Report to Congress on Arms Control, Nonproliferation
and Disarmament Studies

This document has been compiled to enhance Congressional and public understanding of the importance of arms control issues that the U.S. Government is addressing in a research capacity. The following report, consistent with Section 39 of the Arms Control and Disarmament Act, as recently amended, provides:

This report is intended as a significant improvement over previous submissions through its inclusion on the ACDA website. Previous reports provided a compilation of abstracts describing the arms control, nonproliferation and disarmament studies completed in the target year. This year's report continues to contain these abstracts, but also provides links for direct connection to the applicable source.

Table of Contents

ACDA Section

http://www.acda.gov

The U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency website contains many sources of information that are the result of both internal and external research conducted or contracted by ACDA.

1. World Military Expenditures and Arms Transfers. http://www.acda.gov

Section A-Defense Link

http://www.defenselink.mil/search/index.html

1. DoD BIOMEDICAL RESEARCH DATABASE : DoDBIO

2. INFORMATION PAPER, DoD BIOLOGICAL WARFARE FORCE PROTECTION

3. NUCLEAR WEAPON SYSTEMS SUSTAINMENT PROGRAMS

4. STRATEGIC NUCLEAR FORCES

5. COOPERATIVE THREAT REDUCTION

6. NUCLEAR POSTURE REVIEW

7. THE DEFENSE STRATEGY AND THE NATIONAL SECURITY STRATEGY

8. COUNTERPROLIFERATION AND TREATY ACTIVITIES

http://www.defenselink.mil/search/index.html

and a search criteria of (Regional Issues) found:

9. NORTHEAST ASIA

10. RUSSIA, UKRAINE, KAZAKHSTAN, AND BELARUS

11. BACKGROUND ON BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA

12. INFORMATION ABOUT FOREIGN NATIONS

13. AMERICAN INTERESTS IN EUROPE

http://www.defenselink.mil/search/index.html

and a search criteria of (CWC):

14. THE CHEMICAL WEAPONS CONVENTION

http://www.defenselink.mil/search/index.html

and a search criteria of (Missiles):

15. BALLISTIC MISSILE DEFENSES

16. CHEMICAL WEAPONS CONVENTION: A BALANCE BETWEEN OBLIGATIONS AND THE NEEDS OF STATES PARTIES

17. TOP RUSSIAN SCIENTIST URGES SUPPORT; TREATY BEST WAY TO GET AT COVERT PROGRAMS

18. SCIENTISTS, ENGINEERS URGE CWC SUPPORT

Section B-Defense Technical Information Center

1. MEMORANDUM FOR CORRESPONDENTS

2. COUNTERPROLIFERATION AND TREATY ACTIVITIES

3. STRATEGIC NUCLEAR FORCES

4. COUNTERPROLIFERATION AND TREATY ACTIVITIES

5. THE REGIONAL PROLIFERATION CHALLENGE

6. SPECIAL OPERATIONS FORCES

7. RESPONDING TO TERRORISM

8. (UNTITLED, concerns the KHOBAR TOWERS BOMBING)

9. THE MIDDLE EAST AND NORTH AFRICA

10. NUCLEAR TEST MONITORING FOCUS GROUP

11. NUCLEAR PROLIFERATION AND CIVILIAN NUCLEAR POWER (REPORT OF THE NONPROLIFERATION ALTERNATIVE SYSTEMS ASSESSMENT PROGRAM, VOLUME I: PROGRAM SUMMARY)

12. DRAFT ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT STATEMENT ON A PROPOSED NUCLEAR WEAPONS NON-PROLIFERATION POLICY CONCERNING FOREIGN RESEARCH REACTOR SPENT NUCLEAR FUEL INFORMATION PACKET

13. THE TECHNOLOGY BEHIND NUCLEAR PROLIFERATION

THE CHEMICAL WEAPONS CONVENTION VERIFICATION REGIME: A MODEL FOR A NEW NPT?

BRIEFING BOOK. VOLUME 1: THE EVOLUTION OF THE NUCLEAR NON-PROLIFERATION REGIME (FOURTH EDITION).

DIRECTOR'S SERIES ON PROLIFERATION.

NO-FIRST-USE: IMPLICATIONS FOR DETERRENCE, ALLIANCE COHESION, AND NONPROLIFERATION.

NUCLEAR-WEAPON FREE ZONE PROPOSALS: STRATEGIC IMPLICATIONS FOR THE UNITED STATES.

THE SOVIET NORDIC NUCLEAR WEAPON FREE ZONE PROPOSAL.

THE NECESSITY TO CONTINUE NUCLEAR WEAPONS DEVELOPMENT.

NUCLEAR SAFEGUARDS AND THE INTERNATIONAL ATOMIC ENERGY AGENCY.

NUCLEAR CRITICISM AFTER THE COLD WAR: A RHETORICAL ANALYSIS OF TWO TEMPORARY ATOMIC CAMPAIGNS.

NUCLEAR SAFEGUARDS AND THE INTERNATIONAL ATOMIC ENERGY AGENCY.

NUCLEAR SUCCESSOR STATES OF THE SOVIET UNION, NUCLEAR WEAPON AND SENSITIVE EXPORT STATUS REPORT.

Section C-Department of Energy

http://gpo.osti.gov:901

THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE SHADOW ANALYSIS TEAM CONCEPT.

ANNOTATED BIBLIOGRAPHY: CHEMICAL SURETY MATERIEL, ROCKY MOUNTAIN ARSENAL.

SPECIAL NUCLEAR MATERIALS CUTOFF EXERCISE: ISSUES AND LESSONS LEARNED, VOLUME 2 OF 3: APPENDIXES A-C.

CONTROLLING WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION THROUGH THE RULE OF LAW.

PROCEEDINGS OF THE SYMPOSIUM ON THE NON-PROLIFERATION EXPERIMENT (NPE): RESULTS AND IMPLICATIONS FOR TEST BAN TREATIES.

CONCEPTUAL DESIGN REPORT: NUCLEAR MATERIALS STORAGE FACILITY RENOVATION. PART 7, ESTIMATE DATA.

MODEL NATIONAL IMPLEMENTING LEGISLATION FOR THE CHEMICAL WEAPONS CONVENTION.

SURVEY OF DOE FACILITIES: IMPACT OF POTENTIAL MEASURES TO ENHANCE COMPLIANCE WITH THE BIOLOGICAL AND TOXIN WEAPONS CONVENTION.

309 PLUTONIUM RECYCLE TEST REACTOR ION EXCHANGER VAULT DEACTIVATION REPORT.

INTENSE PULSED NEUTRON SOURCE: PROGRESS REPORT 1991--1996.

1994 ACTIVITY REPORT: STANFORD SYNCHROTRON RADIATION LABORATORY.

COMPLEX-WIDE REVIEW OF DOE'S LOW-LEVEL WASTE MANAGEMENT ES&H VULNERABILITIES. VOLUME III. FINAL REPORT.

COMPLEX-WIDE REVIEW OF DOE'S LOW-LEVEL WASTE MANAGEMENT ES&H VULNERABILITIES. VOLUME III APPENDICES. FINAL REPORT.

RARA FY 1994 SUMMARY REPORT.

NON-DESTRUCTIVE EVALUATION TECHNIQUES FOR CHEMICAL WEAPONS DESTRUCTION.

RADIOLOGICAL CONSEQUENCES OF SHIP COLLISIONS THAT MIGHT OCCUR IN U.S. PORTS DURING THE SHIPMENT OF FOREIGN RESEARCH REACTOR SPENT NUCLEAR FUEL TO THE UNITED STATES IN BREAK-BULK FREIGHTERS.

TECHNOLOGY DIFFUSION OF A DIFFERENT NATURE: APPLICATIONS OF NUCLEAR SAFEGUARDS TECHNOLOGY TO THE CHEMICAL WEAPONS VERIFICATION REGIME.

WRAP MODULE 1 WASTE ANALYSIS PLAN.

THE INTERACTIVE ON-SITE INSPECTION SYSTEM: AN INFORMATION MANAGEMENT SYSTEM TO SUPPORT ARMS CONTROL INSPECTIONS.

ROUTINE INSPECTION EFFORT REQUIRED FOR VERIFICATION OF A NUCLEAR MATERIAL PRODUCTION CUTOFF CONVENTION.

FINAL ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT STATEMENT FOR THE CONTINUED OPERATION OF THE PANTEX PLANT AND ASSOCIATED STORAGE OF NUCLEAR WEAPON COMPONENTS.

INFORMATION MODEL FOR ON-SITE INSPECTION SYSTEM.

SPENT NUCLEAR FUEL PROJECT PATH FORWARD: NUCLEAR SAFETY EQUIVALENCY TO COMPARABLE NRC-LICENSED FACILITIES.

ARMS CONTROL AND THE RULE OF LAW: NATIONAL MEASURES FOR ENFORCEMENT AND VERIFICATION.

THE CHEMICAL WEAPONS CONVENTION -- LEGAL ISSUES.

RESIDUAL RADIOACTIVITY GUIDELINES FOR THE HEAVY WATER COMPONENTS TEST REACTOR AT THE SAVANNAH RIVER SITE.

U.S. TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE TO THE IAEA AND THE CHEMICAL WEAPONS CONVENTION (CWC) - A REVIEW AND LOOK TO THE FUTURE.

AUGMENTED COMPUTER EXERCISE FOR INSPECTION TRAINING (ACE-IT) - AN INTERACTIVE TRAINING TOOL FOR "CHALLENGE INSPECTIONS" UNDER THE CHEMICAL WEAPONS CONVENTION.

PERFORMANCE ASSESSMENT FOR A HYPOTHETICAL LOW-LEVEL WASTE DISPOSAL FACILITY.

MAGRAD: A CODE TO OPTIMIZE THE OPERATION OF SUPERCONDUCTING MAGNETS IN A RADIATION ENVIRONMENT.

USER'S GUIDE FOR THE AUGMENTED COMPUTER EXERCISE FOR INSPECTION TRAINING (ACE-IT) SOFTWARE.

THERMAL EXPANSION, THERMAL CONDUCTIVITY, AND HEAT CAPACITY MEASUREMENTS FOR BOREHOLES UE25 NRG-4, UE25 NRG-5, USW NRG-6, AND USW NRG-7/7A.

DETERRENCE, DISARMAMENT, AND POST-COLD WAR STABILITY: ENHANCING SECURITY FOR BOTH "HAVES" AND "HAVE NOTS".

NUCLEAR DETERRENCE AND DISARMAMENT AFTER THE COLD WAR.

FINAL PROGRAMMATIC ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT STATEMENT FOR TRITIUM SUPPLY AND RECYCLING. VOLUME III.

A PERSPECTIVE ON SAFEGUARDING AND MONITORING OF EXCESS MILITARY PLUTONIUM.

DUAL AXIS RADIOGRAPHIC HYDRODYNAMIC TEST FACILITY. FINAL ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT STATEMENT, VOLUME 1: CHAPTERS 1-6 & APPENDIXES A-K.

DUAL AXIS RADIOGRAPHIC HYDRODYNAMIC TEST FACILITY. FINAL ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT STATEMENT, VOLUME 2: PUBLIC COMMENTS AND RESPONSES.

DRAFT PROGRAMMATIC ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT STATEMENT FOR STOCKPILE STEWARDSHIP AND MANAGEMENT. VOLUME I.

ANALYSIS OF THE IMPLICATIONS OF THE USSR PROVIDING REPROCESSING AND MOX FABRICATION SERVICES TO OTHER COUNTRIES.

THE NATIONAL IGNITION FACILITY (NIF) AND THE ISSUE OF NONPROLIFERATION. FINAL STUDY.

ACDA Section

http://www.acda.gov

World Military Expenditures and Arms Transfers.

http://www.acda.gov

Abstract: The WMEAT (pronounced "we-meet") is issued by ACDA annually to serve as a convenient reference on military expenditures, arms transfers, armed forces and related economic data for hundreds of countries over the past decade. Also available in book format through the Superintendent of Documents, the 1997 edition is the most current and provides information on 172 countries.

2.

Section A-Defense Link

http://www.defenselink.mil/search/index.html

1. DoD BIOMEDICAL RESEARCH DATABASE : DoDBIO

www.defenselink.mil/locator/records/000036.html

Abstract: The DoD Biomedical Research Database has been developed from biomedical research, testing, or training programs which were federally funded in FY95. The areas of research, testing, and training include, but are not limited to, the following: infectious diseases, biological hazards, toxicology, medical chemical defense, medical biological defense, clinical medicine, clinical surgery, physical protection, training, graduate medical education and instruction. This information will be updated on an annual basis.

2. INFORMATION PAPER, DoD BIOLOGICAL WARFARE FORCE PROTECTION

www.defenselink.mil/other_info/protect.html

Abstract: The Joint Biological Warfare Defense concept encompasses three pillars: Situational Awareness (Early Warning), Force Protection, and Recovery. The purpose of the doctrine is to maintain combat operations unencumbered by contamination and the wearing of the protective gear. Immunization is a critical factor in this integrated approach to force protection. No single means exists to ensure our men and women in uniform will be protected against this insidious form of warfare. DoD has promulgated guidance for protection of U.S. armed forces against the biological warfare threat through a DoD directive.

3. NUCLEAR WEAPON SYSTEMS SUSTAINMENT PROGRAMS

www.defenselink.mil/pubs/dswa/document.html

Abstract: Since the end of the Cold War, the Defense Department's nuclear forces and programs have been refocused and reconfigured to respond to new requirements. The proliferation of nuclear and other weapons of mass destruction is not a hypothetical threat. A number of nation states already have such weapons; a larger number are capable of producing such weapons, potentially on short notice. In future confrontations, the United States may not be the sole decider of nuclear use.

4. STRATEGIC NUCLEAR FORCES

www.dtic.mil/execsec/adr96/chapt_24.html

Abstract: Although emphasis has shifted in the post-Cold War period from global, possibly nuclear, war to regional conflicts, strategic nuclear deterrence remains a key U.S. military priority. The mission of U.S. strategic nuclear forces is to deter attacks on the United States or its allies and to convince potential adversaries that seeking a nuclear advantage would be futile. To do this, the United States must maintain nuclear forces of sufficient size and capability to hold at risk a broad range of assets valued by potentially hostile foreign nations. The two basic requirements that guide U.S. planning for strategic nuclear forces therefore are: the need to provide an effective deterrent while conforming to treaty-imposed arms limitations, and the need to be able to reconstitute adequate additional forces in a timely manner if conditions require.

5. COOPERATIVE THREAT REDUCTION

www.dtic.mil/execsec/adr96/chapt_8.html

Abstract: With the demise of the Soviet Union and the end of the Cold War, the level of nuclear threat confronting the United States was reduced significantly. Yet, when the Soviet Union disintegrated, an estimated 30,000 nuclear warheads were spread among the former Soviet republics. Approximately 3,200 strategic nuclear warheads were located outside of Russia on the territories of Belarus, Kazakstan, and Ukraine. Political, social, and economic upheaval heightened prospects that the former Soviet republics would not be able to provide for safe disposition of these nuclear weapons or other weapons of mass destruction (WMD).

