Index of "International Narcotics Control Strategy Reports"
Index of "Treaties and Legal Information" ||
Electronic Research Collections Index ||
U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE
INTERNATIONAL NARCOTICS CONTROL STRATEGY REPORT
BUREAU FOR INTERNATIONAL NARCOTICS AND LAW ENFORCEMENT AFFAIRS
AFRICA AND THE MIDDLE EAST 413
Cote d'Ivoire 415
Other Africa 446
Cote d'Ivoire is a transit point for heroin from Asia and cocaine from South America destined for North American and European markets. There is some production of low grade cannabis, primarily for domestic consumption. Domestic use of other illegal drugs, especially heroin and cocaine, are rising. The vast majority of those arrested for drug related offenses are of Ivoirian nationality. The National Drug Police (NDP), while recognizing the problem of narcotics trafficking, is hampered by a lack of resources. In 1994, a project letter of agreement was signed between the Government of Cote d'Ivoire (GOCI) and the USG relative to the fight against narcotics trafficking. Cote d'Ivoire is a party to the 1988 UN Convention.
II. Status of Country
The production of narcotics in Cote d'Ivoire is limited to the cultivation of low-grade cannabis, primarily for domestic consumption. While there is no wide-spread drug use in the country, the influx of both heroin and cocaine concerns authorities. Abidjan serves as a regional hub for both international airline travel and financial activity, and thus is an attractive site for the transshipment of narcotics, and for money laundering. There is no evidence of any narcotics processing in Cote d'Ivoire.
III. Country Action Against Drugs in 1994
Policy Initiatives. The GOCI took a number of small steps in meeting the 1988 UN Convention objectives. In July, the Minister of Security chaired a cabinet-level meeting to ensure that all GOCI counternarcotics programs are properly coordinated.
Accomplishments. There were no significant counternarcotics accomplishments during the year. Despite an apparent willingness to combat trafficking, the GOCI lacks resources to devote to meaningful drug control actions.
Law Enforcement Efforts. The effectiveness of the GOCI's law enforcement activities is limited by the lack of training and resources.
Corruption. There were no significant arrests and/or prosecutions for corruption in 1994, nor is there any evidence to implicate public officials in corrupt practices.
Agreements and Treaties. The GOCI is a party to the 1961 UN Single Convention, the 1972 Protocol thereto, and the 1971 Convention on Psychotropic Substances. In 1991, it ratified the 1988 UN Convention. In 1992, 1993 and 1994, it signed letters of Agreement with the USG seeking to enhance GOCI capabilities to suppress the cultivation, processing, trafficking, consumption and transshipment of illicit narcotics.
Drug Flow/Transit. Abidjan's Houphouet-Boigny International Airport is used as the primary transit point in the country for the flow of Asian heroin and cocaine. It is difficult to gauge the amount of drugs transiting the country, since the GOCI's data base is unreliable.
Demand Reduction. The GOCI's modest demand reduction program is limited to the publication of news articles on drug abuse and on the penalties associated with illicit narcotics use and trafficking.
IV. US Policy Initiatives and Programs.
Policy Initiatives. The USG focuses on ways to limiting the use of Abidjan as a transit point for narcotics trafficking.
Bilateral Cooperation. The bilateral agreements of 1992, 1993 and 1994 helped to relieve some of the GOCI's logistical problems in combatting narcotics. USG and GOCI law enforcement officials cooperate will and share information.
Road Ahead. The USG will continue to seek a decrease the use of Abidjan's Houphouet-Boigny International Airport for the transshipment of narcotics.
Egypt's role as transit point for opium and cannabis destined for other countries in the Middle East, Europe and the United States continued in 1994. Egyptian authorities eradicated an area in the Sinai region capable of producing ten times as much opium as was eradicated in the 1993 campaign. The GOE believes that the increased cultivation was intended for domestic markets. Cannabis cultivation and eradication also increased significantly with over seven million plants destroyed in the Sinai region this year. Domestic demand for opium remained low but increasing. Widespread hashish consumption continued. There is increased abuse of pharmaceutical drugs though the scope is difficult to gauge because prescriptions are not required to purchase pharmaceuticals in Egypt.
Egypt has ratified the 1988 UN Convention, but competition for resources from higher GOE priorities such as counter terrorism hamper efforts to fully comply. There were some indications of low-level narcotics-related public corruption in 1994.
II. Status of Country
Egypt continues to serve as a significant transit point for heroin from Southeast and Southwest Asia to Europe and the United States. Cultivation of cannabis and opium is a small, but growing problem, and the GOE has been aggressive in eradicating suspected cultivation. The GOE has begun to address the transit problem in the Suez Canal.
III. Country Against Drugs
Accomplishments. The GOE's aggressive eradication campaign in the Sinai region resulted in the destruction of over 10.3 million poppy plants and 7 million cannabis plants. In November the GOE formally adopted a comprehensive drug control strategy that coordinates the use of ANGA, Customs, police and some military resources in law enforcement, particularly interdiction at entry points. In addition, the strategy involves non-governmental organizations in planning drug awareness programs. The strategy also addresses the need to establish drug treatment programs.
Law Enforcement Efforts. The GOE strictly enforced its strong anti-narcotics laws and began work on bolstering money laundering and controlled delivery legislation. Bilateral efforts focussed on coordination of law enforcement activity through the implementation of a narcotics task force approach.
The GOE's Anti-Narcotics General Administration (ANGA) continues to conduct effective airport interdiction programs. ANGA coordinates its activities with the frontier police, customs, and police narcotic units in the provinces. ANGA's successful eradication campaign in the Sinai region was conducted with materials and technical support provided by the Ministry of Agriculture.
Corruption. There were no reports of any senior GOS officials engaged in narcotics trafficking. There were indications of limited low-level corruption as low salaries make law enforcement agencies vulnerable to corruption.
Agreements and Treaties. Egypt has a bilateral counternarcotics agreement with the United States signed in 1991. The existing extradition treaty with the USG dates from the Ottoman Empire. The USG has not made any narcotics-related extradition requests since 1989.
Egypt has bilateral agreements with Tunisia, Syria, Pakistan, India, Germany, Jordan, Italy, the United Kingdom, and the United States. All agreements feature cooperation with police agencies in joint investigation, timely exchange of intelligence information, extradition, law enforcement assistance (equipment/training), judicial assistance (role of the judiciary, training of prosecutors, judges, and formulation of laws).
Cultivation/Production. Egyptian authorities destroyed over 10.3 million opium plants and 7 million cannabis plants in 1994. Cultivation is concentrated in remote areas of the Sinai region and along the Nile River in southern Egypt.
US Programs. The United States will continue to make regional training opportunities available to the GOE. The USG will continue to seek the full implementation of its 1991 bilateral counternarcotics agreement and its amendments with the GOE. Major USG policy objectives are:
- To exchange information with the GOE regarding the trafficking of illegal drugs through Egypt and on to the United States and Europe.
- To detect and interdict heroin shipments through Egypt to the United States through a wire intercept program and other efforts.
- To provide training, equipment, and advice to Egyptian law enforcement personnel so that they may function independently, efficiently, and professionally to counter narcotics trafficking.
Road Ahead. The USG will continue to seek full implementation of the 1991 bilateral agreement with Egypt and its 1992 and 1993 amendments, to include the arrival, installation, and use of USG provided equipment, and the implementation of an effective Suez Canal interdiction program. The USG will continue its cooperation with the GOE in both bilateral and regional counternarcotics efforts.
The only illicit (but licit in Ethiopia) drug produced and consumed in Ethiopia is qat, some of which is also exported to neighboring countries. Addis Ababa's international airport, a regional air hub, increasingly is being used as a narcotics transshipment point primarily for heroin originating in India and Thailand destined for Europe and North America. Modest efforts have been made by the transitional Government of Ethiopia (TGE) to overhaul law enforcement and judicial efforts to combat narcotics trafficking and, although in 1994 Ethiopia became a party to the 1988 UN Convention, much remains to be done.
II. Status of Country
Ethiopia serves as a regional air hub which connects South Asia with the Middle East and West Africa, and evidence indicates a significant increase in the number of narcotics shipments transiting Addis Ababa. Criminal sentences in Ethiopia for trafficking offenses are not severe and offer little deterrent to drug couriers. Statistics kept on drug arrests and qat production are not accurate and are therefore suspect.
III. Country Actions Against Drugs in 1994
Policy initiatives. In 1994 Ethiopia became a party to the 1988 UN Convention and to the 1971 Protocol to the 1961 Single Convention, to which it is also a party. In addition, Ethiopia is a party to the 1971 Convention. Under pressure from the US and other countries, the TGE has shown greater concern in addressing all aspects of drug trafficking and consumption, and has begun the process to improve its counternarcotics capability.
Law Enforcement Efforts. A large seizure of heroin at Addis' Bole International Airport (10 kgs.) was made during 1994 resulting in the arrest of several Nigerians and one Ethiopian. As part of the general move to overhaul the antinarcotics apparatus, Ethiopian judges have begun to impose sentences for drug convictions which exceed current statutory limits.
Corruption. Corruption of TGE officials is not a problem in Ethiopia. The TGE does not as a matter of government policy encourage or facilitate illicit production or distribution of illicit drugs or the laundering of drug money.
Agreements and Treaties. During 1994 the TGE signed a Regional Counternarcotics Cooperation Agreement with Eritrea whereby the two countries agreed to exchange information. The Ethiopians have agreed in principle to expand this agreement to neighboring countries.
