A. CONFERENCE ON DISARMAMENT (CD)
Jurisdiction and Purpose: The CD is the single, multilateral arms control negotiating forum.
Recent Accomplishments: The 1996 CD completed negotiations on the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT), which was a high United States priority. Completion of the CTBT is a major CD accomplishment, ranking alongside the 1993 Chemical Weapons Convention.
Other CD Activities: Unfortunately, the CD has been unable to agree to any substantive work since the conclusion of the CTBT in 1996. Last year, for the first time in its history, the CD failed to establish any ad hoc committees (single issue subfora). The United States was unsuccessful in pressing for the CD to establish ad hoc committees to negotiate treaties banning the production of fissile material for use in nuclear explosives and banning the use, production, transfer, and stockpiling of anti-personnel landmines (APL). In the end, the CD did appoint a Special Coordinator to conduct consultations with member states on APL. The United States viewed the appointment of Special Coordinator as an interim step on the way to the establishment of an ad hoc committee on APL. The CD also appointed Special Coordinators on improved and effective functioning, membership, expansion, and the agenda.
Demands for negotiations on the elimination of nuclear weapons in a time-bound framework arerejected by the United States and others, in part because reductions of nuclear weapons are already taking place at an accelerated pace while the issue of reductions in conventional weapons -- an area where hundreds of thousands of lives have been lost in conflicts -- is not yet on the multilateral disarmament agenda. Further, it is the view of many in the disarmament area that reductions cannot take place according to an artificially imposed schedule.
Membership: With the addition of 23 new members in 1996, 61 states currently are CD members: Algeria, Argentina, Australia, Austria, Bangladesh, Belarus, Belgium, Brazil, Bulgaria, Cameroon, Canada, Chile, China, Colombia, Cuba, Egypt, Ethiopia, Finland, France, Germany, Hungary, India, Indonesia, Iran, Iraq, Israel, Italy, Japan, Kenya, Mexico, Mongolia, Morocco, Myanmar, Netherlands, New Zealand, Nigeria, North Korea, Norway, Pakistan, Peru, Poland, Romania, Russia, Senegal, Slovakia, South Africa, South Korea, Spain, Sri Lanka, Sweden, Switzerland, Syria, Turkey, Ukraine, United Kingdom, United States, Venezuela, Vietnam, Yugoslavia, Zaire, and Zimbabwe. Twenty states have applied for membership in the CD. In 1997, the CD also agreed to the participation of 49 non-member states as observers.
Operating Procedures: The CD meets in a three part session annually; each part is seven to ten weeks long. With the assistance and support of the UN Secretariat, representatives of Member States work in Ad Hoc Committees with a variety of mandates and procedures, and report material to the Plenary for approval by consensus.
ACDA's Role: ACDA provides the primary leadership, delegation membership, staff and support for the U.S. CD Delegation. ACDA also chairs the Washington policy formulation efforts for the work of the CD, and prepares all guidance to the delegation.
Year and Circumstances of Founding: The CD is the successor to the previous multilateral negotiating bodies, reconfigured in 1979 to include all of the nuclear weapon states.
Location: Currently, the CD meets three times a year from January-April, May-July, and August-September, for a total of 24 weeks, in Geneva.
Jurisdiction and Purpose: In May 1995, the Conference of Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT), convened in accordance with Article X.2 of the Treaty, decided that the NPT would continue in force indefinitely. The Conference also agreed to a set of Principles and Objectives for Nuclear Nonproliferation and Disarmament, and to measures for strengthening the review process for the Treaty, which together have established the basis for future efforts to secure the full implementation of the NPT. The 1995 NPT Conference also reviewed the operation of the NPT to assure that the purposes of the Preamble and the provisions of the Treaty are being realized. The Conference agreed that reviews of the Treaty should continue to be held every five years, with the next NPT Review Conference scheduled for the year 2000. Preparatory Committee work for the 2000 NPT Review Conference began in 1997.
The NPT itself is a multilateral Treaty which proscribes the manufacture or acquisition of nuclear weapons or nuclear explosive devices by non-nuclear-weapon states. The Treaty also prohibits nuclear-weapon states from transferring nuclear weapons to non-nuclear-weapon states or assisting non-nuclear-weapon states in the manufacture, development or acquisition of nuclear weapons. The Treaty commits all its Parties to pursue negotiations in good faith on effective measures relating to cessation of the nuclear arms race at an early date and to nuclear disarmament, and on a Treaty on general and complete disarmament under strict and effective international control.
Membership: At the end of 1997, the membership of the NPT was 185 states, leaving only five non-NPT countries worldwide (Brazil, Cuba, India, Israel and Pakistan).
ACDA's Role: As the lead agency within the executive branch for the NPT, ACDA will continue to have primary responsibility for addressing preparations for and conduct of the 2000 NPT Review Conference. ACDA will lead interagency efforts to develop and implement U.S. positions on issues related to the 2000 NPT Review Conference. ACDA personnel will continue to lead efforts related to bilateral discussions and group meetings regarding the Conference.
Year and Circumstances of Founding: The NPT was opened for signature on July 1, 1968, and entered into force on March 5, 1970. Article X.2 of the NPT provides that 25 years after the entry-into-force of the Treaty, a conference will be convened to decide whether the Treaty shall continue in force indefinitely, or shall be extended for an additional fixed period or periods. In addition, Article VIII.3 provides that at intervals of five years, a majority of the Parties to the Treaty may obtain, by submitting a proposal to this effect to the Depositary Governments, the convening of conferences with the objective of reviewing the operation of the Treaty.
Justification and Purpose: The Joint Compliance and Inspection Commission (JCIC) is the implementation body established by the Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START I) of 1991. The purpose of the JCIC is to promote the objectives and implementation of the START Treaty's provisions, and specifically to:
(b) agree on additional provisions needed to improve the viability and effectiveness of the Treaty;
(c) determine how to deal with any new kind of strategic offensive arms declared by a Party.
