Mr. Chairman, it is a privilege to appear before you and the Subcommittee on Commerce, Justice, State, the Judiciary and Related Agencies. We at the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency (ACDA) look forward to working with you and your distinguished colleagues. We appreciate the strong interest in and support for ACDA that this committee has consistently demonstrated.
The Department of State has requested that I state:
The Clinton Administration is committed to restructuring the arms control bureaucracy to deal effectively with this new agenda. At the same time, President Clinton wants to streamline and consolidate government functions wherever possible, so long as this can be done without compromising our nation's economic and military security. These are the considerations that will guide the Administration's approach to reorganization of the arms control machinery. We look forward to reporting our recommendations for the future to Congress."
Today, as the Acting Director of ACDA, I come before you with revitalized enthusiasm for the future of arms control. The end of the Cold War, the turbulent changes in eastern Europe and the Former Soviet Union (FSU), and the increased risk of proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and their means of delivery, have had a significant impact on ACDA, along with the rest of the world. As a result, ACDA has had to reassess its agenda and adapt to changing arms control concerns, particularly with regard to regional and nonproliferation issues. Consequently, post-Cold War arms control will have the following priority tasks: eliminate the overarmament of the Cold War era; ensure nonproliferation of weapons of mass destruction; apply arms control techniques to the settlement of regional disputes; establish global norms for the control of arms; and continue verification and compliance activities.
We are urgently pursuing a strategy to strengthen existing nonproliferation arrangements; expand the membership of multilateral nonproliferation regimes; and encourage the development of improved relations among countries in regions of tension.
World changes, while challenging, offer the hope of replacing Cold War antagonism with more cooperative approaches, combining unilateral actions with bilateral and multilateral negotiations. We have an excellent opportunity to create a progressively more stable strategic balance, prevent proliferation and dampen regional conflicts if we can continue to make effective use of the entire mix of arms control tools. One of these arms control tools is the US Arms Control and Disarmament Agency and its vital resources. In adapting to the current world dynamics, ACDA remains focused on its mission -- promoting a secure peace.
In order to support this mission, ACDA is requesting a budget of $62,500,000 for Fiscal Year 1994. Although this represents a $16,000,000 increase over its FY-1993 appropriation, these incremental funds are needed to provide for full-year expenses related to the new Chemical Weapons Convention Preparatory Commission (CWC PrepCom). The remainder of this request reflects the Administration's call for reductions in both positions and administrative costs. Within these constraints, ACDA is simply looking to maintain its ability to carry out its mandate via its historical strength -- its people. As you are aware, approximately one half of ACDA's budget for ongoing activities or approximately $23.4 million goes towards personnel compensation and benefits. This amount provides funding for 246 full-time equivalent personnel, as well as other detailee and consultant appointments. Finally, only nominal increases to maintain ACDA's technological edge and provide for the 1995 NonProliferation Treaty Review Conference (NPT RevCon) preparation, as well as other minor account adjustments, comprise the balance of ACDA's request for ongoing operational activities.
At this point, before asking for your support of this budget request, I would like to apprise this committee of ACDA's recent endeavors and what its people have accomplished as well as where we are going over the next few years. In doing so, I will sequentially touch on multilateral negotiations, regional arms control, nonproliferation, strategic and nuclear negotiations, verification and compliance, and research efforts of the Agency.
ACDA served as the proponent for and provided leadership to USG efforts to conclude the multilateral and the bilateral CW arms control agreements. ACDA continues to backstop and lead the bilateral negotiations with the Russian Federation to complete the protocols for the June 1990 bilateral agreement (drafted by ACDA) on CW destruction and non-production and to develop procedures for implementing the second phase of the September 1989 Wyoming Memorandum of Understanding. In addition, ACDA provides staffing, including the legal advisor, for the US delegation. ACDA backstopped and led the multilateral negotiations on the CWC, culminating in its signature on January 13, 1993. The CWC PrepCom opened February 8 in The Hague and will continue for at least two years developing implementing procedures and setting up the permanent international organization, the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons. ACDA leads and staffs the US PrepCom delegation, chairs the USG PrepCom Task Force and is responsible overall for principal administrative support for implementation of the CWC.
