Adherence To and Compliance With Arms Control Agreements


This Report is being submitted in response to the Congressional requirement in Section 51 of the Arms Control and Disarmament Act, which requires as part of the ACDA Annual Report, a discussion on Adherence to and Compliance With Arms Control Agreements. Section 51, paragraph (1)(C) mandates the inclusion of a section setting out U.S. planned next steps to each of the compliance questions raised. Details of the information contained in this Report are contained in classified annexes under separate cover.


This Report addresses U.S. compliance, compliance by Russia and other successor states to the former Soviet Union (FSU) to treaties and agreements concluded bilaterally with the Soviet Union, and compliance by other countries that are parties to multilateral agreements with the United States. The issues addressed reflect activities from December 1, 1995, through December 31, 1996, unless otherwise noted.



Effective arms control requires parties to comply fully with arms control obligations and commitments they have undertaken. Compliance with agreements freely negotiated by parties is a fundamental cornerstone of international law. The United States' approach to compliance is deeply rooted in our own legal system and fundamental principles and values. To that end, the United States is committed to adhering to the same high standard of compliance that it requires of others.


Our deep-seated legal tradition, a political commitment to U.S. arms control agreements that enhance our security and that of our allies and friends, and our open society, create powerful incentives to comply with agreements to control nuclear and other weapons. Legal and institutional procedures to ensure compliance have been established, and they reflect the seriousness with which these obligations are taken and reinforce these underlying policies and principles. Department of Defense (DoD) compliance review groups oversee and manage DoD compliance with arms control agreements. Department of Energy (DoE) compliance review panels and arms control coordinating committees ensure compliance with the Limited Test Ban Treaty (LTBT) and the Threshold Test Ban Treaty (TTBT). Finally, Congress performs oversight functions through committee hearings and budget allocations.


Because of the broad scope of current arms control verification regimes and their extensive notification and data exchange requirements, the United States has committed some errors, described in the classified annexes, but has acknowledged them to our treaty partners and taken steps to correct them. The United States continues to make every effort to comply scrupulously with all obligations associated with each arms control agreement to which it is a party.


The entry-into-force of START ushered in a verification regime of unprecedented complexity and intrusiveness. In addition to verification by national technical means (NTM), data notifications, missile flight test telemetry exchanges, and other cooperative measures, the Treaty provides for 12 types of on-site inspections and exhibitions, as well as continuous on-site monitoring activities at specified facilities. During 1996, the United States hosted 27 such on-site inspections at U.S. facilities.

In a series of demarches and high-level papers passed to the United States as well as in the Joint Compliance and Inspection Commission (JCIC), our Treaty Partners have raised questions regarding some U.S. practices.

The Russian Federation has raised a number of questions regarding U.S. telemetry-related products provided in accordance with the Telemetry Protocol of the START Treaty. The majority of these questions deal with data provided to assist the Russian Federation in analyzing telemetric information contained on tapes provided after each flight test of an ICBM or SLBM.

The United States corrected the discrepancies it found, reported its conclusions to the other Parties' telemetry experts in the JCIC, and provided the corrections to the Russian Federation. Actions have been taken to ensure these problems do not reoccur.

With regard to other items of concern, the United States believes its implementation of its obligations is consistent with the Treaty. Many issues have been satisfactorily resolved. The United States continues to address those issues that are unresolved with its Treaty partners within the framework of the JCIC.



The Treaty Between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the Elimination of Their Intermediate-Range and Shorter-Range Missiles (INF Treaty) was signed by President Reagan and Soviet General Secretary Gorbachev on December 8, 1987, and entered into force on June 1, 1988. The INF Treaty is of unlimited duration, and required the complete elimination of all U.S. and former Soviet INF missiles, that is, those missiles with ranges between 500 and 5,500 kilometers, and their associated equipment and facilities, no less than 3 years after the Treaty entered into force.