Operational Procedures: The JCIC operating procedures were developed by the U.S., Belarus, Kazakhstan, Russia, and Ukraine following the breakup of the Soviet Union. These procedures permit equal participation by the four successor states to the Soviet Union that are Parties to the Treaty.
Each Party is entitled to participate in concluding any JCIC agreement. A Party may provide its consent to be bound by signing the agreement, although certain agreements may be concluded without all Parties actually signing them. If at least two Parties, including the United States, sign an agreement, the agreement will be sent to the non-signing Parties for their review. Each non-signing Party will provide its response in one of three ways: (1) a diplomatic note of acceptance within 30 days; (2) its objection to the agreement within 30 days, in which case it must attend the next session of the JCIC to address its concerns; or (3) inaction or silence, i.e., it shall be considered to have expressed its consent to be bound if it provides neither a diplomatic note nor an objection within 30 days. The only exception to this third rule is if one of the signing Parties declares an agreement to be one in which the "consent by silence" rule shall not apply.
The intent of this exception is to ensure clear and positive assent by a Party when the agreement in question has practical consequences or imposes obligations on that Party.
ACDA's Role: ACDA leads the United States Delegation to the JCIC, and provides the United States Representative, the executive secretary, the legal adviser, a senior ACDA policy representative and technical experts, and administrative support. ACDA also chairs the U.S. Government's interagency JCIC policy formulation committee, which develops U.S. policy guidance related to the activities of the Commission and the implementation of the START I Treaty.
Year and Circumstance of Founding: The JCIC was created by the signature of START I, and held its first meeting in the fall of 1991. The Commission has held a total of 16 sessions since the Treaty was signed, most recently in October-November 1997.
Location: The JCIC normally meets in Geneva.
Justification and Purpose: The Bilateral Implementation Commission (BIC) will be the implementation body for the bilateral U.S.-Russia START II Treaty. Specifically, the BIC will begin convening after START II enters into force to conclude agreements on additional provisions needed to improve the viability and effectiveness of the Treaty as well as to resolve any questions of compliance with Treaty obligations, should any be raised by either Party. Because the START II Treaty depends, with a few exceptions, on the START I Treaty for definitions, counting rules, and verification and implementation provisions, the work being done in the JCIC on the implementation of the START I Treaty will be directly relevant to the implementation of the START II Treaty.
Membership: The Parties to the Treaty -- the United States of America and the Russian Federation -- are members of the Commission.
Operational Procedures: Since the Treaty is not yet in force, the Commission has not yet convened, and its operating procedures have not been formulated or agreed upon.
ACDA's Role: ACDA will lead the United States Delegation to the Bilateral Implementation Commission, and will provide the United States Representative, the executive secretary, the legal adviser, a senior ACDA policy representative and technical experts, and administrative support.
ACDA will chair the U.S. Government's interagency Bilateral Implementation Commission Policy formulation committee, which will develop U.S. policy guidance related to the activities of the Commission and the implementation of the START II Treaty.
Year and Circumstance of Founding: Paragraph 2 of Article V of the START II Treaty establishes the Bilateral Implementation Commission, but the Commission will not have legal status until the Treaty enters into force, since the START II Treaty does not provide for provisional application of the provisions of paragraph 2 of Article V prior to that time.
Location: When it convenes, the BIC will likely meet in Geneva.
Jurisdiction and Purpose: The purpose of the Cooperative Threat Reduction (CTR) program is to help achieve the complete denuclearization of Belarus, Kazakhstan, and Ukraine, to accelerate reduction of Russia's nuclear arms, the safe and secure dismantlement of Russian and other former Soviet nuclear weapons, the elimination of Russian chemical weapons, and to contribute to nonproliferation.
In late 1991, Congress authorized the Department of Defense to establish the CTR program to assist what soon would be the newly independent states of the former Soviet Union (FSU) in the safety, security and dismantlement of nuclear, chemical and other weapons (to include strategic nuclear delivery vehicles). In Fiscal Year 1998, $381.5M will be available for the CTR program.
Membership: FSU states eligible for CTR assistance are those receiving Presidential certification that a recipient state meets Congressionally-mandated criteria for commitment to its arms control and related obligations. These countries must be recertified by the President annually to retain eligibility for assistance.
Operating Procedures: The CTR program is not a formal treaty or regime. Rather, it consists of bilateral executive agreements between the governments of the participants and implementing agreements between agencies. Specifically, "umbrella" agreements which provided the legal basis for all subsequent implementing agreements were negotiated between the United States Government and the governments of Belarus, Kazakhstan, Russia, and Ukraine between June 1992 and December 1993. For each country, the conclusion and entry-into-force of an "umbrella" agreement was a necessary prerequisite for implementing agreements defining particular projects to be negotiated. To date, 38 implementing agreements have been negotiated and are in force. Now that these agreements have been negotiated, the details of implementing them are being left to the U.S. government agencies, primarily the Departments of Defense and Energy with the relevant programmatic responsibilities. Umbrella policy guidance and the establishment of budget priorities for the Nunn-Lugar program continue to be provided by the U.S. interagency community.
Year and Circumstances of Founding: The CTR program was initiated by Senators Nunn and Lugar in November 1991. Concerns over the "danger to nuclear safety and stability" in the Soviet Union arose in the wake of the August 1991 coup attempt, and grew as the Soviet Union disintegrated during the autumn of that year. These concerns were especially acute over the disposition of non-strategic nuclear weapons (see Section I.C.3.). The Senate also noted that then-President Gorbachev had requested western assistance in dismantling Soviet nuclear weapons, and former President Bush had proposed that the United States and the Soviet Union cooperate on the storage, transportation, dismantling and destruction of nuclear weapons. These concerns and proposals led to the passage of the initial legislation.
