CONTROLLING NUCLEAR WEAPONS



Nuclear weapons are by far the most destructive weapons ever devised. ACDA's highest priority is to protect U.S. security by reducing the probability of nuclear aggression or escalation to nuclear confrontation.

In many respects, the potential for nuclear security is better now than at any time in the nuclear era. The START I Treaty and other recent arms control agreements and unilateral initiatives are producing substantial reductions in the nuclear arsenals of the United States and the new independent states of the former Soviet Union. These agreements and initiatives provide a foundation for further enhancements to national security.

But while the nuclear threat from the former Soviet Union is diminishing, the challenge of preventing nuclear proliferation around the world remains severe. The United States is determined to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons by various means, including negotiation of a comprehensive nuclear test ban treaty to constrain non-nuclear weapons states from efforts to develop their own nuclear arsenals.

Our 1995 nuclear weapons efforts have centered on four tracks:

We are making progress along all four of these tracks to contain and reduce the nuclear threat to America's national security.

Although real reductions in the nuclear arsenals of the United States and the new independent states of the former Soviet Union are being achieved, we continue to face the challenge of nuclear weapons proliferation. With the technology for the production of weapons of mass destruction becoming more and more available, our efforts to prevent the proliferation of nuclear weapons play an even more significant role in enhancing U.S. national security.

During 1995 our nuclear nonproliferation efforts focused on the following:

A. HALTING NUCLEAR PROLIFERATION

1. NPT EXTENSION

The Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) was opened for signature in 1968 and entered into force in 1970. With 181 parties, it is the most widely-accepted multilateral arms control treaty in history and represents the world's primary legal and political barrier against the further proliferation of nuclear weapons. The NPT establishes a framework essential for global and regional stability, for preventing the spread of nuclear weapons, and for facilitating and regulating cooperation among states in the peaceful uses of nuclear energy.

Key Elements of the NPT

Article I: Each nuclear-weapon State Party to the Treaty (U.S., UK, Russia, France, and China) pledges "...not to transfer to any recipient whatsoever nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices or control over such weapons or explosive devices, directly or indirectly; and not in any way to assist, encourage, or induce any non-nuclear-weapon State to manufacture or otherwise acquire nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices, or control over such weapons or explosive devices."

Article II: Each non-nuclear-weapon State Party to the Treaty pledges "...not to receive the transfer from any transferor whatsoever of nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices or of control over such weapons or explosive devices directly, or indirectly; not to manufacture or otherwise acquire nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices; and not to seek or receive any assistance in the manufacture of nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices."

Article III: Each non-nuclear-weapon State Party to the Treaty undertakes to accept International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) safeguards on all peaceful nuclear activities as a means to verify the pledge under Article II. All parties agree to require IAEA safeguards on their exports of nuclear material and nuclear equipment.

Article IV: NPT Parties have a right to develop nuclear energy for peaceful purposes, and all Parties undertake to facilitate the fullest possible exchange of equipment, materials, and information for peaceful uses of nuclear energy.

Article VI: NPT Parties undertake "to pursue negotiations in good faith on effective measures relating to cessation of the nuclear arms race at an early date and to nuclear disarmament, and on a treaty on general and complete disarmament under strict and effective international control."

Although Article VI does not mandate any specific action regarding any specific weapon, it has nevertheless been implemented in significant ways:

Permanent Extension Achieved, Efforts for the Future Begun

From April 17 to May 12, 1995 a Conference of parties met pursuant to Article X(2) of the NPT to "decide whether the Treaty shall continue in force indefinitely or shall be extended for an additional fixed period or fixed periods." On May 11 the parties agreed, without a vote and without conditions, that the Treaty would continue in force permanently.

The significance of the achievement of indefinite extension of the NPT cannot be overstated. It is critically important to ensuring a strong international non-proliferation regime and, reducing the risk of nuclear proliferation and the probability of nuclear weapons use. In President Clinton's words, permanent and unconditional NPT extension is "a critical step in making the American people -- and people throughout the world -- more safe and secure" and which "will build a better future for our children and the generations to come."

Four initiatives outside of the NPT had a significant positive effect in gaining support for permanent NPT extension, or for directly supporting nuclear nonproliferation:

ACDA led the U.S. Government teams on all of these initiatives, three of which are discussed elsewhere in the report. A brief summary of the security assurance initiative is included below.

In addition to deciding to make the NPT permanent, the 1995 NPT Conference also agreed to a set of "Principles and Objectives for Nuclear Nonproliferation and Disarmament" and to a process for "Strengthening the Review Process for the Treaty," which have established the basis for parties' efforts to promote the full implementation of the NPT. The "Principles and Objectives" decision outlines a set of principles and objectives "in accordance with which nuclear nonproliferation, nuclear disarmament and international cooperation in the peaceful uses of nuclear energy should be vigorously pursued and progress, achievements, and shortcomings evaluated periodically within the review process provided for in Article VIII (3) of the Treaty." These principles and objectives include:

Through the decision on "Strengthening the Review Process for the Treaty" NPT parties agreed that, in accordance with Article VIII (3), Review Conferences should continue to be held every five years. Therefore, the next NPT Review Conference will take place in the year 2000. NPT parties also agree that Preparatory Committee work for the year 2000 NPT Review Conference would begin in 1997 and that there would be three and possibly four two-week long Preparatory Committee meetings. The parties also agreed that, "the purpose of the Preparatory Committee meetings would be "to consider principles, objectives, and ways in order to promote the full implementation of the Treaty, as well as its universality, and to make recommendations thereon to the Review Conference. ...The meetings should also make the procedural preparations for the next Review Conference."

The 1995 NPT Conference also adopted without a vote a resolution on the Middle East calling for, inter alia, the establishment of a Middle East free from weapons of mass destruction and also calling for universal adherence to the Treaty. Finally, the 1995 NPT Conference undertook an exhaustive review of the Treaty. While no final review document was possible, agreement within some of the working groups was reached on a number of issues, particularly concerning safeguards and peaceful uses of nuclear energy.

ACDA's Role. As the agency within the Executive Branch responsible for the NPT and its extension, ACDA will lead U.S. Government preparations for the Year 2000 NPT Review Conference. ACDA has already begun this preparation, which will again involve an ACDA-led interagency process to identify key issues and to develop U.S. positions, an ACDA-devised strategy to build international support for U.S. policy relating to the Year 2000 NPT Review Conference, ACDA-led efforts to engage bilaterally and multilaterally with other NPT parties, and ACDA efforts to promote progress on the issues identified as priorities in the 1995 Conference decision on "Principles and Objectives." In addition, ACDA will continue to take the lead in promoting dialogue with NPT parties, promoting efforts to address Parties' noncompliance with NPT obligations, and promoting universal adherence to the Treaty. ACDA will also continue its efforts to ensure that all NPT parties required to do so fulfill their obligations to complete a safeguards agreement with the IAEA.

Promoting Dialogue with NPT Parties

Throughout 1995, ACDA held bilateral consultations with NPT parties as part of an effort to promote continued support for the NPT regime and to build on the constructive dialogue developed, particularly with non-aligned countries, during the 1995 NPT Conference process. These efforts are designed to promote continued awareness of U.S. commitment to its NPT obligations and to facilitate efforts to promote U.S. NPT objectives in the future.

Promoting Efforts to Ensure Treaty Compliance

The post-1995 NPT Conference efforts are taking place during some of the greatest challenges the international nonproliferation regime has yet faced. These include the continued refusal of Iraq to disclose fully the extent of its weapons programs, and the efforts to implement a framework agreement with North Korea designed to achieve North Korea's full compliance with its NPT obligations. ACDA has played an active role in U.S. efforts to deal with Iraq, and seeks to ensure that the Agreed Framework with North Korea results in that country becoming a fully compliant NPT party. ACDA has also supported initiatives to improve and strengthen the IAEA safeguards system.

