REGIONAL ARMS CONTROL



A. EUROPE

1. ORGANIZATION FOR SECURITY AND COOPERATION IN EUROPE (OSCE)

The OSCE is currently constructing a Security Model for Europe for the 21st Century. In addition, the FSC is developing a framework for arms control. The Framework will be comprehensive in scope and will address the diverse challenges and risks to military security in the OSCE region.

In 1995, the OSCE made a special effort to ensure the Central Asian states which were created after the collapse of the Soviet Union are incorporated into the mainstream of activity. In 1995, the OSCE established a liaison office in Uzbekistan to facilitate communications with the Central Asian states. It also conducted a seminar in Kazakstan on CSBMs and Arms Control: Application and Compliance. This effort focused on ensuring military and diplomatic decision-makers in the Central Asian states were aware of their OSCE obligations and strengthened their interest in complying. To assist in this effort, OSCE teams visited the Central Asian states beforehand. Kazakstan and Krgyzstan chaired the OSCE Annual Implementation Assessment meeting in March in Vienna.

2. CENTRAL EUROPE

Following approval of the Conventional Arms Transfer policy for Central Europe and the decision to release advanced fighter aircraft to Poland, Hungary and the Czech Republic, measures have been recommended for the region to increase transparency for the procurement of major weapon systems. These initiatives are based on a commitment by the countries in the region to maintain a regional military balance at the lowest levels consistent with security needs to prevent excessive arms build-ups. Future arms purchases would conform with this strategy and would be conducted in such a manner to promote greater transparency in a more rigorous CSBM regime. Not only will these efforts serve to ease tensions within Central Europe, but it will also serve to alleviate Russia's fears that countries in the region are capping procurement of weapons with significant force multiplier or power projection capabilities. We hope to see these initiatives formally adopted through the OSCE but short of that action, are encouraged by the regions interest in going forward with an Enhanced Transparency Initiative for Central Europe (ENTICE).

B. EURASIA

Collapse of the former Soviet Union and its replacement by 15 independent states has fundamentally altered the geo-strategic environment in Eurasia. Eurasian (as distinguished from European) regional arms control is in a very early stage. At this early point, our objective is to explore what can be accomplished by bilateral or multilateral arms control with China and with the states of the former Soviet Union, as well as region-wide arms control. Our goals in this region are greater transparency, maximum security for and control of nuclear weapons and, above all, adherence to the principles of nonproliferation.

Our arms control contacts in the region have been primarily with Belarus, Kazakstan, Russia, and Ukraine, which are actively participating in the implementation of the START and INF Treaties and SCC discussions on ABM Treaty issues. We are also reaching out to the other states of the former Soviet Union. Many are beginning to understand that arms control and nonproliferation are significant tools that can improve any nation's security.

The collapse of the Soviet Union could lead to new opportunities for a strategic dialogue between the U.S. and China. In light of China's growing military and economic power, its troublesome proliferation history, and its impact on nuclear policies in India and Pakistan, there is an abundance of problems that need to be addressed by a U.S.-China arms control dialogue. We are cautiously optimistic that strategic dialogue with China can lead to improved nonproliferation behavior, better transparency, security and control of China's strategic nuclear forces, and reduced tensions among the major powers of the region.

C. EAST ASIA AND THE PACIFIC REGION

1. NORTH KOREA

The Korean Peninsula remains a heavily armed area of high tension where military preparedness is intense and political intentions are difficult to determine. Nevertheless, the threat posed by North Korea's nuclear program has been substantially reduced by conclusion of the U.S.-North Korea Agreed Framework on October 21, 1994.

North Korea acceded to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty in 1985 but did not negotiate a nuclear safeguards agreement with the IAEA. Toward the end of 1991, North Korea began to take steps to convince the world that its nuclear program was peaceful. These included negotiating its NPT safeguards agreement with the IAEA, and signing an agreement with South Korea that banned nuclear weapons and reprocessing and enrichment facilities on the Korean Peninsula; it also included a commitment to negotiate a bilateral inspection regime. At about the same time, the two Koreas also signed an agreement on reconciliation and non-aggression.

North Korea's NPT safeguards agreement came into force in April 1992, and for a time North Korea cooperated fully with the IAEA in implementation of the agreement. North Korea revealed several nuclear facilities, including a reactor capable of producing significant quantities of weapons-grade plutonium that began operating in 1986, a reprocessing plant, and two larger reactors under construction.