In response to the CWC requirement for States Parties to oversee national implementation, ACDA developed an interagency agreed proposed structure for the USG National Authority, currently at NSC for final approval. In preparation for ratification, ACDA is preparing the requisite Article by Article analysis and the report to Congress on the verifiability of the CWC as required under Section 37 of its Act, and is also preparing a proposed ratification game plan for interagency approval. ACDA will also chair the interagency task force managing the USG ratification efforts.
Biological Weapons Convention
The 1991 Biological Weapons Convention Review Conference (BWC RevCon) agreed to establish an Ad Hoc Group of Government Experts to identify and examine potential verification measures from a scientific and technical standpoint. ACDA chairs both the Backstopping Committee and the Task Force in support of the experts work. Activity has included inter alia, developing a dialogue with US biotech industry and academia. Other efforts have included writing technical papers on the various measures for use in the experts group discussions.
ACDA provided both the head and deputy of the US Delegation to the BWC RevCon in 1991, as we had for previous review conferences concerning this Treaty. In support of the review conference, ACDA chaired and managed the backstopping interagency efforts in the USG. In response to the agenda of the review conference, ACDA was the principal author and seat of technical expertise for the US -- proposed set of additional confidence-building measures adopted by the review conference which proved to be one of the conference's principal products.
ACDA played major roles in the adoption of both the Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe (CFE) and the Concluding Act of the Negotiation on Personnel Strength of Conventional Armed Forces in Europe, otherwise known as CFE lA. The CFE Treaty, signed in November 1990, reduces and restructures the balance of conventional forces in Europe and establishes the cornerstone for future cooperative security on the continent. In Washington, ACDA chaired working groups that developed US positions on methods and standards for the destruction of equipment to meet Treaty equipment ceilings and the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) Communications Network. ACDA also contributed significantly within the policy community in developing the rest of the entire spectrum of US positions relative to the Treaty. In Vienna, ACDA negotiators were active in drafting treaty provisions on verification, equipment destruction, and existing types of conventional systems, and provided the legal advice to the US delegation for drafting and conforming the majority of the Treaty text. The CFE lA Concluding Act limits full-time military manpower and provides for greater transparency of military forces through stabilizing measures and information exchanges. ACDA was deeply involved in developing US policy positions in Washington and negotiating the Act in Vienna.
Forum for Security Cooperation
At the Helsinki CSCE Summit in July 1992, a mandate for new European security negotiations, known as the Forum for Security Cooperation (FSC), was agreed. FSC negotiations, in which ACDA participates as an important substantive member of the US delegation, began in Vienna in September 1992. The FSC will give early attention to several items of arms control interest, including harmonization of existing arms control obligations (i.e., the CFE Treaty and the Vienna Document 1992 (VD92)), improvements to VD92, new Confidence- and Security-Building Measures (CSBMs), nonproliferation and arms transfer regimes, regional measures, and a global information exchange. The aim of the CSCE is to have additional agreements in these and other areas ready for approval at the next CSCE Summit in Budapest in 1994.
ACDA has participated from the beginning in negotiating the Treaty on Open Skies, which was signed in Helsinki in March 1992. This Treaty establishes a wide-ranging confidence-building regime to promote openness of military forces and activities in North America and Eurasia by reciprocal observation flights of unarmed aircraft. The 25 signatories of the Treaty, including the US, expect to ratify it in 1993. ACDA provided representatives to the negotiations in Vienna and provided the legal advisors to the US delegation. ACDA negotiators drafted sections of the Treaty, and ACDA lawyers drafted and conformed the majority of the Treaty text. The Agency continues to participate in backstopping the Open Skies Consultative Commission, which meets regularly in Vienna for the purpose of phased implementation of the Treaty, portions of which have been provisionally applied since its signature. ACDA has been instrumental in providing advice and assistance to the Open Skies Treaty Text Working Group and the Treaty ratification process.
Conference on Disarmament
The Conference on Disarmament (CD), which meets in Geneva for three sessions annually, is the principal existing independent multilateral arms control forum. The CD was responsible for negotiating the CWC. ACDA provides the US Ambassador to the CD as well as administrative support and extensive professional expertise to the delegation. In all areas of CD activity, ACDA chairs the USG interagency process to develop and transmit guidance to the delegation. ACDA frequently supplements the delegation with specific professional expertise on topics that arise for CD deliberation or discussion.
