I. Controlling Nuclear Weapons
Nuclear weapons are by far the most destructive weapons ever devised. ACDA's highest priority is to protect U.S. security by reducing the probability of nuclear aggression or confrontation. We seek to do this through formulating, coordinating, negotiating, and implementing international arms control agreements.
In many respects, the potential for nuclear security is better now than at any time in the nuclear era. The START I Treaty and other recent arms control agreements and unilateral initiatives are producing substantial reductions in the nuclear arsenals of the United States and the new independent states of the former Soviet Union. These agreements and initiatives provide a foundation for further enhancements to national security.
But while the nuclear threat from the former Soviet Union is diminishing, the challenge of preventing nuclear proliferation around the world remains severe. The United States is determined to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons.
Our 1996 nuclear arms control efforts have centered on five tracks:
We are making progress along all five of these tracks to contain and reduce the nuclear threat to America's national security.
Although real reductions in the nuclear arsenals of the United States and the new independent states of the former Soviet Union are being achieved, we continue to face a severe challenge of nuclear weapons proliferation. With the technology for the production of weapons of mass destruction becoming more and more available, our efforts to prevent the proliferation of nuclear weapons play an even more significant role in enhancing U.S. national security.
During 1996 our nuclear nonproliferation efforts focused on the following:
The Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) was opened for signature in 1968 and entered into force in 1970. With 185 parties, it is the most widely-accepted multilateral arms control treaty in history and represents the world's primary legal and political barrier against the further proliferation of nuclear weapons. The NPT establishes a framework essential for global and regional stability, for preventing the spread of nuclear weapons, and for facilitating and regulating cooperation among states in the peaceful uses of nuclear energy.
Article I: Each nuclear-weapon State Party to the Treaty (U.S., UK, Russia, France, and China) pledges "...not to transfer to any recipient whatsoever nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices or control over such weapons or explosive devices, directly or indirectly; and not in any way to assist, encourage, or induce any non-nuclear-weapon State to manufacture or otherwise acquire nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices, or control over such weapons or explosive devices."
Article II: Each non-nuclear-weapon State Party to the Treaty pledges "...not to receive the transfer from any transferor whatsoever of nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices or of control over such weapons or explosive devices directly, or indirectly; not to manufacture or otherwise acquire nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices; and not to seek or receive any assistance in the manufacture of nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices."
Article III: Each non-nuclear-weapon State Party to the Treaty undertakes to accept International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) safeguards on all peaceful nuclear activities as a means to verify the pledge under Article II, and each State Party undertakes to require safeguards on exports of nuclear material and on exports of equipment and material especially designed and prepared for the processing, use, or production of nuclear material.
Article IV: NPT Parties have a right to develop nuclear energy for peaceful purposes, and all Parties undertake to facilitate the fullest possible exchange of equipment, materials, and information for peaceful uses of nuclear energy.
Article V: NPT Parties undertake "to pursue negotiations in good faith on effective measures relating to cessation of the nuclear arms race at an early date and to nuclear disarmament, and on a treaty on general and complete disarmament under strict and effective international control."
Although Article VI does not mandate any specific action regarding any specific weapon, it has nevertheless been implemented in significant ways:
The 1995 NPT Review and Extension Conference decision to extend indefinitely the NPT was critically important to ensuring a strong international non-proliferation regime, and to reducing the probabilities of nuclear proliferation and of nuclear weapons use. The 1995 NPT Conference also agreed to a set of "Principles and Objectives for Nuclear Nonproliferation and Disarmament" and to a process for "Strengthening the Review Process for the Treaty," which represent NPT parties' interests in promoting the full implementation of the NPT.
The "Principles and Objectives" decision outlines a set of principles and objectives "in accordance with which nuclear nonproliferation, nuclear disarmament and international cooperation in the peaceful uses of nuclear energy should be vigorously pursued and progress, achievements, and shortcomings evaluated periodically within the review process provided for in Article VIII (3) of the Treaty." Since the conclusion of the 1995 NPT Conference, the United States has demonstrated its continued commitment to the Treaty, and to goals outlined in the "Principles and Objectives" decision, by:
The 1995 NPT Conference decision on "Strengthening the Review Process for the Treaty" establishes that NPT Review Conferences will be held every five years and that the next NPT Review Conference will take place in the year 2000. NPT parties also agreed that the Preparatory Committee for the 2000 NPT Review Conference would begin its work in 1997. In October 1996, an informal caucus of NPT parties was convened in New York at UN Headquarters, during which NPT parties decided that the first Preparatory Committee meeting for the 2000 NPT Review Conference would be held from April 7-18, 1997, in New York at UN Headquarters.
ACDA's Role: As the agency within the Executive Branch responsible for the NPT and its review conferences, ACDA will lead U.S. Government preparations for the 2000 NPT Review Conference. ACDA's internal preparations have been underway since the 1995 NPT Conference concluded. ACDA chairs an interagency working group comprised of representatives from State, DOE, OSD, JCS, NRC, OMB and CIA, that has been working for more than a year to identify key issues and to develop U.S. positions. U.S. preparations also involve an ACDA-developed strategy to build international support for U.S. policies relating to the 2000 NPT Review Conference, ACDA-led efforts to engage bilaterally and multilaterally with other NPT parties, and ACDA efforts to promote progress on the issues identified as important to ensuring a successful 2000 NPT Review Conference. In addition, ACDA will continue to take the lead in promoting dialogue with NPT parties, addressing parties' noncompliance with NPT obligations, and encouraging universal adherence to the Treaty. ACDA will also continue its efforts to ensure that all NPT parties required to do so fulfill their obligations to complete a comprehensive safeguards agreement with the IAEA.
Throughout 1996, ACDA held bilateral consultations with NPT parties, including many from the developing world, as part of an effort to promote continued support for the NPT regime and to build on the constructive dialogue developed, particularly with non-aligned countries, during the 1995 NPT Conference process. These efforts are designed to promote continued worldwide awareness of U.S. commitment to its NPT obligations, to facilitate efforts to promote U.S. NPT objectives in the future, and to foster a cooperative atmosphere as the 2000 NPT Review Conference process gets underway.
In 1996, ACDA led the interagency U.S. delegations to four meetings of the NPT Depositaries (i.e., U.S., UK, Russia) to facilitate cooperation and coordination among the NPT Depositaries on issues related to preparing for the 2000 NPT Review Conference. ACDA also led the interagency U.S. delegation to two meetings of the NPT Western Group, promoting a process of wider Western consultation on preparations for the 2000 NPT Review Conference.
The 2000 NPT Review Conference process is beginning during some of the greatest challenges the international nonproliferation regime has yet faced. These include the continued refusal of Iraq to disclose fully the extent of its weapons programs, and the efforts to implement the Agreed Framework agreement with North Korea, which is designed to achieve North Korea's full compliance with its NPT obligations. ACDA has played an active role in U.S. efforts to deal with Iraq, and seeks to ensure that the Agreed Framework with North Korea results in that country becoming a fully compliant NPT party. ACDA has also promoted initiatives to improve and strengthen the IAEA safeguards system.
ACDA has led a successful effort to increase adherence to the NPT, as evidenced by the nearly 50 countries that have joined the NPT since 1990 and the 16 countries that have joined since January 1995 alone. For the future, ACDA will continue to lead efforts consistent with U.S. policy to achieve universal adherence to the NPT and will encourage all non-NPT countries, including those of particular proliferation concern in South Asia and the Middle East, to join the Treaty.
