V. Regional Arms Control



In 1997, the OSCE devoted significant resources to the negotiation and implementation of the arms control agreements set forth in the General Framework Agreement for Peace in Bosnia and Herzegovina, initialed in Dayton on November 21, 1995, Annex 1-B. These agreements are described in detail in the section on Balkan Arms Control Under the Dayton Accords.

In accordance with the 1994 OSCE Budapest Decision documents, the Forum for Security Cooperation (FSC) has developed two decision documents: a Framework for Arms Control and the Future Agenda for Arms Control. The Framework is intended to serve as the basis upon which future European conventional arms control agreements will be negotiated, and adopted. The Framework recognizes that a number of existing arms control treaties can serve as the foundation for future agreements, and attempts to address the diverse challenges and risks to military security in the OSCE region. The Agenda outlines several broad areas for future work: enhancing existing CSBMs, further development of regional CSBMs, and the development of new CSBMs. These two documents were adopted by the FSC at the Lisbon Summit. The OSCE has also constructed a Security Model for Europe for the 21st Century.


In the context of developing U.S. arms transfer policy for Central Europe and the decision to release advanced fighter aircraft to Poland, Hungary and the Czech Republic, ACDA advocated measures to increase transparency of the procurement of major weapon systems. These initiatives are based on a commitment by the countries in the region to maintain a regional military balance at the lowest levels consistent with security needs to prevent excessive arms buildups. Future arms purchases would conform with this strategy and would be conducted so as to promote greater transparency in a more rigorous CSBM regime. These efforts will serve to ease tensions within Central Europe and to alleviate Russia's concerns about NATO expansion.


Collapse of the former Soviet Union and its replacement by 15 independent states has fundamentally altered the geo-strategic environment in Eurasia. Eurasian (as distinguished from European) regional arms control is in a very early stage. At this early point, our objective is to explore what can be accomplished by bilateral or multilateral arms control with China and with the states of the former Soviet Union, as well as regionwide arms control. Our goals in this region are greater transparency, regional dialogues, maximum security for and control of nuclear weapons and, above all, nonproliferation. In this regard, ACDA was instrumental in supporting the U.S. decision to become an unofficial observer in the Conference on Interaction and Confidence-Building Measures in Asia.

Our arms control contacts in the region have been primarily with Belarus, Kazakhstan, Russia, and Ukraine, which are actively participating in the implementation of the START and INF Treaties and SCC discussions on ABM Treaty issues. We are also reaching out to the other states of the former Soviet Union. Many are beginning to understand that arms control and nonproliferation are significant tools that can improve any nation's security.

In light of China's growing military and economic power, its troublesome proliferation history, and its impact on nuclear policies in India and Pakistan, we face an abundance of problems that need to be addressed by a U.S.-China arms control dialogue. We are cautiously optimistic that strategic dialogue with China can lead to improved nonproliferation behavior, better transparency, security and control of China's strategic nuclear forces, and reduced tensions among the major powers of the region.



The Korean Peninsula remains a heavily armed area of high tension where military preparedness is intense and political intentions are difficult to determine. Nevertheless, the threat posed by North Korea's nuclear program has been substantially reduced by conclusion of the U.S.-North Korea Agreed Framework on October 21, 1994.

North Korea acceded to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty in 1985 but did not negotiate a nuclear safeguards agreement with the IAEA. Toward the end of 1991, North Korea began to take steps to convince the world that its nuclear program was peaceful. These included negotiating its NPT safeguards agreement with the IAEA, and signing an agreement with South Korea that banned nuclear weapons and reprocessing and enrichment facilities on the Korean Peninsula; it also included a commitment to negotiate a bilateral inspection regime. At about the same time, the two Koreas also signed an agreement on reconciliation and non-aggression.

North Korea's NPT safeguards agreement came into force in April 1992, and for a time North Korea cooperated fully with the IAEA in implementation of the agreement. North Korea revealed several nuclear facilities, including a reactor capable of producing significant quantities of weapons-grade plutonium that began operating in 1986, a reprocessing plant, and two larger reactors under construction.

However, detailed analysis of nuclear samples taken by the IAEA raised questions about North Korea's initial declaration of plutonium production, and North Korea appeared to be attempting to conceal two possible nuclear waste sites. Ultimately, North Korea refused to allow the IAEA to inspect these two sites.

The IAEA Board of Governors adopted a resolution on February 25, 1993, urging North Korea to extend full cooperation to the IAEA and to permit access to these sites. North Korea continued to refuse, and on March 12 sent a letter to the U.N. Secretary-General stating its intention to withdraw from the NPT. On May 11, the Security Council passed a resolution urging North Korea to reconsider its stated intention to withdraw from the NPT and to comply with its NPT safeguards agreement. The Security Council invited all U.N. members to support that effort. This set the stage for direct U.S.-North Korea talks.

On June 11, 1993, following talks in New York, the United States and North Korea issued a joint statement in which North Korea agreed to suspend its withdrawal from the NPT. In a separate statement, the United States also noted that the dialogue could continue only if North Korea avoided certain steps including additional reprocessing, any break in the continuity of IAEA safeguards, or a withdrawal from the NPT.

A further step was taken at the next round of talks, which was held in Geneva from July 14-19, 1994. In the joint statement issued at the close of these discussions, North Korea agreed that it was "prepared to begin" consultations with the IAEA on outstanding issues and with South Korea on bilateral issues including the nuclear issue. The United States made clear that continuation of our dialogue requires continuation of safeguards on North Korean nuclear facilities and a resumption of the North-South dialogue.

The United States agreed that it was prepared to support substitution of light water reactors for North Korean graphite-moderated reactors as part of a broad and thorough solution to the nuclear issue.

Light water reactors are not optimal producers of plutonium for nuclear weapons programs and can be more effectively safeguarded than North Korea's current graphite moderated reactors.

On October 21, 1994, after sixteen months of negotiations, the United States and North Korea signed an Agreed Framework, designed to lead to an end to the threat of proliferation on the Korean Peninsula, and to provide the basis for more normal relations between North Korea and the rest of the world.