However, detailed analysis of nuclear samples taken by the IAEA raised questions about North Korea's initial declaration of plutonium production, and North Korea appeared to be attempting to conceal two possible nuclear waste sites. Ultimately, North Korea refused to allow the IAEA to inspect these two sites.

The IAEA Board of Governors adopted a resolution on February 25, 1993, urging North Korea to extend full cooperation to the IAEA and to permit access to these sites. North Korea continued to refuse, and on March 12 sent a letter to the U.N. Secretary-General stating its intention to withdraw from the NPT. On May 11, the Security Council passed a resolution urging North Korea to reconsider its stated intention to withdraw from the NPT and to comply with its NPT safeguards agreement. The Security Council invited all U.N. members to support that effort. This set the stage for direct U.S.-North Korean talks.

On June 11, 1993, following talks in New York, the U.S. and North Korea issued a joint statement in which North Korea agreed to suspend its withdrawal from the NPT. In a separate statement, the U.S. also noted that the dialogue could continue only if North Korea avoided certain steps including additional reprocessing, any break in the continuity of IAEA safeguards, or a withdrawal from the NPT.

A further step was taken at the next round of talks, which were held in Geneva from July 14-19. In the joint statement issued at the close of these discussions, North Korea agreed that it was "prepared to begin" consultations with the IAEA on outstanding issues and with South Korea on bilateral issues including the nuclear issue. The U.S. made clear that continuation of our dialogue requires continuation of safeguards on North Korean nuclear facilities and a resumption of the North-South dialogue.

The U.S. agreed that it was prepared to support substitution of light water reactors for North Korean graphite-moderated reactors as part of a broad and thorough solution to the nuclear issue. Light water reactors are not optimal producers of plutonium for nuclear weapons programs and can be more effectively safeguarded than North Korea's current graphite moderated reactors.

On October 21, 1994, after sixteen months of negotiations, the United States and North Korea signed an Agreed Framework, designed to lead to an end to the threat of proliferation on the Korean Peninsula, and to provide the basis for more normal relations between North Korea and the rest of the world.

In the Agreed Framework, North Korea has committed itself to:

The Agreed Framework also provides that the U.S. will organize an international consortium to supply two light water reactors to North Korea to replace the graphite reactor program which is terminated under the Agreed Framework. But no critical components will be supplied until North Korea has satisfied the IAEA that it is in full compliance with its NPT obligations.

In 1995 the U.S. and North Korea proceeded to implement the Agreed Framework. North Korea has frozen its nuclear program and the freeze has been verified by a continuous IAEA presence at the Nyongbyon site. The U.S., along with the Republic of Korea and Japan, has organized the Korean Peninsula Energy Development Organization (KEDO) which has concluded negotiations with North Korea on a supply agreement for the provision to North Korea of two South Korean model 1,000 MWe reactors. South Korea and Japan have committed to fund the bulk of the LWR project through KEDO. In addition, pursuant to the Agreed Framework, the U.S. and North Korea have moved toward establishing diplomatic relations by attempting to resolve technical issues related to opening liaison offices in each other's capitals. Further, the U.S. and KEDO delivered 150,000 tons of heavy oil to North Korea for heating and electricity production in 1995. As part of the Agreed Framework, the U.S. agreed to arrange to supply this oil in order to compensate for the energy forgone due to the freeze on North Korea's reactors.

The Agreed Framework does not rely on trust. All of its steps will be verifiable. If fully implemented, the Agreed Framework will defuse one of the most dangerous nuclear hot spots in the world, and will ultimately resolve this nonproliferation threat. Since conclusion of the agreement, North Korea has halted construction and operation activities at its reactors, cooperated in storing its spent fuel without reprocessing, and allowed IAEA monitoring of its nuclear facilities.

ACDA's Role. ACDA has played a substantial role in formulating U.S. policies to convince North Korea to resolve the nuclear issue. ACDA has actively participated in all U.S.-North Korea high-level negotiations that contributed to the U.S.-North Korea Agreed Framework and has played a critical role in implementing aspects of the Agreed Framework. In particular, ACDA is the lead agency on diplomatic issues related to the disposition of North Korea's plutonium-bearing spent fuel and on technical issues related to IAEA inspections in North Korea.

