Appendix A: Arms Control and Related Treaties and Agreements

I. NUCLEAR WEAPONS MEASURES

Treaty Banning Nuclear Weapon Tests in the Atmosphere, in Outer Space and Under Water (Limited Test Ban Treaty)

Requires Parties not to conduct nuclear weapon tests, or any other nuclear explosion, in the atmosphere, beyond atmospheric limits including outer space, or underwater. Signed August 5, 1963; entered into force October 10, 1963.

Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America (Treaty of Tlatelolco)

Obligates Latin American Parties not to acquire or possess nuclear weapons, nor to permit the storage or deployment of nuclear weapons on their territories by other countries. Signed February 14, 1967; entered into force April 22, 1968.

Additional Protocol II to the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America

Obligates nuclear-weapon states to respect the denuclearized status of the zone, and, therefore, not to contribute to acts involving violation of obligations of the Parties; and not to use or threaten to use nuclear weapons against the Latin American Parties. Signed April 1, 1968; ratified by the United States May 8, 1971.

Additional Protocol I to the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons In Latin America

Calls on nations outside the Treaty zone to apply its denuclearization provisions to the territories in the zone "for which de jure or de facto they are internationally responsible." Signed May 26, 1977; ratified by the United States November 19, 1981.

Agreement of 17 February 1989 Between the United States of America and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America

Establishes acceptance by the U.S. of full-scope safeguards for its territories in the Treaty area. Signed February 17, 1989; entered into force April 6, 1989.

Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (Non-Proliferation Treaty)

Designed to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons, while promoting the peaceful uses of nuclear energy. Signed July 1, 1968; entered into force March 5, 1970. Extended indefinitely May 11, 1995.

NPT Exporters Committee

Established in 1971 to develop common understandings of the export control requirements of the NPT. Also known as the Zangger Committee.

Nuclear Suppliers Group

A multilateral political agreement among nuclear suppliers to control the export of nuclear and nuclear-related goods and technologies in order to curb the proliferation of nuclear weapons. The guidelines were first published in February, 1978, and have been revised several times since then.

Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material

Designed to reduce the risk of theft of nuclear material. Signed March 3, 1980; entered into force February 8, 1987.

Agreement Between the United States of America and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards in the United States (and Protocol Thereto)

Provides for the application of IAEA safeguards to all peaceful nuclear activities in designated nuclear facilities in the United States. Signed November 18, 1977; entered into force December 9, 1980.

Treaty on the Prohibition of the Emplacement of Nuclear Weapons and Other Weapons of Mass Destruction on the Seabed and the Ocean Floor and in the Subsoil Thereof (Seabed Arms Control Treaty)

Prohibits nations from using the seabed as a new environment for military installations, including those capable of launching nuclear weapons. Signed February 11, 1971; entered into force May 18, 1972.

Agreement on Measures to Reduce the Risk of Outbreak of Nuclear War Between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics ("Accident Measures" Agreement)

Requires cooperation to reduce the risk that an accidental or unauthorized action might trigger nuclear war. Signed and entered into force on September 30, 1971.

Common Understanding Related to Articles 2 and 5 of the Agreement on Measures to Reduce the Risk of Outbreak of Nuclear War Between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics of September 30, 1971 (June 14, 1985)

Clarifies the meaning of "unexplained nuclear incidents" found in Article 5 of the Agreement on Measures and other terms found in Article 2.

Interim Agreement Between the United States of America and Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on Certain Measures with Respect to the Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms (SALT I Interim Agreement)

Froze existing aggregate levels of American and Soviet strategic nuclear missile launchers and submarines until an agreement on more comprehensive measures could be reached. Signed May 26, 1972; entered into force October 3, 1972.

Treaty Between the United States of America and Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the Limitation of Anti-Ballistic Missile Systems (ABM Treaty)

Provides that the two Parties may each have only two ABM system deployment areas, so restricted and so located that they could not provide a nationwide ABM defense or become the basis for one. Signed May 26, 1972; entered into force October 3, 1972.