In the Agreed Framework, North Korea has committed itself to:

  • forgo reprocessing and eventually ship out its spent fuel from its existing 5 MWe reactor;

  • immediately freeze, and later eliminate, its entire graphite-moderated reactor program under IAEA monitoring; and to

  • remain in the NPT and ultimately allow full implementation of its safeguards agreement with the IAEA, including special inspections.

The Agreed Framework also provides that the United States will organize an international consortium to supply two light-water reactors to North Korea to replace the graphite reactor program which is terminated under the Agreed Framework. But no critical components will be supplied until North Korea has satisfied the IAEA that it is in full compliance with its NPT obligations.

In 1997 the United States and North Korea continued to implement the Agreed Framework. North Korea has frozen its nuclear program, the freeze has been verified by a continuous IAEA presence at the Nyongbyon site, and virtually all of North Korea's spent fuel has been stored in sealed canisters under IAEA safeguards. The United States, along with the Republic of Korea and Japan, has organized the Korean Peninsula Energy Development Organization (KEDO), which has agreed with North Korea on the provision to North Korea of two South Korean model 1,000 MWe light-water reactors (LWR). KEDO membership now includes 11 states and the European Union. South Korea and Japan have committed to fund the bulk of the LWR project through KEDO. Further, the United States and KEDO delivered another annual quota of 500,000 tons of heavy fuel oil to North Korea for heating and electricity production in 1997. As part of the Agreed Framework, the United States agreed to arrange to supply this oil in order to compensate for the energy forgone due to the freeze on North Korea's reactors.

The Agreed Framework does not rely on trust. All of its steps will be verifiable. If fully implemented, the Agreed Framework will defuse one of the most dangerous nuclear hot spots in the world, and will ultimately resolve this nonproliferation threat. Since conclusion of the agreement, North Korea has halted construction and operation activities at its reactors, cooperated in storing its spent fuel without reprocessing, and allowed IAEA monitoring of its nuclear facilities. However, it has not yet allowed "special inspections" pursuant to its NPT safeguards agreement.

ACDA's Role: ACDA has played a substantial role in formulating U.S. policies to convince North Korea to resolve the nuclear issue. ACDA actively participated in all U.S.-North Korea high-level negotiations that contributed to the U.S.-North Korea Agreed Framework and has played a critical role in implementing aspects of the Agreed Framework. In particular, ACDA is the lead agency on diplomatic issues related to the disposition of North Korea's plutonium-bearing spent fuel, and on technical issues related to IAEA inspections in North Korea. From April 1996 until December 1997 the North Korean spent fuel was placed in canisters, where it will remain under seal until it is shipped out of North Korea in accordance with the Agreed Framework. All of the fuel except for a small amount of scrap has now been canned. In 1996 ACDA led an interagency team to North Korea to discuss outstanding issues on the safe storage of North Korea's spent nuclear fuel, and ACDA has continued to participate in interagency supervision of the canning process and in discussions with the IAEA relating to its role of monitoring the freeze under the Agreed Framework.

Additionally, ACDA participates in the privately-organized Northeast Asia Cooperation Dialogue, intends to participate in the thus-far dormant Northeast Asia Security Dialogue, and will explore other possible means of resolving issues involving North Korea.


The United States has maintained its strong alliance with South Korea, including joint efforts to achieve peace on the Korean Peninsula. On April 16, 1996, President Clinton and South Korean President Kim proposed to convene a Four Party Meeting of representatives of South Korea, North Korea, United States, and China as soon as possible and without preconditions. The purpose of this meeting would be to initiate a process aimed at achieving a permanent peace. North Korea has said that it wishes to replace the armistice agreement with a permanent peace, but has not responded to this offer.

South Korea has continued to strengthen its nonproliferation credentials. Already an NPT Party, in 1995 Seoul adopted export regulations for nonproliferation-related items to comply with the guidelines of the Nuclear Suppliers Group and the NPT Exporters (Zangger) Committee and was accepted as a member of these groups. South Korea's new regulations also comply with the Missile Technology Control Regime, the Australia Group, and the post-COCOM multilateral Wassenaar Arrangement. In 1996, South Korea became a member of the Australia Group and Wassenaar Arrangement, while continuing to work closely with the United States to meet all membership criteria for admission to the MTCR.

ACDA's Role: As part of the joint U.S.-South Korean effort to enhance mutual security, ACDA has continued its active role in working with South Korea on arms control and nonproliferation. Building on December 1995 arms control bilaterals in Seoul, ACDA Director Holum met with South Korea's Foreign Minister in Washington in March 1996 to discuss North-South relations, U.S.-North Korean missile talks, regional arms control in Northeast Asia, and stability in the Korean Peninsula. ACDA also participated in the 17th U.S.-South Korean Joint Standing Committee on Nuclear and Other Energy Technology in April 1996 for the purpose of facilitating bilateral cooperation on the peaceful uses of nuclear energy. This meeting covered such nonproliferation issues as the NPT, IAEA safeguards strengthening, export controls, and regional arms control. Similarly, ACDA participated in senior-level bilaterals with South Korea on missile and CW nonproliferation.


The first state visit by a President of China to the United States in 12 years took place from October 26 to November 3, 1997. During that summit, President Clinton and President Jiang agreed that a sound and stable relationship between their two countries is important to fulfilling their common responsibility to work for peace and prosperity in the 21st century.

The summit meeting reinforced those areas of arms control where the United States and China agree: specifically, they agreed to work toward bringing the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty into force at the earliest possible date and to pursue the early start of negotiations at the Conference on Disarmament in Geneva on a treaty to halt of the production of fissionable material for nuclear explosives. Arms control and security issues were among the areas where the two governments decided to expand their cooperation. It was agreed at the summit to hold regular exchanges on these topics at the sub-cabinet level. John Holum, who serves both as the Director of ACDA and the Acting Under Secretary of State for Arms Control and International Security Affairs, visited China early in 1998, to commence this dialogue.

Other developments in 1997 where the United States and China cooperated to advance arms control objective include their becoming original Parties of the Chemical Weapons Convention in April 1997. In May, they jointly supported a major step forwarded by the IAEA in strengthening its safeguards system against the diversion of nuclear material for nuclear explosives. Regular consultations took place in Geneva, Vienna and elsewhere throughout the year on a broad range of other arms control and nonpro-liferation issues including continued efforts to contain North Korea's dangerous nuclear program and to develop common approaches to the 2000 NPT Review Conference.

