February 17, 1994

On February 10, John D. Holum, the new Director of the U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency (ACDA), delivered his first Congressional testimony as ACDA Director before the Subcommittee on Commerce, Justice, State, the Judiciary and Related Agencies of the House Appropriations Committee. A summary of Director Holum's testimony follows. The complete text of Director Holum's testimony is attached.

The world has changed since you and I, Mr. Chairman, began our arms control involvement with SALT II. With the end of the Cold War, there was reason to hope that arms would wither away on their own, and the need for arms control would recede.

In fact, the opposite has occurred. The bipolar nuclear standoff has been replaced by a constantly-shifting multipolar array of what President Clinton accurately describes as rampant arms proliferation, bitter regional conflicts, ethnic and nationalist tensions ... an d fanatics who seek to cripple the world's cities with terror."

This environment means more for ACDA to do, rather than less. It means harder challenges, rather than easier ones. It means a greater need for ACDA's unique capability for complex multilateral negotiation.

The specter of the 1960's was drawn by Wheeler and Burdick's novel Fail Safe about a multi-megaton U.S.-Soviet nuclear exchange nobody wanted but which happened anyway. Now the specter of the 1990s is drawn by Clancy's novel The Sum of All Fears about a single hundred-kiloton bomb -- set off in the U.S. by nihilistic terrorists, who combine possession of plutonium with a desire to kill people at random. Although the explosive power of today's nuclear threat is an order of magnitude less, its probability of occurrence is more than an order of magnitude higher. In one sense we are more secure, but in another sense we are less secure.

Recognizing what ACDA can do for national security, President Clinton has decided to revitalize it.

As the Director of ACDA, I am the principal advisor to the President on arms control, nonproliferation, and disarmament matters.

ACDA leads the U.S. Government's efforts to extend the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, and to negotiate the nuclear Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty. The importance of each of these measures is impossible to overstate. Both are, with good reason, top Presidential priorities.

ACDA leads our Government's implementation of the Chemical Weapons Convention -- the most massive undertaking in the history of arms control.

Please note, Mr. Chairman, that these three undertakings are the major arms control centers of the 1990s, and all are multilateral rather than bilateral. This is a dramatic difference from the days of SALT II. Each of the three is a major challenge and a major opportunity for ACDA's unique capabilities.

ACDA leads U.S. Government implementation of the ABM Treaty, the INF Treaty, and the START Treaty We participate in policy formulation, negotiation, implementation, and verification on an extensive list of other arms control issues. They're listed in my record statement, and described in more detail in the ACDA Annual Report that we'll get to you shortly.

We request $61.278 million for FY95. Of that, $2.278 million is to pay the United States assessment for the 1995 Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty Conference. This is a critically important expenditure for FY95, but it will drop to zero for FY96 because the conference will be finished. $14 million is to pay the United States assessment to prepare to implement the Chemical Weapons Convention.

This leaves $45 million for ACDA operations: Down $1.5 million from our FY94 request, and up $1 million from our FY94 appropriation.

Mr. Chairman, you might ask how I can revitalize an agency on a budget that's basically flat plus inflation. My answer is: frugally and carefully. This isn't Cadillac revitalization, it's Chevrolet revitalization. But we can probably do it on a flat constant dollar budget. It's already under way. I believe you'll be pleased with the results.

I'll be happy to answer any specific questions you may have about ACDA revitalization. But before you begin your questions, I'd like to leave you with two thoughts:

First: I believe revitalization on a flat constant-dollar budget is possible. But revitalization on a contracting budget, in an environment of dramatically expanding responsibilities, would not be possible. The budget we submit today is what we need to meet our national security responsibilities. It's affordable in the context of the rest of the President's budget. I urge you to view it in that light.

Second: In the most profound sense of the terms, arms control isn't an expenditure; it's an investment. Every dollar you put into arms control comes back to the American people, many times over.

The primary purpose of arms control is not to save money It's to create national security. But a welcome side effect of arms control is that it helps our military forces produce more security at less cost.

Consider, for example, the tens of billions of dollars we spent in the 1980s to match and counter the Soviet SS-18 ICBM -- that is, to seek, with not much success, to close the so-called "window of vulnerability." In the 1990s we don't have to do that anymore, because arms control is taking the SS-18s off the face of the Earth, and prohibiting any comparable successor missiles.

This one arms control success, in itself, will save enough in a single year to pay the ACDA budget for a lifetime. ACDA, and the other parts of our government that work for arms control, nonproliferation, and disarmament agreements, are sound investments not only in security terms, but in economic terms as well.

On that note, Mr. Chairman, I'll be happy to take your questions.

