letter in reply accepting the Corrigenda attached to this letter, shall constitute corrections to the texts of the above-mentioned documents.

Sincerely yours,

[s]

Steven E. Steiner

Ambassador

Attachment:

As stated.

CORRIGENDA

I. Agreed Statements Annex

To the Treaty

Between the United States of America

And the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics

On the Reduction and Limitation of

Strategic Offensive Arms,

Hereinafter Referred to as

The Agreed Statements Annex

In the Russian of paragraph (b) of the Tenth Agreed Statement in the Agreed Statements Annex, the words "notwithstanding the provisions of paragraph 4 of Section VII of the Inspection Protocol" shall be deleted and replaced by the words "Notwithstanding the provisions of paragraph 5 of Section VII of the Inspection Protocol".

II. Protocol on Inspections

And Continuous Monitoring Activities

Relating to the Treaty

Between the United States of America

And the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics

On the Reduction and Limitation of

Strategic Offensive Arms,

Hereinafter Referred to as

The Inspection Protocol

Subparagraph 23(a)(iii) of Section VI of the Inspection Protocol shall read as follows:

"(iii) for ICBMs that are maintained, stored, and transported as assembled missiles in launch canisters or without launch canisters, and for SLBMs that are maintained, stored1 and transported as assembled missiles: the diameter and length of an ICBM or SLBM of each type in the shipment configuration that is the shortest configuration specified that holds an assembled ICBM or SLBM of that type without the front section, except for such ICBMs for mobile launchers of ICBMs."

III. The Memorandum of Understanding

On the Establishment of the Data Base

Relating to the Treaty

Between the United States of America

And the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics

On the Reduction and Limitation of

Strategic Offensive Arms,

Hereinafter Referred to as

The Memorandum of Understanding

  1. In the English of paragraph (b) of Annex C to the Memorandum of Understanding, under the category of data "Bomber Type and Variant of a Type" for the air base for former heavy bombers at Engel's, the designator "Bison A" in the left column shall be deleted and replaced by the designator "Bison B"; and the designator "Bison B" in the right column shall be deleted and replaced by the designator "Bison A".
  2. In the English of paragraph (b) of Annex C to the Memorandum of Understanding, under the repair facility for heavy bombers and former heavy bombers at Ryazan' for the category of data "Types of Heavy Bombers and Former Heavy Bombers Normally Repaired at this Facility", the designator "Bison A" shall be deleted and replaced by the designator "Bison B".
  3. In the English and Russian of subparagraph (a)(i) of Annex F to the Memorandum of Understanding, for the category of data "Total Length of Missile as a Unit with Launch Canister Without Front Section3 (meters)" under "SS-24 for Silo Launcher" and "SS-24 for Rail-Mobile Launcher", the numbers "19.4" and "19.6" shall be deleted and replaced by the numbers "20.4" and "20.6", respectively.
  4. In the English and Russian of subparagraph (b)(i) of Annex F to the Memorandum of Understanding, for the category of data "Rail-Mobile Launcher of ICBMs* (in Transport Position, Without Missile): Width (meters)" under "PK for Rail-Mobile Launcher", the number "2.8" shall be deleted and replaced by the number "2.9".
  5. In the English and Russian of subparagraph (b)(ii) of Annex F to the Memorandum of Understanding, for the category of data "Length of Assembled Missile Without Front Section (meters)" under "Poseidon", "Trident I", and "Trident II", the numbers "10.4", "10.4", and "13.6" shall be deleted and replaced by the numbers "8.1", "10.3", and "13.4", respectively; for the category of data "First Stage Length (meters)" under "Trident II", the number "7.1" shall be deleted and replaced by the number "7.0".
  6. In the English of subparagraph (b)(vi)(2) of Annex G to the Memorandum of Understanding, the words "Recognition features of Bison A former heavy bombers" shall be deleted and replaced by the words "Recognition features of Bison1 former heavy bombers"; the words "Features making it possible to identify Bison A former heavy bomber" shall be deleted and replaced by the words "Features making it possible to identify Bison B former heavy bomber"; under the category of data "External Observable Features", the words "The Bison A former heavy bomber is a modification of the Bison1 heavy bomber" shall be deleted and replaced by the words "The Bison B former heavy bomber is an airplane converted from the Bison1 heavy bomber".
  7. In the Russian of subparagraph (b)(vi)(2) of Annex G to the Memorandum of Understanding, under the category of data "External Observable Features", the words "The 3MS-2 former heavy bomber is a modification of the 3M1 heavy bomber" shall be deleted and replaced by the words "The 3MS-2 former heavy bomber is an airplane converted from the 3M1 heavy bomber".
  8. In the English of subparagraph 1(b) of Annex I to the Memorandum of Understanding, under the category of data "Heavy Bomber and Former Heavy Bomber Static Displays: Bomber Type", in all four places the designator "Bison B" shall be deleted and replaced by the designator "Bison A".
  9. In the English and Russian of paragraph 8 of Annex I to the Memorandum of Understanding, under the category of data "Former Heavy Bombers", the designator "Bison A", which corresponds to the designator "3MS-2", shall be deleted and replaced by the designator "Bison B"; and the designator "Bison B", which corresponds to the designator "M-4", shall be deleted and replaced by the designator "Bison A".
  10. In the English and Russian of paragraph 3 of Annex J to the Memorandum of Understanding, the words "in accordance with paragraph 7 of Section I of the Notification Protocol" shall be deleted and replaced by the words "in accordance with paragraph 6 of Section I of the Notification Protocol".

OFFICIAL TRANSLATION

[SEAL OF THE USSR]

Soviet Component

of the Joint Compliance

and Inspection Commission

Geneva, Switzerland

December 19, 1991

Ambassador Steven E. Steiner

Representative of the United States of America

to the Joint Compliance and Inspection Commission

Dear Mr. Ambassador:

I have the honor to acknowledge receipt of your letter of December 18, 1991, in which you refer to the Treaty Between the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the United States of America on the Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms, hereinafter referred to as the Treaty, signed in Moscow on July 31, 1991.

I have the honor to accept your proposal that the corrections set forth in the Corrigenda attached to this letter be made in the texts of the Agreed Statements Annex to the Treaty, the Protocol on Inspections and Continuous Monitoring Activities Relating to the Treaty, and the Memorandum of Understanding on the Establishment of the Data Base Relating to the Treaty. I have the further honor to accept your proposal that this letter, accepting the Corrigenda attached hereto, and your letter shall constitute corrections to the texts of the above-mentioned documents.

Sincerely yours,

Gennadiy I. Shabannikov

Representative of the

Union of Soviet Socialist

Republics to the

Joint Compliance and

Inspection Commission

Attachment:

As stated.

OFFICIAL TRANSLATION

ATTACHMENT

I. Agreed Statements Annex

To the Treaty

Between the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics

And the United States of America

On the Reduction and Limitation of

Strategic Offensive Arms,

Hereinafter Referred to as

The Agreed Statements Annex

In the Russian of paragraph (b) of the Tenth Agreed Statement in the Agreed Statements Annex, the words "Notwithstanding the provisions of paragraph 4 of Section VII of the Inspection Protocol" shall be deleted and replaced by the words "Notwithstanding the provisions of paragraph 5 of Section VII of the Inspection Protocol".

