ARTICLE-BY-ARTICLE ANALYSIS OF THE ANNEX

ON AGREED STATEMENTS STRUCTURE

AND OVERVIEW OF THE ANNEX

The Annex consists of thirty-eight agreed statements in which the Parties codified their understanding of various Treaty provisions. The agreed statements serve primarily to interpret existing Treaty provisions, to document the intent of the Parties to deal with certain future contingencies, or to provide specific exceptions to Treaty provisions. In addition, some provisions agreed upon late in the negotiations were codified as agreed statements, rather than being placed in the other Treaty documents. These statements are legally binding and the Annex in which they have been incorporated is an integral part of the Treaty. There is no significance to the order in which the statements appear in the Annex.

First Agreed Statement. This agreed statement obligates the Parties not to transfer strategic offensive arms subject to the Treaty to third states. The statement makes it clear, however, that patterns of cooperation, including obligations, existing at the time of signature of the Treaty, between a Party and a third state are exempt from this statement as well as from the obligations of Article XVI of the Treaty not to assume any international obligation in conflict with the provisions of the Treaty. Transfers of strategic offensive arms under existing patterns of cooperation are notified in accordance with paragraph 8 of Section I of the Notification Protocol.
The Parties have acknowledged that the only existing pattern of cooperation with a third State involving the transfer of strategic offensive arms by either Party is the longstanding pattern of cooperation between the United States and the United Kingdom. During the negotiations, the United States made clear not only that it would accept no START constraints on its pattern of cooperation with the United Kingdom, but also that START provisions did not apply to United Kingdom deterrent forces. In a formal statement handed over on December 9, 1989, the United States stressed that the United Kingdom has the legal and sovereign right to maintain an independent nuclear deterrent, and that the United States attaches great importance to this right. The formal U.S. statement noted that the United States is committed to a broad pattern of close cooperation with the United Kingdom to maintaining and modernizing that capability. This includes, with regard to strategic weapon systems, agreements by the United States to sell the United Kingdom the Trident II weapon system under the provisions of a longstanding bilateral agreement.
As the formal U.S. statement noted, under this agreement the United States will also provide to the United Kingdom continuing support for this weapon system, including the use of U.S. SLBM support and missile test range facilities. Storage and preparation for issue of all non-deployed Trident II missiles for the United Kingdom will be provided at King's Bay, Georgia in the United States. U.S. negotiators emphasized that, as a sovereign nation, the United Kingdom has the right to test and deploy the Trident II missile with any warhead configuration the UK deems appropriate. This would not affect the number of accountable warheads attributed to the U.S. Trident II missile tests under START. The United Kingdom's exercise of its sovereign right to conduct Trident II missile tests or deployment activity in no way constitutes circumvention of any provisions contained in the START Treaty. In this regard, U.S. negotiators noted that utilization of any U.S. SLBM test range and associated facilities (including maintenance facilities) to support United Kingdom Trident II flight test and deployment are consistent with the exercise of United Kingdom sovereignty and with U.S. obligations under the START Treaty.

On July 11, 1990, the U.S. Chief Negotiator clarified that any ICBM or SLBM launched from a test range, or from anywhere else on U.S. soil, will be treated as a U.S. missile; and that any such launch will be conducted in full conformity with all Treaty requirements, including the limits on the number of re-entry vehicles. On the other hand, as the U.S. had indicated in the past, launches of United Kingdom missiles from United Kingdom submarines are a subject solely a matter for the United Kingdom. In addition, U.S. support to the United Kingdom, which includes the use of radio and radar equipment within U.S. test ranges for missile tracking support, is not regulated by the Treaty. Upon completion of the U.S. statement, the Soviet Chief Negotiator said that the Soviet Union was satisfied with the assurances presented by the United States. (In the foregoing analysis, and in the formal statements to the Soviet Union during the negotiations, the phrase "test range" was used in a broad, general sense and was intended to include facilities that provide support for at-sea testing, such as the U.S. Eastern Test Range in Cape Canaveral, Florida. In the START Treaty, "test range" has the narrower, defined meaning of a land area from which launches of ICBMs or SLBMs are conducted. The Eastern Test Range is not considered to be a test range within the meaning of the START Treaty.) (For additional discussion of the statements on non-circumvention, see the "Declarations and Statements" section of this analysis.)

Second Agreed Statement.

This agreed statement underscores the right to raise for consideration in the Joint Compliance and Inspection Commission, in accordance with subparagraph (c) of Article XV of the Treaty, the question of a new arm that one Party considers might be a new kind of strategic offensive arm, whether or not the notification provided for in paragraph 16 of Section VII of the Notification Protocol has been given. This agreed statement does not alter the substantive rights or obligations of either Party and is included only for emphasis.

Third Agreed Statement.

This agreed statement excepts the Soviet SS-11 ICBMs from:

(a) the counting rule, contained in subparagraph 4(d) of Article III of the Treaty, that provides that each reentry vehicle of an ICBM or SLBM shall be considered to be one warhead; and

(b) the prohibition, contained in paragraph 13 of Article V of the Treaty, on flight-testing or deploying an ICBM or SLBM with a number of reentry vehicles greater than the number of warheads attributed to it. Notwithstanding these exemptions, the SS-11 may not be tested with more than three "multiple re-entry vehicles" (commonly known as an "MRV" system, in contrast to a MIRVed system.) The SS-11 ICBM is the only existing ICBM or SLBM of either Party equipped with multiple re-entry vehicles that are not independently targetable. Some SS-11 ICBMs are deployed with three such re-entry vehicles. Notwithstanding this fact, the SS-11 is counted as only "one" against the warhead limits found in Article II.

Fourth Agreed Statement.

This agreed statement specifies that the definition of the term "air-to-surface ballistic missile (ASBM)" is not intended to describe any missile that sustains flight, or any missile the payload of which sustains flight, through the use of aerodynamic lift over any portion of its flight path. This excludes boost glide vehicles from being considered to be ASBMs, which are banned by subparagraph 18(d) of Article VI of the Treaty. Such boost glide vehicles (also known as hyper velocity vehicles) might be considered new kinds of strategic offensive arms, depending on the parameters of the system. In a formal written statement on January 7, 1991, the United States advised Soviet negotiators that the Pegasus space launch system, which uses newly designed and manufactured three-stage missiles to boost payloads into each orbit, did not meet the definition of either a "weapons-delivery vehicle" or a "ballistic missile" and thus that Pegasus was not relevant to the START Treaty. The Soviet side accepted this statement.