Throughout the year frank discussions were also held at all political levels on those areas of nonproliferation where there are continuing differences. Notwithstanding China's professed support for preventing the spread of weapons of mass destruction and missiles capable of delivering such weapons, the United States and China continue to have significant differences in the export control policies and practices necessary to implement their nonproliferation obligations. These differences are due in part to the fact that China has only recently decided to participate in global nonproliferation regimes and is slow to adopt the controls necessary to enforce them. But there are also significant commercial, foreign policy, and strategic factors which contribute to the problem. These differences narrowed some this year, particularly in the area of nuclear export controls.

On October 29, 1997, President Clinton announced his intention to move forward with implementation of the 1985 U.S.-China peaceful nuclear cooperation agreement. This decision was based on Chinese steps and assurances which persuaded the United States that China had taken and was taking concrete action to improve its nuclear export policies. Progress in this area actually began in May 1996 when China announced that it would not provide assistance to unsafeguarded nuclear facilities such as those found in Pakistan. We continue to monitor that commitment very carefully and have no basis to conclude that China has acted inconsistently with that pledge. In October 1997, China provided written, authoritative assurances that it is not going to engage in new nuclear cooperation with Iran and will complete existing projects in a relatively short period of time. In May and September of 1997, China took action to put into place a nuclear export control system that is largely consistent with international standards. In October 1997, China joined the Zangger (NPT Exporters) Committee, the first time China has become formally associated with a multilateral export control group. More remains to be done, but these steps represent significant progress and provide a firm basis for the President's decision to implement the 1985 U.S.-China peaceful nuclear cooperation agreement. The United States and China will continue their close consultations on these nuclear issues. Through this dialogue on nuclear nonproliferation, China and the United States have moved closer to a common understanding of the steps necessary to ensure that no assistance is being provided to the nuclear weapons programs of Pakistan and Iran. This is an important achievement, particularly in light of China's long history of nuclear cooperation with both countries, and one which considerably advances important U.S. national security objectives.

Our nonproliferation dialogue also addressed controls on chemical weapon-related transfers. In May 1997 the United States imposed sanctions on seven Chinese entities under the Chemical and Biological Weapons Control and Elimination Act of 1991, for knowingly and materially contributing to Iran's CW program through the export of CW precursor chemicals and/or CW-related production equipment or technology. The United States does not question the sincerity of China's commitment under the Chemical Weapons Convention not to assist others to acquire chemical weapons, but it is clear that China does not yet have in place an export control system of sufficient scope to regulate, for example, dual-use chemical-related transfers to countries like Iran. Some progress was made in the latter half of 1997, in improving Chinese government oversight of chemical-related transfers.

On missile export policy, there is no progress to report in 1997. China has pledged to abide by the guidelines of the Missile Technology Control Regime, but China does not interpret its responsibilities under the MTCR as restrictively as does the United States; nor does it have in place control regulations that would enable them to fulfill their MTCR undertakings effectively. Concerns about Chinese missile-related transfers continue and the Administration will not hesitate to impose sanctions again (as was done in 1991 and 1993) if the evidentiary standards are met.

Chinese transfers of advanced conventional weapons to Iran were also a dominant item on our bilateral agenda during 1997. Of particular interest is the sale of anti-ship missiles. The United States has made clear that such missile sales pose a direct threat to shipping in the Gulf region, and have urged they be discontinued. We believe the Chinese understand our concerns and are taking them seriously. Here too the Administration continues to monitor Chinese activities in the context of a 1991 sanctions law which calls for certain punitive measures against entities which transfer destabilizing numbers and types of conventional weapons to Iran or Iraq.

U.S.-Chinese consultations on these and other key arms control, nonproliferation, and security issues will continue in 1998, at both the expert and senior policy level.


The United States seeks in the 21-member Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) Regional Forum (ARF) to promote regional arms control through military transparency and other confidence-building measures in the Asia-Pacific region. ARF is the only regionwide multilateral, governmental regional security forum in the Asia-Pacific region. ARF has agreed to an evolutionary vision of its future, involving a three-stage process: confidence- and security-building; conflict prevention; and conflict resolution. Evolution in this direction will proceed at a pace "comfortable" for all members.

We encourage the ARF to adopt a range of CSBMs related to military transparency and conventional arms, specifically to:

  • seek universal regional participation in the UN Register of Conventional Arms;

  • make voluntary submissions of additional information;

  • support expansion of the Register at the CD; and

  • support development of a regional register.

We also seek through the ARF to encourage universal adherence to the principles and commitments of the nonproliferation treaties and regimes (NPT, MTCR, CWC, BWC, Australia Group, NSG, Zangger Committee) and to engage other members not fully integrated into the global treaty regimes. These dialogues can work to encourage the development of effective export control mechanisms relating to technologies of development and production of weapons of mass destruction (WMD). Asia-Pacific security dialogues such as ARF are not, however, alternatives to global arms control fora as primary negotiating bodies on arms control and nonproliferation matters. Hence:

  • The United States strongly supports active ARF involvement in arms control issues as an important U.S. objective. ARF support for treaty-based regimes dealing with WMD such as NPT, CTBT, CWC, BWC, and the proposed FMCT is the most achievable goal in the short term. The recent admission of India may complicate this, but it may also induce India to adopt regional/global norms.

  • Promoting more active ARF discussion, and support for, non-treaty-based regimes, such as MTCR, the Australia Group, the NSG, and the Wassenaar Arrangement, is likely to take more time, but we seek it as a medium- to long-term objective.

  • We should promote a more active ARF discussion on export controls and their relationship to shared ARF-member WMD arms control objectives.