This past year, four additional states acceded to the Treaty -- Andorra, Angola, Djibouti, and Oman. With these new accessions, the NPT has 185 parties and there are now only five non-NPT countries worldwide: Brazil, Cuba, India, Israel, Pakistan.
The International Atomic Energy Agency continues to promote vital U.S. security and nonproliferation interests through its program of international safeguards, providing assurance that nuclear materials are not diverted from civilian to military purposes. The IAEA also plays a central role in international efforts to make the benefits of peaceful uses of nuclear energy available to countries worldwide, and continues to help make nuclear facilities safer through its nuclear safety program.
The United States is one of the IAEA's strongest supporters and provides about one quarter of its annual budget. The United States is also a significant contributor to technical assistance and cooperation programs, which are supported by voluntary contributions of the membership.
The IAEA budget has faced the financial reality of zero real growth since 1984, but the Agency has nevertheless met the challenge of new responsibilities. Since 1992, however, the IAEA has been forced to cut or defer some programs and to curtail some safeguards inspections of lower priority nuclear material. In 1996, new activities -- including safeguarding U.S. material, increasing its capability to detect clandestine activities, and responding to the need to implement full-scope safeguards in additional Member States -- placed further resource demands on the IAEA that are becoming more and more difficult for it to meet.
Should the IAEA be called upon to verify future agreements such as the Fissile Material Cutoff Treaty, IAEA safeguards resource requirements could double.
The U.S. is committed to ensuring adequate resources for safeguards, especially for the implementation of major new measures to strengthen safeguards and enhance the IAEA's capability to detect clandestine nuclear activities. This will require significant resources. ACDA is working in conjunction with other U.S. agencies to define long-term funding approaches for these increased IAEA responsibilities.
The IAEA's international nuclear safeguards system was developed to assure states that nuclear activities subject to safeguards are directed toward peaceful purposes, that potential proliferators will be dissuaded from using safeguarded nuclear materials for other than peaceful purposes, and that the diversion of nuclear materials from peaceful uses will be detected in a timely manner.
IAEA safeguards are a comprehensive, integrated system of accounting and reporting procedures, on-site inspection, nuclear material measurements, and containment and surveillance techniques. The system is codified in a network of separate international agreements between the IAEA and participating states. These agreements are based on provisions contained in the NPT or in a nuclear weapon-free zone, or on agreed conditions of supply of peaceful nuclear technology and materials between states.
In 1995 the nuclear material under IAEA safeguards totaled approximately 45 tons of separated plutonium, 512 tons of plutonium in irradiated nuclear reactor fuels, 20 tons of high-enriched uranium, 47,000 tons of low-enriched uranium, and 104,000 tons of natural and depleted uranium. The IAEA conducted 2,285 inspections, verified the integrity of 24,000 seals, reviewed approximately 6,400 surveillance records, and analyzed 1,044 samples. This includes U.S. material deemed excess to defense needs that was placed under IAEA safeguards.
ACDA has been a key player in the implementation of the U.S. Voluntary Offer and will continue its efforts to ensure that the maximum quantity of excess nuclear material is made available for international safeguards without compromising U.S. national security or nonproliferation interests.
One of the most important efforts of the IAEA has been its Programme 93+2, to increase the efficiency and enhance the effectiveness of its regime by improving its ability to detect clandestine nuclear activities. Programme 93+2 was established in 1993 with the goal of adopting an enhanced safeguards system two years later. Although the process of developing and strengthening IAEA safeguards has been ongoing since the IAEA's inception, strengthening took on a new dimension in the 1990s following revelations about the existence of a clandestine Iraqi nuclear weapons program and as questions arose about North Korea's potential program.
The inception of Programme 93+2 required evaluation of the technical, legal, and financial aspects of the proposed measures, including:
The eventual result was that Programme 93+2 was divided into two sections: Part 1, which addresses strengthening measures to be undertaken under existing legal authority, and Part 2, which addresses measures requiring complementary legal authority for implementation in Member States.
In June 1995 the IAEA's Board of Governors approved the Part 1 measures, which include:
In December 1995, March 1996, and June 1996, the Board of Governors considered the measures embodied in Part 2. These measures are:
The IAEA has been proceeding with implementation of Part 1 measures and in June 1996 the IAEA Board of Governors established an open-ended Committee of the Board to develop a protocol to serve as the mechanism for Member States to implement Part 2 measures. The Committee met twice in 1996, in July and October.
The Part 2 measures are another step in the process of improving the efficiency and enhancing the effectiveness of IAEA safeguards that began in 1992.
ACDA's Role: ACDA led the U.S. delegation at the negotiating sessions discussed above.
ACDA supports and works directly with IAEA staff to improve and strengthen safeguards. ACDA provides vigorous support to Programme 93+2 for strengthening IAEA safeguards for the detection of clandestine nuclear activities. These efforts include promotion of advanced techniques -- including environmental monitoring -- for detecting clandestine nuclear activities, and for improving safeguards for civil nuclear facilities that process or use separated plutonium for fuel.
In 1994 the U.S. Government established a steering committee to coordinate all IAEA matters. ACDA has actively participated in the steering committee since 1994, chairing its Subcommittee on International Safeguards and Monitoring, which establishes and coordinates U.S. policy on IAEA safeguards.
In 1996 ACDA and other U.S. agencies held bilateral consultations with Australia, the European Atomic Energy Community, France, Finland, Germany, Japan, the Netherlands, Sweden, Russia, and the United Kingdom regarding the implementation of Programme 93+2 and maintaining a dialogue on the implementation of safeguards on facilities in each of these countries.
The United States strongly supports the IAEA's program of technical cooperation. Under Article IV of the NPT, the United States has pledged to foster "the further development of the applications of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes, especially in the territories of non-nuclear weapon States party to the Treaty, with due consideration for the needs of developing areas of the world."
Under the technical cooperation programs administered by the IAEA, many developing nations are able to make great strides in the application of nuclear techniques to a wide range of non-nuclear power activities. These techniques are used in the fields of human health, food and agriculture, industry, hydrology, environment, and radiation safety. Many of these programs are tailored to the needs of individual countries while others are undertaken on a region-wide, or interregional basis. The benefits to the Member States of these programs result in an improved quality of life for their citizens.
The United States supports these technical cooperation programs through voluntary pledges to the IAEA Technical Assistance and Cooperation Fund and extra-budgetary "in-kind" contributions. These latter contributions include equipment for projects, provision of expert services, training courses, and fellowships to study in the United States. The United States has considerable discretion over the distribution of the extra-budgetary portion of its contributions, giving preference to states that have joined the NPT or are Contracting Parties to the Treaty of Tlatelolco. In this way, the United States helps demonstrate the link between economic development and nuclear nonproliferation.
The IAEA's technical cooperation programs focus on projects and activities requested and carried out by individual Member States. Regional and interregional programs that support training and projects have also been instituted in Latin America, the Middle East, the former Soviet Union, Africa, and Asia and the Pacific. The positive contributions of these peaceful nuclear applications are directed in ways that improve the social, economic, and environmental conditions in the many developing countries which comprise the majority of IAEA members. This generates widespread international support for the Agency. Many developing countries also view the technical assistance programs as the major benefit they receive for their continuing support of the NPT and IAEA safeguards. The U.S. pursues these technical cooperation programs, therefore, not only for the important developmental assistance they provide, but also as an integral part of our broader nonproliferation policy. In addition, the technical cooperation programs help bring systematic oversight and stability to the international transfer of nuclear-related technology.
