ARTICLE-BY-ARTICLE ANALYSIS OF DECLARATIONS AND STATEMENTS ASSOCIATED WITH THE TREATY

bbbbb In addition to the formal agreements and exchanges of letters, the Parties also exchanged various statements and declarations. A variety of joint and other statements were exchanged in Geneva during the negotiations. Declarations" on sea-launched cruise missiles and the Soviet Backfire (Tu-22M) bomber were exchanged between the U.S. Secretary of State and the Soviet Foreign Minister in Moscow on July 31, 1991. The texts analyzed below were handed over in written form. The purpose and status of these statements and declarations vary, as indicated below.

DECLARATIONS

bbbbb The United States and Soviet Union exchanged identically worded Declarations of Policy Concerning Sea-Launched Cruise Missiles." The Soviet side also provided a Declaration Concerning the TU-22M Medium Bomber" (known to the United States as Backfire). Both Declarations are the results of political compromises which arose during the negotiations. Both are politically binding" rather than legally binding." The difference is as follows:

bbbbb An undertaking or commitment that is understood to be legally binding carries with it both the obligation of each Party to comply with the undertaking and the right of each Party to enforce the obligation under international law. A political" undertaking is not governed by international law and there are no applicable rules pertaining to compliance, modification, or withdrawal. Until and unless a Party extricates itself from its political" undertaking, which it may do without legal penalty, it has given a promise to honor that commitment, and the other Party has every reason to be concerned about compliance with such undertakings. If a Party contravenes a political commitment, it will be subject to an appropriate political response.

1. SEA-LAUNCHED CRUISE MISSILE DECLARATIONS

bbbbb The Declaration of Policy by the United States of America Concerning Nuclear Sea-Launched Cruise Missiles" consists of eleven unnumbered paragraphs. The first paragraph places the Declaration in context and undertakes a politically binding obligation to make annual declarations of the planned deployments of long-range nuclear SLCMs. The second paragraph makes it clear that the U.S. declaration of SLCM deployments will be made only on a reciprocal basis and specifies that the first such declaration will be provided on the date of entry into force of the Treaty.

bbbbb The third, fourth, fifth, and sixth paragraphs specify what must be included in the annual declarations. The obligation is to declare the maximum number of deployed nuclear sea-launched cruise missiles for each of the following five years. The Parties agreed that the forms of the Declaration would be as follows: For the year beginning , 199 , the deployments of nuclear sea-launched cruise missiles planned by the United States of America will not exceed ." (As previously noted, the wording of the declaration is the same for Soviet systems.) The declarations may be revised annually. That is, if in 1992 the United States were to declare that it planned to deploy 300 nuclear Sea-Launched Cruise Missiles in 1994, the U.S. 1993 Declaration could alter that number either by increasing it or decreasing it. The Parties agree, however, that the number of deployed nuclear sea-launched cruise missiles would not exceed 880 in any one year. Note that this is a limit on the number actually deployed (i.e., the number actually on-board surface ships and submarines), not on the number possessed. There is no limit on the number of nuclear sea-launched cruise missiles the Parties may possess. A limit on deployment of 880 long-range nuclear sea-launched cruise missiles is larger than any current or planned U.S. inventory of long-range nuclear sea-launched cruise missiles.

bbbbb On September 27, 1991, as part of a far-reaching initiative on nuclear weapons, the President announced that the United States will withdraw all tactical nuclear weapons from its surface ships and attack submarines, meaning that all nuclear Tomahawk cruise missiles will be removed from U.S. ships and submarines. Therefore, although the U.S. will continue to abide by its political commitment to provide an annual declaration of planned deployments, the annual U.S. declaration will be zero as soon as the Department of the Navy completes implementation of the President's directive. Likewise, consistent with President Gorbachev's October 4, 1991, statement on the withdrawal of Soviet naval tactical nuclear weapons, the annual Soviet declaration is also expected to be zero.

bbbbb Paragraphs 5 and 6 make is clear that the declarations only apply to nuclear sea-launched cruise missiles of ranges greater than 600 kilometers. Non-nuclear SLCMs are not covered and nuclear SLCMs of ranges between 300 and 600 kilometers are not subject to declarations, but are covered in paragraph 10.

