Index of "International Narcotics Control Strategy Reports"
Index of "Treaties and Legal Information" ||
Electronic Research Collections Index ||
U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE
INTERNATIONAL NARCOTICS CONTROL STRATEGY REPORT
BUREAU FOR INTERNATIONAL NARCOTICS AND LAW ENFORCEMENT AFFAIRS
SOUTHWEST ASIA 203
Sri Lanka 235
USG estimates indicate that opium poppy cultivation increased in Afghanistan for the fifth consecutive year to an estimated 29,180 ha, second to Burma in poppy cultivation. USG analysts attribute the increase to expanded cultivation in the southern growing areas. Production levels showed a 39-percent increase from 685 mt of opium in 1993 to an estimated 950 mt in 1994; if refined, this would yield approximately 95 mt of heroin. DEA's signature program for 1993 indicated that approximately nine percent of the heroin found in U.S. originated in Southwest Asia.
Afghanistan is a party to the 1988 UN Convention, but its lack of an effective central government hindered both domestic and international efforts to curb poppy cultivation, opium production, and drug trafficking. There is no clear evidence of high-level political support for drug production in Afghanistan; however, it is essentially a lawless country with a well-armed civilian population. Autonomous local commanders and warlords have permitted poppy cultivation and trafficking to expand unchecked. The poorly controlled borders of Afghanistan, Pakistan, the states of the former Soviet Union, and Iran offer practically unlimited opportunities for undetected trafficking. The Government of Afghanistan (GOA) recently inquired about possible counternarcotics training opportunities in the U.S. for law enforcement officers.
The USG seeks to develop an antinarcotics alternative for Afghanistan. DEA is preparing to conduct basic narcotics training of Jalalabad's police force in Nangarhar province. U.S. initiatives have been modest because of the lack of central authority and the inability to monitor implementation. The USG funded a modest ($100,000) crop alternatives project run by an American voluntary agency in the Helmand Valley; it also contributed to UNDCP projects in Afghanistan. Work was completed on a 1992 project in Kandahar, which provided agricultural and infrastructure assistance.
II. Status of Country
The Iran/Pakistan/Afghanistan border regions comprise one of the main narcotics trafficking areas in the world.
With 10 of its 30 provinces under opium poppy cultivation, Afghanistan is second only to Burma in poppy production, according to USG survey data. The UNDCP believes Afghanistan may have actually surpassed Burma as the leading producer, but the USG does not agree with this conclusion. In 1994, Helmand province overtook Nangarhar in opium poppy hectarage under cultivation. The combination of returning refugees, displaced persons, continued poor economic conditions, and increasing market demand for narcotics, contributed to the sharp rise in poppy cultivation. Refugee relief organizations estimate there are 750,000 displaced persons throughout the country.
A UNDCP report suggests that, following several Pakistani law enforcement successes, some laboratories moved to Afghanistan from Baluchistan (Pakistan) in 1993. There have been no subsequent reports to confirm the return of the labs to Pakistan. Raw opium is still transported to Khyber Agency (Pakistan), primarily for crude processing to brown heroin (heroin base) and distribution to regional addict markets from India to Iran, and for onward transport abroad.
Drug traffickers employ highly organized networks which extend from laboratories in Nimroz and Helmand to laboratories and markets in Europe. Seizures in Baluchistan and in Iran confirm that narcotics, primarily morphine base and opium, are trafficked from Afghanistan through Iran and Pakistan to illicit laboratories in Turkey for refining and export. There is no indication that laboratories in Afghanistan have as yet enhanced their ability to produce substantial quantities of white heroin, but they do produce brown heroin and morphine base. There is increasing international concern about Afghan trafficking of opiates into and through the states of the former Soviet union.
III. Country Actions Against Drugs in 1994
Policy Initiatives. It has been difficult to undertake initiatives in the absence of an effective national government in Afghanistan. Continued instability and factional fighting precluded effective application of the National Drug Strategy document created in 1993 by an interagency High Commission. While some local authorities publicly denounce opium cultivation, they have undertaken few concrete counternarcotics measures. The 1993-94 anti-opium campaign by Haji Qadir, governor of Nangarhar province, bore little fruit since it was limited to areas close to main roads. According to USG statistics, poppy cultivation in the province showed only an eight-percent reduction from 1993.
Accomplishments. The expansion of opium poppy areas under cultivation suggest that crop eradication and crop substitution projects did not have a major impact in 1994. Haji Qadir began in December a new eradication campaign against the 1994-95 Nangarhar poppy crop. Results will not be confirmed for months, but UNDP, UNDCP and other observers believe he is making a serious effort. Voluntary agencies operating in parts of Afghanistan report limited success in small, ongoing crop substitution and development projects.
Law Enforcement Efforts. The rule of law does not prevail in Afghanistan. In the absence of a viable central government, there is no national police force and no national drug control body. Most regional commanders do not appear to be very interested in enforcing national narcotics laws. Consequently, there are no discernible efforts to identify, prosecute, or punish narcotics traffickers. Some smugglers reportedly were arrested in Herat. The governor of Nangarhar did request narcotics training for the Jalalabad police.
Corruption. Most Afghan factions publicly condemn the illicit cultivation of narcotic substances. However, there are continuing reports alleging the direct involvement of some leaders, particularly smaller independent "commanders," in narcotics production and trafficking, as well as the indirect involvement of others who are paid to provide security to the narcotics trade.
Cultivation and Production. According to USG satellite imagery, opium poppy cultivation increased by 38 percent over 1993 levels to 29,180 ha. The provinces of Helmand, Nangarhar, Oruzgan, and Kandahar account for approximately 98 percent of total opium poppy production in Afghanistan. Opium poppy cultivation in Nangarhar fell by 8 percent, continuing a decline that began in 1990. This was offset by a 308-percent increase in Helmand from 4,070 hectares in 1993, to 12,529 hectares in 1994.
Despite the decreases, Nangarhar and Helmand produced the largest share of poppy cultivated in Afghanistan (77 percent). Kandahar's cultivation increased 283 percent to 2,666 ha, and Oruzgan increased cultivation 238 percent to 3,293 ha. Three provinces (Jowzjan, Lowgar, and Parvan) that cultivated an estimated 615 hectares in 1993, had no cultivation in 1994, suggesting that some eradication took place.
Much Afghan opium poppy is processed in labs located in the Khyber Agency of Pakistan and in Helmand. Little information is available regarding internal Afghan drug demand. However, neighboring Pakistan's internal drug abuse problem has made it a net importer of opium, and a major market for Afghan heroin.
Agreements and Treaties. Afghanistan is a party to the 1961 UN Single Convention on Narcotic Drugs, but not its 1972 Protocol. It is also a party to the 1971 UN Convention on Psychotropic Substances, and the 1988 UN Convention.
IV. U.S. Policy Initiatives and Programs
Policy Initiatives. Bilateral cooperation in narcotics control is difficult because of the continued fragmentation of power in Afghanistan. USG development assistance to Afghanistan through the USAID Mission for Pakistan and Afghanistan terminated in June. Sharp limits to the GOA's ability to exercise authority anywhere outside Kabul prevent any significant initiatives at the national level.
Basic USG counternarcotics goals and objectives for Afghanistan remain to:
-- Encourage the eradication of opium cultivation throughout the country;
-- Encourage law enforcement actions against major producers and traffickers; seek opportunities for narcotics control cooperation with regional and local leaders;
-- Promote closer cooperation between Afghanistan and Pakistan on border interdiction;
-- Encourage donor nations, particularly European, to enter into cooperative narcotics agreements with Afghanistan, or its regional leaders;
-- Help Afghan authorities evaluate the extent of the narcotics problem, develop counternarcotics programs, and begin compliance with the 1988 UN Convention;
-- Encourage voluntary agencies to expand alternative development projects in Helmand, Nangarhar, and Kandahar provinces;
-- Encourage UNDCP to increase its activities in Afghanistan;
-- Support DEA efforts to provide basic law enforcement training to Afghan police;
-- Impress upon Dublin group states the importance of opium poppy conditions in Afghan assistance programs.