Cultivation and Production. Ethiopia is a leading producer of qat, a stimulant used most commonly by Yemenis and the ethnic Somalis in Ethiopia, Djibouti and Somalia. Several tons of qat is flown daily into these neighboring countries via commercial and charter flights. The production, exportation and consumption of qat is entirely legal both in Ethiopia as well as in the importing neighboring countries.
Drug Flow/Transit. There is no doubt that significant amounts of heroin are transiting Addis Ababa, originating in Bombay, Karachi and Bangkok, and destined for Lagos and other West African countries for further transit to Europe and North America.
Demand Reduction. Ethiopia does not have a significant narcotics consumption problem (other than qat, which is legal). However, the TGE no longer ignores the heroin transshipments and recognizes that a domestic consumption problem is often a byproduct of a narcotics transit operation. Consequently, efforts were made in 1994 to develop a public awareness program to highlight the dangers posed by narcotics, particularly heroin.
IV. US Policy Initiatives and Programs.
Policy initiatives. US counternarcotics goals within Ethiopia focus entirely on eliminating, or at least limiting, the use of Addis Ababa as a transit point for international heroin smugglers. The USG will also press the post-transitional government to sign the 1988 UN Convention.
Bilateral cooperation. In April 1994, the USG funded two Ethiopian counternarcotics officers' attendance at a regional counternarcotics conference in Harare, Zimbabwe, and again, in July, a senior Ethiopian counternarcotics officer attended a one-month DEA management conference in Washington, funded by the USG. In September 1994, the Department of State provided two drug sniffer dogs and a transportation vehicle for use at Addis' Bole International Airport.
Road Ahead. The TGE appears to be committed to limiting the flow of heroin through Addis Ababa and to this end looks to the USG for providing continued assistance and expertise.
Ghana's role increased as a transit route for cocaine from Latin America and heroin from Asia, both ultimately destined for the US and Europe, despite the government's intensive law enforcement and public awareness efforts. The Government of Ghana (GOG) also acknowledged the on-going cultivation of marijuana and a rise in drug consumption across the nation. Narcotics authorities implemented US-sponsored training program to improve interdiction efforts at airports and at the borders, resulting in increased arrests and seizures. The Government of Ghana energetically pursued the goals and objectives of the 1988 UN Convention to which it is a party.
II. Status of the Country
Illicit drug trafficking is increasing in Ghana, despite the country's stringent narcotics laws and active law enforcement efforts. The GOG believes that, in addition to the long established Nigerian-Ghanaian organizations based in Accra, international groups headquartered elsewhere are now operating in Ghana. During 1994, there was a dramatic increase in the number of Ghanaians arrested worldwide on narcotics charges, primarily for cocaine trafficking.
III. Country Actions Against Drugs in 1994
Policy Initiatives. The GOC made progress in advancing elements of its counternarcotics master plan by developing effective interdiction capabilities along borders with Togo and the Ivory Coast. Ghana's customs service placed a narcotics squad at the Ghana/Ivory Coast border to interdict cocaine trafficking. Additionally, the police narcotics unit assigned personnel to the seaport at Tema and the regional capitals of Ho, Kumasi and Koforidua to interdict heroin coming from Nigeria. The Narcotics Control Board (NCB) increased its education awareness program in secondary schools and supported the formation of drug prevention clubs.
To meet 1988 UN Convention objectives, the GOG restructured the NCB to include representatives from the Pharmacy Board, the Education Service, trade unions, the public prosecutor's office, psychiatric care givers, and prisons officials. The NCB hopes the public prosecutor will become a major force in getting proposed counternarcotics legislation approved by the parliamentary draft committee.
Law Enforcement Efforts. The NCB routinely investigates local businesses for drug trafficking activity. The NCB is constantly upgrading techniques and methods to counter the sophisticated operations of drug dealers. However, the current budget and manpower levels of law enforcement agencies are insufficient for Ghana's enormous narcotics problem.
The GOG has asset seizure legislation which is routinely enforced. There have been unsuccessful attempts to amend the law so that 50 percent of drug dealer's seized assets would be given to the NCB to fund counternarcotics activities.
The GOG continued its close cooperation with international organizations on counternarcotics issues. In October, chiefs of all three Ghanaian narcotics control agencies (NCB, police, Customs) readily agreed to support a DEA undercover operation in Ghana.
There were no reports of money laundering in Ghana in 1994, nor did the GOG report any diversions of precursor chemicals to manufacture illicit drugs.
Corruption. No Ghanaian government official was implicated in 1994 in facilitating the production, processing, or shipment of narcotic and psychotropic drugs and other controlled substances, or was involved in discouraging the investigation or prosecution of such acts. The GOG opposes all corruption, as evidenced by the dismissal of four senior customs officials this year on corruption charges.
Agreements and Treaties. Ghana and the USG signed a Letter of Agreement (LOA) in 1993 providing for counternarcotics cooperation. Ghana is a signatory to the 1988 UN Convention. In October, the GOG honored its treaty with the US by arresting and extraditing a Ghanaian national. In July and August, the GOG assisted the DEA in a successful drug investigation which led to arrests.
Cultivation/Production. Cannabis grows naturally in most parts of the country. Despite eradication efforts, the number of fields under cultivation is increasing and spreading into new areas closer to urban centers. Ghanaian counternarcotics authorities estimate that their annual seizures of marijuana represent only a small fraction of total production. The GOG lacks detailed information on drug distribution, but acknowledges that marijuana is readily available throughout the country, particularly in the larger urban centers.
The GOG lacks sufficient regional narcotics personnel to monitor closely and investigate cannabis production in rural areas. There is no evidence that other drugs are produced in Ghana.
Drug Flow and Transit. The inauguration of Ghana Airways' direct flights to the US in October enhanced Accra's appeal as a drug transit point. Counternarcotics agencies also uncovered growing use of the international mail to smuggle heroin from Thailand into Ghana, although use of express mail decreased. Cocaine seizures decreased markedly from 1993 levels. Ghanaian counternarcotics officials believe cocaine couriers now primarily use swallowing methods rather than external concealment, making detection more difficult. Cocaine couriers are normally Ghanaian nationals who obtain the drugs in Rio de Janeiro and travel to the Ivory Coast or Nigeria, then return to Ghana overland or by air. Both heroin and cocaine are transshipped to the US or to the UK and other parts of Europe. The majority of drug trafficking organizations appear to be headed by Nigerians who have formed small syndicates with Ghanaians serving as couriers.
Demand Reduction. Under its demand reduction program, the NCB conducted two seminars, distributed information and educational literature, and produced documentary videos to loan to antidrug abuse clubs in schools and local communities. The GOG conducted a seminar to enhance media awareness of the dangers of drug abuse.
IV. US Policy Initiatives and Programs
The Road Ahead.
The USG will support the creation of self-sufficient GOG counternarcotics organizations by assisting the GOG to improve interdiction efforts; by providing commodity assistance and training; and by coordinating intelligence and extradition proceedings.
Israel is a transit route for heroin and hashish. The Israel National Police regards the war on drugs as its highest priority after internal security. While Israeli antidrug policy emphasizes demand reduction, the GOI plans to augment its drug interdiction capabilities with a newly formed, 200-person drug unit recruited from within Israel's Customs Service. The GOI is working to ensure that drug trafficking will not increase with Israel's enhanced regional ties.
There were promising initial steps toward increased regional counternarcotics cooperation. In June, Israeli and Egyptian antidrug agencies established formal lines of communication, and the Israel/Jordan Peace Treaty signed in October calls for cooperation in combatting crime and drugs. At present, Israel lacks the legal means to combat effectively money laundering. The National Police cooperates closely with foreign counterparts and has stationed drug liaison officers in the US and Europe. Israel has signed, but not ratified, the 1988 UN Convention.
II. Status of Country
The GOI is concerned that open borders and improving regional trade relations resulting from the Middle East Peace Process will increase drug trafficking activities through Israel. Drug cultivation and production are a problem in surrounding countries. This makes Israel a potential trafficking route, particularly from Lebanon, a major transit country for hashish and heroin, to Egypt. Israel is not a major drug producer, but the Antidrug Authority (ADA) estimates that there are 200,000 casual drug users and about 30,000 addicts in Israel. Surveys in 1989 and 1993 indicate a slight decline in drug abuse rates as a percentage of the population. However, they show a troubling shift among young people from hashish and marijuana, to synthetic drugs, opiates, heroin, and cocaine.
Israel's banking secrecy laws and liberal immigration policies might allow Israel to become a significant regional money laundering center. Money laundering is illegal and may be prosecuted in conjunction with a criminal conviction. However, there have been few prosecuted cases of money laundering. It appears that Israel's sophisticated financial infrastructure is being used increasingly by money launderers.
III: Country Actions Against Drugs in 1994
Policy Initiatives. The ADA, under the direct authority of the Prime Minister, continues to expand programs of drug education and awareness, treatment, and rehabilitation. At $9.5 million, the ADA's 1994 budget was some 20 percent higher than in 1993: much of the money went for drug treatment. The ADA established additional rehabilitation centers in the southern and central districts, and planned to open two more for the Haifa and Jaffa districts by year end.
Law Enforcement Efforts. Over the next year and a half, Israel hopes to introduce technologically advanced customs checks at all Israeli points of entry, including the Jordan River bridges. The National Police initiated a drug detection canine program at Ben Gurion airport.