During 1995, ACDA led several interagency teams to North Korea to resolve outstanding issues on the safe storage of North Korea's spent nuclear fuel pending ultimate shipment out of North Korea. The ACDA-led teams were the first American to visit North Korea's Nyongbyong Nuclear Center. During these visits the two sides agreed on arrangements for storing the fuel. Pursuant to these agreements and with ACDA support, DOE has installed a system to treat the water in the spent fuel pool. This system includes equipment to slow corrosion of the fuel, and to clarify and remove some of the radioactivity from the water. In 1996, the U.S. and North Korea began to place the fuel in canisters where it will remain under seal until it is shipped out of North Korea in accordance with the Agreed Framework.

2. SOUTH KOREA

ACDA participated in the interagency delegation meetings that led to adoption of Korea's export control law on strategic trade item, and the interagency visit to Korea to observe its implementation in 1993. In these meetings, ACDA pushed strongly for South Korea to expand its controls to include items of proliferation concern. In late 1994, ACDA, along with other concerned agencies, separately hosted a South Korean working level delegation to explain ACDA's role in the export control process and how ACDA reviewed export licenses for arms control and nonproliferation concerns. These meetings with the South Koreans helped pave the way in 1995 for the South Korea's adoption of export regulations for nonproliferation-related items to comply with the guidelines of the NSG/Zangger Committee, the MTCR, and the Australia Group in preparation for Seoul's eventual adherence and membership in the nonproliferation regimes and the post-COCOM multilateral "Wassenaar Arrangement".

3. CHINA

China's export activities continue to be a concern because of their weapons proliferation and regional stability implications. In recent years, there has been progress in China's commitment to nonproliferation, but further progress in 1995 was complicated by problems in the bilateral relationship regarding Taiwan.

ACDA's Role. ACDA continues to support a comprehensive and integrated package of political, security, and technology transfer measures to modify China's proliferation behavior in concrete ways in the context of a bilateral relationship. ACDA has participated actively in the China Interagency Working Group, and has contributed to U.S. strategy for promoting security and arms control with China. In doing so, the ACDA Director revived arms control talks with the Chinese in 1994 that had been in abeyance since the Tiananmen Square tragedy of 1989. Although the ACDA Director's trip to Beijing scheduled for July, 1995 was postponed by the Chinese to express their displeasure with the unofficial visit of Taiwan's President Lee Teng-hui's to Cornell University, we plan to reschedule these arms control talks as soon as politically possible. ACDA plans to continue to engage the Chinese on a broad array of near- and long-term arms control issues; regular high-level consultations help set the stage for improving understanding and cooperation in this area. However, as a participant in the interagency nonproliferation and export control process, ACDA remains committed to ensuring that technology transfers to China do not have adverse security or nonproliferation implications. While China's export policies have improved in recent years, it continues to engage in some export practices which are contrary to international non-proliferation standards. ACDA continues to participate actively in diplomatic and export control efforts to address these problems, and has vigorously supported implementation of sanctions laws when there was strong evidence of potentially sanctionable activities by Chinese entities.

ACDA also participated in the interagency delegations meetings with Taiwan that led to Taipei's adoption of an export control law on strategic trade items in 1994. In these meetings, ACDA strongly urged Taiwan to implement also controls on items of nonproliferation concern. As the Taiwanese have gained experience in implementing and expanding their controls to include the entire island last year, they have begun to indicate that they will move towards including controls on items of nonproliferation concern in the near future, and have requested training in implementing export controls.

D. SOUTHEAST ASIA

ACDA has been increasingly active in both government and mixed government-academic efforts to promote regional arms control through confidence and security building measures in the Asia Pacific Region.

ACDA participated actively in the interagency deliberations on the US position in the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF). This consists of eighteen countries at the governmental level, is engaged in efforts to build security and confidence in the Asia Pacific Region. ACDA also participated in the meetings of the ARF Senior Officials Meeting in May, the Minister-level ASEAN Regional Forum, and the related Post Ministerial Conference in August in Bandar Seri Begawan, Brunei. ACDA also made contributions to the Northeast Asia Security Dialogue, which is a mixed government-academic forum for exchanges of views on building confidence and security among the countries of Northeast Asia. It consists of representatives from the US, Japan, South Korea, Russia, and China with an empty seat for North Korea. The Agency also helped sponsor a RAND effort in cooperation with the Korean Institute of Defense Analysis and the U.S. Army's Concepts Analysis Agency study on security and arms control in Northeast Asia. As part of this study, ACDA participated actively in a conference at RAND in Santa Monica that brought together military officials from the US, Japan, and South Korea to discuss efforts to build confidence and security through regional dialogues. In June, ACDA Assistant Director for Nonproliferation and Arms Control also gave a presentation on the need for transparency in arms transfers in the Asia Pacific region at the Malaysian Institute for Strategic and International Studies in Kuala Lumpur as part of efforts to spur the regional dialogue on security and arms control.