UN Disarmament Activities
In the spring, the UN Disarmament Committee (UNDC) addresses arms control topics in New York. ACDA is responsible for developing, coordinating, and transmitting US policy positions on those issues to USUN in New York. In the autumn, ACDA likewise is the principal USG agency in developing and managing US policy in the UN First Committee (UNFC) deliberations. UNFC activities normally result in somewhere between 60 and 90 resolutions annually, all of which are deliberated in the First Committee and, after voting, subsequently considered by the UN General Assembly (UNGA). ACDA chairs the USG effort in support of our activities in the UN in this area, and contributes professional expertise to USUN to promote US policy during UNFC deliberations.
For example, in an effort to enhance transparency in armaments (TIA), the UN established a UN conventional arms register and also an Ad Hoc Committee in the CD to deal with this ever more important issue. ACDA coordinates US submissions to the UN register, chairs an interagency Task Force on TIA, and sends delegates to the CD to participate in CD discussions on matters of arms transparency.
ACDA provides experts as the USG participant to disarmament and arms control studies chartered under UN auspices, including the UN Panel of Governmental Technical Experts on UN Register of Conventional Arms and the UN Group of Governmental Experts to Study Outer Space Confidence-Building Measures.
ACDA led the US Delegation to the September 1992 Second Review Conference of the Convention on the Prohibition of Military or Any Other Hostile Use of Environmental Modification Techniques (ENMOD). ACDA also led the Delegation for the April PrepCom that preceded it and coordinated and presented the US position in meetings on the margins of the UNFC in New York and Geneva that followed the Second Review Conference. During the entire review conference process, ACDA chaired the backstopping efforts in the USG and also provided the principal substantive and legal expertise on the Convention.
The Agency backstops the CWC negotiations for the PrepCom, the CD, bilateral chemical weapons negotiations with the FSU, the UNDC, the First Committee of the UNGA, and all of the review conferences of international agreements.
REGIONAL ARMS CONTROL
Korean Arms Control ACDA has an ongoing working relationship with senior ROK officials, at their request, on bilateral nuclear inspection issues, efforts in the IAEA, and with developing concepts for CBMs on the Peninsula as well as joint study of conventional arms control issues. The ACDA Director worked closely with the South Korean government on developing an inspection regime to verify its bilateral agreement with North Korea that neither state would produce weapons-usable nuclear material.
The Agency has played a critical role in seminars examining Korean arms control issues under the joint sponsorship of the US Army, RAND Corporation, and the Korean Institute for Defense Analysis.
ACDA planned and led the US delegation to the 1991 OPANAL General Conference of parties to the Treaty of Tlatelolco (also known as the Latin American Nuclear Free Zone Treaty) as well as the 1992 Special OPANAL Conference. The Agency also participated in interagency efforts to ensure that Brazil and Argentina implement the Iguazu Falls Declaration of November 1990 and coordinated the preparation and negotiation of the US-IAEA Safeguards agreement called for under Protocol I of the Treaty.
ACDA has long supported the Central American process of democratization and disarmament and has provided numerous recommendations to Central American governments on a wide range of conventional arms control issues. In December 1992, an ACDA-led team hosted a one-day seminar in Tegucigalpa, Honduras, on ways to reduce the illicit traffic in weapons in the region.
In May 1992, the OAS General Assembly adopted a US/Brazilian resolution on security and development, which established a clear consensus on an arms control agenda for OAS member-states. Many of the arms control initiatives listed in the resolution were derived from the ACDA Director's speech to the OAS Special Committee on Hemispheric Affairs on November 21, 1991. Agency personnel were instrumental in securing widespread support for the resolution. ACDA followed up the resolution by gaining support for an extraordinary session of the Special Committee to discuss the new Chemical Weapons Convention. An ACDA Assistant Director addressed the meeting, which was held October 7, 1992.
Peace Processs - ACRS
The multilateral Arms Control and Regional Security (ACRS) working group is one of five formed during the opening round of the Middle East peace process in Madrid in October 1991. Twelve Arab states, Israel and a handful of extra-regional participants met in May and September for three-day seminars on US-Soviet and European arms control efforts as a primer for possible future arms control measures in the region. Participation of extra-regional states was particularly useful in pointing out the value of arms control in a regional context. Building on these sessions, the participants began a discussion of regional security and confidence-building measures.