Location: CTR meetings are generally held in the capitals of the five countries involved. The United States also discusses CTR issues with NATO and G-7 allies periodically, usually in Brussels, for the purpose of informing allies of U.S. progress, learning of allied assistance in similar areas, and to avoid duplication of effort. When recipients of CTR assistance are involved at NATO's Senior Politico-Military Group on Proliferation, ACDA participates in these discussions as well. Occasionally there are bilateral meetings with the allies in Washington or their capitals. Delegation meetings and technical discussions also take place in field sites in both the United States and FSU. Examples are Albuquerque for nuclear safety matters, nuclear institutes in Russia for storage of fissile materials and nonproliferation issues, and missile dismantlement facilities in Ukraine.
Justification and Purpose: The SVC is the implementing body for the Treaty Between the United States and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the Elimination of Their Intermediate-Range and Shorter-Range Missiles (INF), which entered into force on June 1, 1988. Although elimination of declared missiles and their launchers under the INF Treaty has now been completed, we must be able to satisfy ourselves that more are not being produced. The Special Verification Commission was established by the INF Treaty to promote the objectives and implementation of the provisions of the Treaty. When the SVC is not in session, business related to the Treaty is conducted through diplomatic channels.
Membership: Initially, the United States and the Soviet Union were the only SVC participants. Since the dissolution of the Soviet Union, the 12 former Soviet republics have become successor states to the INF Treaty. Six of those states -- Russia, Ukraine, Belarus, Kazakhstan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan -- have inspectable facilities covered by the INF Treaty on their territories. Of these six, four are active participants in the work of the Commission: Russia, Ukraine, Belarus, and Kazakhstan. Each of the remaining two has only one inspectable facility on its territory; with the consent of the active participants, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan do not attend meetings of the Commission or participate in inspections.
Operating Procedures: The initial SVC procedures were developed by the two original INF Treaty Parties -- the United States of America and the Union Soviet Socialist Republics -- in a Memorandum of Understanding signed on December 20, 1988. Since the breakup of the Soviet Union, the five Parties participating in the Special Verification Commission have been discussing new operating procedures to reflect the multilateral character of the forum.
ACDA's Role: ACDA leads the United States Delegation to the Special Verification Commission, and provides the United States Representative, the executive secretary, the legal adviser, a senior ACDA policy representative, and technical experts and administrative support. ACDA chairs the U.S. Government's interagency Special Verification Commission Support Group, which develops U.S. policy guidance related to the activities of the Commission and the implementation of the INF Treaty.
Year and Circumstances of Founding: The SVC was established by Article XIII of the INF Treaty and first convened on June 6, 1988. It has met a total of 20 times, most recently in November 1997.
Location: The SVC normally meets in Geneva.
Jurisdiction and Purpose: The purpose of the Arrangement is threefold: (l) to promote transparency and greater responsibility with regard to transfers of conventional arms and dual-use goods and technologies; (2) to encourage restraint where the threats to international peace and stability are judged greatest; and (3) to harmonize national export policies to guard against destabilizing accumulations of military might.
Membership: Currently, there are 33 members -- Argentina, Australia, Austria, Belgium, Bulgaria, Canada, Czech Republic, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Ireland, Italy, Japan, South Korea, Luxembourg, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Russia, Slovak Republic, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Turkey, Ukraine, UK, and the United States. The Wassenaar Arrangement is open on a global and nondiscriminatory basis to those meeting the criteria in Appendix 4 of the Initial Elements: pro-ducer/exporter of arms or industrial equipment; nonproliferation policies and appropriate national policies including: adherence to nonproliferation policies, control lists, and, where applicable, guidelines of the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG), Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR), and Australia Group (AG); adherence to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), Biological and Toxicological Weapons Convention (BWC), the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC), and (where applicable) START I and the Lisbon Protocol; fully effective export controls; and prevention of acquisition of arms and sensitive dual-use goods and technologies for military end-uses by states whose behavior is a cause for serious concern (presently, Iran, Iraq, Libya, and North Korea). Admission is based on consensus. The arrangement is now considering several potential new members.
Operating Procedures: The Arrangement's Participating States have undertaken commitments set forth in the Initial Elements, which include maintaining effective export controls on a list of munitions and sensitive dual-use items and various information exchange requirements. The Arrangement operates by consensus. Through its transparency mechanisms, members will seek to detect and prevent destabilizing accumulations of arms and sensitive dual-use items and consult on appropriate courses of action. The United States is working to strengthen the regime, through expansion of reporting requirements on arms exports beyond the major weapons categories of the UN Arms Register and through greater transparency in dual-use exports. A number of proposals for strengthening the regime were submitted by the United States during the year.
ACDA's Role: ACDA was involved in the formulation and execution of U.S. policies related to the Wassenaar Arrangement through its participation in interagency discussions and on U.S. delegations to Arrangement meetings.
Year and Circumstances of Founding: After the end of the Cold War, and considering the experience gained after Desert Storm investigating the Iraqi arms buildup, it became clear that the East-West focus of COCOM was obsolete. A new global arrangement promoting consultation and transparency with respect to arms and sensitive dual-use transfers was clearly needed. The Wassenaar Arrangement on Export Controls for Conventional Arms and Dual-Use Goods and Technologies received final approval by the 33 countries listed above at a meeting in Vienna on July 11 - 12, 1996.
Location: The Wassenaar Arrangement Secretariat is located in Vienna, Austria.
