MULTILATERAL NUCLEAR EXPORT CONTROL REGIMESZangger (NPT Exporters) Committee
The Zangger Committee consists of 31 states (see attached list). It was formed in the early 1970s to establish guidelines for implementing the export control provisions of the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (Article III(2)). According to the Article "Each State Party to the Treaty undertakes not to provide: (a) source or special fissionable material, or (b) equipment or material especially designed or prepared for the processing, use or production of special fissionable material, to any non-nuclear-weapon State for peaceful purposes, unless the source or special fissionable material shall be subject to the safeguards required by this article."
The list of controlled items developed by the Zangger Committee is known as the Trigger List because export of those items triggers International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) safeguards. The items are controlled under the Zangger Committee's understandings because if they were misused they could contribute to a nuclear explosive program. Examples of these items are plutonium, highly-enriched uranium (HEU), reactors, reprocessing and enrichment plants, and equipment and components for such facilities.
The Trigger List has been updated substantially since it was first adopted in 1974 to provide greater detail and clarity in all areas of the nuclear fuel-cycle. The fundamental criterion under the NPT remains whether an item is "especially designed or prepared" for nuclear use.
The Zangger Committee requirements for exports of Trigger List items are that they 1) not be used for nuclear explosives, 2) be subject to IAEA safeguards in the recipient non-nuclear weapon state, and 3) not be reexported unless they are subject to safeguards in the new recipient state.
The Committee meets twice a year in Vienna, Austria. The current Chairman is Fritz Schmidt, a senior official in the Austrian Federal Chancellory, and the Committee Secretary is an officer in the United Kingdom Mission in Vienna. New members are admitted by invitation and must accept the "understandings" of the Committee through a confidential exchange of notes with all existing members. Most of the obligations accepted by Committee members have become a part of the public record through communications to the IAEA Director General and subsequent publication in the Agency's Information Circular (INFCIRC) 209 series.
Claude Zangger of Switzerland was the Committee's first Chairman and served almost 20 years until his retirement in 1989. The Committee continues to be named after him in honor of his long service.
Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG)
Following the 1974 nuclear explosion by India, the United States proposed the formation of a Nuclear Suppliers Group. The primary purpose was to ensure that suppliers uniformly applied a comprehensive set of guidelines to ensure that nuclear cooperation did not contribute to proliferation, and to involve a key non-NPT supplier, France. The NSG grew from seven to 15 countries by early 1978 when its guidelines and control list were published.
Although suppliers consulted regularly on a bilateral basis, the NSG did not meet throughout the 1980s. The NSG resumed meeting multilaterally in The Hague in March 1991 and has held annual plenaries since then. These meetings have led to a progressive strengthening of NSG controls and an expansion of its membership to 34, including as its most recent members Brazil, the Republic of Korea, and Ukraine (see attached list).
The NSG Guidelines include a number of important conditions that help promote nuclear cooperation under sound nonproliferation arrangements. For Trigger List exports, the NSG Guidelines currently require, for example, (1) an agreement between the International Atomic Energy Agency and the recipient state requiring the application of safeguards on all fissionable materials in its nuclear activities (also known as "full-scope IAEA safeguards") -- not just on the exported items, (2) physical protection against unauthorized use of transferred materials and facilities, and (3) restraint in the transfer of sensitive facilities, technology, and weapons-usable materials, i.e., exports that could contribute to the acquisition of plutonium or highly enriched unranium.
In 1992, spurred on by revelations about Iraq's illicit nuclear weapons program, the NSG adopted controls on nuclear-related dual-use goods, for example those with both nuclear and non-nuclear applications, that could make a major contribution to unsafeguarded nuclear activities or to nuclear explosive activities. The NSG Dual-Use Guidelines prohibit the transfer of controlled items for use in a non-nuclear weapon state in a nuclear explosive activity or an unsafeguarded nuclear fuel-cycle activity, or when there is an unacceptable risk of diversion to such an activity. To reduce the risk of diversion, the Guidelines require recipients to provide assurances 1) specifying how transferred items will be used, 2) stating that they will not be used for proscribed activities, and 3) stating that the suppliers consent will be obtained before any retransfers of the items.
The NSG also agreed to control technology related to both Trigger List and controlled dual-use goods. By controlling technical information and assistance for the development, production, and use of controlled goods, NSG members limit the ability of proliferant states to use technical expertise or blueprints as part of a nuclear weapons program.
The British chaired the NSG in the 1970s but this responsibility now rotates annually. The current chair is Argentina, and Canada will chair in May 1997. There is no NSG Secretariat, although Japan serves as the point of contact.
The first 15 NSG members exchanged bilateral notes accepting the guidelines and control list and communicated these commitments to the IAEA Director General. NSG members encourage all countries to adhere to the NSG Guidelines as the basis for responsible nuclear export policy. New members must adhere to the guidelines and are accepted as members only upon the unanimous agreement of all current members.
The NSG Guidelines are published by the IAEA in its Information Circular series. INFCIRC/254 Part 1 contains the Guidelines for Nuclear Transfers, and INFCIRC/254 Part 2 contains the Guidelines for Transfers of Nuclear-Related Dual-Use Equipment, Material and Related Technology.
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