Promoting Universal Adherence to the NPT

ACDA has led a successful effort to increase adherence to the NPT, as evidenced by the more than 45 countries that have joined the NPT since 1990 and the 13 countries that have joined since January 1995 alone. For the future, ACDA will continue to lead efforts consistent with U.S. policy to achieve universal adherence to the NPT and will encourage all non-NPT countries, including those of particular proliferation concern in South Asia and the Middle East, to join the Treaty.

Following the 1995 NPT Conference, five additional states acceded to the Treaty -- Andorra, Chile, Vanuatu, the United Arab Emirates, and the Comoros. With these new accessions, the NPT has 182 parties and there are now fewer than 10 non-NPT countries worldwide.

Security Assurances for NPT Non-Nuclear-Weapon States

Security assurances directly contributed to U.S. efforts to achieve indefinite NPT Extension. In exchange for their commitment not to acquire nuclear weapons, many non-nuclear-weapon states have long pressed for negative security assurances -- that is, legally binding commitments by the nuclear-weapon states not to use nuclear weapons against non-nuclear-weapon NPT states. It was not possible to include such a provision in the NPT, but upon the opening for signature of the NPT in 1968, the United States, United Kingdom, and the Soviet Union pledged to seek immediate assistance from the U.N. Security Council should any NPT non-nuclear-weapon state be threatened with nuclear aggression (so-called positive security assurances). These assurances were affirmed in U.N. Security Council resolution 255 adopted on June 19, 1968. In 1978, the United States and the United Kingdom also provided certain limited negative security assurances expressly directed at NPT non-nuclear weapon states. France and Russia also issued limited negative security assurance statements in 1978, but did not link them specifically to the NPT. Chinese policy has been consistent since 1964 when it declared that it would not use nuclear weapons against any NNWS. Many non-nuclear-weapon states have considered these assurances to be inadequate and have continued to urge adoption of a common and legally binding approach by all nuclear-weapon states.

President Clinton directed that the United States review its policies on security assurances and consult with other nuclear-weapon states on this important topic. Discussions among the nuclear-weapon states led to the issuance, in April, 1995, of a national declaration by each of the nuclear-weapon states that provided comprehensive security assurances for NPT non-nuclear-weapon states. Secretary of State Christopher issued the U.S. declaration on behalf of President Clinton. This was the first time all five nuclear-weapon states have provided such comprehensive assurances to NPT non-nuclear-weapon states. Moreover, the United States, United Kingdom, France, and Russia were able to reach a common formulation on negative security assurances. To cap this initiative, on April 11, 1995 the U.N. Security Council unanimously adopted resolution 984 recognizing these national declarations and, significantly, reaffirming and expanding on the positive security assurances offered in 1968.

These actions were directly responsive to recommendations by NPT non-nuclear-weapon states, including the recommendation to make more explicit the role of the Security Council in responding to nuclear aggression against NPT non-nuclear-weapon states. They constitute substantial progress in enhancing the credibility of security assurances and reinforcing the NPT regime.

2. THE INTERNATIONAL ATOMIC ENERGY AGENCY (IAEA)

The International Atomic Energy Agency continues to promote vital U.S. security and nonproliferation interests through its program of international safeguards, providing assurance that nuclear materials are not diverted from civilian to military purposes. The IAEA also plays a central role in international efforts to make the benefits of peaceful uses of nuclear energy available to countries worldwide, and continues to help make nuclear facilities safer through its nuclear safety program.

The United States is one of the IAEA's strongest supporters and provides about one quarter of its annual budget. The United States is also a significant contributor to technical assistance and cooperation programs, which are supported by voluntary contributions of the membership.

The IAEA budget has faced the financial reality of zero real growth since 1984, but the Agency has nevertheless met the challenge of new responsibilities. Since 1992, however, the IAEA has been forced to cut or defer some programs and to curtail some safeguards inspections of lower priority nuclear material. In 1995, new activities -- including safeguarding U.S. material, increasing its capability to detect clandestine activities, and responding to the voluntary acceptance of full-scope safeguards in additional Member States -- are again placing further resource demands on the IAEA that are becoming more and more difficult for it to meet. Should the IAEA be called upon to verify future agreements such as the FMCT, IAEA resource requirements could double or triple.

The U.S. is committed to ensuring adequate resources for safeguards including the implementation of major new measures to strengthen safeguards and enhance the IAEA's capability to detect clandestine nuclear activities. This will require significant resources. ACDA is working in conjunction with other U.S. agencies to define long-term funding approaches for these increased IAEA responsibilities.

IAEA Safeguards

The IAEA's international nuclear safeguards system was developed to assure states that nuclear activities subject to safeguards are directed toward peaceful purposes, that potential proliferators will be dissuaded from using safeguarded nuclear materials for other than peaceful purposes, and that the diversion of nuclear materials from peaceful uses will be detected in a timely manner.

IAEA safeguards are a comprehensive, integrated system of accounting and reporting procedures, on-site inspection, nuclear material measurements, and containment and surveillance techniques. The system is codified in a network of separate international agreements between the IAEA and participating states, based on provisions contained in the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT), a nuclear-weapon-free zone, or on agreed conditions of supply of peaceful nuclear technology and materials between states.

In 1994 the nuclear material under IAEA safeguards totaled approximately 41 tons of separated plutonium, 450 tons of plutonium in irradiated nuclear reactor fuels, 20 tons of excess defense highly-enriched uranium, 41,000 tons of low-enriched uranium, and 94,000 tons of natural and depleted uranium. The IAEA conducted 2,349 inspections, verified the integrity of 22,000 seals, reviewed approximately 5,300 surveillance records, and analyzed 1,063 samples. This includes U.S. material deemed excess to defense needs that was placed under IAEA safeguards in 1994.

President Clinton's September 27, 1993, announcement to place material deemed excess to U.S. defense needs under IAEA safeguards began the process of adding to the IAEA's verification activities material removed from dismantled weapons. In 1995 additional plutonium was made available for safeguards when a room at Rocky Flats, Colorado was added to the eligible facilities list and selected by the IAEA. Also additional plutonium was placed under IAEA safeguards at the Hanford Site in Washington. These materials were additions to already safeguarded high-enriched uranium at the Y-12 Plant in Oak Ridge, Tennessee and plutonium at Hanford Site, Washington. Also in 1995, discussions continued between the U.S. and the IAEA on placing safeguards on the approximately 600 kilograms of HEU removed from Kazakstan and brought to the U.S. under the auspices of "Project Sapphire." Additionally, at the IAEA's September 1995 General Conference in Vienna, the U.S. announced that it would make an additional 20 tons of excess defense material available for IAEA safeguards. Discussions will continue into 1996 to determine the details of making this material available.

The purpose of making this excess material available to the IAEA under the U.S. voluntary offer is to demonstrate the transparency and irreversibility of the nuclear disarmament process, while setting an example for other nuclear weapons states to initiate the same activities. The President took another significant step in this area during 1995 by announcing on March 1 that 200 tons of fissile material would be withdrawn from the U.S. nuclear stockpile, and that this material would never again be used in nuclear weapons. These actions underline the continuing commitment of the U.S., as a nuclear weapons state, fulfilling its obligations under the NPT. ACDA has been and will continue to be a key U.S. agency in each of these areas of the U.S. voluntary offer.

One of the most dramatic undertakings of the IAEA has been its embarkment on a program, Programme 93+2, to increase the efficiency and enhance the effectiveness of its regime by improving its ability to detect clandestine nuclear activities. Although the process of developing and strengthening IAEA safeguards has been ongoing since the IAEA's inception, strengthening took on a new angle in the 1990s following revelations about the existence of an Iraqi nuclear weapons program and as questions arose about North Korea's potential program.