The dangers posed by this situation were clear: diversion or unauthorized use of weapons, diversion of fissile materials, and possible participation of Soviet weapons scientists in proliferation efforts in other countries. Despite significant positive changes occurring in the New Independent States (NIS), these weapons continued to pose a threat to U.S. national security.

Taking advantage of an historic opportunity, Congress initiated the Cooperative Threat Reduction (CTR) program in November 1991 to reduce the threat to the United States from these weapons of mass destruction. Often referred to as the Nunn-Lugar program, this congressional effort provided the Department of Defense authority and funding for the CTR program. Through the CTR program, DoD provides assistance to the eligible states of the former Soviet Union to promote denuclearization and demilitarization and to reduce the threat of WMD proliferation.

6. NUCLEAR POSTURE REVIEW

www.dtic.mil/execsec/adr95/npr_.html

Abstract: The Nuclear Posture Review (NPR) represents the nuclear analog to the Bottom-Up Review of conventional forces, undertaken in 1993 to address the significant changes in the security environment which face the United States, and the military consequences of those changes. The NPR was the first review of nuclear policy in the post-Cold War world, the first such review in 15 years, and the first review ever to include policy, doctrine, force structure, command and control, operations, supporting infrastructure, safety, security, and arms control. The decisions made in the NPR process allow DoD to put its nuclear programs on a stable footing after several years of rapid change in the international environment and in DoD's forces and programs, and at the threshold of a decade of further reductions called for by the START I and START II agreements.

7. THE DEFENSE STRATEGY AND THE NATIONAL SECURITY STRATEGY

Abstract: Since the founding of the Republic, the United States as a nation has embraced several fundamental and enduring goals: to maintain the sovereignty, political freedom, and independence of the United States with its values, institutions, and territory intact; to protect the lives and personal safety of Americans, both at home and abroad; and to provide for the well-being and prosperity of the nation and its people.

Achieving these basic goals in an increasingly interdependent world requires fostering an international environment in which critical regions are stable, at peace, and free from domination by hostile powers; in which the global economy and free trade are growing; in which democratic norms and respect for human rights are widely accepted; in which the spread of nuclear, biological, and chemical (NBC) and other potentially destabilizing technologies is minimized; and in which the international community is willing and able to prevent and, if necessary, respond to calamitous events. The United States seeks to play a leadership role in the international community, working closely and cooperatively with nations that share its values and goals, and influencing those that can affect U.S. national well-being.

8. COUNTERPROLIFERATION AND TREATY ACTIVITIES

www.dtic.mil/execsec/adr96/chapt_7.html

Abstract: In December 1993, pursuant to Presidential Directive, the Secretary of Defense launched the Department's Counterproliferation Initiative. This initiative was undertaken in light of the growing threats to U.S. security and national interests posed by the proliferation of nuclear, biological, and chemical (NBC) weapons and their means of delivery. In many of the world's regions where the United States is likely to deploy forces -- Northeast Asia, the Persian Gulf, and the Middle East -- potential adversaries are pursuing the development or acquisition of NBC weapons. The American experience in the Gulf War made manifest the implications of NBC proliferation for defense planning. For DoD to do its job in the post-Cold War era, it must take seriously the potential NBC dimension of future conflicts. U.S. forces must be properly trained and equipped for all potential missions, including those in which opponents might threaten or use NBC weapons. The Defense Counterproliferation Initiative is designed to meet these challenges. The primary goal of U.S. policy is to prevent NBC proliferation from occurring in the first place. The Department's activities contribute in many ways to achieving this goal. Military preparations for operations in an NBC environment make clear that threats or use of NBC weapons will not deter the United States from applying its military power in important regions. Effective capabilities to counter proliferation devalue the potential political and military benefits of NBC weapons for a would-be proliferant. In addition, capabilities developed for the battlefield to deal with NBC proliferation -- especially intelligence, surveillance, reconnaissance means -- can be brought to bear in support of international regimes, export controls, and other international monitoring efforts to prevent the spread of NBC weapons and related technologies.

http://www.defenselink.mil/search/index.html

and a search criteria of (Regional Issues):

9. NORTHEAST ASIA

www.dtic.mil/execsec/adr96/chapt_7.html

Abstract: In Northeast Asia, North Korea and China have substantial NBC weapons and missile capabilities. Should there be a conflict on the Korean peninsula, U.S. and allied forces must be prepared to defend against North Korean use of chemical weapons and ballistic missiles. The potential for China's use of ballistic missiles, should a regional conflict occur involving China, also is a particular concern.

North Korea supplies missiles and missile-related technology to countries in the Middle East, while China supplies various NBC- and missile-related equipment to countries in the Middle East and South Asia. Such sales serve both nation's economic and political interests and are especially critical as an income source for Pyongyang. Because of these supply policies, particularly missile exports, any improvements that China and North Korea make to their NBC weapon or missile capabilities in the coming years could have implications far beyond the region.

10. RUSSIA, UKRAINE, KAZAKHSTAN, AND BELARUS

www.defenselink.mil/pubs/prolif97/fsu.html

Abstract: With the breakup of the USSR, Russia has inherited the largest stockpile of weapons of mass destruction and delivery systems in the world. While its public statements and actions regarding the safety, security, and dismantlement of this massive inventory have been positive, some actions indicate Moscow is not yet fully committed to all nonproliferation regimes. Nevertheless, as of November 1996, all of the strategic nuclear weapons that remained outside Russia after the breakup of the Soviet Union had been transferred from Ukraine, Kazakhstan, and Belarus to Russia. Collectively, Russia, Ukraine, Kazakhstan, and Belarus have eliminated or deactivated about 1,300 operational strategic launchers equipped with approximately 4,100 warheads and are more than a year ahead of schedule in meeting the first phase of reduction limits of the Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START I).

Serious concerns remain about the status of Russian chemical and biological warfare programs, the accuracy of the information provided by Russia in its declarations, and the willingness of the Russian defense establishment to eliminate these capabilities. Further, with serious economic and political challenges and the large number of weapons involved, the threat of proliferation of NBC systems and technologies from former Soviet states continues to exist.

11. BACKGROUND ON BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA

www.defenselink.mil/pubs/prolif97/fsu.html

Abstract: During 46 months of the worst war in Europe since World War II, Bosnia-Herzegovina was devastated. During the 24 months since the signing of the Dayton Agreement on November 21, 1995 there has been substantial progress in rebuilding the lives of the people of Bosnia and creating conditions for a sustainable peace.

12. INFORMATION ABOUT FOREIGN NATIONS

www.defenselink.mil/faq/pis/PC06FRGN.html

Abstract: There is a vast amount of data about other nations available via the Internet. The sources below are among those made available by the U.S. Government.

13. AMERICAN INTERESTS IN EUROPE

www.defenselink.mil/other_info/natosloc.html

Abstract: As Secretary Albright made clear in her appearance before this Committee, nowhere are American concerns more vital, and our efforts more concentrated, than in Europe. We will maintain our commitment to Europe in troops on the ground, in capability to reinforce as needed, and in political engagement in seeking to resolve problems. America makes this commitment not as an act of altruism, but because the security of Europe is vital to our own, as events in this century have repeatedly shown.

And we have an historic opportunity before us. President Clinton said recently, "Taking wise steps now to strengthen our common security when we have the opportunity to do so will help build a future without the mistakes and the divisions of the past, and will enable us to organize ourselves to meet the new security challenges of the new century."

Twice before in this century, America had the opportunity to help build a system of European security. The first time, after WWI, we foolishly held back from the responsibilities our interests required we assume. The second time, after WWII, 50 years ago, Western Europe and the United States together chose a path of reconciliation and reconstruction through the Marshall Plan, and together moved from terrible destruction to unprecedented prosperity and security. However, Eastern Europe and Russia did not participate because of Stalin's paranoia and relentless expansionism.

http://www.defenselink.mil/search/index.html

and a search criteria of (CWC):

14. THE CHEMICAL WEAPONS CONVENTION

www.defenselink.mil/other_info/CWC.html

Abstract: "The Chemical Weapons Convention is needed to protect and defend the men and women in uniform who protect and defend our country. We live in a world today in which we find regional aggressors, third-rate armies, terrorist groups, and religious cults who may view lethal chemical agents as the cheapest and most effective weapons against American troops in the field. So to protect against this threat we have developed an array of tools, ranging from protective suits to theater missile defenses. By limiting the chemical weapons threat the Chemical Weapons Convention strengthens these tools and our ability to protect our troops and our nation from chemical attack."

http://www.defenselink.mil/search/index.html

and a search criteria of (Missiles):

15. BALLISTIC MISSILE DEFENSES

www.dtic.mil/execsec/adr96/chapt_25.html

Abstract: The proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) and the ballistic missiles that deliver them pose a major threat to the security of the United States, its allies, and friendly nations. While the end of the Cold War greatly reduced the threat of a global conflict or large-scale attack on the United States, the proliferation of WMD and ballistic missiles that can deliver them raise new threats to U.S. security interests. Over 20 countries possess or are developing nuclear, biological, or chemical (NBC) weapons, and more than 20 nations have theater ballistic missiles (TBMs) -- see chart on the following page. A robust Ballistic Missile Defense (BMD) program plays a critical role in the broader counterproliferation strategy to reduce, deter, and defend against WMD and ballistic missile threats.

The Intelligence Community has estimated that a threat to the United States from ballistic missile attack is not likely to emerge for at least another decade, but the threat to U.S. troops in the field and to allies and friends has already arrived. U.S. missile defense priorities reflect the urgency of this immediate threat and the shifting focus from global conflict to the threat of major regional conflicts involving adversaries armed with advanced conventional weapons and weapons of mass destruction. The U.S. ballistic missile defense program has placed highest priority on Theater Missile Defense (TMD) programs to meet the threat that is here now. The second priority has been development of a National Missile Defense (NMD) program that positions the United States to field the most effective defense system possible at a time in the future when the threat warrants deployment. Third priority has been continued development of a technology base that improves the capability of both TMD and NMD systems to respond to emerging threats.

16. CHEMICAL WEAPONS CONVENTION: A BALANCE BETWEEN OBLIGATIONS AND THE NEEDS OF STATES PARTIES

www.acda.gov/factshee/wmd/cw/cwbal.htm

Abstract: This paper describes some of the CWC's key provisions, which were designed to balance the need for effective Convention provisions with the national security and economic requirements of States Parties in implementing such provisions.

17. TOP RUSSIAN SCIENTIST URGES SUPPORT; TREATY BEST WAY TO GET AT COVERT PROGRAMS

http://www.acda.gov/../txt_nw27.htm

Abstract: Vil Mirzayanov, formerly a top official in the Soviet Union's chemical warfare research center, called prompt ratification of the Chemical Weapons Convention the key to confronting chemical weapons programs worldwide. In a recent letter to Senator Richard Lugar, Dr. Mirzayanov, a former treaty critic, wrote that he had studied the CWC and now considers it the best way to get at covert programs.

18. SCIENTISTS, ENGINEERS URGE CWC SUPPORT

http://www.acda.gov/../txt_nw10.htm

Abstract: Scientific and engineering societies with memberships representing more than 390,000 people, including 46 Nobel Laureates, have written the Senate urging support and ratification of the Chemical Weapons Convention. Excerpts from these letters written throughout the last seven months.

Section B-Defense Technical Information Center

1. MEMORANDUM FOR CORRESPONDENTS

Abstract: The first Open Skies Treaty observation aircraft from a Newly Independent State to overfly the U.S. will be available for static display and photo opportunities on Wednesday, April 23, beginning at 10 a.m. at Hawthorne Aviation, North Service Rd., Dulles International Airport, Chantilly, VA. The Ukrainian An-30 aircraft has just completed a joint trial flight over the United States simulating an Open Skies Treaty observation mission. In addition to the Ukrainian aircraft, the U.S. Air Force OC-135B Open Skies observation aircraft will also be on display. For additional information, members of the media may contact Mr. Dick Cole or Lieutenant Commander Tina Tallman, OSIA Public Affairs Office, at (703) 810-4326.

2. COUNTERPROLIFERATION AND TREATY ACTIVITIES

http://www.dtic.mil/execsec/adr97/chap6.html

Abstract: In December 1993, pursuant to Presidential Directive, Secretary of Defense Aspin launched the Department's Counterproliferation Initiative. This initiative was undertaken in light of the growing threats to U.S. security and national interests posed by the proliferation of nuclear, biological, and chemical (NBC) weapons, often referred to as weapons of mass destruction, and their means of delivery. In many of the world's regions where the United States is likely to deploy forces -- including Northeast Asia and the Middle East -- potential adversaries possess or are pursuing the development or acquisition of NBC weapons. The Gulf War experience showed the implications of NBC proliferation for defense planning. DoD must take seriously the potential NBC dimension of future conflicts. U.S. forces must be properly trained and equipped for all potential missions, including those in which opponents might threaten or use NBC weapons. The Defense Counterproliferation Initiative is designed to meet these challenges.

The primary goal of U.S. counterproliferation policy is to prevent NBC proliferation from occurring. The Department's activities contribute in many ways to achieving this goal. Military preparations for operations in an NBC environment make clear that threats or use of NBC weapons will not deter the United States from applying military power in defense of its national interests. Effective capabilities to counter NBC weapon systems devalue their potential political and military benefits for would-be proliferant. In addition, capabilities developed for the battlefield to deal with NBC proliferation -- especially intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance means -- can be brought to bear in support of international regimes, export controls, and other international monitoring efforts to prevent the spread of NBC weapons and related technologies.

3. STRATEGIC NUCLEAR FORCES

http://www.dtic.mil/execsec/adr98/chap5.html

Abstract: The United State's nuclear forces and posture were carefully examined during the Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR). In evaluating the current and projected security environment, the QDR concluded that nuclear forces remain an important disincentive to nuclear, biological, and chemical proliferation and a hedge against the uncertain futures of existing nuclear powers, as well as a means of upholding U.S. security commitments to allies.

The QDR's work was an important input to a Presidential Decision Directive issued in November 1997. The directive describes in general terms the purposes of U.S. nuclear weapons and provides broad guidance for developing operational plans. This is the first change in Presidential guidance for nuclear weapons employment since 1981, although operational plans have been updated regularly since then with commensurate reductions in the national target list.

The new directive notes that nuclear weapons play a smaller role in the U.S. security posture today than they have at any point during the second half of the 20th century, but that nuclear weapons are still needed as a hedge against an uncertain future, as a guarantee of U.S. security commitments to allies, and as a disincentive to those who would contemplate developing or otherwise acquiring their own nuclear weapons. Accordingly, the United States will maintain survivable strategic nuclear forces of sufficient size and diversity to deter any hostile foreign leadership with access to nuclear weapons.