February 10, 1994


Mr. Chairman, I am honored to appear before you and the other members of this Subcommittee. I look forward to working with you and your distinguished colleagues. I appreciate the strong interest in and support for ACDA that this Subcommittee has consistently demonstrated. In particular, I welcomed the Subcommittee staff's recent visit to The Hague and Geneva and the Survey and Investigations staff's planned trip next week to The Hague to glean a better understanding of the implementation efforts resulting from the Chemical Weapons Convention.


Last year, the Administration undertook a fundamental review of the role of ACDA in the context of an overall analysis of the future requirements of arms control policy. In an effort to make the arms control bureaucracy more responsive to national security requirements, on July 3, 1993, President Clinton announced his decision to strengthen and revitalize ACDA to reflect post-Cold War priorities in arms control, nonproliferation and disarmament.

A revitalized ACDA will play a key role in the conduct, preparation, and management of U.S. Government arms control, nonproliferation and disarmament activities.

The end of the Cold War now means there is significantly more for ACDA to do, not less; a miltilateral world on which to focus, rather than a bipolar world. Every indicator suggests that this trend will continue and ACDA with its unique multilateral negotiating skills is prepared to meet these challenges.

As articulated by President Clinton on January 25, 1994 in his State of the Union Address, "there are still dangers in the world: rampant arms proliferation, bitter regional conflicts, ethnic and nationalist tensions in many new democracies ... and fanatics who seek to cripple the world's cities with terror ... We achieved agreements with Ukraine, with Belarus, with Kazakhstan, to eliminate completely their nuclear arsenals. We are working to achieve a Korean Peninsula free of nuclear weapons. We seek early ratification of the treaty to ban chemical weapons worldwide. And earlier today we joined with 30 nations to begin negotiations on a comprehensive ban to stop all nuclear testing."

In addition, with the end of the Cold War and the dissolution of the Soviet Union, new sources of proliferation have emerged and some of the constraints against proliferation that existed under the Cold War power structure have been eroded. Moreover, the rewards of some of the signal achievements in United States-Soviet arms control negotiations, including the Strategic Arms Reduction (START) Treaties, have been made more difficult to realize because of the collapse of the Soviet Union and its replacement by not one but several nations, each with its own security interests, its own economic limitations, and its own political conflicts.

Although the end of the Cold War has amplified some of our national security problems, it has at the same time augmented the possibility of arms control solutions to those problems. Where once the major nuclear question for the U.S. was how to maintain strategic deterrence while keeping pace with Soviet modernization, now the question is how to steadily move away from the nuclear precipice and reduce our nuclear inventory consistent with our national security. Moreover, in the aftermath of the Cold War we are able to direct more of our resources toward the growing threat posed by the proliferation of mass-destruction weapons.

In meeting these post-Cold War objectives, ACDA will remain actively engaged in carrying out the Clinton Administration's arms control, nonproliferation and disarmament priorities. These include the negotiation of a comprehensive and verifiable ban on nuclear explosions, the ratification and implementation of the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC), the indefinite extension of the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), a ban on the production of fissile material for nuclear explosives, implementing of START I and II Treaties, and other continuing implementation and verification activities.

These challenges will magnify and intensify ACDA's potential contribution to national security. This is an investment well worth its peacekeeping dividend and certainly far less expensive than the alternative -- a renewed arms build-up.

ACDA's unique function is to ensure that arms control, nonproliferation and disarmament are always part of the national security policy debate and that there is always a strong voice on their behalf in the highest levels of government. While I am Director, ACDA will emphatically follow that mandate. We will do so in alliance with other agencies if possible, but alone if necessary. It is when ACDA stands alone that the need for what it has to say is often most acute.


In order to support this mission, ACDA is requesting a budget of $61,278,000 for Fiscal Year 1995. Although this represents a $7,778,000 increase over its FY-1994 appropriation, the bulk of these incremental funds are needed to provide for full-year expenses related to the Chemical Weapons Convention Preparatory Commission (CWC PrepCom) and the 1995 Non-Proliferation Treaty Conference. The remainder of this request reflects the Administration's call for the revitalization of ACDA and provides for increases in both the number of positions and support costs. Within this request, ACDA is looking to maintain its ability to carry out its mandate through its traditional strength -- its people. As you are aware, approximately one half of ACDA's budget for on-going activities, an estimated $23.5 million, goes for personnel compensation and benefits. This amount provides funding for 251 full-time equivalent personnel, as well as other detail appointments.

At this point, I would like to describe ACDA's current activities and plans for the future. I will touch on ACDA's efforts in negotiating and implementing multilateral arms control, nonproliferation and regional arms control, strategic weapons control and defense conversion; verifying compliance with arms control treaties; coordinating arms control research; organizing and storing arms control information; and, informing the public about U.S. arms control, nonproliferation and disarmament policies and initiatives.