ACDA's Middle East Coordinating Group has played a central support role in this process, preparing and presenting seminar topics, timelines, and consultations in the region and among regional disarmament players in various international fora. As detailed discussions follow, ACDA's repository of knowledge related to all phases of arms control should place it in a lead role to advance the ACRS exercise as it fits into the regional peace process effort.
ACDA has played a central role in the United Nations Special Commission (UNSCOM) inspections of Iraq. The Agency provided a full-time staff officer to serve as Deputy Coordinator of the State Department's office on Iraqi Inspections. Currently, a senior ACDA official serves as Deputy to the head of the UNSCOM Operation at the UN in New York. ACDA personnel have often briefed the UNSCOM and largely drafted the CW destruction plan and the long-term verification plan for Iraq.
The discovery by the IAEA of significant undeclared nuclear activities in Iraq has led to efforts to strengthen nuclear safeguards. ACDA is playing a key role in devising measures to strengthen the IAEA safeguards system. These include support for special inspections and universal reporting of nuclear-related transfers.
ACDA played an important role in securing region-wide commitment to the CWC. ACDA representatives held high-level discussions on the CWC export regime with India and Pakistan. ACDA's Director was instrumental in obtaining Chinese commitment to join the CWC during his visit to Beijing.
Also, ACDA's Director traveled to New Delhi in early 1992 for meetings on regional security and nonproliferation raising these issues in discussions with both the Indian Foreign Secretary and with the Indian Defense Minister.
The ACDA South Asia Coordinating Group produced issue papers for the Indo-US bilateral security and arms control discussions held in Washington in November.
ACDA is continuing its vigorous efforts to curb the spread of nuclear weapons to additional countries. These efforts focus mainly on treaties, export controls, IAEA safeguards, and regional measures.
ACDA has led US Government efforts on the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) since the 1960s when the ACDA Director negotiated that treaty. This includes planning and leadership for US participation in four NPT RevCons (1975, 1980, 1985, 1990) and continuous diplomatic efforts toward increasing adherence to the Treaty. With 155 parties, the NPT is the most widely supported multilateral arms control treaty.
Under ACDA's leadership, the US has begun consultations with other key NPT parties on issues related to the 1995 NPT RevCon at which the NPT will be extended indefinitely or for a fixed period or periods. The US is pressing for the unconditional, indefinite extension of the NPT in 1995, a goal that was endorsed during 1992 at the G-7 Summit and by members of NATO and the CSCE. We are currently preparing for the first meeting of the 1995 Conference Preparatory Committee which is scheduled for May 10-14 in New York.
In the area of nuclear export controls, there was substantial activity during 1992, particularly with the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG). The NSG approved during its April plenary meeting a multilateral arrangement involving export guidelines and a control list of some 65 nuclear-related dual-use commodities. This significant achievement resulted from a US initiative in which ACDA played a major role. The NSG also adopted in April a long-sought US objective, i.e. a common policy of requiring non-nuclear-weapon states to accept IAEA safeguards on all their nuclear activities as a condition for any significant, new nuclear supply commitments. ACDA also made important contributions to achieving this objective. Preparations are well underway for the 1993 NSG plenary, with ACDA again taking on a large share of the responsibilities.
ACDA is one of the key agencies within the Executive Branch which reviews US export license applications. ACDA is able to make an independent assessment of such proposed exports, judging them solely against the criterion of whether such exports are consistent with US nonproliferation objectives.
On regional issues, ACDA has been a major participant at all levels in developing arms control and nonproliferation policies toward the Middle East, South Asia, and the Korean Peninsula. For example, within the Middle East peace process the ACDA Director delivered an arms control presentation at the first multilateral seminar in May 1992. With regard to South Asia, the Director chaired bilateral consultations with Indian officials to discuss regional security issues including confidence-building measures that would increase transparency and reduce the risk of conflict. The Director also worked closely with the South Korean government on developing an inspection regime to verify its bilateral agreement with North Korea that neither state would produce weapons-usable nuclear material.
In the past year, ACDA has materially assisted completion of a US - Russian agreement on disposition of some 500 metric tons of highly-enriched uranium (HEU) resulting from dismantlement of Soviet nuclear warheads. This HEU Agreement was signed in February 1993, after Department of Energy experts and I worked out with Russian MINATOM officials the key parts of the US purchase offer. ACDA will be further involved in work this year on an implementing contract and on transparency measures that are required under the HEU Agreement.