International Cooperation. The National Police cooperates closely with its foreign counterparts and has stationed drug liaison officers in the US, Turkey, Holland, France, Germany, Russia, and Ukraine. The Customs Service has posted liaisons officials in Belgium, Italy, Hong Kong, and the US The GOI has called for a comprehensive regional conference to discuss cooperation in the antidrug fight, and is exploring the possibility of establishing a regional training center in Israel.
Agreements and Treaties. In June, Israeli and Egyptian drug agencies established formal lines of communication. The Israel/Jordan Peace Treaty concluded in October calls for cooperation in combatting crime and drugs.
The US and Israel signed a counternarcotics memorandum of understanding (MOU) in 1991. In 1993, the two governments signed a customs cooperation agreement. The recently ratified bilateral tax treaty grants US tax authorities limited access to bank account information. In November, Israel hosted negotiations on a mutual legal assistance treaty with the USG which would cover narcotics matters. Those negotiations are continuing.
Israel acceded to the European Convention on Mutual Legal Assistance in Criminal Matters, and ratified the 1961 UN Single Convention and its 1972 Protocol. In addition, Israeli law permits legal assistance in the absence of a treaty. Israel has signed, but not ratified, the 1988 UN Convention.
Israel has extradition treaties with the US, UK, France, and Italy. It does not extradite its own citizens.
Corruption. Drug-related corruption by government officials does not appear to be a problem in Israel.
Cultivation/Production. Israel neither cultivates nor produces illicit drugs.
Drug Flow/Transit. Israel lies on a drug transit route. Heroin from southwest Asia via Turkey, and from southeast Asia via Europe, enters at airports and seaports and transits Israel to Egypt. According to the ADA, hashish going to Egypt, and heroin to the US pass through Israel.
Demand Reduction. ADA now has a drug awareness program in more than one-third of all primary and secondary schools in Israel. Special programs to combat increasing drug abuse among the Israeli Arab minority are conducted jointly by government ministries, Arab local authorities, the Red Crescent, and the ADA.
IV. US Policy Initiatives and Programs
Policy Initiatives. US-Israel cooperation focuses on helping Israel build a self-sustaining, professional, drug interdiction force, and on fostering regional cooperation between Israel and neighboring countries on antidrug issues.
Bilateral Cooperation. In 1994 the INP established with USG assistance a detector dog program at Ben Gurion airport. The team proved very effective, and made 17 drug seizures in the last quarter of the year. The GOI now plans to expand the program to cover all points of entry into Israel.
Road Ahead. Israeli law enforcement agencies and US Customs will co-sponsor a drug interdiction training program in Israel, with possible additional regional participation from Egypt and Jordan. A USG multi-disciplinary enforcement team also plans to host a money laundering seminar in Israel.
Kenya enacted in 1994 the Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances Control Act. It implemented the terms and conditions of the 1988 UN Convention, to which Kenya is a party. The legislation established severe prison sentences for the possession of or trafficking in illicit drugs. The Government of Kenya (GOK) also appointed a former recipient of USG-funded training as the new director of Kenya's Anti-Narcotics Unit (ANU). Despite the tough new legislation, and the GOK's ambitious counternarcotics strategies, the government's lack of insufficient resources and inefficiency prevented enforcement agencies from stemming the flow of drugs through the country.
II. Status of Country
For reasons of geography and infrastructure, Kenya is an important transit point for heroin originating in India, Pakistan, and Thailand, and destined for Europe and the US The country is also an increasingly popular transshipment point for methaqualone (Maandrax) bound for South Africa. A November agreement calling for the creation of a single travel document for Kenya, Tanzania, and Uganda could complicate attempts by Kenyan drug enforcement agencies to identify the large number of non-Kenyan African couriers operating out of Kenya's two major international airports and its principal seaport.
III. Country Actions Against Drugs in 1994
Policy Initiatives. In August, the GOK implemented the provisions of the 1988 UN Convention by enacting the Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances Control Act. The comprehensive legislation covers drug cultivation, possession, trafficking, forfeiture of assets and proceeds, money laundering, rehabilitation, international assistance, and conspiracy.
The GOK also organized a counternarcotics seminar in conjunction with the UNDCP, and recommended the creation of an inter-ministerial coordinating committee to formulate a national drug policy.
In regional cooperation, ANU officers attended a November workshop in South Africa on the legal aspects of drug enforcement. Kenya agreed to host a meeting of chief narcotics investigators and public prosecutors from Tanzania, Uganda, and Kenya in 1995. In October Kenya sent delegates to Addis Ababa for a conference of the Heads of Drug Law Enforcement Agencies of Africa (HONLEA-Africa).
Accomplishments and Law Enforcement Efforts. Kenyan drug enforcement agencies seized roughly 1,000 kgs of cannabis, 22 kgs of heroin, and 23,000 tablets of methaqualone through October. In a noteworthy sting operation, ANU officers arrested a Pakistani national at Kenyatta Airport carrying 4 kgs of heroin, and used the courier to trace, arrest, and convict a Nairobi-based Nigerian trafficker. This case underscores a recent trend by African traffickers to rely on Indian or Pakistani nationals, rather than on other Africans, to smuggle heroin into Kenya from the subcontinent and East Asia.
ANU officials assert that the primary obstacle to more effective law enforcement efforts is neither corruption nor lack of political will, but insufficient finances and equipment. For instance, there are currently no funds budgeted for street informants. Despite this inadequacy of resources, the ANU plans to form a 10-person investigation section in 1995 to focus on trafficking operations in Nairobi.
Agreements and Treaties. Kenya acceded to the 1988 UN Convention in 1992. It is a party to the 1961 UN Single Convention and the 1972 Protocol thereto, but does not have any formal counternarcotics or extradition agreements with the USG or with any other government.
Cultivation/Production. Cannabis (bhang) is cultivated illegally throughout Kenya, with commercial-scale production near the coast, but there is no data on the extent of cultivation are not available. The GOK is considering the use of aerially-applied herbicides against cannabis crops, but this strategy might prompt opposition, given Kenya's sensitivity to environmental concerns.
Drug Flow/Transit. Kenya remains a popular transit point for traffic in Southwest Asian brown heroin and Southeast Asian white heroin. The drugs typically enter the country from India, Pakistan, and Thailand, are picked up by non-Kenyan African couriers, and transported through Nigeria and other west African countries to Europe and the US. Kenyan drug enforcement agencies also report that cocaine from South American source countries is bartered for heroin in Kenya. The cocaine is then exported to Europe, while the heroin in shipped to the US.
Domestic Programs. Kenya does not have a national public education program on narcotics, nor are there any drug rehabilitation centers in the country. UNDCP officials, working in conjunction with the GOK, are currently conducting research to determine the extent of drug abuse in the country. The UNDCP's findings are to be published in 1995, enabling the GOK to formulate a demand reduction strategy.
IV. US Policy Initiatives and Programs
Policy Initiatives. The USG encourages the GOK to interdict illicit drugs and is prepared to assist the government improve its capabilities to do so.
US Department of Defense officials met with Kenya's Attorney General, the head of the Criminal Investigation Department (CID), and the ANU director in April to discuss possible forms of US assistance for Kenya's antidrug efforts. The GOK submitted a request to DEA headquarters for training assistance. DOD representatives held further talks with the CID and ANU in October about assessment teams (PAT's) that may go to Kenya. A US Customs official met with ANU officers in December to arrange a two-week training seminar for Kenya's drug enforcement agencies in 1995.
The Road Ahead. The USG will assist the GOK in realizing the initiatives planned for 1995 by the new ANU Director. With the implementing legislation for the 1988 UN Convention in place, the USG will focus on law enforcement training and on developing information exchange mechanisms with the GOK.
Lebanon remained a major nexus for narcotics production and trafficking in 1994. Lebanese success in dramatically reducing the cultivation of both opium and cannabis in 1994 was offset by the continued processing of imported narcotics. Lebanese production facilities maintained pre-eradication levels of output. The Syrians have been cooperative in facilitating some advances in the Lebanese counternarcotics effort. However, no processing laboratories in Lebanon were dismantled, and the number of heroin and cocaine laboratories increased significantly during 1994. The volume of raw opium and cocaine flowing into Lebanon for processing and reexport offset the decreased volume of opium and cannabis cultivated in the Biqa' Valley.
In addition to significant successful eradication efforts, positive developments in Lebanon during 1994 include the lifting of immunity to permit prosecution of a legislator alleged to be corrupt, and the initiation of investigations of other public figures. There was also a marked increase in the number of small seizures and arrests reported in Lebanon, a major seizure of cocaine base in the port of Beirut was recorded, and a major importer of pharmaceuticals was also arrested on suspicion of diverting chemicals to illicit laboratories.
Although Lebanon has signalled its intent to accede, it is not yet a party to the 1988 UN Convention and has not met some of the goals and objectives of the Convention. Lebanon does not have a bilateral narcotics agreement with the United States.
II. Status of Country
The Bekaa Valley remains a center of international drug production and distribution. Shipments of illicit narcotics from the Bekaa Valley find their way to Europe and the United States.
Lebanese and Syrian scrutiny in and around the Bekaa Valley has contributed to significant decreases in the cultivation of drugs, but credible reports of the participation of Lebanese and Syrian officials in the drug trade persisted. A recent visit by the UNDCP senior legal advisor addressed Lebanon's need to focus on money laundering and precursor chemical legislation, and prosecutorial guidelines. The Lebanese have not reconciled bank secrecy laws with the need to develop safeguards against money laundering. There have been repeated high level statements that Lebanon will maintain its traditional banking secrecy laws.