ACDA's Role: In March 1997, ACDA attended the second meeting of the ARF Intersessional Group (ISG) on CBMs in Beijing which was co-chaired by China and the Philippines. The meeting, attended by all ARF participants, discussed regional security, defense relations, defense white papers, defense conversion, support for the UN Register of Conventional Arms and the possibility of a regional register and workshop on arms transfers. ACDA developed the U.S. initiatives to encourage the ARF to adopt a range of CSBMs related to military transparency and conventional arms, and recommended a number of specific transparency measures, i.e., to seek universal regional participation in the UN Register of Conventional Arms, to make voluntary submissions of additional information, to support expansion of the Register at the CD, and to support development of a regional register. In May, representatives from ACDA attended the Senior Officials Meeting (SOM) in Langkawi, Malaysia, and attended the ARF Ministerial in July in Kuala Lumpur. The SOM approved two Track I working groups on CBMs and Disaster Relief for 1997/1998, and agreed to include Preventive Diplomacy and Maritime Cooperation on the agenda of the CBM working groups. At the Ministerial meeting, Ministers accepted the proposal to add a third seat for defense officials and discussed the evolution of the ARF from CBMs to the second stage of Preventive Diplomacy.

The first ISG CBM meeting under Philippines ARF chairmanship, was co-hosted by Brunei and Australia in Bandar Seri Begawan in November 1997. In this meeting, ACDA put forward four CBM proposals which include: compilation of lists of publications and experts on CSBMs; discussions on UN Conventional Arms Register data; increased ARF participation in the UN Military Expenditures Report, and ARF liaison with other regional fora such as the Organization of American States (OAS) and the Organization of Security Cooperation in Europe (OSCE). The first three measures won immediate support while the fourth will remain under discussion for possible adoption at the second CBM meeting in Sydney in March 1998.


The Northeast Asian region is highly developed and home to the world's three largest national economies as measured by GNP (United States, Japan and China) and three of the world's five declared nuclear powers (United States, China and Russia). It is also a region plagued by mistrust, historical animosities, and periods of occupation and war. Complicating these factors are China's recent emergence as a great power and military modernization, Russia's shrinking presence in the region and difficult transition to a market economy, North Korea's unclear future, and the high state of tension on the Korean Peninsula.

Multilateral Security Fora

There are no binding arms control accords designed specifically for this region and most work among government and non-government experts continues to focus on creating an environment of more openness and greater predictability. These efforts are, for the most part, manifested in a series of actual and proposed confidence-building measures, such as the publication of defense and arms control white papers. To further promote transparency on defense information sharing, ACDA published in November 1997 a compendium of the official global defense/arms control white papers of the United States, China, Japan, South Korea and Russia for the Northeast Asia Cooperation Dialogue (NEACD) and public at-large.

While no formal government-to-government Northeast Asian regional arms control channel exists at present, the "Track II" NEACD serves as the primary multilateral forum for participants from the region to exchange views on regional confidence-building measures and arms control ideas. The NEACD process began in 1993 and held its seventh plenary session in Tokyo, Japan in December 1997. The NEACD process is managed by the Institute on Global Conflict and Cooperation at the University of California at San Diego.

ACDA believes the NEACD process should be elevated to a "Track I" official dialogue while maintaining its focus on the identification of areas where regional parties can enter into confidence-building measures that enhance stability and improve the climate for more formal arms control agreements in the future.

ACDA also participates in the North Pacific Arms Control Workshop (NPACW), which is another Track II body comprised of official and non-official representatives from South Korea, Japan, China, Russia, Canada, and the United States. The NPACW last met in April 1997, and is scheduled to meet again in June 1998. The NPACW is the only multilateral Northeast Asia security forum dedicated solely to the promotion of regional arms control.

The Korean Peninsula

The United States, China, South Korea, and North Korea convened the opening plenary of Korean Peninsula Four Party Peace Talks on December 9-10, 1997. Those talks are designed to lead to the negotiated conclusion of the formal state of war between South and North Korea and to the eventual peaceful unification of the Korean Peninsula. A key component of those talks will be establishing means to reduce military tension and instability along the demilitarized zone (DMZ) through confidence-building and other tension reduction measures. ACDA hopes that Peninsula military CBMs will be adopted early in the negotiating process. The Acting Assistant Director for Nonproliferation and Regional Arms Control represents ACDA in the Four Party Talks and any future expert talks on Korean Peninsula arms control initiatives.

As close allies, the United States and Republic of Korea (ROK) have formed a Nonproliferation Task Force to discuss regional proliferation issues, especially our mutual concerns about North Korean proliferant activities and bilateral issues of interest. Through the Task Force, the United States also works to help facilitate South Korean membership in global nonproliferation regimes like the MTCR. The forum is designed to maintain close ties and coordination between our two countries on proliferation issues in the region and globally. The Task Force has been meeting since 1995 and hopes to convene again in the near future. ACDA provides a representative to these talks.

ACDA also is supporting the U.S. policy of gradual engagement in discrete areas with North Korea by seeking to establish a dialogue with the DPRK on arms control which we believe will help promote greater stability on the Korean Peninsula. To that end, ACDA helped sponsor a one-day arms control orientation workshop for North Korean delegates to the U.S.-DPRK missile talks at Sandia National Laboratory's Cooperative Monitoring Center (CMC) in June 1997.

To further reduce the serious North Korean missile threat, the United States entered into a dialogue with Pyongyang in April 1996 to seek a negotiated freeze on North Korean missile technology exports and indigenous missile programs. The two sides last met in June 1997 and hope to meet again in the near future. ACDA provides a representative to the talks.


While the likelihood of a fourth war between India and Pakistan remains small, the possibility of a war in the region going nuclear is perhaps higher in South Asia than anywhere else in the world. Both nations could assemble nuclear weapons within a short time and both have tested missiles and acquired aircraft capable of delivering such weapons. The United States remains concerned that continued proliferation developments in the region would have negative repercussions for regional as well as international security.

Although India and Pakistan have resumed their bilateral dialogue, substantive progress has been hampered by continued differences over how to discuss the Kashmir issue and by preoccupation with domestic politics in both countries.

Both India and Pakistan had ratified the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) by 1997. India declared for the first time its chemical weapon capability, submitted a list of its stockpiles and relevant facilities to the OPCW, and is beginning the process of eliminating its CW capabilities. Pakistan has been encouraged to make a complete and accurate declaration.

While the CWC should make a significant contribution to enhancing transparency, stability, and cooperation in South Asia, several other arms control concerns remain. India continues to tie start-up of FMCT negotiations to timebound nuclear disarmament, although there have been some indications in the Indian media and elsewhere that India might show some flexibility in this area. India also says it will not sign the CTBT, and Pakistan maintains its position that it will not sign until India does. ACDA monitors and provides assessments of the positions taken by India and Pakistan on these agreements and assists in the development of U.S. arms control policy toward South Asia.