USG-sponsored agriculture and infrastructure projects in Kandahar province were completed. Work has not been inspected because security considerations preclude road travel to project sites.
During 1994, the USG made a $100,000 grant to the Mercy Corps voluntary agency for a small agricultural development project in the Helmand region where Mercy Corps manages crop substitution and development projects. The USG did not earmark any of its UNDCP contributions for 1994 for Afghanistan, but UNDCP has funds remaining from the $450,000 contributed in 1993 for alternative development/opium reduction programs in Helmand.
The Road Ahead. Despite the continuing instability in Afghanistan, the scale of opium poppy cultivation requires attention. The Nangarhar Shura (governing council) recently announced crop eradication measures that it claims could eliminate 70-80 percent of this year's crop in selected districts. This initiative is new; the progress of the campaign and the results can not yet be fully evaluated. Longer term projects include consideration of bilateral funding to assist Afghanistan to build effective institutions. Possible programs include training, equipment procurement and technical assistance, such as DEA training for the Jalalabad police. The USG will encourage donor nations, as well as international organizations, to help Afghanistan combat its illicit opium problem.
[CHART: AFGHANISTAN STATISTICAL TABLES]
[GRPHIC: AFGHAN OPIUM CULTIVATION 1987-1994]
Bangladesh is not a major producer or consumer of narcotics, but is used increasingly as a narcotics transshipment point. The Government of Bangladesh (BDG) apparently is willing to stem the flow of narcotics across its borders, but it is hampered by poor intra-governmental coordination and a lack of resources. The UNDCP launched a $1.9 million, five-year project in 1994 to enhance the BDG's narcotics control efforts. Bangladesh is a party to the 1988 UN Convention and the South Asia Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC) Convention on Narcotics. It has no bilateral narcotics agreement with the U.S.
II. Status of Country
Bangladesh has no measurable cultivation of poppy. There is some cannabis cultivation, primarily for local consumption. Geographic realities and limited detection and interdiction capabilities make Bangladesh vulnerable to trafficking. Authorities fear an increase in the transshipment of narcotics from Burma and India, and the beginning of shipments from Pakistan and Afghanistan. The USG has no evidence of high-level corruption. Possible official corruption appears to be limited to border area smuggling of brown heroin.
The extent of Bangladesh's internal drug problem is largely unknown. The BDG estimates that there are approximately 100,000 heroin addicts, but concedes that the actual number could be much higher.
III. Country Action Against Drugs in 1994
Policy Initiatives. Bangladesh has signed protocols calling for increased bilateral narcotics cooperation and has worked toward better coordination and enhancement of counternarcotics capabilities within SAARC. The BDG signed in 1994 an agreement with Burma on bilateral cooperation to prevent trafficking of narcotic drugs and psychotropic substances and chemicals. It also passed legislation to establish a Coast Guard, which will be charged with narcotics interdiction.
Law Enforcement Efforts. The BDG's principle narcotics agency is the Department of Narcotics Control (DNC). The lack of coordination between the DCN and other relevant BDG agencies, particularly in information sharing, seriously hampers the BDG's efforts to develop an effective law enforcement capability. Another problem is the overloaded court system with its heavy backlog of criminal cases.
Money Laundering. The BDG has uncovered no evidence of money laundering. However, its mechanisms to detect and/or control this kind of activity are largely ineffective. The BDG recognizes this problem; it has drafted appropriate amendments to the 1990 Narcotics Control Act, but the legislature has taken no action.
Demand Reduction. The BDG has taken initial steps to promote drug awareness, and it places a high priority on demand reduction. The National Narcotics Board (NNB) met in July to address such issues as the need for a national survey, developing antinarcotics mass media campaigns, increasing the number and effectiveness of treatment facilities, and the need for a forensic laboratory for drug testing. The UNDCP's five-year project for Bangladesh focuses heavily on demand reduction and treatment.
IV. U.S. Policy Initiatives and Programs
Policy Initiatives. The USG's seeks to prevent Bangladesh from developing into a major transshipment point for heroin, and provides training and equipment support to the DNC for that purpose. The USG underwrote the costs of sending DNC officials to three seminars -- to New Delhi for the Southwest Asia Regional Drug Enforcement Seminar; to Washington, for the International Narcotics Enforcement Management Seminar sponsored by DEA; and to Virginia for the DEA-sponsored International Forensic Chemists Seminar. The USG funded $22,000 in essential counternarcotics equipment under a letter of agreement.
The Road Ahead. In concert with other donor countries, the U.S. will press the BDG to improve its intra-governmental coordination and to focus resources on airport, border, and seaport interdiction efforts. It will also encourage enactment and implementation of money laundering legislation.
India is an important crossroads for international narcotics trafficking. It is located between the two main sources of illicitly grown Asian opium, the Golden Triangle and the Golden Crescent regions, and is itself the world's largest producer of licit opium. An unknown quantity of opium is diverted from the country's legal production, and there is illegal poppy cultivation as well. There are unauthorized exports of essential and precursor chemicals, and of methaqualone (Mandrax), a popular drug in southern Africa. The Government of India (GOI) has a cooperative relationship with DEA. However, authorities have had limited success in prosecuting major narcotics offenders because of the lack of enforcement funding and weaknesses in the intelligence infrastructure. The GOI needs to take more aggressive enforcement measures and to demonstrate more resolve at the highest levels to counter trafficking and addiction.
India sought to curtail the diversion of licit opium, but failed to establish scientifically the minimum yield that must be sold to the GOI. Controls on acetic anhydride (AA), used to process opium into heroin, instituted in 1993, began to have limited effects in 1994. India met formally several times with both Pakistan and Burma to discuss narcotics matters and is committed to continue the consultations in 1995. Although these meetings have produced only limited results, they were an important step toward much-needed regional narcotics cooperation.
India is a party to the 1988 UN Convention, but has not yet enacted supporting legislation on asset seizures or money laundering; this leaves its law enforcement agencies without the tools to achieve fully the convention's goals and objectives.
II. Status of Country
India is the world's largest producer of legal opium for pharmaceutical purposes, and the only country that still produces gum opium instead of concentrate of poppy straw (CPS). Opium is produced legally in the states of Madhya Pradesh, Rajasthan, and Uttar Pradesh, and there is diversion in all three. For the past several years, the GOI has been reducing opium stocks; in 1994, the GOI was unable to fulfill contracts with U.S. pharmaceutical customers because of the reduction in stocks and its inability under the old storage system to maintain an accurate inventory. To cover the shortfall and to meet anticipated 1995 demand, the GOI increased authorized cultivation for the 1994-5 crop year by 70 percent.
Criminal organizations produce semi-refined heroin from both diverted legal opium and illegally grown opium. Poppies are grown illicitly in the Himalayan foothills of Kashmir and Uttar Pradesh, and in northeast India near the Bangladeshi and Burmese borders in the states of Manipur, Mizoram, Nagaland and Arunachal Pradesh. Diverted opium is consumed domestically and processed for export. Heroin base (No. 3 or 'brown' heroin) is the domestic drug of choice, except in the northeast state of Manipur, where needle sharing from the intravenous use of No. 4 (pure) heroin from Burma has spread the AIDS virus. Brown heroin is readily available in Nepal, Bangladesh, Sri Lanka, and the Maldives.
