July 29, 1991

The Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START) was designed with verification in mind, and verification measures were negotiated in parallel with other aspects. Thus, the basic structure of the Treaty is designed to facilitate verification by national technical means (NTM). The START Treaty contains detailed, interlocking and mutually reinforcing provisions, which supplement national technical means to establish an effective verification regime. This regime provides for data exchanges and notifications on strategic systems and facilities covered by the Treaty, a ban on the denial of data from telemetry, twelve types of on-site inspection and exhibitions, continuous monitoring at mobile ICBM final assembly facilities, and cooperative measures. These elements are outlined below.

National Technical Means (NTM)

START provides for the use of, and non-interference with, national technical means of verification, e.g. satellites. There are explicit provisions prohibiting interference with NTM, or use of concealment measures that impede verification by NTM.


Parties are prohibited from engaging in any practice that denies full access to telemetric information during missile flight tests, with certain limited exceptions. Moreover, Parties are obligated to exchange telemetry tapes, interpretative data and acceleration profiles for every test flight.

Data Exchange and Notifications

Prior to Treaty signature, the sides will exchange data on numbers, locations, and the technical characteristics of START-accountable weapons systems and facilities and will provide regular notifications and data updates thereafter.

Cooperative Measures

Seven times a year, either party may request the other to display in the open road-mobile launchers, rail mobile launchers and heavy bombers at bases specified by the inspecting Party. Additional cooperative measures may be requested following an operational dispersal.

Continuous Monitoring Activities

START establishes continuous monitoring at the perimeter and portals of each side's mobile ICBM assembly facilities. The US has the right to establish a monitoring facility at Votkinsk, which is the final assembly facility for the SS-25, and at Pavlograd, which is the final assembly facility for the SS-24. The Soviet side has the right to monitor the Thiokol Strategic Operations facility at Promontory, Utah, the final assembly facility for the accountable stage of the Peacekeeper. Such monitoring would also be established at any future facilities at which mobile ICBM assembly takes place.