In January, 1995, Japan hosted in cooperation with the US and Australia the second Asian Export Control Seminar for officials for Thailand, Malaysia, Indonesia, Singapore, Philippines, Brunei, South Korea, and Hong Kong. Mongolia, Vietnam, and Taiwan also participated for the first time. This seminar was intended to educate these officials on the various nonproliferation regimes and related-export controls. ACDA participated in the US delegation, and gave the briefing on the Missile Technology Control Regime, while Japan briefed on the Nuclear Suppliers Group and Australia on the Australia Group (CBW). South Korea and Taiwan gave briefings on their export controls on strategic trade items, and South Korea also announced its intention to adopt controls for nonproliferation items as well.

E. SOUTH ASIA

While the likelihood of a fourth war between India and Pakistan is small, the possibility of a war in the region going nuclear are perhaps higher than anywhere else in the world. We continue to believe that both nations could assemble nuclear weapons within a short time; and that both have tested missiles and acquired aircraft capable of delivering such weapons. In addition, the past year has witnessed a significant decline in Indo-Pakistani relations.

For these reasons, the US has sought to work with both countries on a bilateral, regional, and global basis to address the threat to South Asian and international security posed by the existence of advanced, unsafeguarded nuclear and ballistic missile programs in the region.

Recognizing this potential for conflict, India and Pakistan have undertaken several steps to reduce regional tensions. The two countries have signed and ratified bilateral agreements on avoidance of airspace violations, notification of military exercises, and establishment of a hotline at the senior military level. We are concerned, however, that neither side is fully implementing these steps.

In 1991, India and Pakistan ratified an agreement not to attack each other's nuclear facilities. Lists of facilities covered by the agreement have been exchanged since 1992.

India and Pakistan have also declared a regional ban on chemical weapons, and are working on a similar statement concerning biological weapons. Both have signed the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC). While both sides expressed support for a CTBT and fissile material cutoff, India and Pakistan have shown signs of backing away from those positions now that these treaties are approaching reality. India has tried to tie progress to unrealistic disarmament goals, and Pakistan has led NAM obstruction of the cutoff treaty.

In addition, we remain concerned that neither side has fully implemented its bilateral agreements. Talks between Indian and Pakistani Foreign Secretaries intended to address regional security concerns and consider confidence-building measures have not been held since January 1994. Noncompliance with existing agreements may actually be adding to regional tension. In bilateral meetings with both India and Pakistan, ACDA has encouraged establishment of a joint implementation body to oversee the monitoring of current confidence-building measures and address disputes that might arise. We stressed the value of continuing arms control/CBM discussions regardless of political differences. At the moment, however, the prospects that a CBM dialogue between India and Pakistan will resume are slim. With little success to date, and with lack of trust on both sides, many Indians and Pakistanis question the propriety and efficacy of strategic CBMs. Many argue that personal and economic ties need to be built and small steps taken before measures to address regional military tensions can be effective.

Regional instability, and therefore proliferation, continue to be driven by Indo-Pakistani tensions, particularly over Kashmir, and by underlying issues of status-seeking and the Indian desire to be viewed as a major world power. While Pakistan and China supported in principle the establishment of a security dialogue for the region involving all key parties, India has not accepted the proposal, insisting instead that proliferation is a global issue that must be addressed in much wider regional fora. Further, relations between India and Pakistan have recently been strained, fueled by the continuing crisis in Kashmir, possible serial production and deployment by India of the Prithvi ballistic missile, Chinese M-11 missile-related transfers to Pakistan, and reports of Indian nuclear test preparations.