The principal goal of the INF Treaty -- the complete elimination of declared U.S. and Soviet intermediate- and shorter-range missiles -- was achieved on May 28, 1991, with the destruction of the last Soviet-declared SS-20 missile launcher and transporter vehicle. That event marked the final elimination of all declared Treaty-limited items under the provisions of the INF Treaty; however, the ban on the possession, production, or flight-testing of INF missile systems remains in force and must be effectively verified for the duration of the Treaty. To accomplish that task, the Treaty establishes a verification regime which uses methods which are mutually reinforcing -- NTM and an inspection regime consisting of on-site inspection and continuous portal monitoring -- to detect and deter violations of Treaty obligations. The inspection regime began in 1988 and, by the terms of the Treaty, continues until May 31, 2001.

The Parties have the right to conduct an annual quota of short-notice inspections at former INF missile facilities, and to perform continuous monitoring at the portals for any facility at which ballistic missiles that use a stage that is "outwardly similar" to a stage of banned INF missiles are assembled. Currently, the United States monitors the portal at the missile final assembly plant at Votkinsk, Russia, while Russian inspectors monitor the missile production facility at Magna, Utah. By the terms of the Treaty, the annual quota for short-notice inspections was reduced on June 1, 1996, to 10 inspections per year for each side for the remaining five years of the inspection regime.

With the dissolution of the Soviet Union, the United States recognizes 12 former Soviet republics as successor states to the INF Treaty. Six of those states -- Belarus, Kazakstan, Ukraine, Russia, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan -- have inspectable facilities covered by the INF Treaty located on their territories. The first four of the six are active participants in implementation of the Treaty through the Special Verification Commission (SVC), which is the implementing body for the INF Treaty. The last two states -- Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan -- have only one inspectable facility each on their respective territories. Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan do not participate in inspections or attend meetings of the SVC. The United States informed the other Parties that it would no longer conduct INF inspections at the former Soviet facilities in the Baltic states (Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania).

Compliance Issue at Votkinsk. The United States and Russia have been engaged in an intensive diplomatic effort to resolve an issue, which was originally identified in an INF Treaty compliance finding in the May 30, 1995, Report on the Adherence to and Compliance with Arms Control Agreements. On December 25, 1993, Russia exited what it declared to be a training model of the RS-12M Variant 2 ICBM for silo launcher (U.S. designation --SS-X-27 ICBM) from the Votkinsk Machine Building Plant, but refused to allow U.S. inspectors to use the full-range of existing INF inspection procedures for the missile.

An interim policy arrangement was agreed to in 1994 while both parties have worked to finalize longer-term inspection procedures for the new missiles exiting Votkinsk -- the SS-X-27 ICBM, and the "Start" and "Start-1" space launch vehicles which are derived from the SS-25 ICBM. This policy arrangement, effective until July 1, 1995, allowed for a limited number of missiles to exit the facility without being imaged by the CargoScanTM system, but still subject to all other inspection procedures. Since the longer-term inspection procedures had not been agreed to by July 1, 1995, the interim policy arrangement was extended to permit the rest of the limited number of allowed missiles to exit from the facility. The extension of the interim policy arrangement included agreement to image with the CargoScanTM system the missiles exiting after July 1, 1995. Discussions are ongoing with respect to the inspection procedures for these new missiles. Without agreed longer-term inspection procedures, after the exit of the last missiles allowed by the interim policy arrangement, the Russian Federation will not be able to exit legally any new missiles from Votkinsk.


The Treaty between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms (START) was signed on July 31, 1991. The December 1991 breakup of the Soviet Union resulted in the emergence of 12 independent states, four of which had strategic offensive arms (SOA) located on their territory -- Belarus, Kazakstan, the Russian Federation, and Ukraine.

A number of issues related to compliance with START provisions arose in the second year of Treaty implementation. This is to be expected under a Treaty as comprehensive and detailed as START, which governs all facets of two widely disparate strategic nuclear force structures.