II. Protocol on Inspections

And Continuous Monitoring Activities

Relating to the Treaty

Between the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics

And the United States of America

On the Reduction and Limitation of

Strategic Offensive Arms,

Hereinafter Referred to as

The Inspection Protocol

Subparagraph 23(a)(iii) of Section VI of the Inspection Protocol shall read as follows:

"(iii)for ICBMs that are maintained, stored, and transported as assembled missiles in launch canisters or without launch canisters, and for SLBMs that are maintained, stored, and transported as assembled missiles: the diameter and length of an ICBM or SLBM of each type in the shipment configuration that is the shortest configuration specified that holds an assembled ICBM or SLBM of that type without the front section, except for such ICBMs for mobile launchers of ICBMs."

III. The Memorandum of Understanding On the Establishment of the Data Base

Relating to the Treaty

Between the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics

And the United States of America

On the Reduction and Limitation of

Strategic Offensive Arms,

Hereinafter Referred to as

The Memorandum of Understanding

l. In the English of paragraph (b) of Annex C to the Memorandum of Understanding, under the category of data "Bomber Type and Variant of a Type" for the air base for former heavy bombers at Engel's, the designator "Bison A" in the left column shall be deleted and replaced by the designator "Bison B"; and the designator "Bison B" in the right column shall be deleted and replaced by the designator "Bison A".

2. In the English of paragraph (b) of Annex C to the Memorandum of Understanding, under the repair facility for heavy bombers and former heavy bombers at Ryazan' for the category of data "Types of Heavy Bombers and Former Heavy Bombers Normally Repaired at this Facility", the designator "Bison A" shall be deleted and replaced by the designator "Bison B".

3. In the Russian and English of subparagraph (a)(i) of Annex F to the Memorandum of Understanding, for the category of data "Total Length of Missile as a Unit with Launch Canister Without Front Section3 (meters)" under "SS-24 for Silo Launcher" and "SS-24 for Rail-Mobile Launcher", the numbers "19.4" and "19.6" shall be deleted and replaced by the numbers "20.4" and "20.6", respectively.

4. In the Russian and English of subparagraph (b)(i) of Annex F to the Memorandum of Understanding, for the category of data "Rail-Mobile Launcher of ICBMs* (in Transport Position, Without Missile): Width (meters)" under "PK for Rail-Mobile Launcher", the number "2.8" shall be deleted and replaced by the number "2.9".

5. In the Russian and English of subparagraph (b)(ii) of Annex F of the Memorandum of Understanding, for the category of data "Length of Assembled Missile Without Front Section (meters)" under "Poseidon", "Trident I", and "Trident II", the numbers "l0.4", "10.4", and "13.6" shall be deleted and replaced by the numbers "8.1", "10.3", and "13.4", respectively; for the category of data "First Stage Length (meters)" under "Trident II", the number "7.1" shall be deleted and replaced by the number "7.0".

6. In the English of subparagraph (b)(vi)(2) of Annex G to the Memorandum of Understanding, the words "Recognition features of Bison A former heavy bombers" shall be deleted and replaced by the words "Recognition features of Bison B former heavy bombers"; the words "Features making it possible to identify Bison A former heavy bomber" shall be deleted and replaced by the words "Features making it possible to identify Bison B former heavy bomber"; under the category of data "External Observable Features", the words "The Bison A former heavy bomber is a modification of the Bison1 heavy bomber" shall be deleted and replaced by the words "The Bison B former heavy bomber is an airplane converted from the Bison1 heavy bomber".

7. In the Russian of subparagraph (b)(vi)(2) of Annex G to the Memorandum of Understanding, under the category of data "External Observable Features", the words "The 3MS-2 former heavy bomber is a modification of the 3M1 heavy bomber" shall be deleted and replaced by the words "The 3MS-2 former heavy bomber is an airplane converted from the 3M1 heavy bomber".

8. In the English of subparagraph 1(b) of Annex I to the Memorandum of Understanding, under the category of data "Heavy Bomber and Former Heavy Bomber Static Displays: Bomber Type", in all four places the designator "Bison B" shall be deleted and replaced by the designator "Bison A".

9. In the Russian and English of paragraph 8 of Annex I to the Memorandum of Understanding, under the category of data "Former Heavy Bombers", the designator "Bison A", which corresponds to the designator "3MS-2", shall be deleted and replaced by the designator "Bison B"; and the designator "Bison B", which corresponds to the designator "M-4", shall be deleted and replaced by the designator "Bison A".

l0. In the Russian and English of paragraph 3 of Annex J to the Memorandum of Understanding, the words "in accordance with paragraph 7 of Section I of the Notification Protocol" shall be deleted and replaced by the words "in accordance with paragraph 6 of Section 1 of the Notification Protocol".

Geneva, Switzerland

February 3, 1995

STATEMENT OF POLICY BY THE REPUBLIC OF BELARUS

CONCERNING INSPECTION ACTIVITIES UNDER THE START TREATY

The Republic of Belarus, in exercising its rights and fulfilling its obligations concerning inspection activities under the Treaty Between the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the United States of America on the Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms of July 31, 1991, hereinafter referred to as the Treaty, intends to adhere to the following:

The Republic of Belarus understands that inspections on the territory of the United States of America may be conducted by multiparty inspection teams, with the inclusion in such teams of inspectors from the Republic of Belarus, the Republic of Kazakhstan, the Russian Federation, and Ukraine, in a number proportionate to the number of facilities subject to inspection within the territory of each of these states on the date of entry into force of the Treaty.

The Republic of Belarus understands that the Republic of Belarus, the Republic of Kazakhstan, the Russian Federation, and Ukraine have the right to carry out inspection activities on the territory of the United States of America during the entire term of the Treaty, with the understanding that:

(a) The Republic of Belarus, the Republic of Kazakhstan, and Ukraine, for seven years following entry into force of the Treaty, or until completion of the elimination of the strategic offensive arms located on the territory of these States, or until the withdrawal of strategic offensive arms from the territory of these States, whichever is earlier in the case of each of these States, may participate in all inspections on the territory of the United States of America as part of multiparty inspection teams, for which notification is provided by the Russian Federation, and shall each have the right to conduct one inspection each year on the territory of the United States of America, using a multiparty inspection team with the participation of inspectors of the Republic of Belarus, the Republic of Kazakhstan, the Russian Federation, and Ukraine as the Party that provides notification of the intention to conduct an inspection. In this connection, if during the first nine months of each year, the Republic of Belarus, the Republic of Kazakhstan, and Ukraine do not exercise this right, then the Russian Federation may conduct all the inspections remaining until the end of that year as the Party that provides notification of the intention to conduct an inspection.

(b) The Republic of Belarus, the Republic of Kazakhstan, and Ukraine, seven years after entry into force of the Treaty, or after completion of the elimination of the strategic offensive arms located on the territory of these States, or after the withdrawal of strategic offensive arms from the territory of these States, whichever is earlier in the case of each of these States, may participate in one inspection each year on the territory of the United States of America as part of a multiparty inspection team, for which notification is provided by the Russian Federation. If the United States of America conducts more than one inspection each year on the territory of one of these States, during the following year that State shall have the right to participate in an additional number of inspections on the territory of the United States of America, for which notification is provided by the Russian Federation, with the understanding that the total number of inspections in which the Republic of Belarus, the Republic of Kazakhstan, or Ukraine may participate must not exceed the total number of inspections conducted by the United States of America on the territory of that State during the previous year.