The new directive provides a large measure of continuity with previous nuclear weapons employment guidance, including in particular the following three principles:

  • Deterrence is predicated on ensuring that potential adversaries accept that any use of nuclear weapons against the United States or its allies would not succeed.

  • A wide range of nuclear retaliatory options will continue to be planned to ensure the United States is not left with an all-or-nothing response.

  • The United States will not rely on a launch-on-warning nuclear retaliation strategy (although an adversary could never be sure the United States would not launch a counterattack before the adversary's nuclear weapons arrived).

The United States is confident that it can maintain the deterrent called for in the new Presidential directive at the levels envisioned for a future Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START III) as agreed to in the March 1997 Helsinki Accords.

4. COUNTERPROLIFERATION AND TREATY ACTIVITIES

http://www.dtic.mil/execsec/adr95/cp_.html

Abstract: The Department of Defense has made significant progress during the past year moving the Counterproliferation Initiative from policy formulation to operative implementation throughout many functions of the Department and other agencies of the U.S. government. Much work remains, and DoD is continuing to identify potential response measures to prepare for the dangers stemming from the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMD).

5. THE REGIONAL PROLIFERATION CHALLENGE

http://www.defenselink.mil/pubs/prolif/regional.html

Abstract: The quest for nuclear, biological, and chemical (NBC) weapons and the missiles to deliver them creates serious challenges to U.S. interests around the world. Many states have agreed voluntarily to terminate their weapon development programs, but others have not. This section discusses the threat from proliferation to regional stability, U.S. defense strategies, and other interests of the United States and its allies.

6. SPECIAL OPERATIONS FORCES

http://www.dtic.mil/execsec/adr96/chapt_22.html

Abstract: Special Operations Forces (SOF) serve three purposes that are increasingly important in the current international environment. First, they expand the range of options available to decision makers confronting crises and conflicts below the threshold of war, such as terrorism, insurgency, and sabotage. Second, they act as force multipliers in support of conventional forces engaged in major conflicts, increasing the effectiveness and efficiency of the U.S. military effort. Finally, they expand national capabilities to react to situations requiring exceptional sensitivity, including noncombatant missions such as humanitarian assistance, security assistance, and peace operations.

7. RESPONDING TO TERRORISM

http://www.dtic.mil/execsec/adr97/chap9.html

Abstract: The number and lethality of international terrorist incidents directed against U.S. interests increased last year. The Riyadh and Al Khobar bombings in Saudi Arabia resulted in the largest number of U.S. fatalities at the hands of international terrorists since the December 1988 downing of Pan Am 103 over Lockerbie, Scotland. Terrorist violence represents a serious threat to U.S. personnel, facilities, and interests around the world.

Terrorism remains a complex phenomenon spawned by a mix of factors and motivations. Loosely organized groups of radical Islamics, such as those that carried out the bombing of the World Trade Center, pose a growing challenge. Established entrenched ethnic, nationalist, and religiously motivated terrorist movements continue to operate and have been joined by groups that espouse new causes and ideologies. Despite the collapse of the Soviet Union and international communism, leftist ideologically-based terrorists continue to operate. State sponsors of terrorism, particularly Iran, pose a significant continuing threat. Other state sponsors such as Syria, Libya, Iraq, and Sudan, although more cautious, provide safe haven and other forms of support to a variety of terrorist movements. The world is in a period of transition and flux as it moves from the relative stability of the bipolar model to a new political order which has yet to be defined. The disintegration of the Soviet Union and the collapse of the East European communist regimes produced a power vacuum that has enabled nationalist, ethnic, and religious forces long thought dormant to reassert themselves and contribute to the volatility of the post-Cold War era. Violent militant Islamic elements, often with the help of state sponsors, now operate worldwide and have a demonstrated global reach.

Local and regional conflicts, famine, economic disparity, mass movements of refugees, brutal and corrupt regimes, and the increasing porosity of national borders contribute to instability -- fueling a frustration and desperation that increasingly finds expression in acts of terrorism. Ready access to information and information technologies, coupled with the ability to communicate globally via the Internet, fax, and other media, provides terrorists new tools for targeting, fundraising, propaganda dissemination, and operational communication. Just as the established political order is in a state of fundamental flux and transition, so is terrorism and the challenge it presents to the United States, its friends, and its allies.

8. (UNTITLED, concerns the KHOBAR TOWERS BOMBING)

http://www.defenselink.mil/pubs/downing_rpt/unclf913.html

Abstract: On June 25, 1996, a terrorist truck bomb exploded outside the northern perimeter of Khobar Towers, Dhahran, Saudi Arabia, a facility housing U.S. and allied forces supporting the coalition air operation over Iraq, Operation SOUTHERN WATCH. Estimates of the size of the bomb range from the equivalent of 3,000 to more than 30,000 pounds of TNT. The Task Force estimated that the bomb was between 3,000 and 8,000 pounds, most likely about 5,000 pounds. While U.S. Air Force Security Police observers on the roof of the building overlooking the perimeter identified the attack in progress and alerted many occupants to the threat, evacuation was incomplete when the bomb exploded. Nineteen fatalities and approximately 500 U.S. wounded resulted from the attack. The perpetrators escaped. Subsequently, the Secretary of Defense directed an assessment of facts and circumstances surrounding this attack and of the security of U.S. forces in the U.S. Central Command Area of Responsibility.

9. THE MIDDLE EAST AND NORTH AFRICA

http://www.defenselink.mil/pubs/prolif/me_na.html

Abstract: U.S. goals in the Middle East and North Africa include securing a just, lasting, and comprehensive peace between Israel and all Arab parties with which it is not yet at peace; maintaining our steadfast commitment to Israel's security and well-being; building and maintaining security arrangements that assure the stability of the Gulf region and unimpeded commercial access to its petroleum reserves, which are vital to our economic prosperity; ensuring fair access for American business to commercial opportunities in the region; combating terrorism; and promoting more open political and economic systems and respect for human rights and the rule of law. In this volatile region, the proliferation of NBC weapons and the means to deliver them poses a significant challenge to our ability to achieve these goals. Iran, Iraq, and Libya are aggressively seeking NBC weapons and missile capabilities, constituting the most pressing threats to regional stability. Iran and Iraq have demonstrated their intent to dominate the Persian Gulf and to control access to critical oil supplies.

10. NUCLEAR TEST MONITORING FOCUS GROUP

http://www.dtic.mil/npac/

Abstract: The objectives of the Nuclear Test Monitoring Focus Group are to monitor research and development needs emerging from the CTBT, and other relevant treaties, and to make recommendations concerning ways to meet these needs.

11. NUCLEAR PROLIFERATION AND CIVILIAN NUCLEAR POWER (REPORT OF THE NONPROLIFERATION ALTERNATIVE SYSTEMS ASSESSMENT PROGRAM, VOLUME I: PROGRAM SUMMARY)

http://www.dtic.mil/npac/

Abstract: Reactors; recommendations; nuclear weapons; forecasting; historical summary; graphs

12. DRAFT ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT STATEMENT ON A PROPOSED NUCLEAR WEAPONS NON-PROLIFERATION POLICY CONCERNING FOREIGN RESEARCH REACTOR SPENT NUCLEAR FUEL INFORMATION PACKET

No URL, contact: DOE Oak Ridge Public Reading Room, P.O. Box 2001, 55 Jefferson Circle, Room 112, City: Oak Ridge, State: TN, Zip: 37831, Contact: Amy L. Rothrock, Phone: 423-576-1216, Fax: 423-576-1556

Abstract: The proposed action described in this Environmental Impact Statement Information Packet is to adopt a policy to manage foreign research reactor spent nuclear fuel in 41 foreign countries to promote United States Nuclear Weapons Non-Proliferation Policy objectives.

13. THE TECHNOLOGY BEHIND NUCLEAR PROLIFERATION

No URL, contact: DOE/NV Coordination and Information Center, P.O. BOX 98521, City: LAS VEGAS, State: NV, Zip: 89193-8521, Phone: (702)295-1628, Fax: (702)295-0877, EMail: cic@nv.doe.gov

Abstract: (not available)

14. THE CHEMICAL WEAPONS CONVENTION VERIFICATION REGIME: A MODEL FOR A NEW NPT?

Corporate Author: NAVAL POSTGRADUATE SCHOOL MONTEREY CA

Title: The Chemical Weapons Convention Verification Regime: A Model for A New NPT? Descriptive Note: Master's thesis, Personal Authors: Blackburn, Douglas L.

Report Date: 16 DEC 93 Pagination: 80 PAGES

Abstract: In January 1993, the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) was signed, completing the first step towards eliminating all chemical weapons. This treaty is the most comprehensive multilateral arms control treaty ever signed. The teeth of the CWC is a modern verification regime that includes traditional scheduled inspections as well as an innovative challenge inspection system: a party to the treaty may initiate a challenge inspection of another party if it believes there is a treaty violation. The CWC has been called a model for future arms control treaties. The Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) has been in force for 25 years and has its fifth and final review conference in 1995. While the NPT has been both lauded and criticized over its lifetime, most authorities agree that it needs revision to meet the demands of the next century. One of the areas of the treaty requiring extensive review is the NPT verification process. This thesis examines the verification procedures delineated in the CWC and discusses the possibility of creating a similar verification regime for the NPT. It addresses the reasons why the CWC inspection might work for the NPT. It also addresses security questions that must be considered by a technologically advanced state, like the United States, before considering such a verification regime for nuclear weapons and nuclear technology. Arms control, Arms control treaties, Chemical weapons, Chemical weapons convention, Nuclear non-proliferation, Treaty on the nonproliferation of nuclear weapons, Nuclear weapons.

BRIEFING BOOK. VOLUME 1: THE EVOLUTION OF THE NUCLEAR NON-PROLIFERATION REGIME (FOURTH EDITION).

Personal Authors: Bailey, Emily; Guthrie, Richard; Howlett, Darryl; Simpson, John

Report Date: 1998 Pagination: 83 PAGES Descriptors: *NUCLEAR PROLIFERATION, *ARMS CONTROL, *DISARMAMENT, SYMPOSIA, MATERIALS, SECURITY, NUCLEAR POWER PLANTS, NUCLEAR ENERGY.

Identifiers: FOREIGN REPORTS

Abstract: This is the fourth edition of PPNN Briefing Book (Volume I). The first edition was originally produced for delegates attending the 1990 NPT review Conference, the second for those attending the 1995 NPT Review and Extension Conference and the third for those attending the 1997 session of the Preparatory Committee of the 2000 NPT Review Conference. Both this Volume and a new Volume II (which consists of key non-proliferation treaties, agreements and other relevant documentation) are presented in a format designed to facilitate their use as reference materials for delegates attending the 1998 Preparatory Committee meeting for the 2000 NPT Review Conference which will be held in Geneva from 27 April to 8 May.

16. DIRECTOR'S SERIES ON PROLIFERATION.

Corporate Author: CALIFORNIA UNIV LIVERMORE RADIATION LAB

Title: Director's Series on Proliferation. Personal Authors: Bailey, Kathleen C. Report Date: 07 SEP 93 Pagination: 42 PAGES Report Number: UCRL-LR-114070-2

Descriptors: *NUCLEAR PROLIFERATION, NUCLEAR WEAPONS, NORTH KOREA, DECISION MAKING, DEFENSE SYSTEMS, INTERNATIONAL POLITICS, ANTIMISSILE DEFENSE SYSTEMS, STRATEGIC ANALYSIS, VERIFICATION, DYNAMICS, ARMS CONTROL. Identifiers: BMDO COLLECTION, NPT (NUCLEAR NON PROLIFERATION TREATY)

Abstract: The Director's Series on Proliferation is an occasional publication of essays on the topics of nuclear, chemical, biological, and missile proliferation. The views represented are those of the authors and do not represent those of Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory, the University of California, or the United States Government. There are two articles in this report; 1. The Dynamics of the NPT Extension Decision (Archelaus R. Turrentine) 2. North Korea's Nuclear Gambits (Peter Hayes).

17. NO-FIRST-USE: IMPLICATIONS FOR DETERRENCE, ALLIANCE COHESION, AND NONPROLIFERATION.

Fields & Groups: GOVERNMENT AND POLITICAL SCIENCE DEFENSE SYSTEMS NUCLEAR WEAPONS MILITARY FORCES AND ORGANIZATIONS MILITARY OPERATIONS, STRATEGY AND TACTICS Corporate Author: NAVAL POSTGRADUATE SCHOOL MONTEREY CA Title: No-First-Use: Implications for Deterrence, Alliance Cohesion, and Nonproliferation. Descriptive Note: Master's thesis, Personal Authors: Espinosa, Paul E. Report Date: DEC 94 Pagination: 100 PAGES Descriptors: *NUCLEAR WEAPONS, *NATIONAL SECURITY, *MILITARY DOCTRINE, NUCLEAR PROLIFERATION, MILITARY FORCES(UNITED STATES), FOREIGN POLICY, NUCLEAR FORCES(MILITARY), EUROPE, POLICIES, POLITICAL SCIENCE, UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT, RISK, POLITICAL ALLIANCES, THESES, ARMS CONTROL, TREATIES, BALANCE OF POWER, DETERRENCE. Identifiers: NATIONAL SECURITY STRATEGY, NPT(NUCLEAR NONPROLIFERATION TREATY)

Abstract: While a U.S. no first use declaration might help promote some nuclear nonproliferation goals (for example, gaining a larger international consensus to support an indefinite extension of the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty), it could also undermine the credibility of U.S. security commitments and erode alliance cohesion. These developments could, in turn, increase the risk of nuclear proliferation. This thesis identifies and examines the relevant competing arguments and discusses the implications of a U.S. no first use pledge regarding three issues: deterrence, alliance cohesion, and nuclear nonproliferation. The thesis concludes that adopting a no first use policy would probably prove beneficial only in the short term and only in one respect. The policy might help the United States meet its stated objectives for the 1995 NPT Review and Extension Conference. The arguments in favor of adopting a no first use pledge fail to adequately consider the possible long term implications, in particular, the risk that this policy could undermine stability in Europe and the integrity of the global nuclear nonproliferation regime. The potential shortcomings of the arguments on both sides of the no first use debate are highlighted. In view of these shortcomings, recommendations are given to help minimize possible negative political and military effects. (RWJ)

18. NUCLEAR-WEAPON FREE ZONE PROPOSALS: STRATEGIC IMPLICATIONS FOR THE UNITED STATES.

Corporate Author: LIBRARY OF CONGRESS WASHINGTON DC FEDERAL RESEARCH DIV

Title: Nuclear-Weapon Free Zone Proposals: Strategic Implications for the United States.

Personal Authors: Katz, Rodney P., Report Date: NOV 86, Pagination: 42 PAGES

Abstract: This study examines how the two existing nuclear weapon free zones (NWFZ), one in Latin America and the other in the South Pacific, have affected U.S. strategic interests in the regions. It also considers the possibility of the establishment of NWFZs in other regions, including Scandinavia, the Balkans, Southeast Asia, Northeast Asia, South Asia, the Middle East, and Africa. South Pacific, Latin America, Nuclear weapons.