Protocol to the Treaty Between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the Limitation of Anti-Ballistic Missile Systems

Limits each Party to a single ABM system deployment area. Signed July 3, 1974; entered into force May 24, 1976.

Protocol on Procedures Governing the Replacement, Dismantling or Destruction, and Notification Thereof, for ABM Systems and Their Components (July 3, 1974)

Implements the ABM Treaty by establishing procedures for the replacement and dismantling or destruction of ABM systems.

Supplementary Protocol to the Protocol on Procedures Governing Replacement, Dismantling or Destruction, and Notification Thereof, for ABM Systems and Their Components of July 3, 1974 (October 28, 1976), (Including the Integral Agreed Statement Regarding Section III, Paragraph 5)

Implements the ABM Treaty by establishing procedures for the replacement, dismantling, or destruction of operational ABM systems and the exchange of ABM system deployment areas.

Agreed Statement Regarding Certain Provisions of Articles II, IV, and VI of the Treaty Between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the Limitation of Anti-Ballistic Missile Systems of May 26, 1972, and the Utilization of Air Defense Radars at the Test Ranges Referred to in Article IV of that Treaty (November 1, 1978) (Including the Integral Identical Statements Read by the Commissioners at the Initialing of the Agreed Statement)

Defines test ranges within the meaning of Article IV of the ABM Treaty on the basis of the presence of ABM components for testing, identifies the current test ranges for each side, and sets forth procedures of notifying the other Party when a new test range is established. The Agreed Statement also specifies criteria for applying the term "tested in an ABM mode" as used in the ABM Treaty to ABM interceptor missiles, ABM launchers, and ABM radars. Finally, the Agreed Statement specifies that the ABM Treaty permits air defense radars located at ABM test ranges to carry out air defense functions, but to avoid ambiguous situations or misunderstandings, provides that the sides will refrain from concurrent testing of air defense components and ABM system components co-located at the same test range, and that air defense radars utilized as instrumentation equipment will not be used to make measurements on strategic ballistic missiles.

Common Understanding Related to Paragraph 2 of Section III of the Agreed Statement of November 1, 1978, Regarding Certain Provisions of Articles II, IV, and VI of the Treaty Between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the Limitation of Anti-Ballistic Missile Systems of May 26, 1972, and the Utilization of Air Defense Radars at the Test Ranges Referred to in Article IV of that Treaty (June 6, 1985)

Specifies certain criteria for concurrent operation of ABM system components and air defense system components at test ranges.

Agreed Framework Between the United States of America and the Democratic People's Republic of Korea

Commits North Korea to freeze its graphite-moderated reactors and related facilities, including a halt in plutonium reprocessing, to remain a party to the Nonproliferation Treaty, and ultimately to allow full implementation of its safeguards agreement with the IAEA and to dismantle frozen facilities. Signed October 21, 1994.

The South Pacific Nuclear Free Zone Treaty (Treaty of Rarotonga)

Obligates Parties not to test, manufacture, acquire, or permit the stationing of nuclear explosive devices in the territory of Parties to the Treaty and the dumping of radioactive wastes at sea with the zone. Signed August 6, 1985; entered into force December 11, 1986.

Additional Protocol I to the South Pacific Nuclear Free Zone Treaty

Parties are required to apply the basic provisions of the Treaty to their respective territories in the zone established by the Treaty. Signed by the United States on March 25, 1996.

Additional Protocol II to the South Pacific Nuclear Free Zone Treaty

Nuclear weapon state Parties agree not to use or threaten to use nuclear explosive devices against any Party to the treaty or to each other's territories located within the zone. Signed by the United States on March 25, 1996.

Additional Protocol III to the South Pacific Nuclear Free Zone Treaty

Nuclear weapon state Parties agree not to test nuclear explosive devices within the zone established by the Treaty. Signed by the United States on March 25, 1996.