bbbbb In Paragraph 7, the Parties agree to exchange information on the types of surface ships and submarines capable of carrying deployed nuclear sea-launched cruise missiles. The word type" has the sense of what is more commonly referred to as class" of ship or submarine in the United States. Thus, on entry into force, the United States will list as types" items such as the Los Angeles Class nuclear attack submarine or Arleigh Burke Class destroyer, rather than simply list attack submarine" or destroyer". The Soviet Union will provide similarly specific information. The information exchanged under this paragraph will not be made public.

bbbbb In the eighth paragraph the Parties renounced producing or deploying sea-launched cruise missiles of any range armed with two or more nuclear weapons. Neither Party possesses such weapons, nor are there any U.S. plans for their development.

bbbbbThe ninth and eleventh paragraphs must be understood in light of the political compromise which led to this declaration. Throughout most of the negotiations the Soviet Union sought to include nuclear sea-launched cruise missiles within the Treaty. The United States rejected this inclusion, both on the ground that nuclear sea-launched cruise missiles are not strategic weapons and on the ground that limits on nuclear sea-launched cruise missiles are inherently unverifiable. For both these reasons, the United States was unwilling to accept any limitations on sea-launched cruise missiles in the Treaty. The phrase invites the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics to make comparable declarations" in the ninth paragraph is related to the policy stated in the second paragraph that the United States will make declarations only on the basis of reciprocity.

bbbbb The statement that the Declarations may be supplemented by any cooperative measures that may be agreed" and the obligation in the eleventh paragraph to continue to seek mutually acceptable and effective methods of verification" were intended to indicate that the United States would reassess (though not necessarily change) its position if, in the future, effective methods of verification were found. No such methods have been identified, and there are no on-going U.S. - Soviet discussions in this area.

bbbbb The tenth paragraph is also the result of a political compromise. The United States sought to include in the annual declarations nuclear sea-launched cruise missiles with ranges less than 600 kilometers, since such missiles could pose a threat to U.S. coastal targets. The Soviet Union, which deploys a large number of short-range nuclear-armed SLCM types, sought to make the cut-off 600 kilometers, citing the precedent of the protocol to the SALT II Treaty. As a compromise the Parties agreed to exchange, on a confidential basis, annual information on the number of deployed nuclear sea-launched cruise missiles with ranges between 300 and 600km. Only the Soviet Union possesses nuclear sea-launched cruise missiles in this range. The number of such cruise missiles is not included in the 880 limit referred to in the declarations. Again, consistent with President Gorbachev's statement of October 4, l99l, on the withdrawal of naval tactical nuclear weapons, the Soviet Union declaration should be zero.

bbbbb Section 33 of the Arms Control and Disarmament Act specifies that no action shall be taken under this or any other law that will obligate the United States to disarm or to reduce or to limit the Armed Forces or armaments of the United States, except pursuant to the Treaty-making power of the President under the Constitution or unless authorized by further affirmative legislation by the Congress of the United States." Although submitted to the Senate for information, these declarations do not fall within the purview of Section 33 of the Arms Control and Disarmament Act since they are not legally binding and thus do not obligate" the United States within the meaning or purview of Section 33 of the Arms Control and Disarmament Act.

2. BACKFIRE DECLARATION

The Declaration by the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics Concerning the Tu-22M Medium Bomber" was also the result of a compromise reached during the negotiations. The United States sought to include the Backfire (TU-22M) as a heavy bomber. The Soviet Union, asserting, as it did during the SALT II negotiations, that the Backfire was not a heavy bomber, sought to exclude it entirely. The issue was resolved when the Parties agreed to exclude the Backfire from the Treaty in return for a Soviet political commitment. The resulting declaration contains two obligations. First, the Soviet Union declares that it will not give the Backfire an intercontinental capability in any manner including, but not limited to, by equipping the bomber for in-flight refueling. In addition, the Soviet Union obligates itself not to have more than 300 air force and 200 naval Backfires. These are separate limits; there is no freedom to mix between them.

bbbbb Like the declaration on nuclear sea-launched cruise missiles, the Backfire Declaration is politically binding and remains in force for the duration of the Treaty. (See the analysis accompanying the heavy bomber definition in the Definitions Annex for a discussion of START constraints on future bombers that are similar to the Backfire.)