Jurisdiction and Purpose: The Agency for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America and the Caribbean (known by its Spanish acronym OPANAL) was created by the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America and the Caribbean, also known as the Treaty of Tlatelolco. OPANAL's mission is to ensure compliance of the Contracting Parties with the Treaty's provisions. The Treaty obligates all Contracting Parties to use nuclear material and facilities under their jurisdiction exclusively for peaceful purposes, and to prohibit and prevent in their respective territories:
All Contracting Parties also undertake to apply IAEA safeguards to all their nuclear activities.
Membership: 32 Latin American and Caribbean States are Contracting Parties to the Treaty of Tlatelolco, and are therefore Member States of the Agency.
Operating Procedures: OPANAL consists of a Secretary-General, a small Secretariat, and a five member Council to direct Agency activities between general conferences of all the Contracting Parties. Every two years, OPANAL convenes a General Conference, during which resolutions pertaining to Agency operations, Treaty matters, or even general regional issues are put forth, debated, and voted upon. OPANAL occasionally calls special general conferences to consider amendments to the Treaty or to deal with special topics, such as administrative and budgetary issues pertaining to the operation of the Agency.
While not a member of OPANAL and therefore bearing no financial responsibility for its activities, the United States can participate in OPANAL General Conferences as a non-voting State Party by virtue of its signature and ratification of the two Protocols to the Treaty, and can officially speak to General Conference resolutions and proceedings. The United Kingdom, France, Russia, China, and the Netherlands have similar rights as members of either or both Protocols.
Cuba, which has signed but not ratified the Treaty, can also attend as a non-voting Signatory State.
ACDA's Role: ACDA has primary responsibility within the USG for all matters relating to the Treaty of Tlatelolco, and heads all official delegations to OPANAL general and special conferences. ACDA officials represented the United States at the Seminar on the Thirtieth Anniversary of the Treaty of Tlatelolco in February 1997, and again at the Fifteenth Regular Session of the General Conference on July 10, 1997.
The United States supports the universal regional adherence to and implementation of the Treaty of Tlatelolco as a significant contribution to regional peace and security. ACDA is the lead agency in implementing that policy, and works with OPANAL to further that objective.
Year and Circumstances of Founding: OPANAL was created by the Treaty of Tlatelolco. The Treaty was opened for signature in 1967, and entered into force on April 22, 1968, upon the 11th ratification of the Treaty pursuant to Article 28.2 of the Treaty. The Treaty depositary state, Mexico, convened a conference of the initial Contracting Parties in June 1969 to create the Agency; the first General Conference was held in September 1969.
Location: Mexico City.
Jurisdiction and Purpose: The OPCW is the implementing body for the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC). It was established at entry-into-force of the CWC on April 29, 1997. The Organization consists of the Conference of the States Parties (the "Conference"), the Executive Council (EC), and the Technical Secretariat (TS). The Conference of the States Parties has representation from all States Parties. It determines the Organization's program and budget, elects the Executive Council, helps establish a Scientific Advisory Board and any other subsidiary organs it finds necessary, and reviews CWC implementation and compliance issues.
Membership: All States Parties to the CWC.
Operating Procedures: With the support of technical experts employed by the Technical Secretariat, the Executive Council develops consensus recommendations that are approved by the Conference of States Parties in annual sessions.
ACDA's Role: ACDA provides personnel and funding support for the permanent U.S. delegation to the OPCW, and ACDA is the lead agency for coordinating the development of policy related to issues discussed during OPCW meetings.
Year and Circumstances of Founding: The OPCW was established in April 1997, upon entry-into-force of the CWC.
Location: The OPCW is located in The Hague, Kingdom of the Netherlands.
J. (Chemical Weapons) BILATERAL DESTRUCTION AGREEMENT NEGOTIATING FORUM
Jurisdiction and Purpose: To negotiate implementation of the Bilateral Destruction Agreement (BDA) between the United States and the Russian Federation. Under this agreement, both countries commit to not produce chemical weapons and to reduce chemical weapons stockpiles to equal, low levels.
Membership: The United States and the Russian Federation.
Operating Procedures: Provides procedures for destruction of all but 5,000 metric tons of each country's existing chemical weapons agents, and to insure that more are not produced, through cooperation regarding methods and technologies for the safe and efficient destruction of chemical weapons; to cooperate in developing, testing, and carrying out appropriate inspection procedures; and the adoption of practical measures to encourage all chemical weapons-capable states to become parties to the multilateral convention.
ACDA's Role: Continue to press Russia to complete negotiations for entry-into-force of the BDA, and to ensure consistency with respect to the multilateral Chemical Weapons Convention.
Year and Circumstances of Founding: The BDA was signed on June 1, 1990, between the United States and the Soviet Union (now the Russian Federation), but has not yet entered into force.
Location: Negotiating sessions take place on an ad hoc basis in Washington and Moscow.
Jurisdiction and Purpose: To negotiate implementation of the Wyoming Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) signed by the United States and the Soviet Union (now the Russian Federation). The purpose of the MOU was to build confidence in the CW area and thus facilitate completion and implementation of the multilateral Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC). Phase I of the agreement, calling for an exchange of general data on CW stocks and production facilities, was completed in February 1991. Phase II, calling for an exchange of more detailed data and routine and challenge inspections at both declared and undeclared facilities, was completed in December 1994. Although MOU activities are completed, unresolved declarational issues continue to be discussed between the two sides.
Membership: The United States and the Russian Federation.
Operating Procedures: Execution of implementing documents provides for exchange of data and verification inspections. Continuing technical consultations on CW questions and concerns about data declarations as well as resolution of definitions.
ACDA's Role: Continue the ongoing dialogue and informational exchanges, to facilitate the clarification of a few outstanding questions on both sides. Continue building confidence in each Government's willingness to eliminate CW and press the Russians for complete implementation of all aspects of the Wyoming MOU.