The African Nuclear Weapon Free Zone Treaty (Treaty of Pelindaba)

Obligates African Parties not to research, development, manufacture, stockpile, acquire, test, possess, control or permit the stationing of nuclear explosive devices in the territory of Parties to the Treaty and the dumping of radioactive wastes in the African zone by Treaty Parties. The Treaty also prohibits any attack against nuclear installations in the zone by Treaty Parties and requires them to maintain the highest standards of physical protection of nuclear material, facilities and equipment, which are to be used exclusively for peaceful purpose. Signed April 11, 1996.

Additional Protocol I to the African Nuclear Weapon Free Zone Treaty

Obligates nuclear-weapon state Parties to use or threaten to use nuclear weapons against African Parties or territories of Protocol III Parties within the zone, and not to contribute to any act that constitutes a violation of the Treaty or this protocol. Signed by the United States on April 11, 1996.

Additional Protocol II to the African Nuclear Weapon Free Zone Treaty

Obligates nuclear-weapon state Parties not to test or encourage the testing of any nuclear explosive device anywhere within the African nuclear weapon free zone, and not to contribute to any act that constitutes a violation of the Treaty or this protocol. Signed by the United States on April 11, 1996.

Memorandum of Understanding Relating to The Treaty Between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the Limitation of Anti-Ballistic Missile Systems of May 26, 1972

Settles issues relating to ABM Treaty succession by recognizing the United States and the USSR successor states of Belarus, Kazakhstan, the Russian Federation, and Ukraine as the Parties to the ABM Treaty, and by recording their agreement on how the ABM Treaty will be implemented under the changed political circumstances resulting from the dissolution of the USSR. Signed September 26, 1997; it has not entered into force.

First Agreed Statement Relating to the Treaty Between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the Limitation of Anti-Ballistic Missile Systems of May 26, 1972

Records agreement by the United States, Belarus, Kazakhstan, the Russian Federation, and Ukraine on clarifying Treaty obligations relating to the difference between ABM systems -- which are limited by the Treaty -- and land-, sea-, and air-based theater ballistic missile defense (TMD) systems of lower velocity (i.e., systems having interceptor missiles whose velocities do not exceed 3.0 kilometers/second) -- which are not limited by the Treaty. Signed September 26, 1997; it has not entered into force.

Second Agreed Statement Relating to the Treaty Between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the Limitation of Anti-Ballistic Missile Systems of May 26, 1972

Records agreement by the United States, Belarus, Kazakhstan, the Russian Federation, and Ukraine with respect to testing land-, sea-, and air-based TMD systems of higher velocity (i.e., systems having interceptor missiles whose velocity exceed 3.0 kilometers/second); and prohibiting the development, testing or deployment of space-based TMD interceptor missiles and space-based components based on other physical principles that are capable of substituting for such interceptor missiles. Signed September 26, 1997; it has not entered into force.

Agreement on Confidence-Building Measures Related to Systems to Counter Ballistic Missiles Other Than Strategic Ballistic Missiles

Records agreement by the United States, Belarus, Kazakhstan, the Russian Federation, and Ukraine on reciprocal measures to promote openness and transparency in their respective TMD system programs and activities, including information exchanges, notifications, and other voluntary measures. Signed September 26, 1997; it has not entered into force.

Joint Statement on the Annual Exchange of Information on the Status of Plans and Programs with Respect to Systems to Counter Ballistic Missiles Other Than Strategic Ballistic Missiles

Records the mutual understandings of the United States, Belarus, Kazakhstan, the Russian Federation, and Ukraine with regard to providing information annually on the status of each state's own plans and programs with respect to certain TMD systems in connection with the exchange of information under the Confidence-Building Measures Agreement, and conducting consultations, within the framework of the Standing Consultative Commission, to discuss questions or concerns related to any change in such plans. Signed September 26, 1997.

Agreement Between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the Prevention of Nuclear War

Commits the two nations to make the removal of the danger of nuclear war and of the use of nuclear weapons an "objective of their policies." Signed and entered into force on June 22, 1973.