India produces AA for legitimate consumers, such as the tanning industry, but a significant quantity is diverted to heroin labs throughout southern Asia. GOI controls on AA, imposed in 1993, are beginning to have an impact, although only slowly.
India is also a transit route for illicit narcotics from Afghanistan, Pakistan, and Burma bound mainly for the European market. Although Indian traffickers have made large shipments of heroin directly to the U.S. and Canada, the most dramatic recent increase has been in the trafficking of Indian-produced methaqualone to southern and eastern Africa.
III. Country Actions Against Drugs in 1994
Policy Initiatives. The Central Bureau of Narcotics (CBN) and the Narcotics Control Bureau (NCB), responsible respectively for coordinating licit and illicit drug control policies, sought to reduce trafficking. However, CBN and NCB officials have not always received the political and budgetary support needed to conduct a strong counternarcotics program. CBN reduced the number of licensed cultivators of licit opium and adopted measures to increase security of the licit crop.
Accomplishments. The GOI took a number of steps to discourage the diversion of licit opium to the illegal market:
For the third year, it raised the minimum yield of opium that licit farmers must deliver to the government in order to retain a license. All farmers will be required to submit at least 43 kilograms/ha in the 1994-95 crop year. However, this is below the 60 kg/ha minimum qualifying yield (MQY) believed possible on the basis of a GOI crop study. The GOI did not explain to the USG the basis for the decision to raise MQY only from 40 to 43 kilograms/ha.
The GOI withdrew licenses for almost one-third (40,000) of licensed farmers for failing to meet the MQY.
The GOI transferred all opium in its inventory to sealed cans. It also cleaned the vats in which opium had been stored and the bags in which it had been delivered to the factories, both to obtain more opium, and to prevent future discrepancies between book and physical stocks.
After cleaning the opium vats and storage bags, the GOI determined amounts lost in handling, storage and manufacture during the past 13 years and wrote off a large part of the discrepancy that had developed between accounting stocks and physical inventories. The original discrepancy was close to 800 mt, prompting the GOI's inability to fulfill U.S. pharmaceutical's 1994 opium contracts. The USG does not believe the GOI has fully accounted for the discrepancy. However, this was India's first reliable physical inventory of opium stocks and it provided a base for future measurements.
The GOI expanded incentives for the most productive farmers for the 94-95 crop year. Those who produced more than 50 kilograms/ha were licensed to cultivate 50-percent more land, and will receive a premium price for opium delivered in excess of MQY.
International initiatives undertaken by the GOI were:
Indian representatives met for the first time in recent history to discuss counternarcotics with local Burmese officials along their common border.
Under auspices of the UN and with USG encouragement, counternarcotic officials of India and Pakistan met in Vienna in July and in New Delhi in September.
India and Pakistan agreed that representatives of the narcotics agencies are to be included in future regular meetings between the Indian Border Security Force and the Pakistan Rangers.
Authorities seized 2,072 kilograms of opium in 1994, down significantly from the 3,011 kilograms seized in 1993. Heroin seizures of 906 kilograms during the same period were slightly below the 1993 levels of 1,088 kilograms.
GOI officials believe the decreases in seizures resulted from the reopening of alternative trafficking routes that had been closed following the Gulf War, the breakup of the former Soviet Union, and the more stringent security imposed on the production of licit opium in India. They also note that black market prices of opium in the legal production areas have more than doubled since 1993. However, India's alternate trafficking explanation is not corroborated by DEA or other reports. Actual trafficking appears to be up, although quantities cannot be verified.
Indian law enforcement agencies made 12,113 narcotics arrests in 1994, down almost 12 percent from the 13,723 detentions in 1993. AA smuggling continues along both frontiers, but available evidence indicates that the controls instituted in 1993 have begun to work and are driving up black market prices in Pakistan. Indian seizures of AA increased from 22 in calendar 1993 to 37 in 1994. The 23,855 liters seized in 1994 represented a 21 percent increase over 1993 seizures.
Law Enforcement Efforts. Jurisdictional problems hinder effective action against traffickers and illegal producers, but there is evidence the GOI is according the coordination issue a higher priority. A senior interagency group meets quarterly, chaired by the Director General of the NCB. The GOI spent considerable effort in educating state and local law enforcement personnel about narcotics, resulting in increased seizures in 1992-93; the number of arrests has since stabilized. The average quantity of seizures has decreased. Indian officials regard this as a positive sign, indicating the difficulty traffickers face in moving heroin. However, U.S. officials see the lack of large seizures as indicative of a need for improved narcotics intelligence, since there are no indications of decreased trafficking and reports of large shipments continue. It also suggests the need for greater political will on the part of the GOI to make drug enforcement an important priority.
Authorities did not seize or investigate any heroin labs, according to the reports seen by the USG. Heroin labs operate in the vicinity of Bombay, primarily south of the city. There have been reports of processed heroin, primarily in Uttar Pradesh and Bihar, supplying Calcutta.
As a result of a huge backlog of narcotics cases, the GOI doubled the number of narcotics court in the past year, from 25 to 58.
Indian counternarcotics officers are a small force compared to the size of the country and the level of trafficking. The NCB has only 375 employees nationwide. Another primary force, the Directorate of Revenue Intelligence, which also handles customs duty evasion, has only 600 employees. While local and state police participate in counternarcotics efforts, few have the training or are committed to making narcotics interdiction a priority. GOI efforts to combat trafficking would benefit from more personnel and budgetary support, proportionate to the magnitude of the drug problem.
Corruption. Media reports allege corruption among police, government officials, and local politicians in a wide range of governmental activities, but successful prosecutions are rare. Criminal courts release some drug defendants without explanation or on weak legal grounds. The USG receives reports of narcotics-linked corruption, but cannot independently verify the extent. The CBN took a number of steps in 1994 to curb corruption. These include regularly transferring officers; not allowing officers to verify the area under cultivation in their home district; making the most productive farmers responsible for checking the hectarage of all farmers in the village (with violations resulting in the loss of license for both the offending farmer and the supervisors), and cross checking assays and weight of opium as it is delivered to government processing facilities.
The USG is assisting in investigating one case of possible drug-related money laundering through a GOI-owned corporation. Corruption at the working level is believed to be extensive.
Agreements and Treaties. The U.S.-UK extradition treaty of 1931 governs the extradition of fugitives between the U.S. and India, but the two countries are negotiating a new treaty. Neither government made any drug-related extradition requests during 1994. The Indian Foreign Ministry refused to extradite one U.S. fugitive in 1994, despite a favorable ruling by the Indian Supreme Court.
In May, officials of the GOI and USG signed a Memorandum of Understanding on Cooperative Measures to Increase Awareness Of and Support For Efforts to Combat Production, Distribution and Use of Illegal Drugs. The U.S. and India signed a narcotics agreement in 1990. India is a party to the 1961 UN Single Convention on Narcotic Drugs, its 1972 Protocol, the 1971 UN Convention on Psychotropic Substances, and the 1988 UN Convention, but it has not yet completed implementing legislation.
Cultivation and Production. India is the world's largest source of opium for legitimate pharmaceutical use, producing 333 mt in 1993 and 415 mt in 1994 (both measured at ten-percent moisture). The 1993 crop was small because of hail storms near the end of the growing season. Weather conditions were more favorable in 1994, and the USG has no explanation of the fact that the 1994 crop turned in to the GOI for licit sale did not reach the predicted 500-600 mt level.
Unlike other opiate raw material suppliers, India produces opium gum only, with a high content of thebaine, an alkaloid essential to certain pharmaceuticals. The GOI has completed a preliminary feasibility study on converting some production to the concentrate of poppy straw (CPS) method.