ACDA represents the US on the IAEA's Standing Advisory Group on Safeguards Implementation (SAGSI), the key outside group that advises the IAEA on safeguards matters. The ACDA representative has helped formulate new concepts for detecting undeclared nuclear activities.
ACDA participates actively across the entire range of US policy development and implementation in the areas of conventional arms and technology transfers, unconventional and advanced weapons proliferation (with special emphasis on missiles and chemical/biological weapons (CBW)), commercial space activities, export controls, East-West trade, COCOM issues, and regional arms control initiatives. Last year the Agency made approximately 1,400 documented arms control assessments on exports as required by statutory provisions. It participated in interagency review and decision-making involving proposed exports of defense articles, defense services, and dual-use items controlled for national security, foreign policy, or missile, chemical- or biological-weapons nonproliferation reasons.
In addition to membership on the NSC-chartered policy-level interagency working groups, ACDA participates in the interagency staff-level Missile Technology Export Committee (MTEC) and Missile Trade Analysis Group (MTAG). ACDA provides the executive secretary to the MTAG. Cooperation is growing and improving among MTCR members; membership has increased to 22 countries; efforts are underway to recruit others; and at least six other governments have announced they intend to observe the MTCR guidelines.
ACDA participates fully in US efforts to strengthen international norms against illegal use of CBW and to limit CBW proliferation, particularly through US membership in the 24-nation Australia Group. The Agency actively contributed to the President's Enhanced Proliferation Control Initiative (EPCI); the adoption by the Australia Group of warning guidelines on export transactions that could contribute to the spread of CBW; Australia Group initiatives to adopt export controls on equipment and BW-related organisms and toxins; expanded Australia Group membership and an outreach program for non-members; and adoption by other states of EPCI-like export controls.
ACDA made material contributions to technology transfer and export control issues with significant arms control and nonproliferation implications, including the NSC-chaired Committees and the National Space Council. These contributions included (l) US initiatives to ensure that Intra-COCOM Trade arrangements do not adversely affect members' nonproliferation controls; (2) continued development of safeguards for supercomputer exports to preclude or minimize the risk of their use or diversion to projects of proliferation concern; (3) high-speed computer export policy options; and (4) nonproliferation aspects of US commercial space policy including technology transfer policy towards Russia and the Ukraine.
ACDA is engaged in interagency efforts to promote conversion to civilian activity of the defense industry in the FSU. We have given particular attention to the development of entrepreneurial training workshops for Russian nuclear weapons scientists. ACDA, the Department of Energy, and Russia's MINATOM are jointly sponsoring in Moscow in May 1993 a prototype entrepreneurial training workshop, based on the successful experimental one held at Boston University in July 1992. This workshop has a practical focus -- to train Russian nuclear weapons scientists in preparing viable technical and business proposals which could attract investment capital for new civilian enterprises. Similar workshops could focus on ballistic missile technologists in Ukraine and electronics technologists in Belarus.
STRATEGIC & NUCLEAR NEGOTIATIONS
Recent world events have affected the strategic and nuclear area more than any other in the arms control arena. In particular, the dissolution of the Soviet Union in December 1991 continues to have profound implications for treaties in force, as well as for such treaties as START, whose entry into force is, we hope, imminent and whose implementation is provisionally applied in some areas. Historically, ACDA has played a leading role in negotiation and implementation of agreements related to strategic and theater offensive and defensive weapons. Now, ACDA is also carrying out functions related to the new forms being taken by strategic arms control and by related negotiations on nuclear security issues with the Soviet Union's successor states.
Strategic Arms Control Treaties
Following l991's signing of the START Treaty, strategic arms reduction negotiations in 1992 proceeded towards key accomplishments on three levels. First, consultations after the December 1991 demise of the Soviet Union succeeded in solving the thorny succession problem for START -- a prerequisite for Treaty ratification and entry into force. This START succession problem was legally resolved by the Lisbon Protocol to the START Treaty signed by the US, Russia, Ukraine, Belarus and Kazakhstan in Lisbon on May 23, 1992, which recognized the four former Soviet states as START parties and as successors to Soviet obligations under START. This Protocol, together with accompanying commitments by the non-Russian states to have nuclear systems removed from their territory, cleared the way for Senate consent to ratification of the START Treaty on October 1 and Russian legislative approval on November 4. All Parties to START, with the exception of Ukraine, have now given legislative approval to the Treaty.