Treaty Between the United States of America and Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the Limitation of Underground Nuclear Weapons Tests (Threshold Test Ban Treaty)

Prohibits underground nuclear weapon tests of more than 150 kilotons. Signed July 3, 1974; entered into force December 11, 1990.

Treaty Between the United States of America and Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on Underground Nuclear Explosions for Peaceful Purposes (PNE Treaty)

Governs all underground nuclear explosions carried out at locations outside U.S. and Soviet weapon test sites specified under the Threshold Test Ban Treaty and limits any individual nuclear explosion to 150 kilotons. Signed May 28, 1976; entered into force December 11, 1990.

Treaty Between the United States of America and Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms (SALT II Treaty)

Intended to replace the SALT I Interim Agreement (which expired in October 1977) with one, lasting through 1985, having broader scope and more detailed constraints on U.S. and Soviet strategic offensive arms. Signed June 18, 1979; the Treaty was never ratified by either party and did not formally enter into force.

Agreement Between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the Establishment of Nuclear Risk Reduction Centers

Establishes a Nuclear Risk Reduction Center in each nation's capital, a special communications link between the Centers to help reduce the risk of war through rapid exchange of information and notifications. Signed and entered into force September 15, 1987.

Treaty Between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the Elimination of Their Intermediate-Range and Shorter-Range Missiles (INF Treaty)

Establishes an agreement between the U.S. and the Soviet Union to eliminate and ban all ground-launched ballistic and cruise missiles with a range capability of between 500 and 5,500 km. (300 and 3,400 miles). Signed December 8, 1987; entered into force June 1, 1988.

Exchange of Diplomatic Notes Between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the Term, "Weapons Delivery Vehicle." The Exchange of Notes Was Done in Geneva May 11-12, 1988

Defines "weapon delivery vehicle" used in Article II of the INF Treaty. The United States and the USSR agreed that these diplomatic notes were of "the same force and effect as the provisions of the (INF) Treaty," in diplomatic notes exchanged between the United States and the USSR on May 28-29, 1988 in Moscow. Entered into force June 1, 1988.

Agreed Minute of May 12, 1988

Adds a number of understandings, chiefly concerning the conduct of inspections. The United States and the USSR agreed that this Agreed Minute was of "the same force and effect as the (INF) Treaty" in diplomatic notes exchanged between the United States and the USSR on May 28-29, 1988 in Moscow. Entered into force June 1, 1988.

Agreed Statement Between the Government of the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics

Establishes rules concerning the application of Treaty inspection procedures at the U.S. continuous monitoring inspection site at Votkinsk, Russia. Signed and entered into force December 8, 1988.

Memorandum of Understanding Between the Government of the United States of America and the Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics Regarding Procedures for the Operation of the Special Verification Commission

Establishes procedures for the operation of the Commission established by Article XIII of the INF Treaty. Signed and entered into force December 20, 1988.

Agreed Statement Between the Government of the United States of America and the Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics

Establishes rules concerning application of Treaty inspection procedures in connection with the INF Treaty at the USSR's continuous monitoring inspection site at Magna, Utah. Signed and entered into force June 9, 1989.

Memorandum of Agreement Between the Government of the United States of America and the Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics Regarding the Implementation of the Verification Provisions of the Treaty on the Elimination of Their Intermediate-Range and Shorter-Range Missiles

Contains implementation arrangements, lists of inspection equipment and procedures for its use. Signed and entered into force December 21, 1989.

Agreement Between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on Notifications of Launches of Intercontinental Ballistic Missiles and Submarine-Launched Ballistic Missiles

Obligates each Party to notify the other no less than 24 hours in advance, of the planned date, launch area, and area of impact for any planned launch of an ICBM or SLBM. Signed and entered into force May 31, 1988.

Protocol to the Threshold Test Ban Treaty with the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics

Provides for additional verification provisions. Signed June 1, 1990; entered into force December 11, 1990.

Protocol to the Peaceful Nuclear Explosions Treaty with the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics

Provides for additional verification provisions. Signed June 1, 1990; entered into force December 11, 1990.