JOINT STATEMENTS

bbbbb On July 29, 1991, during the final plenary session, the Parties exchanged a number of joint statements. Both Parties intend these statements to be authoritative interpretations of specific Treaty provisions. The text of the statements were, in each case, agreed between the Parties and conformed in English and in Russian.

bbbbb It is important to distinguish between Agreed Statements" and the similar-sounding, but quite different, joint statements" analyzed in this section. Agreed Statements" are integral parts of the Treaty and have equal legal standing with all other portions of the Treaty. As such, they are subject to the advice and consent of the Senate as to ratification, and cannot be altered except through amendment in accordance with Article XVIII. In contrast, joint statements" are negotiated authoritative statements of interpretation, which amplify the intent of the Parties with respect to specified provisions of the Treaty. As such, they are not legally a part of the Treaty, nor are they subject to ratification, although they are associated with the Treaty. They are, therefore, submitted only for the information of the Senate.

The "Joint Statement on New Missile Production Technology Processes" was necessary because of the possibility that solid rocket motors for mobile ICBMs could be developed in which the solid propellant could be removed from the casing non-destructively after initially being cast. In theory, non-destructive removal of propellant could allow a Party to circumvent the requirement to destroy mobile ICBMs in excess of non-deployed missile limits by removing the propellant and destroying no more than an empty casing. In the joint statement, both Parties stated that they had no solid-propellant ICBMs that would permit non-destructive removal. They also agreed that, if in the future mobile ICBMs are produced using so called insertable cartridge" or other technology that allows non-destructive removal of solid propellant, they will consult within the framework of the Joint Compliance and Inspection Commission to determine applicable elimination procedures. Absent any agreement in the Commission, the procedures already set forth in Section I of the Protocol on Conversion or Elimination would remain in effect, except that a Party could not remove propellant from the stages in accordance with paragraph 2(d) of that Section, since the negotiating record makes clear that that provision, and the corresponding provision in paragraph 3 of Section VII of the Protocol, were intended to address only destructive removal of propellant.

bbbbb The "Joint Statement Regarding Data Updates" was required to codify the agreement between the Parties that data on future facilities or items were required to be provided and would follow the form of the MOU at Treaty signature. If a facility or item was not listed in the MOU at Treaty signature, because it had not yet been built or converted to support strategic offensive arms, and if that facility later becomes subject to the Treaty, a notification must be provided according to the complete list of categories of data. If the facility is built or converted between signature and entry into force, this notification would be provided as part of the initial data update after entry into force. Otherwise, notification would be provided, in accordance with paragraph 3 of Section I of the Notification Protocol, within 5 days after the facility becomes subject to the Treaty; this would subsequently be reflected in the six-month data update. This joint statement also codifies the agreement that, while some categories of data may have applied only to one Party at the time of signature, the other Party is required to provide the full breadth of data provided by the first Party should the category later apply to the second Party. In this regard, the statement recognizes that the MOU provides for changing the make-up of categories of data.

bbbbb An example of the application of some categories of data only to one Party at time of signature is the category ICBM base for road-mobile launchers of ICBMs", which, for the U.S., has the simple entry NONE," while for the Soviet Union has the complete list of the appropriate categories, such as Deployed ICBM", Deployed Road-Mobile Launchers of ICBMs", Deployment Area", Restricted Area," and Maintenance Facility," the last two having further subdivisions into, respectively, Deployed ICBMs", Deployed Road-Mobile Launchers of ICBMs," and Fixed Structures for Road-Mobile Launchers of ICBMs", and Non-Deployed ICBMs", Non-Deployed Road-Mobile Launchers of ICBMs", Training Models of Missiles", Transporter-Loaders", and Road-Mobile Training Launchers." Thus, if the U.S. acquires such ICBMs, all those categories of data would have to be filled in.

bbbbb The Parties reached this agreement to eliminate the need to reproduce long lists of categories for items or facilities that one of the Parties did not possess and that, if listed, would be followed by the repetitive NONE" in each data field.

bbbbb The "Joint Statement on Costs Relating to the Convening of a Session of the JCIC on the Territory of one of the Parties" was included in recognition of the fact that, while the Joint Compliance and Inspection Commission will normally meet in Geneva, it might meet in other locations. Section VI of the Protocol on the Joint Compliance and Inspection Commission, which provides that each Party shall bear its own costs in connection with the work of the Commission, was based on the assumption that the Commission would meet in Geneva. By this joint statement the Parties agree that, should they elect to meet in another location, they will determine in advance whether or not different cost arrangements are required. It should be noted that the similar body established under the INF Treaty, the Special Verification Commission, has never met outside of Geneva.