The U.S. seeks to promote arms control initiatives including:

ACDA is developing regional arms control techniques and confidence-building measures to promote tension reduction in the region. Proposals are communicated to the region in both governmental and nongovernmental fora. In January of 1995, ACDA's Assistant Director for Nonproliferation and Regional Arms Control attended the second round of the Shanghai process in India -- the first forum in the region to include governmental and nongovernmental representatives from India, Pakistan, the U.S., and China. At this meeting, ACDA presented papers on ways to stop missile proliferation and de-emphasize nuclear weapons regionally and globally. In June, ACDA and DOE hosted the second in a series of South Asian arms control workshops, this time with a group from India. (Pakistan participated in the first workshop in 1994.) At these sessions, participants discuss the concepts and techniques of arms control and confidence building and explore the ways such techniques could be adapted to meet their unique security concerns.

Fostering major arms control initiatives in South Asia is a slow process. These workshops are a beginning which may, in the long term, yield significant results. At every opportunity, ACDA has provided information to India, Pakistan, and China on the national security benefits of arms control. ACDA is developing ways to assist India and Pakistan to verify their regional agreements, and continues to stress the importance of adequate verification and monitoring.

The U.S. continues its effort to prevent the export of missile and nuclear weapons related material, technology, and equipment to India and Pakistan. We have been greatly aided by the actions of the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG) to restrict the export of 65 dual-use commodities to countries of proliferation concern, and to require full-scope safeguards as a condition of significant new nuclear supply. In addition, the missile and rocket programs of both countries have been slowed by export license denials by the MTCR partner countries. The U.S. continues to urge both India and Pakistan to place all their nuclear facilities under IAEA safeguards, and to adopt responsible national export control policies and regulations to prevent the proliferation of WMD and missiles capable of delivering them. India has made some progress in this area by passing legislation to improve its export control laws.

Because of continued tension, a major factor influencing conventional arms transfer policy toward South Asia is the regional balance. In this regard, we are particularly concerned that arms sales to the region not:

ACDA's assessments of and opinions on proposed U.S. arms transfers to the region have been instrumental in maintaining the U.S. policy of restraint. Over the course of 1995, the U.S. has sought to broaden its ties with both India and Pakistan. Bilateral trade and investment have increased. Secretary of Defense Perry visited India in January and signed an Agreed Minute that will provide for increased security cooperation between the U.S. and India. The first meeting of the U.S.-Indian Defense Policy Group was held in Washington in September. While in Pakistan, Dr. Perry made arrangements to reconvene the U.S.-Pakistan Defense Consultative Group. Its first meeting took place in Washington in May. During the visit of Pakistan's Prime Minister Bhutto in April, the President expressed his commitment to work with Congress to modify the Pressler Amendment (section 620E(e) of the Foreign Assistance Act). In January 1996, the President signed into law the Brown Amendment, which will permit economic and humanitarian assistance, counter-narcotics, counter-terrorism, and IMET, and will allow a one-time release of $370 million in military equipment for which Pakistan had paid but not received due to implementation of the Pressler sanctions in 1990. The President decided that release of 28 F-16s, for which Pakistan had also paid, would be inconsistent with U.S. nonproliferation goals. Instead, the U.S. is seeking to help sell the aircraft to a third party and return the proceeds to Pakistan.

F. MIDDLE EAST

The past year saw continued historic efforts to attain a comprehensive and just peace in this violence-plagued region. The Palestinians signed with Israel additional agreements to implement the September 1993 Declaration of Principles and the Palestinian Authority which expanded limited control over the Gaza Strip and parts of the West Bank. Syria and Lebanon continue to be engaged in genuine peace negotiations with Israel.

For the past 45 years, Middle Eastern conflicts inhibited the establishment of formal relations between Israel and other governments in the region. There have been few opportunities for arms control agreements, or even for arms control discussions, within this region.

As the negotiated settlements of the Middle East Peace Process are implemented, governments will establish relations and expand commercial and social contacts. In this more stable security environment, we expect opportunities for concrete and visible arms control to emerge. We will continue to sponsor and participate in bilateral as well as regional meetings to encourage this process.

ACDA's Role. ACDA seeks to prevent the proliferation of all weapons of mass destruction, their production means, and delivery systems capable of carrying them throughout the Middle East. We are pressing for regional compliance with and are encouraging acceptance of the Chemical Weapons Convention, the Biological Weapons Convention, and the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, all of which, together with progress in the peace process, can set the stage for establishing a zone free of weapons of mass destruction in the Middle East. We also urged states in the region to adhere to the MTCR Guidelines. ACDA is continually active in the export licensing process for military technology and conventional weapons sales to the region, where we limit destabilizing acquisitions of such items.