Second, five-power implementation discussions were held both in diplomatic channels and in the 1992 sessions of the Joint Compliance and Inspection Commission (JCIC), in anticipation of START's entry into force in 1993. The US JCIC Representative is located in and supported by ACDA. In addition, as anticipated by the START Treaty, initial steps were taken to implement certain START provisions even before the Treaty came into force.
Third, building on the foundation of the START Treaty, the United States pursued follow-on strategic arms reductions through bilateral negotiations with Russia (eventually to be the only state on the territory of the former Soviet Union with nuclear weapons) which culminated in the signing of the START II Treaty on January 3, 1993. This historic treaty will reduce the nuclear arsenals of Russia and the US to the level of 3000-3500 actual weapons, and will result in the complete elimination of MIRVed land-based ICBMs by the year 2003, or possibly earlier.
The Treaty between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the Elimination of their Intermediate-Range and Shorter Range Missiles (the INF Treaty) entered into force on June 1, 1988. The Treaty banned the production, deployment and testing of all US and Soviet ground-launched cruise and ballistic missile systems with ranges of 500-5500 kilometers (about 300-3,400 miles). Although declared INF missile systems were eliminated by May 31, 1991, the importance of continuing the ban on INF missiles gives the US a continuing stake in the INF Treaty. To ensure that this ban is observed, the Treaty provides for inspections to continue even after the elimination of INF missiles. This includes continuous monitoring inspections and the right of the Parties to conduct an annual quota of short-notice inspections for 13 years after the Treaty's entry into force.
Following the dissolution of the Soviet Union, the United States indicated that it considered the twelve new states emerging from the Soviet Union to be successors to the Soviet Union for the INF Treaty. The successor states have, in turn, indicated that they intend to observe the Treaty. We are discussing with these states the question of how the Treaty is now to be implemented. We have suggested that implementation responsibilities, such as inspections, could be carried out by those successor states with declared INF facilities on their territories (Belarus, Kazakhstan, the Russian Federation, Turkmenistan, Ukraine and Uzbekistan). We are continuing discussions with the successor states on these issues. Those discussions take place in the Special Verification Commission (SVC), whose US Representative is located in and supported by ACDA. The SVC has a very active agenda as it strives to settle implementation details associated with INF Treaty succession.
Safety, Security and Dismantlement
After the United States' August 1991 unilateral initiative on nuclear weapons, the US withdrew its tactical nuclear weapons from abroad and began destruction of all US nuclear warheads for artillery and short-range ballistic missiles. This US initiative prompted unilateral Soviet (and subsequently Belarusian, Kazakhstani, Russian, and Ukrainian) unilateral measures reducing both strategic and short-range (tactical) nuclear weapons. ACDA supported consultations on these issues with the newly independent states of the FSU on whose territories former Soviet nuclear weapons systems were located, as well as with US NATO Allies, for whom Western technical assistance to the FSU is a high priority. The withdrawal of former Soviet tactical nuclear weapons systems to Russia from the other newly independent states was completed July 1, 1992. This effort, in addition to the need to ensure the Safety, Security and Dismantlement (SSD) of former Soviet strategic and tactical nuclear weapons, gave rise to the US effort on SSD.
The US dialogue with Russia on the provision of US assistance for the SSD of FSU nuclear weapons began in November 1991. This dialogue expanded into discussions and negotiations with the other FSU states that have nuclear weapons belonging to the FSU located on their territories, specifically, Belarus, Kazakhstan, and Ukraine. ACDA has contributed to the US effort to identify, develop and implement SSD projects which may be candidates for technical and material assistance through the Nunn-Lugar legislation and the Freedom Support Act.