The Multilateral Affairs Bureau (MA) will concentrate on the Administration's initiatives to ban nuclear testing and to eliminate both chemical and biological weapons. MA will also continue to address conventional arms control and confidence and security-building measures in Europe, Open Skies, and transparency in armaments.


On July 3, 1993, President Clinton announced his support for a comprehensive test ban and laid a solid foundation for negotiations, which began last month in Geneva. He declared that, "A test ban can strengthen our efforts worldwide to halt the spread of nuclear weapons. " He also extended the 1992 Congressionally-mandated moratorium on U.S. nuclear explosive testing through September 1994, and called upon other nuclear weapons powers to observe similar restraint. The President explained that by doing so, he put the United States "in the strongest position to negotiate a Comprehensive Test Ban and to discourage other nations from developing their own nuclear arsenals."

On January 25, 1994, the Conference on Disarmament (CD) began negotiations on a comprehensive test ban (CTB). The long-standing question of effective verification surely will be extensively discussed during the negotiations. International monitoring to detect and identify explosive events is essential for detecting and deterring violators, while minimizing false alarms. Devising an effective international monitoring regime will be a major challenge to the members of the CD.

ACDA is leading and managing the CTB negotiations in Geneva, will chair the CTB backstopping group in Washington, and will provide expert members to the U.S. delegation to the Conference.


In the past year the world has taken major steps toward total elimination of chemical weapons. An exceptionally significant step was the signing of the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) on January 13, 1993.

On November 24,1993, President Clinton described the CWC as "one of the most ambitious [treaties] in the history of arms control, banning an entire class of weapons of mass destruction." He called it "a central element of my Administration's nonproliferation policy," indicating that "the treaty will significantly enhance our national security and contribute to greater global security."

Up to now, 154 countries have signed the CWC, and four have deposited instruments of ratification. The CWC will enter into force 180 days after the date of deposit of the 65th instrument of ratification, but no earlier than January 1995; thus 65 ratifications are needed by July 1994 for entry into force by January 1995, the earliest possible date.

ACDA is the lead U.S. Government agency on the CWC. This includes: leading the U.S. delegation to the CWC PrepCom; chairing backstopping and task force meetings; developing and coordinating guidance for U.S. Government negotiators; chairing task force meetings and developing and coordinating Executive Branch policy on CWC ratification; supervising and administering U.S. funding for the CWC; serving as the Office of National Authority that will interface with the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW) and coordinate U.S. CWC-related actions in the U.S. after entry into force of the Convention; and, informing and educating the U.S. chemical industry about the CWC. ACDA will also staff and backstop the U.S. Delegation to the OPCW after entry into force of the CWC.

In addition to the multilateral CWC effort, the United States and Russia are committed to: implementing successfully phase II of the Wyoming Memorandum of Understanding (MOU), which provides for chemical weapons inventory and facility declarations and inspections. We are also committed to concluding, as soon as possible, the Bilateral Non-production and Destruction Agreement (BDA), which requires both Parties to destroy all but 5,000 agent tons of their existing chemical weapons and to produce no more chemical weapons, regardless of what other nations may or may not do with their chemical weapons. These agreements are being worked in tandem with the CWC as part of our comprehensive effort to eliminate chemical weapons.

Development, production, and stockpiling of biological weapons is prohibited by the Biological Weapons Convention (BWC) of 1972. We support increased transparency of activities and facilities that could be used for biological weapons as a means of strengthening this essential agreement.

In 1992 and 1993, ACDA led the U.S. delegation to the Ad Hoc Group of Governmental Experts, mandated by the 1991 Review Conference of States Parties to the BWC. The Group identified and examined 21 potential verification measures. Off-site measures include information monitoring, data exchange, remote sensing, and inspections. On-site measures include exchange visits, inspections, and continuous monitoring. The Group concluded that reliance could not be placed on any single measure, but that combinations of measures could help to enhance compliance and potentially deter cheating while protecting sensitive commercial proprietary information and national security needs. A Final Report has been distributed to all 134 Parties to the Convention. If requested by a majority of the Parties, a Special Conference will be convened, most likely in 1994, to discuss the Report. The U.S. supports such a conference.


European security concerns have changed dramatically since the members of NATO and the former Warsaw Pact agreed to bring the conventional forces balance in the Atlantic to the Urals region into approximate numerical parity Three useful conventional forces regimes -- CFE, Open Skies, and the CSBM's Agreement -- have recently been implemented which have set lowered ceilings on force levels, substantially improved predictability, transparency, and stability, and paved the way for further arms control progress.

The Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe (CFE) was designed to establish a secure, stable, and predictable balance of conventional armed forces in Europe at lower levels, to eliminate disparities prejudicial to stability and security, and to eliminate the capability for launching surprise attack and initiating large-scale offensive action in Europe.


For the United States, the CFE Treaty has never been an end in itself, but has been a part of a continuing effort to achieve stability in Europe. Careful implementation of its provisions has served and continues to serve as the basis for a new security relationship in Europe. The Treaty has proven itself a vital part of the structure for peace in post-Cold War Europe. It has significantly enhanced security, accountability, cooperation, and openness throughout the area of application.

ACDA plays a central role in the Joint Consultative Group in Vienna, which is the forum for considering questions relating to implementation of the CFE Treaty and its companion agreement on personnel. Much of the group's work involves on-going destruction of the thousands of items of heavy military equipment mandated by the Treaty. The CFE Treaty will be fully implemented by November 1995.


The Treaty on Open Skies, based upon a U.S. initiative, establishes a regime of unarmed aerial observation flights over the entire territory of its signatories. It is designed to enhance mutual understanding and confidence by giving all participants, regardless of size, a direct role in observing military or other activities of concern to them. Currently covering territory from Vancouver east to Vladivostok, Open Skies is the most wide-ranging international effort to date to promote openness and transparency of military forces and activities.

We believe Open Skies has potential for expansion in the future. In its present form, it can help in increasing transparency and building confidence in Europe. It might later be expanded, either by adding new countries to the present regime, or by developing similar regional regimes in other areas of the world. The rules and procedures for Open Skies, and possibly the current aircraft configurations, could provide a basis for such new regimes.

ACDA prepared the article-by-article analysis of the Treaty on Open Skies which was provided to the U.S. Senate. This analysis led to its ratification in December 1993. Following entry into force, we expect that ACDA will serve as a repository of processed data resulting from the notification and reporting requirements of the Treaty.


The overall implementation of confidence- and security-building measures (CSBMs) continues to improve, with the states of the former Soviet Union taking steps to meet their Vienna Document 92 obligations. Force reductions and CSBMs codified by the European arms control process have helped lessen the instability created by the disintegration of the Soviet Union and the emergence of new independent states. Required regular data exchanges and contacts have enabled member states of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe to monitor the military force building efforts of the newly created states, and potentially to influence those efforts.


The Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) established the Forum for Security Cooperation (FSC) at the CSCE Summit in Helsinki in 1992. The FSC meets in Vienna and is the sole forum for European conventional arms control and the further enhancement of stability and confidence in Europe. Among the objectives in its mandate are the development of new CSBMs and the improvement of existing ones, cooperative measures on nonproliferation, and the negotiation of appropriate regional arms control measures. ACDA plays a leading role in the formulation of FSC negotiating positions in Washington and on the U.S. delegation in Vienna.

NONPROLIFERATION The Administration has declared the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction to be a primary foreign policy concern of the United States. As President Clinton emphasized in his address to the United Nations General Assembly on September 27, 1993, "One of our most urgent priorities must be attacking the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction ... and the ballistic missiles that can rain them down on populations hundreds of miles away. " Within ACDA, the Nonproliferation and Regional Arms Control Bureau (NP) has the primary responsibility for these efforts.

Preventing the spread of nuclear weapons -- nuclear nonproliferation -- has long been a fundamental national security and foreign policy objective of the United States. Nuclear proliferation threatens regional security and challenges our ability to assist allies and friends during a conflict. It can lead to increasingly dangerous arms races throughout the world. Of even greater concern, it can increase the risk that nuclear weapons will be used.


The Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) is the primary legal and political barrier to the further proliferation of nuclear weapons. With over 160 parties, it reflects an international consensus against nuclear proliferation which is increasingly viewed as one of the gravest threats to global security and stability we now face. In addition, the NPT has facilitated international cooperation in the peaceful uses of nuclear energy Without the norms against proliferation established by the Treaty, the wide range of assistance in peaceful nuclear energy that is currently provided to NPT parties would not be possible.

In 1995, by the terms of the Treaty, a critically important conference of NPT Parties will be convened to "decide whether the Treaty shall continue in force indefinitely or shall be extended for an additional fixed period or fixed periods." The U.S. Government strongly supports the NPT and is deeply engaged in efforts to achieve its indefinite, unconditional extension in 1995. ACDA leads this effort on behalf of the U.S. Government. This task includes chairing the interagency committee which oversees the development and implementation of policy, preparing for consultations and meetings with other countries, conducting extensive bilateral diplomacy with key NPT parties, and leading the U.S. delegations to meetings of the NPT Depository Governments (United States, United Kingdom, Russia) and of the Preparatory Committee for the 1995 NPT Conference.