The inception of Programme 93+2 required evaluation of the technical, legal, and financial aspects of the proposed measures, including:

The eventual result was that Programme 93+2 was divided into two sections: Part 1, which addresses strengthening measures to be undertaken under existing legal authority, and Part 2, which addresses measures requiring complementary legal authority for implementation in Member States.

In June 1995 the IAEA's Board of Governors approved the Part 1 measures, which include:

In December 1995, the Board of Governors considered the measures, or some portion thereof, embodied in Part 2. These measures are:

The approved measures are another step in the process of improving the efficiency and enhancing the effectiveness of IAEA safeguards that began in 1992 with such decisions as the requirement for Member States' early submission of design information on nuclear facilities being constructed.

ACDA's Role. ACDA supports and works directly with IAEA staff to improve and strengthen safeguards. ACDA provides vigorous support to Programme 93+2 for strengthening IAEA safeguards for the detection of clandestine nuclear activities. These efforts include promotions of advanced techniques, including environmental monitoring, for detecting clandestine nuclear activities, and for improving safeguards for civil nuclear facilities that process or use separated plutonium for fuel.

In 1994 the U.S. Government established a steering committee to coordinate all IAEA matters. Throughout 1995, ACDA actively participated in the steering committee, chairing its Subcommittee on International Safeguards and Monitoring, which establishes and coordinates U.S. policy on IAEA safeguards.

In 1995 ACDA and other U.S. agencies held bilateral consultations with Australia, the European Atomic Energy Community, France, Germany, Japan, and the United Kingdom regarding the implementation of Programme 93+2 and maintaining a dialogue on the implementation of safeguards on facilities in each of these countries. For the first time consultations were also held with Argentina, Brazil, and the Argentine-Brazilian Agency for Accounting and Control of Nuclear Materials (ABACC). The U.S. agreed with each of these parties to continue support for IAEA field testing and assessment of new safeguards techniques.

IAEA Technical Assistance

The United States strongly supports the IAEA's program of technical cooperation. Under Article IV of the NPT, the United States has pledged to foster "the further development of the applications of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes, especially in the territories of non-nuclear weapon States party to the Treaty, with due consideration for the needs of developing areas of the world."

The IAEA provides peaceful nuclear assistance in many fields, including medicine, agriculture, industry, and nuclear safety. The United States supports these technical assistance programs through voluntary pledges to the IAEA Technical Assistance and Cooperation Fund and extra-budgetary "in-kind" contributions. These latter contributions include equipment for projects, provision of expert services, training courses, and fellowships to study in the United States. The United States has considerable discretion over the distribution of the extra budgetary portion of its contributions, giving preference to states that have joined the NPT or are Contracting Parties to the Treaty of Tlatelolco. In this way, the United States helps demonstrate the link between economic development and nuclear nonproliferation.

The IAEA's technical cooperation programs focus on projects and activities requested and carried out by individual member states. Regional and interregional programs that support training and projects have also been instituted in Latin America, the Middle East, the former Soviet Union, Africa, and Asia and the Pacific. By making a positive contribution to human health, agriculture, and other fields utilizing nuclear techniques in the many developing countries which comprise the majority of IAEA members, the technical assistance and cooperation programs generate widespread international support for the Agency. Many developing countries also view the technical assistance programs as the major benefit they receive for their continuing support of the NPT and IAEA safeguards. The U.S. pursues technical assistance and cooperation programs, therefore, not only for the important developmental assistance they provide, but also as an integral part of our broader nonproliferation policy. In addition, the technical assistance programs help bring systematic oversight and stability to the international transfer of nuclear-related technology.

ACDA's Role. ACDA supplies critical technical expertise to the review and monitoring of the IAEA's various technical programs by the U.S. International Nuclear Technical Liaison Organization, an interagency group overseeing U.S. technical cooperation with the IAEA. ACDA encourages technical assistance that is compatible with a recipient country's nuclear program and with broad nonproliferation policy goals. ACDA also continues to identify and supply highly qualified U.S. nationals for key positions in all departments of the IAEA.

The U.S. supplies essential technical support to IAEA safeguards through its extra-budgetary contributions. This support seeks to match U.S. technology and expertise to the special safeguards problems faced by the IAEA in a time of tight budgets and increasingly broad responsibilities. ACDA has continued to provide policy and technical expertise, both to the IAEA directly and through the interagency process within the U.S., to support Programme 93+2 through addressing such issues as environmental monitoring of undeclared nuclear activities, making safeguards more efficient and effective, and assisting in the development and deployment of modern information processing systems to expand the IAEA's ability to analyze an increasing array of data sources.

3. INTERNATIONAL EXPORT CONTROLS

The United States has long urged cooperation among countries that export nuclear and nuclear-related commodities and technology to ensure that commerce in this area does not contribute to nuclear proliferation. This cooperation ranges from bilateral discussion of individual cases to development and implementation of multilateral guidelines. Multilateral cooperation on nuclear supply largely takes place in the Zangger Committee and in the Nuclear Suppliers Group. In Chapter VI, we describe the groups themselves. In this section we describe the work of these groups and other international export control activities in 1995.

Zangger Committee

The Committee, also called the NPT Exporters' Committee, focused on two matters in 1995: the role it would play in the 1995 NPT Extension Conference and the need to clarify portions of the list of equipment and material subject to its guidelines. The purpose of the Committee is to clarify and harmonize the way countries implement Article III.2 of the NPT, which requires the application of IAEA safeguards to certain exported nuclear equipment and material. The Committee, although informal in character, has a key role in reviewing and harmonizing implementation of this provision. It also helps to explain to all NPT parties the requirements and benefits of the Treaty's export control provisions. This issue was a principal discussion topic at both of the Committee's meetings in 1995.

One of the main activities of the Zangger Committee since its creation has been to produce and clarify the list of items, often called the "Trigger List," which require IAEA safeguards as a condition of supply. In 1995, members of the Zangger Committee continued their efforts to clarify and update the Trigger List, reviewing the sections on reactors, non-nuclear material, and fuel fabrication. The proposed changes are under review and are expected to be finalized in May, 1996.

Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG)

The NSG holds a plenary meeting each year in April, along with a number of working group meetings. The working group on Conditions of Supply, established to review and strengthen the NSG Guidelines, completed its work in 1995. The Helsinki plenary adopted several proposed changes in the guidelines, including the agreement to control technologies related to trigger list items. The Helsinki plenary also agreed to establish a separate working group to facilitate the exchange of information among NSG members.

In addition to annual plenary sessions, the NSG now holds two consultations annually on its arrangement to control nuclear-related dual-use commodities and technology. This dual-use control list includes materials, equipment, and technology that can be used both for nuclear weapons and fuel-cycle activities and for other, non-nuclear purposes. The working group established to refine the NSG dual-use control list completed its work in 1994, and agreed changes were adopted at the plenary in Helsinki, Finland.

NPT Review and Extension Conference

The 1995 NPT Conference adopted two important principles regarding export controls. First, it agreed that countries should not enter into arrangements to transfer nuclear materials or Trigger List items to non-nuclear weapon states unless those states have made a legally binding commitment not to obtain nuclear weapons and have safeguards on all their nuclear fuel cycle activities. Second, the NPT Conference stated that "transparency in nuclear-related export controls should be promoted within the framework of dialogue and cooperation among all interested States party to the Treaty."

Promoting Responsible Export Policies

The United States continues to urge all exporters of nuclear equipment to adopt responsible nuclear export policies. The U.S. believes that all exporters should minimize the danger of nuclear proliferation by adopting existing multilateral export rules. These include the fundamental nuclear export norms embodied in the NSG Guidelines and the Zangger Guidelines.