After three years of no senior-level contact between India and Pakistan, both countries signaled their desire in February 1997 to re-engage. Several meetings were held at the Prime Ministerial and Foreign Secretary level before talks again bogged down in the fall. At the June Foreign Secretary talks, it was agreed that eight working groups would be established covering Kashmir, Siachen, the Wuller Barrage Project, terrorism and drug-trafficking, economic and commercial cooperation, and the promotion of friendly exchanges in various areas. We remain concerned that neither side has fully implemented existing bilateral agreements and hope that India and Pakistan will be able to establish a framework in which they can tackle difficult issues that have an impact on regional security.

In bilateral meetings with both India and Pakistan, ACDA has encouraged continued and regular bilateral talks designed to address all aspects of security and in particular arms control and confidence-building measures that can reduce regional tensions. Regional instability continues to be aggravated by Indo-Pakistani tensions, particularly over Kashmir. India's belief that it needs a nuclear capability to be viewed as a major world power also contributes to the problem. Nuclear and missile proliferation is both a cause and an effect of this situation. While Pakistan and China supported in principle the establishment of a security dialogue for the region involving all key parties, India has not accepted the proposal. In addition, relations between India and Pakistan continue to be strained by limited production and movement by India of the Prithvi ballistic missile, and Indian perceptions of continued Chinese nuclear and M-11 missile-related transfers to Pakistan.

The United States seeks to work with both countries on a bilateral, regional, and global basis to reduce regional tensions and address the threat to South Asian and international security posed by the existence of advanced, ballistic missile and unsafeguarded nuclear programs in the region. This year, the Administration launched with the visits of Assistant Secretary Inderfurth, Under Secretary Pickering, and Secretary Albright a broader, more senior-level dialogue with both India and Pakistan that we hope will advance a number of U.S. interests in the region, key among them nonproliferation and regional stability. During the Secretary's trip to the region, she urged both countries to rethink their attachment to nuclear and missile programs and to reconsider their positions on CTBT and FMCT.

ACDA is developing regional arms control techniques and confidence-building measures aimed at reducing tension in the region and promoting bilateral efforts to address security concerns in the region. Both governmental and nongovernmental fora have been used as vehicles to discuss CBMs and other arms control/nonproliferation initiatives. In August, ACDA hosted the fourth in a series of South Asian arms control workshops, this time with a group from Pakistan. (Pakistani and Indian groups have participated separately in previous workshops.) Plans are now underway for a similar session with a group in India. At these sessions, participants have discussed the concepts and techniques of arms control and confidence-building and explored the ways such techniques could be adapted to meet their unique security concerns. ACDA is developing ways to assist India and Pakistan to verify their regional agreements, and continues to stress the importance of adequate verification and monitoring. ACDA also contributed to a non-governmental workshop on CBMs and arms control at the Regional Centre for Strategic Studies in Colombo, Sri Lanka, that included participants from India, Pakistan, China, and the United States.

Fostering support for major arms control initiatives in South Asia is a slow process. The ACDA workshops represent an innovative way to engage officials in both countries in discussion of CBMs and arms control. They offer a path to longer-term progress in addressing regional security concerns. At every opportunity, ACDA has provided information to India and Pakistan on the national security benefits of arms control.

The United States continues its efforts to prevent the export of missile and nuclear weapons-related material, technology, and equipment to India and Pakistan. We have been greatly aided by the actions of the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG) to restrict the export of nuclear-related dual-use commodities to countries of proliferation concern, and to require full-scope safeguards as a condition of new nuclear supply. The United States continues to urge both India and Pakistan to place all their nuclear facilities under IAEA safeguards, and to adopt responsible national export control policies and regulations to prevent the proliferation of WMD and missiles capable of delivering them. India has made some progress in this area by passing legislation to improve its missile-related export control laws. There were reports in the spring and summer that India had moved Prithvi missiles to a location near the Pakistani border. The United States stressed its concern to the Indian government that the Prithvis not be deployed. We have also urged India and Pakistan to discuss this issue bilaterally.


For the past 46 years, Middle Eastern conflicts inhibited the establishment of formal relations between Israel and other governments in the region. There have been few opportunities for arms control agreements, or even for arms control discussions, within this region. Since l991, Israel has been building on its 1979 peace agreement with Egypt by engaging in negotiations with its immediate neighbors and the Palestinians to reach the objective of a comprehensive and durable peace in the region.

As negotiated settlements of the Middle East Peace Process are implemented, we expect that governments will establish relations and expand commercial and social contacts. In this more stable security environment, we can anticipate opportunities for concrete and visible arms control to emerge. We will continue to sponsor and participate in bilateral as well as regional meetings to encourage this process.

ACDA's Role: ACDA seeks to prevent the proliferation of all weapons of mass destruction, their production means, and delivery systems capable of carrying them throughout the Middle East, as well as excessive and destabilizing accumulations of conventional arms. We are pressing for regional compliance with and are encouraging acceptance of the Chemical Weapons Convention, the Biological Weapons Convention, and the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, all of which, together with progress in the peace process, can set the stage for establishing a zone free of weapons of mass destruction in the Middle East. We also urged states in the region to adhere to the MTCR Guidelines. ACDA's role in the export licensing process for dual-use technology and conventional weapons helps to stabilize the region, where we limit destabilizing acquisitions of such items.

ACDA's more specific activities are described in the following subsections.


As part of the multilateral track of the Middle East peace process, the Arms Control and Regional Security (ACRS) working group was formed in early 1992 under the direction of the Department of State. The ACRS, sponsored jointly by the Russian Federation and the United States, is one of five multilateral groups in the peace process, which complements the bilateral talks between Israel and its immediate neighbors. It is the only such group devoted solely to regional security issues. Thirteen Arab states, Israel, and a Palestinian delegation, together with more than 20 extra-regional entities, participate in plenary meetings to discuss issues related to regional security and direct the work of ACRS.

Full ACRS activities have been in abeyance since September 1995. The U.S. government continues to advance efforts to resume these important talks.

