"A Revitalized ACDA In The Post-Cold War Era"
Chairman Berman and Chairman Lantos, I am pleased to appear before you and the other Members of the Subcommittee on International Operations and the Subcommittee on International Security, International Organizations and Human Rights.
Let me take this opportunity to thank you both for playing central roles in strengthening and revitalizing the U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency. Chairman Lantos made a great contribution last May when he introduced what ultimately became the Arms Control and Nonproliferation Act of 1994 (the "Act"). And of course, Chairman Berman's leadership and management skills were crucial to the timely and successful adoption of the Act as part of the State Department Authorization bill for FY 1995.
With the end of the Cold War, some felt that the need for arms control would recede. The Soviet-American arms race is, indeed, over. But paradoxically, the need for arms control has grown. The bipolar nuclear standoff has been replaced by what President Clinton described in the last State of the Union address as "rampant arms proliferation, bitter regional conflicts, ethnic and nationalist tensions in many new democracies ... and fanatics who seek to cripple the world's cities with terror."
Thanks to your efforts -- and those of Chairman Hamilton, Representatives Gilman, Sabo, Obey, Carr, and Porter and Senators Pell, Simon, Helms, and Hatfield -- ACDA today is more capable than ever of fulfilling its distinctive mission.
The Administration's active and energetic support has been equally important. The President announced his decision as to ACDA's future last July 3. In his radio address that day to the American people, the President declared:
In his letter transmitting ACDA's 1993 Annual Report to the Congress (which I request be included in the hearing record), the President stated: "A specialized, technically competent, and independent arms control institution remains important to the Nation." He also noted that "the ACDA Director acts as principal adviser to the President and the Secretary of State on arms control, nonproliferation, and disarmament."
Just as President Kennedy demonstrated leadership by creating the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency in 1961, strengthening and reinvigorating the Agency today demonstrates such leadership by President Clinton.
The President's determination to strengthen ACDA is shared by the Secretary of State and the National Security Advisor. In a July 12,1993 letter to Chairman Pell of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, Secretary of State Christopher wrote:
The executive and legislative branches agree not only on ACDA's revitalization, but also on the following major priorities: eliminating the overarmament of the Cold War; preventing proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and their means of delivery; pursuing agreements and related policies to serve nonproliferation objectives; applying arms control solutions to regional problems; and establishing norms for the control and transfer of conventional arms.
Functionally, as you know, ACDA has three main missions. The first is to conduct and support negotiations. The second is to provide arms control advice and advocacy. The third is to implement arms control agreements already negotiated -- a burgeoning mission that includes, but goes well beyond verification.
ACDA's revitalization is evident in all three of these areas, and is also reflected in our enhanced policy role, access, and budget. In my testimony today I hope to give you both a progress report and a sense of my priorities after seven months as Director.
First, let me comment briefly on the significant accomplishments of the Act (listed in Appendix 1, which I request be made part of the Record). We are already making use of these important enhancements, which were signed into law by the President less than three months ago on April 30. And they have already proven their value by symbolizing the unequivocal support of both Congress and the Administration for a strong and vital arms control agency -- something that has been felt in the Executive Branch interagency process, in our legislative dealings, in our contacts with nongovernmental organizations, and in our innumerable contacts with foreign governments, bodies, and officials.
When I was initially considering becoming ACDA Director, I heard a great deal about how ACDA was no longer a significant player in the policy community. By virtue of its history in the last decade, the Agency's policy role had in fact been confined. But when I came on board I found a large group of talented and dedicated professionals who have always believed in arms control and in what they are doing to bring it about. The Agency's vast potential was quite apparent to me very early on -- for example, as the focal point of the Government's efforts with regard to the Chemical Weapons Convention, or as a key player in President Clinton's decision to continue U.S. participation in the nuclear testing moratorium.
So I have to stress that ACDA's revitalization, while central to the national interest, is emphatically not a case of making something from nothing. The gifted, experienced, and committed professionals who have been the core of the Agency for the last three decades have always represented a resource of the highest caliber; the challenge of revitalization has been finding the right ways to take advantage of and support this great national security asset.