For over 30 years, the International Atomic Energy Agency has served vital U.S. security and nonproliferation interests through its program of international safeguards, which provides assurances that nuclear materials are not diverted from civilian to military purposes. It plays a central role in international efforts to make the benefits of peaceful uses of nuclear energy available to countries worldwide as well as make nuclear facilities safer through its nuclear safety program.

ACDA is working with the IAEA to help define long-term funding approaches for increased IAEA responsibilities. ACDA continues to supply vital expertise toward the review and monitoring of the IAEA's various technical programs. ACDA is represented on the interagency International Technical Liaison Organization which oversees technical cooperation with the IAEA.


President Clinton also announced a series of new initiatives concerning fissile materials at the UN General Assembly in 1993. The United States will undertake a comprehensive approach to the growing accumulation of fissile material from dismantled nuclear weapons and within civil nuclear programs. Under this approach, the United States will: seek to limit the stockpiling of fissile material for military or civil purposes, and to ensure that existing stockpiles are subject to the highest standards of safety, security, and international accountability; propose a multilateral convention prohibiting the production of highly enriched uranium (HEU) or plutonium for nuclear explosive purposes or outside international safeguards; encourage more restrictive regional arrangements to constrain fissile material production in regions of instability and high proliferation risk; submit U.S. fissile material no longer needed for our deterrent to inspection by the IAEA; seek to minimize the civil use of HEU; and initiate a comprehensive review of long-term options for plutonium disposition, taking into account technical, nonproliferation, environmental, budgetary, and economic considerations. The NP Bureau is helping to implement these initiatives.


The Arms Control and Regional Security Working Group of the Middle East peace process has met several times and has begun consideration of confidence-building measures such as a communications network. Through such small steps trust gradually can be built up, eventually leading to more concrete arms control measures. In South Asia, the U.S. is urging India and Pakistan to exercise restraint in their nuclear and missile programs. Finally, on the Korean peninsula the U.S. and the international community continue to press North Korea to comply with its nuclear nonproliferation commitments.


With the end of the Cold War and the attendant great reduction in the nuclear arms competition between the United States and the former Soviet Union, new momentum has been given to the concept of nuclear weapon free zones. The United States supports the creation of such zones in regions where they would contribute to the achievement of U.S. nuclear nonproliferation goals and would be consistent with other U.S. national security interests.

One of the models for these efforts is the 1967 Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America and the Caribbean, also known as the Treaty of Tlatelolco. The United States remains firmly committed to the goals of the Treaty and will continue to seek its full implementation. A major step toward this goal was taken last month when Argentina and Chile brought this Treaty into force. The Treaty makes a substantial contribution to regional peace and stability, as well to strengthening the global nuclear nonproliferation regime.

Other examples, in which the NP Bureau is involved, include the 1985 South Pacific Nuclear Free Zone and an African Nuclear Weapons Free Zone, which is now being negotiated.


In addition to strengthening the nuclear nonproliferation regime, the President urged transformation of the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR) from an export control effort among now 25 countries to a set of rules that can command universal adherence -- a global norm. Broader participation and adherence to the MTCR will serve to minimize the threat of missile proliferation. Members of the MTCR have also agreed to expand the focus of the regime to include joint action to stem proliferation from both the supply and demand sides. ACDA will continue its involvement in efforts to stem the proliferation of missiles in 1994-95 and beyond.


Another key U.S. nonproliferation goal is to discourage and impede proliferation through domestic and international export controls. The multilateral focus of this effort for chemical and biological weapons is the 25 member Australia Group which has established export controls on 54 chemical precursors to certain microorganisms, toxins and CBW-related production equipment. ACDA supports this Group by serving as the informal Executive Secretary for the U.S. delegation and plays a leading policy role.

The NP Bureau also is actively engaged in promoting controls on dual-use exports that could contribute to proliferation risks. This effort involves domestic U.S. controls as well as promoting multilateral cooperation. This international component of dual-use controls takes place in part through the groups mentioned above, i.e., the Nuclear Suppliers Group, MTCR, and the Australia Group. In addition, in response to a U.S. initiative, COCOM members began developing in 1993 the framework for a new arrangement that would promote transparency and responsible trade in armaments and dual-use goods and technologies. ACDA has participated in the interagency process developing this initiative as well as in the negotiations with COCOM members.

Under the Arms Export Control Act and the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, as amended, ACDA reviews proposed commercial arms exports licensed by the Department of State and government-to-government Foreign Military Sales and military assistance programs. We also evaluate licenses for the export of dual-use items subject to missile and chemical/biological nonproliferation controls administered by the Department of Commerce.