III. Country Action Against Drugs in 1994
The joint Lebanese/Syrian eradication program initiated in 1992 attained its greatest success in 1994. USG agencies estimate that as a result of the 1994 eradication campaign less than 90 hectares of opium poppy were available for harvest with the potential to produce less than one metric ton of opium, an 80 percent decrease from 1993 totals. USG agencies also estimate that 1994 hashish cultivation dropped some 50 percent from 15,700 hectares in 1993 to 8,100 this year with a similar production decrease from 565 metric tons in 1993 to 275 tons in 1994.
It was recently reported that the GOL has tentatively agreed to accept the 1988 UN Convention on Narcotics. UNDCP officials are engaged in an extensive effort to establish sentencing guidelines for narcotics offenses and announced that the GOL has identified a prosecutor for these offenses. At present there is a draft law residing with the parliamentary committee for administration and judicial matters targeting money laundering in connection with narcotics violations. The recent assignment of a UNDCP official in Beirut further echoes the government's willingness to address illicit drug matters in the international arena.
Lebanon's coordinated efforts with the UNDCP crop substitution program have convinced some farmers to cultivate staple crops, but the amount of future remuneration for the substitution of crops will determine the continued success of the program.
Extradition. There were no known extraditions during 1994 as all narcotics offenses committed in Lebanon are prosecuted locally.
Law Enforcement Efforts. Cooperation between Lebanon and Syria resulted in a marked increase in the number of seizures during 1994. The numbers of arrests and seizures in 1994 rose from 250 in 1993 to approximately 1,100 in 1994. Although the majority of seizures were small, in November this cooperation, along with efforts with other governments and organizations, resulted in the seizure of 100 kg of cocaine aboard a Colombian vessel. Three individuals were arrested locally as a result of the seizure and the investigation continues. Lebanese authorities have begun to work closely with European narcotics officials and have made numerous visits to the Bekaa with their European counterparts.
Agreements and Treaties. Lebanon and the US have no existing agreements on narcotics or extradition. Lebanese authorities have stated that the Chamber of Ministers has adopted the 1988 Convention on Narcotics but there has been no official announcement.
Drug Flow/Transit. This year witnessed the first seizures at airports and seaports and the creation of a narcotics unit assigned to the ports and airport.
Domestic Programs. It is difficult to determine the extent of drug addiction in Lebanese society, but anecdotal and media-derived evidence suggest a significant, growing problem. At present the extent of the GOL anti-drug campaign is limited to education and posters in the schools.
IV. US Policy Initiatives and Programs.
Embassy and DEA officals continue to stress the necessity of interdicting shipments of narcotics base chemicals and precursor chemicals in visits with Lebanese narcotics authorities.
Bilateral Cooperation. The US and Lebanon do not have a bilateral narcotics agreement. DEA and embassy officials maintain close liaison with Lebanese counterparts and have worked in concert with them on numerous controlled deliveries in the region. Embassy and Lebanese counterparts have also worked closely together on matters of mutual concern involving transit of drugs to the United States. The GOL has repeatedly stressed its willingness to combat narcotics and to work closely with USG and third country narcotics efforts.
Road Ahead. The progress that the Government of Lebanon is making in counternarcotics through the steps being taken toward acceding to the 1988 Convention on Narcotics and the drafting of laws addressing money laundering schemes, constitute grounds for cautious optimism. The willingness of the Government of Lebanon to pursue the prosecution of a member of Parliament is another indicator of its increased seriousness in its counternarcotics efforts. The posting of a UNDCP official will assist the Lebanese authorities in crafting narcotics statutes consistent with international standards.
[CHART: LEBANON STATISTICAL TABLES]
Morocco is one of the world's largest producers of cannabis. Most Moroccan production is processed into hashish resin or oil, and exported to Europe, Tunisia, and Algeria for consumption or for re-export. Cannabis cultivation and sale is the economic base of a large portion of northern Morocco. Latin American cocaine and Asian heroin enter the country, both to service a small, but growing domestic market, and for transshipment to Europe; the drugs are trafficked through routes historically used for the cannabis trade. The Government of Morocco (GOM) devoted significant resources in 1994 to interdiction efforts, targeting small and medium-scale hashish traffickers. However, producers and large-scale traffickers operated with virtual impunity, due to GOM budgetary constraints, corruption, and nearly exclusive focus of the authorities on lower-level couriers.
Morocco is a signatory to the 1988 UN Convention. However, the Moroccan Parliament has not passed the implementing legislation proposed by the Ministry of Justice.
II. Status of Country
Estimates of the portion of the cannabis crop consumed domestically range from 15 to 40 percent. Moroccan officials and health care workers increasing cocaine and heroin addiction in urban areas, although there were only small seizures of these drugs in 1994. Drug money contributed to a construction boom throughout the country; as an increasing number of office and apartment buildings sit unoccupied, traffickers are seeking new investment opportunities.
III. Country Action Against Drugs in 1994
Policy Initiatives. In December, the Moroccan Minister of the Interior presented to international donors a white paper on combatting drugs which calls for the GOM to invest $100 million annually in agricultural infrastructure, social benefits, and crop substitution for the Rif region, Morocco's main cannabis cultivation area. The initiative also envisions a contribution from the European Union (EU) of more than $2 billion over a five-year period. However, the EU only acknowledges a commitment to provide $30 million for development programs in the Rif region over a two-year period.
Cultivation and Production. Moroccan officials estimate that 55,000-60,000 hectares were under cultivation in the Rif region in 1994, compared to the 50,000 hectare estimate given by the King in a 1993 speech. Vast new resources would be required to implement the crop substitution programs the GOM proposes to replace income lost through crop eradication.
Law Enforcement. The GOM claims 10,000 law enforcement personnel are now assigned to counternarcotics duty in northern Morocco, as opposed to the 3,000 person-force reported in 1993. While drug arrests increased to 8,256 in 1993 from 3,928 in 1987, this increase is more likely due to increased drug production, than improved law enforcement.
Arrest data for 1994 have not been released.
Moroccan law has not been amended to permit asset seizure or undercover operations involving the controlled delivery of illegal drugs. Cooperation between Moroccan and foreign law enforcement agencies in drug matters is limited to training and liaison. The GOM accomplished no drug-related extraditions, joint operations, or joint investigations during the year.
Agreements and Treaties. Morocco ratified a mutual legal assistance treaty with the US in 1993. Morocco and the US concluded a narcotics cooperation agreement in 1989. Morocco also has antinarcotics or mutual legal assistance agreements with the EU, France, Spain, Germany, Italy, Portugal, and the UK.
Corruption. There are credible reports that GOM officials, including high-level officials, have been involved in the drug trade. However, in 1994 only one mid-grade police official was sentenced to prison for drug trafficking. The GOM normally targets low-level traffickers, permitting major traffickers and corrupt officials to act with impunity.
Drug Flow/Transit. Cocaine from South America is transshipped across Morocco by air to Europe primarily by Latin American and West African couriers, or by sea from ports in Casablanca and Tangier. Some cocaine enters Morocco from Europe, as payment in kind for exported cannabis, and is sold domestically. Small amounts of heroin from Asia arrive in Morocco for transshipment to Europe and, to a lesser extent, for domestic distribution.
Demand Reduction. The GOM does not acknowledge a significant hard drug addiction problem in the country, nor does it promote a reduction in the domestic demand for cannabis.
IV. US Policy Initiatives.
The USG encourages Moroccan anti-narcotics efforts by cooperating with law enforcement officials to curtail the production and transshipment of drugs; providing training in law enforcement techniques; promoting GOM adherence to bilateral and international agreement requirements; providing support, as appropriate, for Moroccan-European drug control cooperation; and encouraging greater international cooperation to control Moroccan production and exportation of drugs.
Bilateral Cooperation. The US and Morocco maintain a dialogue on drug issues under their 1989 narcotics agreement. The USG provides training and narcotics intelligence where possible. The US also participates in the Dublin Group, both at the ministerial level and at the working-group level in Rabat.
The Road Ahead. The USG will monitor the narcotics situation in Morocco, cooperate with the GOM in its drug control efforts, support the Dublin Group process, and offer law enforcement training, intelligence, and other support where appropriate.
A major transit country for Asian heroin and Latin American cocaine destined for the international market, Nigeria is the focal point for most West African trafficking organizations. The government of Nigeria (GON) has not addressed adequately corruption among law enforcement agencies, thereby hindering counternarcotics efforts. The export of Nigerian drug trafficking to Liberia and other West Africa countries is of particular concern. The focus of the Nigerian Drug Law Enforcement Agency (NDLEA) remained almost exclusively on drug couriers, rather than on leaders of drug trafficking groups.
The GON did begin to show concern about international and domestic drug abuse during 1994. The GON prepared a draft national drug policy plan designed to curb trafficking and substance abuse. The GON formed a ministerial level task force on drug abuse which will develop a drug control strategy by mid-1995. In December, the GON appointed a special advisor on drugs, money laundering, and fraud whose task is to coordinate the antidrug efforts of the NDLEA, the police, and the customs agency. The GON returned to the United States three major heroin traffickers.
II. Status of Country.
Nigerian trafficking organizations control courier networks that move heroin from Asia to the US and Europe; they also run sophisticated money laundering operations. In response to increasingly vigorous international law enforcement, Nigerian drug organizations quickly adapt, find new means to evade detection, and alter and expand their heroin smuggling routes and markets. Traffickers import South American cocaine for reexport to the US and Europe and, to a lesser degree, for consumption in Nigeria. They also ship cannabis -- the only illicit drug grown in Nigeria -- to Europe and other countries in West Africa.