Fifth Agreed Statement.

This agreed statement limits the exception, contained in subparagraph 2(d) of Article V of the Treaty, to the prohibition against producing, testing, or deploying additional silo launchers of heavy ICBMs. The exception for silo launchers of heavy ICBMs that replace silo launchers of heavy ICBMs that have been eliminated in accordance with Section II of the Conversion or Elimination Protocol shall apply only in the case of silo launchers destroyed by accident or in the case of other exceptional circumstances that require relocation of the existing silo launchers. If relocation is required, the reasons and plans for the relocation shall be provided in the Joint Compliance and Inspection Commission prior to carrying out the relocation. The "exceptional circumstances" which might require relocation have been explained by the Soviet side as circumstances relating to the internal political situation in the Soviet Union. (See the discussion of the letter of December 6, 1990 from Defense Minister Yazov and Foreign Minister Shevardnadze to Secretaries Cheney and Baker, and the letter of December 30, 1990 from Shevardnadze to Baker in the "Certain Correspondence" part of this analysis.)

Sixth Agreed Statement

This agreed statement clarifies the treatment for purposes of the Treaty of three airplanes of the type designated by the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics as 3M or Myasishchev, known to the United States of America as Bison, which have been converted to transport oversized cargo associated with the Soviet space shuttle. Thus, without this agreed statement there could be ambiguity over how to count these three airplanes, since they are not reconnaissance airplanes, tanker airplanes, or jamming airplanes, and therefore do not meet the definition of the term "former heavy bomber." The Parties also agree that all other airplanes of the Myasishchev type will be considered to be former heavy bombers, and therefore subject to the limit in paragraph 3(a) of Article IV.

Seventh Agreed Statement.

This statement clarifies that the Parties intend to limit their exercise of the right, contained in paragraph 1 of Article XIV, to conduct operational dispersals to situations solely for national security purposes in time of crisis when a Party considers it necessary to act to ensure the survivability of its strategic forces. This statement also makes clear the intent of the Parties that, although there are no limits on the number and frequency of such operational dispersals, in practice it is expected that they will occur rarely. These understandings are necessary since the Parties have the right to suspend many Treaty provisions during operational dispersals, in accordance with paragraph 2 of Article XIV.

Eighth Agreed Statement.

This statement clarifies the prohibition, contained in paragraph 28 of Article V of the Treaty, against basing strategic offensive arms subject to the Treaty outside the national territory of the Party. For the United States, "national territory" includes Guam, Puerto Rico, American Samoa, and the Virgin Islands, in addition to the territory of the fifty states and the District of Columbia.

(a) Subparagraph (a) of this statement provides that such arms shall be based only within national territory at permanent bases specified in the Treaty (i.e., listed in the Memorandum of Understanding or subsequent updates) that are equipped to support the long-term operation of strategic offensive arms. This statement also makes it clear that paragraph 28 of Article V does not affect the rights of the Parties under international law relating to the passage of submarines or flights of aircraft, or relating to visits of submarines (including ballistic missile submarines) to ports of third states. This ensures that the prohibition against basing outside national territory will not hamper the movement or visits of submarines or aircraft.

(b) Subparagraph (b) of this statement makes clear the right of the Parties to station temporarily heavy bombers outside their national territory for purposes not inconsistent with the Treaty. This could include conventional military operations against a third state. If, however, a Party stations such bombers outside its national territory for more than 30 continuous days, it must inform the other Party through diplomatic channels before the end of the 30th day. If a Party stations more than 30 heavy bombers outside its national territory at any one time, it must inform the other Party within 48 hours.

(c) Subparagraph (c) of this statement obligates the Parties to disucuss any ambiguity and, if necessary, to provide information to resolve concerns if they arise. Such discussions could occur through diplomatic channels as well as the Joint Compliance and Inspection Commission. The Parties also do not rule out the possibility that clarifications provided in the Joint Compliance and Inspection Commission might include inspections or visits, including visits to locations outside national territory. However, the Treaty does not confer such an inspection right to the Parties.

Ninth Agreed Statement.

This statement clarifies the prohibition, contained in subparagraph 19(a) of Article V of the Treaty, against flight-testing with nuclear armaments an aircraft that is not an airplane, but that has a range of 8000 kilometers or more, and against equipping such an aircraft for nuclear armaments or deploying such an aircraft with nuclear armaments. Since the range of lighter-than-air aircraft, such as balloons, drifting aerostats, and dirigibles, is indeterminate, the agreed statement in effect applies the prohibition to all such lighter-than-air aircraft.

Tenth Agreed Statement.

This agreed statement clarifies the treatment and inspection of certain U.S. heavy bombers and of the Davis-Monthan Air Force Base, which is a specified conversion or elimination facility for heavy bombers and former heavy bombers.

(a) Subparagraph (a) of this statement exempts from exhibition and from the obligation to provide technical data or photographs the heavy bombers designated by the United States of America as, B-52C, B-52D, B-52E, and B-52F. These heavy bombers are in long-term storage at Davis-Monthan Air Force Base and are generally not in safe condition for inspection. They thus could not be made available for detailed exhibition pursuant to paragraph 12 of Article XI. The United States must locate these heavy bombers only at Davis-Monthan. None of these heavy bombers may depart Davis-Monthan before the bomber has been eliminated in accordance with the procedures provided for in the Conversion or Elimination Protocol.

(b) Subparagraph (b) of this statement provides for a baseline data inspection of Davis-Monthan Air Force Base, notwithstanding the fact that conversion or elimination facilities are not among the facilities specified for such inspections in paragraph 5 of Section VII of the Inspection Protocol. This subparagraph also provides for data update inspections at the conversion or elimination facility at Davis-Monthan if at any time the total number of heavy bombers and former heavy bombers that have been located at that base for more than seven days, and upon which the elimination process has not been initiated, exceeds five. Such an inspection shall count against the quota of 15 such inspections per year, with no more than two at any one facility, provided for in paragraph 2 of Section VII of the Inspection Protocol.

(c) Subparagraph (c) of this statement modifies the procedures for baseline data inspections and data update inspections at Davis-Monthan Air Force Base. Inspectors shall have the right only to count the B-52C, B-52D, B-52E and B52-F heavy bombers, and to view them as they are found. Inspectors shall have the right to inspect other heavy bombers and former heavy bombers in accordance with the procedures provided for in Section II of Annex 4 to the Inspection Protocol, but only to the extent that the condition of such airplanes allows such procedures to be carried out. In many cases, heavy bombers at Davis-Monthan are without landing gear or hydraulic systems; thus, for example, opening of bomb bay doors is impossible.