In 1993, ACDA participated in the development of the Presidential Decision Directive on Nonproliferation and Export Controls, particularly regarding the establishment of the requirement for a comprehensive review of U.S. conventional arms transfer policy.

This review is addressing national security, arms control, trade, budgetary, and economic competitiveness factors.


The Strategic and Eurasian Affairs Bureau's (SEA) efforts are concentrated on: eliminating the massive nuclear over-armament that remains from the Cold War; enhancing strategic stability through existing and future strategic offensive and defensive arms control regimes; supporting U.S. efforts to help eliminate and prevent the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction from the former Soviet Union; and promoting defense conversion in the highly militarized economies of the former Soviet Union and China. With the end of the Cold War, the tasks of reducing strategic arms and promoting defense conversion are at once more promising and more challenging than at any time in the past.


U.S. and Russian intermediate-range and shorter-range forces have been eliminated by the INF Treaty, although INF inspection and monitoring activities continue. With no U.S. and Russian ground-launched systems between the range of 500 and 5500 kilometers, and a ban on their production, the U.S. has been able to concentrate recent efforts on strategic (long-range) nuclear weapons in the American and Russian arsenals.

The complete withdrawal of tactical nuclear weapons from Belarus, Kazakhstan, and Ukraine to Russia was accomplished by the summer of 1992. This withdrawal has also demonstrated that sweeping unilateral reciprocity-generating arms control measures can sometimes be effective in the post-Cold War world.


Strategic nuclear weapons are the Intercontinental Ballistic Missiles, Submarine Launched Ballistic Missiles, and heavy bombers, with their warheads, that can strike from one continent to another. They possess not only the longest range of any weapon class, but also the greatest destructive power. While they are unlikely to be the first nuclear weapons to be used in a conflict, if they were used they would cause by far the greatest damage.

On July 31, 1991, President Bush and President Gorbachev signed the START I Treaty, mandating reductions in the superpower strategic nuclear arsenals by approximately one third. After the demise of the Soviet Union, such large scale reductions of strategic weapons remain of critical importance, both intrinsically and because they reduce the motivation for new nuclear-weapon states to emerge from the breakup of the Soviet Union and elsewhere.

On May 23,1992, Belarus, Kazakhstan, Russia and Ukraine signed the Lisbon Protocol to the START I Treaty, designating them the successor states to the former Soviet Union for the START Treaty.

It is particularly important that Belarus and Kazakhstan moved expeditiously to fulfill their Lisbon obligations, and I want to make special note of their efforts.

I also want to praise the recent efforts of Ukrainian President Kravchuk to win the Ukrainian Parliament's (Rada) approval of START and NPT The Rada's original resolution of ratification included unacceptable conditions that precluded START's entry into force. However, as you know, just last week, on February 3, the Rada rescinded the conditions it had previously imposed on its approval of START I and the Lisbon Protocol and authorized the Government of Ukraine to exchange instruments of ratification of START I. By approving the Lisbon Protocol, Ukraine has committed itself to acceding to the NPT in the shortest possible time.

The Trilateral Statement signed January 14,1994 in Moscow by President Clinton, President Yeltsin and President Kravchuk was crucial in opening the way for this positive action in Ukraine. The Trilateral Statement provides for security assurances for Ukraine, compensation for the value of highly enriched uranium (HEU) from the warheads in Ukraine, and technical and financial assistance for dismantling nuclear forces in Ukraine.

We are optimistic that the Rada will act positively on the NPT in the near future. We will continue to work closely with the Ukrainian government and parliament so that they can move swiftly to complete action on Ukraine's accession to the NPT as a non nuclear weapon state.

In the meantime, we are continuing our efforts to make START work in a multilateral context. Although the Treaty has not yet entered into force, the U.S. and its four Treaty partners have been meeting regularly in the Joint Compliance and Inspection Commission (JCIC), established by the Treaty, to work out details of Treaty implementation. Much of the work of the JCIC has been devoted to the complicated and uncharted process of clarifying the Treaty rights and obligations of each of the four successor states to the former Soviet Union.


Recognizing their mutual interest in stabilizing nuclear strategic reductions below the levels dictated by START I, on January 3, 1993 the U.S. and Russia signed the START II Treaty. START II will further reduce the strategic nuclear warheads down to approximately one third of the pre-START I levels.

Like START I, START II will serve U.S. nonproliferation interests by helping to allay the security concerns of the other successor states to the former Soviet Union, and by demonstrating U.S.-Russian commitment to deep reductions in their respective nuclear arsenals.