19. THE SOVIET NORDIC NUCLEAR WEAPON FREE ZONE PROPOSAL.

Corporate Author: NAVAL POSTGRADUATE SCHOOL MONTEREY CA

Title: The Soviet Nordic Nuclear Weapon Free Zone Proposal.

Personal Authors: Lumsden, Catherine A., Report Date: JUN 90, Pagination:

130 PAGES Identifiers: *Balance of power, Northern Europe, *Western security(International), *International politics, Government(Foreign), Elimination, Nuclear free zones.

Abstract: This thesis examines the Soviet proposal and its ramifications for the United States and the West. The central theme running through each Soviet proposal has been removal of American nuclear guarantees. Preservation of U.S. national security interests and hence U.S. ability to extend its forward defense would be gravely threatened by such a NWFZ. However, unilateral agreement on a NWFZ is unlikely by the anticipated members of the Nordic NWFZ the U.S., USSR, Denmark, Norway, Finland, Iceland, Greenland, and Sweden. The U.S. has military installations in Iceland and Greenland and banning of nuclear weapons during wartime is inconceivable. The question then arises as to which nation or groups of nations will dominate and which will acquiesce. Inevitably the debate breaks down to a tug of war between the two superpowers. It is really the politics surrounding the nuclear weapons that is the heart of the nuclear-free-zone debate. Changing world politics demand that the West develop a unified strategy toward the USSR. Through NATO it must preserve its vital economic political and military objectives in the Northern Flank. Flexible naval forces and strong political and economic ties to the governments of the nations bordering the Baltic are essential. Strong NATO naval forces operating in the Baltic Sea must be seen as guarantors of the West's strategic aims and interests. A Nordic NWFZ would prevent this.

20. THE NECESSITY TO CONTINUE NUCLEAR WEAPONS DEVELOPMENT

Title: The Necessity to Continue Nuclear Weapons Development.

Descriptive Note: Technical rept., Personal Authors: Cohen, S. T., Report Date:

01 OCT 81, Pagination: 113 PAGES,

Abstract: The relevant areas surrounding the issue of the need to continue weapon development have been addressed. They are (1) U.S. nuclear policy--the current nature of this policy and its major deficiencies; (2) technological projections related to new nuclear weapon developments and the effect of advanced nuclear technology on U.S. military strategy and capabilities; (3) possible future global military situations requiring U.S. nuclear weapon use to Protect itself and its allies; and (4) the nuclear doctrine and capabilities of potential enemies of the United States. These areas are analyzed and assessed to yield conclusions related to the nuclear weapon development issue. Specific conclusions are reached on the following matters: (1) The impact of a Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) and special nuclear material cut-off on nuclear weapon development; (2) real vs perceived benefits of a CTBT; (3) implications of further refinements in delivery accuracy; (4) the credibility of a U.S. nuclear deterrent against Soviet chemical weapon employment; (5) the need for U.S. nuclear testing above the yield limit imposed by the Threshold Test Ban Treaty; and (6) methods for dealing with adverse public reactions to discriminate tactical nuclear weapons. Nuclear weapons development, Tactical nuclear weapons/warfare, Tactical nuclear policy, Directed effects device, Strategic nuclear policy, Discriminate weapons, Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty, ER devices, Threshold Test Ban Treaty.

21. NUCLEAR SAFEGUARDS AND THE INTERNATIONAL ATOMIC ENERGY AGENCY.

Corporate Author: OFFICE OF TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT WASHINGTON DC Title: Nuclear Safeguards and the International Atomic Energy Agency. Report Date: 1995, Pagination: 161 PAGES Report Number:OTA-ISS-615

Abstract: The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) plays a central role in preventing the spread of nuclear weapons. Through its system of nuclear safeguards, the IAEA is responsible for ensuring that signatories of the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT) do not use their nuclear materials, equipment, or facilities for weapon purposes. IAEA safeguards, however, have significant limitations, as described in the Office of Technology Assessment report Nuclear safeguards and the International Atomic Energy Agency. Some of these limitations were highlighted in the aftermath of the 1991 Persian Gulf War, when it was revealed that Iraq had mounted an extensive, covert nuclear weapon program in addition to, and partly in proximity to, open nuclear research activities that were under IAEA safeguards. The following year, IAEA investigations revealed that the North Korean government was hiding information on the extent of its nuclear material production. The Iraqi and North Korean cases showed that states could and did violate their Nonproliferation Treaty commitments, actions that many had previously considered an abstract and distant threat. They also showed that the IAEA's traditional mission of detecting the misuse of safeguarded nuclear materials addressed only part and probably not the most important part of the proliferation problem. To avoid similar problems in the future, the IAEA has to ensure that states do not have covert nuclear facilities, a mission that in the past the agency did not have the political support, the resources, nor the information to conduct. IAEA safeguards make it very difficult for states to use civil nuclear facilities for weapon purposes without detection. However, they cannot prevent states from acquiring the technology needed to produce nuclear materials, or from stockpiling this material within civil programs, and then withdrawing from.

22. NUCLEAR CRITICISM AFTER THE COLD WAR: A RHETORICAL ANALYSIS OF TWO CONTEMPORARY ATOMIC CAMPAIGNS.

Corporate Author: AIR FORCE INST OF TECH WRIGHT-PATTERSON AFB OH Title: Nuclear Criticism after the Cold War: A Rhetorical Analysis of Two Contemporary Atomic Campaigns. Personal Authors: Hubbard, Bryan Report Date: 01 AUG 97 Pagination: 263 PAGES Report Number: AFIT-97-098

Abstract: Today is a nuclear-powered era. Since 1945 nuclear technology has mutated into a cloud filtering human experiences. Despite the apparent end to the Cold War, nuclear technology remains a critical subject. This study constructs a contemporary framework to continue the project of nuclear criticism in a post-Cold War world to contribute to the discussion of nuclear issues. Building on a comprehensive review of critical nuclear discourse since 1945, this project suggests intertextual analysis of current nuclear discourse can encourage politically-meaningful public participation and can promote a better understanding of assumptions influencing the current shape of conversations concerning nuclear policy. It draws attention to a sphere of rhetoric directly affecting nuclear policy that critics have largely ignored. It builds on the work of nuclear criticism, updating and revising the project with a politically-enabling voice for a post-Cold War era. With this perspective for nuclear criticism, this study analyzes two current nuclear campaigns. The first involves the Department of Energy's Closing the Circle on the Splitting of the Atom as state-sponsored rhetoric reflecting a sustained influence of nuclearism. The second involves the Canberra Commission as a contemporary oppositional nuclear rhetor. The findings suggest successful management of nuclear resources rests with creating an inclusive public discussion and providing perpetual criticism articulating how literary and critical assumptions shape material and discursive action as humanity deals with a lingering nuclear legacy.

23. NUCLEAR SAFEGUARDS AND THE INTERNATIONAL ATOMIC ENERGY AGENCY

Corporate Author: OFFICE OF TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT WASHINGTON DC

Title: Nuclear Safeguards and the International Atomic Energy Agency Report Date: APR 95 Pagination: 153 PAGES

Abstract: From the dawn of the nuclear age, nuclear power has been recognized as a 'dual-use' technology. The same nuclear reactions that give bombs the destructive force of many thousands of tons of high explosive can, when harnessed in a controlled fashion, produce energy for peaceful purposes. The challenge for the international nuclear nonproliferation regime-the collection of policies, treaties, and institutions intended to stem the spread of nuclear weapons-is to prevent nuclear proliferation while at the same time permitting nuclear energy's peaceful applications to be realized. One of the key institutions involved in meeting these two objectives is the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), an international organization created in 1957 as a direct outgrowth of president Eisenhower's 'Atoms for Peace' program. The IAEA Statute, which creates the legal framework for the agency, charges it to 'accelerate and enlarge the contribution of atomic energy to peace, health, and prosperity throughout the world.' At the same time, it gives the agency the authority to enter into so-called safeguards agreements with individual nations or groups of nations to ensure that nuclear materials, equipment, or facilities are not used to produce nuclear weapons. The IAEA's mission and its safeguards responsibilities were extended with the enactment in 1970 of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (also known as the Non-Proliferation Treaty, or NPT). The Treaty requires non-nuclear-weapon states that are parties to the accord to enter into safeguards agreements with the IAEA covering all nuclear materials on their territory (e.g., uranium and plutonium, whether in forms directly usable for weapons or forms that require additional processing before becoming usable in weapons).

24. NUCLEAR SUCCESSOR STATES OF THE SOVIET UNION, NUCLEAR WEAPON AND SENSITIVE EXPORT STATUS REPORT

Corporate Author: MONTEREY INST OF FOREIGN STUDIES CA

Title: Nuclear Successor States of the Soviet Union, Nuclear Weapon and Sensitive Export Status Report , Report Date: 01 MAY 94,Pagination: 53 PAGES

Abstract: The dissolution of the Soviet Union has triggered widespread interest in the disposition of that nation's nuclear arms and related nuclear assets. The status of the nuclear weapons in Belarus, Kazakhstan, and Ukraine, for example, has become a focus of international diplomatic efforts aimed at checking the possible emergence of new nuclear-weapon states. Similarly, ensuring the security of tens of thousands of nuclear weapons and hundreds of tons of weapons-usable nuclear material in Russia has become an area of increasing cooperation between Washington and Moscow. There also have been a number of collaborative initiatives between the United States and the Newly Independent States (NIS) to bolster controls over exports of nuclear goods from the NIS. Recently, some analysts have voiced concern about possible future political instability in Russia and Ukraine. In both states, unrest could lead to difficulties in maintaining proper control over key nuclear assets or to the emergence of new splinter states with nuclear inheritances. Events are moving with surprising swiftness. New non-proliferation agreements are being signed; nuclear arms are being transferred from Belarus, Kazakhstan, and Ukraine to Russia; investments are being made in all of these states to accelerate the dismantling of nuclear arms and to ensure the safe and secure storage of the resulting nuclear materials; and export control systems are being established. To assist those interested in monitoring the rapidly changing nuclear scene in the former Soviet Union, the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace and the Monterey Institute of International Studies have prepared the following report summarizing key developments. We plan to issue the report on a periodic basis. Our two groups will distribute the English version in the United D95IK)I-7H8)

Section C-Department of Energy

http://gpo.osti.gov:901

1. THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE SHADOW ANALYSIS TEAM CONCEPT. 7p. DOE Contract W-7405-ENG-48. Order Number DE96002213. Source: OSTI; NTIS; GPO Dep.

http://gpo.osti.gov:901/cgi-bin/displaybib?QS=651~7eSY0:8:~3b(7&bcode=797~7eO3~3f311044&bib=2154~7ecggd{3~3f652~3c3~3b~3c:&wrap=2153~7ecggd{3~3f652~3c2128&file=2153~7ecggd{3~3f652~3c2139

Part II, Section E, Paragraphs 52-55 of the Verification Annex (Annex 2) of the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) provides the general rights and obligations of both the Inspected State Party (ISP) and the Inspection Team (IT) as to the collection and analysis of samples. In summary, the inspection team has the right to request the collection of samples which will be collected by the ISP unless the decision is made by the ISP to allow the inspectors to collect them. Samples will, if possible, be analyzed at the inspection site, with the assistance of the ISP if requested by the IT. The ISP has the right to retain portions all collected samples. Samples may be sent off-site for independent analysis if deemed necessary. These rights are modified in the case of "Challenge Inspections" by the "Managed Access" Provisions of Part X, Section C, Paragraphs 4648 which specifies that sample collection is to be negotiated between the Inspection Team and the Inspected State Party. In order to assist the ISP in fulfilling its obligation to assist the IT in determining compliance, and in preserving its rights to protect sensitive information not relevant to the CWC, we propose to establish the Army Material Command Treaty Laboratory (AMCTL) Shadow Analysis Team.

2. ANNOTATED BIBLIOGRAPHY: CHEMICAL SURETY MATERIEL, ROCKY MOUNTAIN ARSENAL. 138p. DOE Contract W-31109-ENG-38. Order Number DE96002805. Source: OSTI; NTIS; GPO Dep.

http://gpo.osti.gov:901/cgi-bin/displaybib?QS=651~7eSY0:8:~3b(7&bcode=782~7eO3~3f311:52&bib=2161~7ecggd{3~3f526244~3e9&wrap=217:~7ecggd{3~3f52623298&file=217:~7ecggd{3~3f526232~3e9

This bibliography, prepared under contract for Rocky Mountain Arsenal (RMA) by Argonne National Laboratory (ANL), is the result of an exhaustive literature search. The focus of this search was to gather information on chemical surety material (CSM or "agent"), particularly documents pertaining to CSM known to have been manufactured or stored at RMA, namely Mustard, Lewisite, GB, and VX. Major topics of search included chemistry; analytical detection procedures; applicable regulations; health, safety, and toxicology; soil treatment; and history of RMA pertaining to areas of possible agent contamination. The purpose of this document is to serve as a shelf reference of information for RMA and ANL to aid in the agent-contaminated soil treatability studies and in the decision-making process of choosing a remedial technology for agent-contaminated soil at RMA. The literature search was conducted between July and December 1993, December being the cutoff date for documents included.

3. SPECIAL NUCLEAR MATERIALS CUTOFF EXERCISE: ISSUES AND LESSONS LEARNED, VOLUME 2 OF 3: APPENDIXES A - C. 405p. DOE Contract AC06-76RL01830. Order Number DE96002823. Source: OSTI; NTIS; GPO Dep.

http://gpo.osti.gov:901/cgi-bin/displaybib?QS=651~7eSY0:8:~3b(7&bcode=782~7eO3~3f311:74&bib=216~3b~7ecggd{3~3f52570:8~3d&wrap=2163~7ecggd{3~3f5257~3f38~3b&file=2163~7ecggd{3~3f5257~3f398

This document is the 2nd volume of the three volume set from the Special Nuclear Materials Cutoff Exercise held at Hanford in 1994. Volume 2 contains Appendices A-C, with Appendices A and B containing a discussion of the design of the PUREX process and Appendix C containing a discussion of the safeguards measures for the PUREX facility.