ABM Treaty and Strategic Defense Arms Control Issues
Strategic defense arms control activities in 1992 included two regular sessions of the Standing Consultative Commission (SCC), the body responsible for implementation of the ABM Treaty; another two such sessions are expected in 1993. The next ABM Treaty review must occur prior to October 2, 1993, and ACDA will be lead preparations for that review. The US Commissioner to the SCC is located in and supported by ACDA. ACDA also leads the interagency work on policy formulation and backstopping, including chairing the interagency SCC Backstopping Committee, and provides the legal advisors, policy representatives and support staff for these negotiations. At the Washington Summit Meeting in June 1992, Presidents Bush and Yeltsin agreed to explore the role for defenses in protecting against limited ballistic missile attacks and to work with allies and other interested states in developing a concept for such a system. In order to start work on developing this concept Presidents Bush and Yeltsin established a High-Level Group to explore: 1) sharing of early warning information; 2) cooperation with participating states in developing ballistic missile defense capabilities and technologies; and 3) the legal basis for cooperation, including possible changes to existing treaties and agreements necessary to implement a Global Protection System (GPS).
The High-Level Group for GPS discussions has met twice since July 1992. The two sides established three working groups: a GPS Concept Working Group, a Technology Cooperation Working Group, and a Non-proliferation Working Group. ACDA has been a full participant in both the Concept Working Group and the Technology Cooperation Working Group. These groups each met in the fall of 1992, but no further working group meetings have been scheduled. A review of US administration policy on strategic defense issues is underway.
ACDA provides representatives at all arms control negotiations, including legal advisors. ACDA representatives have chaired working groups to develop verification provisions in the START, START II and CFE Treaties. ACDA legal advisors have written the article-by-article analyses to accompany treaties to the Senate, including INF, TTBT, START, CFE, Open Skies, and START II. ACDA support staff has provided secretarial and communications support to delegations during negotiations in the FSU.
VERIFICATION AND COMPLIANCE
ACDA provides a focal point within the US Government for formulating and implementing arms control verification policy and for assessing the compliance with arms control agreements by US treaty partners worldwide, including the states of the FSU. ACDA plays a leading role in assessing the compliance of treaty partners with arms control obligations. ACDA has responsibility for providing the Congress annually with The President's Report to Congress on Soviet Noncompliance with Arms Control Agreements. Further, in accordance with the mandate of Section 52 of the ACDA Act, the Director submits annually a report entitled Adherence to and Compliance with Arms Control Agreements. This report details the process by which the US Government ensures US compliance with its arms control obligations, addresses any charges of US noncompliance, and, in addition, evaluates other nations' compliance with arms control agreements. In January 1993, these two reports were combined into a single report and submitted to the Congress.
Under Section 37 of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency Act, ACDA is also required to submit reports on the verifiability of US arms control agreements. Such a report was recently presented to the Congress with respect to the START Treaty and the CFE Treaty. So-called "Section 37 Reports" are in preparation for START II and the CWC.
ACDA chairs the interagency group which is developing inspection procedures and report formats for both the Wyoming MOU Phase II inspections and the Bilateral Destruction and Non-Production Agreement, data exchange, and inspections. ACDA has played a central role in National Trial Inspections (NTI), an exercise which has been critical to developing verification modalities for chemical weapons arms control agreements. ACDA personnel have served as team chiefs for five of the NTIs and two mock inspections at sensitive US facilities.
ACDA has played a central role in inspections and negotiations during the past year.
ACDA has led interagency efforts to develop verification requirements for the START and Open Skies treaties, the US-USSR CW Destruction Agreement, and the multilateral CWC. ACDA also conducted "Red Team" verification analyses for the START and CFE Treaties, in which acknowledged experts judged the viability of verification proposals by formulating and assessing the probable effectiveness of evasion scenarios that might be used to defeat verification efforts.
With respect to the INF Treaty, ACDA oversees development and execution of the annual treaty inspection plan. ACDA also provides experienced verification experts to serve on INF inspection teams.
During the coming year, ACDA will prepare several reports for the Congress. Verifiability assessments are in process for the START II Treaty and the CWC. In addition, ACDA will produce the report mandated by the START ratification resolution providing a historical perspective on Soviet compliance and noncompliance with SALT I, SALT II, the ABM Treaty, the INF Treaty, and START. Finally, ACDA will prepare statutorily required annual reports to the Congress: The President's Report to Congress on Soviet Noncompliance with Arms Control Agreements and Adherence to and Compliance with Arms Control Agreements.