Intelligence analysts estimate that farmers diverts some 30-50 percent of the licit crop prior to delivering opium to the GOI. The difference between actual opium yield and opium delivered to the GOI creates the greatest opportunity for diversion; thus the U.S. gives great importance to clarifying real crop yields. A 1994 crop survey reportedly showed attainable yields of 65 kilograms/ha or more. If this figure is correct, it would imply very substantial diversion to the illicit market. The USG is seeking a copy of the survey which the GOI has thus far refused to share.
Although the CBN indicated an interest in U.S. participation in a more extensive crop survey in late 1994, and the USG offering to participate in a joint opium crop yield survey in early December, the GOI did not officially respond to the USG request for high-level agreement in time to plan a 1995 joint crop survey. A well-designed crop study would provide data on expected yield, which, in turn, would enable the GOI to establish scientifically reasonable levels for MQY. Optimal MQY would eliminate a large portion of potential diversion of licit production into illicit markets.
For the past fifteen years, the GOI has been reducing its licit opium production by reducing cultivation in response to concerns from the INCB and the U.S. that excessive inventory levels presented a threat to the security of licit opium stocks. The GOI sold approximately 300 mt more than it acquired in each of the past five years. The GOI did not conduct an accurate physical inventory for at least 20 years, however, and a large discrepancy developed between the amount shown in accounts ("book inventory") and the amount actually on hand ("physical inventory"). In June, India reported opium stocks of 950 mt to the INCB. Little more than a month later, it advised INCB orally that usable stocks actually on hand were, in fact, only 150 mt. INCB conducted an audit, noting that reporting inaccurate stocks violated the 1961 Single Convention on Narcotic Drugs. Accurate physical inventories will be required in the future.
In large part because the GOI did not know the actual size of its opium stock on hand at the beginning of the year, the GOI signed contracts with pharmaceutical firms to sell more opium than it had available. Pharmaceutical firms have agreed to a guarantee of priority fulfillment of contracts from the spring 1995 crop at 1994 prices. The GOI will sign no contracts in 1995 until it knows the actual size of the licit crop.
The GOI's plan will rebuild inventories and further improve security: reduce the number of cultivators; increase allowable cultivated area per farmer, with incentives in future years for production in excess of MQY; bring on new cultivators only in areas with a history of the highest yields; and eliminate the differential between MQY for Uttar Pradesh and the other states.
The area licensed for cultivation in 1994-5, 24,000 hectares, was calculated to produce enough opium to fulfill the 1994 contracts, as well as anticipated demand in 1995, plus ten percent for loss. This is a 71-percent increase in cultivation. Production is planned to remain close to this level for five years. The GOI plans to bring inventory to about 500 mt, about two-thirds of normal demand, which should enable the GOI to meet pharmaceutical needs in the event a harvest fails.
The USG is concerned because diverted opium appears to be proportional to cultivated land. If true, this increase in cultivation, not based on scientific yield figures, could lead to a comparable increase in diverted opium.
India also has significant illicit cultivation, primarily in areas such as Jammu and Kashmir where GOI control is challenged by insurgent groups. USG satellite surveys indicate 1994 illicit cultivation in the range of 5,500 ha, with an estimated yield of 82 mt of opium. Because precise figures on diversion of licit opium are not available, the figures may be disputed. However, between illicit production and diversion, India is believed to be the third largest producer of illicit opium in the world. After initial expressions of interest, India turned down a letter of agreement for India to conduct an aerial survey of the illicit crop, allegedly because the USG's $50,000 contribution was judged inadequate for the magnitude of the project.
Drug Flow and Transit. India's role as a major transshipment point for heroin from Southwest Asia (Afghanistan and Pakistan), and from Southeast Asia (Burma, Laos, and Thailand) is becoming clearer as more attention is devoted to studying the heroin trade. Heroin is smuggled from Pakistan and Burma, with some transshipped through Nepal. Most heroin shipped from India goes to Europe, although some major shipments have been sent to Canada and the U.S. The export of methaqualone, principally to Africa, has become a serious problem. The GOI seized 32.5 mt of methaqualone in 1994, compared to 15 mt in 1993. The GOI prepared to institute nationwide controls on the sale of methaqualone. The GOI is considering controls on ephedrine, used to make amphetamines, as the result of U.S. concerns about illicit exports that eventually reached the U.S. The NCB is cooperating closely with DEA on controlled shipments of ephedrine.
Demand Reduction. There is no accurate data on the extent of opium and heroin addiction, although surveys now under way with cooperation from the U.S. should be available in 1995. Government estimates of from one to five million opium users, and about one million heroin addicts remain unchanged. The Health and Welfare Ministries, the UNDCP, and police groups support treatment and rehabilitation centers. Voluntary agencies conduct demand reduction and public awareness programs under grants from the Indian government, but lack both funding and staff. As in 1993, the USG funded a series of demand reduction training seminars in major Indian cities.
IV. U.S. Policy Initiatives and Programs
Policy Initiatives. The USG works with the GOI to focus more high level attention on and allocate more resource to narcotics control programs, and urged the GOI to update its domestic laws to comply with the obligations of the 1988 UN Convention, particularly those related to asset forfeiture and money laundering.
In November, the Director of the President's Office of National Drug Control Policy visited India, meeting with the Finance Minister, members of Parliament, and senior narcotics officials. A central focus of that visit was the need for India to adopt money laundering legislation. The USG has provided detailed material on U.S. money laundering legislation to the appropriate ministries and to Parliament. Legislation is being drafted, although the government has not yet offered a timetable for its submission to the Parliament.
Bilateral Cooperation. The USG funds training for enforcement personnel and for the Indian Coast Guard. Relations between the DEA and NCB are cordial, with emphasis on exchanges of narcotics information and controlled deliveries from India to other countries.
Pursuant to the U.S.-India Narcotics Agreement of 1990, India and the U.S. signed letters of agreement in 1992 and 1993 to improve India's interdiction capabilities, and to tighten security at its opium production facilities. The GOI declined a 1994 letter of agreement, which would have provided partial funding for an aerial survey of illicit crops.
The Road Ahead. The GOI took a number of steps in 1993 and 1994 to address what it concedes are serious shortcomings in its licit opium cultivation program. Having improved factory and inventory security, the GOI now needs to focus on diversion by farmers after harvest. More resources and increased political support are needed for counternarcotics forces, particularly to combat corruption and to close judicial loopholes. In the coming years, the U.S. plans to encourage the GOI to intensify its efforts to combat illicit cultivation and trafficking, improve its extradition practices, identify, prosecute and convict corrupt officials, and pass enabling legislation in support of the 1988 UN Convention.
[CHART: INDIA STATISTICAL TABLES]
Iran is a major transshipment point for illegal opiates, primarily opium and morphine base moving from the Golden Crescent to Turkey, where it is refined prior to further distribution in Europe and the U.S. Iran also cultivates opium poppies. The USG estimated in 1993 that opium poppies were cultivated on 3,500 ha.
The Government of Iran (GOI) maintains that it has an active counternarcotics campaign. Radio broadcasts almost daily claim seizures of narcotics, primarily morphine base and opium, as well as the arrest and frequent execution of traffickers. UNDCP visitors conducted on-site inspection of some drug seizures, including one exhibit room with 30 mt of narcotics. Observers have also verified that Iran has fortified its border with Pakistan in an attempt to prevent narcotics caravans from crossing from Baluchistan, Pakistan, to Baluchistan, Iran. Some traffickers have reported battles with Iranian forces which have forced them to be more cautious.