ACDA's Role: ACDA supplies critical technical expertise to the review and monitoring of the IAEA's various technical programs by the U.S. International Nuclear Technical Liaison Organization, an interagency group overseeing U.S. technical cooperation with the IAEA. ACDA seeks to ensure that technical assistance is both compatible with a recipient country's nuclear infrastructure and with broad nonproliferation policy goals. ACDA also continues to identify and supply highly qualified U.S. nationals for key positions in all departments of the IAEA.
The U.S. supplies essential technical support to IAEA safeguards through its extra-budgetary contributions. This support seeks to match U.S. technology and expertise to the special safeguards problems faced by the IAEA in a time of tight budgets and increasingly broad responsibilities. ACDA has continued to provide policy and technical expertise, both to the IAEA directly and through the interagency process within the U.S., to support Programme 93+2 through addressing such issues as environmental monitoring of undeclared nuclear activities, making safeguards more efficient and effective, and assisting in the development and deployment of modern information processing systems to expand the IAEA's ability to analyze an increasing array of data sources.
The United States has long promoted cooperation among countries that export nuclear and nuclear-related commodities and technology to ensure that commerce in this area does not contribute to nuclear proliferation. This cooperation ranges from bilateral discussions to development and implementation of multilateral guidelines. Multilateral cooperation on nuclear supply takes place mainly in the Zangger Committee and in the Nuclear Suppliers Group. In Chapter VI, we describe the groups themselves. In this section we describe the work of these groups and other international export control activities in 1996.
The main purpose of the Zangger Committee is to clarify and harmonize the way member countries implement the export control provision in Article III.2 of the NPT. The Committee also provides de facto guidance to all NPT parties on the interpretation and implementation of Article III.2. This provision requires the application of IAEA safeguards to certain nuclear equipment and material as a condition of supply.
Since its inception, the Zangger Committee has concentrated on developing and clarifying the list of items that trigger the requirement of IAEA safeguards as a condition of supply. This list, known as the "Trigger List," consists of nuclear materials and items "especially designed or prepared for the processing, use, or production of special fissionable material."
In 1996, the Zangger Committee focused on two matters: the need to clarify portions of the list of equipment and material subject to its guidelines, and how to respond to the decisions adopted at the 1995 NPT Review and Extension Conference. In October 1996, the Zangger Committee adopted revisions to the sections on reactors, non-nuclear material, fuel fabrication, and heavy water production. The U.S. will lead a group of technology holders to review conversion equipment and its possible addition to the Zangger Committee's Trigger List.
The Nuclear Suppliers Group was established to develop multilateral export control guidelines that deal with concerns not reflected in the Zangger Committee. The NSG Guidelines therefore call for additional conditions on the supply of Trigger List items. In addition, the NSG Guidelines include controls on nuclear-related dual-use commodities and technology. This dual-use control list includes materials, equipment, and technology that can be used both for nuclear weapons and nuclear fuel-cycle activities and for other, non-nuclear purposes.
The Nuclear Suppliers Group held its annual plenary meeting in April 1996 in Buenos Aires, Argentina, its first meeting in Latin America. The main topic was how suppliers should respond to the agreement at the 1995 NPT Conference that "transparency in nuclear-related export controls should be promoted within the framework of dialogue and cooperation among all interested States party to the Treaty." To this end, a working group was established to pursue a program of education and outreach to nonmember states. The NSG also adopted the Trigger List updates agreed to by the Zangger Committee.
The United States continues to urge all exporters of nuclear equipment and material to adopt responsible nuclear export policies. The U.S. believes that all exporters should minimize the danger of nuclear proliferation by adopting existing multilateral export rules. These include the fundamental nuclear export norms embodied in the NSG Guidelines and the Zangger Understandings.
In 1996, several new nuclear suppliers took significant steps to adopt responsible export policies. Brazil and Ukraine became members of the NSG in 1996, and along with the Republic of Korea, which joined in 1995, attended their first NSG Plenary meeting in Buenos Aires. Ukraine also indicated its intention to join the Zangger Committee. The United States has also engaged China in a dialogue aimed at improving China's export control policies and system. In the course of these discussions, China announced that it would not provide support to unsafeguarded nuclear facilities.
ACDA's Role: ACDA personnel participate in all U.S. delegations to meetings of the Zangger Committee and the NSG. ACDA also plays an important role in bilateral efforts to promote responsible nuclear export policies, including the ongoing dialogue with China and seminars on export controls for the Newly Independent States of Central Asia and the Caucasus. ACDA also plays a leading role developing U.S. policy on how the NSG and Zangger Committee should respond to the NPT Review Process and the decisions taken at the 1995 NPT Conference.
The end of the Cold War and the near-universal membership to, and indefinite extension of, the NPT has added new momentum to the creation of nuclear weapon-free zones (NWFZ). The U.S. supports the creation of such zones in regions where they would contribute to the achievement of U.S. nuclear nonproliferation goals and would be consistent with national security interests, including our established criteria for recognizing such zones. The United States fully endorses the objective of establishing additional NWFZ embodied in the Declaration of Principles and Objectives that accompanied the May 1995 decision to indefinitely extend the NPT.
The 1967 Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America and the Caribbean, also known as the Treaty of Tlatelolco, establishes the first nuclear weapon-free zone in a populated region. The Treaty of Tlatelolco has now been signed by all 33 Latin American and Caribbean states, including Argentina, Brazil, and Chile, and is in force for 30 of them. These 30 states have assumed the Treaty's binding international commitment not to acquire, manufacture, test, use, or station a nuclear explosive device in their sovereign territory. Tlatelolco Contracting Parties have also accepted the application of IAEA safeguards for all their nuclear activities to assist in verifying compliance with the Treaty. The Treaty also establishes a regional organization, the Agency for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America (known by its Spanish acronym OPANAL), to help ensure compliance with its provisions.
Cuba signed the Treaty on March 25, 1995, the last Latin American state to do so. Cuba, St. Kitts/Nevis, and St. Lucia have yet to ratify the Treaty. In May 1996, Guyana brought the Treaty into force. The Treaty will come fully and formally into force when all eligible states have ratified the Treaty and its two Protocols, and concluded comprehensive safeguards agreements with the IAEA as required. States can, however, individually waive this requirement for universal adherence and declare the Treaty in force for their respective territories, thereby creating the nuclear-free zone in a piecemeal fashion. All current Tlatelolco Parties have brought the Treaty into force for themselves in this way.
The U.S. is a party to the two Protocols to the Treaty. Protocol I requires parties with international responsibility for territories within the region to respect specific denuclearization provisions of the Treaty and to conclude IAEA safeguards agreements for their territories. Protocol II requires nuclear weapon states to respect and support the denuclearization provisions and not use or threaten to use nuclear weapons against Treaty parties. The U.S. has signed and ratified both Protocols, with understandings and declarations consonant with U.S. policy (such as freedom of naval and air passage, etc.). The United States has also brought into force a safeguards agreement pursuant to Protocol I that covers the territories in the region for which we are internationally responsible. All eligible states have now signed and ratified the two Protocols.