The Republic of Belarus understands that the apportionment of personnel among the Republic of Belarus, the Republic of Kazakhstan, the Russian Federation, and Ukraine in the lists of inspectors and monitors, the procedures governing the composition and activities of multiparty inspection teams, as well as the procedure for reimbursement of the relevant costs shall be subject to agreement among the Parties to the Treaty.

The Republic of Belarus understands that the United States of America, the Republic of Belarus, the Republic of Kazakhstan, and Ukraine have agreed on statements of policy regarding the reimbursement of costs for inspections conducted by the United States of America on the territories of the Republic of Belarus, the Republic of Kazakhstan, and Ukraine.

[Initialled]

Aleksandr Baichorov

Geneva, Switzerland

February 3, 1995

STATEMENT OF POLICY BY THE REPUBLIC OF KAZAKHSTAN

CONCERNING INSPECTION ACTIVITIES UNDER THE START TREATY

The Republic of Kazakhstan, in exercising its rights and fulfilling its obligations concerning inspection activities under the Treaty Between the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the United States of America on the Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms of July 31, 1991, hereinafter referred to as the Treaty, intends to adhere to the following:

The Republic of Kazakhstan understands that inspections on the territory of the United States of America may be conducted by multiparty inspection teams, with the inclusion in such teams of inspectors from the Republic of Belarus, the Republic of Kazakhstan, the Russian Federation, and Ukraine, in a number proportionate to the number of facilities subject to inspection within the territory of each of these states on the date of entry into force of the Treaty.

The Republic of Kazakhstan understands that the Republic of Belarus, the Republic of Kazakhstan, the Russian Federation, and Ukraine have the right to carry out inspection activities on the territory of the United States of America during the entire term of the Treaty, with the understanding that:

(a) The Republic of Belarus, the Republic of Kazakhstan, and Ukraine, for seven years following entry into force of the Treaty, or until completion of the elimination of the strategic offensive arms located on the territory of these States, or until the withdrawal of strategic offensive arms from the territory of these States, whichever is earlier in the case of each of these States, may participate in all inspections on the territory of the United States of America as part of multiparty inspection teams, for which notification is provided by the Russian Federation, and shall each have the right to conduct one inspection each year on the territory of the United States of America, using a multiparty inspection team with the participation of inspectors of the Republic of Belarus, the Republic of Kazakhstan, the Russian Federation, and Ukraine as the Party that provides notification of the intention to conduct an inspection. In this connection, if during the first nine months of each year, the Republic of Belarus, the Republic of Kazakhstan, and Ukraine do not exercise this right, then the Russian Federation may conduct all the inspections remaining until the end of that year as the Party that provides notification of the intention to conduct an inspection.

(b) The Republic of Belarus, the Republic of Kazakhstan, and Ukraine, seven years after entry into force of the Treaty, or after completion of the elimination of the strategic offensive arms located on the territory of these States, or after the withdrawal of strategic offensive arms from the territory of these States, whichever is earlier in the case of each of these States, may participate in one inspection each year on the territory of the United States of America as part of a multiparty inspection team, for which notification is provided by the Russian Federation. If the United States of America conducts more than one inspection each year on the territory of one of these States, during the following year that State shall have the right to participate in an additional number of inspections on the territory of the United States of America, for which notification is provided by the Russian Federation, with the understanding that the total number of inspections in which the Republic of Belarus, the Republic of Kazakhstan, or Ukraine may participate must not exceed the total number of inspections conducted by the United States of America on the territory of that State during the previous year.

The Republic of Kazakhstan understands that the apportionment of personnel among the Republic of Belarus, the Republic of Kazakhstan, the Russian Federation, and Ukraine in the lists of inspectors and monitors, the procedures governing the composition and activities of multiparty inspection teams, as well as the procedure for reimbursement of the relevant costs shall be subject to agreement among the Parties to the Treaty.

The Republic of Kazakhstan understands that the United States of America, the Republic of Belarus, the Republic of Kazakhstan, and Ukraine have agreed on statements of policy regarding the reimbursement of costs for inspections conducted by the United States of America on the territories of the Republic of Belarus, the Republic of Kazakhstan, and Ukraine.

[Initialled]

Kairtay Zhabatyrov

Geneva, Switzerland

February 3, 1995

STATEMENT OF POLICY BY THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION

CONCERNING INSPECTION ACTIVITIES UNDER THE START TREATY

The Russian Federation, in exercising its rights and fulfilling its obligations concerning inspection activities under the Treaty Between the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the United States of America on the Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms of July 31, 1991, hereinafter referred to as the Treaty, intends to adhere to the following:

The Russian Federation understands that inspections on the territory of the United States of America may be conducted by multiparty inspection teams, with the inclusion in such teams of inspectors from the Republic of Belarus, the Republic of Kazakhstan, the Russian Federation, and Ukraine, in a number proportionate to the number of facilities subject to inspection within the territory of each of these states on the date of entry into force of the Treaty.

The Russian Federation understands that the Republic of Belarus, the Republic of Kazakhstan, the Russian Federation, and Ukraine have the right to carry out inspection activities on the territory of the United States of America during the entire term of the Treaty, with the understanding that:

(a) The Republic of Belarus, the Republic of Kazakhstan, and Ukraine, for seven years following entry into force of the Treaty, or until completion of the elimination of the strategic offensive arms located on the territory of these States, or until the withdrawal of strategic offensive arms from the territory of these States, whichever is earlier in the case of each of these States, may participate in all inspections on the territory of the United States of America as part of multiparty inspection teams, for which notification is provided by the Russian Federation, and shall each have the right to conduct one inspection each year on the territory of the United States of America, using a multiparty inspection team with the participation of inspectors of the Republic of Belarus, the Republic of Kazakhstan, the Russian Federation, and Ukraine as the Party that provides notification of the intention to conduct an inspection. In this connection, if during the first nine months of each year, the Republic of Belarus, the Republic of Kazakhstan, and Ukraine do not exercise this right, then the Russian Federation may conduct all the inspections remaining until the end of that year as the Party that provides notification of the intention to conduct an inspection.

(b) The Republic of Belarus, the Republic of Kazakhstan, and Ukraine, seven years after entry into force of the Treaty, or after completion of the elimination of the strategic offensive arms located on the territory of these States, or after the withdrawal of strategic offensive arms from the territory of these States, whichever is earlier in the case of each of these States, may participate in one inspection each year on the territory of the United States of America as part of a multiparty inspection team, for which notification is provided by the Russian Federation. If the United States of America conducts more than one inspection each year on the territory of one of these States, during the following year that State shall have the right to participate in an additional number of inspections on the territory of the United States of America, for which notification is provided by the Russian Federation, with the understanding that the total number of inspections in which the Republic of Belarus, the Republic of Kazakhstan, or Ukraine may participate must not exceed the total number of inspections conducted by the United States of America on the territory of that State during the previous year.

The Russian Federation understands that the apportionment of personnel among the Republic of Belarus, the Republic of Kazakhstan, the Russian Federation, and Ukraine in the lists of inspectors and monitors, the procedures governing the composition and activities of multiparty inspection teams, as well as the procedure for reimbursement of the relevant costs shall be subject to agreement among the Parties to the Treaty.