III. Country Action Against Drugs in 1994.
Policy Initiatives. Responding to USG extradition requests, the GON returned three major Nigerian traffickers to the US to face drug charges. The GON developed a national drug control policy to curb trafficking and substance abuse, but did not sign the plan into law; it was referred to an inter-ministerial task force on national drug control strategy created by Head of State Abacha to oversee and coordinate nationwide antidrug efforts. On December 27, the GON appointed a special advisor on drugs, money laundering, and advance fee fraud. The government did not introduce legislation providing for the seizure and forfeiture of narcotics traffickers' assets and took no enforcement actions in this area.
Accomplishments. The NDLEA and other law enforcement agencies conducted small drug raids and seizures, primarily at airports, seaports, and border checkpoints. The GON increased its cannabis seizures and arrests of minor drug offenders. The GON also engaged a team of American legal and drug enforcement experts to examine the money laundering statutes with a view to strengthening them. The NDLEA seized two air cargo shipments containing $2 million in gold believed to be drug trafficking proceeds, acting on USG-provided information. Although it failed to apprehend two major traffickers whose extradition the US has sought since 1992, the NDLEA arrested and turned over to US law enforcement authorities three other Nigerian drug dealers wanted in the US.
Law Enforcement Efforts. The effectiveness of Nigerian counter narcotics efforts remained inadequate. Operations were hindered by the lack of cooperation between the NDLEA, police, and customs. Rampant corruption in every law enforcement body continued unabated. The military general appointed in late 1993 to head the NDLEA pledged to rid the agency of corrupt officials and downsize it from its estimated staff of 2,000. The new administrator initially relieved as many as 350 NDLEA agents, but later hired an estimated 700 new agents. NDLEA screening and training procedures continued to be inadequate: some current and newly appointed agents have known drug ties. NDLEA cooperated only minimally with foreign missions. Although in late 1994 the NDLEA began to cooperate more closely with the USG, the narcotics task force created in 1993 to locate traffickers sought by the USG was inactive throughout the year. The NDLEA was unable or unwilling to use USG-provided assistance effectively, and the agency focused on apprehending couriers, rather than those controlling trafficking networks.
The authorities made no money laundering arrests or prosecutions. The GON took no steps to reduce cannabis production in the country.
Corruption. The GON replaced the discredited former leader of the NDLEA and expressed concerns about corruption in antinarcotics
agencies. However, it did not investigate or punish any senior official for alleged involvement in the drug trade. While encouraging narcotics trafficking and money laundering do not appear to be objectives of official government policy, there appears to be rampant corruption that facilitates trafficking and money laundering.
The GON did not foster or protect an independent judiciary for drug cases, nor encourage prosecution of money laundering cases. It permitted the circumvention and/or intimidation of honest officials who sought to fight drug trafficking. Drug suspects often were released without proper court authorization, and thefts of drug evidence prevented prosecution of drug cases or resulted in the release of drug suspects.
Agreements and Treaties. Nigeria is a party to the 1988 UN Convention, the 1961 UN Single Convention, and its 1972 Protocol, as well as the 1971 Convention on Psychotropic Substances. The 1931 US-UK extradition treaty, extended to include Nigeria in 1935, is the legal basis for USG extradition requests. The US and Nigeria signed a mutual legal assistance treaty in 1989, but it has not been ratified. The Nigerian government and Nigeria Airways signed an air carrier agreement with US Customs in 1993. The Nigerian government has not entered into an asset sharing agreement with the USG, or any other country.
Demand Reduction Programs. There has been a rise in domestic drug abuse in Nigeria, along with the growth of drug trafficking. The Nigerian government began to show some interest in the problem of increased domestic consumption in 1994. A credible demand reduction program should be established in 1995.
IV. US Policy Initiatives and Programs.
US Policy Initiatives. Reduction of trafficking in illicit drugs by Nigerian citizens, particularly of heroin destined to the US, is the goal of US policy. Its realization depends on the willingness of the GON to arrest or extradite major traffickers, and to enforce anti-conspiracy laws that will allow the prosecution of the drug barons behind the couriers. The USG has offered to assist the GON with training and information sharing. The GON must improve operational cooperation and make a realistic effort to stamp out corruption in Nigerian counternarcotics agencies.
Bilateral Cooperation. Cooperation between the US and Nigeria was far below USG expectations; Nigeria did not fulfill the conditions of its bilateral narcotics agreement with the US The USG will continue to seek the extradition of two major traffickers sought since 1992, as well as other drug offenders remaining at large. The US-Nigerian Joint Narcotics Task Force (JNTF), a cooperative effort between the NDLEA and the DEA, was inactive in 1994 and should be reactivated in 1995. The NDLEA did not make effective use of previously provided USG assistance.
Road Ahead. The USG will stress to the GON the importance the USG attaches to narcotics control. Specifically it will:
-- Press for the extradition of prominent traffickers and other Nigerians wanted in the US on drug charges;
-- Call for the investigation, arrest and prosecution of major traffickers, as opposed to confining efforts to apprehending to couriers;
-- Press for aggressive investigative and other enforcement efforts aimed at dismantling trafficking organizations;
-- Monitor the GON's willingness to share intelligence on the operations of trafficking organizations within Nigeria with the international community;
-- Advocate effective GON attacks on corruption and on the lack of coordination among its drug law enforcement agencies, especially the NDLEA;
-- Seek the enforcement and strengthening of money laundering and asset seizure and forfeiture laws through the development and effective enforcement of a money laundering bill based on the UNDCP model; and
-- Encourage the reform of banking regulations to increase the integrity of financial transactions.
[CHART: NIGERIA STATISTICAL TABLES]
[GRAPHIC: NIGERIA COCAINE SEIZURES 1988-1994]
Senegal an important transit point for heroin and cocaine, given its good air and sea connections to Europe and North America, as well as its worsening economic climate The suspension of direct commercial flights between Lagos and New York in 1993 increased the importance of Dakar as a direct transit point for Nigerians smuggling Asian heroin to the US Drug abuse is increasing among Senegalese youth. Senegal is a party to all the major international treaties dealing with drug production and trafficking, including the 1988 UN Convention. However, the Government of Senegal (GOS) is not in full compliance with the Convention because of inadequate resources, weak border controls, and as well as competing national priorities. The GOS has devoted little effort to controlling the production of cannabis. Law enforcement also is hampered by inefficient coordination among various GOS agencies.
II. Status of Country
However, Senegal has grown in importance as a transit point for drugs bound for the North American and European drug markets. Nigerian nationals lead the list of couriers arrested in Senegal. The suspension of the direct air link between Lagos and the US has made Dakar more attractive to Nigerian, with direct biweekly flights from Dakar to New York.
Senegal is not a major drug-producing country. The only drug crop cultivated is cannabis, sold mostly for local consumption. There is no evidence that Senegal is a major money laundering center.
III. Country Actions Against Drugs in 1994
Accomplishments. The Government of Senegal (GOS) made no significant progress in the effort to end the illicit cultivation and distribution of cannabis. Senegal does not have the resources to conduct an effective eradication program.
Law Enforcement Efforts. Authorities make most drug-related arrests as a result of search and seizures at Dakar Yoff airport. Although statistics for the 1994 are not yet available, there were 20-30 drug arrests annually in years past. There are continuing problems with coordinating among the various GOS agencies dealing with drug trafficking. The National Commission on Narcotics has not proven to be effective in coordinating drug enforcement activities.
Corruption. Although it is difficult to document, it is likely that corruption in the lower civil service levels plays a role in the illicit narcotics trade in Senegal.
Agreements and Treaties. Senegal is a party to all three major UN Conventions, including the 1988 Convention. Senegal has extradition treaties with Cape Verde, the Gambia, Guinea Bissau, Mali, Morocco, Tunisia and France. Senegal is a member of INTERPOL and relies heavily on drug information obtained through its channels.
Cultivation/production. Senegal's narcotics production is limited to cannabis, none of which is exported.
Drug Flow/Transit. Drug trafficking through Dakar appears to be rising, although its rate of growth is difficult to chart because the GOS publishes statistics on drug arrests and seizures infrequently.
Demand Reduction. During 1994, a local group associated with the Ministry of Interior formed the first Sub-Sahara Africa chapter of PRIDE which promotes a parent-teaching approach to drug education, and introduced the PRIDE methodology into local schools and youth groups. The group also has proposed opening a drug treatment center.
IV. US Policy Initiatives and Programs
US Policy Initiatives. The USG seeks to assist the GOS in curbing the transit of narcotics through Dakar.
Bilateral Cooperation and Accomplishments. In March, US Customs presented a drug course in Dakar for 24 students from the Senegalese police, Customs and Gendarmerie.
The Road Ahead. Although receptive to counternarcotics training and materials, it is unlikely in the current climate of economic decline that the GOS will increase its resources targeted against illicit narcotics. National priorities are dominated by other more pressing social and economic problems, despite the increase in local drug use.
Syria is an important transit point for narcotics flowing through the Middle East to Europe and, to a lesser extent, the US In addition, Syria has a responsibility for assisting Lebanese authorities to end drug production and trafficking through Lebanon because of the presence of some 30,000 Syrian troops in the Bekaa Valley of Lebanon. In 1994, Syria continued and expanded its cooperation with Lebanese authorities to eradicate opium poppy and cannabis cultivation in the Bekaa, significantly reducing opium and cannabis cultivation. Syrian forces increased seizures of cocaine, heroin, and hashish and raised the number of arrests of drug traffickers in Syria and Lebanon. Syrian military authorities in Lebanon assisted in a significant seizure of cocaine base delivered to Beirut's port. Despite these efforts, however, the flow of narcotics did not diminish in 1994.