II. Status of Country
Although Iran is an opium producer, most domestic production is assumed to be consumed by Iranian addicts. Iran also is a conduit for opiate raw materials from Pakistan and Afghanistan, which pass through Iran in route to final processing in Turkey. Processed heroin also is sometimes delivered through Iran. The USG is skeptical of Iranian claims about the extent of its counternarcotics drive because of the volume drugs which flow through Iran.
III. Country Action Against Drugs in 1994
Policy Initiatives. The GOI signed a tripartite agreement with UNDCP and Pakistan to reduce trafficking in the region. The USG is unaware of any other new policy initiatives during the year.
Law Enforcement Efforts. Because the USG and Iran do not have diplomatic relations, the U.S. has only limited information concerning the adequacy of legal and law enforcement counternarcotic measures taken by the GOI. According to an Interpol report, which is probably based on GOI figures, the GOI seized nearly 112 mt of opium, 15 mt of morphine and 800 kilograms of heroin in 1994. If these figures were accurate, they would suggest that Iran seizes far more narcotics than any other opium/heroin transit or producing state. The USG continues to receive reports from exiles and human rights groups claiming that some of those arrested as traffickers, in fact, are members of separatist or opposition movements. Many of the traditional trafficking organizations are operated by Kurds and Baluchis; claims that arrested individuals are narcotics traffickers have a high degree of credibility in Iran.
Corruption. The USG receives intermittent reports that drug-related corruption is endemic among GOI law enforcement and security personnel. According to these reports, there is extensive bribing of border guards to permit drug caravans through the reinforced border crossings. Arrested traffickers are sometimes set free upon payment of a bribe. Iran's economic difficulties, particularly its inflation rate of approximately 50 percent and an unemployment rate of more than 30 percent, likely contribute to corruption. In the absence of diplomatic relations, the USG lacks specific information on the extent to which the GOI has taken legal and law enforcement measures to prevent and punish such corruption. It does not appear that, as a matter of government policy, the GOI encourages or facilitates drug production, distribution, or money laundering. The USG does not have evidence of involvement of senior GOI officials in narcotics activities.
Agreements and Treaties. In January 1994, Iran signed a regional counternarcotics agreement with the UNDCP and Pakistan. There are plans to include Afghanistan in the future. Iran has ratified the 1988 UN Convention, but the USG is unaware of the passage of implementing legislation to permit complete compliance with its requirements. Counternarcotics agreements have been signed with several countries.
Cultivation and Production. In addition to opium poppy cultivation of about 3,500 ha, some opiates cultivated outside Iran are processed into morphine base or heroin by Baluchis in the southwest, and Kurds and Azeris in the northeast.
Drug Flow and Transit. Turkey seizes opiates that have transited Iran, some by sealed trucks, others by more primitive means. Ethnic Iranian traffickers in Turkey use their connections in Iran to facilitate shipments through that country. Opiates enter Iran both directly from Afghanistan and via Pakistan.
Demand Reduction. The USG has little information on demand reduction programs. Addicts are commonly arrested. GOI figures released in 1994 state that more than 52,000 prison detainees were convicted on drug charges. Prison officials claimed they offered rehabilitation programs, including workshops which reportedly employed 21,000 inmates in textiles, carpentry and farming. Press reports put the total number of addicts at two million, but the USG cannot verify this estimate.
IV. U.S. Policy Initiatives and Programs
Policy Initiatives. In the absence of USG diplomatic relations with Iran, no narcotics initiatives are planned. The USG does encourage regional cooperation among countries in the region.
The Republic of Maldives, composed of 1,100 islands in the Indian Ocean, has only a modest drug problem. The Government of the Republic of Maldives (GORM) fears, however, that narcotics traffickers may begin to increase drug transshipment. To help counter this possibility, the GORM, with USG assistance, is currently computerizing its immigration record-keeping system. Two customs officials participated in a training seminar sponsored by U.S. Customs in Sri Lanka in June, while three National Security Service officers took part in a DEA-sponsored training program in India in September. USG supports demand reduction programs sponsored by the Colombo plan, of which the GORM is a member, which promote public awareness of the dangers of narcotics addiction.
Although the GORM has no formal extradition treaty with the U.S., its cooperation was crucial in bringing a Nigerian national detained in Maldives to the U.S. in September to face narcotics trafficking charges. The GORM signed the 1988 UN Convention in 1989, but has not yet ratified it. The GORM, singed the South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC) Convention on Narcotic Drugs in 1990; it entered into force in 1993.
Nepal is not a significant producer or consumer of narcotic drugs. Although not yet a major drug transit country, its 1,000 mile border with India, as well as its proximity to Pakistan and Burma, make it an ideal alternate route for illicit narcotics transiting Asia to Europe and the U.S.
The Government of Nepal (GON) initiated its commitment to narcotics control by signing a Narcotics Master Plan with the UNDCP in 1992 and forming a Drug Law Enforcement Unit (DLEU) in 1993. During 1994, the DLEU was active, but implementation of the master plan slowed. Nepal is a party to the 1988 UN Convention, as well as to the 1961 UN Single Convention, the 1972 Protocol thereto, and the 1971 Convention on Psychotropic Substances.
II. Status of Country
Southwest and Southeast Asian heroin is smuggled into Nepal across the porous Indian border and through Kathmandu's international airport. There has been a dramatic increase in recent years in the number of Nepalese arrested for drug offenses overseas, most commonly in Hong Kong, indicating both a rise in trafficking and more effective law enforcement efforts. Prior to 1994, brown heroin (No. 3 heroin) was the drug of choice in Nepal. However, while use of heroin has continued to rise, abuse of locally grown cannabis and hashish is more widespread. These drugs are marketed in freelance operations, independent of major international trafficking organizations.
III. Country Action Against Drugs in 1994
Policy Initiatives. The extent of cannabis cultivation is unknown, but substantial. Crop eradication efforts focus almost entirely on cannabis.
Cultivation and Production. The lack of a crop substitution program complicates efforts to eradicate locally grown cannabis. There is minimal cultivation of opiates. Detection is complicated by small plantings amid licit crops. All heroin seized in Nepal is thought to originate elsewhere.
Drug Flow and Transit. Nepal lacks the ability to analyze narcotics intelligence on drug flows through the country. Reporting indicates that there is inadequate narcotics control security at Kathmandu's International Airport, facilitating the transit of drugs. Increasing arrests of Nepalese couriers overseas indicate that Nepal's importance as a transit point may be increasing.
Drug-related arrests and contraband seizures have trended sharply upwards for the past several years. Authorities make most seizures of heroin and hashish in Kathmandu.
Demand Reduction. The GON works with voluntary agencies to heighten public awareness of the dangers of narcotics abuse. During 1994, UNDCP undertook a survey of local demand reduction agencies, advised the Home Ministry on designing educational materials and curricula, and sponsored a drug training session for teachers.
Law Enforcement. Drug-related arrests and contraband seizures have risen sharply for the past several years. Most seizures of heroin and hashish are made in Kathmandu's international airport. One weakness in the GON's law enforcement effort is the lack of coordination and cooperation between the DLEU and Nepal's Customs, Immigration, and National Police Services. However, in cooperation with UNDCP, the GON did conduct in 1994 a counternarcotics training session for law enforcement personnel from all over the country.
IV. U.S. Policy Initiatives
Policy Initiatives. The USG works closely with representatives of all relevant institutions and GON agencies to further progress under the UNDCP Narcotics Master Plan, and to implement the Narcotics Control Act. The USG also works closely with other donor nations, and provides funding for demand reduction activities. The U.S. does not have a bilateral narcotics agreement with Nepal, but cooperation continued to broaden in 1994.
Road Ahead. The U.S. was instrumental in bringing about Nepal's new commitment to drug control. The USG plans to support activities related to improving operational and training programs with the DLEU.