[Initialled]

Mikhail Strel'tsov

Geneva, Switzerland

February 3, 1995

STATEMENT OF POLICY BY UKRAINE

CONCERNING INSPECTION ACTIVITIES UNDER THE START TREATY

Ukraine, in exercising its rights and fulfilling its obligations concerning inspection activities under the Treaty Between the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the United States of America on the Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms of July 31, 1991, hereinafter referred to as the Treaty, intends to adhere to the following:

Ukraine understands that inspections on the territory of the United States of America may be conducted by multiparty inspection teams, with the inclusion in such teams of inspectors from the Republic of Belarus, the Republic of Kazakhstan, the Russian Federation, and Ukraine, in a number proportionate to the number of facilities subject to inspection within the territory of each of these states on the date of entry into force of the Treaty.

Ukraine understands that the Republic of Belarus, the Republic of Kazakhstan, the Russian Federation, and Ukraine have the right to carry out inspection activities on the territory of the United States of America during the entire term of the Treaty, with the understanding that:

(a) The Republic of Belarus, the Republic of Kazakhstan, and Ukraine, for seven years following entry into force of the Treaty, or until completion of the elimination of the strategic offensive arms located on the territory of these States, or until the withdrawal of strategic offensive arms from the territory of these States, whichever is earlier in the case of each of these States, may participate in all inspections on the territory of the United States of America as part of multiparty inspection teams, for which notification is provided by the Russian Federation, and shall each have the right to conduct one inspection each year on the territory of the United States of America, using a multiparty inspection team with the participation of inspectors of the Republic of Belarus, the Republic of Kazakhstan, the Russian Federation, and Ukraine as the Party that provides notification of the intention to conduct an inspection. In this connection, if during the first nine months of each year, the Republic of Belarus, the Republic of Kazakhstan, and Ukraine do not exercise this right, then the Russian Federation may conduct all the inspections remaining until the end of that year as the Party that provides notification of the intention to conduct an inspection.

(b) The Republic of Belarus, the Republic of Kazakhstan, and Ukraine, seven years after entry into force of the Treaty, or after completion of the elimination of the strategic offensive arms located on the territory of these States, or after the withdrawal of strategic offensive arms from the territory of these States, whichever is earlier in the case of each of these States, may participate in one inspection each year on the territory of the United States of America as part of a multiparty inspection team, for which notification is provided by the Russian Federation. If the United States of America conducts more than one inspection each year on the territory of one of these States, during the following year that State shall have the right to participate in an additional number of inspections on the territory of the United States of America, for which notification is provided by the Russian Federation, with the understanding that the total number of inspections in which the Republic of Belarus, the Republic of Kazakhstan, and Ukraine may participate must not exceed the total number of inspections conducted by the United States of America on the territory of that State during the previous year.

Ukraine understands that the apportionment of personnel among the Republic of Belarus, the Republic of Kazakhstan, the Russian Federation, and Ukraine in the lists of inspectors and monitors, the procedures governing the composition and activities of multiparty inspection teams, as well as the procedure for reimbursement of the relevant costs shall be subject to agreement among the Parties to the Treaty.

Ukraine understands that the United States of America, the Republic of Belarus, the Republic of Kazakhstan, and Ukraine have agreed on statements of policy regarding the reimbursement of costs for inspections conducted by the United States of America on the territories of the Republic of Belarus, the Republic of Kazakhstan, and Ukraine.

[Initialled]

Anatoliy Shevtsov

Geneva, Switzerland

February 3, 1995

STATEMENT OF POLICY BY THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

CONCERNING INSPECTION ACTIVITIES UNDER THE START TREATY

The United States of America, in exercising its rights and fulfilling its obligations concerning inspection activities under the Treaty Between the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the United States of America on the Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms of July 31, 1991, hereinafter referred to as the Treaty, intends to adhere to the following:

The United States of America understands that inspections on the territory of the United States of America may be conducted by multiparty inspection teams, with the inclusion in such teams of inspectors from the Republic of Belarus, the Republic of Kazakhstan, the Russian Federation, and Ukraine, in a number proportionate to the number of facilities subject to inspection within the territory of each of these States on the date of entry into force of the Treaty.

The United States of America understands that, for the duration of the Treaty, the Republic of Belarus, the Republic of Kazakhstan, the Russian Federation, and Ukraine each has the right to conduct inspections on the territory of the United States of America with the understanding having been reached among these Parties that:

(a) The Republic of Belarus, the Republic of Kazakhstan, and Ukraine, for seven years following entry into force of the Treaty, or until completion of the elimination of strategic offensive arms located on the territory of these States, or until the withdrawal of strategic offensive arms from the territory of these States, whichever is earlier in the case of each of these States, may participate in all inspections on the territory of the United States of America as part of multiparty inspection teams, for which notification is provided by the Russian Federation, and shall each have the right to conduct one inspection each year on the territory of the United States of America using a multiparty inspection team with the participation of inspectors of the Republic of Belarus, the Republic of Kazakhstan, the Russian Federation, and Ukraine as the Party that provides notification of the intention to conduct an inspection. In this connection, if during the first nine months of each year, the Republic of Belarus, the Republic of Kazakhstan, and Ukraine do not exercise this right, then the Russian Federation may conduct all the inspections remaining until the end of that year as the Party that provides notification of the intention to conduct an inspection.

(b) The Republic of Belarus, the Republic of Kazakhstan, and Ukraine, seven years after entry into force of the Treaty, or after completion of the elimination of the strategic offensive arms located on the territory of these States, or after strategic offensive arms have been removed from the territory of these States, whichever is earlier in the case of each of these States, may participate in one inspection each year on the territory of the United States of America as part of a multiparty inspection team, for which notification is provided by the Russian Federation. If the United States of America conducts more than one inspection each year on the territory of one of these States, during the following year that State shall have the right to participate in an additional number of inspections on the territory of the United States of America, for which notification is provided by the Russian Federation, with the understanding that the total number of inspections in which the Republic of Belarus, the Republic of Kazakhstan, or Ukraine may participate must not exceed the total number of inspections conducted by the United States of America on the territory of that State during the previous year.

The United States of America understands that the apportionment of personnel between the Republic of Belarus, the Republic of Kazakhstan, the Russian Federation, and Ukraine in the lists of inspectors and monitors, the composition and activities of multiparty inspection teams, as well as the procedure for reimbursement of the relevant costs shall be subject to agreement among the Parties to the Treaty.

The United States of America understands that the United States of America, the Republic of Belarus, the Republic of Kazakhstan, and Ukraine have agreed on statements of policy regarding the reimbursement of costs for inspections conducted by the United States of America on the territories of the Republic of Belarus, the Republic of Kazakhstan, and Ukraine.

[Initialled]

Steven Steiner

Geneva, Switzerland

February 3, 1995

STATEMENT OF POLICY BY THE REPUBLIC OF BELARUS CONCERNING

REIMBURSEMENT OF INSPECTION COSTS

The Republic of Belarus makes the following statement concerning its understanding of the plans of the United States of America with respect to costs of inspections conducted by the United States of America on its territory under the Treaty Between the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the United States of America on the Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms of July 31, 1991, hereinafter referred to as the Treaty.

If the Republic of Belarus does not conduct inspections, except as provided below, on the territory of the United States of America during a six-month period beginning from the date of entry into force of the Treaty and for each subsequent six-month period, the Republic of Belarus understands that the United States of America intends to reimburse the Republic of Belarus the inspected Party costs for inspections conducted by the United States of America during that six-month period in the following cost categories: meals, lodging, work space, transportation, and as necessary, medical care for the inspection team and aircrew members of the United States of America, parking and security protection for the inspection airplanes at the point of entry, and transportation of monitors at the point of entry. To reimburse such costs, the Republic of Belarus understands that the United States of America plans to use the procedures for settlement of accounts contained in the Treaty and agreements reached within the framework of the Joint Compliance and Inspection Commission.

