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MARCH 1995



Policy and Program Overview                     1
Next Steps                                                6
Coca and Cocaine                                          8
Opium and heroin                                         10
Methodology                                              21
Status of Potential Worldwide Production            23
Cultivation and Production Charts                        26

UN CONVENTION SIGNATORIES                          31

AND FUNCTIONAL BUDGET                                   35


INTERNATIONAL TRAINING                                  40


Drug Enforcement Administration                         45
United States Customs Service                           52
United States Coast Guard                               55



CBRN          Caribbean Basin Radar Network
CICAD         Inter-American Drug Abuse Control Commission
DEA           Drug Enforcement Administration
ESF           Economic Support Fund
FATF          Financial Action Task Force
FBI           Federal Bureau of Investigation
INCSR         International Narcotics Control Strategy Report
INM           See INL
INL           Bureau for International Narcotics Control and Law Enforcement Affairs
JICC          Joint Information Coordination Center
MLAT          Mutual Legal Assistance Treaty
NBRF          Northern Border Response Force
NNICC         National Narcotics Intelligence Consumers Committee
OAS           Organization of American States
OPBAT         Operation Bahamas, Turks and Caicos
UN Convention 1988 United Nations Convention Against Illicit Traffic in Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances
UNDCP         United Nations International Drug Control Program
USAID         Agency for International Development
USG           United States Government
ha            Hectare
HCl           Hydrochloride (cocaine)
kg            Kilogram
mt            Metric Ton

     Executive Summary 

     Policy and Program Overview for 1994

Global antidrug efforts in 1994 present a definitely mixed record.  There were some undeniable accomplishments.  More governments than ever before expressed their willingness to combat the international drug trade.  Domestic legislation was introduced restricting the spread of precursor chemicals or the use of the nation's financial institutions to launder trafficking proceeds.  There were serious, sustained eradication efforts in several key areas.  Major traffickers were arrested, and their organizations dismantled.  Seizures were up on several major trafficking routes, along with law enforcement and interdiction cooperation.

But 1994 was not a banner year for global counternarcotics cooperation and progress.  Despite enforcement and interdiction efforts, the principal drug trafficking organizations did a brisk business in cocaine and heroin.  They demonstrated an unprecedented degree of sophistication, rivaling that of the world's great multinational corporations.  In Brazil, for example, we uncovered a trafficking organization managed by Russians, using Ghanaian and Nigerian couriers, and moving cocaine by way of West Africa to Europe and the United States.  In their organization and technology, the trafficking networks compare favorably with the most modern businesses.  They moved more cocaine than ever before to Europe and Southeast Asia.  They fed a growing appetite for heroin in the Western Hemisphere.  The independent states of the former Soviet Union offered laboratories not only for developing democracies and new market economies, but also for trafficking organizations in Turkey, Afghanistan, Pakistan, and Colombia seeking to exploit political instability to open up new routes to markets in Europe.

Positive Developments.  The annual INCSR review, however, is by its very nature a snapshot of events captured in a narrow time-frame, and the picture must be seen in context.  It omits a host of individually unheralded, but collectively important achievements that are lost among the more dramatic media accounts of a deteriorating drug situation.  It does not reflect long-term progress, such as stronger counternarcotic cooperation between governments, the cumulative eradication of drug crops, the continued dismantling of trafficking networks, the steady inroads into the drug trade's financial networks, or international progress in limiting access to drug processing chemicals.

Such developments seldom capture dramatic headlines, especially when they take place routinely throughout the year in widely scattered countries.  Yet, as we have noted in previous years, it is this kind of long-term, sustained action that the drug trade fears.  The illegal drug industry knows that without a steady flow of drugs, money, and chemicals it cannot survive, particularly in the face of concerted action across borders by determined governments.  Our aim is to keep up the momentum in all these areas in order to build upon the long term progress already achieved.  Neutralizing the narcotic trade is not the work of a year or even of a decade--it is the work of a generation or more.
Diplomatic Efforts.  In the past year, the US Government used both traditional and public diplomacy in the key drug countries to make governments aware of--and publicly accountable for--their role in the common effort.  For example, greater use in 1994 of the drug certification process, which ties US foreign assistance to the antidrug performance of the major drug transit and producing countries, underscored the seriousness of our commitment to destroy the drug trade.  We worked with growing success to encourage other donor government, international organizations, and international financial institutions to integrate counternarcotics into the loan and development policies.

At the same time we pressed ahead with long-range drug control assistance programs in the producing and transit countries, helping their governments to eradicate drug crops, destroy trafficking organizations, strengthen judicial systems, and reduce consumption at home.  With few exceptions, these programs showed positive, if not always spectacular, results.