bbbbb The "Joint Statement on the Ban on Support Equipment at Eliminated Facilities" was included because the Parties elected not to provide a comprehensive list of support equipment in the Treaty. Such a list might have failed to capture all items that might be considered to be support equipment and would have failed to capture new types of support equipment. Instead, the Parties relied on a general definition of support equipment: vehicles and mobile or transportable equipment used to support the operation of an ICBM or SLBM." Nevertheless, in the interest of clarity, since the Parties agreed that certain specific items were examples of support equipment, these items were listed in the joint statement. The joint statement also makes it unambiguously clear that the items listed as examples of support equipment would be prohibited at eliminated facilities, as stipulated in paragraph 27 of Article V of the Treaty.

bbbbb The "Joint Statement on Narrow Directional Beaming" was included when the Parties agreed not to attempt to define narrow directional beaming" in the Definitions Annex to the Treaty. The joint statement establishes the intent of the Parties that the purpose of such a ban is to ensure near-omnidirectional radiation of broadcast signals during flight-tests of ICBMs or SLBMs.

The "Joint Statement on the Term 'Ton'" and the Joint Statement on Weapon Storage Areas" were necessary for linguistic reasons, in order to allow the certifying officials to state with certainty that the English and Russian were identical. The addition of the word metric" before the word ton was necessary in the English text in order to avoid ambiguity between a metric ton (1000 kilograms) and an English ton (2000 pounds). In contrast, the Russian language has only one type of ton" (i.e., 1,000 kilograms); there is no Russian language counterpart for the English word meaning 2,000 pounds.

bbbbb The Russian term translated as "weapon storage area" has the connotation of short term storage, whereas the English term has no such connotation. The Joint Statement makes it clear that, as used the Treaty, both Parties understand that weapon storage areas are used for both long term and short term storage of nuclear and non-nuclear armaments.

bbbbb Due to the complicated and prolonged discussions on the use of charter aircraft, the "Joint Statement on Charter Flights" was necessary because the Parties could not agree on treaty provisions regulating the use of such charter flights. The Joint Statement establishes that the absence of discussion of charter flights in the Inspection Protocol was not intended to preclude such flights. The joint statement obligates the Parties, if necessary for transport pursuant to the Treaty, to agree on procedures for charter flights within the Joint Compliance and Inspection Commission.

bbbbb The "Joint Statement Concerning Currency of Payment for Costs Relating to Implementation of the START Treaty" provides formal acknowledgement that the Parties have yet to agree on the currency of payment for costs associated with various arms control agreements, including the START Treaty. The Inspection Protocol provides details on the allocation of costs, but is silent on the issue of the currency of payment. During the negotiations, the Soviet Union believed that all costs should be paid in freely-convertible currency, while the United States took the position that certain costs should appropriately be paid in local currency (i.e., in rubles which were, at time of signature, not convertible on the international monetary market). The United States agreed to pay in dollars for special arrangements to visit Soviet submarine tunnels and exhibitions of Bear D bombers, but made it clear that these arrangements were without prejudice to the final resolution of the currency payment issue. This dispute extends beyond the START Treaty; the joint statement makes it clear that the Parties will resolve the issue in a broader context.

bbbbb The "Joint Statement Concerning Interpretive Data" establishes that the intent of the Parties in providing the interpretive data listed in sub-paragraphs 1(a) and 1(b) of Section II of the Telemetry Protocol is to facilitate verification. In addition, the joint statement makes clear that paragraph 1(b) of Section II of the Telemetry Protocol, which requires exchange of names of telemetry parameters and of conversion factors, only applies to telemetric information necessary to determine the values for the parameters of acceleration, separation times, and reentry vehicle separation commands and release times. Both of these provisions are inherent in the Treaty; the joint statement was included to avoid any possible ambiguity.

bbbbb The "Joint Statement on the Exchange of Site Diagrams" makes it clear that the exchange of site diagrams of facilities subject to suspect site inspection, like the exchange of all other site diagrams, are required to meet the criteria in Annex J to the Memorandum of Understanding. The exchange of such diagrams was not completed prior to Treaty signature because agreement on which facilities would be subject to such inspections was reached only shortly before signature and more time was required by both Parties to complete the diagrams. The joint statement also records the Parties' intention that facilities or portions of facilities involved in the production of solid rocket motors not be subject to inspection. The agreement in the joint statement to exchange site diagrams of facilities subject to suspect site inspection no later than 30 days after signature is redundant; an identical obligation is found in paragraph 4 of Annex J to the Memorandum of Understanding. All site diagrams, including those for facilities subject to suspect site inspections, were exchanged on schedule on August 30, 1991.