ACDA's Role: ACDA has been a key participant in the ACRS process since its inception. It has contributed substantively to U.S. efforts to create a regional security center and establish the ACRS communications network, based on its experience with setting up the original CSCE network and as the architect of the new OSCE communications network. ACDA has presented numerous papers and briefings on arms control both to the ACRS working group and governmental and nongovernmental entities from the region. ACDA serves as a main provider of source material both to participants new to arms control and to those wishing to understand the intricate details of specific agreements. It also continues to develop new proposals for confidence-building and arms control measures for consideration by the working group. ACDA's unique attributes -- historical interaction with regional and extra-regional participants on arms control, negotiating experience on agreements of relevance to the region, and the ability to coordinate ACRS work with other negotiations and the work of other agencies -- enable us to make substantial and sustained efforts in support of regional security in the Middle East.

In addition to direct support for the Middle East Peace Process, ACDA has sought to deepen and expand the expertise of regional parties in arms control, nonproliferation, and confidence-building measures. Since January 1996, ACDA, with interagency support, has conducted several two-week training courses on arms control for Middle East officials new to the subject. Innovative arms control training tools were introduced during the courses, including a verification negotiation exercise developed by ACDA and Sandia National Laboratories' Cooperative Monitoring Center and a computer-based exercise of a managed access inspection. Courses have been conducted for officials from Israel, Oman, Qatar, Egypt, and Jordan. More of these courses as well as an advanced course are being planned for the future. In addition to broadening the ties between the United States and regional arms control communities, these courses are considered invaluable for expanding the regional coterie of experts on the subject of arms control who, in turn, may be involved in both global and regional arms control initiatives and negotiations.

ACDA continues to be the lead U.S. agency sponsoring workshops and conferences organized by nongovernmental organizations that bring together regional parties for informal discussions on nonproliferation and confidence-building measures in the Middle East. ACDA also fosters, supports, and advises other U.S. government agencies on sponsoring activities promoting regional interactions on arms control. Middle East parties have acclaimed these efforts for sustaining dialogue between regional parties and generating ideas that may be useful to formal regional security and arms control negotiations.


By Resolution 687 (April 3, 1991), the Security Council established the formal Gulf War cease-fire. Beyond elements that pertain to sanctions, compensation, return of seized property and establishment of a well-defined border, the resolution:

  • condemns Iraq's violation of its NPT, IAEA Safeguards and 1925 Geneva Protocol obligations;

  • establishes the UN Special Commission (UNSCOM) and mandates that it and the IAEA destroy, remove, and render harmless Iraq's biological, chemical, and nuclear capabilities and ballistic missiles having a range greater than 150 km, and eliminate capabilities to develop and produce any weapons of mass destruction;

  • requires a long-term monitoring and verification plan, of unlimited duration, to ensure compliance with the obligation Iraq accepted not to reacquire such weapons or capabilities.

Supporting implementation are Security Council Resolution SC Res. 707 (1991), which condemns Iraq for having attempted to obstruct the inspection and verification process and demands full disclosure of its weapons programs, and SC Res. 715 (1991), which approves UNSCOM and IAEA long-term monitoring plans; both resolutions are of unlimited duration.

Arms Control, Disarmament and Nonproliferation Objectives

Provisions of Resolutions 687, 707 and 715 are legally binding on Iraq, having been adopted under Chapter VII of the UN Charter ("Action with Respect to Threats to the Peace, Breaches of the Peace, and Acts of Aggression"). No element of the resolutions is negotiable: Iraq is required to prove to UNSCOM and the Director General of IAEA that it has eliminated all weapons of mass destruction. Repeated inaccurate Iraqi "Full, Final and Complete Disclosures," in all weapons categories, demonstrate that the objectives under Chapter VII have yet to be met.

Status of Activities

Since May 1991, UNSCOM and the IAEA have conducted over 220 inspections, both at Iraqi declared sites as well as suspect sites designated by UNSCOM. The monitoring system, which encompasses some 250 weapons-related sites, has been in effect for over two years. Due in great measure to incomplete declarations, concealment, and the obstruction of inspection teams despite political-level agreements to the contrary, UNSCOM and the IAEA are not yet ready to state with confidence that proscribed items have been accounted for and disposed of. Limited but significant quantities of proscribed missiles, and certain high-quality chemical and biological warfare agents and related capabilities, may remain.

Significant questions also remain on Iraqi centrifuge and weaponization programs; the IAEA believes that Iraq retains a comprehensive library of documents relating to its nuclear program.

Significant events during 1997 include:

  • Ambassador Richard Butler of Australia, relieving Rolf Ekeus July 1, 1997, became the second Executive Chairman of UNSCOM.

  • In response to dangerous incidents involving UNSCOM inspection teams, Resolution II 15, adopted by the UNSC June 21, 1997, "condemn[ed] the repeated refusal of Iraqi authorities to allow access to sites designated by the Special Commission, which constitutes clear and flagrant violations of UNSC resolutions 687, 707, 715 and 1060." In that resolution the Security Council agreed not to review lifting sanctions against Iraq (UNSCR 687) until a six-month evaluation period was completed October 11, 1997.

  • During the period from April 11 - October 11, 1997, UNSCOM sent over 40 inspection teams in support of United Nations Security Resolution 1115. The six-month, aggressive inspection regime highlighted a significant lack of cooperation by the Iraqi government. Iraqi obfuscation and deception tactics continued unabated, and as a result, the UNSCOM Report to the Security Council concerning UNSCR 1115 found that, "[T]he outstanding problems are numerous and grave."

  • In the period of August to October 1997, UNSCOM supervised the destruction of 325 pieces of newly-identified CW production equipment, 125 pieces of analytical instruments and 275 tons of precursor chemicals. However, the report cautioned that, "Iraq has only addressed issues on which the evidence of inconsistencies has been made clear to it by the Commission" and, "... the Commission recently obtained further sufficient evidence that Iraq had indeed succeeded in acquiring VX production capabilities ... [with] this area clearly requiring further verification...."

  • The UNSC passed Resolution 1134 October 23 after the consolidated report by the Executive Chairman concerning the previous six months. In it the Security Council, "Decides not to conduct the reviews provided for in paragraphs 21 and 28 of resolution 687...." This signified continued resolve by the Security Council to not lift sanctions until the Iraqi government came into full compliance, as determined by UNSCOM, with UNSCR 687.