In 1995, several new nuclear suppliers made significant steps to adopt responsible export policies. South Africa became a member of the Nuclear Suppliers Group in 1995, after acceding to the NPT in 1991 and adopting comprehensive nuclear export controls and adhering to the NSG Guidelines in 1994. Similarly, Argentina and the Republic of Korea became members of both the NSG and the Zangger Committee in 1995.

Highlights of Nuclear Exporters' Committee Guidelines

Covered items include:

Supplier state must:

Highlights of Nuclear Suppliers' Group Guidelines

Covered items:

Part 1: Same as those of Nuclear Exporters' Committee, with the addition of facilities and equipment for uranium conversion.

Part 2: Nuclear-related dual-use items.

Conditions for transfer of Part 1 items:

Conditions for transfer of Part 2 items:

4. NUCLEAR WEAPON-FREE ZONES

The end of the Cold War and the consequent cessation of the nuclear arms competition between the United States and the states of the former Soviet Union has conferred new momentum to the creation of nuclear-weapon-free-zones (NWFZs) in many areas of the world. The United States supports the creation of such zones in regions where they would contribute to the achievement of U.S. nuclear nonproliferation goals and would be consistent with our established criteria for recognizing such zones and with other U.S. national security interests. The U.S. fully endorses the objective of establishing additional NWFZ embodied in the Declaration of Principles and Objectives that accompanied the May 1995 decision to indefinitely extend the NPT.

The Treaty of Tlatelolco

The 1967 Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America and the Caribbean, also known as the Treaty of Tlatelolco, establishes the first nuclear-weapon-free zone in a populated region. Nuclear weapons are banned in Antarctica, outer space, and on the seabeds. The Treaty of Tlatelolco has now been signed by all 33 Latin American and Caribbean states, including Argentina, Brazil, and Chile, and is in force for 29 of them. These 29 states have assumed the Treaty's binding international commitment not to acquire, manufacture, test, use, or station a nuclear explosive device in their sovereign territory. Cuba signed the Treaty on March 25, 1995, the last Latin American state to do so. Cuba, St. Kitts/Nevis, and St. Lucia have yet to ratify the Treaty; in January 1995, Guyana ratified but did not bring the Treaty into force.

Tlatelolco Contracting Parties have accepted the application of IAEA safeguards for all their nuclear activities to assist in verifying compliance with the Treaty. The Treaty also establishes a regional organization, the Agency for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America (known by its Spanish acronym OPANAL), to help ensure compliance with its provisions.

The Treaty will come fully into force when all eligible states have ratified the Treaty and its two Protocols, and concluded comprehensive safeguards agreements with the IAEA as required. States can, however, individually waive this requirement for universal adherence and declare the Treaty in force for their respective territories, thereby creating the nuclear-free zone in a piecemeal fashion. As noted above, 29 states have exercised this waiver and brought the Treaty into force.

The U.S. is a party to two Protocols to the Treaty. Protocol I requires parties with international responsibility for territories within the region to respect specific denuclearization provisions of the Treaty and to conclude IAEA safeguards agreements for their territories. Protocol II requires nuclear weapon states to respect and support the denuclearization provisions and not use or threaten to use nuclear weapons against Treaty parties. The U.S. has signed and ratified both Protocols, with understandings and declarations consonant with U.S. policy (such as freedom of naval and air passage, etc.). The U.S. has also brought into force a safeguards agreement pursuant to Protocol I that covers the territories in the region for which we are internationally responsible. All eligible states have now signed and ratified the two Protocols.

The United States remains firmly committed to the goals of the Treaty of Tlatelolco, and will continue to seek its full implementation. The Treaty makes a substantial contribution to regional peace and stability, as well to strengthening the international nuclear non-proliferation regime as a whole.

The South Pacific Nuclear Free Zone

In August 1985, eight members of the South Pacific Forum signed the South Pacific Nuclear Free Zone (SPNFZ) Treaty, known as the Treaty of Rarotonga. The Treaty is now in force for 11 of 15 Forum members: Australia, Cook Islands, Fiji, Kiribati, Naurau, New Zealand, Niue, Papua New Guinea, Solomon Islands, Tuvalu, and Western Samoa. The Treaty bans the manufacture, possession, stationing, and testing of any nuclear explosive device in treaty territories for which the parties are internationally responsible; it also bans the dumping of radioactive waste at sea. Three Protocols extend the Treaty's provisions to states outside the zone:

Russia (with understandings) and China signed and ratified Protocols II and III; neither has zonal territories that would require its adherence to Protocol I. The U.S., U.K. and France signed the SPNFZ Protocols in Suva, Fiji, on March 25, 1996.

African NWFZ

The Organization of African Unity (OAU) approved in June 1995 the final draft of an African Nuclear Weapon Free Zone (ANWFZ) Treaty -- the Treaty of Pelindaba -- named for the South African site where the text was concluded. The Treaty was opened for signature on April 11, 1996 in Cairo, and the United States signed Protocols I and II without any written reservations.

The OAU first formally enunciated the desire to draft a treaty insuring the denuclearization of Africa in Cairo in July 1964 at the first OAU Summit. No real progress toward a treaty was made until South Africa joined the NPT in mid-1991. In April 1993, a UN/OAU "experts group" convened to begin drafting a treaty. Using the South Pacific Nuclear Free Zone Treaty (SPNFZ, also known as the Treaty of Rarotonga) as a model, the Experts Group included in the Treaty new provisions on the physical protection of nuclear material and the prohibition of attacks on nuclear installations; its three protocols are similar to those of the SPNFZ. The proposed Treaty commits Parties not to conduct or receive or give assistance in the research, development, manufacture, stockpiling, acquisition, possession or control over any nuclear explosive device by any means anywhere. The U.S. would be eligible to sign the non-use and non-testing Protocols only, as it has no territories for which it is internationally responsible in the African region.

The U.S. has supported the concept of the denuclearization of Africa since the first UNGA resolution in 1965. The U.S. finished its review of the text of the proposed Treaty to assess its conformity with our long-standing criteria for supporting such zones, and signed Protocols I and II on April 11, 1996 in Cairo when the Treaty itself opened for signature.

Southeast Asia NWFZ

Indonesia and Malaysia proposed the establishment of a Southeast Asian Nuclear Weapons Free Zone (SEANWFZ) in the mid-1980's; opposition from some ASEAN members, however, slowed the drafting of a proposed treaty. Secretary Christopher told the 1993 ASEAN PMC that the U.S. was willing to take a fresh look at SEANWFZ, but would need to see a draft of a treaty. President Clinton sent a letter in early February 1995 to President Soeharto of Indonesia, stating that the U.S. would be prepared to consider favorably a SEANWFZ, in the context of its conformity with our longstanding criteria. Ten Southeast Asian states signed the SEANWFZ treaty at the December 15 ASEAN Summit in Bangkok. The U.S. has explained to the ASEAN states that the latest text of the Treaty and Protocol does not meet all of our fundamental concerns, and that these concerns must be addressed if ASEAN wishes the U.S. to give serious consideration to signing the protocol. Consultations between the U.S. and ASEAN on this matter have continued in 1996.

B. BANNING NUCLEAR EXPLOSIVE TESTING

A Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) has been sought by seven Presidents, and is a top Administration foreign policy priority. Progress in negotiations in the Geneva Conference on Disarmament (CD), has brought the Treaty within reach. U.S. actions during 1995 have been critically important. Early in 1995, President Clinton decided to withdraw the U.S. proposal for a treaty provision that would allow withdrawal 10 years after entry into force without citing reasons of supreme national interest. This decision underscored the U.S. commitment to an enduring test ban. The President also decided, on the assumption that a treaty will be signed before September 30, 1996, to extend the U.S. nuclear testing moratorium until a CTBT enters into force. The United States and all other Parties at the Review and Extension Conference of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty pledged in May 1995 to conclude a CTBT no later than 1996. President Clinton announced on August 11, 1995, that the U.S. goal is a true zero-yield CTBT banning all nuclear explosions, no matter how small their nuclear yield and including so-called hydronuclear tests. He also stated that the maintenance of a safe and reliable nuclear stockpile is a supreme national interest of the United States, and that we could meet this challenge through a science-based stockpile stewardship program without nuclear testing.