The Republic of Belarus understands that the United States of America will consider inspections conducted on the territory of the United States of America, notified by the Parties that have exchanged statements of policy concerning reimbursement of inspection costs with the United States, by a multiparty inspection team composed of inspectors from states that have exchanged statements of policy concerning reimbursement of inspection costs, and up to one inspector from each state that has not exchanged statements of policy concerning reimbursement of inspection costs, to be conducted by the Party that provided the notification of inspection to the United States of America in fulfilling its obligations provided for in the Treaty.

The Republic of Belarus understands that the United States of America does not plan to assign cost responsibilities as specified above to any of the states that have exchanged statements of policy concerning reimbursement of inspection costs for one inspection on U.S. territory during the baseline inspection period provided for by the Treaty that is conducted by a multiparty inspection team.

[Initialled]

Aleksandr Baichorov

Geneva, Switzerland

February 3, 1995

STATEMENT OF POLICY BY THE REPUBLIC OF KAZAKHSTAN CONCERNING

REIMBURSEMENT OF INSPECTION COSTS

The Republic of Kazakhstan makes the following statement concerning its understanding of the plans of the United States of America with respect to costs of inspections conducted by the United States of America on its territory under the Treaty Between the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the United States of America on the Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms of July 31, 1991, hereinafter referred to as the Treaty.

If the Republic of Kazakhstan does not conduct inspections, except as provided below, on the territory of the United States of America during a six-month period beginning from the date of entry into force of the Treaty and for each subsequent six-month period, the Republic of Kazakhstan understands that the United States of America intends to reimburse the Republic of Kazakhstan the inspected Party costs for inspections conducted by the United States of America during that six-month period in the following cost categories: meals, lodging, work space, transportation, and as necessary, medical care for the inspection team and aircrew members of the United States of America, parking and security protection for the inspection airplanes at the point of entry, and transportation of monitors at the point of entry. To reimburse such costs, the Republic of Kazakhstan understands that the United States of America plans to use the procedures for settlement of accounts contained in the Treaty and agreements reached within the framework of the Joint Compliance and Inspection Commission.

The Republic of Kazakhstan understands that the United States of America will consider inspections conducted on the territory of the United States of America, notified by the Parties that have exchanged statements of policy concerning reimbursement of inspection costs with the United States, by a multiparty inspection team composed of inspectors from states that have exchanged statements of policy concerning reimbursement of inspection costs, and up to one inspector from each state that has not exchanged statements of policy concerning reimbursement of inspection costs, to be conducted by the Party that provided the notification of inspection to the United States of America in fulfilling its obligations provided for in the Treaty.

The Republic of Kazakhstan understands that the United States of America does not plan to assign cost responsibilities as specified above to any of the states that have exchanged statements of policy concerning reimbursement of inspection costs for one inspection on U.S. territory during the baseline inspection period provided for by the Treaty that is conducted by a multiparty inspection team.

[Initialled]

Kairtay Zhanbatyrov

Geneva, Switzerland

February 3, 1995

STATEMENT OF POLICY BY UKRAINE CONCERNING

REIMBURSEMENT OF INSPECTION COSTS

UNDER THE START TREATY

Ukraine makes the following statement concerning its understanding of the plans of the United States of America with respect to costs of inspections conducted by the United States of America on its territory under the Treaty Between the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the United States of America on the Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms of July 31, 1991, hereinafter referred to as the Treaty.

If Ukraine does not conduct inspections, except as provided below, on the territory of the United States of America during a six-month period beginning from the date of entry into force of the Treaty and for each subsequent six-month period, Ukraine understands that the United States of America intends to reimburse Ukraine the inspected Party costs for inspections conducted by the United States of America during that six-month period in the following cost categories: meals, lodging, work space, transportation, and as necessary, medical care for the inspection team and aircrew members of the United States of America, parking and security protection for the inspection airplanes at the point of entry, and transportation of monitors at the point of entry. To reimburse such costs, Ukraine understands that the United States of America plans to use the procedures for settlement of accounts contained in the Treaty and agreements reached within the framework of the Joint Compliance and Inspection Commission.

Ukraine understands that the United States of America will consider inspections conducted on the territory of the United States of America, notified by the Parties that have exchanged statements of policy concerning reimbursement of inspection costs with the United States, by a multiparty inspection team composed of inspectors from states that have exchanged statements of policy concerning reimbursement of inspection costs, and up to one inspector from each state that has not exchanged statements of policy concerning reimbursement of inspection costs, to be conducted by the Party that provided the notification of inspection to the United States of America in fulfilling its obligations provided for in the Treaty.

Ukraine understands that the United States of America does not plan to assign cost responsibilities as specified above to any of the states that have exchanged statements of policy concerning reimbursement of inspection costs for one inspection on U.S. territory during the baseline inspection period provided for by the Treaty that is conducted by a multiparty inspection team.

[Initialled]

Anatoliy Shevtsov

Geneva, Switzerland

February 3, 1995

STATEMENT OF POLICY BY THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

CONCERNING REIMBURSEMENT OF INSPECTION COSTS

The United States of America makes the following statement concerning its plans with respect to costs of START Treaty inspections conducted on the territory of the Republic of Belarus:

If the Republic of Belarus does not conduct inspections on the territory of the United States of America, except as provided below, during a six-month period beginning from the date of entry into force of the Treaty and for each subsequent six-month period, the United States of America intends to reimburse the Republic of Belarus the inspected Party costs for inspections conducted by the United States of America for that six-month period in the following cost categories: meals, lodging, work space, transportation, and as necessary, medical care for the inspection team and aircrew members of the United States of America, parking and security protection for the inspection aircraft at the point of entry, and transportation of monitors at the point of entry. To reimburse such costs, the United States of America plans to use the procedures for settlement of accounts contained in the Treaty and agreements reached within the framework of the Joint Compliance and Inspection Commission.

With regard to inspections notified by Parties that have exchanged statements of policy concerning reimbursement of inspection costs with the United States of America, the United States of America plans to consider inspections on the territory of the United States of America by a multiparty inspection team composed of inspectors from states that have exchanged statements of policy concerning reimbursement of inspection costs, and up to one inspector from each state that has not exchanged statements of policy concerning reimbursement of inspection costs, to be conducted by the Party that provided the notification of inspection to the United States of America in fulfilling its obligation provided for in the Treaty.

The United States of America does not plan to assign cost responsibilities as specified above to any of the states that have exchanged statements of policy concerning reimbursement of inspection costs for one inspection on the territory of the United States of America during the baseline inspection period provided for by the Treaty that is conducted by a multiparty inspection team.