4. CONTROLLING WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION THROUGH THE RULE OF LAW.8p. DOE Contract W-31-109-ENG-38. US Defense Nuclear Agency DNA001-90-C-0177. (CONF-9508209--1: ). Order Number DE96004292. Source: OSTI; NTIS; GPO Dep.

http://gpo.osti.gov:901/cgi-bin/displaybib?QS=651~7eSY0:8:~3b(7&bcode=780~7eO3~3f3170~3c5&bib=2160~7ecggd{3~3f3635~3e29~3d&wrap=2161~7ecggd{3~3f3635~3e4~3b8&file=2161~7ecggd{3~3f3635~3e489

Many who speak of the end of the Cold War emphasize the improvement in international relations when they speak of the momentous consequences of this event. According to this image, the half century since Trinity has been a period of sparse international communication during which the Eastern and Western blocs hibernated in their isolated dens of security alliances. The emphasis in the phrase "Cold War" was on the word "cold," and relations with the former Communist regimes are now "warm" by comparison. It is equally valid to consider what has happened to the word "was" in this highly descriptive phrase. While meaningful international dialogue was in a state of relative lethargy during much of the last fifty years, the military establishments of the Great Powers were actively engaged in using as much force as possible in their efforts to control world affairs, short of triggering a nuclear holocaust. Out of these military postures a tense peace ironically emerged, but the terms by which decisions were made about controlling weapons of mass destruction (i.e., nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons) were the terms of war. The thesis of this paper is that the end of the Cold War marks a shift away from reliance on military might toward an international commitment to controlling weapons,of mass destruction through the "rule of law." Rawls wrote that "legal system is a coercive order of public rules addressed to rational persons for the purpose of regulating their conduct and providing the framework for social cooperation. The regular and impartial administration of public rules, becomes the rule of law when applied to the legal system." Inparticular, Rawls identifies as part of this system of public rules those laws that aim to prevent free riders on the economic system and those that aim to correct such externalities as environmental pollution."

5. PROCEEDINGS OF THE SYMPOSIUM ON THE NON-PROLIFERATION EXPERIMENT (NPE): RESULTS AND IMPLICATIONS FOR TEST BAN TREATIES. 599p. DOE Contract W-7405-ENG-48. Order Number DE95011413. Source: OSTI; NTIS; GPO Dep.

http://gpo.osti.gov:901/cgi-bin/displaybib?QS=651~7eSY0:8:~3b(7&bcode=796~7eO3~3c302644&bib=2126~7ecggd{3~3f55~3b~3c32~3e&wrap=2111~7ecggd{3~3f55~3b~3c~3f49&file=2111~7ecggd{3~3f55~3b~3c~3f58

The large amounts of chemical explosives used worldwide in mining, quarrying, and civil engineering projects presents a challenge for policy makers molding a test ban, since their use could provide the necessary cover for a clandestine nuclear test. The Non-Proliferation Experiment (NPE) seeks to measure certain differences between an underground nuclear test and a chemical explosion in the same geology. Two chemical explosions were detonated at the Nevada Test Site to compare their signatures with previous nuclear tests. This conference presents results of these tests and discusses implications for test ban treaties. Conference papers are divided into the following sections: Background; Test preparations; EOS and code simulations; Rainier Mesa structure; Ground motion measurements; Non-seismic technologies; On-site inspection technologies; and a panel discussion. Selected papers are indexed separately for inclusion in the Energy Science and Technology Database.

6. CONCEPTUAL DESIGN REPORT: NUCLEAR MATERIALS STORAGE FACILITY RENOVATION. PART 7, ESTIMATE DATA. 600p. DOE Contract W-7405-ENG-36. Order Number DE96005718. Source: OSTI; NTIS; INIS; GPO Dep.

http://gpo.osti.gov:901/cgi-bin/displaybib?QS=650~7eSY0:8:~3b(6&bcode=784~7eO3~3f31654~3f&bib=2162~7ecggd{3~3f173772~3b1&wrap=2152~7ecggd{3~3f173777~3d~3e&file=2152~7ecggd{3~3f1737772~3f

The Nuclear Materials Storage Facility (NMSF) at the Los Alamos National Laboratory (LANL) was a Fiscal Year (FY) 1984 line-item project completed in 1987 that has never been operated because of major design and construction deficiencies. This renovation project, which will correct those deficiencies and allow operation of the facility, is proposed as an FY 97 line item. The mission of the project is to provide centralized intermediate and long-term storage of special nuclear materials (SNM) associated with defined LANL programmatic missions and to establish a centralized SNM shipping and receiving location for Technical Area (TA)-55 at LANL. Based on current projections, existing storage space for SNM at other locations at LANL will be loaded to capacity by approximately 2002. This will adversely affect LANUs ability to meet its mission requirements in the future. The affected missions include LANL's weapons research, development, and testing (WRD&T) program; special materials recovery; stockpile survelliance/evaluation; advanced fuels and heat sources development and production; and safe, secure storage of existing nuclear materials inventories. The problem is further exacerbated by LANL's inability to ship any materials offsite because of the lack of receiver sites for mate rial and regulatory issues. Correction of the current deficiencies and enhancement of the facility will provide centralized storage close to a nuclear materials processing facility. The project will enable long-term, cost-effective storage in a secure environment with reduced radiation exposure to workers, and eliminate potential exposures to the public. This report is organized according to the sections and subsections outlined by Attachment III-2 of DOE Document AL 4700.1, Project Management System. It is organized into seven parts. This document, Part VII - Estimate Data, contains the project cost estimate information.

7. MODEL NATIONAL IMPLEMENTING LEGISLATION FOR THE CHEMICAL WEAPONS CONVENTION. 20p. DOE Contract W-31-109-ENG-38. (CONF-9511190--1: ). Order Number DE96006891. Source: OSTI; NTIS; GPO Dep.

http://gpo.osti.gov:901/cgi-bin/displaybib?QS=651~7eSY0:8:~3b(7&bcode=613~7eO3~3f315:~3c6&bib=2142~7ecggd{3~3f~3f60~3d~3f1~3c~3d&wrap=214:~7ecggd{3~3f~3f60~3d~3f:3~3d&file=215~3b~7ecggd{3~3f~3f60~3d~3f~3b::

Good day. It is an honor to address this distinguished audience. I am grateful to the Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia for hosting this important gathering and to the staff of the Provisional Technical Secretariat of the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (PTS) for sponsoring it. I also want to express my gratitude to the DePaul University Human Rights Law Institute, the Merck Foundation, and Argonne National Laboratory for supporting my participation here. This workshop is an another excellent opportunity for all of us to learn from each other about how the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) can become a foundation of arms control in Africa and around the world. At this meeting I speak only for myself, neither for the government of the United States of America nor for any other institution. Today, I shall discuss model national implementing legislation under the CWC. Such implementing legislation is likely to be required in every State Party--not only to the few States Parties that will declare and destroy chemical weapons, but also to the many States Parties that have never had a chemical weapons programme. This new need for national measures to implement multilateral arms control agreements has generated unease due to a perception that implementation may be burdensome and at odds with existing national law. In 1993, concerns arose that the complexity of integrating the treaty with national law would cause each nation to implement the Convention without regard to what other nations were doing, thereby causing inconsistencies among States Parties in how the Convention would be carried out.

8. SURVEY OF DOE FACILITIES: IMPACT OF POTENTIAL MEASURES TO ENHANCE COMPLIANCE WITH THE BIOLOGICAL AND TOXIN WEAPONS CONVENTION. 54p. DOE Contract AC04-94AL85000. Order Number DE96008273. Source: OSTI; NTIS; GPO Dep.

http://gpo.osti.gov:901/cgi-bin/displaybib?QS=651~7eSY0:8:~3b(7&bcode=785~7eO3~3f31~3b024&bib=21:0~7ecggd{3~3f622676~3e87&wrap=21::~7ecggd{3~3f622676294&file=21::~7ecggd{3~3f622676285

The Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention (BTWC) is a multi-national agreement that seeks to forestall the stockpiling of biological materials in types or quantities not justifiable for protective, prophylactic, or other peaceful purposes. The convention has no verification regime to monitor compliance, but the Parties to the Convention are mandated to write a legally binding monitoring regime for the BTWC that will supplement existing confidence building measures. The scope of this regime is not yet clear, but may include a series of on-site measures designed, to varying degrees, to help enhance compliance with the Convention. DOE National Laboratories may be subject to declaration and/or inspection under the monitoring regime because of the extensive biotechnology work now performed at those sites. This study surveys major DOE sites to analyze the effects on biotechnology programs of measures on which could be agreed in the future, and is intended to assist decision makers as the U.S. Government develops its approach to the negotiations under the Convention.

9. 309 PLUTONIUM RECYCLE TEST REACTOR ION EXCHANGER VAULT DEACTIVITATION REPORT. 60p. DOE Contract AC06-93RL12367. Order Number DE96009902. Source: OSTI; NTIS; INIS; GPO Dep.

http://gpo.osti.gov:901/cgi-bin/displaybib?QS=651~7eSY0:8:~3b(7&bcode=785~7eO3~3f31:~3b55&bib=2035~7ecggd{3~3f63:55381:&wrap=203~3b~7ecggd{3~3f63:553~3f1~3b&file=203~3b~7ecggd{3~3f63:553~3f04

This report documents the deactivation of the ion exchanger vault at the 309 Plutonium Recycle Test Reactor (PRTR) Facility in the 300 Area. The vault deactivation began in May 1995 and was completed in June 1995. The final site restoration and shipment of the low-level waste for disposal was finished in September 1995. The ion exchanger vault deactivation project involved the removal and disposal of twelve ion exchangers and decontaminating and fixing of residual smearable contamination on the ion exchanger vault concrete surfaces.

10. INTENSE PULSED NEUTRON SOURCE: PROGRESS REPORT 1991--1996. 15. ANNIVERSARY EDITION -- VOLUME 1. 168p. DOE Contract W-31109-ENG-38. Order Number DE96009977. Source: OSTI; NTIS; INIS; GPO Dep.

http://gpo.osti.gov:901/cgi-bin/displaybib?QS=651~7eSY0:8:~3b(7&bcode=61~3b~7eO3~3f31:~3b20&bib=2030~7ecggd{3~3f60351:~3f80&wrap=21:~3b~7ecggd{3~3f60351~3b:87&file=21:~3b~7ecggd{3~3f60351~3b:~3b0

The 15th Anniversary Edition of the IPNS Progress Report is being published in recognition of the Intense Pulsed Neutron Source's first 15 years of successful operation as a user facility. To emphasize the importance of this milestone, the authors have made the design and organization of the report significantly different from previous IPNS Progress Reports. This report consists of two volumes. For Volume 1, authors were asked to prepare articles that highlighted recent scientific accomplishments at IPNS, from 1991 to present; to focus on and illustrate the scientific advances achieved through the unique capabilities of neutron studies performed by IPNS users; to report on specific activities or results from an instrument; or to focus on a body of work encompassing different neutron-scattering techniques. Articles were also included on the accelerator system, instrumentation, computing, target, and moderators. A list of published and "in press" articles in journals, books, and conference proceedings, resulting from work done at IPNS since 1991, was compiled. This list is arranged alphabetically according to first author. Publication references in the articles are listed by last name of first author and year of publication. The IPNS experimental reports received since 1991 are compiled in Volume 2. Experimental reports referenced in the articles are listed by last name of first author, instrument designation, and experiment number.

11. 1994 ACTIVITY REPORT: STANFORD SYNCHROTRON RADIATION LABORATORY. 503p. DOE Contract AC03-76SF00515. Order Number DE96011739. Source: OSTI; NTIS; INIS; GPO Dep.

http://gpo.osti.gov:901/cgi-bin/displaybib?QS=651~7eSY0:8:~3b(7&bcode=784~7eO3~3f30256~3e&bib=2026~7ecggd{3~3f664~3c23~3e12&wrap=2023~7ecggd{3~3f664~3c20:~3b4&file=2023~7ecggd{3~3f664~3c20::5

The SSRL facility delivered 89% of the scheduled user beam to 25 experimental stations during 6.5 months of user running. Users from private industry were involved in 31% of these experiments. The SPEAR accelerator ran very well with no major component failures and an unscheduled down time of only 2.9%. In addition to this increased reliability, there was a significant improvement in the stability of the beam. The enhancements to the SPEAR orbit as part of a concerted three-year program were particularly noticeable to users. The standard deviation of beam movement (both planes) in the last part of the run was 80 microns, major progress toward the ultimate goal of 50-micron stability. This was a significant improvement from the previous year when the movement was 400 microns in the horizontal and 200 microns in the vertical. A new accelerator Personal Protection System (PPS), built with full redundancy and providing protection from both radiation exposure and electrical hazards, was installed in 1994. It is not possible to describe in this summary all of the scientific experimentation which was performed during the run. However, the flavor of current research projects and the many significant accomplishments can be realized by the following highlights: A multinational collaboration performed several experiments involving x-ray scattering from nuclear resonances; Studies related to nuclear waste remediation by groups from Los Alamos National Laboratory and Pacific Northwest Laboratories continued in 1994; Diffraction data sets for a number of important protein crystals were obtained; During the past two years a collaboration consisting of groups from Hewlett Packard, Intel, Fisons Instruments and SSRL has been exploring the utility of synchrotron radiation for total reflection x-ray fluorescence (TRXRF); and High-resolution angle-resolved photoemission experiments have continued to generate exciting new results from highly correlated and magnetic materials.

12. COMPLEX-WIDE REVIEW OF DOE'S LOW-LEVEL WASTE MANAGEMENT ES&H VULNERABILIITES. VOLUME III. FINAL REPORT. 479p. Order Number DE96011891. Source: OSTI; NTIS; INIS; GPO Dep.

http://gpo.osti.gov:901/cgi-bin/displaybib?QS=651~7eSY0:8:~3b(7&bcode=785~7eO3~3f302:~3c6&bib=2015~7ecggd{3~3f66:~3c~3f5~3f~3f7&wrap=201:~7ecggd{3~3f66:~3c~3f::14&file=201:~7ecggd{3~3f66:~3c~3f::05

The U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) conducted a comprehensive complex-wide review of the environment, safety, and health (ES&H) vulnerabilities associated with its management of low-level waste (LLW) and the radioactive component of mixed low-level waste (MLLW). This review was conducted in response to a recommendation from the Defense Nuclear Facilities Safety Board (DNFSB). The DNFSB's recommendation concerning conformance with safety standards at DOE LLW sites was issued on September 8, 1994 and is referred to as Recommendation 94-2. DOE submitted an Implementation Plan for its response to Recommendation 94-2 to the DNFSB on March 31, 1995. DOE has conducted this complex-wide review in accordance with that Implementation Plan and subsequent revisions. Among its conclusions and recommendations, the DNFSB recommended that a complex-wide review of LLW management, similar to that conducted by DOE for spent nuclear fuel, be initiated. As with the Spent Nuclear Fuel assessment and other recent vulnerability assessments conducted by DOE, the goal of the complex-wide review of DOE's LLW management system was to identify vulnerabilities that could lead to unnecessary radiation exposure of workers or the public or unnecessary releases of radioactive materials to the environment. Additionally, the DNFSB stated that an objective of the complex-wide review should be to establish the dimensions of the DOE LLW problem and support the identification of corrective actions to address safe disposition of past, present, and future volumes of LLW.