(d) Subparagraph (d) of this statement provides for similar procedures for a Soviet heavy bomber conversion or elimination facility if, in the future, the Soviet Union has a facility that corresponds to Davis-Monthan. This provision was included in the interest of reciprocity.

Eleventh Agreed Statement

. This agreed statement makes it clear that the Conversion or Elimination Protocol intentionally omits procedures either for the elimination of ICBMs for mobile launchers of ICBMs containing a stage equipped with a liquid-propellant main rocket engine or for the elimination of heavy bombers that have no tail sections. At the time of Treaty signature, neither Party possessed a liquid-propellant ICBM for mobile launchers of ICBMs. The Parties did not consider it necessary at this time to develop procedures for eliminating an airplane such as the B-2 that does not have a tail section. This agreed statement further provides that these items shall not be eliminated until procedures have been agreed to in the Joint Compliance and Inspection Commission. Nevertheless, these items may otherwise be removed from accountability under the Treaty by exercising the appropriate provisions of:

(a) Section VII of the C or E Protocol, which provides for removal from accountability of ICBMs for mobile launchers of ICBMs as a result of flight tests or static testing; or

(b) Section VIII of that Protocol, which provides for removal from accountability of Treaty-limited systems that are converted for use as ground trainers or static displays, or that are lost accidentally or disabled beyond repair.

Twelfth Agreed Statement.

This statement clarifies the treatment of the Soviet Tu-95RTs maritime reconnaissance airplane (known to the United States as Bear D), the Soviet Tu-142 antisubmarine warfare patrol airplane (known to the United States as Bear F), the Soviet Tu-142 maritime communications relay airplane (known to the United States as Bear J), and the Soviet Tu-95U training heavy bomber (known to the United States as Bear T). The definition of a heavy bomber excludes bombers tested, equipped, and configured exclusively for maritime operations, provided such bombers are not models or modifications of an accountable heavy bomber. The term "modification of an accountable heavy bomber" means having a design essentially identical to the design of an accountable heavy bomber. The Tu-95RTs (Bear D), although built on the airframe of a heavy bomber, was designed and built as a maritime patrol airplane. The Tu-142 (Bear F/J), although designated by the Soviet Union as a separate type of airplane from the Tu-95, has a design essentially identical to the design of the Tu-95 heavy bomber.

The agreed statement provides that none of these airplanes shall be considered to be former heavy bombers. At the same time, the phrase "notwithstanding the definition of the term 'former heavy bomber'" makes it clear that other airplanes having a design essentially identical to the design of the Tu-95 heavy bomber shall be considered former heavy bombers.

The treatment and exhibition of the Bear D is provided for in an exchange of letters between heads of delegation on July 31, 1991. In those letters, the Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics informed the Government of the United States of America that: such airplanes are not heavy bombers nor have they been equipped with air-to-surface weapons or undergone conversion; such airplanes possess a variety of external features distinguishing them from heavy bombers of the TU-95 type; and that the Soviet Union has 37 such airplanes, all of which are based at naval air bases. (See analysis of the Letters Exchanged by Heads of Delegation)

This agreed statement further provides that all Soviet Tu-95U airplanes formerly known to the United States of America as Bear E and now known as Bear T shall be considered to be training heavy bombers, and thus subject to the limit in paragraph 3(a) of Article IV.

Thirteenth Agreed Statement.

This agreed statement provides that the United States of America may locate engineering models of silos at the repair facility for ICBMs at Hill Air Force Base, Utah. There are currently three such engineering models at Hill Air Force Base; they are used for engineering development and may, in some cases, contain and support more than one type of missile. Without this clarification, such silos could be considered to be silo launchers of ICBMs. This agreed statement limits the number of such models located at this facility to four.

This number was chosen to ensure that all four U.S. ICBMs­Minuteman II, Minuteman III, Peacekeeper, and the Small ICBM­could be supported simultaneously. Moreover, such models are also subject to the limitations on silo training launchers provided for in subparagraph 2(e) of Article IV of the Treaty, including counting against the numerical limitation of 60 training launchers found in that subparagraph. Also, such models shall: be specified in the Memorandum of Understanding as a separate category; not be subject to inspection; and be subject to elimination procedures in accordance with Section II of the Conversion or Elimination Protocol.

Fourteenth Agreed Statement.

This agreed statement provides an exception to the 100 kilometer minimum distance, specified in subparagraph 11(a) of Article IV of the Treaty, between an ICBM storage facility and a deployment area. The existing ICBM storage facilities located at Khrizolitovyy and Surovatikha, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, are thus "grandfathered" and may be located no less than 20 kilometers from any deployment area, provided that the distance between such facilities and any restricted area or maintenance facility of an ICBM base for road-mobile launchers ICBMs is no less than 60 kilometers. However, such storage facilities may not be re-established after they have been eliminated in accordance with the Conversion or Elimination Protocol.

Fifteenth Agreed Statement.

This agreed statement provides an exception to the 100 kilometer minimum distance, specified in subparagraph 11(d) of Article IV of the Treaty, between a training facility for ICBMs and a test range. The existing training facility for ICBMs at Plesetsk, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, is "grandfathered" and shall be exempt from this provision. However, no more than 12 non-deployed mobile launchers of ICBMs may be located at this facility and this facility may not be reestablished after its elimination in accordance with the Conversion or Elimination Protocol. The special treatment of this training facility is necessary because of the proximity of the Plesetsk training facility to the Plesetsk test range.

Sixteenth Agreed Statement.

This agreed statement clarifies the provisions of subparagraph 9(d) of Article III of the Treaty, which specify that, if a launcher other than a soft-site launcher has contained an ICBM or SLBM of a particular type, it shall be considered to be a launcher of ICBMs or SLBMs of that type.

This agreed statement stipulates that, as of the date of signature of the Treaty, each existing ICBM launcher or SLBM launcher is capable of launching only an ICBM or SLBM of the type specified for that launcher in the Memorandum of Understanding, notwithstanding what other type of ICBM or SLBM it may have contained in the past.

Seventeenth Agreed Statement.