For example, Russia has been using different submarine launched ballistic missile (SLBM) elimination procedures for removing its liquid-fueled SLBMs from Treaty accountability than those discussed in the Joint Compliance and Inspection Commission (JCIC) before Treaty entry-into-force (EIF). During JCIC-XIII the Parties agreed on coordinated plenary statements expressing the understanding that Russia's liquid-propellant SLBMs shall be considered to have been rendered inoperable, precluding their use for their original purposes, after carrying out certain additional procedures. The United States considers that the use of these additional procedures by Russia resolved this issue.

Belarus, Kazakstan, the Russian Federation, and Ukraine are in compliance with the START SOA reduction obligations. START requires that each side reduce SOA to a level that does not exceed 2,100 deployed launchers, 9,150 deployed warheads, and 8,050 deployed ballistic missile warheads no later than three years following EIF. Additionally, START Treaty successor states of the Soviet Union are committed to reduce at least 22 heavy ICBM launchers per year during this timeframe. By the end of the second Treaty year, the successor states had reduced their aggregate forces to 1,664 deployed launchers, 7,984 deployed warheads, and 7,070 deployed ballistic missile warheads, and had eliminated 106 heavy ICBM launchers since EIF. The United States is confident that these reductions were accomplished in an irreversible manner.

In a related development, Russia withdrew the remaining 16 SS-25 ICBMs and 18 road-mobile launchers from Belarus in late November 1996.

The Parties continue to work through the JCIC, the Treaty's implementing body, to ensure smooth implementation of the Treaty and effective resolution of compliance issues and questions.


The issue is whether Russia has met its obligations under the Wyoming Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) and whether Russia has undertaken actions which would defeat the object and purpose of the Bilateral Destruction Agreement (BDA) or the 161- nation Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC).

In the 1994 report (dated May 1995), the United States found that:

Two phases comprise the Wyoming MOU. Phase I ended in 1991. Phase II, which began on January 14, 1994, consisted of a two-part data exchange on the respective country's chemical weapons (CW) program including stockpiles and facilities associated with the development, production and storage of CW and five inspections by each country of facilities declared under Phase II. The data exchanged was intended to serve not only Phase II purposes, but also to be an indicator of the two countries' approaches to data declarations under the BDA and, in part, under the CWC. The data exchange occurred in April and May 1994 and the inspections began in August 1994 and ended in December 1994.

After completion of the Phase II inspections and declarations of the Wyoming MOU, the two sides agreed, in order to contribute to CWC implementation negotiations, to issue a Joint Report on the results of the Wyoming MOU. Draft Joint Reports on implementation of the Wyoming MOU have been exchanged on several occasions. However, as of the date of this report, agreement has not been reached on the final text for the Joint Report to closeout the Wyoming MOU.

The BDA verification measures, if approved by the CWC's Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons, are expected to substitute for several multilateral CWC verification requirements.

In March 1995, President Yeltsin signed an edict establishing the Interdepartmental Commission for Chemical Disarmament (ICCD). The ICCD is chaired by Yeltsin's National Security Adviser, Yuri Baturin. In April 1996, Presidential Decree #542 gave Presidential Status to the government's "Federal Targeted program on the Destruction of Chemical Weapon Stockpiles in the Russian Federation." This program summarizes the distribution of the Russian CW stockpile and states that its purpose is to meet CWC requirements for the destruction of CW.

In February 1996, the Russian Delegation to the CWC Preparatory Commission (PrepCom) proposed that negotiators stop assuming the BDA will be in effect when the CWC enters into force. In subsequent informal discussions, Russian negotiators cited financial considerations and a preference for multilateral inspections as a reason for this approach.

In his statement to the CWC PrepCom Plenary in July 1996, the head of the Russian Delegation declared the Russian Government's position that:

Continued statements by some Russian officials indicate Russian ratification of the CWC would parallel U.S. ratification. The Russian resolution of ratification was sent to President Yeltsin at the end of December 1996.

Russia has officially stated its commitment to destroy, and not replace, its declared CW stocks. The Russian Duma, on December 27, 1996, passed a law on the destruction of CW; however, the Federation Council voted it down on January 23, 1997, on the grounds that it did not provide sufficient guarantees for ecological safety.