13. COMPLEX-WIDE REVIEW OF DOE'S LOW-LEVEL WASTE MANAGEMENT ES&H VULNERABILITIES. VOLUME III APPENDICES. FINAL REPORT. 298p. Order Number DE96011892. Source: OSTI; NTIS; INIS; GPO Dep.

http://gpo.osti.gov:901/cgi-bin/displaybib?QS=651~7eSY0:8:~3b(7&bcode=784~7eO3~3f302:~3c5&bib=2013~7ecggd{3~3f66~3b4~3f12~3d~3b&wrap=2012~7ecggd{3~3f66~3b4~3f68~3e:&file=2012~7ecggd{3~3f66~3b4~3f681~3b

The U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) conducted a comprehensive complex-wide review of the environment, safety, and health (ES&H) vulnerabilities associated with its management of low-level waste (LLW) and the radioactive component of mixed low-level waste (MLLW). This review was conducted in response to a recommendation from the Defense Nuclear Facilities Safety Board (DNFSB). The DNFSB's recommendation concerning conformance with safety standards at DOE LLW sites was issued on September 8, 1994 and is referred to as Recommendation 94-2. DOE submitted an Implementation Plan for its response to Recommendation 94-2 to the DNFSB on March 31, 1995. DOE has conducted this complex-wide review in accordance with that Implementation Plan and subsequent revisions. Among its conclusions and recommendations, the DNFSB recommended that a complex-wide review of LLW management, similar to that conducted by DOE for spent nuclear fuel, be initiated. This document contains the Volume III Appendices.

14. RARA FY 1994 SUMMARY REPORT. 43p. DOE Contract AC06-93RL12367. Order Number DE96005060. Source: OSTI; NTIS; INIS; GPO Dep.

http://gpo.osti.gov:901/cgi-bin/displaybib?QS=651~7eSY0:8:~3b(7&bcode=794~7eO3~3f316237&bib=2021~7ecggd{3~3f676~3d67~3c9~3b&wrap=2021~7ecggd{3~3f676~3d64:07&file=2036~7ecggd{3~3f676~3d64~3b90

Radiation Area Remedial Action (RARA) is responsible for the interim stabilization and maintenance of the majority of the inactive waste sites at Hanford. This equates to approximately 400 individual sites and 4,000 acres. Examples of waste sites include cribs, ponds, ditches, burial grounds, tanks, french drains, and unplanned release sites. Consistent with the site effort to reduce liquid waste disposal to the soil column and the site transition from production activities to environmental restoration, several new sites were deactivated, isolated, and transferred into the RARA project in July 1994. They were all Resource Conservation and Recovery Act of 1976 (RCRA) Treatment Storage and Disposal (TSD) Units: 216-A-36 B Crib, 216-A-37-1 Crib, 216-B-3 Pond and Ditch, 216-S-10 ditch, 216-U-12 Crib, and the Non-Radioactive Dangerous Waste Landfill. RARA activities are broken into two broad categories, interim stabilization and surveillance and maintenance. Interim stabilization addresses major corrective action for sites with radioactive surface contamination. Surface contamination is handled two ways. First, surface contamination may be collected using heavy equipment, and consolidated (preferably) on the waste site from which it originated then covered with a layer of soil or other material. Secondly, surface contamination may be covered with a layer of soil or other material. The method employed is dictated by whether surface contamination is associated with a waste site or has migrated onto areas not associated with a waste site. Waste sites are then revegetated or receive treatments of nonselective herbicide. Interim stabilization is required to minimize the spread of radioactive material from these individual waste sites. RARA has interim stabilized or decontaminated approximately 1,400 acres at Hanford over the last 14 years.

15. NON-DESTRUCTIVE EVALUATION TECHNIQUES FOR CHEMICAL WEAPONS DESTRUCTION. 8p. DOE Contract AC07-94ID13223. (CONF-9605171--2: ). Order Number DE96014107. Source: OSTI; NTIS; GPO Dep.

http://gpo.osti.gov:901/cgi-bin/displaybib?QS=651~7eSY0:8:~3b(7&bcode=79:~7eO3~3f307350&bib=2154~7ecggd{0~3f5:04~3f4~3f~3f&wrap=2164~7ecggd{0~3f5:04~3e29:&file=2164~7ecggd{0~3f5:04~3e2~3e~3b

The safe and verifiable disposition, either by incineration or chemical neutralization of chemical warfare (CW) agents requires correct {ital a priori} identification of each munition or container to be processed. A variety of NDE techniques have been used or tested for the examination and characterization of munitions. In the U.S., three widely used techniques are X-ray radiography, acoustic resonance spectroscopy (ARS), and prompt gamma ray neutron activation analysis (PINS). The technical bases, instrumental implementations, and applications of the U.S. versions of these methods are briefly discussed. 10 refs., 2 figs., 1 tab.

16. RADIOLOGICAL CONSEQUENCES OF SHIP COLLISIONS THAT MIGHT OCCUR IN U.S. PORTS DURING THE SHIPMENT OF FOREIGN RESEARCH REACTOR SPENT NUCLEAR FUEL TO THE UNITED STATES IN BREAK-BULK FREIGHTERS. 246p. DOE Contract AC04-94AL85000. (TTC--1463). Order Number DE96014413. Source: OSTI; NTIS; INIS; GPO Dep.

http://gpo.osti.gov:901/cgi-bin/displaybib?QS=651~7eSY0:8:~3b(7&bcode=79:~7eO3~3f307644&bib=2165~7ecggd{0~3f4372602~3b&wrap=2165~7ecggd{0~3f437264~3f8&file=2165~7ecggd{0~3f437264~3c9

Accident source terms, source term probabilities, consequences, and risks are developed for ship collisions that might occur in U.S. ports during the shipment of spent fuel from foreign research reactors to the United States in break-bulk freighters.

17. TECHNOLOGY DIFFUSION OF A DIFFERENT NATURE: APPLICATIONS OF NUCLEAR SAFEGUARDS TECHNOLOGY TO THE CHEMICAL WEAPONS VERIFICATION REGIME. 14p. DOE Contract AC02-76CH00016. (CONF-960767--67: ). Order Number DE96015061. Source: OSTI; NTIS; GPO Dep.

http://gpo.osti.gov:901/cgi-bin/displaybib?QS=651~7eSY0:8:~3b(7&bcode=79:~7eO3~3f306236&bib=215~3b~7ecggd{0~3f4~3b64~3f2~3d0&wrap=2142~7ecggd{0~3f4~3b64~3f73:&file=2153~7ecggd{0~3f4~3b64~3f4:~3b

The following discussion focuses on the issue of arms control implementation from the standpoint of technology and technical assistance. Not only are the procedures and techniques for safeguarding nuclear materials undergoing substantial changes, but the implementation of the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) and the Biological Weapons Convention (BWC) will give rise to technical difficulties unprecedented in the implementation of arms control verification. Although these regimes present new challenges, an analysis of the similarities between the nuclear and chemical weapons non-proliferation verification regimes illustrates the overlap in technological solutions. Just as cost-effective and efficient technologies can solve the problems faced by the nuclear safeguards community, these same technologies offer solutions for the CWC safeguards regime. With this in mind, experts at the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW), who are responsible for verification implementation, need to devise a CWC verification protocol that considers the technology already available. The functional similarity of IAEA and the OPCW, in conjunction with the technical necessities of both verification regimes, should receive attention with respect to the establishment of a technical assistance program. Lastly, the advanced status of the nuclear and chemical regime vis-a-vis the biological non-proliferation regime can inform our approach to implementation of confidence building measures for biological weapons.

18. WRAP MODULE 1 WASTE ANALYSIS PLAN. 49p. DOE Contract AC06-87RL10930. Order Number DE96050011. Source: OSTI; NTIS; INIS; GPO Dep.

http://gpo.osti.gov:901/cgi-bin/displaybib?QS=651~7eSY0:8:~3b(7&bcode=790~7eO3~3f343246&bib=2160~7ecggd{0~3f364160::&wrap=2156~7ecggd{0~3f3641662~3c&file=2156~7ecggd{0~3f3641663~3d

The purpose of this waste analysis plan is to document the necessary characterization, sampling, screening, analysis, and waste acceptance criteria for waste received at the WRAP Module 1. Waste expected to be received at WRAP Module 1 includes newly generated and retrieved waste. The newly generated waste will undergo verification prior to treatment, storage, or disposal. Retrieved waste from the burial grounds or above ground storage will undergo further characterization (as needed), treatment, supercompaction, and repackaging.

19. THE INTERACTIVE ON-SITE INSPECTION SYSTEM: AN INFORMATION MANAGEMENT SYSTEM TO SUPPORT ARMS CONTROL INSPECTIONS. 59p. DOE Contract AC04-94AL85000. Order Number DE97002487. Source: OSTI; NTIS; GPO Dep.

http://gpo.osti.gov:901/cgi-bin/displaybib?QS=651~7eSY0:8:~3b(7&bcode=78~3b~7eO3~3e3116~3d0&bib=21~3b~3b~7ecggd{0~3f~3f~3b:~3d2420&wrap=21~3b:~7ecggd{0~3f~3f~3b:~3d2~3b~3c~3e&file=21~3b:~7ecggd{0~3f~3f~3b:~3d2~3b~3d~3f

The increasing use of on-site inspection (OSI) to meet the nation's obligations with recently signed treaties requires the nation to manage a variety of inspection requirements. This document describes a prototype automated system to assist in the preparation and management of these inspections.

20. ROUTINE INSPECTION EFFORT REQUIRED FOR VERIFICATION OF A NUCLEAR MATERIAL PRODUCTION CUTOFF CONVENTION. 39p. DOE Contract AC02-76CH00016. (SSN--96-14). Order Number DE97002847. Source: OSTI; NTIS; INIS; GPO Dep.

http://gpo.osti.gov:901/cgi-bin/displaybib?QS=651~7eSY0:8:~3b(7&bcode=78~3b~7eO3~3e311:10&bib=2142~7ecggd{0~3f~3e7610628&wrap=2146~7ecggd{0~3f~3e7610~3b:1&file=2146~7ecggd{0~3f~3e7610~3b~3b~3e

On 27 September 1993, President Clinton proposed "a multilateral convention prohibiting the production of highly enriched uranium or plutonium for nuclear explosives purposes or outside of international safeguards." The UN General Assembly subsequently adopted a resolution recommending negotiation of a non-discriminatory, multilateral, and internationally and effectively verifiable treaty (hereinafter referred to as "the Cutoff Convention") banning the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons. The matter is now on the agenda of the Conference on Disarmament, although not yet under negotiation. This accord would, in effect, place all fissile material (defined as highly enriched uranium and plutonium) produced after entry into force (EIF) of the accord under international safeguards. "Production" would mean separation of the material in question from radioactive fission products, as in spent fuel reprocessing, or enrichment of uranium above the 20% level, which defines highly enriched uranium (HEU). Facilities where such production could occur would be safeguarded to verify that either such production is not occurring or that all material produced at these facilities is maintained under safeguards.

21. FINAL ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT STATEMENT FOR THE CONTINUED OPERATION OF THE PANTEX PLANT AND ASSOCIATED STORAGE OF NUCLEAR WEAPON COMPONENTS. Volume 3 -- Comment response. 807p. Order Number DE97003073. Source: OSTI; NTIS; INIS; GPO Dep.

http://gpo.osti.gov:901/cgi-bin/displaybib?QS=651~7eSY0:8:~3b(7&bcode=783~7eO3~3e310224&bib=21~3b1~7ecggd{0~3f~3e5:200~3d1&wrap=21~3b2~7ecggd{0~3f~3e5:204:1&file=21~3b2~7ecggd{0~3f~3e5:204~3b~3e

The Draft Environmental Impact Statement (EIS) for the continued operation of Pantex Plant was published in March 1996. The document assessed the alternatives of no action, relocation of the storage of plutonium components resulting from nuclear weapon disassemble activities at Pantex Plant to another site, and the proposed action (preferred alternative) of continuing operations and increasing the quantity of pits in interim storage at Pantex Plant. This report contains the comments and responses received on the Draft EIS.

22. INFORMATION MODEL FOR ON-SITE INSPECTION SYSTEM. 55p. DOE Contract AC04-94AL85000. Order Number DE97003469. Source: OSTI; NTIS; GPO Dep.

http://gpo.osti.gov:901/cgi-bin/displaybib?QS=651~7eSY0:8:~3b(7&bcode=78:~7eO3~3e31063~3e&bib=2034~7ecggd{0~3f6200229~3e4&wrap=2035~7ecggd{0~3f620022~3d~3e7&file=2035~7ecggd{0~3f620022~3d10

This report describes the information model that was jointly developed as part of two FY93 LDRDs: (1) Information Integration for Data Fusion, and (2) Interactive On-Site Inspection System: An Information System to Support Arms Control Inspections. This report describes the purpose and scope of the two LDRD projects and reviews the prototype development approach, including the use of a GIS. Section 2 describes the information modeling methodology. Section 3 provides a conceptual data dictionary for the OSIS (On-Site Information System) model, which can be used in conjunction with the detailed information model provided in the Appendix. Section 4 discussions the lessons learned from the modeling and the prototype. Section 5 identifies the next steps--two alternate paths for future development. The long-term purpose of the On-Site Inspection LDRD was to show the benefits of an information system to support a wide range of on-site inspection activities for both offensive and defensive inspections. The database structure and the information system would support inspection activities under nuclear, chemical, biological, and conventional arms control treaties. This would allow a common database to be shared for all types of inspections, providing much greater cross-treaty synergy.

23. SPENT NUCLEAR FUEL PROJECT PATH FORWARD: NUCLEAR SAFETY EQUIVALENCY TO COMPARABLE NRC-LICENSED FACILITIES. 150p. DOE Contract AC06-87RL10930. Order Number DE97051215. Source: OSTI; NTIS; INIS; GPO Dep.

http://gpo.osti.gov:901/cgi-bin/displaybib?QS=651~7eSY0:8:~3b(7&bcode=782~7eO3~3e342042&bib=2153~7ecggd{1~3f53240:~3f1&wrap=217~3b~7ecggd{1~3f5324~3f3~3c8&file=217~3b~7ecggd{1~3f5324~3f3~3d9

This document includes the Technical requirements which meet the nuclear safety objectives of the NRC regulations for fuel treatment and storage facilities. These include requirements regarding radiation exposure limits, safety analysis, design and construction. This document also includes administrative requirements which meet the objectives of the major elements of the NRC licensing process. These include formally documented design and safety analysis, independent technical review, and oppportunity for public involvement.