bbbbb The "Joint Statement in Connection with Procedures for Confirming Launch Weight" should be read in connection with the obligation in paragraph 10 of Section XIV of the Inspection Protocol, which provides that, if a Party declares a new type of ICBM or SLBM on the basis of launch weight, the inspecting Party shall have the right to weigh or determine by other agreed means the launch weight of both the new type of ICBM or SLBM and the existing and previously declared new types used as the bases of comparison. Paragraph 10 of section XIV of the Inspection Protocol makes it clear that agreement on the procedures for weighing or for determining the weight by other means is a prerequisite for deployment of the new type declared on the basis of a change in launch weight. This joint statement confirms that obligation and was included so that there could be no ambiguity about the nature of the obligation assumed. In addition, the joint statement records the intention of the Parties to avoid artificially delaying reaching agreement on procedures for weighing or for determining the weight of ICBMs or SLBMs by other means.

OTHER STATEMENTS

bbbbb In addition to the joint statements, the Parties exchanged a number of other statements. Most were so-called reciprocal statements, whereby the Parties made parallel, though not necessarily identical, statements on a variety of subjects. The bulk of these were exchanged formally during the final plenary sessions of the negotiations on July 29, 1991. There are three exceptions. The statements on the Tri-Service Short-Range Attack Missile were exchanged in a meeting between Ambassador Brooks and Ambassador Nazarkin on July 27, 1991. The statements on the relationship between START and the ABM Treaty were exchanged between Ambassador Brooks and Soviet Deputy Foreign Minister Obukhov on June 13, 1991. The second Soviet statement on non-circumvention was inadvertently omitted from the final plenary and, while dated July 31, 1991, was handed over by the Soviet Ministry of Foreign Affairs in September 1991. The fact that a statement was or was not made at the final plenary has no particular legal significance.

bbbbb The "other" statements are of four kinds. The first kind of statement is a negotiated unilateral statement whereby one Party undertakes a politically-binding obligation. The second kind of statement provides a voluntary undertaking by a Party. The third kind of statement is the functional equivalent of a joint statement, indicating the mutual intent of the Parties. Like the text of the joint statements, the texts of these second kind of statements were negotiated and agreed between the Parties. The fourth and final kind of statement serves to place on the record the positions of the Parties on topics which could, in theory, become the subject of dispute in the future. These four kinds of statements are discussed in the four following corresponding sections of the analysis.

1. NEGOTIATED UNILATERAL STATEMENT

At the final plenary on July 29, 1991, the United States presented a "Unilateral Statement by the United States of America Concerning the B-2 Heavy Bomber." The text of this statement, which is intended to be politically binding, was negotiated with the Soviet Union as part of the overall solution to the issue of inspecting the B-2 heavy bomber. Under the Treaty, the B-2 heavy bomber is exempt from exhibition and inspection unless and until it is tested with a long-range nuclear ALCM.

bbbbb The statement has three parts. First, the United States certifies that it has no plans to equip deployed B-2 heavy bombers for long-range nuclear ALCMs until such an ALCM has been flight-tested from a B-2 heavy bomber. This statement was made in response to Soviet concern that the testing of long-range non-nuclear ALCMs might be used to give the B-2 a capability as a long-range nuclear ALCM carrier. The second part of the statement simply acknowledges that, once a long-range nuclear ALCM is flight-tested from a B-2, the relevant Treaty requirements will apply. This statement adds nothing to the obligations of the United States and merely restates Treaty provisions. The final portion of the unilateral statement simply states that, should the Soviet Union, in the future, deploy a heavy bomber that is never tested with any long-range nuclear ALCM, that heavy bomber would be treated the same as the B-2 with respect to Treaty requirements for exhibition and inspection.

2. STATEMENTS INVOLVING VOLUNTARY ACTIONS

bbbbb The identically-worded "Statements of Policy Concerning Encryption and Jamming" provide for the voluntary cessation of encryption and jamming beginning 120 days after signature of the Treaty (i.e., beginning on November 28, 1991.) This is not an instance of provisional application of the Treaty, but a voluntary, non-binding act of good-will by both Parties. Thus, it does not engage any of the Treaty provisions on data denial. Specifically, there are no provisions for exemptions, no specific requirements to make or broadcast measurements, and no requirements to exchange telemetry tapes or information. To avoid having an open-ended obligation if ratification is delayed, the Parties agreed that this voluntary restraint from encryption and jamming would last for one year, beginning 120 days after Treaty signature, unless the Treaty enters into force sooner.

