Adherence To and Compliance With Arms Control Agreements


This Report is being submitted in response to the Congressional requirement in Section 51 of the Arms Control and Disarmament Act, which requires as part of the ACDA Annual Report, a discussion on Adherence to and Compliance With Arms Control Agreements. Section 51, paragraph (1)(C), mandates the inclusion of a section setting out U.S. planned next steps to each of the compliance questions raised.


This Report addresses U.S. compliance, compliance by Russia and other successor states to the former Soviet Union (FSU) to treaties and agreements concluded bilaterally with the Soviet Union, and compliance by other countries that are parties to multilateral agreements with the United States. The issues addressed reflect activities from January 1, 1997, through December 31, 1997, unless otherwise noted.



Effective arms control requires parties to comply fully with arms control obligations and commitments they have undertaken. Compliance with agreements freely negotiated by parties is a fundamental cornerstone of international law. The U.S. approach to compliance is deeply rooted in our own legal system and fundamental principles and values. To that end, the United States is committed to adhering to the same high standard of compliance that it requires of others.


Our deep-seated legal tradition, a political commitment to U.S. arms control agreements that enhance our security and that of our allies and friends, and our open society, create powerful incentives to comply with agreements to control nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass destruction. Legal and institutional procedures to ensure compliance have been established, and they reflect the seriousness with which these obligations are taken and reinforce these underlying policies and principles. Department of Defense (DoD) compliance review groups oversee and manage DoD compliance with arms control agreements. Department of Energy (DoE) compliance review panels and arms control coordinating committees ensure compliance with the Limited Test Ban Treaty (LTBT) and the Threshold Test Ban Treaty (TTBT). The Verification, Compliance Analysis Working Group (VCAWG), an interagency organization, oversees and manages the analysis of compliance with arms control agreements of our Treaty Partners. In addition, the VCAWG is responsible for the preparation of an annual report detailing the assessment of both the United States and other nations to obligations undertaken in all arms control, nonproliferation, and disarmament agreements to which the United States is a participating state. Moreover, an interagency review is conducted when other Treaty Parties officially raise questions regarding implementation of U.S. arms control obligations. Finally, Congress performs oversight functions through committee hearings and budget allocations.


Because of the broad scope of current arms control verification regimes and their extensive notification and data exchange requirements, the United States has committed some errors, but has acknowledged them to our treaty partners and taken steps to correct them. The United States continues to make every effort to comply with all obligations associated with each arms control agreement to which it is a party.

START Treaty

At the end of the START Treaty's first phase of reductions, U.S. strategic forces, as well as forces of the other Parties to the START Treaty, were well below the limits that came into effect in December 1997, and have met or are approaching limits that do not come into force until 1999.

As might be expected under a verification regime with the breadth and intrusiveness of START, a number of compliance questions have been raised by our Treaty Partners. In a series of demarches and high-level papers passed to the United States as well as in the JCIC, our Treaty Partners have raised questions regarding some U.S. practices.

The Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention

In June 1997, Cuba formally requested consultations under the Biological Weapons Convention (BWC) to consider its allegations that a U.S. State Department aircraft (model S2RHG-T-65) on an approved flight plan from Patrick AFB, FL, to Grand Cayman in October 1996, dispensed a crop-destroying insect (called Thrips palmi). The allegation was and is completely unfounded and false. The United States rejected the allegation as totally groundless noting that the U.S. aircraft could not have dispensed the insect as charged by Cuba, and there is no evidence linking the infestation to the U.S. overflight. On July 31, 1997, informal consultations were held in Geneva among BWC Parties to establish the procedures and date for formal consultations. Formal consultations were held August 25-27, 1997, in Geneva under the Chairmanship of the United Kingdom. Cuba and the United States made presentations. The Bureau was to resolve the outstanding issues and issue a report to BWC Parties by December 31, 1997. The Bureau's report was issued December 15, 1997, and concluded that "it has not proved possible to reach a definitive conclusion with regard to the concerns raised by the Government of Cuba," and did not recommend any follow-on actions. The report did go on to say "there has been general agreement throughout the process that the requirements of Article V of the Convention and of the consultative process established by the Third Review Conference have been fulfilled in an impartial and transparent manner."