Let me review briefly how our revitalization has been proceeding in terms of the three main missions mentioned earlier.
Negotiation is the first of ACDA's main missions that I'd like to discuss. Under the direction of the President and Secretary of State, ACDA has primary responsibility for the preparation, conduct and management of U.S. participation in all international negotiations in arms control and disarmament, and when directed by the President, in nonproliferation. These responsibilities include the CTBT, extension of the NPT, the fissile cutoff proposal, Nuclear Weapons Free Zone initiatives, and future strategic weapons negotiations.
Our top negotiating priority in the coming year is substantively straightforward but politically complex: indefinite extension of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty. The NPT is the institutional framework and legal basis for all our efforts on nuclear nonproliferation -- from South Asia to North Korea. Next year's NPT Conference is our one best chance to ensure that this bedrock regime -- and all it means to global security -- can be counted on forever.
We're also pushing hard in the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty negotiations in the Conference on Disarmament (CD) in Geneva. The negotiations reconvened on May 16, and we are working to achieve a CTBT "at the earliest possible time," as the President has instructed. I am cautiously optimistic that substantial progress in this negotiation will, in fact, create a favorable political climate for the NPT Conference next April.
A third negotiating priority is the fissile material cutoff. Such a global convention would prohibit the production of fissile materials for nuclear explosives or outside international safeguards. It could bring the unsafeguarded nuclear programs of non-NPT states under some measure of restraint for the first time. And it would likewise halt the production of plutonium and highly-enriched uranium for weapons in the five declared nuclear-weapon states.
Preliminary consultations on a fissile cutoff have begun. It will be formally negotiated at the Conference on Disarmament in Geneva, and we expect that expert-level discussions on verification issues will be held in Vienna, the home of the International Atomic Energy Agency. We enter these talks with initiative, commitment, and serious purpose.
Ambassador Shannon of Canada has been appointed Special Coordinator in the CD for the fissile cutoff, and he has been consulting widely. The next step is to agree on a negotiating mandate and establishment of an ad hoc committee for this purpose.
In themselves, the CTBT and the fissile cutoff cannot prevent nuclear arms, but they are vitally important steps that would erect additional meaningful fences around nuclear weapons ambitions.
Our second main responsibility is implementation and verification. Realizing the full potential of arms control agreements, including their verification obligations, is one of the central arms control and nonproliferation tasks of the future. Negotiafing agreements sets the stage for buttressing our security, but it is in their fulfillment -- the largely unsung work of implementation -- that weapons which could be used against us are actually averted or taken down. More and more, the biggest part of the job is done after the Rose Garden ceremonies have ended.
With the advent of the arms control implementation era, ACDA's plate is full and growing fuller. just a partial listing of the areas in which we are increasingly active includes the following:
* leading the push for ratification, entry into force, and effective implementation of the Chemical Weapons Convention -- which will completely ban an entire category of indiscriminate weapons and break new ground on verification;
* also regarding chemical weapons, our work with Russia on the Bilateral Destruction Agreement and the Wyoming MOU;
* the Trilateral Agreement on Biological Weapons between the U.S., the U.K., and Russia;
* fulfilling the Conventional Forces in Europe Treaty (CFE), and responding to the Russians' aspirations to exceed treaty limits on the flanks;
* entry into force and operation of the Open Skies Treaty; * resolving issues in the Special Verification Commission (SVC) over monitoring procedures under the INF Treaty, and completing work on multilateralizing the Treaty; and
* intensive work in the Joint Compliance and Inspection Commission (JCIC) on the START treaties, relating both to preparations for their entry into force and to multilateralizing START I.
In the area of implementation, compliance, and backstopping, ACDA manages the U.S. role in a great many intemational bodies. ACDA also has primary responsibility for assuring compliance and conducting periodic reviews of major arms control, nonproliferation, and disarmament agreements. And ACDA participates in policy-related and implementation activities with all the leading international arms control, nonproliferation, and disarmament entities. (Complete lists of these international agreements and entities are attached hereto as Appendices 2, 3, and 4, which I request be made part of the Record.)