The BDA has not entered into force. Russia has been unwilling to engage in efforts to resolve remaining differences in the implementation protocols. Also, in The Hague, the Russians have reiterated their desire that verification of CW destruction be accomplished by a multinational inspectorate under the auspices of the CWC. Strong sentiment within the PrepCom for a "possessor pays" arrangement has caused the Russians to begin to reassess their position. In any event, Russia's continued approach to certain Wyoming MOU Phase II data issues will, if not resolved, have implications for implementation of the BDA.



The 1972 Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention (BWC) prohibits development of biological warfare (BW) capabilities beyond those justifiable for prophylactic, protective, or other peaceful purposes. Currently there are 139 States Parties to the Convention.

The issue addressed in this Report is whether the nations reviewed are complying with the obligations assumed under the 1972 BWC and are providing accurate data under agreed BWC Confidence-Building Measures (CBMs).

1) Russia. Previous assessments of Russian compliance have highlighted the dichotomy between what appears to be the commitment from President Yeltsin and other members of the Russian leadership in attempting to resolve BWC issues and the continued involvement of "old hands" in trilateral BW discussions, BWC negotiations and in what Russia describes as its defensive BW program.

With regard to former Soviet biological weapon- related facilities, some research and production facilities are being deactivated and many have taken severe personnel and funding cuts. However, some facilities, in addition to being engaged in legitimate activity, may be maintaining the capability to produce BW agents. The Russian Federation's 1993-1996 BWC data declarations contained no new information and its 1992 declaration was incomplete and misleading in certain areas. With regard to the trilateral process that began in 1992, while there has been progress toward achieving the openness intended in the Joint Statement (which calls for a series of confidence-building visits and information exchanges), the progress has not resolved all U.S. concerns.

2) Iraq. Until the August 17, 1995, defection of General Hussein Kamel Hassan to Jordan, Iraq claimed that it had met its obligations under the BWC. Iraq then presented UNSCOM with dramatically new information on its past BW program, including details concerning weaponization, agents, and sites. Iraq's accounts of weapon development and deployment remain incomplete, as are its accounts of overall military dimensions and concepts of use. Many UNSCOM biological inspection teams visited Iraq in 1996 to obtain further details about Iraq's BW program. UNSCOM has yet to receive documentation which supports (1) the information contained in Iraq's Full, Final, and Complete Declaration, (2) Iraqi claims that all BW agents and weapons have been destroyed, or (3) Iraqi claims that its BW program has been dismantled.

The United States believes that after signing the BWC in 1972, Iraq developed, produced, and stockpiled BW agents and weapons. Though the recent Iraqi disclosures have been substantial, we believe that Iraq has not yet presented all details of its offensive BW program. The United States suspects that Iraq is not in compliance with the BWC.

3) China. The United States believes that China had an offensive BW program prior to 1984 when it became a Party to the BWC, and maintained an offensive BW program throughout most of the 1980s. The offensive BW program included the development, production, stockpiling or other acquisition or maintenance of BW agents. China's CBM-mandated declarations have not resolved U.S. concerns about this program, and there are strong indications that China probably maintains its offensive program. The United States, therefore, believes that in the years after its accession to the BWC, China was not in compliance with its BWC obligations and that it is highly probable that it remains noncompliant with these obligations.

4) Syria. Syria has signed but has not ratified the BWC. The United States reaffirms its previous judgment that it is highly probable that Syria is developing an offensive BW capability.

5) Iran. The Iranian BW program has been embedded within Iran's extensive biotechnology and pharmaceutical industries so as to obscure its activities. The Iranian military has used medical, education and scientific research organizations for many aspects of BW agent procurement, research, and production. Iran has also failed to submit the data declarations called for in the CBMs.

The United States reiterates its previous finding that Iran probably has produced BW agents and apparently has weaponized a small quantity of those agents.

6) Egypt. Egypt has signed but has not ratified the BWC. The United States believes that Egypt has developed BW agents by 1972. There is no evidence to indicate that Egypt had eliminated this capability and it remains likely that the Egyptian capability to conduct BW continues to exist.