In adopting such a clear position, the United States provided further important impetus to the negotiations. The United States and other key CD members are pressing to complete the CTBT text early in 1996, so that it can be signed before the opening of the 51st session of the UN General Assembly in September 1996. This objective was codified by consensus adoption of a December 1995 UN General Assembly resolution calling for the Treaty to be opened for signature by September 1996.

Arms Control and Nonproliferation Objectives

The CTBT will not eliminate existing nuclear weapons or make it impossible to build new ones, but it will severely constrain their development. For states that already have nuclear weapons, a "no testing" regime will mean low confidence in any new design, making new types of nuclear weapons very unlikely. For cautious military planners, including the United States, it means that new types of nuclear weapons will be virtually out of the question. Thus the CTBT should have the practical effect of further constraining any international competition in advanced nuclear arms.

For states that do not possess but might wish to acquire nuclear weapons, the ban on testing will mean they are prohibited from gaining confirmation that weapons designed without testing will perform as expected. This, and the restraint the CTBT will place on nuclear weapon development by the nuclear powers, will strengthen the global norm against nuclear-weapon proliferation.

Status of Negotiations

The CD held three formal negotiating rounds in Geneva during its 1995 session. In addition, technical experts held informal intersessional meetings in Geneva and elsewhere to work on specific technical issues, and diplomats held numerous consultations on the margins of UN meetings in New York. The "rolling text," consisting of agreed text and text still under negotiation, was further developed during 1995.

Prospects for the Forthcoming Year

As noted above, the United States is pressing for CD completion of the CTBT text early in 1996, in time to allow the text to be conformed, sent to the 50th UNGA for its endorsement, and opened for signature by the fall of 1996. While important issues remain to be settled, worldwide political momentum behind the CTBT is strong, and has been reinforced by positions taken at the NPT Extension Conference and the UNGA in 1995.

ACDA's Role. ACDA leads the U.S. Government in the CTBT negotiations. ACDA's responsibilities include:

C. REDUCING COLD WAR NUCLEAR STOCKPILES

The demise of the Soviet Union significantly increased prospects for reducing the magnitude of the nuclear threat to the United States. This reduction has not been, and will not be, automatic, spontaneous, nor easy to accomplish. Significant challenges in this area remain, including:

As the United States seeks the overall goal of enhancing national security in the post-Cold War era, it is pursuing the following key objectives with regard to nuclear weapons:

1. STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE ARMS

Strategic offensive arms include intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs) with ranges over 5500 kilometers, submarine-launched ballistic missiles (SLBMs) with ranges over 600 kilometers, and heavy bombers. These weapons would be immensely destructive if they were ever used. The START I and START II treaties enhance U.S. national security by reducing the numbers of these strategic offensive arms and shaping strategic arsenals toward more secure and stabilizing force structures.

Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START) I and the Lisbon Protocol.

The START I Treaty is the first treaty actually to reduce the numbers of deployed strategic offensive arms. This Treaty reduces and limits these arms by 30-40 percent from their pre-START levels; reductions of 50 percent are required in the most threatening systems, heavy ICBMs. These large scale reductions of strategic offensive arms as a result of START are critically important. In this regard, the Lisbon Protocol to the Treaty committed Belarus, Kazakstan, and Ukraine to accede to START, and to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) as non-nuclear-weapon states in the shortest possible time; associated letters from the Presidents of these three states further commit them to eliminate all nuclear weapons, including strategic offensive arms, located on their territories within the seven year START I reduction period.

The Treaty provides for extensive and intrusive on-site inspection, in conjunction with national technical means of verification and information exchanges, to assist in verification of compliance. Shortly after the entry into force of the Treaty on December 5, 1994, the sides began to exercise their right to conduct continuous monitoring activities, as well as a number of different types of on-site inspections provided for by the Treaty, including: baseline data, data update, suspect-site, re-entry vehicle, conversion or elimination, close-out, and formerly declared facility inspections. Additionally, there have been technical characteristics exhibitions of treaty-limited items.

The START I Treaty establishes the right to conduct baseline data inspections at most declared START facilities to confirm the accuracy of data on the numbers and types of items specified for each facility in the initial exchange of data. This initial exchange of data occurred, as required, in early January 1995, 30 days after entry into force of the Treaty. Subsequent exchanges of updated data for each category of data in the MOU occur routinely at six month intervals throughout the duration of the Treaty.

The Parties agreed in the framework of the Joint Compliance and Inspection Commission (JCIC) (START's implementing body) to a Russian request to delay the initiation of baseline data inspections from January 19, 1995, (45 days after entry into force of the Treaty) until March 1, 1995. This shift increased the likelihood of our inspectors being able to arrive at the inspection sites in the allotted time and to thoroughly inspect the designated facility, because March offers better weather conditions and more daylight in Russia and the northern United States than mid-January. These baseline data inspections were completed by June 28, 1995. As expected, a number of issues arose. The United States and its Treaty partners are seeking to resolve these issues in the JCIC.

Additionally, the United States agreed, via an exchange of letters of policy outside of the framework of the JCIC, not to exercise its right to conduct continuous monitoring activities at the Pavlograd Machine Plant in Ukraine after May 31, 1995, instead of December 7, 1995 -- one year after the notification of cessation of production of ICBMs for mobile launchers of ICBMs. Any renewed production of such mobile ICBMs, including for space launch vehicles that use newly produced first stages of such missiles, would constitute grounds for the United States to re-establish continuous monitoring activities at Pavlograd. In return, Ukraine permitted the United States to conduct three short-notice inspections, outside of the START inspection regime, of the plant's interior between June 1, 1995 and December 6, 1995.

Since 1991, the United States and the four other Treaty states have been working out details of Treaty implementation in regular meetings of the JCIC. The JCIC has held four regular meetings in Geneva during 1995, in January-February, June, September, and November-December. During these meetings, eight JCIC Agreements were signed and three Joint Statements were initialed to enhance effective implementation of the START I Treaty. JCIC Agreements concluded during 1995 are:

The Joint Statements that were negotiated and initialed during 1995 in the JCIC are:

The momentum from the onset of the inspection regime and the exchange of telemetric data is likely to assure a similarly intensive pace for the JCIC in 1996.

ACDA's Role. The expertise and experience of ACDA's personnel are essential to the complex and often highly technical work of START implementation.

ACDA co-chairs the interagency committee that has principal responsibility for developing U.S. policy for the JCIC and for drafting diplomatic communications on START implementation to the governments of the other START Parties. This work was made even more challenging by the emergence of four successor states to the former Soviet Union which, as Parties to the Treaty, participate in START implementation.

ACDA co-chairs the interagency working group that develops guidance for U.S. operations that implement inspection and monitoring under START and verifies compliance with the Treaty.

ACDA houses and supports the Office of the United States Representative to the JCIC.

Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START) II

Recognizing their mutual interest in creating smaller and more stabilizing nuclear forces than those allowed under START I, the U.S. and Russia signed the START II Treaty on January 3, 1993. START II codifies a stabilizing and orderly drawdown of strategic nuclear forces that is in the security and economic interests of both the United States and Russia. START II relies heavily and explicitly on the START I Treaty's definitions and extensive verification procedures. START II will remain in effect as long as START I is in force.