In addition, ACDA's implementation responsibilities extend to such matters as: security assurances; confidence-building measures (CBMs); "European" regional security issues such as Balkan arms control and establishment of the CSCE communications network throughout the former Soviet Union; the UN Special Commission on Iraq (UNSCOM); ongoing industry liaison with chemical and biological industry representatives; liaison with the Chemical Weapons Office of National Authority (ONA), and bilateral and trilateral arms control efforts such as CW destruction agreements; and efforts to support non-proliferation in all these areas. In addition, the Act reinforced ACDA's role regarding the UN Conventional Arms Transfer Register (TIA), and its participation in backstopping for all European arms control negotiations and implementation, as well as the management of treaty review conferences.
Let me just comment briefly on the challenge and importance of START implementation -- addressing the bulk of all the world's weapons of mass destruction that can be delivered with devastating force on our own country. Our work encompasses two main tasks: dealing with the problems of multilateralizing a treaty originally negotiated bilaterally; and preparing for entry into force.
START was signed in 1991, and START II in January 1993. Some think that means we have taken care of the problem of Soviet heavy missiles and counterforce capabilities, and deeply cut back strategic nuclear forces. Well, not quite. Though reductions are being made, no country is yet legally required to destroy a single missile, bomber or submarine under the START Treaties. They have not yet entered into force.
Therefore, we must aggressively pursue efforts in the START Treaty's Joint Compliance and Inspection Commission (or JCIC) to resolve issues that must be worked out prior to, or shortly after, START's entry into force. The U.S. delegation to the JCIC, led by Ambassador Steve Steiner of ACDA, has been making great progress on those issues.
In addition we must, of course, continue pressing Ukraine to fulfill its commitment under the Lisbon Protocol and the Trilateral Statement to adhere to the NPT as a non-nuclear-weapon state as soon as possible. That action is the one remaining hurdle to START entry into force.
New and unexpected technical issues can also cause complications. For example, when Russian defense enterprises began modifying ICBM missile designs for civil space launch purposes, this posed the question of their treatment under START obligations and monitoring procedures. If arms control agreements are to make a continuing contribution to the security of the United States and the other parties, then each such agreement must be kept viable through a continuing negotiating effort and through solutions that account for new developments but preserve the original policy objectives of those agreements.
Agreements of the complexity of the START Treaties, INF, and the Chemical Weapons Convention involve a continuing need to negotiate detailed implementing procedures and carry out obligations regarding notifications and inspections. That reality is detailed in my remarks on the advent of the "arms control implementation era," delivered at an American Bar Association conference earlier this month. I ask that a copy of this speech be included in your hearing record.
As you know, the need for arms control advice and advocacy is not just what saved ACDA last year, but what first led to its creation in the Kennedy Administration. ACDA grew out of the conviction that the President needs to hear the case for arms control unfiltered -- presented by an advisor dedicated to arms control as his or her highest priority.
This means that arms control considerations -- instead of being compromised down or washed out by the time they reach the Cabinet level -- are injected into the decision-making process at the highest levels. When arms control and nonproliferation issues are on the agenda, the Director of ACDA joins the National Security Advisor, the Secretaries of State and Defense, the Chairman of the joint Chiefs of Staff, the UN Ambassador, the Director of Central Intelligence, and the heads of other affected departments and agencies in meetings of the NSC Principals' Committee. The right to go directly to the President with arms control advice is also built into the ACDA Director's role. Obviously this is a right to be exercised sparingly. But it is a valuable recourse when the interagency process does not adequately reflect our views. Fortunately, there has been little need for this, because the access granted to ACDA in the interagency process has been very broad.