This agreed statement clarifies the provisions for distinguishability of heavy bombers and former heavy bombers. The Parties agree that the fact that a specific airplane is "not equipped" for a particular kind of armament shall be confirmed by distinguishing features. The agreed statement was included following agreement to reject a Soviet interpretation of the phrase "not equipped" as meaning that the airplane "cannot be equipped" for particular armaments. As a result, the phrase "not equipped" implies nothing about a hypothetical "capability" to be equipped for particular armaments.

This agreed statement specifies that each Party shall determine for itself the distinguishing features of its heavy bombers and former heavy bombers. A Party's freedom to select distinguishing features is not absolute, however. In a statement for the record on July 21, 1991, made to counter Soviet claims that U.S. distinguishing features would be inadequate, U.S. negotiators made it clear that the United States had a responsibility to select "meaningful" distinguishing features that would allow the Soviet Union to identify and distinguish the heavy bomber or former heavy bomber. A similar responsibility applies to the Soviet Union. If the other Party considers such distinguishing features insufficient, it may raise the issue in the Joint Compliance and Inspection Commission.

Eighteenth Agreed Statement.

This agreed statement explains that, because there are no heavy bombers permanently based at Andersen Air Force Base, Guam, the base, which is used periodically by U.S. heavy bombers for operations, has not been specified as an air base for heavy bombers in the Memorandum of Understanding (and is thus not subject to inspection). The Parties also agree that, if in the future the United States of America permanently bases such bombers at this base, all applicable provisions of the Treaty will apply. This agreed statement does not alter the substantive rights or obligations of either Party and is included only for emphasis.

Nineteenth Agreed Statement.

This agreed statement sets out the conditions under which mobile space launchers and space launch boosters associated with such launchers could be developed. Such systems, which neither side currently possesses, could be addressed in the Joint Compliance and Inspection Commission, and would be allowed provided that:

(a) mobile space launchers and their associated boosters have differences from ICBM launchers and SLBM launchers and from ICBMs and SLBMs, respectively, that are observable by national technical means of verification;

(b) mobile space launchers do not contain an ICBM or SLBM;

(c) the number of mobile space launchers and their associated boosters that are produced and stored do not exceed space launch requirements; and

(d) mobile space launchers and their associated boosters are not located at an ICBM base for rail-mobile launchers of ICBMs or an ICBM base for road-mobile launchers of ICBMs. While additional conditions could always be agreed in the Joint Compliance and Inspection Commission, if the foregoing conditions are met, mobile space launchers and space launch boosters associated with such launchers would be allowed. Thus, the Treaty does not allow one Party to exercise a veto over such a deployment by the other Party. If a Party deployed mobile space launchers, and the other Party believed that the above conditions had not been met, it could, of course, raise the matter as a compliance concern.

Twentieth Agreed Statement.

This agreed statement provides an exception to the requirement, specified in paragraph 4 of Article VII, that a launch canister remaining at a test range or an ICBM base after the flight test of an ICBM for mobile launchers of ICBMs shall be eliminated only in the open, in situ, or at a conversion or elimination facility. At the time of signature, only the Soviet Union employed launch canisters for ICBMs for mobile launchers of ICBMs; the existing Treaty provisions are consistent with current Soviet practice. This agreed statement preserves the U.S. right to refurbish and reuse launch canisters for ICBMs for mobile launchers of ICBMs (e.g., for the Small ICBM), in the future. This agreed statement also provides that, if the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics changes its existing practice for the elimination of such launch canisters, it will have the same right. Notification of the movement of such launch canisters to a refurbishment location shall be provided through the Nuclear Risk Reduction Centers no later than five days after the completion of the movement; the content of such a notification has not been included in the Notification Protocol and would have to be agreed between the Parties at the time.

Twenty-first Agreed Statement.

This agreed statement clarifies that the requirement, specified in paragraph 3 of Section I of the Notification Protocol, to provide notifications for "each change in data for categories of data contained in the Memorandum of Understanding" is intended to mandate only one notification for each event that results in changed data, regardless of the number of categories for which data must be changed. For example, converting an ICBM to be a static display would require only a single notification, although it could require changes to the following portions of the Memorandum of Understanding: Section II (Aggregate Numbers); Section IV (Additional Aggregate Numbers); Annex A (ICBMs and ICBM Launchers) aggregate section; Annex A (ICBMs and ICBM Launchers) individual base section; and Annex I (ICBM Static Displays).

Twenty-second Agreed Statement.

This agreed statement sets out the arrangements for conducting continuous monitoring activities under this Treaty concurrently with continuous monitoring activities at the same facility under the INF Treaty. The focus of this agreed statement is to retain the integrity of the continuous monitoring regime under both Treaties. Without specifying all the provisions that overlap, the Parties have provided a framework for eliminating duplication that would occur if the Parties performed the same procedures under both Treaties. Thirty days after START entry-into-force, concurrent continuous monitoring activities will take place at the Votkinsk Machine Building Plant, Udmurt Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic. Continuous monitoring is permitted under INF to help ensure that the SS-20 missile is not being produced there.

(a) Subparagraph (a) of this agreed statement requires that issues relating to this subject be agreed upon prior to entry into force of this Treaty, within the framework of the Joint Compliance and Inspection Commission and the Special Verification Commission (for the INF Treaty). An agreement on these issues, however, shall not affect substantive rights or obligations of the Parties under either Treaty. Even if the Parties agreed to suspend certain provisions of one Treaty, the corresponding or identical rights or obligations pertaining to such provisions of the other Treaty would continue.

(b) Subparagraph (b) of this agreed statement provides the framework for reaching agreement on START-INF concurrent continuous monitoring issues. During the period when continuous monitoring at Votkinsk Machine Building Plant, Udmurt Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic, USSR, is conducted concurrently under both Treaties, the Parties pledge to ensure the application of continuous monitoring procedures under both Treaties. However, the engineering site survey provided for in the START Treaty will not be conducted at the Votkinsk facility because a permanent continuous monitoring system is already in place. In cases where the continuous monitoring procedures under both Treaties are identical, the Parties agree that such procedures may be performed only once, although the results will be recorded, as appropriate, in both the continuous monitoring report (for START) and the inspection report (for INF). The Parties shall agree on a list of the specific provisions of the INF Treaty and its Memorandum of Agreement Regarding the Implementation of the

Verification Provisions that are to be suspended at INF continuous monitoring facilities upon entry into force of the START Treaty. Such provisions that are to be suspended include those relating to pre-inspection requirements, notifications, activities beginning upon arrival at the point of entry, and general provisions related to continuous monitoring. Agreement on such a list shall not be considered to be an amendment to the INF Treaty proper. The provisions of the INF Treaty or its implementing documents may be suspended either by making amendments to the Memorandum of Agreement or by employing the "measures to improve the viability and effectiveness" clause of the INF Protocol on Inspections.