The Chemical Weapons Convention

The Chemical Weapons Convention entered into force on April 29, 1997. Several countries have cited the United States for non-compliance with the CWC for its failure to fully comply with the declaration provisions of the convention. While the United States provided a full and complete declaration of its chemical weapons and related facilities, it was unable to file a declaration of its chemical industry facilities because the Congress had not completed action on the implementing legislation that would authorize the Department of Commerce to collect commercial information. This lack of an industry declaration compromises U.S. effectiveness in the OPCW. Thirty-four initial inspections of U.S. DoD facilities were completed from August through November 1997. The Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW) and the United States are engaged in consultations to clarify technical questions which arose during the initial CWC inspections.



The Treaty Between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the Elimination of Their Intermediate-Range and Shorter-Range Missiles (INF Treaty) was signed by President Reagan and Soviet General Secretary Gorbachev on December 8, 1987, and entered into force on June 1, 1988. The INF Treaty is of unlimited duration, and required the complete elimination of all U.S. and former Soviet INF missiles and launchers, that is, those missiles with ranges between 500 and 5,500 kilometers, and their associated support equipment and structures, no less than 3 years after the Treaty entered into force.

The principal goal of the INF Treaty was achieved on May 28, 1991, with the destruction of the last Soviet declared SS-20 missile launcher and transporter vehicle. That event marked the final elimination of all declared Treaty-limited items under the provisions of the INF Treaty; however, the ban on the possession, production, or flight-testing of INF missile systems remains in force and must be effectively verified for the duration of the Treaty. To accomplish that task, the Treaty established a verification regime which uses methods which are mutually reinforcing -- national technical means (NTM) and an inspection regime consisting of on-site inspection and continuous portal monitoring -- to detect and deter violations of Treaty obligations. The inspection regime began in 1988 and, by the terms of the Treaty, continues until May 31, 2001.

The Parties have the right to conduct an annual quota of short-notice inspections at former INF missile facilities, and to perform continuous monitoring at the portals of any facility at which ballistic missiles that use a stage that is "outwardly similar" to a stage of banned INF missiles are assembled. Currently, the United States monitors the portal at the missile final assembly plant at Votkinsk, Russia, while Russian inspectors monitor the missile production facility at Magna, Utah. By the terms of the Treaty, the annual quota for short-notice inspections was reduced on June 1, 1996, to 10 inspections per year for each side for the remaining five years of the inspection regime.

With the dissolution of the Soviet Union, the United States recognizes 12 former Soviet republics as successor states to the INF Treaty, who remain subject to the treaty's indefinite ban on the possession, production, and flight testing of intermediate-range and shorter-range missiles. Six of those states -- Belarus, Kazakhstan, Ukraine, Russia, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan -- have inspectable facilities covered by the INF Treaty located on their territories. The first four of the six are active participants in implementation of the Treaty through the Special Verification Commission (SVC), which is the implementing body for the INF Treaty. Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan have only one inspectable facility each on their respective territories but do not participate in inspections or attend meetings of the SVC. Because of these factors, as a matter of policy, the United States has elected not to conduct short-notice inspections at the two facilities on their territory. The United States informed the other Parties that it also would no longer conduct INF inspections at the former Soviet facilities in the Baltic states (Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania).

Inspections at Votkinsk. During SVC-XX, in November 1997, the Parties concluded a package of documents related to longer-term inspection procedures for new Russian missiles exiting the missile production plant at Votkinsk, i.e., the "Start" Space Launch Vehicle (SLV), the "Start-1" SLV, and the SS-X-27 ICBM -- for both silo and road-mobile launcher. This package of documents included a multilateral "umbrella" amendment to the Memorandum of Agreement amending the terms of the 1988 Votkinsk Agreed Statement to permit the legal exit of these four new missiles and authorizing the United States and Russia to enter into bilateral agreements on specific new inspection procedures for these missiles. The United States and Russia concluded three such missile-specific agreements: one agreement for each of the two SLVs and one agreement for the SS-X-27 ICBM. These documents, and the procedures they codify, allow the United States to exercise its Treaty inspection rights, including non-damaging CargoScanTM imaging, at the Votkinsk portal for these new missiles.