I'm told that in the past ACDA commonly had to fight to gain access to the policy process, and too often was excluded. This is something I have focussed on determinedly. We have been able to work out with a receptive National Security Advisor and staff a very inclusive list of subject areas, meetings, and interagency working groups in which ACDA now is routinely involved. It includes not only subjects on which we have lead negotiating responsibility -- such as the ABM/TMD demarcation - but subjects, such as proliferation in South Asia, where others are at the front line. And it includes not only matters where arms control is predominant -- like the test ban negotiations -- but also areas, like China and the Middle East, where arms control is on, but does not dominate, the agenda.
As part of this process, the ACDA Director and Deputy Director take part in relevant meetings of the Principals' and Deputies' committees, made up of members of the President's cabinet and their deputies. Thus far I have represented ACDA's perspective at Principals'Committee meetings about once every 10 days.
The overriding point is institutional, not personal. This Administration is genuinely committed to arms control and nonproliferation and to ACDA's expanded role. And that would be the case no matter who sat in my chair.
ACDA's revitalization means strengthened ties not just with the White House, but throughout the Executive Branch. We are enjoying a good working relationship with the Departments of State, Defense, Energy, the joint Chiefs, and the intelligence community. ACDA's views are sought out and considered at the most senior levels of foreign policy formulation. It has been my privilege to articulate ACDA's views and judgements to the President, the National Security Advisor, the Secretary of State, and to a variety of Cabinet and sub-cabinet officials, to members of the Legislative Branch, to foreign officials and to various public interest groups.
ACDA has vigorously met the challenge of resuming its intended role. Its Director is the principal advisor to the President, the National Security Council and the Secretary of State on the full range of arms control, nonproliferation and disarmament matters.
Perhaps of even more significance to the long-term institutional resurgence of ACDA is the now routine participation of ACDA representatives in all levels of the Washington interagency policy arena. ACDA is represented on the full spectrum of policy formulation and implementation venues. This permits us to have access to formerly restricted channels of communication and documents so that we can fully vet and coordinate our perspectives on relevant issues. We have established closer ties to the Department of State, relative both to the substance of issues and in the use of technology and communications. We are working to pool limited resources and to obtain the most out of our joint endeavors to achieve U.S. objecfives-I have insisted, and will continue to insist, on coordination and good process in both directions. So far, ACDA and the other national security agencies are working well together as we work out our respective roles and address a colossal agenda.
One aspect of ACDA's revitalization is its enhanced role in the Administration's nonproliferation policy-making process. One example is its acfive participafion in the Administrafion's conventional arms transfer policy review. Another is the enhancement and clarification of its role in decisions on U.S. dual-use exports.
Another aspect of ACDA's advisory role is innovation. We are looking not just at what arms control can do better, but at what arms control can do for the first time.
ACDA will be examining such matters as the need for new arms control restraint regimes, the potenfial merits of citizen verification, and ways to foster greater cooperation between the U.S. Government and industry in arms-control related areas. Such cooperation worked well during the negotiation of the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) and continues to work well in the CWC ratification phase. Cooperation with industry will also be important to future arms control agreements, including a CTBT.
Let me discuss briefly just one initiative in which ACDA will play a leading role. We're becoming increasingly involved in conventional weapons generally, and land mines specifically. If we set our priorities according to weapons' actual versus potential harm, this would quickly work its way to the top of the list. Nuclear weapons haven't killed anyone on purpose since Hiroshima and Nagasaki. But in the time we will spend in this room together, it's likely that somewhere in the world, a noncombatant civilian -- most likely a farmer at work or a child at play -- will be killed or maimed by a land mine.
More than a hundred million land mines are in place today. Most sit and wait for years until someone -- anyone -- steps on them. And over 2 million additional mines are being emplaced every year -- about 25 times as many as are being removed.
But it's not that hard to make land mines that are both self-destructing and self-inerting within a few days of emplacement. It seems to me that we'd accomplish a great deal if we succeeded in globalizing a norm to make all land-mines self-eliminating in this way.
As the end of the Cold War has changed arms control, it must also change ACDA. As a complement to our revitalization by the Congress and the Administration, we have undertaken an in-house process of self-improvement that is well underway It is dedicated to the proposition that our Agency must make the very best use of its people and resources if its influence is to transcend its size.