The Parties shall also agree upon a list of the specific provisions of the START Treaty that, in connection with the suspension of the INF provisions, shall apply at such facilities from the date of entry into force of the START Treaty. Once continuous monitoring activities commence under paragraph 14 of Article XI of the Treaty, such activities performed under both Treaties shall be conducted by a team of no more than 30 monitors. Issues related to increasing the quota of monitors for maintenance of the perimeter and portal continuous monitoring system and replacement of monitors shall be governed by the provisions of the Inspection Protocol of the START Treaty. Equipment at Votkinsk used for continuous monitoring under the INF Treaty may be used for continuous monitoring under the START Treaty, even after termination of the INF Treaty, if the purpose of such equipment coincides under both Treaties. However, equipment the use of which is not provided for under START may only be used under INF. Equipment for use exclusively under START may be sent to and installed at Votkinsk in accordance with that Treaty. Specific issues that arise in connection with the concurrent application of continuous monitoring procedures under both Treaties may be addressed within the framework of the Joint Compliance and Inspection Commission and the Special Verification Commission.

(c) Subparagraph (c) of this agreed statement prohibits concurrent inspection at a facility subject to both Treaties. Moreover, there must be a pause of not less than six days between an inspection conducted at such a facility under one Treaty and the commencement of an inspection conducted under another. There are no restrictions on the time between one inspection under the INF Treaty and a second inspection under the INF Treaty, or on the time between one inspection under the START Treaty and a second inspection under the START Treaty.

While the START Treaty generally has no effect on the substantive rights or obligations of the Parties under the INF Treaty, the restrictions on the timing of inspections contained in subparagraph (c) of this Agreed Statement alter the inspection provisions of paragraph 1 of Article XI of the INF Treaty. The INF Treaty places no limit on the time between sequential inspections at SS-25 bases that are former SS-20 missile operating bases (inspectable under INF as formerly declared facilities).

The Twenty-second Agreed Statement does not allow an inspection under the INF Treaty if a START inspection has been held at the facility during the preceding six days. Thus, for as long as START is in force and INF inspections are being conducted, the timing of INF inspections at these converted bases will be circumscribed. START also has an effect on INF obligations due to the fact that in START, pursuant to paragraph 5 of Section XVI of the Inspection Protocol, each Party has the right to change the perimeter of a monitored facility. This would allow the Soviet Union to change the perimeter of their facility at Votkinsk. That facility, however, is also a missile support facility under the INF Treaty. Paragraph 5 of Article VIII of the INF Treaty prohibits changes to the boundaries of missile support facilities. Thus, the provision in the START Treaty would alter an obligation under the INF Treaty.

Twenty-third Agreed Statement.

This agreed statement clarifies the prohibition, specified in paragraph 25 of Article V of the Treaty, against having underground facilities accessible to ballistic missile submarines by specifying that the term "accessible" in this paragraph means able to be entered on the surface of the water, while submerged, or while partially submerged. The phrase "on the surface of the water" makes it clear that storing small waterborne craft in these structures through land access is not prohibited.

This agreed statement further specifies that the USSR will not make the underground structures located in the immediate vicinity of the Ara Inlet, the Yagel'naya Submarine Base, and the Pavlovskoye Submarine Base, all of which the Soviet side has stated are used for purposes unrelated to the Treaty, accessible to any waterborne craft of any displacement whatsoever. This latter provision is designed to preclude the possibility that work to make the existing structures accessible even to small surface craft also could make the structures accessible to ballistic missile submarines. There is a fourth such facility located in the Black Sea. Since ballistic missile submarines do not operate in the Black Sea, the Parties agreed that this facility need not be mentioned in this agreed statement.

Twenty-fourth Agreed Statement.

This agreed statement clarifies the meaning, for purposes of warhead attribution, of "a front section of a fundamentally new design." Subparagraph 4(b) of Article III of the Treaty specifies that, except for those with front sections of a fundamentally new design that carry more than one reentry vehicle, ICBMs and SLBMs of new types shall be attributed with a number of warheads equal to the maximum number with which they have been flight-tested, but in no event less than the nearest integer that is smaller than the result of dividing 40 percent of the accountable throw-weight of the ICBM or SLBM by the weight of the lightest reentry vehicle flight-tested on an ICBM or SLBM of that type. In the event of a new type with a front section of a fundamentally new design with more than one RV, the question of the applicability of the 40 percent rule would be determined by the JCIC. Rather than attempt to define what a front section of "fundamentally new design" is, the agreed statement specifies what it is not: it is not a front section with the essential features of any existing design as of entry into force; it is not a front section with a self-contained dispensing mechanism that dispenses reentry vehicles to different aim points sequentially; and it is not a front section on an ICBM or SLBM, the final stage of which executes a procedure for dispensing reentry vehicles.

The statement also requires that the fundamentally new nature of such a design be verifiable by national technical means of verification.

In paragraph 4(b) of Article III of the Treaty and in the Twenty-fourth Agreed Statement, the words "front section" in the phrase "front section of a fundamentally new design" are used in a unique sense. Although the defined term "front section" excludes the self-contained dispensing mechanism, the Parties used "front section of a fundamentally new design" to refer to the entire payload of an ICBM or SLBM. The presence or absence of a self-contained dispensing mechanism is a significant factor in determining the existence of a front section of a fundamentally new design.

Twenty-fifth Agreed Statement.

This agreed statement clarifies that an ICBM or SLBM of a type, a dimension of which differs from that of another ICBM or SLBM of the same type by more than three percent, but by less than that necessary to qualify as a new type, must be considered to be a "variant," as the term is defined in the Treaty. Furthermore, a Party may declare an ICBM or SLBM to be a variant if its dimensions differ by less than three percent from those of another ICBM or SLBM of the same type.

Twenty-sixth Agreed Statement.

This agreed statement sets out the conditions for declaring a portion of the territory of an eliminated ICBM base as a space launch facility. Such a space launch facility is still subject to the provisions of subparagraph 4(b) of Article IV of the Treaty, which limit the aggregate number of silo launchers of ICBMs and mobile launchers of ICBMs located at space launch facilities to no more than ten, unless otherwise agreed, and to the provisions of subparagraph 11(c) of Article IV of the Treaty, which set forth a minimum distance of 100 kilometers between space launch facilities and ICBM bases or deployment areas.

