NEGOTIATING AND IMPLEMENTING ARMS CONTROL



A. CONFERENCE ON DISARMAMENT (CD)

Jurisdiction and Purpose: The CD is the single, multilateral arms control negotiating forum.

Recent Accomplishments: The CD's most notable recent achievement is the Chemical Weapons Convention, which was signed by the United States in January 1993 and submitted to the Senate for advice and consent to ratification on November 23, 1993. The Senate has not yet acted on the Chemical Weapons Convention, but is expected to do so in early 1996.

During 1995, negotiations on a Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) were the CD's major activity. A CTBT is one of the Administrations's highest priorities; we seek to conclude it in 1996, with the Treaty opened for signature in September, prior to the opening of the 51st United Nations General Assembly. Significant progress was made toward a treaty, but much work remains to be done.

In 1995 the CD agreed to a mandate to establish an Ad Hoc Committee (AHC) to negotiate a treaty to end the production of fissile material for nuclear explosive purposes, but no AHC chairman was appointed and the committee did not meet. No other AHC's were re-established during 1995 due to a procedural deadlock over the CD's Agenda resulting from attempts by some delegations to link any progress to their demand that the CD launch discussions on the general subject of nuclear disarmament, a demand which the U.S. and others rejected.

Membership: The CD's original membership of 40 states was reduced to 38 following the unification of Germany and the dissolution of Czechoslovakia. The current member states are: Algeria, Argentina, Australia, Belgium, Brazil, Bulgaria, Burma (Myanmar), Canada, China, Cuba, Egypt, Ethiopia, France, Germany, Hungary, India, Indonesia, Iran, Italy, Japan, Kenya, Mexico, Mongolia, Morocco, Netherlands, Nigeria, Pakistan, Peru, Poland, Romania, Russian Federation, Sri Lanka, Sweden, United Kingdom, United States, Venezuela, Yugoslavia, and Zaire. Yugoslavia's seat is vacant.

In 1995, the Conference on Disarmament agreed to the participation of 51 nonmember states as observers. During 1995, the CD expanded its membership, in principle, to include 23 designated applicants: Austria, Bangladesh, Belarus, Cameroon, Chile, Columbia, Finland, Iraq, Israel, New Zealand, Democratic Peoples Republic of Korea, Norway, Senegal, Slovakia, South Africa, Republic of Korea, Spain, Switzerland, Syria, Turkey, Ukraine, Vietnam, and Zimbabwe. However, the CD could not reach consensus on allowing the 23 new members to take their seats because of the ongoing impasse over Iraq, which the U.S. believes should not participate in CD decisions while under UN Security Council Chapter VII sanctions.

Operating Procedures: The CD meets for three sessions annually; each session is seven to ten weeks long. With the assistance and support of the UN Secretariat, representatives of Member States work in Ad Hoc Committees with a variety of mandates and procedures, and report material to the Plenary for approval by consensus.

ACDA's Role: ACDA provides the primary leadership, delegation membership, staff and support for the U.S. CD Delegation. ACDA also chairs the Washington policy formulation efforts for the work of the CD, and prepares all guidance to the delegation. Ambassador Steven Ledogar leads the U.S. Delegation.

Year and Circumstances of Founding: The CD is the successor to the previous multilateral negotiating bodies, reconfigured in 1979 to include all of the nuclear weapon states.

Location: Currently, the CD meets three times a year from January-April, May-July, and August-September, for a total of 24 weeks, in Geneva.

B. CONFERENCE ON THE TREATY ON THE NON-PROLIFERATION OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS

Jurisdiction and Purpose:. In May 1995, the Conference of Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT), convened in accordance with Article X.2 of the Treaty, decided that the NPT would continue in force indefinitely. The Conference also agreed to a set of "Principles and Objectives for Nuclear Nonproliferation and Disarmament" and to a process for "Strengthening the Review Process for the Treaty," which together have established the basis for future efforts to promote the full implementation of the NPT. The 1995 NPT Conference also reviewed the operation of the NPT to assure that the purposes of the Preamble and the provisions of the Treaty are being realized. The Conference agreed that reviews of the Treaty should continue to be held every five years, with the next NPT Review Conference scheduled for the year 2000. Preparatory Committee work for the Year 2000 NPT Review Conference will begin in 1997.

The NPT itself is a multilateral treaty which proscribes the manufacture or acquisition of nuclear weapons or nuclear explosive devices by non-nuclear weapon states. The Treaty also prohibits nuclear weapon states from transferring nuclear weapons to non-nuclear weapon states or assisting non-nuclear-weapon states in the manufacture, development or acquisition of nuclear weapons. The Treaty commits all its Parties to pursue negotiations in good faith on effective measures relating to cessation of the nuclear arms race at an early date and to nuclear disarmament, and on a treaty on general and complete disarmament under strict and effective international control.

Membership: As this report went to press, the membership of the NPT was 181, leaving only eight non-NPT countries worldwide. The parties to the Treaty are listed in Appendix D.

ACDA's Role: As the lead agency within the Executive Branch for the NPT, ACDA will continue to have primary responsibility for addressing preparations for and conduct of the Year 2000 NPT Review Conference. ACDA will lead interagency efforts to develop and implement U.S. positions on issues related to the Year 2000 NPT Review Conference. ACDA personnel will continue to lead efforts related to bilateral discussions and group meetings regarding the Conference.