There are two broad parts to this process. First, ACDA's Management Assessment has involved broad and active initial consultations within the Agency as to how we can make most effective use of our resources, empower our employees, improve morale, and remove barriers to top performance. Virtually every employee in the Agency took part in these discussions. The results were tabulated, and our senior staff then met to consider them, absorb data, and discuss issues. We have designed and are now implementing an action plan to help the agency run more effectively and smoothly. Our Strategic Planning Working Group has begun addressing near term solutions for the FY 96 budget cycle. Then it will assist in developing our vision for the future -- in light of changes in the world, the needs of our "customers" within and without the Administration, and our Congressional mandate.
The second element of this process is an assessment of the "lines of business" of our various bureaus and offices -- a comprehensive examination of everything ACDA does and should be doing. We entered it with no preconceptions about protecting turf or enshrined ways of doing things. It may well be that we ought to do less in some areas in order to do certain core things better.
Two principles have guided my approach to this effort. One is that we must fulfill as best we can the arms control missions defined as priorities for us by Congress and the Administration. The second is that we ought to be guided as well by the concept of value added.
ACDA should not duplicate everything DOD does in defense, or State does in diplomacy, or Commerce does as to exports. We should instead concentrate on matters where we can bring something unique to the table -- whether it is our expertise, our capacity for innovation, or our distinct point of view. A highly-disciplined focus is how a small agency can make a big difference. Mindless turf-grabbing is a bureaucratic reflex that I intend to avoid.
BUDGET AND PERSONNEL MATTERS
Let me comment briefly on the cross-cutting matters of budgets -- our own and others' -- and personnel. Such matters are among the best barometers of revitalization's success.
The Administration's commitment to a strong and vital ACDA is reflected in our budget. At a time when budgets throughout the Executive Branch are being cut, the President proposed for ACDA an increase in both human and financial resources. We are grateful for the support of the President and OMB in the budget process, and also for the strong advocacy on our behalf by Secretary of State Christopher. We also have a strong interest in the adequacy of other agencies'budgets, as they directly affect our mission. Specifically, as I have said, arms control implementation is becoming a mammoth mission. It is complicated by the fact that, to verify compliance, we depend heavily on physical and analytical resources controlled by other agencies.
One example of this is the COBRA DANE radar system, located in the Aleutian Islands, which is used to verify key provisions of the Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty. With the demise of the former Soviet Union, a number of national collection assets have been reoriented to other areas of the world or disestablished. In this vein, there were suggestions to discontinue operations of the COBRA DANE radar system. But we have been able to work with the Department of Defense and the Central Intelligence Agency to retain this important verification asset.
This case, however, points up a long-term systemic danger to the arms control implementation and verification mission. With the NPT, CWC, CFE, Open Skies, INF, and START Treaties -- as well as a global test ban, fissile material cutoff, and other initiatives to come -- we are piling up arms control implementation and verification requirements. But verification depends on radars, sensors, satellites, on-site inspectors, and other assets owned and operated entirely by other agencies, not by ACDA.
And most agencies of the government are cutting their budgets, to attack more than a decade of deficits and thereby rescue the economy. Deep cuts are expected from agencies like Defense, Energy, and Intelligence, whose missions have changed in the aftermath of the Cold War.
All of those agencies quite reasonably will apply their own standards of cost- effectiveness to their budgets -- balancing defense or intelligence requirements against arms control verification.
You can see the tension. Already it has occupied a considerable amount of my time as Director of ACDA. In the months ahead it could well become a preoccupation.
A related cross-cutting interagency issue is the important challenge of coordinating the development and implementation of programs and projects to support arms control verification. Historically, coordination has been spotty at best. So this is an issue that I believe has benefitted from timely congressional interest. The Act this year significantly strengthened ACDA's role in coordinating research and development (R&D) on arms control, nonproliferation, and disarmament. It also called on ACDA to prepare a report on all such research and development conducted by Executive Branch agencies.