Pakistan is an important producer of, as well as a major transit country for, opiates and cannabis destined for the international markets. In the 1993-4 crop year, Pakistan produced about 160 mt of opium from about 7,300 hectares of poppy. Despite the efforts and dedication of some counternarcotics officials, Pakistan made only modest counternarcotic progress in 1994. Pakistani authorities arrested no new major narcotics traffickers, eradicated only 463 hectares of opium poppy, continued extradition proceedings against several drug figures, but did not extradite any, and faced continued delays in the trials of arrested traffickers, such as Notezai. They closed down no heroin laboratories operating in the tribal areas of the North West Frontier Province (NWFP) and did not significantly expand areas in the tribal areas where opium production is banned. Pakistan is a party to the 1988 UN Convention. Legislation to bring Pakistani law into conformity with the Convention has not yet been presented to Parliament, but on January 9, 1995, it was promulgated by the president as a temporary ordinance.
Pakistan agreed to cooperate with India on controlling the smuggling of essential precursor chemicals and narcotics, extended Pakistani drug laws to cover the tribal areas (and used the authority in 1995), and seized increased amounts of illicit drugs. The Anti-Narcotics Force (ANF) filed twelve new asset seizure cases.
The Government intensified its efforts in early 1995, building on groundwork laid in 1994, freezing almost $70 million in assets of seven major traffickers, improving eradication efforts in the NWFP and extending the poppy ban in Bajaur Agency, raiding a hashish factory in the NWFP, and seizing 132 mt of hashish and 480 kilograms of heroin. It also created a demand reduction office in the ANF. The USG recently received notification that the GOP indicated a willingness to proceed expeditiously on outstanding extradition requests.
II. Status of Country.
Pakistan is a significant producer and transit country for opiates and cannabis products, producing about 160 mt of opium in the last crop year. Intelligence information and seizures indicate that considerable amounts of Afghan opiates and cannabis products are either consumed in Pakistan by its addict population, or pass through on their way to world markets. Morphine base is produced in the tribal areas of the NWFP for refining abroad, and heroin is produced for domestic use and for export. For domestic political reasons, the Government of Pakistan (GOP) did not take action against processing laboratories, or illicit cultivation, in the NWFP in 1994. In addition, considerable amounts of Afghan opium, morphine base, and cannabis products are either processed in labs or transshipped through Pakistan.
The government included provisions against money laundering and forfeiture in the temporary antinarcotics ordinance promulgated in January 1995. Pakistan is a moderately significant money-laundering center.
III. Country Actions Against Drugs in 1994
Policy Initiatives. The GOP announced a number of legal and foreign policy initiatives in the drug control area. It made the ANF, led by an army major general, a permanent force, and continued efforts to meld it into an effective drug enforcement agency. It increased funding for the ANF by 34 percent in a supplemental appropriation to about $1.65 million, while the budgets of virtually all other GOP agencies were frozen or cut substantially. The GOP hopes to avoid the corruption that pervaded the Pakistan Narcotics Control Bureau by building a new drug enforcement agency from the ground up. The GOP is hampered by IMF fiscal limits in providing adequate financial resources for narcotics efforts. The GOP is further constrained by its belief that vigorous police efforts to enforce the poppy ban in the tribal areas of the NWFP could provoke widespread violence from the heavily armed tribesmen in the region. The two agencies in the tribal areas that produce the most opium, Dir and Mohmand, openly rebelled against the Federal Government in November and December. While the GOP would like to bring the tribal areas into the mainstream of Pakistani life and end opium production, it feels that it must move slowly to minimize violence.
Pakistan amended existing drug trafficking laws in 1994 to increase periods of incarceration, to permit the death penalty, and to authorize asset confiscation. The government extended existing drug laws to cover the tribal areas, making drug crimes illegal for the first time in these parts of Pakistan. However, in the several months since the extension, the law apparently has not been enforced in the tribal areas. Paramilitary forces did raid a hashish factory in Khyber Agency in January 1995, seizing 132 mt of hashish and a reported 480 kilograms of heroin, a significant step that prompted an armed march against the city of Peshawar.
Pakistan agreed with India to cooperate in curbing the trafficking of essential chemicals and narcotics. It also signed a memorandum of understanding with Iran to cooperate against Afghan drug traffickers. There apparently have been only modest results from these accords.
The Narcotic Control Division is discussing a narcotics Master Plan with the UNDCP. NCD officials state that a strategy has been agreed upon at the working level. This is one of the goals of Pakistan's bilateral counternarcotics agreement with the USG.
Accomplishments. Despite several public statements by the prime minister and senior members of her government reiterating the importance of counternarcotics efforts, there have been few concrete achievements in 1994.
Pakistan placed little or no additional hectarage in the tribal areas of the NWFP under the opium ban. Eradication of illicit poppy cultivation fell for the second consecutive year. The GOP destroyed only 463 hectares in 1994, compared with 856 hectares in 1993. An eradication campaign conducted in Bajaur Agency in mid-January 1995 reputedly eradicated 1,100 ha, or the equivalent of half of Bajaur's 1994 crop. One police official was killed in the operation.
Authorities seized neither seized any refineries, nor arrested any opiate producers, although local authorities negotiated the surrender of some laboratory equipment used for drug processing. There is no evidence that the overall level of production in the labs decreased as a result of these negotiations.
The Parliament passed legislation strengthening penalties for narcotics trafficking, including the death penalty. The Prime Minister signed a decree in September extending the 1930 Narcotics Law to the Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA) of the NWFP, which previously had not been subject to the provisions of the law. On January 9, 1995, President Leghari promulgated a comprehensive narcotics decree that included some money laundering provisions. It is valid only for 120 days, but can be re-instituted by presidential decree if not adopted by the Parliament.
The government is pursing several cases involving important legal principles in the courts. The ANF is presently prosecuting Pakistan's first asset seizure case. At the close of 1994, the GOP was pursuing eight U.S. requests for extradition which have been subject to court proceedings for as long as 30 months. No extraditions took place in 1994.
In 1994, the Supreme Court ruled that some direct evidence of guilt must be provided in extradition requests. The Pakistani judicial system is slow moving, and provides ample opportunity for defense counsel to delay processing. Recently, the GOP indicated a willingness to proceed expeditiously on outstanding extradition requests. Extraditions are among the areas covered in the bilateral agreement between Pakistan and the U.S.
Pakistani authorities filed 12 new asset seizure cases during 1994. If there is a favorable decision in the first case, thereby establishing a precedent, the ANF will prosecute the other cases. The small size of the ANF, its lack of legally and financially trained personnel, and the clogged Pakistani court system, resulted in little progress in this area. In late January 1995, the GOP announced the freezing of assets of seven major drug traffickers. These assets were valued at about $70 million. The traffickers are permitted to use the assets while they are frozen; however, they may not sell or transfer them.
Pakistan's prosecutions of major traffickers now under arrest, such as Sakhi Dost Jan Notezai, were tied up in the Pakistani court system during 1994. It is disappointing that a major case, such as that of Notezai, has been moved from court to court repeatedly and remains unresolved more than three years after its initiation.
Law Enforcement Efforts.
Pakistani authorities have not arrested any of the major traffickers whose extradition has been sought by the USG since 1993. While ANF leaders have earned the respect of DEA, and information sharing is common, the ANF has not yet developed its own investigative powers sufficiently to cooperate in major cases.
Data prepared by the ANF indicate that Pakistani law enforcement officials in 1994 seized 14.36 mt of opium, 6.2 mt of heroin (DEA tests indicate much of this is morphine base, rather than heroin), 178.3 mt of hashish and 2,773 liters of acetic anhydride. These figures represent a decrease in hashish seizures, but show increases of 250 percent in opium taken, and 44 percent in heroin captured. Arrest figures provided by the ANF report 48,296 drug arrests, a 15.2 percent increase over 1993. Of concern is the fact that all arrestees were couriers, and that in several instances of drug seizures, no arrests were made.