Year and Circumstances of Founding: The NPT was opened for signature on July 1, 1968 and entered into force on March 5, 1970. Article X (2) of the NPT provides that twenty-five years after the entry into force of the Treaty, a conference will be convened to decide whether the Treaty shall continue in force indefinitely, or shall be extended for an additional fixed period or periods. In addition, Article VIII (3) provides that at intervals of five years, a majority of the Parties to the Treaty may obtain, by submitting a proposal to this effect to the Depositary Governments, the convening of conferences with the objective of reviewing the operation of the Treaty. The 1995 NPT Conference agreed that review conferences should continue to be held every five years, in accordance with Article VIII and, as such, the next NPT Review Conference will take place in the year 2000.

Location: The location of the Preparatory Committee meetings, of which there are to be a three and possibly four, and of the 2000 Review Conference itself has not been decided. A caucus of NPT parties will take place in 1996, probably on the margins of the UN General Assembly, at which time a decision will be made on the location and timing of the first Preparatory Committee meeting. A decision on the location of other Preparatory Committee meetings and of the Year 2000 NPT Review Conference will probably be made during the first Preparatory Committee meeting in 1997.

C. (START I) JOINT COMPLIANCE AND INSPECTION COMMISSION (JCIC)

Justification and Purpose: The Joint Compliance and Inspection Commission (JCIC) is the implementation body established by the Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START I) of 1991. The purpose of the JCIC is to promote the objectives and implementation of the START Treaty's provisions, and specifically to:

Membership: After the dissolution of the Soviet Union, the Russian Federation, the Republic of Belarus, the Republic of Kazakhstan, and Ukraine became Parties to the START I Treaty. All Parties to the START I Treaty are represented in the JCIC.

Operational Procedures: The JCIC operating procedures were developed by the U.S., Belarus, Kazakhstan, Russia, and Ukraine following the break-up of the Soviet Union. These procedures permit equal participation by the four successor states to the Soviet Union that are Parties to the Treaty.

Each Party is entitled to participate in concluding any JCIC agreement. A Party may provide its consent to be bound by signing the agreement, although certain agreements may be concluded without all Parties actually signing them. If at least two Parties, including the United States, sign an agreement, the agreement will be sent to the non-signing Parties for their review. Each non-signing Party will provide its response in one of three ways: (1) a diplomatic note of acceptance within 30 days; (2) its objection to the agreement within 30 days, in which case it must attend the next session of the JCIC to resolve its concerns; or (3) inaction or silence, i.e., it shall be considered to have expressed its consent to be bound if it provides neither a diplomatic note nor an objection within 30 days. The only exception to this third rule is if one of the signing Parties declares an agreement to be one in which the "consent by silence" rule shall not apply. The intent is to ensure clear and positive assent by a Party when the agreement in question has practical consequences or imposes serious obligations on that Party.

ACDA's Role: ACDA leads the United States Delegation to the JCIC, and provides the United States Representative, the executive secretary, the legal adviser, a senior ACDA policy representative and technical experts, and administrative support. ACDA also chairs the U.S. Government's interagency JCIC Policy formulation committee, which develops U.S. policy guidance related to the activities of the Commission and the implementation of the START I Treaty.

Year and Circumstance of its Founding: The JCIC was created by START I, and held its first meeting in the fall of 1991. The Commission has held a total of 12 sessions since the Treaty was signed, most recently in November-December 1995.

Location: The JCIC normally meets in Geneva, Switzerland.

D. (START II) BILATERAL IMPLEMENTATION COMMISSION (BIC)

Justification and Purpose: The Bilateral Implementation Commission (BIC) is the implementation body for the bilateral U.S.-Russia START II Treaty . Specifically, the BIC will convene after START II enters into force to resolve questions of compliance with Treaty obligations, as well as agrees on additional provisions needed to improve the "viability and effectiveness" of the Treaty. Because the START II Treaty depends, with a few exceptions, on the START I Treaty for definitions, counting rules, and verification and implementation provisions, the work being done in the JCIC on the implementation of the START I Treaty will be directly relevant to the implementation of the START II Treaty.

Membership: The Parties to the Treaty -- the United States of America and the Russian Federation -- are members of the Commission.

Operational Procedures: Since the Treaty is not yet in force, the Commission has not yet convened, and its operating procedures have not been formulated or agreed upon.

ACDA's Role: ACDA will lead the United States Delegation to the Bilateral Implementation Commission, and will provide the United States Representative, the executive secretary, the legal adviser, a senior ACDA policy representative and technical experts, and administrative support. ACDA will chair the U.S. Government's interagency Bilateral Implementation Commission Policy formulation committee, which will develop U.S. policy guidance related to the activities of the Commission and the implementation of the START II Treaty.

Year and Circumstance of its Founding: Paragraph 2 of Article V of the START II Treaty establishes the Bilateral Implementation Commission, but the Commission will not convene until after the Treaty enters into force, since there are no provisions in the START II Treaty for the provisional application of the BIC, as was the case for the JCIC.

Location: When it convenes, the BIC will likely meet in Geneva, Switzerland.