The United States remains firmly committed to the goals of the Treaty of Tlatelolco, and will continue to seek its full implementation. The Treaty makes a substantial contribution to regional peace and stability, as well as to strengthening the international nuclear non-proliferation regime as a whole.
In August 1985, eight members of the South Pacific Forum signed the South Pacific Nuclear Free Zone (SPNFZ) Treaty, known as the Treaty of Rarotonga. The Treaty is now in force for 11 of 15 Forum members: Australia, Cook Islands, Fiji, Kiribati, Naurau, New Zealand, Niue, Papua New Guinea, Solomon Islands, Tuvalu, and Western Samoa. The Treaty bans the manufacture, possession, stationing, and testing of any nuclear explosive device in treaty territories for which the parties are internationally responsible; it also bans the dumping of radioactive waste at sea. Three Protocols extend the Treaty's provisions to states outside the zone:
The United States, along with the United Kingdom and France, signed all three Protocols on March 25, 1996 in a special ceremony in Suva, Fiji, the site of the depositary of the Treaty. Russia (with understandings) and China signed and ratified Protocols II and III; neither has zonal territories that would require adherence to Protocol I.
The African Nuclear Weapon Free Zone (ANWFZ) Treaty, also known as the Treaty of Pelindaba, was opened for signature on April 11, 1996 in Cairo. The United States, the United Kingdom, France and China all signed the relevant Protocols to the Treaty on the same day.
The United States has supported the concept of the denuclearization of Africa since the first UNGA resolution in 1965. The Organization of African Unity (OAU) first formally enunciated the desire to draft a treaty insuring the denuclearization of Africa in Cairo in 1964 at the first OAU Summit. No real progress toward a treaty was made until South Africa joined the NPT in mid-1991. In April 1993, a UN/OAU "experts group" convened to begin drafting a treaty. Using the South Pacific Nuclear Free Zone Treaty (SPNFZ) as a model, the Experts Group included in the treaty new provisions on the physical protection of nuclear material and the prohibition of attacks on nuclear installations; its three protocols are similar to those of the SPNFZ. The proposed Treaty commits Parties not to conduct, receive or give assistance in the research, development, manufacture, stockpiling, acquisition, possession or control over any nuclear explosive device by any means anywhere. The United States was eligible to sign the non-use and non-testing Protocols only, as it has no territories for which it is internationally responsible in the African region.
Although Indonesia and Malaysia proposed the establishment of a Southeast Asian Nuclear Weapons Free Zone (SEANWFZ) in the mid-1980's, opposition from some members of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) slowed the drafting of a proposed treaty. Secretary Christopher told the 1993 annual ASEAN ministers' meeting that the U.S. was willing to take a fresh look at a SEANWFZ, but would need to see a draft of a treaty. President Clinton sent a letter in early February 1995 to President Soeharto of Indonesia, stating that the United States would be prepared to consider favorably a SEANWFZ, in the context of its conformity with our longstanding criteria. Ten Southeast Asian states signed the SEANWFZ treaty at the December 15, 1995 ASEAN Summit in Bangkok. The U.S. has explained to the ASEAN states that the latest text of the Treaty and Protocol does not meet all of our fundamental concerns, and that these concerns must be addressed if ASEAN wishes the United States to give serious consideration to signing the Protocol. Consultations between the U.S. and ASEAN on this matter continued in 1996.
ACDA's Role: ACDA played a leading role in the decisions to sign the SPNFZ and ANWFZ protocols in 1996. ACDA has also led delegations seeking changes in the SEANFZ necessary for the U.S. to support that treaty.
The Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) was concluded in 1996. This was a major achievement for peace and satisfied a long-standing goal of the United States and nearly all other countries of the world. It also met a specific major goal in the "Principles and Objectives" document agreed at the NPT Review and Extension Conference in 1995.
The Geneva-based Conference on Disarmament completed work on a text for the Treaty in August 1996, but could not agree to forward the text to the UN General Assembly (UNGA). Nevertheless, Australia, on behalf of many states that strongly supported moving the Treaty forward, introduced a resolution in the reconvened 50th UNGA, calling for adoption of the Treaty and its opening for signature. The resolution attracted over 120 co-sponsors, and was approved by the UNGA on September 10, 1996, by a vote of 158-3 (Bhutan, India, Libya), with five abstentions (Cuba, Lebanon, Mauritius, Syria, Tanzania). The Treaty was opened for signature September 24. President Clinton was the first to sign, and by June 1997, 144 states had signed. The CTBT will enter into force after the 44 states named in the Treaty have ratified, but India has said it will not sign or ratify, and Pakistan has said it will not sign unless India does so and not until it has assessed the impact of the treaty on its security. The United States is hopeful that these positions will eventually change, with the encouragement of a broad range of countries.
As made clear by its Preamble, the CTBT will constrain "the development and qualitative improvement of nuclear weapons" and end "the development of advanced new types of nuclear weapons," thus constituting "an effective measure of nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation in all its aspects." For states that already have nuclear weapons but might contemplate new designs, a no-testing regime will mean low confidence in any new design they might seek to develop, making the attempt very unlikely. For prudent military planners, including U.S. military planners, it means that new types of nuclear weapons will be essentially out of the question. Thus the CTBT should have the practical effect of ending any international competition in advanced nuclear arms.
For states not possessing nuclear weapons, the CTBT will significantly limit their ability to acquire them. The ban on testing will mean they are prohibited from gaining confirmation that even primitive weapons designed without testing will perform as expected. This, and the restraint the CTBT will place on nuclear weapon development by the nuclear powers, will strengthen the global norm against nuclear-weapon proliferation. The United States expects the CTBT to be an important milestone on the path toward nuclear disarmament and to serve as a stabilizing factor in all regions of the world. As President Clinton said in his address to the UNGA on September 24 after signing the CTBT, "The signatures of the world's declared nuclear powers -- the United States, China, France, Russia and the United Kingdom -- along with those of the vast majority of its nations, will immediately create an international norm against nuclear testing -- even before the Treaty formally enters into force."
In 1997 the United States will work to encourage more states to sign the CTBT and will encourage those that have signed to ratify, especially those states whose ratification is required for entry into force. Of these, 41 had signed by June 1997, but only Japan had ratified the Treaty. The executive branch is preparing to transmit the CTBT to the U.S. Senate for its advice and consent to ratification. The Treaty will enter into force 180 days after all 44 required states have deposited their instruments of ratification, but no earlier than two years after it was opened for signature. The U.S. objective is entry into force of the CTBT as soon as its terms allow, September 24, 1998.
ACDA's Role: ACDA has led U.S. Government efforts in the CTBT negotiations. ACDA's responsibilities have included:
ACDA will continue to play a leading role, both in the U.S. ratification process, and in working for Treaty signature and ratification by other states.
Since the demise of the Soviet Union, we have successfully reduced the magnitude of the nuclear threat to the United States. As of December 1996, with the return to Russia of all remaining nuclear weapons in Belarus, all of the non-Russian former Soviet states that had nuclear weapons on their territories after the fall of the Soviet Union have now been denuclearized. This was accomplished even as these states -- Belarus, Kazakstan and Ukraine -- experienced severe social, economic and political stress.