Year and Circumstances of Founding: The Wyoming MOU was signed between the United States and the Soviet Union (now the Russian Federation) at a ministerial meeting in Jackson Hole, Wyoming, on September 23, 1989.
Location: Negotiating sessions take place on an ad hoc basis in Washington and Moscow.
L. AUSTRALIA GROUP (AG)
Jurisdiction and Purpose: The "Australia Group" is an informal forum of states, chaired by Australia, whose goal is to discourage and impede CW and BW proliferation by:
Membership: The 30 members of the AG are Argentina, Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Czech Republic, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Luxembourg, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Portugal, Poland, Romania, Slovak Republic, South Korea, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, United Kingdom, and the United States. Requests by other states to join the group are considered on a case-by-case basis.
Operating Procedures: The Group has no charter or guidelines. It operates by consensus. The Group has established common export controls for chemical and biological weapons nonproliferation. For CW, members of the AG control 54 chemical precursors as well as specified CW-related production equipment. For BW, members have established export controls on certain micro-organisms, toxins and equipment that could be used in a BW program. This list was amended in 1995 to reflect the threat revealed by the United Nations Special Commission on Iraq which found that Iraq has used small scale equipment and previously un-weaponized agents in its BW program.
In tandem with export controls, the AG has periodically used warning mechanisms to sensitize the public to CBW proliferation. The Group has issued an informal "warning list" of dual-use CW precursors, bulk chemicals, and CW-related equipment. Members develop and share the warning lists with their chemical industry and ask it to report on any suspicious transactions. The AG has also warned industry, the scientific community, and other relevant groups of the risks of inadvertently aiding BW proliferation.
ACDA's Role: ACDA personnel participate in U.S. delegations to bilateral discussions, to the annual AG Plenary meetings and to periodic meetings of technical experts, as well as in the internal policy process of the U.S. government. ACDA personnel also participate in the USG's internal chemical and biological nonproliferation efforts. ACDA is a charter member of the U.S. Government's interagency chemical and biological weapons interdiction group (SHIELD), which is responsible for U.S. interdiction efforts and CBW sanctions review. ACDA members also participate in review of chemical and biological technology export licensing through SHIELD.
Year and Circumstances of Founding: The Group was formed in 1984 as a result of CW use in the Iran-Iraq War. Members meet annually in Paris, where the 1925 Geneva Protocol is deposited. The Group's actions are complementary to provisions of the 1925 Geneva Protocol, the 1972 Biological and Toxins Weapons Convention, and the 1993 Chemical Weapons Convention.
Location: The Australia Group holds annual plenary sessions in Paris.
Jurisdiction and Purpose: The Standing Consultative Commission (SCC) was established under the terms of the 1972 U.S.-Soviet Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty to promote the objectives and implementation of the Treaty. The ABM Treaty provides that the Parties should consider in the SCC, inter alia, questions of compliance with the Treaty, possible changes in the strategic situation which would have a bearing on the provisions of the Treaty, and proposals for amendments to the Treaty.
Membership: Initially, the United States and the Soviet Union, as the two ABM Treaty Parties, were the only SCC participants. With the dissolution of the Soviet Union, the question arose as to which state or states would assume the former Soviet Union's ABM Treaty obligations. In the MOU signed in September 1997, the United States made clear that it is only willing to accept Belarus, Kazakhstan, Russia and Ukraine as Treaty Parties. Belarus, Kazakhstan, Russia, and Ukraine have participated with the United States in the SCC since 1994, and will be recognized as Parties to the ABM Treaty along with the United States upon entry into force of the Memorandum of Understanding of Succession.
Operational Procedures: SCC regulations were developed by the two original ABM Treaty Parties. These procedures are being adjusted to take account of additional New Independent States who may become Treaty Parties following the breakup of the Soviet Union. In accordance with the Memorandum of Understanding establishing the SCC, the Commission meets no less than twice a year. It met most recently July 23 - August 21, 1997.
ACDA's Role: ACDA leads the United States Component of the SCC, providing the U.S. Commissioner, the secretariat, the legal adviser, policy and technical experts, and administrative support.
ACDA chairs the U.S. Government interagency SCC policy formulation committee, which has overall responsibility for developing U.S. policy guidance related to the activities of the Commission and implementation of the ABM Treaty.
Year and Circumstances of Founding: The SCC was established during the first negotiating session of SALT II (the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks) by a Memorandum of Understanding between the United States and the Soviet Union dated December 21, 1972.
Location: The SCC meets in Geneva.
N. ZANGGER COMMITTEE
Origins and Purposes: After the Non-Proliferation Treaty entered into force in 1970, the Zangger Committee was established in 1971 to harmonize suppliers' interpretations of the export control provision contained in NPT Article III.2. This provision calls for exporters to require IAEA safeguards as a condition for the supply of nuclear material or items "especially designed or prepared for the processing, use, or production of special fissionable material." Also known as the NPT Exporters' Committee, the Zangger Committee was named in honor of Professor Claude Zangger of Switzerland, who chaired the Committee from its inception in 1971 until 1989.
The Zangger Committee first published the resulting "Trigger List" of items that triggers this safeguards requirement in 1974. Although the list has been refined several times since then, the basic outlines remain unchanged. Covered items include:
Before approving the export of these items, a supplier state must:
Operating Procedures: The Zangger Committee meets twice a year, in October and May, in Vienna, and is chaired by Dr. Fritz Schmidt of Austria. It operates by consensus on all matters, including the scope of controls, conditions of supply, membership, and other policy matters.
Membership: The 33 current members are: Argentina, Australia, Austria, Belgium, Bulgaria, Canada, China, Czech Republic, Denmark, France, Finland, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Republic of Korea, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Russian Federation, Slovak Republic, South Africa, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Ukraine, United Kingdom, and United States. The European Union is a permanent observer at Zangger Committee meetings.