E. NUNN-LUGAR LEGISLATION AND COOPERATIVE THREAT REDUCTION INCLUDING SAFE, SECURE DISMANTLEMENT OF FORMER SOVIET NUCLEAR WEAPONS

Jurisdiction and Purpose: The purpose of the Cooperative Threat Reduction (CTR) program is to help achieve the complete denuclearization of Belarus, Kazakhstan, and Ukraine, to accelerate reduction of Russia's nuclear arms, the safe and secure dismantlement of Russian and other Former Soviet nuclear weapons, the elimination of Russian chemical weapons, and to contribute to nonproliferation.

In late 1991, Congress authorized the Department of Defense to establish the CTR program to assist what soon would be the newly independent states of the former Soviet Union (FSU) in the safety, security and dismantlement of nuclear, chemical and other weapons (to include strategic nuclear delivery vehicles). Through 1995, $1.27 billion is available for the CTR program.

Membership: The FSU states eligible for CTR assistance are those that receive Presidential certification that a recipient state meets Congressionally-mandated criteria for commitment to its arms control and related obligations. These countries must be recertified by the President annually to retain eligibility for assistance.

Operating Procedures: The CTR program is not a formal treaty or regime. Rather, it consists of bilateral executive agreements between the governments of the participants and implementing agreements between agencies. Specifically, "umbrella" agreements which provided the legal basis for all subsequent implementing agreements were negotiated between the United States Government and the governments of Belarus, Kazakhstan, Russia, and Ukraine between June 1992 and December 1993. For each country, the conclusion and entry into force of an "umbrella" agreement was a necessary prerequisite for implementing agreements defining particular projects to be negotiated. To date, 36 implementing agreements have been negotiated and are in force. Now that these agreements have been negotiated, the details of implementing them are being left to the U.S. government agencies (primarily DOD and DOE) with the relevant programmatic responsibilities. Umbrella policy guidance and the establishment of budget priorities for the Nunn-Lugar program continue to be provided by the U.S. interagency community

Year and Circumstances of Founding: The CTR program was initiated by Senators Nunn and Lugar in November 1991, and is sometimes referred to as the Nunn-Lugar program. Concerns over the "danger to nuclear safety and stability" in the Soviet Union arose in the wake of the August 1991 coup attempt, and grew as the Soviet Union disintegrated during the autumn of that year. These concerns were especially acute over the disposition of non-strategic nuclear weapons (see Section I.C.3.). The Senate also noted that then-President Gorbachev had requested western assistance in dismantling Soviet nuclear weapons, and former President Bush had proposed that the United States and the Soviet Union cooperate on the storage, transportation, dismantling and destruction of nuclear weapons. These concerns and proposals led to the passage of the initial legislation.

Location: CTR meetings are generally held in the capitals of the five countries involved. The United States also discusses CTR issues with NATO and G-7 allies periodically, usually in Brussels, for the purpose of informing Allies of U.S. progress, learning of allied assistance in similar areas, and to avoid duplication of effort. When recipients of CTR assistance are involved at NATO's Group on Nuclear Weapons, ACDA participates in these discussions as well. Occasionally there are bilateral meetings with the Allies in Washington or their capitals. Delegation meetings and technical discussions also take place in field sites in both the United States and FSU; e.g., Albuquerque for nuclear safety matters, various nuclear institutes in Russia for storage of fissile materials and nonproliferation issues, or missile dismantlement facilities in Ukraine, to name a few.

F. (INF Treaty) SPECIAL VERIFICATION COMMISSION (SVC)

Justification and Purpose: The SVC is the implementing body for the Treaty Between the United States and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the Elimination of Their Intermediate-Range and Shorter-Range Missiles (INF), which entered into force on June 1, 1988. Although elimination of declared missiles under the INF Treaty has now been completed, we must be able to satisfy ourselves that more are not being produced. The Special Verification Commission (SVC) was established by the INF Treaty to promote the objectives and implementation of the provisions of the Treaty. When the SVC is not in session, business related to the Treaty is conducted through diplomatic channels.

Membership: Initially, the United States and the Soviet Union were the only SVC participants. Since the dissolution of the Soviet Union, the 12 former Soviet republics have become successor states to the INF Treaty. Six of those states -- Russia, Ukraine, Belarus, Kazakhstan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan -- have inspectable facilities covered by the INF Treaty on their territories. Of these six, four are active participants in the work of the Commission: Russia, Ukraine, Belarus and Kazakhstan. Each of the remaining two has only one inspectable facility on its territory; with the consent of the active participants, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan do not attend meetings of the Commission or participate in inspections.

Operational Procedures: The initial SVC procedures were developed by the two original INF Treaty parties -- the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics -- in a Memorandum of Understanding signed on December 20, 1988. Since the breakup of the Soviet Union, the successor state Parties participating in the Special Verification Commission have been discussing new operating procedures to reflect the multilateral character of the forum. Pending agreement on new procedures, the position of the United States is that the originally agreed procedures remain in force.

ACDA's Role: ACDA leads the United States Delegation to the Special Verification Commission, and provides the United States Representative, the executive secretary, the legal adviser, a senior ACDA policy representative, and technical experts and administrative support.

ACDA chairs the U.S. Government's interagency Special Verification Commission Support Group, which develops U.S. policy guidance related to the activities of the Commission and the implementation of the INF Treaty.

Year and Circumstance of its Founding: The SVC was established by Article XIII of the INF Treaty and first convened on June 6, 1988. It has met a total of 17 times, most recently in May-June 1995.

Location: The SVC normally meets in Geneva, Switzerland.