[Initialled]

Steven Steiner

Geneva, Switzerland

February 3, 1995

STATEMENT OF POLICY BY THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

CONCERNING REIMBURSEMENT OF INSPECTION COSTS

The United States of America makes the following statement concerning its plans with respect to costs of START Treaty inspections conducted on the territory of the Republic of Kazakhstan:

If the Republic of Kazakhstan does not conduct inspections on the territory of the United States of America, except as provided below, during a six-month period beginning from the date of entry into force of the Treaty and for each subsequent six-month period, the United States of America intends to reimburse the Republic of Kazakhstan the inspected Party costs for inspections conducted by the United States of America for that six-month period in the following cost categories: meals, lodging, work space, transportation, and as necessary, medical care for the inspection team and aircrew members of the United States of America, parking and security protection for the inspection aircraft at the point of entry, and transportation of monitors at the point of entry. To reimburse such costs, the United States of America plans to use the procedures for settlement of accounts contained in the Treaty and agreements reached within the framework of the Joint Compliance and Inspection Commission.

With regard to inspections notified by Parties that have exchanged statements of policy concerning reimbursement of inspection costs with the United States of America, the United States of America plans to consider inspections on the territory of the United States of America by a multiparty inspection team composed of inspectors from states that have exchanged statements of policy concerning reimbursement of inspection costs, and up to one inspector from each state that has not exchanged statements of policy concerning reimbursement of inspection costs, to be conducted by the Party that provided the notification of inspection to the United States of America in fulfilling its obligation provided for in the Treaty.

The United States of America does not plan to assign cost responsibilities as specified above to any of the states that have exchanged statements of policy concerning reimbursement of inspection costs for one inspection on the territory of the United States of America during the baseline inspection period provided for by the Treaty that is conducted by a multiparty inspection team.

[Initialled]

Steven Steiner

Geneva, Switzerland

February 3, 1995

STATEMENT OF POLICY BY THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

CONCERNING REIMBURSEMENT OF INSPECTION COSTS

The United States of America makes the following statement concerning its plans with respect to costs of START Treaty inspections conducted on the territory of Ukraine:

If Ukraine does not conduct inspections on the territory of the United States of America, except as provided below, during a six-month period beginning from the date of entry into force of the Treaty and for each subsequent six-month period, the United States of America intends to reimburse Ukraine the inspected Party costs for inspections conducted by the United States of America for that six-month period in the following cost categories: meals, lodging, work space, transportation, and as necessary, medical care for the inspection team and aircrew members of the United States of America, parking and security protection for the inspection aircraft at the point of entry, and transportation of monitors at the point of entry. To reimburse such costs, the United States of America plans to use the procedures for settlement of accounts contained in the Treaty and agreements reached within the framework of the Joint Compliance and Inspection Commission.

With regard to inspections notified by Parties that have exchanged statements of policy concerning reimbursement of inspection costs with the United States of America, the United States of America plans to consider inspections on the territory of the United States of America by a multiparty inspection team composed of inspectors from states that have exchanged statements of policy concerning reimbursement of inspection costs, and up to one inspector from each state that has not exchanged statements of policy concerning reimbursement of inspection costs, to be conducted by the Party that provided the notification of inspection to the United States of America in fulfilling its obligation provided for in the Treaty.

The United States of America does not plan to assign cost responsibilities as specified above to any of the states that have exchanged statements of policy concerning reimbursement of inspection costs for one inspection on the territory of the United States of America during the baseline inspection period provided for by the Treaty that is conducted by a multiparty inspection team.

[Initialled]

Steven Steiner

ANNEX J.

OTHER REQUIREMENTS

  1. The Parties shall provide, as a category of data, geographic coordinates relating to the data contained in this Memorandum. All geographic coordinates provided for in this Memorandum shall be expressed in latitude and longitude to the nearest minute, except in cases where two or more locations are within one minute of latitude and longitude of each other, and are of the same type or have the same appearance; in such cases, the latitude and longitude shall be expressed to include seconds. Geographic coordinates for silos used as launch control centers, other launch control centers, and silo launchers of ICBMs located in a silo launcher group at an ICBM base shall be expressed to the nearest minute. In specifying geographic coordinates, each Party shall use the system of coordinates commonly employed by it.
  2. The geographic coordinates for training facilities specified in Annex A to this Memorandum and for test ranges shall be specified as follows:

(a) If such a training facility or a test range comprises a single area of less than ten square kilometers, the geographic coordinates of its reference point shall be provided pursuant to this Memorandum and shall be specified on the site diagram, but if such an area is ten square kilometers or greater, the geographic coordinates of points on its perimeter, connected by straight or curved lines to delineate boundaries, shall be specified using, where possible, man-made or natural features such as roads, fences, railroad tracks, or rivers.

(b) If such a training facility or a test range comprises a number of non-contiguous areas, the geographic coordinates of the reference point for the entire training facility or test range shall be provided pursuant to this Memorandum and shall be specified on the site diagram. In addition, for each of its separate areas of less than ten square kilometers, the geographic coordinates of its reference point shall be specified on the site diagram, but if such an area is ten square kilometers or greater, the geographic coordinates of points on its perimeter, connected as described in subparagraph (a) of this paragraph, shall be specified.

3. If coordinates of two or more locations are specified as provided for in paragraph 1 of this Annex, but the other Party considers that these locations have the same appearance, notification thereof shall be provided in accordance with paragraph 6 of Section I of the Notification Protocol. In this case, the Party providing the coordinates shall, within 15 days, provide clarifying information permitting the other Party to differentiate between the locations within one minute of latitude and longitude of each other, or provide their coordinates to include seconds of sufficient accuracy to differentiate between the locations.

4. The Parties shall provide site diagrams for each facility at which baseline data inspections, data update inspections, new facility and suspect-site inspections may be conducted; and for each facility subject to continuous monitoring, in accordance with the following:

(a) No later than 30 days after signature of the Treaty, each Party shall provide site diagrams for each facility listed in this Memorandum at which baseline data inspections and data update inspections may be conducted, and at which suspect-site inspections may be conducted, and for each facility subject to continuous monitoring.

(b) Thereafter, for each new facility provided for in this paragraph, each Party shall provide site diagrams.

All such site diagrams shall be drawn to scale and shall include boundaries of the facility, road and rail entrances/exits, facility reference points with geographic coordinates, and scale of the site diagram.

5. For ICBM bases, the following site diagrams shall be provided:

ICBM base for silo launchers of ICBMs -- a site diagram of the entire ICBM base and a site diagram of the maintenance facility.

ICBM base for road-mobile launchers of ICBMs -- a site diagram of the entire ICBM base, a site diagram of the maintenance facility, and a site diagram of each restricted area.

ICBM base for rail-mobile launchers of ICBMs -- a site diagram of the entire ICBM base, a site diagram of the rail garrison and a site diagram of the maintenance facility if the maintenance facility is located outside the rail garrison. If the maintenance facility is within the rail garrison, the site diagram of the entire ICBM base shall not be required, and in this case the maintenance facility shall be shown on the site diagram for the rail garrison, and a separate site diagram of the maintenance facility shall not be required.

Each site diagram of the entire ICBM base shall be drawn in a simplified form. Such a simplified site diagram shall consist of the following:

For each group of silo launchers of ICBMs, only its name or designation shall be required to be specified, and the location of each silo launcher of ICBMs shall be depicted;

For each restricted area, its name or designation shall be specified, and the reference point and approximate boundary of each such restricted area shall be depicted;

For each rail garrison, its name shall be specified, and the reference point, location and designation of each parking site, each rail entrance/exit, and connecting rail lines shall be depicted.

For each maintenance facility, its name shall be specified, and the reference point and approximate boundary of the maintenance facility shall be depicted.