Significant challenges remain, including:
As the United States seeks the overall goal of enhancing national security in the post-Cold War era, it is pursuing these key objectives with regard to nuclear weapons:
Strategic offensive arms include intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs) with ranges over 5,500 kilometers, submarine-launched ballistic missiles (SLBMs) with ranges over 600 kilometers, and heavy bombers. These weapons would be immensely destructive if they were ever used. The START I Treaty (and, upon its entry into force, START II) enhances U.S. national security by reducing the numbers of these strategic offensive arms and shaping strategic arsenals into more secure and stabilizing force structures.
The START I Treaty is the first treaty actually to reduce the numbers of deployed strategic offensive arms. This Treaty reduces and limits these arms by 30-40 percent from their pre-START levels; reductions of 50 percent are required in heavy ICBMs, which are the most threatening systems. START I's large-scale reductions of strategic offensive arms are critically important. The Lisbon Protocol to the Treaty committed Belarus, Kazakstan, Russia, and Ukraine to becoming START I Parties as successors to the former Soviet Union. Belarus, Kazakstan and Ukraine also committed to join the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) as non-nuclear-weapon states; associated letters from the Presidents of these three states further commit them to eliminate all nuclear weapons, including strategic offensive arms, located on their territories within the seven-year START I reduction period.
The START I Treaty, signed in July 1991 by the U.S. and the USSR, entered into force on December 5, 1994, when the five Parties to START exchanged instruments of ratification. START I will result in reductions, over a period of no more than seven years, of approximately one-third of the U.S. and former Soviet Union respective strategic arsenals.
The United States, Belarus, Kazakstan, Russia, and Ukraine have already made great progress in achieving the START I reductions. The Parties have already reduced below the second phase reduction limit of 1,900 deployed strategic weapons delivery vehicles required by December 5, 1999. The Parties have also already reduced below the first phase reduction limit of 9,150 warheads attributed to deployed strategic weapons delivery vehicles required by December 5, 1997.
The Treaty provides for extensive and intrusive on-site inspections, in conjunction with national technical means of verification and information exchanges, to assist in verification of compliance. Shortly after the entry into force of the Treaty on December 5, 1994, the sides began to exercise their right to conduct continuous monitoring activities, as well as a number of different types of on-site inspections provided for by the Treaty, including: baseline data, data update, suspect-site, re-entry vehicle, close-out, and formerly declared facility inspections. Additionally, there have been technical characteristics exhibitions of Treaty-limited items.
The Parties have continued to work together to ensure that the START I Treaty is implemented smoothly and that all Treaty obligations are fulfilled. For example, all Parties are participating in inspections and in the exchange of notifications and information required by the Treaty. The Parties meet regularly in START's implementing body, the Joint Compliance and Inspection Commission (JCIC) to oversee implementation and resolve any problems.
The United States and the four other Parties have been working out details of Treaty implementation in regular meetings of the JCIC. To date, the Parties have concluded in excess of 65 JCIC documents clarifying Treaty provisions and codifying agreement on procedures as mandated by the Treaty. The JCIC held two regular sessions in Geneva during 1996 in April/May and September/October. During these sessions, four JCIC Agreements were signed and six Joint Statements were initialed to enhance effective implementation of the START I Treaty. JCIC Agreements concluded during 1996 are:
The Joint Statements that were negotiated and initialed during 1996 in the JCIC are:
These documents served to resolve several questions that have arisen in the first two years of Treaty implementation such as how to confirm missile types, how to use and make changes to site diagrams, and how to transmit data updates more efficiently. The Parties also exchanged policy commitments not to construct silo launchers of ICBMs at space launch facilities located outside their national territory. This commitment will support non-proliferation efforts.
ACDA's Role: The expertise and experience of ACDA's personnel are essential to the complex and often highly technical work of START implementation.
Recognizing their mutual interest in reducing to smaller and more stabilizing nuclear forces than those allowed under START I, the U.S. and Russia signed the START II Treaty on January 3, 1993. START II codifies a stabilizing and orderly drawdown of strategic nuclear forces that is in the security and economic interests of both the United States and Russia. START II relies heavily and explicitly on the START I Treaty's definitions and extensive verification procedures. START II will remain in effect as long as START I is in force.
START II will dramatically reduce the total number of strategic nuclear arms deployed by both countries to a third of the pre-START levels. By the end of the second stage of reductions, each side must have reduced its total deployed strategic nuclear warheads to 3,000-3,500 warheads.
But START II's qualitative stabilizing features are even more important than its numerical reductions. By prohibiting heavy ICBMs and multiple warhead ICBMs, START II will significantly reduce first-strike potential and thereby increase stability. These weapons have long been considered destabilizing because they are at once the most vulnerable strategic systems and those most capable of destroying large numbers of hardened targets on the other side. Like START I, START II will serve U.S. nonproliferation interests by helping to allay the security concerns of the other successor states to the former Soviet Union, and by demonstrating to the world U.S.-Russian commitment to deep reductions in their respective nuclear arsenals.
While the START II Treaty has yet to enter into force, at a summit in April 1996 Presidents Clinton and Yeltsin reaffirmed their intention to seek ratification of START II as soon as possible. The Treaty has been transmitted to the legislative branches of both Parties. The U.S. Senate approved ratification of START II on January 26, 1996. We are awaiting Russian Parliamentary action.
ACDA's Role: ACDA led the U.S. negotiating delegation, and provided substantial support to the high-level exchanges that led to the Treaty's signature. ACDA played a key role in the Executive Branch's efforts to obtain Senate advice and consent to START II ratification. Once the Treaty enters into force, ACDA will lead in the implementation of START II, chairing the interagency committee providing guidance to the Bilateral Implementation Commission (BIC), which will be the implementing body for START II. The Office of the U.S. Representative to the BIC will reside in ACDA.
In October 1996, ACDA Director John Holum led an interagency delegation to Beijing to initiate a regular U.S.-China dialogue on strategic arms control. The purpose of the dialogue is to foster greater understanding on strategic nuclear arms control issues. This includes discussing potential contributions of arms control to national security, identifying areas of common and individual concern, and encouraging greater cooperation in other areas of our arms control and broader security agendas. The United States believes the dramatic changes in the post-Cold War security environment, especially those affecting U.S., Chinese, and Russian strategic nuclear security and capabilities, make it increasingly important for us to have a firm and mutual understanding of each other's respective approaches to nuclear force structure, doctrine, and strategic stability.
ACDA's Role: ACDA anticipates that this dialogue will continue at both the senior policy level and at the expert level. The expert-level talks will tentatively focus on three areas: strategic arms control, confidence-building measures, and verification and transparency.
It is frequently asked whether further strategic arms reductions beyond the levels called for in START II are being considered within the United States Government. Naturally, the United States is focusing its immediate efforts on ensuring smooth implementation of START I, and on achieving the ratification of START II. Once START II is ratified, we will work with Russia on early deactivation of START II forces, as discussed by Presidents Clinton and Yeltsin.
As for further steps beyond START II, at the September 1994 U.S.-Russian summit, the Presidents ordered their experts "to intensify their dialogue to compare conceptual approaches and to develop concrete steps to adapt the nuclear forces and practices on both sides to the changed international security situation and to the current spirit of U.S.-Russian partnership, including the possibility, after ratification of START II, of further reductions of, and limitations on, remaining nuclear forces."