G. AGENCY FOR THE PROHIBITION OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS IN LATIN AMERICA AND THE CARIBBEAN (OPANAL)

Jurisdiction and Purpose: The Agency for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America and the Caribbean (known by its Spanish acronym OPANAL), was created by the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America and the Caribbean, also known as the Treaty of Tlatelolco. OPANAL's mission is to ensure compliance of the Contracting Parties with the Treaty's provisions. The Treaty obligates all Contracting Parties to use nuclear material and facilities under their jurisdiction exclusively for peaceful purposes, and "to prohibit and prevent in their respective territories:

All Contracting Parties also undertake to apply IAEA safeguards to all their nuclear activities.

Membership: 29 Latin American and Caribbean States are Contracting Parties to the Treaty of Tlatelolco, and are therefore Member States of the Agency.

Operating Procedures: OPANAL consists of a small Secretariat, a Secretary-General, and a five-member Council to direct Agency activities between general conferences of all the Contracting Parties. Every two years, OPANAL convenes a General Conference, during which resolutions pertaining to Agency operations, Treaty matters, or even general regional issues are put forth, debated, and voted upon. OPANAL occasionally calls special general conferences to consider amendments to the Treaty or to deal with special topics, such as administrative and budgetary issues pertaining to the operation of the Agency.

While not a member of OPANAL and therefore bearing no financial responsibility for its activities, the United States can participate in OPANAL General Conferences as a non-voting State Party by virtue of its signature and ratification of the two Protocols to the Treaty, and can officially speak to General Conference resolutions and proceedings. The United Kingdom, France, Russia, China, and the Netherlands have similar rights as members of either or both Protocols. Of the four Latin American states which have not brought Tlatelolco into force, St. Kitts/Nevis, St. Lucia, and Cuba (who have signed but not ratified the Treaty) can also attend as non-voting State Parties; Guyana can attend as an observer.

ACDA's Role: ACDA has primary U.S. responsibility for all matters relating to the Treaty of Tlatelolco, and heads all official delegations to OPANAL general and special conferences. The United States supports the universal regional adherence to and implementation of the Treaty of Tlatelolco as a significant contribution to regional peace and security. ACDA is the lead agency in implementing that policy, and works with OPANAL to further that objective.

Year and Circumstance of Founding: OPANAL was created by the Treaty of Tlatelolco. The Treaty was opened for signature in 1967, and entered into force on April 22, 1968 upon the eleventh ratification of the Treaty pursuant to Article 28(2) of the Treaty. The Treaty depositary state, Mexico, convened a conference of the initial Contracting Parties in June 1969 to create the Agency; the first General Conference was held in September 1969.

Location: Mexico City.

H. PREPARATORY COMMISSION FOR THE ORGANIZATION FOR THE PROHIBITION OF CHEMICAL WEAPONS (PrepCom)

Jurisdiction and Purpose: The purpose of the Preparatory Commission (PrepCom) is to carry out necessary preparations for effective implementation of the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production, Stockpiling and Use of Chemical Weapons and on Their Destruction (Chemical Weapons Convention, CWC). The PrepCom develops detailed implementing procedures for the CWC and lays the foundations for a new international treaty-implementing agency, the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW), based in The Hague.

Membership: All signatories to the CWC (160 countries as of the end of 1995).

Operating Procedures: With the support of technical experts employed by the Provisional Technical Secretariat (PTS) (the predecessor of the OPCW Technical Secretariat), representatives of Member States develop consensus recommendations that are then formally approved at quarterly Plenary sessions.

ACDA's Role: ACDA provides personnel and funding support for the permanent U.S. delegation to the PrepCom; ACDA has been designated the lead agency within the U.S. Government for developing policy related to issues discussed during PrepCom meetings; and ACDA funds the annual U.S. assessment for support of the PrepCom. However, future funding will come from the State Department.

Year and Circumstances of Founding: The PrepCom was established in February 1993 by the 130 original signatories of the CWC. The Commission will remain in existence until shortly after the CWC enters into force, at which time it will be superseded by the Conference of States Parties and the OPCW Technical Secretariat.

Location: The PrepCom conducts daily meetings at the Netherlands Conference Center and the PTS Headquarters in The Hague, The Netherlands. A new headquarters building is scheduled for completion in mid-1997 to house the OPCW in The Hague.

I. (Chemical Weapons) BILATERAL DESTRUCTION AGREEMENT NEGOTIATING FORUM

Jurisdiction and Purpose: To negotiate implementation of the Bilateral Destruction Agreement (BDA) between the United States and the Russian Federation. Under this agreement, both countries commit to destroy all but 5,000 agent-tons of their existing chemical weapons and to cease chemical weapons production, regardless of what other nations may or may not do.

Membership: The United States and the Russian Federation.

Operating Procedures: The BDA provides for destruction of CW stockpiles according to an agreed timetable.

ACDA's Role: In March 1993, ACDA led a United States delegation to Geneva which conducted the complex and detailed negotiations for implementation of the BDA including draft protocols to the BDA. Formal agreement is still pending on the protocols provisionally agreed in Geneva. The United States supported the protocols as final, but upon further review in Moscow, Russia sought further changes in the protocols because of concerns relating to the conversion of chemical weapons production facilities. We continue to seek both Russian agreement to the protocols and implementation of the BDA.

Year and Circumstances of Founding: The BDA was signed on June 1, 1990, between the United States and the Soviet Union (now the Russian Federation), but has not yet entered into force.