ACDA's more specific activities are described in the following subsections.

1. ARMS CONTROL AND REGIONAL SECURITY WORKING GROUP

As part of the multilateral track of the Middle East peace process, the Arms Control and Regional Security (ACRS) working group was formed in early 1992 under the direction of the Department of State. The ACRS, sponsored jointly by the Russian Federation and the United States, is one of five multilateral groups in the peace process, which complement the bilateral talks between Israel and its immediate neighbors. It is the only such group devoted solely to security issues. Thirteen Arab states, Israel, and a Palestinian delegation, together with more than 20 extra-regional entities, participate in plenary meetings to discuss issues related to regional security and direct the work of ACRS. Smaller intersessional meetings are held to focus experts' attention on arms control and confidence-building measures that can be applied in the Middle East.

Since 1993, the working group has sought to conduct its meetings in the Middle East as much as possible. The fifth ACRS plenary, in May 1994, was the first such meeting to be held in the region, and the sixth plenary was held in Tunis in December 1994. Intersessional meetings were held in Jordan, Finland, Canada, and Turkey during the past year.

During 1995, the ACRS working group:

ACDA's Role. ACDA has been a key participant in the ACRS process since its inception. It has contributed substantively to U.S. efforts to create a regional security center and establish the ACRS communications network, based on its experience with setting up the original CSCE network and as the architect of the new OSCE communications network. ACDA has presented numerous papers and briefings on arms control both to the ACRS working group and governmental and non-governmental entities from the region. ACDA serves as the main provider of source material both to participants new to arms control and to those wishing to understand the intricate details of specific agreements. It continues to present, in both plenary and intersessional sessions of the ACRS, new proposals for confidence-building and arms control measures for consideration by the working group.

ACDA's unique contributions to the ACRS -- historical interaction with regional and extra-regional participants on arms control, negotiating experience on agreements of relevance to the region, and the ability to coordinate ACRS work with other negotiations and the work of other agencies -- continue to provide substantial and sustained efforts in support of regional security in the Middle East.

2. UNITED NATIONS SPECIAL COMMISSION FOR IRAQ (UNSCOM)

Following Iraq's defeat in early 1991 in the Gulf War, the U.N. Security Council adopted three resolutions (SC Res. 687, 707, and 715) to eliminate future threats from Iraqi weapons of mass destruction and missiles. Among other things, these resolutions:

Arms Control, Disarmament and Nonproliferation Objectives. UNSCOM and IAEA objectives in Iraq are enforcement of Chapter Seven of the UN Charter, and are non-negotiable. Elimination of all weapons of mass destruction is required of this nation whose leader has committed large-scale international aggression.

Status of Activities. As of the end of 1995, UNSCOM and the IAEA had conducted over 125 inspections to first document, then destroy or render harmless, key nuclear, chemical, biological, and missile related buildings, equipment, and material. In August, over a million pages of documentation and other media was released by the Iraqis in an attempt to pre-empt disclosure of WMD details by then defector Hussein Kamel, brother-in-law of Saddam Hussein, and overseer of WMD programs. Information derived from this material, as well as that provided subsequently by Hussein Kamel, has revealed a great deal of additional information on the extent and intent of the Iraqi biological and chemical weapons programs as well as their indigenous missile producing capabilities. It also yielded new information on Iraqi attempts to design and build a nuclear weapon. Translation efforts continue.

Even after elimination is completed, continued monitoring and verification is essential. After prolonged delay, on November 26, 1993 Iraq accepted U.N. Resolution 715, which provides for long-term monitoring.

The "Ongoing Monitoring and Verification" (OMV) regime became "provisionally operational" in October 1994. Monitoring of missiles and of nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons is ongoing. Nevertheless, substantial new information on past and possibly current Iraqi biological, chemical and nuclear weapons programs as well as on Iraq's missile activities will require further inspections and a reassessment of the OMV regime before it can become fully operational. The "Baghdad Center" has been established to house OMV operations and will maintain a continuous presence in Iraq for the foreseeable future.

Prospects for the Forthcoming Year. The U.S. still considers Iraq to be non-compliant with UN resolutions regarding full and final disclosure of its WMD programs, return of Kuwaiti property, Kuwaiti prisoners and missing, and human rights in Iraq. The U.S. view is that Iraq has yet to display the "peaceful intentions" required by the Gulf War Cease-fire Resolution, UNSC Res. 687. Some Security Council members have in the past suggested that Iraqi cooperation to date should be taken into account and that sanctions be lifted within six months of OMV's nominal inception. However, Iraq has yet to provide detailed, accurate information on any WMD programs. UNSCOM and the IAEA are now working to analyze the documents, while at the same time implementing OMV.