The Treaty between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms (START) was signed on July 31, 1991. The December 1991 breakup of the Soviet Union resulted in the emergence of twelve independent states, four of which had strategic offensive arms (SOA) located on their territory -- Belarus, Kazakhstan, Russia, and Ukraine. The five Parties ratified START and it entered into force on December 5, 1994.

Belarus, Kazakhstan, Russia, and Ukraine are in compliance with the START SOA central limits. START requires that each side reduce SOA to a level that does not exceed 2,100 deployed launchers, 9,150 deployed warheads, and 8,050 deployed ballistic missile warheads no later than three years following entry into force (EIF). Additionally, START Treaty successor states of the Soviet Union are committed to reduce at least 22 heavy ICBM SS-18 silo launchers each year during this time frame until the limit of 154 heavy ICBM silo launchers is reached. By the end of the third Treaty-year, the successor states had reduced their aggregate forces to 1,598 deployed launchers, 7,641 deployed warheads, and 6,719 deployed ballistic missile warheads, and had eliminated 128 heavy ICBM silo launchers since EIF leaving a balance of 180 heavy ICBM silo launchers.

Notwithstanding the overall success of START implementation, a number of issues related to compliance with START provisions arose in the third year of Treaty implementation. This is to be expected under a Treaty as comprehensive and detailed as START, which governs all facets of two widely disparate strategic nuclear force structures. However, the Parties continue to work through the JCIC, the Treaty's implementing body, to ensure smooth implementation of the Treaty and effective resolution of compliance issues and questions.


The Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production, Stockpiling and Use of Chemical Weapons and on their Destruction was ratified by the United States on April 25, 1997, and entered into force on April 29, 1997. As of December 31, 1997, there were 106 States Parties to the Convention.

This Report finds implementation of the CWC proceeding well, despite a steep learning curve for all concerned entities. Both the newly formed Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW) and CWC States Parties are working hard to meet the heavy demands of the first year of CWC implementation and to integrate more recent States Parties into the regime.

Consistent with its status as a new organization, the OPCW is working to put in place uniform procedures for such things as the handling and protection of State Parties data declarations. This should help address delays in the dissemination of data declarations, which in some cases have not been released to State Parties until several months after they have been received by the OPCW. It also should help address questions about the OPCW Technical Secretariat's approach to redacting information from data declarations. Although intended to protect the confidentiality of information, the redacting has, in a number of cases, led to questions and uncertainties about States Parties declarations.

Countries that were original State Parties to the CWC were required to submit their initial data declaration not later than 30 days after entry into force. Countries that ratify subsequently become State Parties 30 days after the deposit of their instrument of ratification and are required to submit their initial data declaration 30 days after becoming a State Party.

Under the CWC, a State Party is required to declare, inter alia, whether it:

  • owns or possesses any chemical weapons, or whether there are any chemical weapons under its jurisdiction or control;

  • has on its territory old or abandoned chemical weapons or has abandoned chemical weapons on the territory of another State Party;

  • has or has had any chemical weapons production facility under its jurisdiction or control at any time since January 1, 1946;

  • had transferred or received directly or indirectly any equipment for the production of chemical weapons since January 1, 1946;

  • has any facility or establishment in any place under its jurisdiction or control that has been designed, constructed or used since January 1, 1946, primarily for the development of chemical weapons; and,

  • holds riot control agents for riot control purposes.

The United States is working closely with the OPCW to help it expedite the dissemination of declarations and the results of inspection activities, and is encouraging both the Technical Secretariat and State Parties to be as transparent as possible about the contents of declarations and inspection results. The United States also is pursuing questions about data declarations directly with the State Parties concerned. Nevertheless, until the United States completes its declaration requirements under the CWC, it will be difficult to press either the OPCW or other State Parties for greater transparency or to work effectively with other Parties to address questions about their implementation of CWC obligations.

Wyoming MOU and BDA

During the past year there has been no progress on resolving remaining U.S. questions concerning certain aspects of the Russian data declaration. Neither has there been any concrete progress toward implementing the BDA. Discussions are continuing.