Treaty Between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms (START I)

Establishes significantly reduced limits for, and restrictions on, deployed intercontinental ballistic missiles and submarine-launched ballistic missiles as well as their associated launchers, and heavy bombers and their armaments, including long-range, air- launched cruise missiles. The Treaty, inter alia, establishes a far-reaching inspection regime designed to complement verification of compliance by national technical means. Signed July 31, 1991; entered into force December 5, 1994.

Protocol to the Treaty Between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms (Lisbon START Protocol)

Provides for implementation of the START Treaty in the new international situation following the dissolution of the Soviet Union. The Protocol constitutes an amendment to, and is an integral part of, the START Treaty and provides for Belarus, Kazakhstan, Russia, and Ukraine to succeed to the Soviet Union's obligations under the Treaty. Also, Belarus, Kazakhstan and Ukraine commit themselves to accede to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty as non-nuclear-weapon states in the shortest possible time. In accompanying letters they commit themselves to eliminate all nuclear weapons including strategic offensive arms, from their territory within seven years. Signed May 23, 1992; entered into force December 5, 1994.

Joint Statement on Korean Nuclear Non-Proliferation

Calls for full implementation by Russia and the United States of the North-South Joint Declaration on the Denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula; dated June 17, 1992.

Agreement Between the United States of America and the Russian Federation Concerning the Safe and Secure Transportation, Storage and Destruction of Weapons and Prevention of Weapons Proliferation

Establishes an agreement by the United States to assist the Russian Federation in destroying its nuclear, chemical, and other weapons; to provide safe and secure transportation and storage of such weapons in connection with their destruction; and to establish additional verifiable measures against the proliferation of such weapons. Signed and entered into force June 17, 1992.

Agreement Between the United States of America and the Russian Federation Concerning the Disposition of Highly Enriched Uranium Resulting from the Dismantlement of Nuclear Weapons in Russia

Establishes an agreement by the Parties to convert as soon as practicable highly enriched uranium (HEU) resulting from dismantlement of Russian nuclear weapons into low enriched uranium (LEU) for fuel in commercial nuclear reactors, and to establish appropriate measures to fulfill the non-proliferation, physical security, material accounting and control, and environmental requirements with respect to HEU and LEU subject to the agreement. Signed and entered into force February 18, 1993.

Agreement Between the Government of the United States of America and the Government of the Russian Federation Concerning Cooperation Regarding Plutonium Production Reactors

Establishes the commitments: to convert the three operating Russian production reactors by the year 2000 so as to cease their production of weapon-grade plutonium; to keep the remaining 10 Russian and 14 U.S. shutdown reactors permanently shut down; and not to use in nuclear weapons the plutonium produced by the reactors prior to their conversion. Provides for comprehensive arrangements for monitoring fulfillment of each of these commitments. Signed and entered into force Sept. 23, 1997.

Agreement Between the United States of America and the Republic of Belarus Concerning Emergency Response and the Prevention of Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction

Establishes an agreement by the United States to assist the Republic of Belarus in responding to emergencies related to removing nuclear weapons and nuclear weapons delivery systems from Belarus for destruction and in preventing the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. Signed and took effect October 22, 1992.

Treaty Between the United States of America and the Russian Federation on Further Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms (START II)

Calls for the United States of America and the Russian Federation further to reduce strategic offensive arms by eliminating all ICBMs attributed with more than one warhead, as well as all "heavy" ICBMs and reducing the overall total of warheads for each side to between 3,000 and 3,500. Signed January 3, 1993; Senate consented to ratification January 26, 1996. The Treaty will enter into force following ratification by Russia.

Protocol to the Treaty Between the United States of America and the Russian Federation on Further Reductions and Limitations of Strategic Offensive Arms of January 3, 1993

Extends the time period for implementation of the START II Treaty until December 31, 2007, when all Treaty-mandated reductions are to be completed. Signed September 26, 1997; it has not yet entered into force.