3. STATEMENTS DOCUMENTING AGREED UNDERSTANDINGS

bbbbb The Parties exchanged identically worded statements "On Consultations Relating to the Release to the Public of Data and Other Information." Paragraph 6 of Article VIII of the Treaty, provides that the Parties will hold consultations on the release to the public of data and other information exchanged under the Treaty. The Treaty thus allows for the possibility that the Parties might elect not to make such data (for example, the locations of specific strategic offensive arms) public. The exchange of statements makes it clear, however, that the Parties intend to follow the precedent of the INF Treaty, as codified in an April 1990 exchange of diplomatic notes.

bbbbb The April 1990 exchange of notes bans the release of original language texts of notifications (this is consistent with the agreement establishing the Nuclear Risk Reduction Centers), as well as the release of the name of any individual mentioned in such notifications. INF information (other than names of individuals) contained in notifications is divided into three categories: that which will not be released, that which can be released after three months, and that which can be released after three months unless the other Party objects. In INF, all notifications involving changes in data fall into the second category; thus information contained in them may be released to the public after the three-month interval. Following this precedent, information contained in START notifications involving changes of data (except for geographic coordinates, which may not be released) may also be released to the public after three months. This precedent applies only to data similar to that exchanged under the INF Treaty; other data (such as that associated with telemetry tapes) will not be made public.

bbbbb In these statements, the Parties agree to conclude consultations on the details of applying the INF precedent prior to entry into force of the START Treaty. Such consultations will take place within the framework of the Joint Compliance and Inspection Commission.

bbbbb The reciprocal "Statements on Launch-Associated Support Vehicles and Driver Training Vehicles" were necessary to take account of Soviet plans for possible future conversion of such vehicles, as well as to take account of existing Soviet practices. Launch associated support vehicles and driver training vehicles, which are captured by the definition of support equipment, are banned from eliminated facilities under paragraph 27 of Article IV of the Treaty. Soviet driver training vehicles could be converted for use as tank trucks used for the transportation of various liquids. While such converted tank trucks would no longer be driver training vehicles" or support equipment," and hence would not be banned from eliminated facilities, they would be very similar externally to driver training vehicles. Similarly, the Soviets claim to have a number of vehicles (mobile kitchens, sleeper vans, etc.) which are similar externally to launch associated support vehicles, but which are not launch associated support vehicles, and thus also would not be banned from eliminated facilities. In these negotiated statements, the Soviet Union states that, if a compliance concern arises, the Soviet Union will provide additional information on the vehicles that give rise to such concerns. In return the United States acknowledges that such information would be helpful in discussing compliance concerns when and if such concerns arise.

bbbbb The U.S. "Statement on Non-circumvention of the START Treaty" describes the existing U.S. pattern of cooperation with the United Kingdom. The statement, negotiated with the Soviet Union, makes it clear that the pattern of cooperation involves maintaining the independent British nuclear deterrent, rather than simply selling the British a specific weapon system. The Soviets tried to limit the concept of the U.S.-UK pattern of cooperation to the D-5, then -- failing that -- to SLBMs only. The United States rejected categorically any such confinement of the U.S.-UK pattern of cooperation. The pattern of cooperation currently" includes agreement to sell the United Kingdom the Trident II weapon system; the pattern of cooperation is not, however, limited to Trident II. Finally, the U.S. statement endorses the British intent to maintain their strategic nuclear deterrent as a minimum one. This statement was included in deference to Soviet concerns with excluding British forces affected by U.S. patterns of cooperation from START and allowing unrestricted U.S. support of the modernization of those forces.

bbbbb The comparable Soviet statement takes note of the U.S. statement, and sets forth the Soviet position that U.S. assistance to the British that both circumvented the terms and purposes of the START Treaty and altered the strategic balance could jeopardize Soviet supreme interest and be grounds for withdrawal from the START Treaty under the provisions of Article XVII.

bbbbb A separate Soviet statement, dated July 31, 1991, indicates that the Soviet Union has no patterns of cooperation involving the transfer of strategic offensive arms. Thus the Soviets are prohibited by Article XVI of the Treaty from establishing any such patterns of cooperation with third countries.