Drug Cultivation Steady.  Continuing a trend detected in the early 1990s, the world's principal illicit drug crops did not expand significantly in 1994.  While coca and opium poppy cultivation have fluctuated from year to year, the total area under cultivation for both crops in 1994 remained below the respective highs of 1992 and 1993.  The size of the drug crop is important, for it not only sets an upper limit on the amount of finished drugs that can be produced, but it can also indicate how active governments have been in trying to suppress illicit drug cultivation.  Coca cultivation remained essentially steady overall, with a slight overall increase in cultivation  because of greater cultivation in Colombia and Bolivia.  We were encouraged to see no increase in Peru's coca cultivation, since it grows over 60 percent of the world's coca supply.  We were concerned, however, over reports of increasing opium poppy cultivation in Colombia and Peru.  Worldwide, total estimated opium poppy hectarage fell, as a drop in Southeast Asian heroin offset a larger crop in Afghanistan and Pakistan.  The 1994 potential opium poppy harvest was the smallest in three years, a positive development at a time that heroin consumption is increasing around the globe.

While a stable drug crop is good news, it is worth noting that in most cases government actions last year were responsible for little, if any, of the decline.  Poor growing conditions in Southeast Asia held down the opium harvests, while fungus, weather, and soil depletion played a major role in limiting coca expansion in Peru.  

Eradication reluctance.  With some exceptions, most governments have been reluctant to conduct effective crop eradication programs.  We have learned from experience that the most efficient way to make significant inroads into an illicit drug crop is by aerial eradication using environmentally approved herbicides.  Few major drug producing countries, however, will allow the use of such products on drug crops, though many permit even stronger herbicides to control weeds in legitimate agricultural crops.  Colombia is the only major drug producer currently carrying out intensive aerial eradication.  The reasons for resisting aerially applied herbicides differ from country to country.  They run the gamut from environmental concerns to the political  and economic realities of displacing and finding legitimate alternatives for illegal crop farmers to simple lack of political will.  But the result in all cases is an illegal drug crop which poisons consumers in far-off lands and ultimately undermines the political and economic stability of the drug-producing country itself, while devastating the natural and social environment of these producer countries.

Effective Actions.  The United States worked with the governments of the key drug-affected countries in 1994 to promote closer drug control cooperation at all levels.  At the highest level of government, the US in December hosted the Miami Summit of the Americas, at which the leaders of 34 Western Hemisphere countries agreed to conclude a comprehensive counternarcotics strategy for the Twenty-First century.  They acknowledged the critical importance of cutting off drug-related financial flows by agreeing to convene a Hemispheric Experts and Ministerial Conference on money laundering in the near future.  

Working Relations.  There was close cooperation at lower levels, as the US worked with governments to dismantle trafficking rings, eradicate crops, and provide training to strengthen judicial and law enforcement programs.  In Latin America, we cooperated with counterpart agencies to target drug kingpins who had previously  eluded capture through bribery and violence.  Peru and Colombia hunted down a major drug trafficker, Demetrio Chavez Penaherrera, alias El Vaticano, whose organization had become the main supplier of Peruvian cocaine to the Cali cartel.  By preventing Vaticano's organization from evolving into a full-blown syndicate, the Peruvians nipped a potentially serious new drug threat in the bud.  He is currently serving a thirty-year sentence in a Peruvian maximum security jail.

The Mexican government arrested key figures from the Gulf (Matamoros) Cartel, the Arellano Felix group, believed responsible for the assassination of Cardinal Posada Ocampos, and sentenced Miguel Angel Felix Gallardo, a major trafficking syndicate leader involved in the 1985 murder of DEA Special Agent Camarena, to forty years in prison. In Thailand, authorities cooperated with DEA to capture ten of the key "lieutenants" of Shan United Army leader Khun Sa, inflicting serious damage to the strongest drug trafficking organization in the region.  The Thai government is currently processing a USG extradition request for these criminals.  The Thai action dealt a serious blow to the aura of invincibility which had developed around Khun Sa during the past decade.  These accomplishments show that patience and persistence in pursuing the most elusive or well entrenched drug traffickers can eventually pay off.