Pursuant to SC Res. 715, an export/import monitoring mechanism has been forwarded to the Security Council for approval. It covers any future sales or supplies by other countries to Iraq of items relevant to the implementation of SC Res. 687. It sets out procedures for notifications to the Commission and IAEA of exports of dual-purpose items to Iraq. Such notifications would be made both by the exporting country and by Iraq, once sanctions have been lifted.

ACDA's Role. An ACDA official served for two years as the UNSCOM Deputy Executive Chairman in New York. In 1993 and 1994, ACDA provided a biological weapons expert to the UNSCOM staff in New York who developed inspection protocols and participated in BW inspections in Iraq. During 1995, ACDA BW experts worked closely with UNSCOM staff on detection of the BW program. ACDA will continue to provide policy and analytical studies and evaluations, to include how efforts in Iraq may affect ongoing arms control activities, and as active participants in the interagency policy formulation group supporting UNSCOM and the IAEA.

3. IRAN

We are very concerned about Iran's nuclear program, and continue to monitor the nuclear activities in that country very closely. Judgments about timetables for any country's development of nuclear weapons are difficult to make with precision. In recent years, the U.S. intelligence community has stated publicly that Iran would probably take at least 8-10 years to produce its own nuclear weapons. While Iran would perhaps take less time if it received critical foreign assistance, nevertheless its acquisition of nuclear weapons capability still would be unlikely until the next century.

Through multilateral and bilateral contacts ACDA, working with other U.S. agencies, will continue to urge all supplier countries not to engage in any nuclear cooperation with Iran. During 1995, U.S. efforts with other supplier countries focussed on Russia and China.

In high level meetings, including those involving Presidents Clinton and Yeltsin, the United States attempted to persuade Russia that its plans to assist Iran in constructing nuclear power reactors would aid Iran in its long-term goal of acquiring nuclear weapons. All of the G-7 countries (U.S., U.K., France, Germany, Canada, Japan, and Italy) made this same point to Russian President Yeltsin during a June summit meeting in Halifax. Russia is planning to proceed with this export to Iran and cites the lack of any convincing evidence that Iran is in violation of its obligations under the NPT or the accompanying full-scope IAEA safeguards.

China's plans for providing nuclear reactors to Iran appear to be suspended, at least for the present time. However, Chinese nuclear cooperation with Iran continues in a number of other areas.

G. LATIN AMERICA AND THE CARIBBEAN

We continue to work closely with the Department of State, promoting arms control in Latin America and the Caribbean. In 1995, ACDA made significant progress toward WMD nonproliferation and development of CSBMs in Latin America.

ORGANIZATION OF AMERICAN STATES (OAS) PERMANENT WESTERN HEMISPHERIC FORUM FOR THE DISCUSSION OF ARMS CONTROL. In 1991 the General Assembly of the Organization of American States created a permanent council working group to examine security issues ranging from proliferation and arms transfers to "cooperation for hemispheric security."

The resulting working group and special committee on hemispheric security has built an impressive record of achievement since its beginnings. On June 6, 1994, the OAS adopted a resolution urging all OAS members to exchange the data submissions of the United Nations Register of Conventional Arms and the United Nations Standardized International Reporting of Military Expenditures. These two measures are the hemisphere's first Confidence and Security Building Measure (CSBMS).

With little pomp and no circumstance, on June 9, 1995 the General Assembly of the Organization of American States, meeting in Montrouis, Haiti, adopted a resolution instructing the permanent council to establish a permanent committee on hemispheric security. The U.S. authored the resolution and strongly supported it. This smooth outcome at the General Assembly followed months of committee hearings and extensive coordination among delegations both in Washington and in capitals. The consensus adoption of the resolution creates the region's first permanent forum on arms control, nonproliferation, defense, and security issues. The initiative will institutionalize the OAS ability to deal in a permanent forum with arms control, defense and security issues. It will also increase the chances that OAS consideration and involvement will become more substantive.