1. The 1972 Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention

The 1972 Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention (BWC) prohibits development of biological warfare (BW) capabilities beyond those justifiable for prophylactic, protective, or other peaceful purposes. Currently there are 140 States Parties to the Convention.

The issue addressed in this Report is whether the nations reviewed are complying with the obligations assumed under the 1972 BWC and are providing accurate data under agreed BWC Confidence Building Measures (CBMs).

1) Russia. Previous assessments of Russian compliance have highlighted the dichotomy between what appears to be the commitment from President Yeltsin and other members of the Russian leadership in attempting to resolve BWC issues and the continued involvement of "old hands" in BWC Protocol negotiations and in what Russia describes as its defensive BW program.

With regard to former Soviet biological weapon related facilities, some research and production facilities are being deactivated and many have taken severe personnel and funding cuts. However, some facilities, in addition to being engaged in legitimate activity, may be maintaining the capability to produce BW agents. The Russian Federation's 1993-1997 BWC data declarations contained no new information and its 1992 declaration was incomplete and misleading in certain areas. With regard to the trilateral process that began in 1992, while there has been progress toward achieving the openness intended in the Joint Statement (which calls for a series of confidence-building visits and information exchanges), the progress has not resolved all U.S. concerns.

2) Iraq. Until the August 17, 1995, defection of General Hussein Kamel Hassan to Jordan, Iraq claimed that it had met its obligations under the BWC. Iraq then presented UNSCOM with dramatically new information on its past BW program, including details concerning weaponization, agents, and sites. Iraq's accounts of weapon development and deployment remain incomplete, as are its accounts of overall military dimensions and concepts of use. Many UNSCOM biological inspection teams visited Iraq in 1996-97 to obtain further details about Iraq's BW. UNSCOM has yet to receive documentation which supports: (1) the information contained in Iraq's Full, Final, and Complete Declaration, (2) Iraqi claims that all BW agents and weapons have been destroyed, or (3) Iraqi claims that its BW program has been dismantled.

As a signatory to the BWC in 1972, Iraq was obligated not to take any actions which would have defeated the object and purpose of the BWC and its accession to the BWC in 1991 obligated Iraq to destroy or divert to peaceful purposes all agents, toxins, and delivery means in its possession or under its jurisdiction or control. The United States believes that since 1972 Iraq has developed, produced, and stockpiled BW agents and weapons. Though the recent Iraqi disclosures have been substantial, we believe that Iraq has not yet presented all details of its offensive BW program. The United States suspects that Iraq is not in compliance with the BWC.

3) China. The United States believes that China had an offensive BW program prior to 1984 when it became a Party to the BWC, and maintained an offensive BW program throughout most of the 1980s. The offensive BW program included the development, production, stockpiling or other acquisition or maintenance of BW agents. China's CBM-mandated declarations have not resolved U.S. concerns about this program, and there are strong indications that China probably maintains its offensive program. The United States, therefore, believes that in the years after its accession to the BWC, China was not in compliance with its BWC obligations and that it is highly probable that it remains noncompliant with these obligations.

4) Syria. Syria has signed but has not ratified the BWC. The United States reaffirms its previous judgment that it is highly probable that Syria is developing an offensive BW capability.

5) Iran. The Iranian BW program has been embedded within Iran's extensive biotechnology and pharmaceutical industries so as to obscure its activities. The Iranian military has used medical, education and scientific research organizations for many aspects of BW agent procurement, research, and production. Iran has also failed to submit the data declarations called for in the CBMs.

The United States reiterates its previous finding that Iran probably has produced BW agents and apparently has weaponized a small quantity of those agents.

6) Egypt. Egypt has signed but has not ratified the BWC. The United States believes that Egypt had developed BW agents by 1972. There is no evidence to indicate that Egypt had eliminated this capability and it remains likely that the Egyptian capability to conduct BW continues to exist.

7) Libya. Evidence suggests Libya is seeking to acquire the capability to develop and produce BW agents. Such development or production would violate key provisions of the BWC. Libya also has failed to submit the data declarations stipulated in the CBMs.