Location: Negotiating sessions take place on an ad hoc basis in Washington and Moscow.

J. (Chemical Weapons) WYOMING MEMORANDUM OF UNDERSTANDING NEGOTIATING FORUM (MOU)

Jurisdiction and Purpose: To negotiate implementation of the Wyoming Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) signed by the United States and the Soviet Union (now Russian Federation). The purpose of the MOU was to build confidence in the CW area and thus facilitate completion and implementation of the CWC. Phase I of the agreement, calling for an exchange of general data on CW stocks and production facilities and a series of reciprocal visits to CW facilities, was completed in February 1991. Phase II, calling for an exchange of more detailed data and routine and challenge inspections at declared facilities, was initiated in January 1994. Data exchanges and inspections were conducted during 1994. Russian supplementary data was received in June 1995, and consultations are continuing to resolve standing issues.

Membership: The United States and the Russian Federation.

ACDA's Role: In late 1993, ACDA led an interagency negotiating team to Moscow to complete work on the Phase II implementing documents. ACDA also participated in the MOU implementation process.

Year and Circumstances of Founding: The Wyoming MOU was signed between the United States and the Soviet Union (now the Russian Federation) at a ministerial meeting in Jackson Hole, Wyoming, on September 23, 1989.

Location: Consultations in 1995 took place on an ad hoc basis in Washington and Moscow.

K. AUSTRALIA GROUP (AG)

Jurisdiction and Purpose: The "Australia Group" is an informal forum of states, chaired by Australia, whose goal is to discourage and impede CW and BW proliferation by harmonizing national export controls on CW precursor chemicals, BW pathogens, and CBW dual-use production equipment, sharing information on CW proliferation developments, and seeking other ways to curb the use of CBW.

Membership: The 29 members of the AG are Argentina, Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Czech Republic, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Luxembourg, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Portugal, Poland, Romania, Slovak Republic, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, United Kingdom, and the United States. Requests by other states to join the group are considered on a case-by-case basis.

Operating Procedures: The Group has no charter or constitution. It operates by consensus. The Group has established common export controls for chemical and biological weapons nonproliferation. For CW, members of the AG control 54 chemical precursors as well as specified CW-related production equipment. For BW, members have established export controls on certain microorganisms, toxins and equipment that could be used in a BW program.

In tandem with export controls, the AG has periodically used warning mechanisms to sensitize the public to CBW proliferation. The Group has issued an informal "warning list" of dual-use CW precursors, bulk chemicals, and CW-related equipment. Members develop and share the warning lists with their chemical industry and ask it to report on any suspicious transactions. The AG has also warned industry, the scientific community, and other relevant groups of the risks of inadvertently aiding BW proliferation.

ACDA's Role: ACDA personnel participate in U.S. delegations to bilateral discussions, to the annual AG Plenary meetings and to periodic meetings of technical experts, as well as in the internal policy process of the U.S. government. ACDA personnel also participate in the U.S.G.'s internal chemical and biological nonproliferation efforts. ACDA is a charter member of the U.S. government's interagency chemical and biological weapons interdiction group (SHIELD), which is responsible for U.S. interdiction efforts and CBW sanctions review. ACDA members also participate in review of chemical and biological technology export licensing through SHIELD.

Year and Circumstances of Founding: The Group was formed in 1984 as a result of CW use in the Iran-Iraq War. Members meet annually in Paris, where the 1925 Geneva Protocol is deposited. The Group's actions are complementary to provisions of the 1925 Geneva Protocol, the 1972 Biological and Toxins Weapons Convention, and the 1993 Chemical Weapons Convention.

Location: The Australia Group holds annual plenary sessions in Paris, France.

L. (ABM Treaty) STANDING CONSULTATIVE COMMISSION (SCC)

Jurisdiction and Purpose: The Standing Consultative Commission (SCC) was established under the terms of the 1972 U.S.-Soviet Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty to promote the objectives and implementation of the Treaty. The ABM Treaty provides that the SCC should consider questions of compliance with the Treaty, possible changes in the strategic situation which would have a bearing on the provisions of the Treaty, and proposals for amendments to the Treaty.

Membership: Initially, the United States and the Soviet Union, as the two ABM Treaty parties, were the only SCC participants. With the dissolution of the Soviet Union, the question arose as to which state or states would assume the former Soviet Union's ABM Treaty obligations. The United States has made clear that it is willing to accept as Treaty Parties any of the New Independent States (NIS) that want to be Party to the Treaty. During the last session of the SCC, Belarus, Kazakstan, Russia, Ukraine, and the United States participated.

Operational Procedures: SCC procedures were developed by the two original ABM Treaty Parties. These procedures are being adjusted to take account of additional New Independent States who may become Treaty Parties following the break-up of the Soviet Union. In accordance with the Memorandum of Understanding establishing the SCC, the Commission meets no less than twice a year. It met most recently for its 49th and 50th sessions, December 4-20, 1995

ACDA's Role: ACDA leads the United States Component of the SCC, providing the U.S. Commissioner, the secretariat, the legal adviser, policy and technical experts, and administrative support. Dr. Stanley Riveles is the U.S. SCC Commissioner.

ACDA chairs the U.S. Government interagency SCC Policy formulation committee, which has overall responsibility for developing U.S. policy guidance related to the activities of the Commission and implementation of the ABM Treaty.