ACDA will also continue to play a central role in verification activities. As part of the US-UK-Russia Trilateral Agreement on Biological Weapons, ACDA leads the US team which has visited former Russian biological weapons facilities. In the coming year, ACDA will continue to lead the US - UK inspection teams visiting biological facilities of the FSU. In addition, ACDA heads the US delegation to the ongoing international Ad Hoc Group of Governmental Experts charged with evaluating proposed verification measures for the BWC. ACDA will participate in the interagency evaluation of verification measures for the Biological Weapons Convention proposed by the international verification experts group, and will lead the US delegation at the two sessions scheduled for 1993. ACDA will support the work of the CWC PrepCom with respect to inspection and other verification issues. ACDA will also assist in the planning of and participate in the inspections scheduled to be held this year pursuant to the Antarctica Treaty.
As stated in our Annual Report to the Congress, ACDA's objectives include the conduct and coordination of arms control research, and the dissemination of arms control and disarmament information. Worldwide events of the past two years have magnified the importance of these two missions significantly. The myriad of new challenges that confront our community demand innovative solutions employing the latest technology. For example, the recently signed CWC presents unprecedented opportunities for developing and deploying advanced verification technologies. The cost of conducting arms control research, both in terms of dollars and human resources, has solidified the necessity for a high degree of coordination between government agencies involved in such research. Similarly, the complexity and scope of recent arms control agreements dictate that all government agencies involved in the arms control business have access to an accurate repository of treaties, negotiating records and data exchanged pursuant to the agreements. ACDA continues to lead the way in the areas of research and information dissemination.
During the past year ACDA undertook a wide range of research projects. One of these studies explored the distinction between Anti-Ballistic Missiles (ABMS) and Anti-Tactical Ballistic Missiles (ATBMs). This study was most important because of the recent proliferation of short range anti-missile technology and the potential impact on the current ABM Treaty. Other studies included examinations of potential future Russian targeting policies, defense conversion in the FSU and a variety of treaty implementation issues. Not merely restricting ourselves to formal analyses, ACDA sponsored a series of highly successful Nuclear Policy Workshops that featured distinguished participants from the arms control community. These workshops examined arms control challenges with a view toward providing insights into the kinds of analyses which are necessary to meet future arms control scenarios.
ACDA continues to be a leader in coordination of arms control research within the US government. For example, ACDA chairs the Arms Control Research Coordinating Committee, and chairs on a rotating basis with the Intelligence Community the Verification Technology Working Group. The first of these coordinates all arms contro-related external research and databases within the US government, while the other focuses on the research and development required to supply the technology base for anticipated post-Cold War activities. In addition, ACDA has hosted the Arms Control Seminar for Defense Science Study Group, which provides promising academicians with a solid overview of the context and requirements of arms control, the role of research and prospects for the future.
In the area of data automation, ACDA is in the midst of an ambitious program to improve the efficiency with which we process information and make vital arms control records available to authorized agencies within the arms control community. During the past year ACDA continued to support the ARENA computer system, which provides users with advanced full text and key field searches of major arms control records. Included are the treaty texts and negotiation records of agreements such as the START, INF, CWC and CFE Treaties. More than 100 organizations, both within and outside government, have copied and implemented the software developed for ACDA databases.
During the past year, ACDA procured and brought on-line an automated arms control data repository. When fully operational this summer, the data repository will provide authorized users with dial-up access to all data exchanged under the terms of arms control treaties.
ACDA also provides extensive data automation support to overseas arms control delegations, in the form of permanent systems in locations such as Geneva, Vienna and The Hague, as well as mobile equipment that can be deployed to temporary sites. The mobile system, which consists of portable computers, printers and a satellite telephone with data fax capability, has seen near continuous use during the past year. We have deployed the mobile office to locations such as Moscow, Kiev, Minsk and Alma Ata in support of arms control delegations. The delegations' response to the flexibility of this system has been overwhelmingly positive.
These are many of the numerous arms control activities ACDA has been and will continue to be involved in for the foreseeable future.
Therefore, as you can see, the US Arms Control & Disarmament Agency, whose mission is being pushed beyond the traditional approaches to arms control, remains a vital link within the Administration to ensure US national security strategy is maintained.
In closing, I ask for your support, Mr. Chairman, in obtaining Congressional approval to fund the Administration's request of $62,500,000 for ACDA in FY-1994. I, my staff and the members of our overseas delegations look forward to working with this Committee on the crucial and important arms control issues which we now face.