Origins and Purposes: The Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG) was established in 1974 in response to India's explosion of a nuclear device that year. Its purpose was to establish multilateral guidelines for nuclear export control that added to those of the Zangger Committee, and to include France, a nuclear supplier country that was not then Party to the NPT. The NSG met regularly in London until 1978, when it first published its guidelines.
The NSG did not meet again until 1991, when it reconvened to consider strengthening its guidelines in response to recent developments in proliferant states, particularly Iraq. Its principal accomplishments since then have been to adopt separate guidelines for the control of nuclear-related dual-use goods and technology, known as Part 2 of the Guidelines, and to strengthen the Part 1 Guidelines for Nuclear Exports. The dual-use guidelines help to ensure that civil commerce in sensitive dual-use goods and related technologies does not contribute to the proliferation of nuclear weapons and unsafeguarded nuclear fuel cycle capabilities. The strengthened Part 1 Guidelines, particularly the requirement that the recipient have safeguards on all its nuclear materials and facilities (full-scope safeguards), similarly ensure that exports for peaceful nuclear purposes do not contribute to unsafeguarded nuclear capabilities. The NSG Guidelines also control technology related to Trigger List and nuclear-related dual-use goods in order to ensure that the provision of technical information and support will not enable proliferators to develop unsafeguarded nuclear programs on their own.
Items covered by Part 1 are the same as those of the Zangger Committee, with the addition of facilities and equipment for uranium conversion. The conditions for transfer of Part 1 items include:
The conditions for the transfer of dual-use items in Part 2 include:
Operating Procedures: The NSG functions by consensus among its members. The NSG holds an annual plenary meeting in the spring in a location that rotates depending on who is Chairman. The 1996 Plenary was held in Buenos Aires and was chaired by Argentina; the 1997 Plenary was chaired by Canada in Ottawa. The Dual-Use Regime meets twice a year, in the spring and fall, to consult on nuclear programs of concern and other policy issues. Other working groups are established on an ad hoc basis.
Membership: The 35 current members are Argentina, Australia, Austria, Belgium, Brazil, Bulgaria, Canada, Czech Republic, Denmark, France, Finland, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Republic of Korea, Latvia, Luxembourg, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Russian Federation, Slovak Republic, South Africa, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Ukraine, United Kingdom, and United States. New members may be accepted by consensus among current members, and all states are encouraged to adhere to the NSG Guidelines. The European Union is a permanent observer at NSG meetings.
ACDA's Role: ACDA has played a significant role in developing U.S. positions within the Zangger Committee and the NSG from the inception of those regimes. ACDA personnel participate in all plenary meetings, the NSG dual-use consultations, and in most working groups of either regime. As a participant in the Subgroup on Nuclear Export Coordination (SNEC) since 1978, ACDA has a longstanding role in developing U.S. Government policies on the implementation of nuclear-related export controls and in reviewing individual nuclear export licenses.
Jurisdiction and Purpose: The purpose of the MTCR is to arrest missile proliferation worldwide, in particular through export controls on missiles and their related technologies.
Membership: The 29 members of the MTCR are Argentina, Australia, Austria, Belgium, Brazil, Canada, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Luxembourg, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Portugal, Russia, South Africa, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Turkey, United Kingdom, and the United States.
Operating Procedures: Members of the MTCR follow an agreed set of Guidelines for transfers of missile technology as listed in the Missile Equipment and Technology Annex. The MTCR operates by consensus on all issues. France serves as an informal Point of Contact for correspondence with the MTCR partners.
ACDA's Role: ACDA personnel participate in U.S. delegations to bilateral discussions, to the annual MTCR Plenary meetings and to periodic meetings of technical experts, as well as in the internal policy process of the U.S. government. ACDA personnel also participate in the USG's unilateral missile nonproliferation efforts. ACDA serves on the interagency Missile Trade Analysis Group which is responsible for U.S. interdiction efforts and missile sanctions review. ACDA members also participate in review of missile technology export licensing through the Missile Technology Export Control Group, and provide inputs to the review process of the MTCR Equipment and Technology Annex in the Missile Annex Review Committee.
Year and Circumstances of Founding: In April 1987, the United States and its six major trading partners (Canada, the former West Germany, France, Italy, Japan, and the United Kingdom) created the Missile Technology Control Regime to restrict the proliferation of missiles and related technology.
Location: The MTCR holds annual plenary sessions in different partner countries on a rotating basis. Monthly "Point of Contact" meetings are held among Partner embassy representatives in Paris.
Jurisdiction and Purpose: CCW is a Law of War Treaty, dealing with the use of certain conventional weapons. Its purpose is to prevent the use of conventional weapons that cause injury and suffering not required for military purposes. It is particularly focused on weapons that injure or kill innocent civilians or are excessively injurious. In its present form, it includes four protocols restricting the use of (1) weapons with undetectable fragments, (2) mines, booby traps and similar devices, (3) incendiary weapons, and (4) blinding laser weapons.
In March 1995, the United States ratified the landmine and undetectable fragments protocols, but the protocol dealing with incendiaries was withheld for future study. Approval of the amended landmine protocol, the incendiary protocol, and the blinding laser protocol is now pending before the Senate.
The primary purpose of the 1995-1996 Review Conference was to strengthen the protocol dealing with landmines; as we noted in section IV.B., major amendments on that subject were approved in May 1996 and submitted to the U.S. Senate in January 1997.
Membership: More than 60 nations, including the United States, have ratified the original CCW.
Operating Procedures: Four preparatory Experts' Meetings were held in 1994 and early 1995; a Review Conference was held in September and October 1995. A technical meeting was held in January 1996, and the final Review Conference of this cycle was held April-May 1995. The amended landmine protocol and the blinding laser weapon protocol, respectively, will enter into force six months after ratification by the 20th State. We expect entry-into-force in mid-to late 1998. Following entry-into-force, annual conferences shall be held, with a major Review Conference expected in 2001. Amendment conferences can be called at any time upon request of a majority of the Parties, but are not expected.