Year and Circumstances of Founding: The SCC was established during the first negotiating session of SALT II (the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks) by a Memorandum of Understanding between the United States and the Soviet Union dated December 21, 1972.

Location: The SCC meets in Geneva, Switzerland.

M. MISSILE TECHNOLOGY CONTROL REGIME (MTCR)

Jurisdiction and Purpose: The purpose of the MTCR is to arrest missile proliferation worldwide through export controls on missiles and their related technologies.

Membership: The 28 members of the MTCR are Argentina, Australia, Austria, Belgium, Brazil, Canada, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Luxembourg, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Portugal, Russia, South Africa, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, United Kingdom, and the United States.

Operating Procedures: Members of the MTCR follow an agreed set of Guidelines for transfers of missile technology as listed in the Missile Equipment and Technology Annex. The MTCR operates by consensus on all issues. France serves as an informal Point of Contact for correspondence with the MTCR partners.

ACDA's Role: ACDA personnel participate in U.S. delegations to bilateral discussions, to the annual MTCR Plenary meetings and to periodic meetings of technical experts, as well as in the internal policy process of the U.S. government. ACDA personnel also participate in the U.S.G.'s internal missile nonproliferation efforts. ACDA serves as the executive secretary to the interagency Missile Trade Analysis Group which is responsible for U.S. interdiction efforts and missile sanctions review. ACDA members also participate in review of missile technology export licensing through the Missile Technology Export Control Group, and provide inputs to the review process of the MTCR Equipment and Technology Annex in the Missile Annex Review Committee.

Year and Circumstances of Founding: In April 1987, the United States and its six major trading partners (Canada, the former West Germany, France, Italy, Japan, and the United Kingdom) created the Missile Technology Control Regime to restrict the proliferation of missiles and related technology.

Location: The MTCR holds annual plenary sessions in different partner countries on a rotating basis. Monthly "Point of Contact" meetings are held among Partner embassy representatives in Paris.

N. AMENDMENT CONFERENCE OF THE CONVENTION ON CERTAIN CONVENTIONAL WEAPONS (CCW)

Jurisdiction and Purpose: CCW is a Law of War treaty, dealing with the use of certain conventional weapons. Its purpose is to prevent the use of conventional weapons that cause injury and suffering not required for military purposes. It is particularly focused on weapons that injure or kill innocent civilians or are excessively injurious. In its present form, it includes three protocols restricting the use of (1) weapons with undetectable fragments, (2) personnel landmines, and (3) incendiary weapons. A fourth protocol on blinding laser weapons was approved at the Review Conference in October 1995.

The primary purpose of the Review Conference was to strengthen the protocol dealing with landmines; as we noted in section IV.B., major amendments on that subject were approved in May 1996.

In March 1995, the U.S. ratified the landmine and undetectable fragments protocols, but the protocol dealing with incendiaries was withheld for future study. Although the United States supported adoption of the protocol on blinding lasers at the September-October 1995 CCW Review Conference, we have not yet considered ratification of that protocol.

Membership: 57 nations, including the United States, have ratified CCW.

Operating Procedures: Four preparatory Experts' Meetings were held in 1994 and early 1995; a Review Conference was held in September and October 1995. A technical meeting was held in January 1996, and the final Review Conference of this cycle was held April-May 1995. The amended landmine protocol and the laser weapon protocol, respectively, will enter into force when each has been ratified by at least 20 nations. We expect entry into force in about 1998. Following entry into force, annual conferences shall be held, with a major Review Conference expected in 2001.

Meetings have operated by consensus.

ACDA's Role: An ACDA official served as deputy head of the U.S. delegation. ACDA originated and drafted the U.S. position on self-destructing and self-deactivating anti-personnel landmines.

Year and Circumstances of Founding: The original convention entered into force in 1983. During the 1980s it became apparent that, while the CCW provides an essential foundation, it needs significant strengthening if it is to serve its humanitarian purpose.

Location: The 1995 Review Conference was held in Vienna. All other CCW meetings have been held in Geneva.

O. U.S-U.K. LANDMINE CONTROL PROGRAM

Jurisdiction and Purpose: The U.S.-U.K. Anti-personnel Landmine Control program is a proposal for a political agreement limiting production, stockpiling, and transfer of anti-personnel landmines. Its purpose is to reduce the ratio of long-lived mines to short-lived mines, consistent with military requirements.

Membership: This regime has not yet been formalized, either in content or membership. We are consulting with other governments to refine the terms of the regime, and to bring in as many other governments as possible. It is essential that membership have wide geographic representation, and include mine users as well as the major mine producers and exporters.

Operating Procedures: Wherever possible, the regime will build on the CCW; for example, it will use the CCW definitions, and will prohibit production, stockpiling, and export of any mines whose use is prohibited by CCW

ACDA's Role: ACDA has played a critical part in formulation of the regime, particularly regarding definitions of short-lived mines and restrictions on long-lived mines.

Year and Circumstances of Founding: The program has not yet been founded. It is still being formulated.

Location: The largest consultation to date has been held in Budapest, with more than 30 countries represented. Other bilateral consultations have been held in various national capitals and on the margins of the CCW Experts' meetings.

P. JOINT CONSULTATIVE GROUP (JCG)

Jurisdiction and Purpose: The overall mandate of the JCG is to promote the objectives of the CFE Treaty, implement its provisions, and resolve disagreements among the States Parties.