The ratification, entry into force, and implementation of the START I and START II Treaties is at once the unfinished business of the Cold War and the first task of the Post-Soviet era. Full implementation of the START I and START Ill reductions, and fulfillment of Ukraine's commitment to accede to the NPT as a non-nuclear weapons state, remain among our major foreign policy goals.


In 1993, the Clinton Administration reaffirmed the U.S. commitment to the ABM Treaty. The preservation of this Treaty remains crucial to stability, to the START I and START II reductions, and to longer term strategic arms control opportunities. At the Fourth ABM Treaty Review, conducted from September 27 to October 1, 1993, representatives of Belarus, Russia, Ukraine and the United States reaffirmed their commitment to the ABM Treaty and agreed that maintaining the viability of the Treaty in view of political and technological changes remains important.

At the Standing Consultative Commission (SCC) since then, the United States, Russia, and some other New Independent States have begun work on two important issues: (1) establishment and codification of a multilateral succession arrangement for the ABM Treaty in light of the demise of the Soviet Union, and (2) clarification of the demarcation between ABM systems and components limited by the Treaty and theater ballistic missile defenses which are not limited by the Treaty. The U.S. and its partners in the SCC have agreed on the importance of resolving these two issues in parallel.


In the coming year, the SEA Bureau will explore the possibility of further arms control measures designed to structure the world's major nuclear forces in such a way as to promote stability and prevent a first-strike potential. ACDA is also increasing its efforts to assess the impact of new technology on strategic arms control and its verification.


Safety, security, and dismantlement (SSD) of weapons of mass destruction from the arsenal of the FSU is a principal U.S. security concern and policy goal. This includes the complete denuclearization of Belarus, Kazakhstan and Ukraine, as well as the accelerated reduction of Russia's nuclear weapons, the elimination of its chemical weapons, and the advancement of U.S. nonproliferation objectives.

In this context, the United States has completed and signed three framework agreements and a total of twenty-eight implementing agreements for providing U.S. SSD technical and material assistance to the former Soviet Union. To meet this challenge, ACDA's Strategic Affairs Bureau was reorganized and redesignated the Strategic and Eurasian Affairs Bureau. Within that Bureau, the Strategic Transition and Defense Conversion Divisions are devoted almost exclusively to U.S.-FSU denuclearization efforts.

Key elements of the U.S. SSD program are to provide assistance in the following areas: strategic offensive arms dismantlement to facilitate and accelerate eliminations required under the START/ Lisbon Protocol package; fissile material control and accounting (MC&A) systems; export controls; defense conversion; and design of a storage facility for fissile material recovered from dismantled nuclear weapons, along with construction and operating equipment for such facility and related training.


Defense conversion is another integral part of the Administration's nonproliferation policy It is of direct U.S. national security interest to see that the scientific talent and industrial capacity of the FSU military industrial complex is put to use in production of peaceful endeavors.

Through the re-orientation of nuclear weapons R&D to industrial R&D, there is a potential for former military scientists to create long-term high-technology civilian enterprises that can be commercially viable. To evaluate this concept ACDA, together with the U.S. Department of Energy and Russia's Ministry of Atomic Energy (MINATOM), has cosponsored entrepreneurial workshops in Moscow and the United States. The objectives of these workshops are: to facilitate conversion of a major portion of Russian nuclear weapons R&D complexes into market-driven, commercially viable industrial R&D enterprises; to encourage weapons scientists to contribute to a market based economy; and to exploit the enterprise- and job-creation potential of the high technology capabilities of the Russian nuclear weapons complex.


In addressing arms control across the board, one of ACDA's most important responsibilities is to ensure that existing and future arms control agreements are effectively verifiable. Because verification requirements sometimes conflict with considerations of negotiability or operational flexibility, it is essential that verification has a strong independent advocate within the arms control policymaking community. ACDA's Bureau of Intelligence, Verification, and Information Support (IVI) performs this function. There are three aspects to this role.

First, ACDA plays a key role within the U.S. Government for formulating arms control verification policy. This involves ensuring that verifiability is properly considered in negotiating any new arms control treaty. Once agreements have been signed, ACDA is required by statute to assess the verifiability of all provisions of arms control agreements to which the United States is a party, and to notify Congress if there is any change in that assessment. These assessments are included in reports prepared and submitted to Congress pursuant to Section 37 of the Arms Control and Disarmament Act. Such reports have been prepared for START, CFE, INF, TTBT, and other arms control treaties.