7) Libya. Evidence suggests Libya is seeking to acquire the capability to develop and produce BW agents. Such development or production would violate key provisions of the BWC. Libya also has failed to submit the data declarations stipulated in the CBMs.

Evidence indicates that Libya has the expertise to produce small quantities of biological equipment for its BW program and that the Libyan Government is seeking to move its research program into a program of weaponized BW agents.

8) Taiwan. The United States believes that Taiwan has been upgrading its biotechnology capabilities by purchasing sophisticated biotechnology equipment from the United States, Switzerland, and other countries. The evidence indicating a BW program is not sufficient to determine if Taiwan is engaged in activities prohibited by the BWC.


During 1996, most of the provisions of the CFE Treaty were implemented with continuing success, and a number of the compliance concerns that were described in last year's Report were resolved. Moreover, at the first Review Conference of States Parties to the Treaty from May 15 to 31, 1996, an agreement was reached on procedures and steps to revise the Treaty's flank regime. This provided a solution to Russian and Ukrainian flank concerns.

Many of the compliance violations reported last year were corrected by the end of 1996. Belarus completed its declared reduction obligations in August 1996. According to its data as of January 1, 1997, Russia came into compliance with all limits in the Treaty except those for the flank zone. However, provisionally-applied portions of the Flank Agreement had raised Russia's limits for the original flank zone (which remained in effect pending the Flank Agreement entering into force) , and Russia's declared holdings are within those limits. Similarly, concerns over the quantities of equipment declared by Russia as temporarily in the CFE zone while awaiting export were resolved when Russia's data as of January 1, 1997, showed the numbers of such items dropping from 1,026 in November 1995 to only 226 items. Ukraine, too, came into compliance with all Treaty limits.

In addition, one concern that surfaced during 1996 was resolved during the year. In its data as of January 1, 1996, Russia declared several hundred items more than the Treaty allows for decommissioned equipment present in the zone while awaiting disposal. In its data as of January 1, 1997, these numbers were lowered to be within Treaty limits.

Progress was also made in resolving the issue of Russian reductions of equipment east of the Urals. When the original deadline for meeting this commitment passed, Russia was about 9,000 items of TLE-type equipment short of meeting its political obligation to destroy or convert 15,992 additional items east of the Urals. At the CFE Review Conference in May 1996, the States Parties accepted a Russian statement of intention regarding a commitment which entailed additional means for reducing this equipment and an obligation to complete the reductions by 2000. As of January 1, 1997, using both the new methods and the previous procedures, Russia has notified the destruction of an additional 3,100 items.

Nevertheless, there were some continuing concerns. Armenia and Azerbaijan continued to exceed their maximum levels of treaty limited equipment (TLE) in one or more categories. Neither state has declared a proper reduction obligation, nor carried out the reductions it would be required to complete according to Treaty rules. Similarly, concerns remain over the quantities of equipment Bulgaria has declared as temporarily in the zone while awaiting export, as have those over similar declarations by Belarus. In addition, the eight CFE successor states to the FSU have made little or no progress on meeting their collective obligation to declare and complete TLE reductions equal to those the Soviet Union would have been obligated to complete. Finally, there continues to be no additional progress on the issue of Russia's and Ukraine's joint obligation to carry out naval infantry/coastal defense-related reductions equal to those contained in the Soviet Union's legally binding commitment of June 1991. This issue, however, is related to the unresolved division of the assets of the former Soviet Black Sea Fleet.

In addition, a number of smaller, more technical concerns continued to arise about such things as TLE not presented as complete assemblies at reduction event inspections, late notifications, failure to notify removal of TLE from sites, unreported TLE, undeclared sites, and inability of escorts and unit commanders being inspected to account for missing TLE.