Meetings have operated by consensus. The United States favored allowing decisions to be made by supermajority, but we could not obtain the consensus required for this rule.
ACDA's Role: ACDA provided the deputy head of the U.S. delegation and a legal adviser to the delegation. ACDA originated and drafted the U.S. position on self-destructing and self-deactivating anti-personnel landmines.
Year and Circumstances of Founding: The original convention entered into force in 1983. During the 1980s it became apparent that, while the CCW provides an essential foundation, it needed significant strengthening of its landmine provisions in order to serve its humanitarian purpose.
Location: The first session of the Review Conference was held in Vienna. (Sept. - Oct. 1995.) All other CCW meetings have been held in Geneva.
Jurisdiction and Purpose: The purpose of the Ottawa Convention is to ban use, stockpiling, production, and transfer of anti-personnel mines.
Membership: By the end of December 1997, 122 countries had signed the Ottawa Convention. For reasons explained in Chapter IV, the United States has not signed. Neither have the countries with the largest stockpiles of anti-personnel mines.
Operating Procedures: The rules of the Ottawa conference provided for decisions to be taken by majority vote. However, no decisions were put to a vote; in effect, the conference operated by consensus.
ACDA's Role: ACDA provided a co-head of delegation to some meetings of the Ottawa process, and provided the second-ranking member of delegation, as well as legal and other advisors to the other meetings.
Year and Circumstances of Founding: In 1996, the "Ottawa process" was begun for the purpose of completing a global anti-personnel landmine ban. The Ottawa Convention was opened for signature on December 3, 1997, at Ottawa, Canada.
Location: A Preparatory sessions of the Ottawa process was held in Brussels; related meetings were held in Vienna and Bonn. The actual negotiations were conducted in Oslo. The Convention was signed in Ottawa.
Jurisdiction and Purpose: The FSC's mandate includes:
Membership: All 54 member states of OSCE; Yugoslavia's participation is suspended.
Operating Procedures: The FSC structure consists of working groups, which report to the plenary on their activities; the plenary deliberates and adopts recommendations by consensus. In 1997, the FSC focused on implementing Vienna Document 1994, elaborating a questionnaire on anti-personnel landmines, and developing a Framework for Arms Control, as well as the Future Agenda for Arms Control.
ACDA's Role: ACDA continues to participate in the work of the FSC both in the interagency process and as a member agency of the U.S. Delegation to the OSCE. This includes active participation in FSC deliberations, working groups, and seminars, and the lead role in Vienna in planning the Annual Implementation Assessment Meeting.
Year of Creation and Circumstances of Founding: The Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) was established in 1973. The participating states of the CSCE created the FSC at the Helsinki Summit in 1992. The tasks of the FSC were expanded by CSCE Ministers in Rome in December 1993, and again at the Budapest Summit in December 1994. On January 1, 1995, CSCE was changed to the Organization for the Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE).
Location: The FSC meets in Vienna.
T. (Former Yugoslavia) BALKAN ARMS CONTROL JOINT CONSULTATIVE COMMISSION (JCC) AND SUBREGIONAL CONSULTATIVE COMMISSION (SRCC)
Jurisdiction and Purpose: The arms control agreements negotiated in accordance with the Dayton Accords and under the auspices of the OSCE established these two separate bodies to oversee implementation of the agreements and resolve disputes among the parties.
Membership: The Joint Consultative Commission for the Article II Agreement includes Bosnia and Herzegovina and its two entities, the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina and the Republika Srpska. The Sub-Regional Consultative Commission for the Article IV Agreement includes, in addition to the three Bosnian parties, Croatia and the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia. The OSCE participates in both, and the Contact Group countries, including the United States, provide special support to both.
Operating Procedures: Both implementing groups have been meeting about once a month since the agreements were signed. Inspections and reductions have been the focus of attention. Implementation of both Agreements has been a difficult process and has required firm and constant oversight and pressure by the OSCE and the Contact Group. Such pressure will continue to be needed in 1998 to ensure continued success in implementation.
ACDA's Role: ACDA seconded an expert to assist the OSCE's Personal Representative for the Article IV Agreement and Chairman of the Sub-Regional Consultative Commission throughout 1996 and 1997. In addition, ACDA actively participates in U.S. policy formulation in support of both arms control agreements.
Year of Creation: The Joint Consultative Commission for Article II, and the Sub-Regional Consultative Commission for Article IV were established in January and June 1996 respectively.
Location: The Joint Consultative Commission for Article II meets either in Vienna or in Sarajevo or Pale. The Sub-Regional Commission for Article IV meets in Vienna.
U. OPEN SKIES CONSULTATIVE COMMISSION (OSCC)
Jurisdiction and Purpose: The OSCC is the forum for implementing the Open Skies Treaty, which has not yet entered into force. The Treaty allows the OSCC to:
Membership: All 27 signatories are entitled to participate in the OSCC.
Operating Procedures: The OSCC's structure consists of informal working groups which report to the plenary; the latter deliberates and decides by consensus. During the five years of the Treaty's provisional application period, the OSCC has adopted numerous decisions on technical issues, prepared by several working groups composed of experts from various states.
ACDA's Role: ACDA's Senior Representative on the OSCE Delegation is the U.S. Chief Delegate to the OSCC in Vienna; he participates in all plenary sessions. An ACDA representative is the chairman of the OSCC working group on notifications and formats, and ACDA representatives participate in all working group meetings.
Year of Creation: The OSCC was established by the Open Skies Treaty in March 1992.