The Organization of American States Conference on CSBMS

The passage in June 1994 in Belem, Brazil of OAS resolutions on confidence- and security-building measures and the March 1994 Buenos Aires Governmental experts meeting on CSBMs marked the first adoption and dialogue in regional CSBMs by the OAS member states, indicating an encouraging interest in CSBMs in Latin America and the Caribbean.

The Organization of American States (OAS) held a regional Conference on CSBMs in Santiago Chile, on Nov. 8-10, 1995. The U.S. delegation was led by ACDA Director John D. Holum. Twenty-three OAS Member States participated: Argentina; Belize, Bolivia, Brazil, Canada, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, El Salvador, Guatemala, Haiti, Honduras, Jamaica, Mexico, Nicaragua, Panama, Paraguay, Peru, Uruguay, Venezuela, and the United States.

On November 10, 1995, the OAS Conference issued a consensus "Declaration of Santiago on Confidence- and Security-Building Measures" which inter alia contains a program including:

Two significant regional initiatives were announced. Argentina and Chile signed an agreement to conduct annual security cooperation consultations and a Declaration was issued by Peru and Ecuador, recounting the various CSBMs which they have begun observing since a cease-fire ended their undeclared border war in February.

The Santiago Conference on CSBMs and its Final Declaration indicate a growing consensus in the hemisphere on the value of arms control, in particular CSBMs, as a component of a national security strategy. The Conference also reinforced the basic tenet that participation by civilian and military officials, in partnership, constitute an important factor in the development and implementation of CSBMs.

NORTH-SOUTH CROSS-FERTILIZATION. Understanding that they can profit from the arms control lessons learned by the governments of Europe and North America, in 1995 Argentina, Brazil and Chile sponsored the first ever OAS-OSCE consultations and conducted bilateral talks with ACDA director John Holum.

CENTRAL AMERICAN DEMOCRATIC SECURITY TREATY. In August 1995, a new draft treaty entitled Central American Democratic Security Treaty was tabled, and on December 14, 1995 it was signed by Costa Rica, Honduras, El Salvador, Guatemala, Nicaragua and Panama. We believe the treaty is an important first step to strengthen democracy in the region; protect human rights; restore and sustain military equilibrium among the Central American States; begin to eliminate narcotics and weapons trafficking; promote sustained development; and encourage a regional arms control arrangement that promotes transparency, confidence and long-term peace.

DEFENSE MINISTERIAL OF THE AMERICAS. The July 24-26, 1995, Defense Ministerial was a significant CSBM for the region. All 34 of the hemisphere's democratically-elected governments were present. The ministerial was not intended to be a U.S. event but an opportunity for all participants to build close working relations. Nevertheless, the U.S. announced that it would henceforth provide advance notice of all significant multilateral military exercises in the region, and notification of significant military exercises procedures commenced following the ministerial.

ARMS CONTROL AND ARMS TRANSFER STRATEGY FOR PERU AND ECUADOR. To contribute to the resolution of conflict and the establishment of greater regional security, ACDA has participated in the inter-agency working group on Peru and Ecuador, and has developed and is implementing in late 1995 and 1996 an arms control strategy to reduce tension, ensure stability, and foster further progress in resolving issues that had led to the recent conflict. It has two key elements:

ACDA will continue its active effort to contribute to peace between Ecuador and Peru.

H. AFRICA

In 1995, ACDA vigorously pressed a number of policy initiatives and activities to foster arms control in Africa.

ACDA has led U.S. efforts in monitoring and influencing the development of an African Nuclear Weapons Free Zone Treaty to ensure that it conforms to longstanding U.S. criteria for supporting such zones. In May 1995, ACDA represented the United States at the final meeting of the United Nations/Organization of African Unity Experts Group in Johannesburg, South Africa, where the final draft text was adopted.

In addition to its lead role in fostering a nuclear weapons free zone, ACDA actively participated in the interagency integrated long-term plan to support conflict resolution capabilities and demobilization activities in sub-Saharan Africa. This plan was mandated by the 1994 African Conflict Resolution Act. ACDA thus succeeded in expanding U.S. conflict resolution policy in Africa to include arms control.

During the year, ACDA was responsible for three independent U.S. offers of arms control assistance to the Organization of African Unity and Southern African Development Community, one of which was made directly by President Clinton to President Mugabe of Zimbabwe. ACDA also forwarded to the Department of State a comprehensive strategy for support of regional arms control in Africa. The strategy recommended policy initiatives to encourage incipient regional arms control efforts.