(a) Subparagraph (a) of this agreed statement requires that, first, all strategic offensive arms and support equipment be removed, and second, that all silo launchers of ICBMs or fixed structures for mobile launchers of ICBMs be eliminated in accordance with the Conversion or Elimination Protocol, except those launchers or structures located in the portion of the territory of the ICBM base that the Party intends to declare subsequently as a space launch facility. Silo launchers or fixed structures located in that portion of the territory are exempt from the provisions of the Conversion or Elimination Protocol. Only after the elimination inspection of the base can the space launch facility be declared. Thereafter, non-deployed ICBMs are allowed to be located at space launch facilities pursuant to subparagraph 9(a) of Article IV.

(b) Subparagraph (b) of this agreed statement mandates that all activity associated with strategic offensive arms shall cease and shall not subsequently resume at the ICBM base.

(c) Subparagraph (c) of this agreed statement requires that a close-out inspection be conducted at the ICBM base to confirm that the elimination of the base has been completed

(d) Subparagraph (d) of this agreed statement prohibits the reestablishment of such eliminated ICBM bases.

e) Subparagraph (e) of this agreed statement makes clear that nothing in the agreed statement affects the obligation of the USSR to eliminate, by actual destruction, 154 SS-18 silo launchers no later than seven years after entry into force of the Treaty. In this regard, no SS-18 silo launchers of ICBMs among the 154 launchers to be eliminated shall be retained for use at a space launch facility. The Soviet Union could convert to space launch purposes SS-18 silos from among the 154 not required to be eliminated, but only by eliminating all other SS-18 silo launchers at a specific ICBM base.

In addition, the Parties resolved a conflict between the general provisions applicable to space launch facilities (which are not inspectable) and the general provisions applicable to eliminated facilities (which are inspectable) by specifying in this agreed statement that the portion of the territory which has been declared as a space launch facility shall be exempt from inspection during a formerly declared facility inspection of the ICBM base.

Twenty-seventh Agreed Statement.

This agreed statement exempts the six existing soft-site launchers located at Cape Canaveral, Florida, from the provisions of paragraph 9 of Article V of the Treaty which prohibit location of such launchers except at test ranges and space launch facilities. These launchers are currently not being used but may be required in the future. Without this agreed statement, the United States would have been required either to declare a test range or space launch facility in Florida, encompassing these launchers, or to destroy them. This exemption continues until such time as such launchers contain or launch an ICBM or SLBM after the date of signature of the Treaty; to be in compliance with the Treaty, the United States would need to declare a test range or space launch facility encompassing these launchers before taking such a step.

Twenty-eighth Agreed Statement.

This agreed statement sets out the limitations on the location of a first stage of an ICBM or SLBM that is maintained, stored, and transported as an assembled missile without a launch canister. Such a stage may be located separate from other stages of such a missile only at a production facility for such ICBMs or SLBMs or a location specified in Annex I to the Memorandum of Understanding where static testing of first stages occurs or a conversion or elimination facility for ICBMs or SLBMs, or, for ICBMs and SLBMs other than mobile ICBMs, other locations where such an ICBM or SLBM is eliminated or at an exhibition site. Moreover, such a stage may be moved between these locations only in connection with an exhibition conducted pursuant to paragraph 11 of Article XI of the Treaty as well as in connection with an elimination of such ICBMs or SLBMs. The statement makes clear that, if such a stage is located separate from other stages at a location other than those specified, then all ICBMs or SLBMs of that type shall thereafter be considered, for the purposes of the Treaty, to be ICBMs or SLBMs that are maintained, stored, and transported in stages, unless otherwise agreed.

This agreed statement also sets out the limitations on an assembled missile or first stage of an ICBM that is maintained, stored, and transported as an assembled missile in its launch canister. Such a missile or stage may be located outside its launch canister only at a production facility for such ICBMs; for first stages of such ICBMs for mobile launchers of ICBMs, locations specified in Annex I to the Memorandum of Understanding, where solid rocket motors of ICBMs for mobile launchers of ICBMs may be tested with or without nozzles attached; for other such ICBMs not subject to the limitations contained in paragraph 10 of Article IV of the Treaty, a location, specified in Annex I to the Memorandum of Understanding, where static testing of first stages occurs; a conversion or elimination facility for ICBMs, or, for ICBMs other than ICBMs for mobile launchers of ICBMs, another location where such an ICBM is eliminated; or an exhibition site.

Such a first stage may be moved between these locations only in connection with an exhibition conducted pursuant to paragraph 11 of Article XI of the Treaty as well as in connection with the elimination of such ICBMs. If, however, such a missile is located outside its launch canister, or such a first stage is located separate from other stages of such a missile, at a location other than these locations, all ICBMs of that type shall thereafter be considered, for the purposes of the Treaty, to be ICBMs that are maintained, stored, and transported in stages, unless otherwise agreed.

Twenty-ninth Agreed Statement.

This agreed statement makes it clear that the STARS booster (Strategic Target System) is not the same as the Polaris A-3 SLBM. STARS uses first and second stage boosters from "former type" Polaris A-3 missiles, but adds a third-stage motor. STARS thus has a different number of stages than Polaris A-3. The STARS booster is considered to be a booster used only for research and development purposes under the provisions of paragraph 12 of Article VII of the INF Treaty.

Paragraph 12 of Article VII of the INF Treaty allows the Parties, under specified conditions, to produce and use only existing types of booster stages for certain booster systems that might otherwise be considered to be intermediate-range or shorter-range missiles. Under the INF Treaty, there are no restrictions on telemetry encryption for such boosters. The result of this agreed statement is that STARS is not subject to any START provisions.

Thirtieth Agreed Statement.

This agreed statement provides for the possibility of launching ICBMs and SLBMs for delivering objects into the upper atmosphere or space from waterborne vehicles other than submarines or from airplanes other than heavy bombers or former heavy bombers. Unless the Parties agree to such launches, the launches would be in violation of subparagraphs 18(a) and 18(d) of Article V of the Treaty. Provisions concerning such launches shall be agreed in the Joint Compliance and Inspection Commission.

This agreed statement does not, however, waive any rights or obligations of the Parties related to the non-proliferation of missiles and missile technology, stipulated in the Washington Summit Joint Statement of June 1, 1990. If the Parties agree to allow such launches, this agreed statement provides the legal basis for doing so without amending the Treaty. Since the Treaty itself, unlike the Protocols, has no provision permitting "changes not deemed to be amendments," without this agreed statement the Parties would lack authority to alter subparagraphs 18(a) and 18(d) of Article V of the Treaty without formally amending the Treaty.