However, there were also some new issues that arose during the year, including -- but not limited to -- questions about the completeness and accuracy of some notifications. Throughout the year, Russia denied or delayed on-site inspections in much of the North Caucasus Military District on the grounds of safety -- a practice that continued even after the fighting ceased in Chechnya. By the end of the year, the Russians had provided assurances that such inspections would not be delayed or denied in 1997. In a second concern, on-site inspections of two Russian units in the flank zone revealed that quantities of armored personnel carriers were being excluded from Treaty accountability on the grounds that they were ambulances -- despite the fact that they were a type of vehicle unsuitable for use as ambulances and considerable additional evidence that they were being used as armored personnel carriers.


In general terms, compliance with the Vienna Document has continued to be good. A very few states failed to submit data as of January 1, 1996, and a larger number has failed to submit data on time as of January 1, 1997. In addition, there have been some other -- mostly minor -- notification, data, and inspection problems similar to those discussed under CFE.


This Report updates developments relevant to other nations' compliance with the 1968 Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT), and addresses in particular developments in North Korea, Iraq, Iran, Libya, and China. Additionally, 58 countries have not complied with their obligations under Article III of the NPT to conclude with the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) and put into effect a full-scope safeguards agreement within 18 months after joining the NPT. The United States will continue to urge all NPT parties required to do so to complete full-scope safeguards agreements with the IAEA in a timely fashion.

l) North Korea. The United States has determined that North Korea has not complied fully with its NPT Article III obligations. Serious questions remain regarding North Korea's intentions and regarding the possibility that North Korea violated its NPT Article II obligation "not to manufacture or otherwise acquire nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices." However, the signing of the Agreed Framework is significant as it requires North Korea to resolve these concerns.

In accordance with the Agreed Framework, North Korea has allowed the IAEA a continuous presence at Nyongbyon. However, it has not allowed "special inspections" pursuant to the NPT. Although the Agreed Framework creates a process for resolving the North Korean nuclear issue, North Korea's efforts to obstruct the full implementation of full-scope IAEA safeguards required by Article III of the NPT continue, as does international concern about North Korea's nuclear intentions.

2) Iraq. The United States has determined that Iraq violated its safeguards agreement when it pursued an active nuclear weapons development program and that this program violated Iraq's obligations under Articles II and III of the NPT. The United States has further determined that Iraq has continued to undermine the UNSCOM/IAEA inspection process by withholding relevant information, and to preserve as much nuclear-related technology and expertise as possible for a renewed weapons effort.

Iraq's nuclear weapons program violated Article II's requirement "not to manufacture or otherwise acquire nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices; and not to seek or receive any assistance in the manufacture of nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices." Iraq's construction of secret nuclear facilities, including its construction of a facility for nuclear weapons development and assembly, contributed to its violation of Article II. Iraq's failure to apply safeguards to its clandestine program also constituted a violation of Article III, which requires that safeguards be applied "with a view to preventing diversion of nuclear energy from peaceful purposes to nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices."

3) Iran. Although Iran's rudimentary program has apparently met with limited success so far, we believe Iran remains intent on acquiring a nuclear weapons capability. Iran's questionable nonproliferation credentials have caused many nuclear suppliers to refrain from cooperation with Tehran.

4) Libya. The United States has determined that Libya has demonstrated a continuing interest in the acquisition of nuclear weapons but that it has not progressed beyond the early stages of developing a nuclear weapons program. Libya's longstanding interest in acquiring nuclear weapons strongly suggests that its nuclear research and procurement efforts are aimed at development of an indigenous nuclear weapons capability. This may be inconsistent with Article II's requirement:

5) China. In early 1992, China joined the NPT. Prior to China's accession, the United States concluded that China had assisted Pakistan in developing nuclear explosives. The U.S.-China dialogue over the past year has led to a better understanding by China of its NPT obligations. On May 11, 1996, China stated that it would provide no assistance to unsafeguarded nuclear facilities. Our current information does not provide a basis for concluding that China has acted inconsistently with that statement. Questions remain about contacts between Chinese entities and elements associated with Pakistan's nuclear weapons program.

However, the information is not sufficient to reach a judgement of non-compliance with the NPT.