  • As a result of the Security Council not lifting sanctions against the Iraqi government Iraq took a more confrontational, brinkmanship attitude by demanding removal of U.S. members of UNSCOM inspection teams while at the same time issuing threats of military action against U.N. U-2 reconnaissance flights. UNSCOM refused to buckle, and with the full backing of the Security Council through UNSCR 1137, reminded the Iraqi government that the safety of U.N. inspectors was an Iraqi responsibility and that any action against them would be considered a material breach of past resolutions. The crisis became more acute as the U.S. military presence in the theater was increased substantially.

  • As a result of UNSCOM inspectors being forced out of Iraq, with only a skeleton staff left at the Baghdad Monitoring and Verification Center, the Iraqi government proceeded to remove monitoring equipment installed in a number of critical sites. Additionally, under the claim of being possible targets, Iraq moved significant quantities of monitored equipment to unknown sites.

  • Approval of UNSC 1143 by the Security Council extended the provisions of UNSCR 986 for an additional six months through June 1998.

Prospects for the Forthcoming Year

UNSCOM inspectors returned to Iraq to resume inspections in late November 1997 after a two-week hiatus. However the tone of rhetoric coming from the Iraqi government has made it clear that UNSCOM can expect to have less, rather than more, cooperation in its attempts to fully account for Iraqi weapons of mass destruction and associated programs. In discussions between the Executive Chairman and Deputy Prime Minister Tariq Aziz held in December 1997, the Iraqi's made clear that Iraq will not allow UNSCOM inspectors the full and complete access required under numerous Security Council resolutions, and Iraq will continue to impede full disclosure of the extent of its programs of weapons of mass destruction. Iraq, contrary to UNSCOM documentation, claims that, "Iraq had destroyed and/or no longer had any weapon of mass destruction ... and, Iraq would volunteer no new information. It preferred a situation where it would verify the information held by the Commission."

It is likely that Iraq will continue to resist providing a full, final and complete declaration in any of the four proscribed weapons categories. This assessment is backed by official statements by the Iraqi Deputy Prime Minister to the Security Council's representative that Iraq will not even try to complete this obligation. Further, he states that, instead of allowing UNSCOM to verify the required Iraqi declaration, Iraq wants to verify confidential information provided to UNSCOM by most of the Security Council members. The United States will continue to use diplomatic efforts and to work with other Security Council members to resolve these outstanding problems.

ACDA's Role: ACDA continues to provide USG policy and analytical evaluations, to include how efforts in Iraq may affect ongoing arms control activities. ACDA personnel also serve as active participants in the policy formulation group supporting UNSCOM and the IAEA. Various ACDA officials have served since 1991 as UNSCOM Deputy Executive Chairman (2 years); UNSCOM BW site planner/protocol designer (2 years); and as inspectors in Iraq.


We are very concerned about Iran's nuclear program, and continue to monitor the nuclear activity in that country very closely. Although Iran's rudimentary program has apparently met with only limited success so far, we find that Iran has not abandoned its efforts to expand its nuclear infrastructure to support nuclear weapons development. Judgements about timetables for any country's development of nuclear weapons are difficult to make with precision. In recent years, the U.S. intelligence community has stated publicly that Iran would probably take at least 8-10 years to produce an indigenous nuclear weapons production capability. The most significant factor in reducing this timetable would be critical foreign assistance or acquisition of fissile materials through smuggling.

Through multilateral and bilateral contacts ACDA, working with other U.S. agencies, will continue to urge all supplier countries not to engage in any nuclear cooperation with Iran. During 1996 U.S. efforts focussed on Russia and China, which continue to be Iran's primary source of nuclear-related cooperation.

In high-level meetings with Russia, the United States has repeatedly and strenuously objected to any form of nuclear cooperation with Iran. Although President Yeltsin has publicly stated his opposition to an Iranian nuclear weapon capability, Russia continues to argue that its cooperation with Iran will not materially contribute to a fissile material production capability, and that Iran is complying with its NPT obligations. The administration has established a multilevel dialogue with the Russians and continues to give this issue top priority on the bilateral agenda.

During 1997 the United States continued to stress to Chinese officials the dangers of nuclear cooperation with Iran. We argued that Iran has strong nuclear weapons ambitions and any nuclear cooperation with them contributes to the risk of proliferation. China's plans for providing nuclear reactors to Iran appear to be suspended. Moreover, in the context of the October 1997 summit in Washington between Presidents Jiang and Clinton, China provided authoritative assurances that it is not going to engage in new nuclear cooperation with Iran and will complete existing projects in a relatively short period of time. This decision by China is a significant step forward in the ongoing effort to prevent Iran from acquiring a basic nuclear capability. This assurance was an important factor in President Clinton's decision to move forward with the long-stalled 1985 U.S.-China civil nuclear cooperation agreement. The Chinese know that if they act in a manner inconsistent with their assurances, the United States has the right to suspend cooperation under the 1985 agreement.


U.S. regional arms control policy is aimed at promoting CSBMs and deepening security dialogue and transparency. CSBMs and increased transparency will be essential to maintaining regional confidence and stability and preventing unnecessary arms purchases. In 1997, ACDA vigorously led U.S. government efforts to foster and support regional arms control in Latin America and the Caribbean. This has led to U.S. leadership at the OAS on this issue, greater dialogue among members of the hemisphere, and concrete progress in implementing the Santiago Declaration of confidence- and security-building measures (CSBMs).


On June 9, 1995, the 25th Organization of American States (OAS) adopted a U.S.-authored resolution instructing the Permanent Council to establish a Committee on Hemispheric Security. The resolution created the region's first permanent forum for the consideration of arms control, nonproliferation, and security issues. Since 1991, the OAS has built an impressive record of achievement in this area. ACDA has actively participated in the endeavors of the Committee. In recognition of its expertise and support the ACDA advisor to the U.S. Mission to the OAS was elected as a vice chairman to the Committee in 1997.