Evidence indicates that Libya has the expertise to produce small quantities of biological equipment for its BW program and that the Libyan Government is seeking to move its research program into a program of weaponized BW agents.

8) Taiwan. The United States believes that Taiwan has been upgrading its biotechnology capabilities by purchasing sophisticated biotechnology equipment from the United States, Switzerland, and other countries. The evidence indicating a BW program is not sufficient to determine if Taiwan is engaged in activities prohibited by the BWC.

2. The Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe (CFE)

During 1997, most of the provisions of the CFE Treaty were implemented with continuing success. By the end of 1997, the States Parties had reduced more than 51,300 pieces of conventional armaments and equipment inside the CFE zone according to full Treaty provisions, with many States Parties having reduced their holdings to lower levels than required -- notifying voluntary reductions of over 3,300 items of equipment below limits. By the same time, Russia had notified for destruction or conversion another approximately 11,600 items toward obligations outside of the CFE area of application inherited from the former Soviet Union (FSU). Meanwhile, more than 3,000 intrusive on-site inspections had taken place by the end of the year.

On May 15, 1997, the Flank Agreement signed at the May 1996 Review Conference entered fully into force. Also in 1997, the States Parties began negotiations to adapt the Treaty to new political circumstances, including the dissolution of the Warsaw Pact and the Soviet Union and enlargement of NATO.

Nevertheless, most of the compliance issues that were described in last year's Report continue to be of concern, although some were resolved and some others appear to be approaching resolution. Armenia and Azerbaijan continue to exceed their maximum levels of treaty-limited equipment (TLE) in one or more categories. Both states have still never declared a proper reduction obligation, and neither has carried out the reductions it would be required to complete according to Treaty rules. There was further corroboration of the transfer of TLE from Russia to Armenia without any notifications by either state. The Russian press reported on official Russian investigation reports that indicated quantities of TLE had been illegally transferred to Armenia from 1994 to 1996. Other continuing, unresolved concerns include: improper designation by Russia of armored personnel carriers (APCs) as ambulances; Russia's stationing of forces on the territory of other States Parties without their consent; and, Russia's continued refusal to report MT-LB-U APC look-alikes which are accountable under the CFE Protocol on Existing Types. Similarly, concerns remain over the quantities of equipment several States Parties (Bulgaria, Belarus, Hungary, and Ukraine) have declared as temporarily in the zone while awaiting export, with Belarus of particular concern since it has used TLE declared as awaiting export as a replacement and modernization stock. In addition, the eight CFE successor states to the FSU have made little or no progress on meeting their collective obligation to declare and complete TLE reductions equal to those the Soviet Union would have been obligated to complete, although progress was made in the Joint Consultative Group in developing measures to address the partially contributory problem of unaccounted for and uncontrolled TLE. Finally, Russia and Ukraine continue to share an unfulfilled obligation to carry out naval infantry/coastal defense (NI/CD) related reductions equal to those contained in the Soviet Union's legally binding commitment of June 1991. This issue, however, also shows signs of progress as Russia and Ukraine have finally agreed on the division of the assets of the former Soviet Black Sea Fleet -- an issue which had long blocked resolution of the NI/CD-related reduction issue.

During 1997, a number of new issues arose. Among them was the deployment of Armenian armed forces and TLE on the territory of Azerbaijan without Azerbaijani consent. Others included Russia's failure to declare a unit and its TLE and Russia's declaration of excessive numbers of decommissioned TLE temporarily in the area of application while awaiting disposal. In addition, Ukrainian data as of January 1, 1998, showed Ukraine to have exceeded limits on equipment in active units in zone 4.3. Other new issues involving Russia or Belarus related to on-site inspections. Both States Parties improperly denied full access to one or more sites, while Russia also restricted treaty-provided in-country and inspection time on one or more occasions.


In general terms, compliance with the Vienna Document has continued to be good. A very few states failed to submit data as of January 1, 1997, and several failed to submit data on time as of January 1, 1998. In addition, there have been some other -- mostly minor -- notification, data, and inspection problems similar to those discussed under CFE.