The Syrian government has reiterated its willingness to pursue all information regarding the possible production of narcotics in Lebanon and Syria. Nevertheless, neither the Syrian nor the Lebanese authorities moved successfully against cocaine or heroin laboratories operating in either country. There were a significant number of arrests in Syria for drug-related offenses, but despite reports of individual Syrian military personnel profiting from the drug trade in Lebanon, the government initiated no corruption investigations nor brought charges against any Syrian security or military personnel during the year.
The USG does not provide Syria with bilateral assistance and does not support loans for Syria in multilateral institutions.
Syria is a party to the 1988 UN Convention. Syria does not have a bilateral narcotics agreement with the US.
II. Status of Country
There were continuing reports that Syrian military and security personnel personally profited from the drug trade in 1994. Syria remained a transit site for drugs processed within Lebanon or imported from third countries. Lebanese hashish transits Syria in route Egypt and the Gulf region. Syria did not collaborate sufficiently with the Lebanese to stop the transit of raw drugs base moving to cocaine and heroin production laboratories in Lebanon.
III. Country Actions Against Drugs in 1994
Policy Initiatives. There were no new policy initiatives, but the Syrian government continued to implement its stiff 1993 drug law. The Syrian antinarcotics police arrested over 1,500 suspects on drug charges, and sentences ranged from two to twenty years. There were also at least four ongoing cases in which the defendants faced the death penalty for trafficking.
The Syrian government hosted the 30th session of the UNDCP's Subcommission on Illicit Drug Traffic in the Near and Middle East in February 1994.
Accomplishments. Joint Syrian and Lebanese eradication efforts in the Bekaa Valley drastically reduced potential annual opium production to less than one mt. In addition, USG estimates indicate Syrian and Lebanese officials destroyed nearly 50 percent of the cannabis crop between 1993 and 1994.
Syrian and Lebanese authorities jailed and fined some farmers still engaged in illicit cultivation. Lebanese officials working with the UNDCP crop substitution program in Lebanon claimed that farmers might return to drug crops if the Syrian forces lessened their efforts against illicit cultivation. The UNDCP maintains a small program in Syria to train antinarcotics officials and enhance interdiction capabilities.
Extradition. There were no known instances of narcotics-related extradition from Syria. Syrians detained in Lebanon for drug-related offenses are turned over to Syrian military officials by the Lebanese for detention and prosecution in Syria.
Law Enforcement Efforts. While the reported number of seizures and the percentage of drug crops destroyed in Lebanon both rose in 1994, the Syrians and Lebanese did not make progress against cocaine and heroin laboratories operating in the Bekaa Valley and elsewhere in Lebanon and Syria. Syrian officials deny the existence of drug production facilities in Syria. Successful joint operations with the Lebanese netted a Bekaa Valley pharmaceuticals importer suspected of diverting chemicals needed to manufacture cocaine. In November, authorities seized 100 kgs of cocaine base in Beirut's port found aboard a Colombian ship.
Corruption. Credible reports of Syrian military protection for drug traffickers persisted in 1994, despite official claims to the contrary. The Syrian government asserted that there was no evidence on which to base the investigation of any Syrian military personnel for involvement in drug trafficking. Syria does not as a matter of government policy encourage the production or distribution of drugs.
Agreements and Treaties. Syria is a party to the 1988 UN Convention and the 1961 UN Single Convention on narcotics and its 1972 Protocol, as well as the 1971 Convention on Psychotropic Substances. Syria maintains antinarcotics trafficking agreements with Germany, Iran, Jordan, Lebanon, the Netherlands, Cyprus, Saudi Arabia, and Turkey. Syria and the US do not have a narcotics agreement, nor is there an extradition treaty between the two countries. Syria is a member of Interpol.
Drug Flow/Transit. Raw materials for the production of heroin and cocaine are reported to transit Syria on their way from Turkey to Lebanon for processing. Syrian authorities maintained that no such transit occurs, but promised to follow up on the reports. The Government of Syria believes raw opium may enter Lebanon by sea directly through Lebanese ports. Cocaine does not appear to transit Syria to the same degree as opium; Syrian authorities said they seized only 2 kgs of cocaine during the first six months of 1994. Overland routes through Syria provide a means for smuggling Capaton (fenethyline) to Saudi Arabia and other countries in the Middle East.
The quantities of narcotics seized by Syrian authorities failed to reflect the full scope of the smuggling, transit, and distribution of drugs and precursor chemicals in and through Syria and Lebanon. The magnitude of the transit problem is illustrated by Turkey's seizure in December of a 16.5 mt shipment of acetic anhydride aboard a Honduran vessel coming from Lebanon.
Domestic Programs. Continuing publicity about the new drug law is considered to have been sufficient to discourage demand for drugs, and there are no additional programs being designed to reduce demand. There is anecdotal evidence of increased drug use among well-to-do young people, but social stigma and strong family traditions combine with strict laws to limit drug abuse. The government maintains two short-term treatment centers, and is planning a third. Private doctors also provide treatment, although there does not appear to be any coordination between private and public centers.
Law Enforcement and Transit Cooperation. In addition to cooperation with Lebanon, the Syrians also engaged in "controlled deliveries" with Jordan and Lebanon of 2,050 kgs of hashish moving from Lebanon through Syria into Jordan, presumably destined for the Gulf region.
IV. US Policy Initiatives and Programs
Policy Initiatives. The USG stresses to the Syrian government the need to continue its efforts to end drug crop cultivation in those areas of Lebanon in which it maintains a presence; of expanding its joint efforts with the Lebanese to dismantle drug laboratories and interdict shipments of narcotic base materials and precursor chemicals; and of ending any involvement, active or passive, of individual Syrian officials in the drug trade.
Bilateral Cooperation. The US and Syria do not have a bilateral narcotics agreement. However, DEA officials based in Nicosia and US Embassy officials in Damascus maintain liaison with the Syrian National Police antinarcotics unit. In addition, US officials periodically shares their views and recommendations with the Ministers of Foreign Affairs and Interior. The Syrian government exchanged information concerning ongoing investigations to interdict narcotics coming from Lebanon.
The Road Ahead. The USG will encourage high-ranking officials of the Syrian government to close drug processing facilities in areas of Lebanon where Syrian forces are present, and to end the involvement of Syrian officials in all facets of drug trafficking. It also will encourage the Syrian government to sustain the positive efforts on eradication it has made to date, and to expand its collaboration with the Lebanese government to attack drug production and transit in the region.
[CHART: SYRIA STATISTICAL TABLES]
Tunisia's role as a drug transshipment point is limited, and the government works closely with neighboring states and with international bodies to interdict shipments. Tunisia has only a minor domestic demand problem. The use of drugs such as heroin and cocaine is virtually non-existent, but there is some cannabis cultivated and consumed in rural areas. The Government of Tunisia (GOT) is concerned about the abuse of prescription drugs, and has an active antidrug education program with a special focus on youth. There is no counternarcotics agreement between the US and Tunisia. Tunisia was an early ratifier of the 1988 UN Convention, and the GOT makes a sincere effort to comply with its provisions.
II. Status of the Country
There is some scattered production of cannabis in northern Tunisia, but it rarely enters commercial channels. Consumers generally are older farmers; the use of cannabis and cannabis resin was legal in pre-independence Tunisia.
III. Country Action Against Drugs in 1994
The most visible government effort was its active antidrug education program, focusing on youth. The government also sought to curb the abuse of prescription drugs by Tunisia's growing middle class.
Tunisia has an active narcotics interdiction effort. The Police, National Guard, and Customs Service have drug enforcement units. Tunisia has tough security/anti-terrorist procedures which include thorough customs checks and arbitrary vehicle and pedestrian inspections. However, such efforts are hindered by Tunisia's relatively long borders, lack of personnel and equipment, and its interest in attracting foreign tourists. No government officials were implicated in drug-related corruption during 1994.
IV. US Policy Initiatives and Programs.
The USG supports Tunisian efforts to comply fully with the 1988 UN Convention, and seeks Tunisian support for US international antinarcotics initiatives. There is no US-Tunisia bilateral narcotics agreement, but the USG in the past provided narcotics-related training assistance in maritime security for Tunisian customs officials. The USG will use all appropriate means to enhance Tunisian capabilities in its narcotics control efforts.
OTHER AFRICA AND MIDDLE EAST
ALGERIA. Algeria faces relatively modest problems of drug consumption and trafficking, although domestic consumption and the transit trade in cannabis and pharmaceuticals appeared to be increasing until the border with Morocco was closed in September. Cannabis appears to be the only narcotic cultivated or produced in Algeria, and is grown for the domestic market. The Algerian government estimates that 95 percent of the narcotics brought into Algeria, primarily hashish from Morocco, are reexported to Europe or the Middle East.
Narcotics-related corruption does not appear to be a problem in Algeria; competing priorities are the major obstacles to effective law enforcement. Algeria has signed the 1988 UN Convention and attempts to meet its goals and objectives, but it is hamppered by a lack of resources and political unrest.
Algeria averages more than 2,500 seizures annually. The majority take place in the Western regions of the country near the Moroccan border and involve hashish or cannabis from Morocco. In April, customs in Oran seized 132 kgs of hashish destined for Europe; in June, police intercepted 80 kgs arriving from Morocco. Algerian government demand reduction effortd focussed on encouraging youth associations to work in poorer neighborhoods to discourage drug consumption.