In 1994, under the auspices of the Organization of American States, a CSBMs experts' meeting was held in Buenos Aires, Argentina. Chile hosted a follow-up Vice-Ministerial Conference on CSBMs in November 1995, which adopted the Declaration of Santiago on CSBMs. The Declaration calls for each country to gradually adopt agreements regarding advance notification of military exercises, participate in the U.N. Standardized International Reporting of Military Expenditures, promote exchanges of information concerning defense policies and doctrines, and invite foreign observers to military exercises. El Salvador hosted another follow-on ministerial on CSBMs in February 1998.

The 1995 Declaration of Santiago on CSBMs marked a watershed in Inter-American cooperative efforts to build hemispheric confidence. 1998 offers new opportunities to build on this progress. The OAS Vice Ministerial meeting on CSBMs in El Salvador will allow the hemisphere to further develop interest in confidence- and security-building measures as well as further develop the Santiago Declaration measures on a regional and bilateral basis. The next Defense Ministerial of the Americas (DMA) will be held in the fall of 1998 in Colombia. DMA III will be another opportunity to foster a better understanding of the Declaration of Santiago on CSBMs by the Defense Ministers and the military establishments, which will be increasingly called upon to implement those measures. ACDA worked diligently to generate regional momentum in implementing the Declaration of Santiago on CSBMs. ACDA was also instrumental in fostering better understanding between Defense and Foreign Ministries on the vital role they need to play in the implementation of the Santiago Declaration on CSBMs and on OAS resolutions adopted by the General Assembly on this matter.

Since the historic Santiago Conference on CSBMs, the USG has organized itself to ensure on an annual basis we will be working to comply and to report to the OAS and its member states on our progress of implementing the Declaration of Santiago. An interagency working group headed by ACDA has been created to fulfill this work.

In May 1997, the United States presented to the OAS Secretary General, the chairman of the Committee on Hemispheric Security, and the OAS member states the U.S. annual report on steps we have taken to comply with the Declaration of Santiago. In addition, the United States included in the report the information conveyed by the United States to the United Nations for the Register of Conventional Arms for 1996.

On June 5, 1997, the OAS General Assembly adopted a U.S. resolution which calls for the OAS to develop a hemispheric legal framework on advance notification of major arms acquisitions covered by the United Nations Register of Conventional Arms. The transparency measure foreseen in the OAS General Assembly Resolution would make it easier for countries in the region to evaluate their security situation, as far as it is related to arms procurement by other countries, and hence to avoid unnecessary arms procurement based on a misperception of what others in the region are purchasing. Such a measure would create an environment even more conducive to trust, confidence, and mutual restraint. Transparency in arms acquisition would also make it possible to devote more resources to the economic and social development of OAS member states.


ACDA continued to support U.S. efforts to fostering the development of an arms transparency and restraint mechanism between the two countries in order to avoid an arms race, and support the ongoing negotiations on resolution of the border dispute.

In the October 6, 1995, Declaration of the Guarantor Countries of the 1942 Protocol of Rio De Janeiro and the Vice Foreign Ministers of Ecuador and Peru on the Advances in the Peace Process, the parties pledged that "It is essential to avoid the risks of an arms race so as not to undermine the end of hostilities or otherwise damage the peace." On February 23, 1996, Ecuador and Peru agreed: "to form a Working Group made up of officials from the Defense sectors of both countries and by a diplomatic liaison official. Said Group will undertake to design a bilateral mechanism to build confidence between Ecuador and Peru, which contributes to transparency in military acquisitions and to strengthening the climate of security and stability between the two countries." At the U.S. invitation, the Peruvian Working Group members and other senior Peruvian officials attended an intensive five-day arms control workshop sponsored by ACDA from October 27-31, 1997. The course was designed to provide the participants with the opportunity to question many of the United States leading authorities on the role of arms control in national defense and security. Last year, ACDA hosted the Ecuadorian Working Group for the same workshop.


In 1997 ACDA continued to contribute to the technical consideration of arms control measures to address growing security concerns in the Caribbean. ACDA also began internal studies on how traditional arms control measures could be tailored to address non-traditional security threats such as illegal trafficking and proliferation of small arms.


In 1997, ACDA pressed a number of policy initiatives and activities to foster arms control in sub-Saharan Africa.

The agency intensified its efforts to support the Mali-initiated West African regional moratorium on the import, export, and manufacture of small arms. In conjunction with the eight-country West African Ministerial meeting held in Bamako in March to discuss Mali's proposal for an arms moratorium, ACDA responded to a request from the Government of Mali for technical assistance to draft a subregional register on small arms and light weapons. This register is designed to complement the UN Register of Conventional Arms, which is limited to major weapons. ACDA also circulated at the Ministerial a paper encouraging the subregional grouping to commit to military transparency by participating in 1997 in the UN Register, and to continue their efforts toward greater control and transparency in the flow of all conventional arms.

ACDA is preparing initiatives and has taken follow-up actions to support Mali's effort to achieve a five-year regional moratorium on small arms, light weapons, and land mines (the Programme for Coordination and Assistance on Security and Development (PCASED). Our agency hosted a visit to Washington by UN officials to brief and seek support from U.S. officials on the Mali proposal. These meetings were quite successful in promoting widespread awareness of PCASED among many U.S. departments and agencies, its implications for U.S. interests and policies, and the types of international assistance required to establish and sustain this program. ACDA has been following up with other U.S. agencies to identify possible sources of material, technical, and/or financial support for this program. ACDA will be working with the UN Secretary General's Representative to the Mali Peace Process on actions such as the establishment of a small arms registry, creation of a subregional data bank, and training support for customs and police forces.

In November, ACDA presented a paper on Mali's proposed sub-regional small arms moratorium at the Annual African Studies Association Conference in Colombus, Ohio, and in December at the American Academy of Arts and Sciences Workshop on Controlling the Global Trade in Light Weapons. This paper contributes analytically to understanding the role of arms control in conflict prevention, management, and resolution, and identifies concrete steps that the United States and the international community can take to enhance the prospects for success of such subregional arms control efforts.

ACDA actively participated in the interagency follow-up integrated long-term plan to support conflict resolution capabilities and demobilization activities in sub-Saharan Africa. This plan was mandated by the 1994 African Conflict Resolution Act.

ACDA continues to compile and publish country data on military expenditures, armed forces, arms imports and exports, and other indicators to foster transparency in the region, and has disseminated this data within the region.