Accordingly, ACDA has taken an active role in working toward a more effective process for coordinating arms control and nonproliferation R&D. With the support of the National Security Advisor, ACDA drafted a Presidential Review Directive, issued on May 25, toward that end, and it is now being worked interagency. In the meantime, ACDA also significantly revised the format of future reports on completed R&D studies to include assessments of the relationship of these projects to national arms control priorities.
Great interest has been expressed -- and rightly so - as to when ACDA may be graced with its full complement of presidential appointments. Obviously I share this interest. My personnel search was prompt and aggressive. I recruited broadly, reviewed scores of resumes, and personally interviewed at least fifty candidates. Within about six weeks of coming on board, I submitted a full slate of eight PAS candidates to the White House. All were substantively very well qualified for the positions for which they were proposed. The President blessed them all in two weeks' time -- one week of which, incidentally, he was in Brussels at the NATO summit and in Moscow and Kiev finalizing the trilateral accords.
As you know, we have named most of the PAS appointees publicly. Assistant Director designees Amy Sands, Lawrence Scheinman, and Michael Nacht are all superbly qualified, highly respected, and deeply experienced in their respective fields. Confirmation of Thomas Graham Jr. will officially place the task of NPT extension into just the right hands. And if confirmed, our Chief Science Advisor designee, James Sweeney, will greatly help both sides understand one another when science and policy intersect. I am delighted that their confirmation hearing before your colleagues on the Senate Foreign Relations Committee is being held tomorrow.
The remaining appointments will be made public soon. Their qualifications -- and my enthusiasm for them -- are equally strong. There is good reason to be hopeful that the process will be completed in the next two months.
Part of ACDA's charge, of course, is to be a forceful public advocate and authoritative source of information for arms control.
As you know, ACDA's organic act from the beginning has always mandated "the dissemination and coordination of public information concerning arms control and disarmament." To this end, we have established two new components in our office of Public Information: a Public Diplomacy Division and a Publications and Media Division.
The Publications and Media Division produces a range of materials, including press releases, fact sheets, brochures, ACDA News, News Roundup, Special Edition, reports, compendiums of treaties and agreements, historical documents, ACDA Newsletter, Current Articles, and a journal, Studies in Arms Control and Nonproliferation. It also handles press contacts and the ACDA Speakers Bureau. This division fills thousands of information requests each year. Responding to this increasing demand, we recently established a toll-free number (1-800-581-ACDA) for publications requests and inaugurated an Electronic Bulletin Board.
I am particularly proud of the ACDA Annual Report for 1993, which many have said is the most useful such document in years. It inaugurated a new format and contained fuller descriptions of our activities and priorities than ever before. I am gratified by the response the Report has received already, and look forward to presenting you with an even more useful such document next year.
In the past seven months our public information activity has expanded considerably, often breaking new ground for the Agency. For example, we have inaugurated and are conducting an active public diplomacy effort, coordinating an interagency working group on the subject and conducting substantial public outreach in the academic and NGO communities. And preparations are underway for significant outreach and recruitment efforts that will take me to visit a number of historically black colleges in coming months.
The priority I have placed on public outreach and education has meant an active schedule of public speaking for me as well as other top Agency officials. I have already made more than a dozen major speeches -- not only to Washington audiences, but also at the UN in New York, at Notre Dame, at the Conference on Disarmament in Geneva, and in England and Japan.
We have all seen the world change dramatically in recent years. The post-Soviet era truly has brought a sea change in the global security environment. The aftermath of the bipolar arms race remains a great issue that we continue to address in implementing the START, NF, and ABM treaties. But we are also dealing with a series of new challenges that have emerged from the shadow of the old superpower standoff - challenges on which the President and leading voices in the Congress have spoken out.
All this means that the business of national security agencies has changed not only in the United States, but worldwide. India, Egypt, Malta and several other countries have begun to set up national entities which are based on the ACDA model. Germany has had an arms control commissioner for some time. At their summit May 30-31, France and Germany reportedly discussed opening their proposed bilateral armaments agency to other members of the Western European Union. In short, the ACDA model of a specialized arms control agency is becoming more widely known and emulated throughout the global arms control community.