24. ARMS CONTROL AND THE RULE OF LAW: NATIONAL MEASURES FOR ENFORCEMENT AND VERIFICATION. 13p. DOE Contract W-31109-ENG-38. (CONF-9704128--1: ). Order Number DE97006923. Source: OSTI; NTIS; GPO Dep.

http://gpo.osti.gov:901/cgi-bin/displaybib?QS=651~7eSY0:8:~3b(7&bcode=784~7eO3~3e315~3b74&bib=215:~7ecggd{1~3f2~3b1~3d04:8&wrap=214~3b~7ecggd{1~3f2~3b1~3d~3f220&file=214~3b~7ecggd{1~3f2~3b1~3d~3f231

Much has been written about the deterrence strategies that justified the arms race. Walter Slocombe explained that "the dominant problem of U.S. nuclear strategy is credibly using U.S. nuclear power to deter and if necessary resist non-nuclear as well as nuclear threats to America's allies, forces, and interests overseas." As a result, the "flexible response" doctrine was developed to declare "that the United States, in consultation with its allies, is prepared to use nuclear weapons should other means of protection from Soviet attack threaten to fail" In contrast, Freeman Dyson pointed out the Soviet Union was committed to the concept of "counterforce" which meant that "if the Soviet Union sees a nuclear attack coming or has reason to believe that an attack is about to be launched, the Soviet Union will strike first at the attacker's weapons with all available forces, and will then do whatever is necessary in order to survive" Out of these military postures a tense peace ironically emerged, but the terms by which decisions were made about controlling weapons of mass destruction (i.e., nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons) were the terms of war. The thesis of this paper is that the end of the Cold War marks a shift away from reliance on military might toward an international commitment to control weapons of mass destruction through the 'rule of law.'

25. THE CHEMICAL WEAPONS CONVENTION -- LEGAL ISSUES. 16p. DOE Contract W-31109-ENG-38. Contract DNA001-90-C-0177. (CONF-970443--23: ). Order Number DE97007014. Source: OSTI; NTIS; GPO Dep.

http://gpo.osti.gov:901/cgi-bin/displaybib?QS=651~7eSY0:8:~3b(7&bcode=79:~7eO3~3e314243&bib=215:~7ecggd{1~3f02:~3c37~3b~3c&wrap=21~3b3~7ecggd{1~3f02:~3c3~3b2~3e&file=21~3b3~7ecggd{1~3f02:~3c3~3b3~3f

The Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) offers a unique challenge to the U.S. system of constitutional law. It's promise of eliminating what is the most purely genocidal type of weapon from the world's arsenals as well as of destroying the facilities for producing these weapons, brings with it a set of novel legal issues. The reservations about the CWC expressed by U.S. business people are rooted in concern about safeguarding confidential business information and protecting the constitutional right to privacy. The chief worry is that international verification inspectors will misuse their power to enter commercial property and that trade secrets or other private information will be compromised as a result. It has been charged that the Convention is probably unconstitutional. The author categorically disagrees with that view and is aware of no scholarly writing that supports it. The purpose of this presentation is to show that CWC verification activities can be implemented in the U.S. consistently with the traditional constitutional regard for commercial and individual privacy. First, he very briefly reviews the types of verification inspections that the CWC permits, as well as some of its specific privacy protections. Second, he explains how the Fourth Amendment right to privacy works in the context of CWC verification inspections. Finally, he reviews how verification inspections can be integrated into these constitutional requirements in the U.S. through a federal implementing statute.

26. RESIDUAL RADIOACTIVITY GUIDELINES FOR THE HEAVY WATER COMPONENTS TEST REACTOR AT THE SAVANNAH RIVER SITE. 194p. DOE Contract AC09-96SR18500. Order Number DE97060218. Source: OSTI; NTIS; INIS; GPO Dep.

http://gpo.osti.gov:901/cgi-bin/displaybib?QS=651~7eSY0:8:~3b(7&bcode=787~7eO3~3e37304~3f&bib=2141~7ecggd{1~3f01:6~3e49~3c&wrap=2153~7ecggd{1~3f01:173~3e~3c&file=2153~7ecggd{1~3f01:173~3f~3d

Guidelines were developed for acceptable levels of residual radioactivity in the Heavy Water Components Test Reactor (HWCTR) facility at the conclusion of its decommissioning. Using source terms developed from data generated in a detailed characterization study, the RESRAD and RASRAD-BUILD computer codes were used to calculate derived concentration guideline levels (DCGLs) for the radionuclides that will remain in the facility. The calculated DCGLs, when compared to existing concentrations of radionuclides measured during a 1996 characterization program, indicate that no decontamination of concrete surfaces will be necessary. Also, based on the results of the calculations, activated concrete in the reactor biological shield does not have to be removed, and imbedded radioactive piping in the facility can remain in place. Viewed in another way, the results of the calculations showed that the present inventory of residual radioactivity in the facility (not including that associated with the reactor vessel and steam generators) would produce less than one millirem per year above background to a hypothetical individual on the property. The residual radioactivity is estimated to be approximately 0.04 percent of the total inventory in the facility as of March, 1997. According to the results, the only radionuclides that would produce greater than 0.0.1-millirem per year are Am-241 (0.013 mrem/yr at 300 years), C-14 (0.022 mrem/yr at 1000 years) and U-238 (0.034 mrem/yr at 6000 years). Human exposure would occur only through the groundwater pathways, that is, from water drawn from, a well on the property. The maximum exposure would be approximately one percent of the 4 millirem per year ground water exposure limit established by the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency. 11 refs., 13 figs., 15 tabs.

27. US TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE TO THE IAEA AND THE CHEMICAL WEAPONS CONVECTION (CWC) - A REVIEW AND LOOK TO THE FUTURE. 13p. DOE Contract AC02-76CH00016. (SSN--97-02; CONF-970744--18: ). Order Number DE97007332. Source: OSTI; NTIS; GPO Dep.

http://gpo.osti.gov:901/cgi-bin/displaybib?QS=651~7eSY0:8:~3b(7&bcode=781~7eO3~3e314165&bib=2154~7ecggd{1~3f0777~3e38~3f&wrap=215~3b~7ecggd{1~3f0777~3e4~3c9&file=214:~7ecggd{1~3f0777~3e4~3c0

This paper reviews the Safeguards mandate of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) and describes U.S. technical support programs. We also review the mandate of the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) and speculate on the technical areas where U.S. assistance may prove useful. The IAEA was organized in 1957 in response to President Eisenhower's "Atoms for Peace" initiative presented to the UN General Assembly on December 8, 1953. The Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW) has been organized by a Preparatory Commission (PREPCOM) to prepare for the entry-into-force of this new convention which prohibits the development, production, stockpiling and use of chemical weapons and on their destruction. The safeguards mandate of the IAEA is to carry out verifications of nuclear material pursuant to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) and other voluntary but legally binding agreements. U.S. technical support programs have provided and continue to provide assistance in the form of Cost-Free Experts (CFE's), systems studies on new safeguards approaches, training, computerized information systems, and equipment for nuclear materials measurements and containment and surveillance systems. Because the CWC just recently entered into force (April 29, 1997), verification procedures of the OPCW are not yet fully developed. However, it is expected, and can already be seen for many aspects of the technical task, that there are many similarities between the verification activities of the OPCW and those carried out by the IAEA. This paper will discuss potential technical support areas that can help strengthen the OPCW. 9 refs.

28. AUGMENTED COMPUTER EXERCISE FOR INSPECTION TRAINING (ACE-IT) - AN INTERACTIVE TRAINING TOOL FOR "CHALLENGE INSPECTIONS" UNDER THE CHEMICAL WEAPONS CONVENTION. 5p. DOE Contract AC04-94AL85000. (CONF-970744--2: ). Order Number DE97007161. Source: OSTI; NTIS; GPO Dep.

http://gpo.osti.gov:901/cgi-bin/displaybib?QS=651~7eSY0:8:~3b(7&bcode=781~7eO3~3e314336&bib=2155~7ecggd{1~3f0:0712~3d~3f&wrap=2140~7ecggd{1~3f0:0717~3c~3e&file=2140~7ecggd{1~3f0:0717~3d~3f

The on-site inspection provisions in many current and proposed arms control agreements require extensive preparation and training on the part of both the Inspection Teams and the Inspected Parties. Current training techniques include lectures, table-top inspections, and practice inspections. The Augmented Computer Exercise for Inspection Training (ACE-IT), an interactive computer training tool, increases the utility of table-top inspections. Under the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) challenge inspections are short-notice inspections that may occur anywhere, anytime, and with no right of refusal. The time interval between notice of intent to inspect a facility and the arrival of inspectors at the facility may be as short as 72 hours. Therefore, advance training is important. ACE-IT is used for training both the Inspection Team, (inspector) and the Inspected Party (host) to conduct a hypothetical challenge inspection under the CWC. An exercise moderator controls the exercise. The training covers all of the events in the challenge inspection regime, from initial notification of an inspection through post-inspection activities. But the primary emphasis of the training tool is on conducting the inspection itself, and in particular, the concept of managed access. Managed access is used to assure the inspectors that the facility is in compliance with the CWC, while protecting sensitive information that is not related to the CWC.

29. PERFORMANCE ASSESSMENT FOR A HYPOTHETICAL LOW-LEVEL WASTE DISPOSAL FACILITY. 112p. DOE Contract AC07-94ID13223. Order Number DE97053012. Source: OSTI; NTIS; INIS; GPO Dep.

http://gpo.osti.gov:901/cgi-bin/displaybib?QS=651~7eSY0:8:~3b(7&bcode=79~3b~7eO3~3e340245&bib=214~3b~7ecggd{1~3f~3f374~3e~3b20&wrap=217~3b~7ecggd{1~3f~3f37776:9&file=216:~7ecggd{1~3f~3f37776:0

Disposing of low-level waste (LLW) is a concern for many states throughout the United States. A common disposal method is below-grade concrete vaults. Performance assessment analyses make predictions of contaminant release, transport, ingestion, inhalation, or other routes of exposure, and the resulting doses for various disposal methods such as the below-grade concrete vaults. Numerous assumptions are required to simplify the processes associated with the disposal facility to make predictions feasible. In general, these assumptions are made conservatively so as to underestimate the performance of the facility. The objective of this report is to describe the methodology used in conducting a performance assessment for a hypothetical waste facility located in the northeastern United States using real data as much as possible. This report consists of the following: (a) a description of the disposal facility and site, (b) methods used to analyze performance of the facility, (c) the results of the analysis, and (d) the conclusions of this study.

30. MAGRAD: A CODE TO OPTIMIZE THE OPERATION OF SUPERCONDUCTING MAGNETS IN A RADIATION ENVIRONMENT. 297p. DOE Contract AC05-76OR00033. Order Number DE97053096. Source: OSTI; NTIS; INIS; GPO Dep.

http://gpo.osti.gov:901/cgi-bin/displaybib?QS=651~7eSY0:8:~3b(7&bcode=613~7eO3~3e3402~3c1&bib=215~3b~7ecggd{1~3f~3f37~3d22~3f1&wrap=2145~7ecggd{1~3f~3f37~3d273~3e&file=215:~7ecggd{1~3f~3f37~3d24:~3f

A powerful computational tool, called MagRad, has been developed which optimizes magnet design for operation in radiation fields. Specifically, MagRad has been used for the analysis and design modification of the cable-in-conduit conductors of the TF magnet systems in fusion reactor designs. Since the TF magnets must operate in a radiation environment which damages the material components of the conductor and degrades their performance, the optimization of conductor design must account not only for start-up magnet performance, but also shut-down performance. The degradation in performance consists primarily of three effects: reduced stability margin of the conductor; a transition out of the well-cooled operating regime; and an increased maximum quench temperature attained in the conductor. Full analysis of the magnet performance over the lifetime of the reactor includes: radiation damage to the conductor, stability, protection, steady state heat removal, shielding effectiveness, optimal annealing schedules, and finally costing of the magnet and reactor. Free variables include primary and secondary conductor geometric and compositional parameters, as well as fusion reactor parameters. A means of dealing with the radiation damage to the conductor, namely high temperature superconductor anneals, is proposed, examined, and demonstrated to be both technically feasible and cost effective. Additionally, two relevant reactor designs (ITER CDA and ARIES-II/IV) have been analyzed. Upon addition of pure copper strands to the cable, the ITER CDA TF magnet design was found to be marginally acceptable, although much room for both performance improvement and cost reduction exists. A cost reduction of 10-15% of the capital cost of the reactor can be achieved by adopting a suitable superconductor annealing schedule. In both of these reactor analyses, the performance predictive capability of MagRad and its associated costing techniques have been demonstrated.

31. USER'S GUIDE FOR THE AUGMENTED COMPUTER EXERCISE FOR INSPECTION TRAINING (ACE-IT) SOFTWARE. 63P. DOE CONTRACT AC04-94AL85000. Order Number DE98000449. Source: OSTI; NTIS; GPO Dep.

http://gpo.osti.gov:901/cgi-bin/displaybib?QS=651~7eSY0:8:~3b(7&bcode=786~7eO3131361~3e&bib=21~3b2~7ecggd{1~3f~3f403~3e~3b~3e~3e&wrap=2154~7ecggd{1~3f~3f40271~3d~3d&file=2154~7ecggd{1~3f~3f402712:

The on-site inspection provisions in many current and proposed arms control agreements require extensive preparation and training on the part of both the Inspection Teams (inspectors) and Inspected Parties (host). Current training techniques include table-top inspections and practice inspections. The Augmented Computer Exercise for Inspection Training (ACE-IT), an interactive computer training tool, increases the utility of table-top inspections. ACE-IT has been designed to provide training for challenge inspections under the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC); however, this training tool can be modified for other inspection regimes. Although ACE-IT provides training from notification of an inspection through post-inspection activities, the primary emphasis of ACE-IT is in the inspection itself--particularly with the concept of managed access. ACE-IT also demonstrates how inspection provisions impact compliance determination and the protection of sensitive information. This User's Guide describes the use of the ACE-IT training software.

32. THERMAL EXPANSION, THERMAL CONDUCTIVITY, AND HEAT CAPACITY MEASUREMENTS FOR BOREHOLES UE25 NRG-4, UE25 NRG-5, USW NRG-6, AND USW NRG-7/7A. 386p. DOE Contract AC04-94AL85000. Order Number DE98000769. Source: OSTI; NTIS; INIS; GPO Dep.

http://gpo.osti.gov:901/cgi-bin/displaybib?QS=651~7eSY0:8:~3b(7&bcode=613~7eO3131353~3e&bib=21:2~7ecggd{1~3f~3f443~3e~3b20&wrap=2157~7ecggd{1~3f~3f4427798&file=2157~7ecggd{1~3f~3f44277~3e9

Specimens were tested from four thermal-mechanical units, namely Tiva Canyon (TCw), Paintbrush Tuff (PTn), and two Topopah Spring units (TSw1 and TSw2), and from two lithologies, i.e., welded devitrified (TCw, TSw1, TSw2) and nonwelded vitric tuff (PTn). Thermal conductivities in W(mk){sup {minus}1} averaged over all boreholes, ranged (depending upon temperature and saturation state) from 1.2 to 1.9 for TCw, from 0.4 to 0.9 for PTn, from 1.0 to 1.7 for TSw1, and from 1.5 to 2.3 for TSw2. Mean coefficients of thermal expansion were highly temperature dependent and values, averaged over all boreholes, ranged (depending upon temperature and saturation state) from 6.6 {times} 10{sup {minus}6} to 49 {times} 10{sup {minus}6} C{sup {minus}1} for TCw, from the negative range to 16 {times} 10{sup {minus}6} {center_dot} {degree}C{sup {minus}1} for PTn, from 6.3 {times} 10{sup {minus}6} to 44 {times} 10{sup {minus}6} C{sup {minus}1} for TSw1, and from 6.7 {times} 10{sup {minus}6} to 37 {times} 10{sup {minus}6} {center_dot} {degree}C{sup {minus}1} for TSw2. Mean values of thermal capacitance in J/cm{sup 3}K (averaged overall specimens) ranged from 1.6 J to 2.1 for TSw1 and from 1.8 to 2.5 for TSw2. In general, the lithostratigraphic classifications of rock assigned by the USGS are consistent with the mineralogical data presented in this report.