Algeria is a member of the Customs Cooperation Council, in which European and Maghreb countries exchange information on drug trafficking. Authorities cooperate with enforcement officials in other countries on narcotics-related issues; Algerian police also cooperate closely with Interpol.
BENIN. Benin is not a significant narcotics producer or consumer country, but there has been a growing trafficking problem. Because of Benin's rather porous land and sea borders with Nigeria, Nigerian traffickers smuggle heroin from Asia and cocaine from South America through Benin, destined for US and European markets. Given Benin's dismally low GNP, it is not difficult to find willing candidates to assist with facilitating the transit of drugs. Benin is not a party to the 1988 UN Convention, although it is a party to the 1961 Single Convention, the 1971 Protocol and the 1971 Convention.
The Government of Benin's (GOB) anti-narcotics programs are somewhat diluted because Benin's legal basis for prosecuting drug offenses rests on an obsolete 1976 law which in effect reduces drug trafficking to a misdemeanor status. The major consequence of this anomaly is that little incentive is provided for Beninese prosecutors to pursue narcotics cases. Notwithstanding these deficiencies, the GOB has shown a marked increase in its concern for narcotics transshipments and has worked closely with the US and other countries to interdict the traffickers and seize the contraband. There were no instances of drug-related public corruption reported by the GOB in 1994. An eight-day seminar on overseas enforcement training, conducted by the US Customs Service, is scheduled to be held in Cotonou in April, 1995. During 1994 the USG provided two patrol boats for the small Beninese navy to assist its efforts to interdict traffickers.
BOTSWANA. Botswana is a transit country primarily for Mandrax (methaqualone) shipped through east and central Africa from India, and destined for South Africa. Botswana is not a major producer or consumer of illegal drugs. There is some local production and use of marijuana, and Mandrax is consumed in limited quantities. Botswana is an active participant in regional and international efforts to combat drug smuggling, although its efforts are limited by the size of its sixty-person narcotics squad. There does not appear to be corruption problem among counternarcotics enforcement agencies. Botswana is not a signatory to the 1988 UN Convention, although it is a party to the 1961 Single Convention, its 1972 Protocol, as well as the 1971 Convention on Psychotropic Substances.
CAMEROON. Cameroon is not a significant narcotics producing or consuming country, but there has been an increase in Asian heroin smuggled to Nigeria via Cameroon. The increase in drug trafficking activity in 1994 also reflected worsening economic conditions, the devaluation of the CFA, and a stronger effort by traffickers in neighboring Nigeria to take advantage of relatively weak controls at Cameroon's border posts and airports.
Cameroon is a party to the 1988 UN Convention, and to the other major UN Conventions, but has addressed only some of the Conventions' objectives; it has met those with limited success. Most of the government's counternarcotics resources are devoted to airport interdiction and to roadblocks, and seizures during 1994 increased significantly. The Government of Cameroon did not report any instances of drug-related corruption on the part of public officials in 1994.
The USG withheld narcotics assistance in 1992 as part of the overall suspension of assistance because of Cameroon's inadequate record in democratization, human rights, and economic reform. The narcotics aid was not released in 1993 or in 1994 because of the unwillingness of the police to furnish drug data to the USG. However, during 1994 some senior police officials indicated a greater willingness to cooperate with the USG on counternarcotic efforts.
CAPE VERDE. Cape Verde is not a significant narcotics producer or consumer country, but it is a transit route for narcotics, particularly cocaine, shipped by sea and air from Asia and South America to Europe and North America. The Government of Cape Verde (GOCV) showed greater concern over narcotics during 1994, and undertook some concrete actions. To improve its ability to patrol its territorial waters, it signed an agreement with Mauritania for the use of a 100-foot ocean-going naval vessels. The GOCV also launched a National Coordinating Commission to Combat Drugs, which is to develop a two-track approach to narcotics control by improving law enforcement and establishing rehabilitation programs. The GOCV sent its Director of Judicial Policy to the Naples Conference on Organized Transnational Crime. Corruption of public officials is not a problem. Although it is a party to the 1961 UN Single Convention, its 1972 Protocol, and the 1971 UN Convention on Psychotropic Substances, Cape Verde is not a party to the 1988 UN Convention, nor is there any bilateral agreement regarding narcotics between the US and Cape Verde.
JORDAN. Illegal transit of narcotics is still a small problem in Jordan, although there is some trafficking of drugs from Lebanon to Egypt and Saudi Arabia. However, authorities are concerned that the opening of new border crossing points with Israel could increase the country's attractiveness to international trafficking organizations. Jordan has comparatively few problems with drug use; cultural norms limit the use of drugs primarily to hashish. There are no major problems of narcotics cultivation, money laundering, or precursor chemical diversion. Jordan cooperates with its neighbors on the illegal transit of drugs.
The GOJ is committed to combatting increasing domestic consumption. Programs for rehabilitation and drug education also expanded, and a hospital for the treatment of drug-related problems was opened.
Jordanian authorities maintain liaison with the USG and several other governments on international narcotics matters. Jordanian police and security services have excellent professional relationships with Interpol and appropriate USG law enforcement agencies. The government's budgetary and personnel constraints limit efforts to enhance counternarcotics performance.
The US and Jordan currently are negotiating an extradition treaty. It is expected that cooperation with the United States will be maintained, and that the GOJ will continue to rigorously enforce its strong anti-narcotics measures and asset seizure laws.
Corruption does not appear to be a problem. Jordan has signed the 1988 UN Convention and is working to comply with its goals and objectives.
LESOTHO. Lesotho is neither a significant producer nor a major consumer of illegal drugs. Cannabis is cultivated as a cash crop; it is exported to South Africa or consumed locally. Lesotho is a transit route for smugglers moving Mandrax from India to South Africa, but the extent of this traffic is unknown. Lesotho's tiny Drugs and Diamond Smuggling Unit cooperates with the South African police in interdiction, but is ill-equipped to undertake major actions on its own. An officer from the unit attended a DEA-sponsored regional workshop in Harare, Zimbabwe, in 1994. The Government of Lesotho reported no instances of drug-related public corruption in 1994. Lesotho is not a party to the 1988 UN Convention, although it is a party to the 1961 Single Convention, its 1972 Protocol, and the 1971 UN Convention on Psychotropic Substances.
MAURITIUS. The principal narcotics problem for Mauritius continues to be trafficking of heroin brought into the country from Bombay by couriers via commercial airlines. The volume suggests that a significant part of the shipments is for onward shipment but there is no hard evidence yet developed to confirm this. Good air and sea connections to Europe and South Africa, the establishment of a free port, a growing offshore banking industry, and the large cash-turnover of its successful tourist industry all indicate that Mauritius may develop into a major narcotics transshipment point and money laundering center.
During 1994, narcotics-related problems made headlines with increasing regularity, leading to the establishment of a Parliamentary committee to address the issue of drugs in Mauritius and the adoption of a constitutional amendment which improves law enforcement officials' ability to pursue drug traffickers. The GOM also recognized that it needed to extend its fight against drugs beyond its borders and assigned police officers to Bombay and Singapore where they worked effectively and have assisted with several arrests. Internally, in August 1994 the Prime Minister appointed a new Commissioner of Police who instituted a system designed to get all police units involved in the fight against drugs and to improve information sharing with the GOM. The GOM reported no instances of drug-related corruption by public officials in 1994. Mauritius has signed but not ratified the 1988 UN Convention. It is a party to the 1961 Single Convention and the 1971 Convention, and increasingly is pursuing bilateral agreements to combat narcotics. USG goals are to assist Mauritius in limiting its very real potential for growth in narcotics transshipment and money laundering.
MOZAMBIQUE. Mozambique is not a significant drug producer or exporter, nor is it a important center for money laundering. Concern is growing, however, about the increasing use of Mozambique as a transit point for mandrax (which is a legal substance in Mozambique), South American cocaine, and heroin from Asia. Local interdiction efforts are extremely weak due to an undermanned counternarcotics unit. Marijuana use is common among rural Mozambicans and is often cultivated for traditional medicinal purposes and not for exportation.
Mozambique is not a party to the 1988 UN Convention or any of the other UN Conventions on narcotics. There are currently no bilateral agreements between the USG and the GOM on narcotics matters. Mozambique, one of the world's most aid-dependent economies, is receiving no foreign financial assistance in counternarcotics. Drug-related public corruption appears not to be a problem and no instances were reported by the GOM in 1994.
NAMIBIA. Namibia is neither a producer nor consumer of illicit narcotics, but its role as a transit point for Mandrax (European trade name for methaqualone combined with an antihistamine) from India destined for South Africa and South American cocaine, smuggled via Angola to South Africa and Europe, is growing. In 1992 the Government of Namibia (GON) created the Drug Enforcement Bureau as part of the police department. This Bureau has grown from 15 to 70 members in the past two years. Nevertheless, counternarcotics measures are, at best, barely adequate for the job, and more equipment, training, and personnel are needed, particularly in the field of interdiction and seizure. To this end, in 1994 DEA provided drug enforcement training to Namibian counterparts. There has been no report of any drug-related corruption of public officials. Namibia is not a party to the 1988 UN Convention, but it will adhere to many of the Convention's goals and objectives if, as anticipated, it promulgates in 1995 the Drug and Drug Trafficking Act. One of the USG's goals will be to have Namibia become a party to the Convention in 1995 as well.
NIGER. Niger is neither a significant producer nor a consumer of illicit drugs, nor is it considered an important transit point. The Government of Niger (GON) has no bilateral counternarcotics treaties or agreements with the US, although it does have several agreements with France and Nigeria. There is no evidence that GON officials are involved in drug-related corrupt activities. Niger is a party to all the major UN narcotics Conventions, including the 1988 Convention.