Joint Agreed Statement Between the United States of America and the Russian Federation on Further Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms of January 3, 1993 (START II)

Records the agreement between the United States and the Russian Federation that Minuteman III ICBM downloading under the START II Treaty can be carried out at any time before December 31, 2007. Signed September 26, 1997; it has not yet entered into force.

Letters on Early Deactivation

Legally codifies the previous commitment that the United States and the Russian Federation, upon entry into force of the START II Treaty, will deactivate by December 31, 2003, all strategic nuclear delivery vehicles that, under the START II Treaty, will be eliminated by December 31, 2007. Signed September 26, 1997; they have not yet entered into force.

Agreement Between the United States of America and Ukraine Concerning Assistance to Ukraine in the Elimination of Strategic Nuclear Arms, and the Prevention of Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction

Establishes an agreement by the United States to assist Ukraine in the elimination of strategic nuclear arms located in Ukraine; assist and cooperate in the establishment of measures against the proliferation of nuclear weapons from Ukraine, to include the technology and expertise related to such weapons; and the expansion of emergency response capabilities in connection of the removal of nuclear warheads from Ukraine for destruction and the elimination of strategic nuclear arms. Signed on October 25, 1993; will take effect when both Parties exchange diplomatic notes confirming the completion by each Party of all applicable procedures required for the entry-into-force of this agreement. (The United States provided such a note to Ukraine on December 4, 1993; the U.S. is awaiting Ukraine's response.)

Agreement Between the United States of America and the Republic of Kazakhstan Concerning the Destruction of Silo Launchers of Intercontinental Ballistic Missiles, Emergency Response, and the Prevention of Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

Establishes an agreement by the United States to assist the Republic of Kazakhstan in the destruction of ICBM silo launchers, and other activities related to the destruction of strategic offensive arms located in Kazakhstan; to assist in the establishment of verifiable measures against the proliferation of nuclear weapons from Kazakhstan, to include the technology, expertise and materials related to such weapons; to expand emergency response capabilities in connection with the removal of nuclear weapons from Kazakhstan for destruction; and to provide other assistance related to the destruction of strategic offensive arms located in Kazakhstan. Signed and entered into force December 13, 1993.

II. CHEMICAL AND BIOLOGICAL WEAPONS MEASURES

Protocol for the Prohibition of the Use in War of Asphyxiating, Poisonous or Other Gases, and Bacteriological Methods of Warfare (The Geneva Protocol)

Restates the prohibition of the 1919 Versailles and 1922 Washington Treaties against the use of poisonous gases, and adds a ban on bacteriological warfare. Signed June 17, 1925; entered into force February 8, 1928.

Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on Their Destruction (Biological Weapons Convention)

Establishes an agreement by the parties to the Convention not to develop, produce, stockpile, acquire or retain biological agents or toxins "of types and in quantities that have no justification for prophylactic, protective, and other peaceful purposes," as well as related weapons and means of delivery. Signed April 10, 1972; entered into force March 26, 1975.

Memorandum of Understanding Between the Government of the United States of America and the Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics Regarding a Bilateral Verification Experiment and Data Exchange Related to Prohibition of Chemical Weapons

Provides for early data exchange and visits designed to facilitate the negotiation, signature and ratification of a global ban on chemical weapons. Signed and entered into force September 23, 1989.

Agreement Between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on Destruction and Non-Production of Chemical Weapons and on Measures to Facilitate the Multilateral Convention on Banning Chemical Weapons

Calls for the destruction of the vast bulk of the U.S. and Soviet declared chemical weapons stockpiles, with on-site inspection to determine that destruction has taken place. Signed June 1, 1990; it has not yet entered into force.

Convention on the Prohibition of the Develop-ment, Production, Stockpiling and Use of Chemical Weapons and on their Destruction (CWC)

The CWC prohibits all development, production, acquisition, stockpiling, transfer, and use of chemical weapons. It requires destruction of all existing chemical weapons by April 29, 2007, 10 years after the Convention entered into force, with a five-year extension possible only on the recommendation of the Executive Council of the international Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons and final approval of its Conference of the States Parties. The CWC was opened for signature in Paris January 13, 1993. It entered into force April 29, 1997.