4. STATEMENTS SETTING FORTH POSITIONS ON
POSSIBLE FUTURE ISSUES

bbbbb The remaining reciprocal statements constitute the formal placing on the record of the positions of the two Parties on issues that could arise in the future.

bbbbb The exchange of statements on the SS-N-23 was made necessary by a Soviet revelation, late in the negotiations, that they consider the SS-N-23 to be of a different design than the United States believes it to be. Paragraph 1 of Section I of the Throw-Weight Protocol provides two different methods of determining ICBM or SLBM throw-weight. One method applies to ICBMs or SLBMs that carry more than one reentry vehicle and whose final stage executes a procedure for dispensing reentry vehicles. The other method applies to all other ICBMs and SLBMs. During the negotiations the United States understood, and believed that the Soviet Union agreed, that the first method was included in the Throw-weight Protocol to take account of the Soviet SS-N-23, an SLBM whose final stage dispenses multiple reentry vehicles directly. Near the end of the negotiations, however, Soviet negotiators asserted that, since the rocket engine of the final stage of the SS-N-23 was jettisoned prior to the time that dispensing of the reentry vehicles began, what remained following this jettisoning was not a final stage," but rather a self-contained dispensing mechanism, albeit of exceptionally unusual design. They further asserted that the jettisoned rocket engine (essentially a nozzle and combustion chamber) constituted the final stage, despite the fact that the jettisoned portion clearly does not conform to the agreed definition of stage." As a result, Soviet negotiators claimed that it was correct to calculate the ballistic missile throw-weight of the SS-N-23 based on the rules for all other ICBMs and SLBMs, including those with self-contained dispensing mechanisms. The Soviet approach resulted in a ballistic missile throw-weight for the SS-N-23 less than the throw-weight derived by the approach that the United States believed to be appropriate.

bbbbb As part of the overall final agreement on ballistic missile throw-weight values, the United States accepted the Soviet throw-weight value for the SS-N-23 and thus, for purposes of throw-weight calculations, accepted the Soviet characterization of the SS-N-23 as falling under paragraph 1(b) of Section I of the Throw-weight Protocol. The U.S. statement was issued to make it clear that this acceptance was unique to the calculation of SS-N-23 throw-weight; that the United States did not agree with Soviet assertions on the design of the SS-N-23, but believed that the final stage of the SS-N-23 is used to dispense more than one reentry vehicle; and that the United States reserved the right to challenge any future Soviet attempts to characterize similar ICBMs or SLBMs of new types or modifications of existing types as being subject to paragraph l(b) of Section I of the Throw-Weight Protocol. The Soviet statement simply repeated, without attempting to provide technical details, the Soviet assertion that the throw-weight of the SS-N-23 -- and by implication, the throw-weight of new types of ICBMs or SLBMs of similar design -- should properly be calculated using the procedures of paragraph l(b) of Section I of the Throw-Weight Protocol. (See the analysis of the Throw-weight Protocol for further discussion of these two methods of determining throw-weight.)

bbbbb The"U.S. Statement on Attachment Joints" and the Soviet Statement Concerning the Purposes of Inclusion in the Memorandum of Understanding of Data on the Distance Between Joints for Attaching Long-range Nuclear ALCMs" were made necessary because of different bomber design practices between the two Parties. For the United States, some attachment devices are used on the wings and fuselage of bombers to carry more than one type of weapon (so called universal attachment joints"). The presence or absence of such an attachment device says nothing about the type of armament with which the bomber is equipped. As a result, for U.S. bombers, attachment joints cannot be used to determine whether or not a particular bomber is or is not equipped for long-range nuclear ALCMs. In contrast, the Soviets have stated that their attachment joints are weapon-specific. Thus, certain attachment joints are used for attaching long-range nuclear ALCMs and for no other purpose. The presence of such attachment joints on Soviet bombers, therefore, is a valid indication that the bomber is equipped for long-range nuclear ALCMS.