This Report updates developments relevant to other nations' compliance with the 1968 Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT), and addresses in particular developments in North Korea, Iraq, Iran, Libya, and China. Additionally, 54 countries, have not yet complied with their obligations under Article III of the NPT to conclude with the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) and put into effect a full-scope safeguards agreement within 18 months after joining the NPT. The U.S. will continue to urge all NPT parties required to do so to complete full-scope safeguards agreements with the IAEA in a timely fashion.

1) China. Over the past year China has taken some steps to establish a comprehensive export control system which places it in a much better position than a year ago to ensure its compliance with the NPT. China's decision to join the Zangger Committee also reflects the importance China attaches to fulfilling its NPT obligations. Moreover, China's cooperation on individual cases during 1997 and its continued compliance with its May 1996 commitment not to assist unsafeguarded nuclear facilities further demonstrates the degree of Chinese commitment not to assist other countries to acquire nuclear weapons.

2) Iran. Although Iran's rudimentary program has apparently met with limited success so far, the U.S. believes Iran has not abandoned its efforts to expand its nuclear infrastructure to support nuclear weapon development. U.S. pressure and Iran's highly questionable NPT nonproliferation credentials have caused nuclear suppliers to refrain from cooperation with Tehran, Russia being the most notable exception. Iran is aware that its nuclear intentions are suspect despite its status as an NPT State Party and that these suspicions have limited its ability to obtain foreign technology, equipment, and facilities.

In late 1995, Iran accepted part one of the IAEA Strengthened Safeguards System (93+2) which allows the IAEA to conduct environmental sampling at declared facilities. Acceptance of additional Strengthened Safeguards measures (i.e., Part II measures) by Iran has not yet occurred, but such measures are seen as important in the effort to ensure compliance by non-nuclear-weapon states with their NPT Article II obligations.

3) Iraq. The United States has determined that Iraq violated its safeguards agreement when it pursued an active nuclear weapons development program and that this program violated Iraq's obligations under Articles II and III of the NPT. The United States Government has further determined that Iraq has continued to undermine the UNSCOM/IAEA inspection process by withholding relevant information, and to preserve as much nuclear-related technology and expertise as possible for a renewed weapons effort.

Iraq's nuclear weapons program violated Article II of the NPT. Its construction of secret nuclear facilities, including a facility for nuclear weapons development and assembly, contributed to its violation of Article II. Iraq's failure to apply safeguards to its clandestine program also constituted a violation of Article III, which requires that safeguards be applied "with a view to preventing diversion of nuclear energy from peaceful purposes to nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices."

4) Libya. The United States has determined that Libya has demonstrated a continuing interest in the acquisition of nuclear weapons but that it has not progressed beyond the early stages of developing a nuclear weapons program. Libya's longstanding interest in acquiring nuclear weapons strongly suggests that its nuclear research and procurement efforts are aimed at development of an indigenous nuclear weapons capability. This may be inconsistent with Libya's NPT Article II obligations.

5) North Korea. The United States Government has determined that North Korea has yet to comply fully with its NPT Article III obligations. Serious questions remain regarding the DPRK's intentions and regarding the possibility that North Korea violated its NPT Article II obligation "not to manufacture or otherwise acquire nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices." However, the signing of the Agreed Framework is significant as it requires North Korea to resolve these concerns.

In accordance with the Agreed Framework, North Korea has allowed the IAEA a continuous presence at Nyongbyon. However, it has not allowed "special inspections" pursuant to the NPT. Although the Agreed Framework creates a process for resolving the North Korean nuclear issue, the DPRK's efforts over the past few years to obstruct the full implementation of full-scope IAEA safeguards required by Article III of the NPT continue, as does international concern about the DPRK's nuclear intentions. The DPRK clearly is not meeting its NPT Article III commitments.

Conclusive statements cannot yet be made about the extent to which North Korea is concealing evidence that would indicate a violation of its NPT Article II commitment. The DPRK's actions to obstruct and confuse the IAEA's ability to preserve important historical information on the 5-MWe reactor's fuel to determine plutonium production, combined with its previous refusal to allow special inspections at two nuclear waste sites, may reflect an attempt to hide evidence that it has violated Article II. The United States believes that the DPRK's efforts to prevent the IAEA from learning about past activities raises serious questions about a potential Article II violation.