Less spectacular but in the long run just as important were the ongoing, routine efforts of police, customs, and military units in many disparate countries.  Brazil and Italy, for example, respectively seized 11 metric tons and 6.5 metric tons of cocaine in 1994--record amounts for each country.  Pakistan and China reported seizing nearly 5 metric tons and 3.1 metric tons of heroin in the first nine months of the year; while Turkey (1.6 metric tons) and Italy (1.1 metric tons) each intercepted over a ton of heroin in 1994.  Peru doubled its seizures of cocaine base in 1994 to over ten metric tons.  Colombian police reported eradicating over 4,500 hectares each of coca and opium poppy.  Burma reported destroying over 3,500 hectares of opium poppy.  Pakistan removed a little over 400 hectares.  Government authorities eradicated approximately 1,000 hectares of opium poppy in Venezuela.
These actions by themselves may seem of little consequence, but taken together over time they represent movement in the right direction.  Fighting the drug trade is above all a matter of persistence and of advances sustained over time.  Every ton of cocaine or heroin seized, every hectare of coca or poppy destroyed and not replanted represents drugs that do not reach the streets of America and thereby puts the drug trade on the defensive.  

The Key to Success:  Political Will.  The linchpin of a successful counternarcotics strategy is political will.  This means the willingness to push ahead with effective antidrug measures that may be politically unpopular in the short-term, but can permanently improve conditions over time.  Year after year we see countries begin to make progress against the drug trade, only to lose ground when governments fail to carry through on antidrug initiatives.  When governments back down it is almost always a sign of flagging political will.  We notice it and so do the traffickers.

The pattern has become all too familiar.  The government promises to attack the drug trade on all fronts.  When it successfully finds the traffickers' weak point and causes losses, the drug organizations begin countermeasures.  They may stir up farmer revolts in drug-growing areas, or bribe key government and military officials, or mount a campaign of terror.  Few governments are willing to face down such pressure.  Instead, they look for ways to appear to be making a serious effort at rolling back the drug trade while keeping trafficker backlash to a minimum.  In practice, this has often meant hitting drug organizations in the particular sector where they can best absorb losses.

In countries where coca supply is critical to the trade, governments might avoid serious eradication campaigns, which could destroy the crop, and focus instead on interdiction.  Any losses suffered in trafficker personnel are more than offset by gains in coca supply.  Conversely, in a major cocaine processing and distribution country where trafficking organizations are more important to the trade than local drug crops, the authorities might attack the crop.  But they do not reform the judicial system that allows traffickers to negotiate their way out of prison and stay in business.  In a major drug banking country, the authorities might eradicate crops, interdict drugs and arrest traffickers, but evade serious banking reforms.  Almost every country has or can develop the technical and professional capability to crush and destroy a vital element of the international drug trade.  Every country has individual statesmen and law enforcement professionals who would like to see the drug trade crushed and destroyed.  But so far few governments have shown the political determination to carry through fully on their promises.

Corruption, Democracy and National Security.  That situation will have to change if these governments wish to avoid being devoured by corruption.  At the heart of the struggle against the drug trade is a battle to eliminate corruption.  Corruption is a threat to any nation's security, for it allows criminal elements to undermine the legitimacy of the state from within.  Democracies are especially vulnerable--particularly fragile democracies in the developing world.  

Drug Corruption.  Among all criminal enterprises, the drug trade is best positioned to spread corruption.  Drugs generate illegal revenues on a scale without historical precedent.  At a street value of $100 per gram, each metric ton of cocaine or heroin sold on the streets of the United States is worth $100 million, twice as much if its purity is cut to increase quantity.  At this price, 100 metric tons of cocaine seized in the Western Hemisphere in 1994 would have been worth at least $ 10 billion, more than the GNP of many developing countries.  This gives the drug trade revenues on a scale not available to most national governments -- and traffickers do not have to account to a central budget authority for their expenditures.  Trafficking organizations have the wherewithal to buy their way into power.  Why resort to armed force when one can buy protection at the highest levels of government?  Of course, since they have modern fire-power and few ethical restraints against using it, violence  is available as a fall-back position.

In the 1980's, many governments of the key drug-affected countries were slow to react to the threat posed by drug corruption.  They placed the onus of blame and the responsibility for control on the consuming countries, especially on the world's largest consumer, the United States.  Some governments felt that they could reap the economic benefits of large infusions of drug cash without paying any of the costs.  These illusions were dispelled when Colombia's Medellin mafia assassinated the Minister of Justice in 1984.  Since then drug syndicates have killed a Colombian presidential candidate (1989), Mexico's leading prelate (1993), and perhaps were involved in the assassination of the Mexican presidential candidate last September.  Not even the highest levels of government are immune from attack by determined trafficking organizations seeking to manipulate democratic governments.  As tragic as these deaths were, they demonstrate that no country can tolerate for long the presence of powerful drug trafficking interests.  They show that it is only a question of time before they will face a direct or indirect challenge to their legitimacy by the drug trade.  It is imperative that we intensify our collective efforts to destroy the drug trade before it succeeds in fully gaining de facto power in any country in the hemisphere.