The GON appears to be willing to do what is necessary to prevent drugs from becoming a problem for Niger. New legislation will be brought before the 1995 National Assembly and is expected to pass easily, which would largely bring Niger into conformity with the 1988 UN Convention. Niger is on schedule in its efforts to complete the goals of its 1993 Five-Year Plan on counter-narcotics. These goals are increasing attention to domestic demand reduction, improving training and research facilities, creating regional commissions to better coordinate counternarcotics law enforcement, and developing the National Center for the Repression of Illicit Drug Trafficking.
In 1994, the USG donated a computer with appropriate software to be used by the GON to track data and generate reports. Given Niger's relatively modest problems with illicit drugs, the GON's efforts in this field are not given top priority. US goals will continue to focus on border control issues.
SEYCHELLES. The Republic of Seychelles is neither a producer nor a major consumer of illicit drugs, and its involvement in drug transshipment appears to be quite minimal. Given its size, isolation, and strong governmental internal control, it is unlikely that it will become a major player in the world of narcotics will develop. The Republic of Seychelles is a party to the 1988 UN Convention, as well as the 1961 Single Convention and its 1972 Protocol, and the 1971 Convention.
The Government of Seychelles' (GOS) police department and its modest coast guard facilities are, along with other functions, charged with providing law enforcement to counter drug trafficking . However, neither agency has a defined, strong, and dedicated role to play in counter-narcotics activities, so combatting drugs is a distant, secondary responsibility. In 1994 the US Coast Guard Mobile Training Team (MTT) provided some training on seizure and interdiction techniques.
In 1994, the USG funded the attendance of a Seychelles police officer to a DEA-sponsored regional conference and also funded a small education program on anti-drug and alcohol abuse. There were no instances of drug-related public corruption reported by the GOS in 1994. USG goals are focused primarily on improving GOS' law enforcement techniques.
SIERRA LEONE. Sierra Leone's civil unrest, combined with the deterioration of law enforcement capability, resulted in 1994 in an increased number of transshipments of heroin from Asia and cocaine from South America destined to Europe and North America. Little effort is being paid by the Government of Sierra Leone (GOSL) to counternarcotics measures during this difficult period for the country. While there are some demand reduction programs, there has been no detectable diminishment of the indigenous cannabis production, the overwhelming majority of which is consumed locally. Sierra Leone ratified the 1988 UN Convention in June 1994, but no effort has been made to implement the Convention. Also in 1994, Sierre Leone became a party to the 1961 UN Single Convention on Narcotic Drugs and the 1971 Convention.
Drug-related corruption of public officials, particularly along Sierra Leone's borders, is relatively commonplace, and the GOSL has made no genuine effort to root it out and prosecute. There is no USG program of assistance to the GOSL and, until domestic difficulties are resolved, there is little likelihood that any assistance will be forthcoming.
SUDAN. Sudan is neither a significant producer nor consumer of illicit drugs, but it is becoming increasingly important as a transshipment point in the international drug trade. Sudan's strategic location at the crossroads of Africa, along with its 500 km of largely unpatrolled coast on the Red Sea, offers easy entry and exit for drug shipments. Domestic drug use is not well-documented, but it is estimated that between one and five percent of the population is uses drugs. While cannabis is considered a drug of the poorer population, Asian heroin, South American cocaine, and synthetic drugs are used by the wealthier populace, or by students who have travelled abroad.
The Government of Sudan (GOS) made important progress in combatting illicit drug cultivation, in prosecuting drug users and dealers, and in treating addicts. In 1994, the government enacted a new law on narcotics and psychotropic substances, replacing Sudan's 1924 law. Under this law, the government strengthened penalties, included synthetic drugs, and established its first drug treatment clinic. The primary agency for narcotics control is the Drug Combat Administration (DCA). Its staff expanded in 1994, but its total budget decreased in dollar terms due to the devaluation of the Sudanese pound. The GOS reported no instances of drug-related corruption on the part of government officials in 1994.
The DCA, in conjunction with the Ministries of Education and Health, stepped up its demand reduction programs. These included antidrug campaigns on television, radio, and in secondary schools and universities. Treatment at the DCA's small drug rehabilitation center is free and patients are exempt from criminal prosecution.
Sudan signed the 1988 UN Convention in 1989, but has not ratified it. Sudan is a party to the 1961 UN Single Convention and in 1994 became a party to the 1972 Protocol thereto. It also is a party to the 1971 Convention.
SWAZILAND. Swaziland is not an important producer or consumer of illegal drugs. Local production is limited to cannabis, a small portion of which is smuggled across borders to neighboring countries. Swaziland does, however, serve as a transit point for Mandrax from India to South Africa and heroin from Asia to Europe. Swaziland's law enforcement efforts are hampered by a lack of proper equipment and poor training of its 15-person narcotics unit. The Government of Swaziland (GOS) recognizes that drug-related corruption of its officials exists, but the problem is not extensive. Swaziland is not a signatory to the 1988 UN Convention, nor are there any drug-related bilateral agreements with the US.
TOGO. Given its proximity to Nigeria and largely ineffective border controls, Togo is a transit point for narcotics shipments, particularly Asian heroin, from Nigeria to the US and Europe. Drug shipments are likely to increase as a result of the opening in 1994 of the Togo-Ghana border. Cannabis, grown in small amounts, is Togo's only drug crop and it is not exported. Due to civil disturbances and diminishing resources, counternarcotics efforts by the Government of Togo (GOT) received a low priority in 1994. Togo is a party to the 1961 UN Single Convention on Narcotic Drugs, its 1972 Protocol, and the 1971 Convention on Psychotropic Substances. Togo also is a party to the 1988 UN Convention, but is not yet in full compliance. Hopefully, efforts toward this end will be made once the civil unrest is quelled. There are no drug-related bilateral agreements between Togo and the US The GOT reported no instances of drug-related corruption of public officials during 1994. The USG will assist the GOT by providing a limited amount of equipment for drug interdiction and by helping the GOI improve the quantity and quality of narcotics intelligence.
UGANDA. Uganda is neither a significant producer nor transit point for illicit drugs. As its trade and tourism expand it is expected that Uganda's role as a transshipment point will grow in importance. In 1994 Uganda drafted new narcotics legislation to replace its outdated laws. The draft legislation was sent to the UNDCP for review to align it with international standards. With financial assistance from the UNDCP, Uganda is completing a two-year project to train police, customs and immigration officers. Uganda is a party to all the major UN narcotics treaties, including the 1988 UN Convention, but has no narcotics or extradition bilateral treaties.
Uganda's anti-narcotics efforts are severely limited by lack of funding, personnel and training. Although the Ugandan Government (GOU) increased security measures at all airports, the police have not yet placed trained anti-narcotics personnel at all land border crossing points. Uganda has no legislation against money laundering nor any provisions for seizure of assets or extradition in criminal narcotics cases. The GOU has not reported any instances of drug-related corruption by public officials in 1994.
The GOU began a public awareness campaign to increase reporting of illegal cultivation and to decrease local usage of marijuana. However, funding shortages preclude the implementation of any effective narcotics awareness program in the near future. USG goals focus primarily on encouraging Uganda's counternarcotics efforts and in 1994 the USG funded a DEA-sponsored training program for Ugandan anti-narcotics enforcement officers.
ZAMBIA. Zambia is a transit point for illicit narcotics shipments, principally Mandrax (methaqualone), from the Asian subcontinent to South Africa. Transshipment of Southwest Asian heroin and South American cocaine, although still minor, is growing. With direct and indirect air routes to and from South America, Asia, and Europe, Zambia is strategically situated along established and developing narcotics trafficking routes. Heroin and cocaine trafficking are of increasing concern to Zambian narcotics officials. West African heroin traffickers use Zambian documentation and couriers to ferry drugs to Europe and North America. Cannabis is the only drug cultivated in Zambia. Money laundering by regional traffickers, made easier by economic liberalization, is increasing as well.
Narcotics-related corruption is a problem within the Customs and Immigration services, and the police force. During 1993 there were persistent credible reports of drug trafficking by high-level government officials. Following strong intervention by the donor community, Zambian officials began to take steps to deal with the problem as the year ended.
A strengthened narcotics law entered into force in 1993. The new law provides for harsher penalties and streamlines forfeiture procedures. Zambia ratified the 1988 UN Convention in 1993, but failed to meet many of its goal and objectives.
ZIMBABWE. Zimbabwe is transit point for illicit narcotics shipments, particularly for Mandrax from India in route to South Africa. Aside from small amounts of cannabis, which are domestically consumed, no illicit drugs are produced in Zimbabwe. Demand reduction programs, therefore, are modest. There is no concrete evidence of drug-related corruption among members of the Zimbabwe Republic Police (ZRP), although there are reports that there is widespread corruption among customs officials staffing Zimbabwe's land borders.
The ZRP has a small and dedicated narcotics control force; however, it would benefit from further training. Several high-ranking officers attended a DEA-sponsored management course in the US, which included observation of drug interdiction operations on the US-Mexico border and at Denver's Stapleton Airport. The USG also funded the training of drug detector dogs for use at Harare's airport. The Government of Zimbabwe wants to improve its counternarcotics capabilities across the board and will participate in as many international training programs as possible. Zimbabwe became a party to the 1988 UN Convention in 1993; it also is a party to the 1971 UN Convention on Psychotropic Substances.
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