The months and years to come will continue to be a time of profound rethinking and reorientation about how ACDA's authority and resources can best be deployed to fulfill a growing mission in a world transformed. We must preserve our achievements -- and be willing to reconsider old ways of thinking about global security. We must realize the promise of our strategic treaties -- and begin looking beyond them to other steps that could increase stability and reduce reliance on nuclear weapons.
ACDA is working to meet all the challenges I've laid out today, and at the same time, to rethink and redesign how we are structured and operate. The Arms Control and Nonproliferation Act of 1994 is an integral part of this ongoing process -- representing not just a great achievement, but a practical tool for the future. My testimony today has suggested some of my further thinking on these matters.
I appreciate the attention and commitment this Committee has devoted to arms control issues; these precious resources are the true coin of the realm in our deliberative democracy today. I am keenly aware of how important to our mission your support has been and continues to be. And I fully expect that future such sessions will continue and deepen ACDA's dialogue with the Congress, which has demonstrated for more than three decades a unique appreciation for the necessity, importance and role of an agency dedicated to arms control.
With that, I'll be happy to take your questions.
APPENDIX 1: Brief Summary of Some Significant Accomplishments
The Arms Control and Nonproliferation Act of 1994. Among other things, the Act provides for:
* new authority to hire specialized technical and expert personnel;
* reaffirmation of the Agency's lead role in informing and educating the public on arms control, nonproliferation and disarmament matters;
* increased involvement in export review, decision-making, and controls pertaining to arms control, nonproliferation, and disarmament objectives;
* a guarantee of ACDA's role in the development and implementation of policies and programs to promote defense conversion and to dismantle the excessive armament of the Cold War era; and
* reaffirmation of the Agency's role as the coordinator within the U.S. Government for arms control, nonproliferation, and disarmament research.
APPENDIX 2: International Bodies or Negotiations In Which ACDA Manages the United States Role
|Bilateral Consultative Commission||BCC|
|Biological Weapons Convention||BWC|
| Chemical Weapons Convention Preparatory
|Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty||CTBT|
|Fissile Material Cutoff||FMC|
| Joint Compliance and Implementation
|Joint Consultative Group||JCG|
|Open Skies Consultative Commission||OSCC|
| Organization for the Prohibition of|
Nuclear Weapons in Latin America and
the Caribbean (Treaty of Tlatelolco
|Special Verification Commission (INF)||SVC|
|Standing Consultative Commission (ABM)||SCC|
APPENDIX 3: International Agreements in Which ACDA has Primary Responsibility for Implementation, Compliance, or Review
|Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty||ABM|
|Biological Weapons Convention||BWC|
|Bilateral Destruction Agreement (CW, 1990)||BDA|
|Conventional Armed Forces in Europe Treaty||CFE|
|Chemical Weapons Convention||CWC|
|Intermediate-range Nuclear Forces Treaty||INF|
|Limited Test Ban Treaty||LTBT|
|Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons Treaty||NPT|
|Open Skies Treaty||OS|
|Peaceful Nuclear Explosions Treaty||PNET|
|Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty||START|
|Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty||START II|
|Threshold Test Ban Treaty||TTBT|
|Vienna Document 1992||CSBMs|
|Wyoming Memo of Understanding (CW, 1989)||MOU|
APPENDIX 4: Leading International Entities In Which ACDA Participates
|Bilateral Implementation Commission||BIC|
| Conference on Security|
and Cooperation in Europe
|Forum for Security Cooperation (CSCE)||FSC|
|International Atomic Energy Agency||IAEA|
|Missile Technology Control Regime||MTCR|
|NATO High Level Task Force||HLTF|
|Nuclear Risk Reduction Center||NRRC|
|Nuclear Suppliers Group||NSG|
|On-Site Inspection Agency||OSIA|
|Zangger Committee (NPT Exports Committee)||ZC|