In addition, the name of the entire ICBM base, reference point with geographic coordinates for the entire ICBM base, and the network of major roads that connect the maintenance facility with the groups of silo launchers of ICBMs, the restricted areas, or the rail garrisons shall be depicted on a simplified site diagram. In all other respects, each simplified site diagram of the entire ICBM base shall meet all requirements set forth in subparagraphs 9(a) and 9(b)(i) of this Annex.

6. Site diagrams of deployment areas shall not be required. The boundaries of deployment areas shall be defined by straight lines connecting points on the terrain, the geographic coordinates of which shall be provided pursuant to this Memorandum. Site diagrams of restricted areas shall show the road network connecting fixed structures for road-mobile launchers of ICBMs. Site diagrams for rail garrisons shall show all rail lines, rail entrances/exits, and parking sites within the rail garrison, and the maintenance facility if the maintenance facility is within the rail garrison. Site diagrams of rail garrisons need not have boundaries shown. If the boundaries of a rail garrison are not shown, the site diagram of such a rail garrison shall be drawn to include all parking sites and rail entrances/exits, as well as all rail lines and associated structures that are large enough to contain items of inspection, except for those structures where reentry vehicles are stored.

7. The site diagrams of facilities associated with SLBM launchers shall show the fixed piers and wharves at these facilities.

8. Site diagrams for air bases for heavy bombers and former heavy bombers shall depict runways and taxiways. Additionally, parking areas, revetments, shelters, hangars, and all locations where heavy bombers are parked or maintained shall be depicted on the site diagram.

9. For site diagrams of facilities provided pursuant to this Memorandum, the following requirements are established:

(a) All site diagrams shall meet the following requirements:

(i) The title of a site diagram shall provide the name and function of the facility depicted on the site diagram as it appears in this Memorandum, reference point geographic coordinates of this facility provided pursuant to this Memorandum, and the day, month, and year that the diagram was prepared. A site diagram that does not depict the entire facility, but only a portion of that facility, shall include the above-mentioned title for the entire facility and an additional sub-title with similar information for that portion of the facility. The information shall be provided in both English and Russian.

(ii) The facility reference point, as specified by geographic coordinates provided pursuant to this Memorandum or on the facility site diagram, shall be indicated on the site diagram by a "+" sign and by the letters "RP" (Reference Point) near that sign.

(iii) An arrow indicating the orientation of the facility relative to geographic (true) north shall be included on the site diagram.

(iv) The cartographic projection method used as the basis for a site diagram shall provide an undistorted view of the facility.

(v) The site diagram shall be drawn so that the depicted facility fills approximately 80 percent of either the vertical or horizontal dimension of a page. At a minimum, a page must be 21 x 27.9 centimeters. The site diagram shall include a bar scale, showing the scale of the site diagram in meters or kilometers, and a numerical ratio 1:S, where "S" is the number indicating the factor of reduction used in depicting on the site diagram the actual measurements taken in the field.

(vi) Symbols shall be used to draw site diagrams to represent, for example, the boundaries of the facility, road and rail entrances and exits, structures, and roads. A list of the symbols used, with a clear explanation of what is represented by them, shall be included by the Parties on the front or reverse side of each site diagram, or one copy of such a list shall be included with each exchange of site diagrams between the Parties.

(b) Site diagrams of facilities, except those required for continuous monitoring activities, shall meet the following additional requirements:

(i) Facility boundaries shall be shown on the site diagram that, at a minimum, enclose the structures used for, and the area associated with, items declared at that facility, as well as the structures used to contain the support equipment declared at that facility. The boundaries shall be clearly delineated by using, where possible, man-made or natural features such as roads, fences, railroad tracks, or rivers.

(ii) The network of major roads within the facility shall be shown on the site diagram, but if the facility consists of two or more non-contiguous areas, the network of major roads connecting these separate areas shall also be shown.

(iii) At a minimum, all structures used for items declared at that facility, and the structures used to contain the support equipment declared at that facility shall be shown within the boundary of that facility on the site diagram. Additionally, all structures that are intended for, and are large enough to be used for, items or support equipment declared at that facility shall be shown within the boundary of that facility, except those structures the entrances of which are not large enough to permit passage of such items or support equipment. If such structures are below ground, the entrances shall be marked and an outline of the below-ground structure shall be shown on the site diagram. Structures shown on the site diagram shall be in the shape of the area occupied by them or the area covered by the roofs of those structures and shall be accurately shown in proper scale and orientation to other structures and features shown on the site diagram. Notwithstanding the provisions of this subparagraph or of subparagraph 9(b)(i) above, silo training launchers and silo test launchers shall be shown on the site diagram of the facility at which they are declared, either outside or within the boundary of that facility. (4)

(iv) In case of construction of additional structures at facilities or elimination of the existing structures specified in subparagraph (b) (iii) of this paragraph, no updating of site diagrams provided pursuant to this Memorandum shall be required. During pre-inspection procedures, a member of the in-country escort shall provide the inspectors a copy of the site diagram, updated to show changes in such structures and all other structures that are large enough to contain items and support equipment subject to inspection at that facility, except those structures the entrances of which are too small to permit passage of such items or support equipment. This process shall constitute an official update of site diagrams.

(c) Site diagrams for facilities subject to continuous monitoring shall meet the following additional requirements:

(i) The outer perimeter of such a facility shall be delineated by a single,continuous line drawn on the site diagram.

(ii) The proposed boundary of the perimeter continuous monitoring area shall be delineated by a dashed line.

(iii) Additionally, the portal and all road exits and personnel exits shall be depicted.

(iv) Finalized site diagrams of such a facility shall be prepared followingcompletion of the engineering survey.

10. Photographs of assembled ICBMs; assembled SLBMs; first stages of ICBMs; first stages of SLBMs; launch canisters for assembled ICBMs; mobile launchers of ICBMs; fixed structures for mobile launchers of ICBMs; support equipment; long-range nuclear ALCMs; and heavy bombers and former heavy bombers subject to inspection of, as applicable, all types, categories, variants, and versions that are specified in this Memorandum shall be appended to this Memorandum. In addition, photographs of the distinguishing features of heavy bombers and former heavy bombers, specified in Annex G to this Memorandum, shall be provided during distinguishability exhibitions. All photographs shall meet the following requirements:

(a) All photographs shall be taken using black and white film.

(b) All photographs shall be taken with adequate lighting. The use of flash and lighting equipment shall be allowed.

(c) The object being photographed shall contrast with the background in the photograph.

(d) All photographs shall be of high definition and in focus.

(e) For each object, one photograph, at least 18 by 24 centimeters, including 1.5 centimeter borders, shall be provided. For objects other than heavy bombers, all photographs shall be taken at the same level as the object being photographed with the camera placed perpendicular to the longitudinal axis of the object. Road-mobile launchers of ICBMs shall be photographed without tarpaulins or covers. In this connection, ICBM launchers mounted on a trailer or semi-trailer shall be photographed both with and without prime movers. A road-mobile launcher of ICBMs shall be photographed both with and without a missile, in a transport position. For rail-mobile launchers of ICBMs, photographs of railcars (flatcars) shall be provided. For heavy bombers and former heavy bombers subject to inspection, the

photographs shall be taken from the front right-hand side, at an angle of 30-45o to the longitudinal axis of the heavy bomber. These photographs shall show the heavy bomber with the maximum number of nuclear armaments for which it is externally equipped.

(f) The object that is being photographed shall fill at least 80 percent of the photograph (not including borders) in either horizontal or vertical aspect.