Jurisdiction and Purpose: The purpose of the bilateral committees is to further cooperative efforts to convert excess defense capacity to non-defense, commercial uses. The committees promote orderly shrinkage and reorientation to peaceful purposes of defense industrial, technological, and scientific facilities and the redirection of personnel not needed for legitimate defense efforts to civil needs. The committees provide a senior channel of communications on issues related to the defense industry and experiences in defense conversion and diversification.
Membership: Bilateral (e.g., U.S.-Russia).
Operating Procedures: The committees meet periodically in the members' respective capitals or selected defense sites to pursue defense conversion projects, such as joint ventures between U.S. companies and selected Newly Independent State defense enterprises.
ACDA's Role: The ACDA Director is a member of the bilateral committees, which are chaired by the Secretary of Defense. An ACDA representative is a member of the Interagency Working Group (IWG) tasked to support the committees' efforts.
Year and Circumstances of Founding: The first committee was established with Russia under the Gore-Chernomyrdin Commission in 1993, and the others were established soon after.
Location: Capitals and defense sites of committee members.
W. UNITED NATIONS DISARMAMENT COMMISSION (UNDC)
In 1997 the UNDC considered three items:
SSOD-IV was carried over from the previous year's UNDC, and the others were new items. Since items normally remain on the UNDC's agenda for three years, the Commission did not produce any substantive reports in 1997.
During the discussion of SSOD-IV, the United States emphasized that another special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament could only be useful if its agenda and objectives were agreed by consensus and if there was a reasonable expectation that it could produce results. The working group on nuclear weapon free zones began consideration of guidelines for the establishment of such zones. In this discussion, the United States reiterated its criteria for recognizing them (see chapter I.A.4). The discussion in the working group on conventional arms control focused on guidelines for disarmament in peacekeeping operations in the aftermath of conflict.
ACDA's Role: ACDA chairs the interagency policy formulation process for the UNDC and provides personnel for the delegation.
X. FIRST COMMITTEE OF THE UNITED NATIONS GENERAL ASSEMBLY
Jurisdiction and Purpose: The 1997 First Committee of the United Nations General Assembly (UNFC) convened on October 13 and continued consideration of disarmament and international security items through November 17, in a largely non-contentious session. The Committee considered 44 resolutions and two decisions, 23 of which were adopted by consensus, including resolutions on the Chemical Weapons Convention, the fourth Special Session on Disarmament (SSOD-IV). However, for the fourth consecutive year, the UNFC failed to take action on a fissile material cutoff resolution.
In the wake of the negotiation of the Ottawa Convention banning anti-personnel landmines (APL), that subject proved the most controversial during the 1997 UNFC session. In the end, the Committee adopted three resolutions related to APL: one supporting the Ottawa Convention, one supporting the Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons (CCW) -- the amended second protocol of which places restrictions on landmines, and one urging work in the CD on APL. The United States co-sponsored the CCW resolution and was a key proponent and co-sponsor of the resolution on the CD. Because the United States was not able to sign the Ottawa Convention, it abstained on the resolution urging its signature.
The United States introduced two resolutions, one on compliance with arms control agreements and one introduced jointly with Russia on bilateral nuclear arms negotiations and nuclear disarmament. The compliance resolution was adopted by consensus. The resolution on bilateral nuclear arms negotiations passed with 147 for, no negative votes, and only 8 abstentions.
Membership: The UNFC is a UN General Assembly Committee of the Whole; as such its membership includes all UN members.
Operating Procedures: The UNFC considers resolutions submitted by members, and operates by majority voting.
ACDA's Role: ACDA provides the primary leadership and some staff for the United States Delegation to the First Committee, and chairs the Washington policy formulation efforts for preparation of guidance and instructions to the delegation.
Year and Circumstances of Founding: The UNFC is one of the seven main UN Committees established under the UN Charter in 1945.
Location: The UNFC meets annually in the fall at UN Headquarters in New York.
Jurisdiction and Purpose: The purpose of the Preparatory Commission (Prepcom) is to carry out necessary preparations for effective implementation of the Comprehensive Nuclear Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT), and to prepare for the first session of the Conference of the States Parties to that Treaty. The Prepcom develops detailed implementing procedures for the CTBT and lays the foundations for a new international treaty-implementing body, the Comprehensive Nuclear Test-Ban Treaty Organization (CTBTO), based in Vienna. A task unique to this Prepcom is establishing an International Monitoring System (IMS), which is the monitoring portion of an international verification regime that also includes consultation and clarification, on-site inspection, and confidence-building measures. The IMS is comprised of seismic, hydroacoustic, radionuclide, and infrasound monitoring stations -- a total of 321 monitoring stations, distributed worldwide.
Membership: All signatories to the CTBT.
Operating Procedures: With the support of technical experts employed by the Provisional Technical Secretariat (PTS) (the predecessor of the CTBTO Technical Secretariat), representatives of Member States develop consensus recommendations that are then formally approved at Plenary sessions. Four plenary sessions were held in 1997, and three sessions are planned for 1998.
ACDA's Role: ACDA provides personnel and funding support for the permanent U.S. delegation to the Prepcom; ACDA has been designated the lead agency within the U.S. Government for developing policy related to issues discussed during Prepcom meetings; and ACDA has partially funded the annual U.S. assessment for support of the Prepcom. Other funding has come from the State Department.
Year and Circumstances of Founding: The Prepcom was established November 19, 1996, by the signatories of the CTBT, numbering 134 at the time. The Prepcom will remain in existence until the CTBT enters into force, at which time it and the PTS will be superseded by the Conference of the States Parties and the CTBTO Technical Secretariat, respectively.
Location: Plenary sessions of the Prepcom and working groups established by the Prepcom are held periodically at the Vienna International Center in Vienna, Austria. PTS Headquarters is also in the Vienna International Center.