33. DETERRENCE, DISARMAMENT, AND POST-COLD WAR STABILITY: ENHANCING SECURITY FOR BOTH "HAVES" AND "HAVE NOTS". 19p. DOE Contract W-7405-ENG-48. (CONF-9604214--1: ). Order Number DE97052050. Source: OSTI; NTIS; GPO Dep.

http://gpo.osti.gov:901/cgi-bin/displaybib?QS=651~7eSY0:8:~3b(7&bcode=79:~7eO3~3e341207&bib=2154~7ecggd{1~3f~3e63605~3b~3c&wrap=2141~7ecggd{1~3f~3e6360~3b2:&file=2141~7ecggd{1~3f~3e6360~3b3~3b

This paper examines possible developments in nuclear disarmament resulting from the end of the Cold War.

Nuclear Proliferation NPT Extension

34. NUCLEAR DETERRENCE AND DISARMAMENT AFTER THE COLD WAR. 23p. DOE Contract W-7405-ENG-48. (CONF-9411266--1: ). Order Number DE96002667. Source: OSTI; NTIS; GPO Dep.

http://gpo.osti.gov:901/cgi-bin/displaybib?QS=650~7eSY0:8:~3b(6&bcode=784~7eO3~3f311430&bib=2152~7ecggd{3~3f6~3b1110~3d8&wrap=2157~7ecggd{3~3f6~3b11172~3b&file=2157~7ecggd{3~3f6~3b111738

During the Cold War, nuclear arms control measures were shaped significantly by nuclear doctrine. Consequently, the negotiation of arms control agreements often became a battleground for different nuclear strategies. The Cold War between the United States and the Soviet Union has been declared over. Today, both nuclear weapons policies and arms control objectives are again being reviewed. This document discusses points of this review.

35. FINAL PROGRAMMATIC ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT STATEMENT FOR TRITIUM SUPPLY AND RECYCLING. VOLUME III. 640p. Order Number DE96003002. Source: OSTI; NTIS; INIS; GPO Dep.

http://gpo.osti.gov:901/cgi-bin/displaybib?QS=651~7eSY0:8:~3b(7&bcode=795~7eO3~3f317176&bib=2161~7ecggd{3~3f360440~3e~3f&wrap=2167~7ecggd{3~3f36044:8~3d&file=2167~7ecggd{3~3f36044:9:

Tritium, a radioactive gas used in all of the Nation's nuclear weapons, has a short half-life and must be replaced periodically in order for the weapon to operate as designed. Currently, there is no capability to produce the required amounts of tritium within the Nuclear Weapons Complex. The PEIS for Tritium Supply and Recycling evaluates the alternatives for the siting, construction, and operation of tritium supply and recycling facilities at each of five candidate sites: the Idaho National Engineering Laboratory, the Nevada Test Site, the Oak Ridge Reservation, the Pantex Plant, and the Savannah River Site. Alternatives for new tritium supply and recycling facilities consist of four different tritium supply technologies: Heavy Water Reactor, Modular High Temperature Gas-Cooled Reactor, Advanced Light Water Reactor, and Accelerator Production of Tritium. The PEIS also evaluates the impacts of the DOE purchase of an existing operating or partially completed commercial light water reactor or the DOE purchase of irradiation services contracted from commercial power reactors. Additionally, the PEIS includes an analysis of multipurpose reactors that would produce tritium, dispose of plutonium, and produce electricity. Evaluation of impacts on land resources, site infrastructure, air quality and acoustics, water resources, geology and soils, biotic resources, cultural and paleontological resources, socioeconomics, radiological and hazardous chemical impacts during normal operation and accidents to workers and the public, waste management, and intersite transport are included in the assessment.

36. A PERSPECTIVE ON SAFEGUARDING AND MONITORING OF EXCESS MILITARY PLUTONIUM. 15p. DOE Contract W-7405-ENG-48. (CONF-9410329--2: ). Order Number DE96004321. Source: OSTI; NTIS; INIS; GPO Dep.

http://gpo.osti.gov:901/cgi-bin/displaybib?QS=651~7eSY0:8:~3b(7&bcode=795~7eO3~3f317176&bib=2161~7ecggd{3~3f360440~3e~3f&wrap=2167~7ecggd{3~3f36044:8~3d&file=2167~7ecggd{3~3f36044:9:

The purpose of this paper is to provide a perspective and framework for the development of safeguarding and monitoring procedures for the various stages of disposition of excess military plutonium. The paper briefly outlines and comments on some of the issues involved in safeguarding and monitoring excess military plutonium as it progresses from weapons through dismantlement, to fabrication as reactor fuel, to use in a reactor, and finally to storage and disposal as spent fuel. "Military" refers to ownership, and includes both reactor-grade and weapon-grade plutonium. "Excess" refers to plutonium (in any form) that a government decides is no longer needed for military use and can be irrevocably removed from military stockpiles. Many of the issues and proposals presented in this paper are based on, or are similar to, those mentioned in the National Academy of Sciences (NAS) report on excess military plutonium. Safeguards for plutonium disposition are discussed elsewhere in terms of requirements established by the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE), the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC), and the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). Here, the discussion is less specific. The term "safe guarding" is used broadly to refer to materials control and accountancy (MC&A), containment and surveillance (C&S), and physical protection of nuclear materials by the state that possesses those materials. This is also referred to as material protection, control, and accountancy (MPCA). The term "safeguarding" was chosen for brevity and to distinguish MPCA considered in this paper from international or IAEA safeguards. "Monitoring" is used to refer to activities designed to assure another party (state or international organization) that the nuclear materials of the host state (the United States or Russia) are secure and not subject to unauthorized use.

37. DUAL AXIS RADIOGRAPHIC HYDRODYNAMIC TEST FACILITY. FINAL ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT STATEMENT, VOLUME 1: CHAPTERS 1-6 & APPENDIXES A-K. 500p. Order Number DE96005117. Source: OSTI; NTIS; GPO Dep.

http://gpo.osti.gov:901/cgi-bin/displaybib?QS=651~7eSY0:8:~3b(7&bcode=783~7eO3~3f316340&bib=2166~7ecggd{3~3f2:0516~3b8&wrap=2154~7ecggd{3~3f2:051~3b~3b1&file=2154~7ecggd{3~3f2:051~3b8~3e

DOE proposes to provide enhanced high-resolution radiographic capability for hydrodynamic tests and dynamic experiments to help meet its mission to ensure the safety and reliability of the Nation's nuclear weapons. The DARHT Facility would include two electron accelerators to produce x-ray beams that intersect at a firing point to produce radiographs of exploding or imploding material. This EIS evaluates the potential environmental impacts of six alternatives: No Action continue to operate the 30-year old Pulsed High Energy Radiation Machine Emitting X-Rays (PHERMEX) Facility at the Los Alamos National Laboratory (LANL) and the Flash X-Ray (FXR) Facility at the Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory; DARHT Baseline (complete and operate the DARHT Facility at LANL); Upgrade PHERMEX (upgrade PHERMEX with enhanced radiography technology instead of completing the DARHT Facility); Enhanced Containment (in addition to containing all experiments involving plutonium, enclose most or all experiments under one of three options: vessel containment, building containment, or phased containment, which is the prefer-red alternative); Plutonium Exclusion (exclude any applications involving experiments with plutonium at the DARHT Facility); and Single Axis (complete and operate only a single axis of the DARHT Facility). The affected environment is primarily within LANL. Analyses indicate very little difference in the environmental impacts among the alternatives. The major discriminator would be contamination of soils near the firing points, health effects to workers, and amount of construction materials. This document, Volume 1 includes Chapter 1-6 and Appendices A-K (Federal Register Notices; Phermex Baseline; air quality and noise; geology and soils; water resources; biotic resources; socioeconomics; human health; facility accidents; transportation; threatened and endangered species).

38. DUAL AXIS RADIOGRAPHIC HYDRODYNAMIC TEST FACILITY. FINAL ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT STATEMENT, VOLUME 2: PUBLIC COMMENTS AND RESPONSES. 500p. Order Number DE96005118. Source: OSTI; NTIS; GPO Dep.

http://gpo.osti.gov:901/cgi-bin/displaybib?QS=651~7eSY0:8:~3b(7&bcode=782~7eO3~3f31634~3f&bib=216~3b~7ecggd{3~3f2:6736:~3c&wrap=2146~7ecggd{3~3f2:673:~3d0&file=2146~7ecggd{3~3f2:673:21

On May 12, 1995, the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) issued the draft Dual Axis Radiographic Hydrodynamic Test Facility Environmental Impact Statement (DARHT EIS) for review by the State of New Mexico, Indian Tribes, local governments, other Federal agencies, and the general public. DOE invited comments on the accuracy and adequacy of the draft EIS and any other matters pertaining to their environmental reviews. The formal comment period ran for 45 days, to June 26, 1995, although DOE indicated that late comments would be considered to the extent possible. As part of the public comment process, DOE held two public hearings in Los Alamos and Santa Fe, New Mexico, on May 31 and June 1, 1995. In addition, DOE made the draft classified supplement to the DARHT EIS available for review by appropriately cleared individuals with a need to know the classified information. Reviewers of the classified material included the State of New Mexico, the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, the Department of Defense, and certain Indian Tribes. Volume 2 of the final DARHT EIS contains three chapters. Chapter 1 includes a collective summary of the comments received and DOE's response. Chapter 2 contains the full text of the public comments on the draft DARHT EIS received by DOE. Chapter 3 contains DOE's responses to the public comments and an indication as to how the comments were considered in the final EIS.

39. DRAFT PROGRAMMATIC ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT STATEMENT FOR STOCKPILE STEWARDSHIP AND MANAGEMENT. VOLUME I. 871p. Order Number DE96006085. Source: OSTI; NTIS; Office of Reconfiguration DP-25, United States Dept. of Energy, 1000 Independence Avenue SW, Washington, DC 20585 (United States); GPO Dep.

http://gpo.osti.gov:901/cgi-bin/displaybib?QS=651~7eSY0:8:~3b(7&bcode=786~7eO3~3f3152~3d2&bib=2166~7ecggd{3~3f003370~3c:&wrap=2165~7ecggd{3~3f0033749~3c&file=2165~7ecggd{3~3f003374~3e~3d

In response to the end of the Cold War and changes in the world's political regimes, the United States is no longer producing new nuclear weapons. Instead, the emphasis is on reducing the size of the nuclear stockpile by dismantling existing nuclear weapons. DOE has developed a Stockpile Stewardship and Management Program. The PEIS describes and analyzes alternative ways to implement the proposed actions for the Program. Stockpile stewardship refers to activities associated with research, design, development and testing of nuclear weapons and the assessment and certification of the safety and reliability. The PEIS evaluates the potential impacts of three proposed facilities: the National Ignition Facility (NIF), the Contained Firing Facility (CFF), and the Atlas Facility. The alternatives involving these facilities could affect four sites: Los Alamos National Laboratory (LANL), Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory (LLNL), Sandia National Laboratories (SNL), and Nevada Test Site (NTS). Stockpile management refers to activities associated with the production, maintenance, surveillance, refurbishment, and dismantling of the nuclear weapons stockpile. The PEIS evaluates the potential impacts of carrying out Stockpile Management alternatives at eight sites: Oak Ridge Reservation (ORR), Savannah River Site (SRS), Kansas City Plant (KCP), Pantex Plant (Pantex), LANL, LLNL, SNL, and NTS. The Stockpile Stewardship and Management PEIS also evaluates the No Action alternative (to date the Department had identified only one preferred alternative). Evaluation of impacts on land resources, site infrastructure, air quality, water resources, geology and soils, biotic resources, cultural and paleontological resources, socioeconomics, environmental justice, as well as radiological and hazardous chemical impacts during normal operation and accidents to workers and the public and impacts on waste management are included.

40. ANALYSIS OF THE IMPLICATIONS OF THE USSR PROVIDING REPROCESSING AND MOX FABRICATION SERVICES TO OTHER COUNTRIES. 9p. DOE Contract W-7405-ENG-36. Order Number DE96006871. Source: OSTI; NTIS; INIS; GPO Dep.

http://gpo.osti.gov:901/cgi-bin/displaybib?QS=651~7eSY0:8:~3b(7&bcode=78~3b~7eO3~3f315:26&bib=2141~7ecggd{3~3f~3f632043~3d&wrap=2155~7ecggd{3~3f~3f632~3f2~3d~3c&file=2155~7ecggd{3~3f~3f632~3f22~3d

This brief analysis, which is based on unclassified sources, seeks to identify what some of the implications would be if the Soviets started to move actively to try to provide reprocessing and MOX fabrication services to the U.S. and other countries. While information on Soviet intentions is limited, it postulates that the Soviets would offer to reprocess spent LWR at competitive prices, fabricate the plutonium and reenrich the uranium, and sell these products back to the customer. Since it is not known whether they would insist on returning the waste from reprocessing or would be prepared to keep it, we comment briefly on what the implications of either of these actions might be.

41. THE NATIONAL IGNITION FACILITY (NIF) AND THE ISSUE OF NONPROLIFERATION. FINAL STUDY. 82p. Order Number DE96007377. Source: OSTI; NTIS; INIS; GPO Dep.

http://gpo.osti.gov:901/cgi-bin/displaybib?QS=651~7eSY0:8:~3b(7&bcode=613~7eO3~3f314120&bib=2152~7ecggd{3~3f~3f~3b0~3c66:9&wrap=2155~7ecggd{3~3f~3f~3b0~3c658~3b&file=2155~7ecggd{3~3f~3f~3b0~3c6598

NIF, the next step proposed by DOE in a progression of Inertial Confinement Fusion (ICF) facilities, is expected to reach the goal of ICF capsule ignition in the laboratory. This report is in response to a request of a Congressman that DOE resolve the question of whether NIF will aid or hinder U.S. nonproliferation efforts. Both technical and policy aspects are addressed, and public participation was part of the decision process. Since the technical proliferation concerns at NIF are manageable and can be made acceptable, and NIF can contribute positively to U.S. arms control and nonproliferation policy goals, it is concluded that NIF supports the nuclear nonproliferation objectives of the United States.