Second, by legislative charter, ACDA takes the lead in evaluating U.S. and other nations' compliance with arms control agreements. As mandated by Congress, ACDA is responsible for preparing annual reports on adherence to and compliance with arms control agreements. These agreements include START, INF, ABM, BWC, CFE, NPT, the 1925 Geneva Protocol and the Wyoming MOU. IVI chairs the interagency group charged with preparing these annual reports.

Third, ACDA has primary responsibility within the interagency group for developing the verification provisions of all arms control agreements. These presently include START I & II, INF, CWC, CW Bilateral Agreements, Open Skies, CFE, Antarctic, BWC, TTBT, CTBT, and ABM. This includes developing effective verification provisions and planning, conducting and reviewing on-site inspection procedures, including issues pertaining to inspection equipment and procedures for its use.


In developing U.S. policy and in support of the Agency's multifaceted arms control, nonproliferation, and dismantlement efforts, ACDA has responsibility for the coordination of all relevant research government wide.

Historically, ACDA has met this requirement through such efforts as sponsorship of the Arms Control Research Coordinating Committee (an interagency group established to coordinate arms control research), maintenance of the Arms Control Research Network (ACORN) data base of completed, ongoing and planned research, participation in interagency committees focusing on research and development, and compilation and submittal of the Annual Report to Congress on Arms Control Research.

A significant component of ACDA's own research effort is its external research program, which is managed by an internal Research Review Board. The Research Review Board looks to the external research program to provide support for the Agency through projects that are critical to performance of the ACDA mission, that are time sensitive, and that directly support ongoing arms control negotiating efforts concerning nuclear and strategic forces, including strategic defenses; conventional forces; chemical and biological weapons; and nonproliferation issues.


Information gathering is also critical to prudent policy making. ACDA continues to improve upon its long history of arms control information management. Having used computers in support of arms control analyses virtually since the creation of the Agency, ACDA computer support now also provides administrative and operations support to all parts of the Agency, maintains arms control data bases used by other interested federal agencies as well as ACDA staff, and -- with the recent introduction of a public information bulletin board -- is providing pertinent arms control information to the entire academic and institutional research world. Aside from the ACORN database, the Agency maintains several other well established data bases, including: the Automated Recourse to Electronic Negotiation Archives (ARENA) system which permits search of the complete text of all arms control negotiations; the Processor for Arms Control Treaties (PACTS) database which permits similar search of the complete texts of all arms control treaties to which the U.S. is a party; the World Military Expenditures and Arms Transfers (WMEAT) databases of international arms sales and military expenditures; various economic data used to prepare the Annual Report to the Congress on WMEAT; the ACDA Integrated Retrieval System (AIRS) database of citations to thousands of arms control studies and reports; and, the Arms Control Community On-line Repository Data (ACCORD) repository which was established by ACDA during 1993. This computer-based federal repository allows exchange data, notifications, and inspection reports to be archived in a single location.

ACDA is a statutory repository for the U.S. Government of data exchanged among nations pursuant to arms control treaties. To the extent possible, the information is made available in electronic form so that federal agencies can have immediate access.

To provide improved management of its computer resources, ACDA reorganized its Operations and Information office under the Chief Information Officer to provide separate but coordinated focal points for analysis, databases, development, and computer administration. We anticipate that, by the end of 1994, every member of the ACDA staff will have a personal computer that will enable access, under appropriate security controls, to all ACDA databases and automated support capabilities. Interconnection to other Agency systems will also be available on a selective basis. Studies and development to further improve the efficiency and capability for organization and storage of arms control information will continue to be a significant ACDA focus.


One of ACDA's four mandates and one critical to ACDA's success is the dissemination and coordination of public information concerning arms control, nonproliferation and disarmament issues. ACDA seeks to provide the public with clear and technically competent insight into the often arcane debate over national security policy. In the information age, a coherent strategy for informing the public is essential to the success of U.S. arms control and nonproliferation initiatives and policies. To develop and implement such a strategy, ACDA's Acting Director of Public Information chairs a new Interagency Working Group on Public Diplomacy for; Arms Control and Nonproliferation. This group meets regularly under the auspices of the National Security Council to formulate and implement plans for communicating with the American people and the rest of the world.

ACDA also is significantly upgrading and increasing its production of a wide range of informational materials that explain present and past arms control, nonproliferation and disarmament developments to the United States and the world. I consider ACDA's public information mission to be one of the Agency's most important responsibilities.


Based upon this overview of the Agency's role in the multifaceted arms control, nonproliferation and dismantlement arena, together with the budget materials submitted to the Committee, I ask for your approval of ACDA's FY-1995 budget request of $61,278,000. The Administration, equipped with these resources and your support, is determined to meet the challenges of this new multipolar arms control environment. I pledge ACDA's commitment to do its share in promoting a secure peace.