Joint Trilateral Statement on Biological Weapons

Statement on agreed activities between the governments of the United States, United Kingdom and the Russian Federation to address concerns with regard to Russian compliance with the 1972 Biological Weapons Convention. Signed September 14, 1992, in Moscow.

III. CONVENTIONAL WEAPONS MEASURES

Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe (CFE Treaty)

Reduces and sets ceilings from the Atlantic to the Urals on key armaments essential for conducting surprise attack and initiating large scale offensive operations. Signed by the 30 NATO and Warsaw Pact states November 19, 1990; applied provisionally July 17, 1992; entered into force November 9, 1992.

Final Document of the Extraordinary Conference of the States Parties to the Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe (Oslo Final Document)

Enables implementation of the CFE Treaty in the new international situation following the dissolution of the Warsaw Pact and the Soviet Union. Notes the May 15, 1992 Agreement in Tashkent among the successor states of the USSR on the principles and procedures for implementing the CFE Treaty. Signed and entered into force June 5, 1992.

Concluding Act of the Negotiations on Personnel Strength of Conventional Armed Forces in Europe (CFE-1A)

Establishes national limits on the personnel strength of CFE States-Parties' conventional armed forces in the Atlantic to the Urals area. Signed July 10, 1992; entered into force July 17, 1992.

Document Agreed among the States Parties to the Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe of November 19, 1990 (Flank Agreement)

The Flank Agreement realigns the map associated with the Article V of the CFE Treaty to reduce the amount of Russian and Ukrainian territory in the 'flank zone.' It also limits the amount of TLE allowed in the entire former territory of the flank zone and in areas removed from the flank territory, and obligates Russia and Ukraine to provide additional information for, and host supplemental inspections in, the territories addressed in the agreement. The Flank Agreement was signed May 31, 1996, at the first CFE Review Conference and entered into force on May 15, 1997.

Vienna Document 1994 of the Negotiations on Confidence- and Security-Building Measures

This agreement by the 52 OSCE participating states went into effect on January 1, 1995. It incorporates the Vienna Document 1992, and adds provisions for defense planning and strengthens several existing confidence- and security-building measures. For further information, see Chapter IV.

Treaty on Open Skies

Commits 27 member nations in Eurasia and North America to open their airspace, on a reciprocal basis, permitting the overflight of their territory by unarmed observation aircraft in order to strengthen confidence and transparency with respect to their military activities. Signed and applied provisionally March 24, 1992; ratified by the United States November 2, 1993; has not yet entered into force.

Wassenaar Arrangement on Export Controls for Conventional Arms and Dual-Use Goods and Technologies

A multilateral arrangement among the United States and 32 other nations designed to promote transparency and greater responsibility with regard to transfers of conventional arms and dual-use goods and technologies; to encourage restraint where the threats to international peace and stability are judged greatest; and to harmonize national export policies to guard against destabilizing accumulations of military might. Formally established July 11-12, 1996.

IV. MISSILE AND SPACE WEAPON MEASURES

Treaty on Principles Governing the Activities of States in the Exploration and Use of Outer Space, Including the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies (Outer Space Treaty)

Establishes an agreement by the parties to the Treaty not to place in orbit around the Earth, install on the Moon or any other celestial body, or otherwise station in outer space, nuclear or any other kinds of weapons of mass destruction. Signed January 27, 1967; entered into force October 10, 1967.

Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR)

A multilateral political agreement between the United States and its G-7 (Economic Summit) allies (Canada, France, Germany, Italy, United Kingdom, and Japan) to control the export of missile-related technologies. Announced on April 16, 1987. Now consisting of 29 nations: Argentina, Australia, Austria, Belgium, Brazil, Canada, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Luxembourg, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Portugal,Russia, South Africa, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Turkey, United Kingdom, United States.