bbbbb The Parties agreed to list dimensions of attachment joints in Section (i) of Annex G to the Memorandum of Understanding and to list the distance between attachment points for specific long-range nuclear ALCMs in Annex H to the Memorandum of Understanding. The U.S. statement implies that these listings are included in the Memorandum of Understanding only to help determine the number of long-range nuclear ALCMs for which a particular bomber is equipped, and it makes clear that such listings are inappropriate for use as specified features making U.S. heavy bombers equipped for long-range nuclear ALCMs distinguishable from those not so equipped. The U.S. statement also states that since such attachment joints are installed on airplanes other than heavy bombers, their presence is not sufficient to consider such airplanes to be heavy bombers. The Soviet counter-statement, while generally accepting the U.S. position, preserves the Soviet view that attachment joints are an optional distinguishing feature, which could, at the discretion of the Party owning the heavy bomber, be used to determine whether a bomber is or is not equipped for long-range nuclear ALCMs.

bbbbb The "U.S. Statement on Underground Structures" and the parallel Soviet statement result from the long-standing U.S. concern over the three large Soviet underground structures (sometimes referred to as submarine tunnels") that are mentioned in the statements. These massive tunnels were initially constructed a number of years ago, but construction of sea-level entrances was never completed. This was confirmed by a visit of a U.S. team to these structures in February l99l. Paragraph 25 of Article V of the Treaty bans such structures if they are accessible by ballistic missile submarines. The Twenty-third Agreed Statement obligates the Soviet side not to make the three existing structures accessible by waterborne craft of any displacement.

bbbbb The U.S. statement noted that construction of additional similar structures would raise questions about Soviet intent to continue to comply with paragraph 25 of Article V. The U.S. statement also affirmed that there are no U.S. plans for constructing similar structures in the United States and notes that the United States proceeded from the premise that the Soviet Union would exercise similar restraint. The Soviet counterstatement repeats the Soviet obligation from the Twenty-third Agreed Statement and lays down a reciprocal admonition that the United States not construct similar structures.

bbbbb The "Statement by the Soviet Side at the U.S.-Soviet Negotiations on Nuclear and Space Arms concerning the Interrelationship between Reductions in Strategic Offensive Arms and Compliance with the Treaty between the U.S. and the USSR on the Limitation of Anti-ballistic Missile Systems" and the counter Statement by the U.S. Side at the U.S.-Soviet Negotiations on Nuclear and Space Arms" set forth the positions of the two sides on the relationship between the START Treaty and continued adherence to the ABM Treaty. The statements were exchanged on June l3, l99l, but were not discussed.

bbbbb The Soviet Union's statement claims that withdrawal from the ABM Treaty or material breach of the Treaty by one of the Parties would constitute an extraordinary event jeopardizing the supreme interests of the other Party, and that such an event would, thus, be grounds for withdrawal from the START Treaty pursuant to Article XVII of the Treaty. The U.S. statement states that the full exercise by the U.S. of its legal rights under the ABM Treaty would not constitute a basis for withdrawal from START. The statement further notes that Soviet statements, that a future or hypothetical U.S. withdrawal from the ABM Treaty would constitute grounds for Soviet withdrawal from START, are without legal or military foundation. Finally, the U.S. statement notes that, should future negotiations lead to agreed changes in the ABM Treaty, such changes would not be a basis for questioning the effectiveness or viability of the START Treaty.

bbbbb The U.S. and Soviet statements on the Tri-Service Stand-off Attack Missile (TSSAM) were exchanged on July 27, l99l. In June l99l, following press reports of the development of the TSSAM, the U.S. delegation provided the Soviets, as a courtesy, a copy of the U.S. Air Force press release on the new missile. The Soviets subsequently took the occasion to express their longstanding concern that development and testing of non-nuclear cruise missiles could be used as a cover for covertly giving heavy bombers not equipped for long-range nuclear ALCMs the capability of deploying long-range nuclear ALCMs. The Soviets further indicated their longstanding concern over the U.S. practice of using so-called universal attachment joints and the fact that they would be used for the TSSAM and are on both the B-52 and the B-2. If TSSAM were tested from the B-2, therefore, the Soviet statement claimed, the B-2 might be used as a carrier of long-range nuclear ALCMs. (See previous discussion.)

bbbbb The U.S. response simply stated the fact that the Tri-Service Stand-off Attack Missile is a non-nuclear, short-range cruise missile completely unrelated to the START Treaty. The U.S. response also asserts that the use of TSSAM on the B-2 would not imply that the B-2 was equipped for long-range nuclear ALCMs or alter the status of the B-2 under START. The statement reaffirmed the previous U.S. assurance (see previous discussion of the U.S. B-2 statement) that the B-2 heavy bomber would not be given a capability to employ long-range nuclear ALCMs unless and until a long-range nuclear ALCM was tested from a B-2.