START II will dramatically reduce the total number of strategic nuclear arms deployed by both countries to one-third of the pre-START levels. By the end of the second stage of reductions, each side must have reduced its total deployed strategic nuclear warheads to 3,000-3,500 warheads. But START II's qualitative stabilizing features are even more important than its numerical reductions. By prohibiting heavy ICBMs and multiple warhead ICBMs, START II will significantly reduce first-strike potential and thereby increase stability. These weapons have long been considered destabilizing because they have been at once the most vulnerable strategic systems and those most capable of destroying large numbers of hard targets on the other side. Like START I, START II will serve U.S. nonproliferation interests by helping to allay the security concerns of the other successor states to the former Soviet Union, and by demonstrating to the world U.S.-Russian commitment to deep reductions in their respective nuclear arsenals.

While the START II Treaty has yet to be ratified, at summits in May and October 1995 Presidents Clinton and Yeltsin reaffirmed their intention to seek ratification of START II as soon as possible. The Treaty has been transmitted to the legislative branches of both Parties. The U.S. Senate approved ratification of START II on January 26, 1996. We are awaiting Russian ratification.

Significantly, Presidents Clinton and Yeltsin have also concurred that, once START II is ratified by both sides, the United States and Russia will proceed to deactivate all strategic delivery systems to be reduced under START II by removing their nuclear warheads or taking other steps to remove them from combat status.

ACDA's Role. The START II chief negotiator was from ACDA. The agency provided substantial support to the high-level exchanges that led to the Treaty's signature. During 1995, ACDA played a key role in the Executive Branch's efforts to obtain Senate advice and consent to START II ratification. Once the Treaty enters into force, ACDA will lead in the implementation of START II, chairing the interagency committee providing guidance to the Bilateral Implementation Commission (BIC), which is the implementing body for START II. The Office of the U.S. Representative to the BIC will reside in ACDA.

Future Strategic Arms Control

It is frequently asked whether further strategic arms reductions beyond the levels called for in START II are being considered within the United States Government. Naturally, the United States is focusing its immediate efforts on ensuring smooth implementation of START I, and on achieving the ratification of START II. Once START II is ratified, we will work with Russia on early deactivation of START II forces, as discussed by Presidents Clinton and Yeltsin at their September 1994 summit.

As for further steps beyond START II, at the September 1994 U.S.-Russian summit, the Presidents ordered their experts "to intensify their dialogue to compare conceptual approaches and to develop concrete steps to adapt the nuclear forces and practices on both sides to the changed international security situation and to the current spirit of U.S.-Russian partnership, including the possibility, after ratification of START II, of further reductions of, and limitations on, remaining nuclear forces." At their May 1995 summit, Presidents Clinton and Yeltsin agreed to work with their respective parliamentary bodies to ratify START II quickly. At the press conference held at the conclusion of the summit and in a speech at Moscow State University, President Clinton indicated that the Presidents had again discussed their mutual desire to consider, after START II is ratified, further reductions in nuclear arsenals. The Administration will consider what further strategic arms control measures could contribute to strategic stability and enhance U.S. national security overall.

ACDA's Role. For 1995, ACDA actively participated in the interagency process designed to develop policy options on further reductions in strategic offensive arms once START II is ratified. ACDA will play a lead role in developing U.S. policy positions in future strategic arms control initiatives.

2. INTERMEDIATE-RANGE AND SHORTER-RANGE NUCLEAR FORCES

The Treaty Between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the Elimination of Their Intermediate-Range and Shorter-Range Missiles (INF) entered into force on June 1, 1988. It provides for the elimination of all U.S. and Soviet ground-launched cruise and ballistic missiles having ranges between 500 and 5500 kilometers. The last of the INF missiles declared by the United States and the Soviet Union was eliminated by May 31, 1991.

The INF Treaty provides an extensive inspection regime, including an annual quota of short-notice inspections (currently 15 per year) and continuous monitoring at missile assembly plants at Magna, Utah, and, currently at, Votkinsk, Russia. The inspection regime continues through May 31, 2001, but the INF Treaty and its prohibitions will remain in force indefinitely.

There are 12 successor states to the Soviet Union for purposes of the INF Treaty. However, there is agreement that only four states with inspectable INF facilities on their territory (Belarus, Kazakstan, Russia, and Ukraine) will participate in inspections and take part in the INF implementation body, the Special Verification Commission (SVC). Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan each have one inspectable INF site, but the U.S. and these two states, with the consent of Belarus, Kazakstan, Russia, and Ukraine, have developed an understanding whereby Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan will not participate actively in implementation of the Treaty, and the U.S. as a policy matter will not exercise its right to conduct inspections in these two states.

Mechanisms were put in place in 1994 for continued implementation of U.S. INF inspection rights in Belarus, Kazakstan and Ukraine, as well as in Russia. There are now points of entry open in each of those states and we have added direct government-to-government communications links with Belarus, Kazakstan, and Ukraine. Additionally, these four states have reached basic agreement on sharing among themselves the rights of the Former Soviet Union to conduct inspections of U.S. INF facilities.

The United States has been working out details of Treaty implementation with Belarus, Kazakstan, Russia, and Ukraine within the framework of the Special Verification Commission (SVC). The SVC has met in 17 sessions since 1988. In recent sessions, the Commission has worked to adapt the Treaty to the realities of the post-Soviet world. Two regular meetings of the Special Verification Commission took place in Geneva, during 1995, in February and May-June. These sessions dealt primarily with the following issues:

Equally important have been the exchanges on INF Treaty issues among the Parties through diplomatic channels.

Concerning the inspection procedures at the Votkinsk portal, U.S. monitors exercise our treaty right to inspect all missiles exiting the plant that are as large or larger than the banned SS-20 GLBM. The Russians have indicated their intention to produce two different space-launch vehicles (SLVs), which they call the "Start" and the "Start-1," both of which use all the stages of the SS-25 ICBM, as well as a new ICBM, the SS-X-27. The United States is currently discussing with the Russian Federation, through diplomatic channels, INF Treaty inspection procedures under INF for these three new missiles.

ACDA's Role. ACDA chairs the interagency working group that develops U.S. policy for implementation of the INF Treaty, and develops instructions for the SVC. ACDA also develops diplomatic communications regarding INF Treaty implementation, for delivery to the governments of the INF Parties in their respective capitals. Additionally, ACDA co-chairs the interagency working group that develops guidance for U.S. operations that implement inspection and monitoring under INF and verifies compliance with the Treaty. ACDA chaired the U.S.-Russian bilateral technical talks on long-term inspection procedures at Votkinsk. The Office of the U.S. Representative to the SVC is in ACDA.

3. OTHER NON-STRATEGIC NUCLEAR WEAPONS

The political instability that gave rise to the aborted coup in the Soviet Union in August 1991 raised serious questions about how control would be maintained over the thousands of non-strategic nuclear weapons located in the Soviet republics and not covered by the INF Treaty. Because of their larger numbers, smaller size, and in some cases simple design and relative ease of employment, non-strategic nuclear weapons pose more difficult command, control, and safety concerns than strategic nuclear weapons. As political instability increased in the Soviet Union, there was growing concern that a breakdown in authority and the military command and control of these weapons could lead to their being sold on the black market, used in political blackmail, involved in accidents, or even employed in civil conflict.

The United States announced on September 27, 1991 that, with the expectation of Soviet reciprocity, it would unilaterally withdraw approximately 2,400 non-strategic nuclear weapons from overseas to the continental United States.

Within a week, former Soviet President Gorbachev responded by announcing similar measures that would result in the withdrawal of all Soviet tactical nuclear weapons to Russia for centralized storage. These measures were to include elimination of most Soviet short-range missile warheads and nuclear artillery shells, withdrawal and elimination of all Soviet nuclear land mines and nuclear warheads for air-defense missiles, and removal of all Soviet non-strategic nuclear weapons from surface ships and multi-purpose submarines.