V. REGIONAL ARMS CONTROL

The Antarctic Treaty

Internationalizes and demilitarizes the Antarctic Continent and provides for its cooperative exploration and future use. Signed December 1, 1959; entered into force June 23, 1961.

See also Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America (Treaty of Tlatelolco), signed February 14, 1967 (and related protocols and agreements), under Chapter I, Controlling Nuclear Weapons.

VI. CONFIDENCE-BUILDING MEASURES (CBMs)

Memorandum of Understanding Between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics Regarding the Establishment of A Direct Communications Link ("Hot Line"Agreement)

Assures quick and reliable communications between the heads of governments of the nuclear superpowers. Signed and entered into force June 20, 1963.

Agreement Between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on Measures to Improve the U.S.-USSR Direct Communications Link ("Hot Line" Modernization Agreement)

Establishes two satellite communications circuits, with multiple terminals in each country. Signed and entered into force on September 30, 1971.

Agreement Between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics to Expand the Direct Communications Link

Adds a facsimile transmission capability to the "Hot Line." Signed and entered into force July 17, 1984.

Agreement Between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics Modifying the Memorandum of Understanding of June 20, 1963, Regarding the Establishment of a Direct Communications Link

Further improves the Direct Communications Link by integrating advanced facsimile capabilities. Notes exchanged and entered into force June 24, 1988.

See also, "Accidents Measures" Agreement, signed September 30, 1971, and subsequent Common Understanding (June 14, 1985), in Chapter I, Controlling Nuclear Weapons.

Agreement Between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the Prevention of Incidents On and Over the High Seas

Provides for cooperation to reduce the risk of naval conflict due to accident, miscalculation, or the failure of communication. Signed and entered into force May 25, 1972.

See also Agreement Between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the Prevention of Nuclear War (signed and entered into force June 23, 1973), in Chapter I, Controlling Nuclear Weapons; Agreement Between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the Establishment of Nuclear Risk Reduction Centers, signed September 15, 1987; and, Agreement Between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on Notifications of Launches of Intercontinental Ballistic Missiles and Submarine-Launched Ballistic Missiles (signed May 31, 1988), also under Chapter I.

Agreement on the Prevention of Dangerous Military Activities

Establishes cooperative procedures to prevent and resolve peacetime incidents between the armed forces of the U.S. and USSR. Signed June 12, 1989; entered into force January 1, 1990.

Agreement Between the Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the Government of the United States of America on Reciprocal Advance Notification of Major Strategic Exercises

Establishes a confidence-building measure requiring notification of major strategic exercises which include heavy bomber aircraft. Signed September 23, 1989; entered into force January 1, 1990.

See also, Vienna Document 1990 of the Negotiations on Confidence- and Security-Building Measures Convened in Accordance with the Relevant Provisions of the Concluding Document of the Vienna Meeting of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE), adopted November 17, 1990, in Chapter V, Regional Arms Control; Vienna Document 1992, adopted March 4, 1992 in section on Regional Arms Control; and, Treaty on Open Skies, signed March 24, 1992, under Chapter V, Regional Arms Control.

Convention on the Prohibition of Military or Any Other Hostile Use of Environmental Modification Techniques

Prohibits the hostile use of certain environmental modification techniques having widespread, long lasting and severe effects. Signed May 18, 1977; entered into force October 5, 1978.

Joint Russian-American Declaration on Defense Conversion

Establishes a declaration by the United States and the Russian Federation of their intention to devote priority to cooperation in advancing defense conversion. Dated June 17, 1992.

Memorandum on Cooperation in the Field of Defense Conversion

Reaffirms the commitment of the United States and the Russian Federation to cooperate in defense conversion and identify six examples of mutually beneficial cooperative activities. Dated December 16, 1993.

Founding Act on Mutual Relations, Cooperation and Security Between NATO and the Russian Federation

Establishes a political commitment between the North Atlantic Treaty Organization and the Russian Federation to build a lasting and inclusive peace in the Euro-Atlantic area on the principles of democracy and cooperative security. Dated May 27, 1997.