Counternarcotics law enforcement responsibilities are shared by the ANF, Customs, Coast Guard, and the Border Forces. The efforts of all these forces are primarily directed toward interdicting shipments of essential chemicals and drugs, rather than developing usable intelligence, investigating, indicting and arresting major traffickers. The ANF absorbs the best personnel from the old Pakistan Narcotics Control Board, and is establishing offices and organizations in all four provinces of Pakistan. The GOP has authorized that the ANF be almost doubled in size to 2,200 members. Its expansion to a fully effective force probably will take at least three more years. Because of the unfamiliarity of most of the new leadership and recruits with criminal investigations, substantial training will be required. ANF leaders have been scrupulously reviewing candidates in an effort to accept only honest candidates. The rigorous screening has slowed recruitment.
Although senior Pakistani officials improved efforts to cooperate on an inter-agency basis by instituting a law enforcement coordination committee, the lack of cooperation at the working level remained an impediment to developing strong cases on major traffickers or shipments.
The GOP supplies substantial (by Pakistani standards) funding for both the Narcotics Control Division and the ANF, but needs still far outstrip resources. The USG law enforcement project, the UNDCP, and other donors contribute equipment, training and other resources to augment the $1.65 million provided by the GOP. The Pakistani army has provided high quality officers to lead the ANF, and has indicated its continued commitment to supporting the antidrug effort. It also has supplied material, office space and transportation.
Corruption. A former head of the Coast Guard was removed from his position in 1994, allegedly for corruption, but was not prosecuted. Members of the former antidrug police force, the Pakistan Narcotics Control Board, believed to be corrupt are not being accepted on active duty in the new antidrug organization, the ANF; however, they are not being prosecuted. The ANF is setting up an internal affairs unit to control corruption in its ranks.
No action has been taken against the official who released Shorang Khan, a major Afghan trafficker, after only three days in custody. There were other incidents during the year as well, such as the release of Rafi Munir, which would seem to indicate corruption in the judiciary. No action has been taken against the individuals involved in these cases either. Sufficient legislation exists to control and punish public corruption, but these laws are not enforced.
The USG is unaware of any senior official of the GOP who engages in or facilitates the production or distribution of narcotics, but occasional accusations continue to surface that senior officials have condoned trafficking.
Treaties and Agreements. Pakistan is a party to the 1961 UN Single Convention on Narcotic Drugs, which it ratified in 1965, but not to the 1972 Protocol amending it. It is also a party to the 1971 UN Convention on Psychotropic Substances, and the 1988 UN Convention, which it ratified in October 1991.
The Parliament did not enact legislation to bring Pakistani law into compliance with the 1988 UN Convention in 1994. As a result, President Leghari promulgated the legislation as an emergency ordinance on January 9, 1995, valid for 120 days.
Extradition between the U.S. and Pakistan takes place under a treaty signed between the U.S. and the UK in 1931, made applicable to India in 1942, and the terms of which Pakistan accepted at independence.
In late 1994, Pakistan agreed to cooperate with India on controlling the smuggling of essential drug producing chemicals and narcotics between the two countries.
On May 5, Pakistan signed an agreement with Iran and the UNDCP to cooperate on controlling drug transit trade from Afghanistan. During 1994, it also agreed with the United Arab Emirates to expand cooperation against "narco-terrorists".
Cultivation and Production. Almost all of Pakistan's poppy is grown in the tribal areas of the NWFP, bordering on Afghanistan. Cannabis grows wild in Pakistan and is cultivated in the Chitral Agency of the NWFP. In the 1993-4 crop year, Pakistan produced about 160 mt of opium from about 7,300 hectares of poppy, according to U.S. remote sensing technology. This is a 16-percent increase in opium acreage, and a 14-percent increase in opium production from their 1992-93 figures. Other sources agree on the 1993-94 crop estimate, but do not believe it was an increase from the previous year. All sources agree that Pakistan in 1993-94 was probably the third-largest cultivator of illicit opium in the world, after Burma and Afghanistan.
Pakistan wishes to increase government control over the tribal areas of the NWFP, but the rugged terrain and the hardy, independent, and well-armed tribesmen of the region make this a formidable task. The two agencies in the tribal areas that produce the most opium, Dir and Mohmand, were also the most heavily involved in an outright rebellion against the government over religious issues in November and December of 1994.
Reliable statistics on refining of opium into morphine base and heroin do not exist. Of the approximately 160 mt of opium produced in Pakistan in 1994, about 141 were available for refining after losses and seizures. If this were all refined, it would produce about 14 mt of heroin. However, this does not account for Afghan opium brought into Pakistan for processing.
Although ANF officials in Baluchistan claim that some morphine base refineries have been forced back into Afghanistan, there is no reliable evidence that this is the case. No refineries in the NWFP were shut down through government operations, although there were some negotiated closures. There is no evidence that the number of refineries in the NWFP decreased below the 100 estimated last year.
Most of Pakistan's refineries process opium gum only to the morphine base or low-quality brown (No. 3 or heroin base) heroin used by local addicts. However, although highly refined heroin is not mass produced, Pakistani refineries are capable of producing at least limited quantities of the purer product. Most of the couriers arrested in the Pakistani airports, generally of African nationalities, are transporting highly refined heroin.
Drug Flow and Transit. Considerable amounts of Afghan opium and morphine base flow through Pakistan. While there is no hard data to quantify the traffic, substantial amounts of morphine/heroin base have been identified moving from southwestern Afghanistan through Pakistan's Baluchistan province to the Arabian Sea, for transport to refineries in Turkey. Most of these opiates are loaded either in Karachi or off the Makran coast of Baluchistan. Another trafficking route moves opium and refined products from eastern Afghanistan through Baluchistan, Pakistan, into Baluchistan, Iran, through Iran and into southeastern Turkey. Additional opium from Afghanistan is transported to Peshawar for use in Pakistan. Yet another route moves drugs from eastern Afghanistan and the NWFP through Lahore for domestic use and shipment to India. Pakistani Customs reported seizing two relatively small shipments of refined heroin heading east on the Karakorum Highway to China.
The press reports regularly that Pakistanis have been arrested in Saudi Arabia, the Gulf States, Europe and the U.S. for narcotics trafficking. There are also regular arrests of Nigerians and other West Africans in Pakistan who have entered Pakistan to buy heroin for trafficking purposes. These couriers purchase a smaller amount of the purer heroin that Pakistani labs are capable of producing and then attempt to body carry it out of Pakistan, or hide it in luggage. The African couriers use many different routes to transmit the heroin to its final destination.
Essential chemicals for heroin production enter Pakistan in relatively small lots from India via train, and in much larger shipments from Europe through the port of Karachi. There has been progress in reducing flows of essential chemicals into Pakistan from India. In meetings between Indian and Pakistani counternarcotics officials, they agreed to cooperate in controlling acetic anhydride (AA) smuggling from India to Pakistan. Pakistan has difficulty identifying illegal shipments of AA coming through the port of Karachi from Europe.
Demand Reduction. Pakistan has a substantial drug abuse problem. A 1993 UN study indicated that Pakistan has about 3 million addicts of all kinds, 1.5 million of whom are heroin addicts. Most heroin addicts smoke the drug, but some needle users have been identified, mostly in the larger cities. Growth among the addict population seems to have slowed or stagnated after the extremely high growth of the late 1980s. Experts have been estimating between 1.2 and 1.7 million addicts for the last couple of years. The UN study merely provided a more precise estimate. Public efforts against drug addiction are limited to detoxification, without any follow-up treatment. A number of private clinics use a variety of treatment methods against addiction. Relapse rates are very high for almost all methods.