In remarks to the 51st General Assembly of the United Nations on September 24, 1996, President Clinton stated: "When Russia ratifies START II, President Yeltsin and I are all ready to discuss the possibilities of further cuts, as well as limiting and monitoring nuclear warheads and materials. This will help make deep reductions irreversible."
ACDA's Role: In 1996, ACDA actively participated in the interagency process designed to develop policy options on further reductions in strategic offensive arms once START II is ratified. ACDA will play a lead role in developing U.S. policy positions in future strategic arms control initiatives.
The Treaty Between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the Elimination of Their Intermediate-Range and Shorter-Range Missiles (INF Treaty) entered into force on June 1, 1988. It provides for the elimination of all U.S. and Soviet ground-launched cruise and ballistic missiles having ranges between 500 and 5,500 kilometers. The last of the INF missiles declared by the United States and the Soviet Union was eliminated by May 31, 1991.
The INF Treaty provides an extensive inspection regime, including an annual quota of short-notice inspections (currently 10 per year). Additionally, the Treaty provides continuous monitoring at missile assembly plants. Currently, two such plants are subject to continuous monitoring; these are located at Magna, Utah, and Votkinsk, Russia. The inspection regime continues through May 31, 2001, but the INF Treaty and its prohibitions will remain in force indefinitely.
There are 12 successor states to the Soviet Union for purposes of the INF Treaty. Of these, only six have inspectable facilities on their territory, of which four (Belarus, Kazakstan, Russia, and Ukraine) have chosen to exercise their right to participate in inspections and take part in the INF implementation body, the Special Verification Commission (SVC). Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan each have one inspectable INF site, but do not participate actively in implementation of the Treaty, and the U.S. as a policy matter does not exercise its right to conduct inspections in these two states.
Mechanisms were put in place in 1994 for continued implementation of U.S. INF inspection rights in Belarus, Kazakstan and Ukraine, as well as in Russia. There are now points of entry open in each of those states, and we have added direct government-to-government communications links with Belarus, Kazakstan, and Ukraine. Additionally, these four states have reached basic agreement on sharing among themselves the rights of the Former Soviet Union to conduct inspections of U.S. INF facilities.
The United States has been working with Belarus, Kazakstan, Russia, and Ukraine within the framework of the SVC to resolve concerns relating to Treaty implementation. The SVC has met in 19 sessions since 1988. In recent sessions, the Commission has worked to adapt the Treaty's procedures to the realities of the post-Soviet world. Two regular sessions of the Special Verification Commission took place in Geneva during 1996, in July and October. These sessions dealt primarily with establishing inspection procedures for new missiles exiting from the Votkinsk Machine Building Plant in Russia.
Equally important have been the exchanges on INF Treaty issues among the Parties through diplomatic channels.
Concerning the inspection procedures at the Votkinsk portal, U.S. monitors exercise our Treaty right to inspect all missiles exiting the plant that are as large or larger than the banned SS-20 missile. The Russians have indicated their intention to produce two space-launch vehicles (SLVs), which they call the "Start" and the "Start- I," both of which use all the stages of the SS-25 ICBM. They also intend to produce two varieties of a new ICBM, the SS-X-27. The United States is currently seeking to conclude, with its INF implementing partners, agreements on INF inspection procedures for these three new missiles.
ACDA's Role: ACDA chairs the interagency working group that develops U.S. policy for implementation of the INF Treaty and develops instructions for the SVC. ACDA also develops diplomatic communications regarding INF Treaty implementation, for delivery to the governments of the INF Parties in their respective capitals. Additionally, ACDA co-chairs, with the Intelligence Community, the interagency working group that develops guidance for U.S. operations that implement inspection and monitoring under INF and verifies compliance with the Treaty. ACDA chaired the U.S.-Russian bilateral technical talks on long-term inspection procedures for the new missiles exiting Votkinsk. The Office of the U.S. Representative to the SVC is in ACDA.
Because of their larger numbers, smaller size, and in some cases simple design and relative ease of employment, non-strategic nuclear weapons pose more difficult command, control, and safety concerns than do strategic nuclear weapons. As political instability increased in the Soviet Union, there was growing concern that a breakdown in authority and the military command and control of these weapons could lead to their being sold on the black market, used in political blackmail, involved in accidents, or even employed in civil conflict.
The United States announced on September 27, 1991, that, with the expectation of Soviet reciprocity, it would unilaterally withdraw approximately 2,400 non-strategic nuclear weapons from overseas to the continental United States.
Within a week, then-Soviet President Gorbachev responded by announcing similar measures that would result in the withdrawal of all Soviet tactical nuclear weapons to Russia for centralized storage.
These measures were to include elimination of most Soviet short-range missile warheads and nuclear artillery shells, withdrawal and elimination of all Soviet nuclear landmines and nuclear warheads for air-defense missiles, and removal of all Soviet non-strategic nuclear weapons from surface ships and multi-purpose submarines.
This Soviet response spurred U.S. and Soviet interest in enhancing the safety and security of nuclear weapons to be transported and centrally stored in Russia, which led to the Safety, Security, and Dismantlement (SSD) effort funded by the DoD Cooperative Threat Reduction program. After the dissolution of the Soviet Union, Russian President Yeltsin accelerated the withdrawal schedule for non-strategic weapons and informed the United States that all of these weapons had been returned to Russia by May 1992.
Indications are that elimination of many former Soviet non-strategic nuclear weapons is underway. Nevertheless, ACDA continues to be concerned about the continuing presence of large numbers of non-strategic nuclear weapons in a politically and economically strained Russia.
In the United States, elimination of most non-strategic nuclear weapons is also in progress. All surface-to-surface non-strategic nuclear missiles and artillery shells have been withdrawn from overseas locations and returned to the United States. All warheads for ground-launched, non-strategic nuclear weapons have been removed to central storage in the United States. Artillery-fired nuclear projectiles have also been returned to the United States and turned over to the Department of Energy for dismantlement. Non-strategic nuclear weapons have been removed from U.S. surface ships and multi-purpose submarines, as well as from land-based naval aviation, and have been placed in centralized storage on U.S. territory. Nuclear depth bombs have been destroyed. U.S. ground forces no longer train for nuclear missions and have no nuclear capability under their current organization. The U.S. Army has deactivated all Lance missiles.
The Cooperative Threat Reduction (CTR) program, which began in 1991 and which is led by the Department of Defense, has been central to the U.S. effort to ensure that denuclearization of non-Russian former Soviet states ( i.e., return of all nuclear warheads on their territories to Russia) and Russian nuclear weapons dismantlement is accomplished rapidly, safely, and securely. At the heart of CTR assistance are projects devoted to accelerating the dismantlement of strategic offensive arms pursuant to the START I Treaty. The United States has concluded agreements with Russia, Kazakstan and Ukraine to assist in the dismantlement of ICBM silos, missile airframes, heavy bombers, and Russian SLBM launchers. Implementation of these agreements is proceeding vigorously. CTR funding is currently providing assistance for protection, control and accounting of fissile material from dismantled Russian nuclear warheads, as well as the safety and security of nuclear weapons destined for dismantlement.
CTR assistance to Belarus, Kazakstan, Russia and Ukraine falls into three principal categories:
Nonproliferation is also a principal goal of the Nunn-Lugar program. The U.S. is helping Belarus, Kazakstan, Russia, and Ukraine ensure that expertise, special materials for weapons of mass destruction, and of course the weapons and delivery vehicles themselves remain under control of authorized personnel and do not spread beyond their borders to other countries or to sub-national groups.