(g) A reference gauge shall be included in each photograph together with the object. The gauge shall have alternating half-meter sections in black and white. It must be long enough to provide accurate scaling and must be placed against the object or in close proximity to it. If a reference gauge with sections of a different length is used, the length of these sections (increments) shall be specified on the label on the photograph.

(h) Each photograph shall be labeled in both English and Russian to include the type and variant of a type of object photographed, as they are specified in this Memorandum.

11. For each base or facility specified in Annexes A, B, and C to this Memorandum, each Party shall provide data on each ICBM, SLBM, and heavy bomber of a type and variant of a type based or stored at that base or facility, according to paragraphs 1, 2, and 3 of Section I of the Notification Protocol.

12. Each Party shall:

(a) For each measurement of the dimensions of items specified in Annexes F, G, and H to this Memorandum, specify all values to the nearest 0.01 meter if the value of the dimension being measured is less than two meters and to the nearest 0.1 meter if the value of the dimension being measured is two or more meters.

(b) For variants, specify separately technical data for all variants of a type specified in Annexes F, G, and H to this Memorandum.

13. For the purposes of confirming the type of ICBM or SLBM, the length of an assembled ICBM or SLBM without its front section shall be the distance from the edge of the main engine nozzle of the first stage to:

(a) the place where the missile joins the front section, or

(b) the forward point of the missile if the front section is inside the missile airframe or its reentry vehicles are inside the missile airframe.

14. For the purposes of the Treaty that are unrelated to confirming a new type of ICBM or SLBM, first stage length shall be:

(a) For ICBMs or SLBMs maintained, stored, and transported as assembled missiles in launch canisters or without launch canisters, the distance from the edge of the main engine nozzle to the edge of the ICBM or SLBM airframe where the first stage separates during flight.

(b) For ICBMs or SLBMs maintained, stored, and transported as stages, the distance from the lower edge of the main engine nozzle to the place where the first stage, in the form in which it exits the production facility, joins the rest of the missile airframe.

15. For purposes of confirming a new type of ICBM or SLBM on the basis of a change in the length of the first stage (with or without a change in throw-weight), the length of the first stage shall be:

(a) For solid-propellant first stages, the distance from the point where the aft end dome of the motor case joins with the nozzle to the upper point of the forward end dome of the motor case.

(b) For liquid propellant first stages, the distance from the aft end of the propellant tank nearest the main engine nozzle to the forward end of the propellant tank farthest from the main engine nozzle.

16. For purposes of measuring the diameter of stages of ICBMs and SLBMs, the diameter shall be the maximum external diameter of the stage excluding protruding elements.

17. For each of its submarine bases, each Party shall provide, through diplomatic channels no later than 30 days after entry into force of the Treaty, a coastlines and waters diagram on which shall be identified the coastline of the inspection site, the coastline adjacent to the other piers and wharves at which a ballistic missile submarine that is considered by the inspected Party to be located at the submarine base might be moored, and the waters within arcs with a radius of five kilometers from such coastlines. In the event such coastlines and waters change, a new coastlines and waters diagram reflecting such change shall be provided through diplomatic channels no less than 30 days in advance of the effective date of the change. Coastlines and waters diagrams provided pursuant to this paragraph shall be used only for the purposes of the procedures set forth in paragraph 4 and subparagraph 8(d) of Section IX of the Inspection Protocol.(5)

18. Geographic coordinates pertaining to data in the Memorandum of Understanding, and site diagrams provided by the Parties pursuant to the Treaty, and coastlines and waters diagrams provided by the Parties pursuant to the Treaty shall not be released to the public by any Party other than the Party that provided such geographic coordinates and such diagrams in fulfilling its obligations provided for in the Treaty, unless otherwise agreed. Additional data and other information may be agreed by the Parties within the framework of the Joint Compliance and Inspection Commission for inclusion in this paragraph. The provisions of this paragraph shall not affect the rights and obligations of the Parties with respect to the communication of such data and other information to those individuals who, because of their official responsibilities, require such data or other information to carry out activities related to the fulfilliment of the obligations provided for in the Treaty.(6)

19. For each change to the boundary of a facility shown on the existing site diagram of the facility provided pursuant to this Memorandum that would result in the exclusion from within such boundary of any structure that was shown within such boundary pursuant to subparagraph 9(b)(iii) of this Annex, the change shall become effective after the following requirements are met:

(a) the provisions of paragraph 2 of Section IX of the Conversion or Elimination Protocol have been met with respect to the portions of the facility to be excluded from within the boundary of the facility;

(b) for all structures that were shown on the existing site diagram pursuant to subparagraph 9(b)(iii) of this Annex and that would be excluded from within the boundary of the facility, information has been provided by the Party changing the boundary of the facility, within the framework of the Joint Compliance and Inspection Commission or through diplomatic channels, on its intent with regard to:

(i) the structures that will remain unchanged but which that Party declares will no longer be used for items of inspection;

(ii) the structures that will be destroyed;

(iii) the structures that will be converted in a manner so that they are not large enough to contain items of inspection or their entrances are not large enough to permit passage of items of inspection; and

(iv) the approximate effective date of the change;

(c) agreement has been reached, within the framework of the Joint Compliance and Inspection Commission, on:

(i) the new boundary of the facility; and

(ii) inspections of portions of the facility to be excluded from within the boundary of the facility. The procedures for such inspections shall be agreed taking into account the plans specified pursuant to subparagraph (b) of this paragraph for each structure, including its possible destruction or conversion. Such procedures and plans shall be recorded in the agreement reached pursuant to this subparagraph. Unless otherwise agreed, the procedures for such inspections shall be based on the provisions contained in, as applicable, Sections XII and XIII of the Inspection Protocol; and

(d) a notification has been provided in accordance with paragraph 19 of Section I of the Notification Protocol.

20. For each change to the boundary of a facility shown on the existing site diagram of the facility provided pursuant to this Memorandum that would not result in the exclusion from within such boundary of any structure that was shown within such boundary pursuant to subparagraph 9 (b) (iii) of this Annex, the change shall become effective after the following requirements are met:

(a) agreement has been reached, within the framework of the Joint Compliance and Inspection Commission, on:

(i) the new boundary of the facility; and

(ii) inspection of portions of the facility to be excluded from within the boundary of the facility. Unless otherwise agreed, the procedures for such inspection shall be based on the provisions contained in Section XII of the Inspection Protocol;

(b) information has been provided by the Party changing the boundary of the facility on the approximate effective date of the change; and

(c) a notification has been provided in accordance with paragraph 19 of Section I of the Notification Protocol.

21. For each change to the boundary of a facility shown on the existing site diagram of the facility provided pursuant to this Memorandum that would not result in the exclusion of any portion of the existing inspection site from within such boundary, the change shall become effective on the date specified in the notification of the change to such boundary provided in accordance with paragraph 19 of Section I of the Notification Protocol.(7)

(1) This agreement was not included in original publication of the Treaty. It is inlcuded here for completeness.

(2) Revised official spelling.

(3) This statement and the accompanying statement by the USSR jointly comprise Joint Statement Number 1.

(4) JCIC Agreement No. 2, Paragraph 8.

(5) JCIC Agreement No. 13, Article 1, Paragraph 4.

(6) JCIC Agreement No. 17, Article 2.

(7) JCIC Agreement No. 29, Article 1.