Thirty-first Agreed Statement.

This agreed statement exempts from the provisions of Article X of the Treaty and of the Telemetry Protocol objects launched by ICBMs or SLBMs used to deliver objects into the upper atmosphere or space, after such objects either are in orbit or have achieved escape velocity. This means that full encryption and encapsulation would be permitted on such an object (for example, a communications satellite) after it reaches orbit or attains escape velocity, and that a Party launching such an object undertakes no obligation to make available any telemetry tapes for the portion of the flight of such an object after it reaches orbit or attains escape velocity. All provisions of Article X and of the Telemetry Protocol would apply to the object prior to its reaching orbit or attaining escape velocity.

Thirty-second Agreed Statement.

This agreed statement mandates agreement in the Joint Compliance and Inspection Commission on the procedures for establishing the throw-weight accountability of an ICBM or SLBM of a new type in the event that a Party deploys an ICBM or SLBM of that type prior to its eighth flight test. Without this agreed statement the throw-weight accountability in such a situation would be ambiguous, since subparagraph 3(b) of Section I of the Throw-weight Protocol provides that, under certain conditions, none of the first seven flight tests need be taken into account in determining the accountable throw-weight, while paragraph 1 of Section III of the Notification Protocol ties the notification of certain data related to determination of accountable throw-weight to the eighth flight test of an ICBM or SLBM of a new type.

The reference to paragraph 4 of Section VII of the Notification Protocol (which provides for notification that a prototype ICBM or prototype SLBM shall be considered an ICBM or SLBM of a new type) does not affect the substance of the agreed statement.

Thirty-third Agreed Statement.

This agreed statement provides special provisions for the treatment of no more than two U.S. ballistic missile submarines that, at Treaty signature, are equipped with Poseidon SLBMs and that may be subsequently modified for use as special purpose submarines. This agreed statement allows the United States to modify two special purpose submarines that we use to support combat swimmer delivery vehicles (i.e., devices that put swimmers into the water from submarines) without either (a) the expense of eliminating the SLBM launchers, or (b) making the submarines and their home ports subject to the inspection provisions of the Treaty. Except for the removal of the SLBMs themselves, there are no specific conversion procedures specified in the Treaty for these special purpose submarines. In describing U.S. plans for such submarines to the Soviet side, however, U.S. negotiators specified on November 20, 1990, that these submarines would be unable to launch missiles.

(a) Subparagraph (a) of this agreed statement requires that such submarines be permanently based only at ports other than submarine bases (defined in the Treaty as bases for ballistic missile submarines) specified in the Memorandum of Understanding. Such ports shall be specified in paragraph 11 of Annex I of the Memorandum of Understanding and shall not be subject to inspection. There are no restrictions on the locations of these ports nor are there any prohibitions on special purpose submarines visiting submarine bases specified in the Memorandum of Understanding.

(b) Subparagraph (b) of this agreed statement requires that the United States of America open all the launch tubes on such a submarine, when so requested and when such a submarine is located at its home port, in order to demonstrate that they do not contain SLBMs. After receipt of such a request, such a submarine shall not leave the port until the display is completed. If both special purpose submarines are located in the same home port when a request is made, both submarines shall be displayed, and the request shall count as one request for each such submarine.

(c) Subparagraph (c) of this agreed statement gives the USSR the right to make two such requests per submarine each year. In the event the United States of America is unable to conduct such a display because of the absence of such submarine from the port, it shall provide notification and the request shall not count against the quota. While the content of the request is provided in paragraph 5 of Section V of the Notification Protocol, no specific content is provided for the notification of the inability to comply with the request due to the absence of the submarine from port.

(d) Subparagraph (d) of this agreed statement makes clear that, until they are eliminated in accordance with Section IV of the Conversion or Elimination Protocol, the 16 launchers on each special purpose submarine shall continue to count as 16 launchers against the aggregate limit of 1,600 provided for in Article II of the Treaty and to count as 160 against the 6,000 and 4,900 warhead limits also provided therein. When all launchers of Poseidon SLBMs have been converted or eliminated­except those contained on the two special purpose submarines, test launchers, and launchers at space launch facilities­the Poseidon SLBM shall be considered to be a retired type of SLBM for all purposes under the Treaty, including those purposes associated with exemptions to the ban on encryption of telemetry.

Thirty-fourth Agreed Statement.

This agreed statement clarifies how the criteria contained in subparagraph (f) of the definition of the term "new type" provided for in the Definitions Annex are to be applied. That subparagraph provides one of the criteria by which an ICBM or SLBM will be considered of a different type from other ICBMs or SLBMs as follows: "throw-weight, by an increase of 21 percent or more, in conjunction with a change in the length of the first stage by five percent or more." This agreed statement provides details of how these changes are to be measured.

(a) Subparagraph (a) of this agreed statement provides that the 21 percent increase in throw-weight and the five percent change in length of the first stage shall each be determined in relation to an ICBM or SLBM of the same existing type or the same previously declared new type. Thus an ICBM could not be considered a new type if it differed from one existing type of ICBM by 21 percent throw-weight and differed from a separate existing type of ICBM by a five percent change in the length of the first stage.

(b) Subparagraph (b) of this agreed statement simply refers to the requirement of paragraph 15 of Annex J of the Memorandum of Understanding as the reference on how the length of the first stage is to be specified for purposes of confirming a new type of ICBM or SLBM on the basis of a change in length of the first stage.

(c) Subparagraph (c) of this agreed statement makes it clear that there are no special provisions required by the new types definition for determining the throw-weight of an ICBM or SLBM of an existing type or previously declared new type. The throw-weight involved shall be the accountable throw-weight specified in the Memorandum of Understanding.

(d) Subparagraph (d) of this agreed statement provides that the throw-weight of an ICBM or SLBM of a type declared to be a new type shall be the greatest throw-weight demonstrated in flight tests of an ICBM or SLBM of that type to a range of no less than 11,000 kilometers for an ICBM, or a range of no less than 9,500 kilometers for an SLBM. These ranges were selected to be the same as the ranges specified in paragraph 3 of Section I of the Throw-weight Protocol for use in determining the maximum calculated throw-weight of a new type of ICBM or SLBM. If an ICBM or SLBM of a type declared to be a new type is not capable of being flight-tested to such a range, it shall be flight-tested to a range of no less than 10,000 kilometers for an ICBM, or a range of no less than 8,500 kilometers for an SLBM.