ACDA's Role: ACDA provides arms control policy input to interagency consideration of CTR activities, especially in the establishment of U.S. Government budgetary priorities for the CTR program, to promote denuclearization and safety and security in dismantlement in the former Soviet Union. ACDA supports the CTR program focus on dismantlement of strategic launch delivery vehicles and their associated equipment in a manner consistent with START I. ACDA personnel participated in the negotiation and conclusion of SSD agreements with Belarus, Kazakstan, Russia and Ukraine, which include the "umbrella" and implementing agreements. Now that these agreements have been negotiated, their implementation is in the hands of the U.S. government agencies (the Departments of Defense and Energy) with the relevant programmatic responsibilities.
No existing arms control agreement requires the dismantlement of nuclear warheads, an accounting of warheads dismantled, or an accounting of fissile material from dismantled nuclear weapons. However, the Highly Enriched Uranium (HEU) purchase agreement does require that the HEU comes from dismantled nuclear weapons. As nuclear warheads are unilaterally dismantled and nuclear weapons stockpiles are reduced, it is important that each side has confidence that dismantlement is actually occurring, that the process of dismantlement is irreversible, and that the fissile material from dismantled nuclear weapons is safely and securely stored, pending limited disposition. Under the terms of the HEU purchase agreement, Russian HEU is blended down into low-enriched uranium and is then shipped to the United States. The HEU must come from dismantled Russian nuclear weapons and must not be enriched by the United States. During 1996, significant new procedures to confirm the weapons origin of the Russian HEU were negotiated. The United States now has access to the documentation associated with dismantled weapons, and to the receipt and storage area for Russian HEU weapons components arriving from dismantlement facilities. The United States has the right to perform radiation measurements on HEU weapons components, HEU metal chips from weapons components, and HEU oxide in sealed containers. Additionally, the United States negotiated the right to install enrichment and flow measurement equipment at the blend points in Russian facilities to further enhance confidence in the dismantlement process. While U.S. CTR assistance is not provided for actual dismantlement of nuclear warheads, a major CTR project involves assistance for the design and construction of a facility to store fissile material from dismantled nuclear warheads.
A high-priority ACDA objective is to encourage Russian dismantlement of warheads and to negotiate agreements on measures to make warhead dismantlement transparent and irreversible. Transparency promises to be a key element of post-Cold War arms controls for a number of important reasons:
At the January 1994 and May 1995 U.S.-Russian Summit, Presidents Clinton and Yeltsin explicitly agreed to seek more transparency and irreversibility in nuclear weapons reduction. They also agreed to exchange detailed information on aggregate stockpiles of nuclear warheads, on stocks of fissile materials, and on their safety and security. At those Summits, the Presidents committed to several new initiatives, including:
At the January 1994 Summit, Russia agreed to consider voluntary acceptance of IAEA safeguards on all source and special fissionable materials, excluding only those having direct national security significance. The Russian government, following the U.S. lead, also specifically agreed to consider putting excess fissile material released from military uses as a result of nuclear arms reductions under IAEA safeguards.
The U.S. looks forward to progress in transparency, especially in view of President Clinton's September 24, 1996 UN General Assembly speech which called for monitoring of nuclear warheads and materials after entry into force of START II.
With respect to President Yeltsin's proposal for a treaty on nuclear safety and strategic stability among the five nuclear powers, the United States and Russia declared at the May 1995 Summit that:
ACDA's Role: ACDA provided the Deputy and other members of the U.S. Safeguards, Transparency and Irreversibility (STI) initiative and continues to play a prominent role in a range of transparency initiatives. ACDA also played a leading role in promoting and developing concepts for a possible U.S.-Russian regime on warhead elimination and control. Efforts included sponsoring conferences designed to facilitate discussion among U.S. Government and Non-Government Organization representatives to develop concepts and relate the concepts to possible monitoring technologies and procedures so that the United States will be prepared for progress in this area.
Millions of men and women and thousands of labs and factories constituted the industrial underpinning of the Cold War. Major legacies of the Cold War now include not only surplus weapons from nuclear bombs, tanks, and submarines, but also the industries and experts responsible for producing them. The competitors in that confrontation now face enormous defense industrial overcapacity, from factory space to highly-skilled scientists. Redirecting this capacity to peaceful civilian and/or commercial uses is critical to economic and political stability in countries undergoing such restructuring, as well as to enhancing our own national security.
While this problem affects almost any country with an arms industry, it is especially acute in the former Soviet Union, where the difficulty in converting industries, communities, and personnel is compounded by the simultaneous political and economic reforms taking place. The combination of (1) highly capable weapons designers and producers now without their traditional sources of income and (2) wealthy and unscrupulous would-be proliferant governments eager to hire these experts is not just a local problem. It is a concern to the United States and the entire world.
The U.S. Government is committed to assisting the transformation to peaceful civilian use of defense industries by encouraging participation of the U.S. private sector in this effort.
To accomplish this, the U.S. has established bilateral Defense Conversion Committees with Russia, Ukraine, Kazakstan, and Belarus. ACDA actively participates in these organizations and their efforts because of the Agency's commitment to preventing the spread of weapons-related equipment, technology, and expertise (especially in the area of weapons of mass destruction) that threatens to accompany economic dislocations, and to demilitarizing the associated economies. By maximizing the civilian opportunities that exist in these countries, we contribute to the orderly, transparent, and permanent shrinkage of this sector of the former Soviet economy, as well as to reducing the probability that threats will appear elsewhere.
In addition to working with these bilateral organizations, ACDA seeks to identify conversion and restructuring applications that serve U.S. arms control purposes. In the past, this effort included sponsorship for several "entrepreneurial workshops" to redirect Russian nuclear weapons designers to civilian projects. Current work includes an effort to work with other U.S. agencies and the U.S. private sector to redirect a Russian chemical weapons production facility to non-military applications.
Conversion is an arduous, expensive, and time-consuming process, with benefits that are often difficult to quantify or which are apparent on balance-sheets only after several years. However, the contribution that the effort itself has made to increasing contact and trust between former adversaries, to increasing the confidence of those involved that they can operate successfully in a market economy, and to achieving stability and permanence in the reduction of excessive defense sectors, is immeasurable.
The United States believes that the world should, as quickly as possible, conclude an international treaty banning production of fissile materials for use in nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosives. This treaty, proposed by President Clinton on September 27, 1993 would include effective verification measures which would provide additional transparency to the nuclear programs of the United States and Russia, as well as in other countries that today lack safeguards on key production processes. At the same time, the United States has been working intensively with Russia for several years to enhance transparency measures associated with the purchase of 500 tons of excess high-enriched uranium from Russia, and to reach a bilateral agreement on a permanent cessation of production of plutonium for nuclear weapons.
Since 1993, negotiating a Fissile Material Cutoff Treaty (FMCT) has been a high priority for the Clinton Administration. In September of 1993, President Clinton urged the negotiation of a ban on the production of fissile material for use in nuclear explosives or outside of international safeguards. In December 1993, the United Nations General Assembly adopted, by consensus, a resolution endorsing such a ban. Unfortunately, negotiations have not yet begun.