Specific functions of the JCG include:

Membership: All 30 CFE States Parties are entitled to representation on the JCG.

Operating Procedures: The JCG has been in nearly continuous session since November 1990. Decisions of the JCG are made by consensus, defined as the absence of any objection by any party to the Treaty.

Among the issues addressed by the JCG in 1995 were the limits on conventional armaments and equipment in the flank zones of Europe, distributing costs among JCG participants, and developing additional reduction and conversion procedures to supplement Treaty provisions. Additionally, as the end of the 42-month equipment reduction (destruction) period approached, an Implementation Working Group was formed to attempt to resolve outstanding implementation issues, such as destroying equipment east of the Ural Mountains.

ACDA's Role: ACDA continues to play a key role in the interagency policy formulation process for the CFE Treaty. Under the leadership of the Head of the U.S. Delegation to the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), ACDA's senior representative in Vienna, Austria is the Chief U.S. Delegate to the Joint Consultative Group, the forum for CFE Treaty implementation. In this capacity, he continues to advocate completing CFE Treaty-mandated destruction of offensive military equipment, negotiate quicker and cheaper methods of equipment destruction, and develop policy initiatives and recommendations for the May 1996 CFE Treaty Review Conference and follow-on CFE requirements.

Year of Creation:The JCG was established by the CFE Treaty in November 1990.

Location: The JCG meets in Vienna, Austria.

Q. ORGANIZATION FOR SECURITY AND COOPERATION IN EUROPE (OSCE) FORUM FOR SECURITY COOPERATION (FSC)

Jurisdiction and Purpose: The FSC's mandate includes:

Membership: All 52 member states of OSCE; Yugoslavia's participation is suspended.

Operating Procedures: The FSC structure consists of working groups, which report to the plenary on their activities; the plenary deliberates and adopts recommendations by consensus. In 1995, the FSC focused on completing the formats for the Global Exchange of Military Information; implementing Vienna Document 1994 and other agreements; and initial work in developing a framework for future arms control. Two seminars were conducted, one on regional arms control and one on conventional arms transfers. Other areas receiving attention were defense planning, nonproliferation, and military cooperation and contacts. The 1995 AIAM reviewed the implementation of CSBMs during 1994 and the results of the OSCE Budapest Review Conference and Summit.

ACDA's Role: ACDA continues to participate in the work of the FSC both in the interagency process and as a member of the U.S. Delegation to the OSCE. This includes active participation in FSC deliberations, working groups, and seminars, and the lead role in Vienna in planning the Annual Implementation Assessment Meeting.

Year of Creation and Circumstances of Founding: The Conference on Security and Cooperation (CSCE) was established in 1973. The participating states of the CSCE created the FSC at the Helsinki Summit in 1992. The tasks of the FSC were expanded by CSCE Ministers in Rome in December 1993, and again at the Budapest Summit in December 1994. On 1 January 1995, CSCE was changed to the Organization for the Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE).

Location: The FSC meets in Vienna.

R. OPEN SKIES CONSULTATIVE COMMISSION (OSCC)

Jurisdiction and Purpose: The OSCC is the forum for implementing the Open Skies Treaty. The Treaty allows the OSCC to:

Membership: All 27 States Parties are entitled to participate in the OSCC.

Operating Procedures: The OSCC's structure consists of informal working groups which report to the plenary; the latter deliberates and decides by consensus. In 1995, the following working groups were in session: Rules and Procedures (legal issues); Notifications and Formats (chaired by the U.S.); Flight Rules and Procedures; and Sensors (chaired by the U.S.). During the last three years, the OSCC has adopted 22 technical issue decisions, complementary and integral to the Treaty.

ACDA's Role: ACDA's Senior Representative on the OSCE Delegation is the Chief U.S. Delegate to the OSCC; he participates in all plenary sessions. An ACDA representative is the chairman of the OSCC working group on notifications and formats, and ACDA representatives participate in all working group meetings.

Year of Creation: The OSCC was established by the Open Skies Treaty in March 1992.

S. BILATERAL COMMITTEES ON DEFENSE CONVERSION WITH BELARUS, KAZAKSTAN, RUSSIA, AND UKRAINE

Jurisdiction and Purpose: The purpose of the bilateral committees is to further cooperative efforts to convert excess defense capacity to non-defense, commercial uses. The committees promote orderly shrinkage and reorientation to peaceful purposes of defense industrial, technological, and scientific facilities and the redirection of personnel not needed for legitimate defense efforts to civil needs. The committees provide a senior channel of communications on issues related to the defense industry and experiences in defense conversion and diversification.

Membership: Bilateral (e.g., U.S.-Russia).

Operating Procedures: The committees meet periodically in the members' respective capitals or selected defense sites to pursue defense conversion projects, such as joint ventures in housing for Russian military officers and joint ventures between U.S. companies and selected NIS defense enterprises.

ACDA's Role: The ACDA Director is a member of the bilateral committees, which are chaired by the Secretary of Defense. The Deputy Under Secretary of Commerce serves as the deputy chair. An ACDA representative is a member of the Interagency Working Group (IWG) tasked to support the committees' efforts.

ACDA, in cooperation with the U.S. Department of Energy and the Russian Ministry of Atomic Energy, sponsored the most recent entrepreneurial workshop for Russian nuclear weapons scientists in Moscow in June 1995. The Workshop provided an important bridge between the U.S. private sector, more than 40 scientists at Russia's two key nuclear weapons design labs, and DOE's cooperative programs. The workshops have been cited by the Russian side in the Gore-Chernomyrdin Commission as an example of successful defense conversion cooperation.