(e) Subparagraph (e) of this agreed statement modifies subparagraph (d) and provides that should an ICBM of any type be declared to be a new type in relation to the Soviet SS-25 ICBM on the basis of an increase in throw-weight in conjunction with a change in the length of the first stage, the throw-weight of the new type of ICBM shall be the greatest throw-weight demonstrated in flight tests to a range of no less than 11,000 kilometers. This provision was included to deal with the fact that the SS-25 already has been flight-tested with its maximum demonstrated throw-weight to a range in excess of 10,000 kilometers. Thus, if a new type based on the SS-25 were not flight-tested to 11,000 kilometers, the Soviets would be able to demonstrate a significant increase in throw-weight without significant redesign of the missile, and thereby require less than a real 21% increase in throw-weight in order to be considered a new type.

Thirty-fifth Agreed Statement.

This agreed statement provides for the reimbursement of certain unequal costs incurred in the provision of telemetry data tapes pursuant to paragraph 4 of Article X of the Treaty and Section I of the Telemetry Protocol. The Party that provides in any one year such tapes for a greater number of flight tests shall be reimbursed the difference in the tape-associated costs. There are no provisions for reimbursement if a Party, because of its collection procedures, must provide more tapes per flight than the other Party. Tape-associated costs are those associated with the purchase of the tapes and the copying of telemetric information onto the tapes, rather than those associated with the development of a taping system. Specific costs to be included, as well as the procedure for the reimbursement, are subject to agreement in the Joint Compliance and Inspection Commission. This agreed statement does not address the question of the currency of reimbursement.

Thirty-sixth Agreed Statement.

This agreed statement provides that the USSR may conduct only one inspection at any one time at each of the following bases: Ellsworth Air Force Base, South Dakota; Grand Forks Air Force Base, North Dakota; Minot Air Force Base, North Dakota; and Whiteman Air Force Base, Missouri. Each of these bases, except Whiteman, is listed in the Memorandum of Understanding as both an ICBM base and an air base for heavy bombers (Whiteman is projected as a B-2 base). Thus, in theory any of these bases could simultaneously be required to host an inspection of the heavy bomber portion and the ICBM portion of the base. Limiting inspections to only one at any one time at a given base reduces the administrative and operational burden on the base. Nothing in this agreed statement prohibits simultaneous inspections at more than one of these bases.

Thirty-seventh Agreed Statement.

This agreed statement contains a number of provisions on the treatment of ICBMs or SLBMs of former or retired types as well as on the treatment of the one test launcher located at the Vandenberg Air Force Base, California, test range, that is equipped for flight-testing only the Minuteman I.

(a) Subparagraph (a) of this agreed statement provides that retired single-warhead ICBMs for mobile launchers of ICBMs shall not count against the limit of 250 non-deployed ICBMs for mobile launchers of ICBMs specified in subparagraph 1(a) of Article IV of the Treaty. Retired ICBMs for mobile launchers of ICBMs of types which have ever had more than one warhead attributed to them shall count against the non-deployed limit.

(b) Subparagraph (b) of this agreed statement provides that the limitations on the number of ICBMs and SLBMs at test ranges and at space launch facilities provided for in subparagraphs 1(d) and 4(c) of Article IV of the Treaty, respectively, shall apply to ICBMs of retired types of ICBMs for mobile launchers of ICBMs, but not to other retired or former types of ICBMs or SLBMs.

(c) Subparagraph (c) of this agreed statement provides that the restrictions on the locations of non-deployed ICBMs and non-deployed SLBMs provided for in subparagraph 9(a) of Article IV of the Treaty shall not apply to ICBMs or SLBMs of former or retired types except for ICBMs of retired types of ICBMs for mobile launchers of ICBMs.

(d) Subparagraph (d) of this agreed statement provides that retired types of ICBMs for mobile launchers of ICBMs shall not be located at ICBM bases or submarine bases.

(e) Subparagraph (e) of this agreed statement provides that data on ICBMs or SLBMs of former and retired types shall not be included in the Memorandum of Understanding except for the technical characteristics contained in Annex F for such retired (but not former) types. Retaining technical characteristics in Annex F provides a formal way to preserve the dimensions of retired types of ICBMs and SLBMs as an aid to inspectors in identifying these retired ICBMs and SLBMs, and as a baseline for new types determination.

(f) Subparagraph (f) of this agreed statement provides that retired single-warhead ICBMs for mobile launchers of ICBMs shall not be subject to the procedures contained in the Conversion or Elimination Protocol for elimination or removal from accountability. Retired ICBMs for mobile launchers of ICBMs of types which have ever had more than one warhead attributed to them shall continue to be subject to these procedures.

(g) Subparagraph (g) of this agreed statement provides that the provisions of Section IV of the Notification Protocol (i.e., notifications related to conversion or elimination) shall only apply to retired ICBMs for mobile launchers of ICBMs which have ever had more than one warhead attributed to them and not to other retired or former ICBMs or SLBMs.

(h) Subparagraph (h) of this agreed statement effectively provides that launchers of ICBMs or SLBMs of a former or retired type (as opposed to the ICBMs or SLBMs themselves) shall continue to be subject to all provisions of the Treaty. In particular, such launchers shall be subject to the numerical limitations on test launchers and on launchers at space launch facilities contained in subparagraphs 2(d) and 4(b) of Article IV of the Treaty, respectively.

(i) Subparagraph (i) of this agreed statement modifies subparagraph (h) and provides that the one Minuteman I test launcher located at the Vandenberg Air Force Base, California test range shall not be counted against the limits on the number of test launchers provided for in Article IV of the Treaty nor be subject to the notification requirements of Article VII of the Treaty, unless it is converted to launch other ICBMs or SLBMs.

Thirty-eighth Agreed Statement.

This agreed statement makes clear that there are no provisions in paragraph 23 of Section VI of the Inspection Protocol for establishing reference cylinders in order to determine size criteria for ICBMs for mobile launchers of ICBMs containing a first stage equipped with a liquid-propellant main rocket engine. At the time of Treaty signature, neither Party possessed a liquid- propellant ICBM for mobile launchers of ICBMs. Procedures for establishing such reference cylinders shall be agreed in the Joint Compliance and Inspection Commission prior to the deployment of such ICBMs.