An FMCT would constitute a decisive turn away from nuclear arms races and unsafeguarded fissile material production. A multilateral, effectively verifiable cutoff would cap the amount of fissile material available for use worldwide in nuclear weapons, thus limiting the number of nuclear weapons that could be produced. In particularly volatile areas that can least bear the risks of escalating arms races, such as South Asia and the Middle East, an FMCT would be an especially important measure to strengthen stability.
Member states of the Conference on Disarmament (CD) agreed to negotiate a cutoff, and agreed on a negotiating mandate and on the establishment of an Ad Hoc Committee in March 1995. In the Principles and Objectives document that resulted from the NPT Review and Extension Conference in May 1995, the immediate negotiation and early conclusion of a cutoff treaty on terms consistent with the March mandate was further endorsed by all NPT adherents.
However, a handful of states have held the start of FMCT negotiations in the CD hostage to other issues. Since the FMCT is in the interests of all states and should be negotiated on its own merits, the United States has opposed these linkage tactics. We will redouble our efforts so that negotiations on a cutoff treaty can begin with no linkages or conditions. In that context, the United States will seek to broaden support for the FMCT on its own terms and work closely with allies on important substantive FMCT issues.
ACDA's Role: ACDA leads the U.S. Government's efforts to achieve a fissile material cutoff treaty. This includes heading the U.S. delegation to the Conference on Disarmament in Geneva, leading bilateral and trilateral experts' meetings, and chairing the interagency group in Washington that develops guidance and instructions for the delegation. ACDA also leads bilateral and trilateral experts' meetings in capitals.
Blending high-enriched uranium (HEU) with natural or low-enriched uranium (LEU) for use in nuclear electric power plants is the most widely accepted solution for reducing accumulations of HEU from dismantled nuclear weapons. In 1993, the United States and Russia agreed to convert 500 or more tons of HEU extracted from Russian nuclear weapons into LEU for use as fuel in commercial nuclear reactors. Pursuant to that agreement, LEU equivalent to over 18 tons of blended-down HEU has already been delivered to the United States. ACDA is committed to transparency in this process. To that end, we have provided experts to work in close coordination with the Departments of State and Energy to develop, negotiate, and implement such measures.
ACDA has also applied its expertise in nonproliferation and plutonium management to the comprehensive review of long-term options for disposition of excess plutonium, both in the United States and through joint technical work with Russia. These efforts have been underway since the Clinton-Yeltsin summit meeting in January 1994 and led to the release of a "Record of Decision" by the Department of Energy in January 1997 on preferred options in the United States. The United States and Russia have also completed a detailed joint study, which was made publicly available in the fall of 1996. Both the United States and joint efforts address a complex set of technical, nonproliferation, environmental, safety, health, and budgetary considerations. ACDA has participated by evaluating a variety of options in detail for proliferation resistance as well as technical feasibility. In addition, we helped pave the way for and participated in an international meeting of experts in October 1996 to address plutonium disposition, as called for by the G-7 countries and Russia at the April 1996 Moscow Nuclear Summit.
As a matter of policy, the United States does not recycle plutonium for electric power generation and does not encourage such use in other countries, although the United States does maintain its existing commitments regarding the use of plutonium in civil nuclear programs in Western Europe and Japan. We believe the proliferation risk from plutonium recycling far exceeds any potential economic gain. To limit the possible proliferation risk if plutonium is to be recycled elsewhere, the United States continues to engage other developed nations in discussing means to limit the stockpiling of civilian plutonium for electric power generation. These discussions have continued in Vienna over the past year in conjunction with the IAEA Board of Governors meetings. ACDA has helped develop and refine the concepts for a regime that would limit accumulation of plutonium by balancing the pace of plutonium separation with the pace of civilian plutonium consumption.
ACDA has also continued to play a central role in contributing direct technical and policy expertise to the negotiations on the revised version of the U.S.-Russian Plutonium Reactor Shutdown Agreement. Although 10 production reactors in Russia have already been shut down, and the last of the 14 in the United States was shut down by 1989, the original version of this Agreement, signed by Vice President Gore and Prime Minister Chernomyrdin in June 1994, never entered into force. The primary reason for this was that Russia could not be assured that replacement sources of the heat and electricity could be found in time to compensate for the shutdown of their last three production reactors in Tomsk and Krasnoyarsk.
Following feasibility studies on replacement sources of energy for these regions, the Gore-Chernomyrdin Commission agreed in January 1996 that the sides would pursue a joint project to convert the cores of these three reactors so that they would permanently cease producing weapon-grade plutonium, but continue to provide heat and electricity until their normal end of lifetime. By late 1996, the U.S. and Russia were in the midst of renewed negotiations on this revised shutdown agreement, whose main elements would ensure that:
Negotiations on the compliance regime for the modified agreement were making substantial progress by the end of 1996. Monitoring measures center around means to ensure the operation of the converted reactors in non-production mode, and that plutonium produced prior to conversion remains in storage. ACDA has played a leading role in organizing U.S. production-reactor and storage-facility experts in crafting such a regime and negotiating specific monitoring activities.
In its current formulation, the Agreement would constitute a substantial, bilateral step toward a global non-discriminatory treaty banning the production of fissile materials for use in nuclear weapons or outside of safeguards. Although the agreement will not formally enter into force until it is signed in its revised version and diplomatic notes are exchanged, Russia has stated that as of October 1, 1994, it stopped using newly produced plutonium in nuclear weapons and instead began storing it in the form of plutonium oxide, thus claiming that it is already abiding by a key aspect of the Agreement.
The United States remains committed to ensuring the transparency and irreversibility of the process of nuclear weapons reduction. While formal U.S.-Russian talks on safeguards, transparency, and irreversibility did not move forward during 1996, there was limited progress at the expert level. Under the terms of the agreement, the U.S. and Russia will agree not to re-start 24 shut-down reactors (14 in the U.S. and 10 in Russia), and the U.S. will provide assistance to Russia to convert the remaining three reactors in Tomsk and Krasnoyarsk so that they no longer produce weapon-grade plutonium. The agreement should include extensive monitoring rights to ensure that the shut-down reactors are not restarted, that the converted reactors operate as intended, and that the plutonium used in the reactors prior to their conversion is not used in nuclear weapons.
In 1996 the United States, Russia, and the IAEA began to discuss a role for the IAEA in monitoring material of nuclear weapon origin (including that to be stored in the long-term fissile material storage facility now under construction at Mayak). The sides had an organizational meeting in Vienna in September, and met again in Washington in early November. The November meeting was held in conjunction with a visit by U.S., Russian and IAEA officials to facilities in the U.S. where material declared excess to U.S. defense needs is stored under IAEA safeguards. The sides met in January 1997 in Moscow and agreed to meet again in March in Vienna. ACDA will continue to help shape the policies for this new initiative and participate actively in these discussions.
The significance of transparency and irreversibility of nuclear weapons reductions is rapidly increasing. In his September 24, 1996 remarks at the United Nations, President Clinton indicated that a priority U.S. goal is to lift the threat of nuclear weapons and the threat of weapons of mass destruction. At that time, he noted that "When Russia ratifies START II, President Yeltsin and I are all ready to discuss the possibilities of further cuts, as well as limiting and monitoring nuclear warheads and materials. This will help make deep reductions irreversible."
ACDA's Role: ACDA provided the chief negotiator for the talks on safeguards, transparency, and irreversibility, the head of the experts group, and the delegation's executive secretary.