Year and Circumstances of Founding: The first committee was established with Russia under the Gore-Chernomyrdin Commission, and the others were established soon after.

Location: Capitals and defense sites of committee members.

T. U.S.-CHINA DEFENSE CONVERSION COMMISSION

Jurisdiction and Purpose: The purpose of the bilateral commission is to further cooperative efforts to convert excess defense capacity to non-defense, commercial uses. The commission promotes orderly shrinkage and reorientation to peaceful purposes of defense industrial, technological, and scientific facilities, and the redirection of personnel not needed for legitimate defense efforts to civil needs. The commission provides a senior channel of communications on issues related to the defense industry and experiences in defense conversion and diversification.

Membership: United States and China.

Operating Procedures: The commission meets periodically in Beijing and Washington or selected defense sites to pursue defense conversion discussions and projects.

ACDA's Role: The ACDA Director is a member of the bilateral commission, which is chaired by the Secretary of Defense. The Deputy Under Secretary of Commerce serves as the deputy chair. ACDA is a member of the Interagency Working Group (IWG) supporting the committee's efforts.

ACDA also participated at senior levels on Secretary Perry's delegation to the 1994 meeting in Beijing that established the Commission and began its work with Chinese officials in Beijing this fall after the U.S.-China Commission meetings. ACDA also co-led a survey of conversion sites in preparation for the first Commission meeting.

Year and Circumstances of Founding: The commission was established in 1994 to promote defense conversion in China through economic and technical exchanges.

Location: Washington, Beijing, and defense sites.

U. UNITED NATIONS DISARMAMENT COMMISSION (UNDC)

Jurisdiction and Purpose: The United Nations Disarmament Commission (UNDC) is a subsidiary body of the United Nations General Assembly which deliberates and makes recommendations on arms control and security issues.

Recent Accomplishments: Three items were on the agenda in 1995: The Process of Nuclear Disarmament, International Arms Transfers, and the Review of the Declaration of the 1990's as the Third Disarmament Decade. Deliberations on the Nuclear Disarmament and Third Disarmament Decade items were concluded, but no consensus was reached on the final report for any of the three items. Deliberations on International Arms Transfers will continue at the 1996 UNDC.

Membership: The United Nations Disarmament Commission (UNDC) is a subsidiary body of the United Nations General Assembly, and as such, its membership includes all UN members.

Operating Procedures: Work in the UNDC is conducted by representatives of Member States in working groups with a number of different mandates. By tradition, the UNDC operates by consensus.

ACDA's Role: ACDA provides the primary leadership for the United States Delegation to the UNDC, and chairs the Washington policy formulation for preparation and guidance to the delegation.

Year and Circumstances of Founding: The current UNDC was revitalized and reformulated by the First Special Session on Disarmament in 1978, and is the successor to the earlier Disarmament Commission created in 1952 by merging the Atomic Energy Commission and the Commission for Conventional Armaments.

Location: The UNDC meets annually in New York in the spring, normally for a three-week period.

V. FIRST COMMITTEE OF THE UNITED NATIONS GENERAL ASSEMBLY

Jurisdiction and Purpose: The First Committee of the United Nations General Assembly deals with arms control and security issues.

Recent Accomplishments: Despite ceremonies marking the 50th Anniversary of the United Nations, a somewhat negative atmosphere marked the 1995 UNFC Session, resulting from controversy over the Nuclear Testing Resolution and concerns by some delegations over the pace of nuclear disarmament. 'Killer amendments' proposed for the Chemical Weapons Convention and Fissile Material Cutoff resolutions also led the sponsors of these resolutions to withdraw them. The U.S. sponsored resolutions on the anti-personnel landmine moratorium, compliance with arms control agreements and, with the Russian Federation, bilateral nuclear arms negotiations and further reductions in nuclear arms. These resolutions were adopted by the UNFC despite unwelcome amendments and counter drafts. On a more positive note, the UNFC adopted a resolution by consensus calling for the completion of the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty negotiations as soon as possible in 1996, and its opening for signature prior to the beginning of the 51st UN General Assembly. The UNFC also welcomed the completion of the Pelindaba Treaty for the African Nuclear Weapon Free Zone, and urged the Conference on Disarmament in Geneva to expand its membership in 1996.

Membership: The UNFC is a UN General Assembly Committee of the Whole; as such its membership includes all UN members.

Operating Procedures: The UNFC considers resolutions submitted by members, and operates by majority voting.

ACDA's Role: ACDA provides the primary leadership and some staff for the United States Delegation to the First Committee, and chairs the Washington policy formulation efforts for preparation of guidance and instructions to the delegation.

Year and Circumstances of Founding: The UNFC is one of the seven Main UN Committees established under the UN Charter in 1945.

Location: The UNFC meets annually in the fall at UN Headquarters in New York.

W. STRATEGIC ARMS CONTROL DIALOGUE WITH CHINA

Historically, the United States and China have had little contact in this area. ACDA is preparing now for a future possible U.S.-China dialogue on strategic issues. ACDA is convinced that increasing U.S.-China mutual understanding of strategic nuclear arms control is critical to our mutual security, especially as China's nuclear forces become more sophisticated.