This Soviet response spurred U.S. and Soviet interest in enhancing the safety and security of nuclear weapons to be transported and centrally stored in Russia, which led to the Safety, Security, and Dismantlement (SSD) effort funded by the Cooperative Threat Reduction program. After the dissolution of the Soviet Union, Russian President Yeltsin accelerated the dismantlement schedule for non-strategic weapons and informed the United States that all of these weapons had been returned to Russia by May 1992.

Indications are that elimination of many former Soviet non-strategic nuclear weapons is underway. Nevertheless, ACDA continues to be concerned at the presence of large numbers of non-strategic nuclear weapons in a politically and economically strained Russia.

In the United States, elimination of most non-strategic nuclear weapons is also in progress. All surface-to-surface non-strategic nuclear missiles and artillery shells have been withdrawn from overseas locations and returned to the United States. All warheads for ground-launched, non-strategic nuclear weapons have been removed to central storage in the United States. Artillery-fired nuclear projectiles have also been returned to the United States and their return to the Department of Energy for dismantlement is expected to be completed in 1995. Non-strategic nuclear weapons have been removed from U.S. surface ships and multi-purpose submarines, as well as from land-based naval aviation, and have been placed in centralized storage on U.S. territory. Nuclear depth bombs have been destroyed. U.S. ground forces no longer train for nuclear missions and have no nuclear capability under their current organization. The U.S. Army has deactivated all Lance missiles.

4. NUNN-LUGAR PROGRAM: COOPERATIVE THREAT REDUCTION FOR DESTRUCTION AND DISMANTLEMENT OF FORMER SOVIET WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION

The Cooperative Threat Reduction (CTR) program, which began in earnest in 1991 and has been led by the Department of Defense, has been critical to the U.S. effort to ensure that nuclear weapons dismantlement in the former Soviet Union is accomplished rapidly, safely, and securely. At the heart of CTR assistance are projects devoted to the acceleration of nuclear weapons dismantlement, particularly those weapons subject to the START Treaty. The United States has concluded agreements with Russia, Kazakstan and Ukraine to assist in the dismantlement of ICBM silos, missile airframes, heavy bombers, and Russian SLBM launchers. Implementation of these agreements is proceeding vigorously. CTR funding is currently providing assistance for nuclear weapons protection, control, and accounting, and for chemical weapons destruction in Russia as well.

CTR assistance to Belarus, Kazakstan, Russia and Ukraine can be categorized under three principal headings: weapon destruction and dismantlement; chain of custody; and demilitarization.

Nonproliferation is also a principal goal of the Nunn-Lugar program. The U.S. is helping Belarus, Kazakstan, Russia, and Ukraine ensure that expertise, special materials for weapons of mass destruction, and of course the weapons and delivery vehicles themselves remain under control of authorized personnel and do not spread beyond their borders to other countries or to sub-national groups.

ACDA's Role. ACDA provides arms control policy input to interagency consideration of CTR activities to promote denuclearization in the former Soviet Union, with particular attention to ensuring that the program continues to have as its highest priority the consolidation of all former Soviet strategic and tactical nuclear weapons into Russia in a safe and secure manner. ACDA supports the CTR program focus on dismantlement of strategic launch delivery vehicles and their associated equipment in a manner consistent with START I. ACDA personnel participated in the negotiation and conclusion of SSD agreements with Belarus, Kazakstan, Russia and Ukraine, which include the overarching "umbrella" agreements and the numerous implementing agreements. Now that these agreements have been negotiated, their implementation is left to the U.S. government agencies (the Departments of Defense and Energy) with the relevant programmatic responsibilities. ACDA continues to monitor the progress and direction of the CTR program by participating actively in interagency policy deliberations and decisions relating to the amendment of SSD implementing agreements.

5. SAFEGUARDS, TRANSPARENCY, AND IRREVERSIBILITY (ST&I)

Existing arms agreements do not require dismantling of retired nuclear warheads, as distinct from the launchers and vehicles that carry them. They do not even require that nuclear warheads be accounted for. Hence, such agreements limit neither stockpiles of nuclear warheads nor the fissile material for them. While U.S. CTR assistance is focused on assistance to dismantling delivery systems, a major CTR project is for assistance to design and build a facility to store fissile material from dismantled nuclear warheads. One of our current high-priority arms control objectives is to encourage Russian dismantlement of such warheads and to work out measures to make this warhead dismantlement transparent and irreversible. Transparency can support irreversibility in several ways:

At the January 1994 U.S.-Russian Summit, Presidents Clinton and Yeltsin explicitly agreed to seek more transparency and irreversibility in the process of reduction of nuclear weapons and to exchange detailed information on aggregate stockpiles of nuclear warheads, on stocks of fissile materials and on their safety and security. To that end, they established a Joint Working Group on Safeguards, Transparency, and Irreversibility and gave it a broad mandate to seek ways to improve transparency and irreversibility. This group has begun several separate transparency efforts and, as a result, a broad strategy for transparency and irreversibility in arms reduction is emerging. The September 1994 Summit added several specific new initiatives, including:

During 1995, Russia was slow to engage in STI discussions. At the May 1995 Summit, however, Russia and the United States reaffirmed their January and September 1994 commitments to pursue further measures to improve confidence in and increase the transparency and irreversibility of the process of nuclear arms reduction. They also reaffirmed their desire to exchange detailed information on aggregate stockpiles of nuclear warheads, on stocks of fissile materials and on their safety and security and to develop a process for exchanging this information regularly.

With respect to President Yeltsin's proposal for a treaty on nuclear safety and strategic stability among the five nuclear powers, the United States and Russia declared at the May 1995 Summit that:

In October 1995 Russia and the United States began the final phase of discussions on an agreement for cooperation between the governments enabling the exchange of classified or sensitive information as necessary to implement the arrangements called for above, by providing for the protection of that information.

The United States believes that the world should, as quickly as possible, move to an international convention banning production of fissile materials for use in nuclear explosives. This convention, which was proposed by President Clinton on September 27, 1993, would include effective verification measures which would provide additional transparency to the nuclear programs to the United States and Russia, as well as other countries that today lack safeguards on key production processes.

ACDA's Role. ACDA's role in the ST&I process is substantial. ACDA provides the ST&I deputy and other members of the U.S. ST&I Delegation. In addition, ACDA participates fully in the interagency ST&I policy formulation group, that develops guidance for the ST&I Delegation. ACDA also provides senior-level representatives to NSC-chaired working groups where U.S. ST&I policy is developed. In addition, ACDA provides both policy and technical representation in ST&I technical experts meetings.

6. DEFENSE INDUSTRY RESTRUCTURING AND CONVERSION

Millions of men and women and thousands of labs and factories constituted the industrial underpinning of the Cold War. Major legacies of the Cold War now include not only surplus weapons from nuclear bombs to tanks to submarines, but also the industries and people responsible for producing them. The competitors in that confrontation now face enormous defense industrial overcapacity, from factory space to highly-skilled scientists. Redirecting this capacity to peaceful civilian and/or commercial uses is critical to economic and political stability in countries undergoing such restructuring, as well as to enhancing our own national security.

While this problem affects almost any country with an arms industry, including both NATO members and former Warsaw Pact countries participating in the Partnership for Peace program, it is especially acute in the former Soviet Union, where the difficulty in converting industries, communities, and personnel is compounded by the simultaneous political and economic reforms taking place. The combination of (1) highly capable weapons designers and producers now without their traditional sources of income and (2) wealthy and unscrupulous would-be proliferant governments all too eager to hire these experts is not a local problem. It is a matter of grave concern to the United States and the entire world.