Building on groundwork laid in 1994, a demand reduction office in the ANF was established at the beginning of 1995. The GOP channels its demand reduction efforts through the UN's Integrated Drug Demand Reduction Project (IDDRP). Thus far, there is no coordinating body between federal and provincial demand reduction groups.
IV U.S. Policy Initiatives
Policy Initiatives. The USG will seek to promote progress in the following areas:
--More rigorous implementation of Pakistani drug laws and active support of U.S. and international counternarcotic laws and measures.
--Prosecution and imprisonment of heroin processors in all areas of the NWFP and Baluchistan, and confiscation of their property.
--Active investigations and prosecutions of major traffickers, including assets seizure and the interdicting of heroin and morphine traffic.
--Development of a coordinated, long-term national counternarcotics strategy, which includes exercise of federal enforcement authority in the Federally Administered Tribal Areas.
--Provision of higher levels of personnel and financial resources to support the narcotics control effort.
--Replacement of the temporary Comprehensive Drug Ordinances, by passing permanent legislation.
--Implementation of laws and bank regulations to prevent drug money laundering.
--Curbing of corruption in GOP law enforcement agencies, and ending the influence of drug traffickers on government policy and the judicial process.
--Strengthened counternarcotics expertise in Pakistan's judicial system including creation, if necessary, of special narcotics courts capable of prosecuting and convicting major traffickers.
--Continued active GOP cooperation on bilateral investigations and extraditions of major traffickers.
--Curbing of smuggling of essential and precursor chemicals not only from India, but from the major sources in Europe by enforcing diversion controls on transportation and effective intelligence about illegal shipments.
--Expansion of the poppy ban and eradication of poppy in the NWFP with a goal of eliminating significant commercial cultivation within five years.
--Promotion of drug awareness, drug rehabilitation and demand reduction, by supporting the UN's IDDRP.
--Broadening public support for counternarcotics initiatives.
Bilateral Cooperation. The USG provided $2.5 million in narcotics control assistance to Pakistan in 1994 under its annual letters of agreement that amend the original bilateral agreement on narcotics; this is the same amount as the previous year. This assistance is used for three primary programs: law enforcement, poppy ban expansion, and demand reduction. In earlier years, funds for poppy ban expansion in the NWFP were effectively supplemented by USAID development funds. The Pressler Amendment resulted in the departure of USAID from Pakistan during 1994, which limited the ability of the USG to provide crop substitution or development guidance. Poppy ban expansion efforts were also hampered by the inability of contractors to construct roads in a timely fashion, and by the recent insurrection in several of the NWFP agencies. USG poppy ban funds are primarily used to extend roads, and thereby political and law enforcement control, into areas of the NWFP where poppy is grown.
With the expansion of the ANF, however, and with additional requests from the Coast Guard, Customs, law enforcement requests for equipment and training have risen. The USG has provided ANF, Coast Guard and the Frontier Corps with vehicles and office and communication equipment. It is presently concentrating on those items of equipment that most enhance the ability of units to pursue investigations. The USG also has been actively training Pakistani personnel to enhance their own training capabilities Demand reduction efforts within Pakistan seek to increase public awareness of the dangers of drug addiction. USG funds have been used to translate antidrug programming into local languages, to fund spot announcements on TV, etc. and provided funding for those NGOs with higher rehabilitation rates.
The Road Ahead. The USG plans to press the GOP to take more actions that will impede major traffickers. Support for law enforcement will expand, based on helping the ANF to develop into a fully effective force, but it also will include Customs, Coast Guard, and the Border Forces. The USG plans to focus on the training and equipping of an Internal Affairs Division to identify and remove corrupt narcotics officers. The USG plans to expedite progress on crop reduction projects in the NWFP by opening up transportation into inaccessible valleys. Demand reduction efforts will be coordinated with the UN's IDDRP to achieve enhanced results. The USG will encourage the GOP to continue the progress noted early in 1995.
[CHART: PAKISTAN STATISTICAL TABLES]
[GRAPHIC: PAKISTAN: ESTIMATED OPIUM PRODUCTION 1987-1994]
Legislation to comply with the 1988 UN Convention was put on hold in July when the president dissolved the Parliament and called for general elections. The legislation has since been redrafted and it is expected to be resubmitted to Parliament early in 1995. During 1994, Sri Lanka also began implementing a narcotics master plan, written in cooperation with the UNDCP, and continued its extensive demand reduction campaigns.
II. Status of Country
Sri Lanka currently has a comparatively modest drug problem. There may be a slight, but steady, increase in narcotics consumption because of high unemployment levels. The Ministry of Defense has the overall responsibility for all counternarcotics and demand reduction activities. However, ethnic insurgency problems in Sri Lanka drain much of the ministry's resources, leaving it little time to address its other responsibilities. Furthermore, Sri Lanka has 1,100 miles of coastline, which cannot be adequately patrolled so long as Sri Lanka's naval resources are engaged in combatting the insurgency. Consequently, Sri Lanka's popularity as a transshipment point for narcotics from Southwest and Southeast Asia is expected to grow.
III. Country Action Against Drugs in 1994
Policy Initiatives. The Government of Sri Lanka (GSL) began implementation of a counternarcotics master plan. A legislative package was drafted for Parliamentary consideration in early 1995. This package focuses on three counternarcotics issues: money laundering; treatment and rehabilitation of drug addicts; and compliance with the UN Convention and the 1990 South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC) Convention.
Law Enforcement Efforts. The Police Narcotics Bureau (PNB), the Customs Service, and the Department of Excise share responsibility for narcotics interdiction. Cannabis is the only illicit narcotic cultivated and produced in Sri Lanka; eradication efforts declined in 1994, netting only one-fifth of the hectarage eliminated in 1993. In 1994, 9,772 suspects were arrested for narcotics-related offenses; 9,741 have been successfully prosecuted to date.
Corruption. The new government, voted into office in July, campaigned on an anti-corruption platform, and has established a permanent commission to investigate charges of bribery and corruption against public officials. The commission reported no cases of drug-related corruption of public officials in 1994.
Agreements and Treaties. Enabling legislation for the UN and SAARC Conventions is to be presented to Parliament early in 1995. It will include specific provisions for extradition for narcotics-related offenses.
Drug Flow and Transit. Heroin is the only illicit drug detected transiting Sri Lanka in significant quantities. Most is detected at the airport, but undoubtedly a substantial number of transshipments take place along the Sri Lankan coast. Since Sri Lanka has no coast guard and its naval vessels are occupied responding to the insurgency, there is no reliable information on maritime transshipments of drugs.
Demand Reduction. Multi-media drug information campaigns are enthusiastically promoted by the GSL. In September, Sri Lanka signed a letter of agreement with the USG which provides $20,000 for audio-visual equipment for public education campaigns.
IV. U.S. Policy Initiatives and Programs
Policy Initiatives. The USG seeks to sustain and increase the GSL's efforts to promote increased awareness of the dangers of narcotics among the general population, and to advance self-sufficiency and regional cooperation among law enforcement and other government officials.
Bilateral Cooperation. In 1994, the USG bought the GSL software to support a regional database on drug arrests, investigations and other information for SAARC law enforcement agencies. The USG also sponsored three training seminars for Sri Lankan law enforcement officials, and provided office equipment and other logistical support for the SAARC seminar on law enforcement training held in Colombo.
The Road Ahead. Given the concern about the increasing use of Sri Lanka as a transshipment point for narcotics, assistance programs will focus on regional cooperation in enforcement and interdiction, and on providing more training programs.
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