The U.S. Government is committed to assisting the transformation to peaceful civilian use of defense industries by encouraging participation of the U.S. private sector in this effort.

To accomplish this, the U.S. has established bilateral Defense Conversion Committees with Russia, Ukraine, Kazakstan, and Belarus and a Defense Conversion Commission with China. ACDA actively participates in these organizations and their efforts because of the Agency's commitment to preventing the spread of weapons-related equipment, technology, and expertise (especially in the area of weapons of mass destruction) that threatens to accompany economic dislocations, and to demilitarizing the associated economies. By maximizing the civilian opportunities that exist in these countries, we contribute to the orderly, transparent, and permanent shrinkage of this sector of the former Soviet economy, as well as to ensuring that fewer threats are likely to appear elsewhere.

In addition to its work with these bilateral organizations, ACDA, in cooperation with the U.S. Department of Energy and the Russian Ministry of Atomic Energy, has over the last several years sponsored several "entrepreneurial workshops" to support the conversion of facilities and personnel in the two key Russian nuclear weapons laboratories from weapons work to civilian projects. These workshops have focused on helping Russia identify potentially commercial technologies, creating initial plans to develop these technologies, and introducing developers to leading experts from relevant U.S. industries.

Conversion is an arduous, expensive, and time-consuming process, with benefits that are often difficult to quantify or which are apparent on balance-sheets only after several years. However, the contribution that the effort itself has made to increasing contact and trust between former adversaries, to increasing the confidence of those involved that they can operate successfully in a market economy, and to achieving stability and permanence in the reduction of excessive defense sectors, is immeasurable.

D. FISSILE MATERIAL PRODUCTION CUTOFF AND CONTROL

1. FISSILE MATERIAL CUTOFF TREATY (FMCT)

In September 1993, President Clinton proposed a ban on the production of fissile material for use in nuclear explosives or outside of international safeguards. In December 1993, the United Nations General Assembly agreed upon a consensus resolution endorsing such a ban.

A fissile material cutoff treaty (FMCT) is a high priority for the United States. In and of itself, it would constitute a decisive turn away from nuclear arms races and unsafeguarded fissile material production. A multilateral, effectively verifiable cutoff would cap the amount of fissile material available for use worldwide in nuclear weapons, thus limiting the number of nuclear weapons that could be produced. In particularly volatile areas, such as South Asia and the Middle East, that can least bear the risks of escalating arms races, an FMCT would be an especially important measure to strengthen stability.

Member states of the Conference on Disarmament (CD) agreed that the CD was the most appropriate forum to negotiate a cutoff, and agreed on a negotiating mandate in March of 1995. In the Principles and Objectives document that resulted from the NPT Review and Extension Conference in May 1995, the "immediate negotiation and early conclusion" of a cutoff treaty on terms consistent with the March mandate was further endorsed by all NPT adherents.

However, a handful of states are holding the start of FMCT negotiations hostage to other agenda items. Since the FMCT is in the interests of all states and should be negotiated on its own merits, the United States has opposed these procedural tactics to block the start of negotiations. We will redouble our efforts so that negotiations on a cutoff treaty can begin on terms consistent with the March 1995 mandate, with no linkages or conditions. In that context, the United States will seek to broaden support for the FMCT and work closely with allies on important substantive FMCT issues.

ACDA's Role. ACDA will continue to lead the U.S. Government's efforts to achieve a fissile material cutoff treaty. This includes heading the U.S. delegation to the Conference on Disarmament in Geneva, and chairing the interagency policy formulation process in Washington that develops guidance and instructions for the delegation.

2. CONTROLLING EXISTING FISSILE MATERIAL

Blending highly enriched uranium (HEU) with natural or low enriched uranium (LEU) for use in nuclear electric power plants is the most widely accepted solution for reducing accumulations of HEU from dismantled nuclear weapons. ACDA is committed to transparency in HEU disposition. As part of an agreement to purchase LEU blended by Russia from 500 or more tons of HEU extracted from dismantled nuclear weapons, we have urged measures to confirm that the source material used in the blending has actually come from dismantled nuclear weapons. To that end, we have provided technical experts to evaluate the transparency measures and have recommended improvements to those measures.

ACDA has also applied its expertise in nonproliferation and plutonium management to the comprehensive review of long term U.S. options for plutonium disposition underway since 1994, as well as to the evaluation of options for Russian plutonium disposition. These activities deal with a complex set of technical, nonproliferation, environmental, safety, health, and budgetary considerations. We will continue to evaluate a variety of potential options for proliferation resistance and technical feasibility. ACDA has also provided technical and policy expertise to the joint U.S.-Russian technical working group on fissile material disposition and accumulation launched by the Clinton-Yeltsin summit meeting in January 1994. In this area, we have worked with the Department of Energy and other agencies in developing plans for the U.S.-Russian joint technical studies to compare specific disposition options.

The U.S. does not recycle plutonium for electric power generation and does not encourage such recycling in civil nuclear programs anywhere. We believe the proliferation risk from plutonium recycling far exceeds any potential economic gain. To limit the possible proliferation risk if plutonium is to be recycled for electric power generation, the U.S. continues to engage other developed nations in discussing means to limit the stockpiling of civilian plutonium for electric power generation. These discussions have taken place in Vienna over the past year on the margins of the IAEA Board of Governors meetings. ACDA has helped develop and refine the concepts for a regime that would limit accumulation of plutonium by balancing the pace of plutonium separation with the pace of civilian plutonium consumption.

The U.S. has taken steps to submit to IAEA safeguards nuclear material deemed excess to U.S. national security needs. Also in 1994, the IAEA began inspections of excess plutonium in a vault at the Hanford Site in Washington state. Additional excess plutonium was submitted to IAEA safeguards at Hanford and in a facility at Rocky Flats near Denver, CO, during 1995. In 1994 and early 1995, several tons of HEU were placed under IAEA safeguards at one facility, and substantial quantities of plutonium were placed under IAEA safeguards at two more facilities. In March 1995, President Clinton further ordered that 200 tons of fissile material -- enough for thousands of nuclear weapons -- be permanently withdrawn from the U.S. nuclear stockpile and never again be used to build nuclear weapons. ACDA is actively working with the Department of Energy and other agencies to facilitate the goal of placing as much of this material under international safeguards as is practicable.

Plutonium Production Reactor Shutdown Agreement

ACDA has played a key role in the agreement signed by Vice President Gore and Prime Minister Chernomyrdin in June 1994 on Shutdown of Plutonium Production Reactors and the Cessation of Use of Newly Produced Plutonium for Nuclear Weapons. The agreement specifies that:

The only remaining former Soviet plutonium production reactors still in operation are two located at Tomsk-7 and one at Krasnoyarsk-26 in Russia, which continue to produce power and heat. Ten others in Russia and 13 in the United States have already been shut down. Although negotiations on the compliance regime for this agreement are not yet complete, they have made substantial progress. The sides have agreed that, as a first step, the monitoring measures should focus on detailed verification of subject plutonium placed into designated storage facilities, and on production-reactor modeling and monitoring to provide assurance that this plutonium was newly produced in the specified reactors and is the correct amount. ACDA has played a leading role in organizing groups of U.S. production-reactor and storage-facility experts in crafting such a regime and negotiating specific monitoring activities.

The agreement constitutes a positive step toward a global non-discriminatory treaty banning the production of fissile materials for use in nuclear weapons or outside of safeguards. Although the agreement will not formally enter into force until the sides exchange diplomatic notes to that effect, Russia has stated that as of October 1, 1994, it stopped using newly produced plutonium in nuclear weapons and was instead storing it in the form of plutonium oxide. The U.S. ceased producing fissile material for use in weapons in 1988.