The Certification Process.  Drug corruption, like any form of subversion, thrives underground or in the shadows.  It is in the drug trade's interest to remain behind the scenes working through corrupt public officials who can maintain a facade of probity and respectability.  One of the best ways of routing out drug corruption is to expose it to public scrutiny.  Thanks to a provision in the Foreign Assistance Act, the United States Government has a powerful diplomatic spotlight to illuminate such corruption:  the drug certification process.  Each year the President must certify whether every major drug producing and transit country has cooperated fully of has taken adequate steps on its own to meet the goals and objectives of the 1988 UN Convention, including the elimination of public corruption.  In his annual determination, the President of the United States can focus international attention on the performance of the principal drug countries, citing their accomplishments and shortcomings and, if necessary, imposing serious foreign assistance reductions and other sanctions. 
 In the past two years, in keeping with a Presidential Directive, we have been using the certification process more stringently than ever before to provide honest appraisals of performance, recognize achievement, and condemn backsliding.  We believe that, as painful or embarrassing as some countries may find this public scrutiny, it is the most effective means of ensuring that the drug trade cannot hide behind the polite formalities of traditional bilateral diplomacy.  While such revelations may cause short-term embarrassment, in the long run they will limit the influence of the drug trade. 


Experience has taught us that the drug trade is far from invincible.  It is vulnerable at four points:  at the source (suppression of drug crops); in processing (destruction of refineries, disruption of processing chemicals to clandestine labs); in the distribution system (interdicting shipments); and in its financial dealings (interrupting drug money flows).  But it is particularly vulnerable at the crop cultivation and the financial operations stages.  We have already stressed the importance of eliminating drugs at the source through eradication, but the financial transactions stage is also critical.  

The drug cartels have created an enormous money-generating machine.  It transforms a crude, common natural product into one of the world's most lucrative commodities.  But this machine can only function when fueled by a steady flow of drugs to generate the money the syndicates require to stay in business.  And the trafficking organizations can only remain viable with ready access to the money necessary to buy and process the drugs.  Since the illicit drug trade, like a legitimate enterprise, partially finances future growth by borrowing against future earnings, every metric ton of drugs that does not make it to market represents a potential loss of tens of millions of dollars in essential revenue.  

The formula for choking off the drug trade is simple:  no drugs, no money; no money, no drugs.  Implementing it, of course, is more difficult, but not impossible.  By cutting off one or both of these critical ingredients for long enough, we can weaken and eventually destroy today's drug syndicates.

Our next step must be collectively to regain and maintain momentum in attacking the drug problem at all its vulnerable points.  In past years we have often seen governments gear up for major campaigns against drug production and trafficking, undertake successful operations to put the drug syndicates on the defensive, and then lose heart.  We keep taking and losing the same ground in regular cycles, many of which coincide with foreign election years when drug interests can manipulate the local political situation to their benefit.

Yet progress is possible.  The governments of the major drug producing and transit countries should adhere to a simple military principle: they will not give up ground once taken.  Had several major producer countries observed this principle over the past few years, drug crops could have been reduced dramatically.  Bolivia, for example, in 1990 eradicated over 8,000 hectares of coca.  In 1988, Peru eradicated over 5,000 hectares.  The same year Burma  destroyed more than 12,000 hectares of opium poppy.  The drug trade suffered.  Had that peak rate been maintained subsequently and new cultivation prevented, Bolivia by now could have limited production to that required to meet legitimate needs, Peru's cultivation could have been checked much earlier, and Burma could have been down to half the opium poppy hectarage detected at the end of 1994.  That would be real progress.  Whatever the reasons for not sustaining this pace, these countries showed what is possible when a government throws its weight behind drug control. 

We must work collectively to ensure that more governments keep up the offensive against the drug trade.  This means working together to suppress and eventually eliminate illicit drug crops altogether.  It means better law enforcement efforts to dismantle trafficking organizations and to keep drugs from entering the pipeline. It means more effective judicial reform to put and keep traffickers in jail.  It means improved cooperation in the implementation of the Chemical Action Task Force's recommendations to deny traffickers the essential chemicals they need to produce cocaine and heroin.  It requires closer international cooperation in fora such as the Financial Action Task Force, targeting the drug trade's profits, and focusing on elements such as stronger asset seizure laws and less bank secrecy.  It also requires multilateral assistance to provide alternatives to drug crops, while increasing drug awareness, education, and prevention activities.

Finally, it requires the recognition by all governments that a strong drug trade--and especially the corruption it fosters--poses a direct challenge to national sovereignty.  While the United States Government will continue to provide international leadership and resources to fight drugs, our partners must renew their commitment to rolling back the drug trade even in the face of inevitable political resistance.  National self-interest, not levels of foreign assistance, must drive counternarcotics policy, since ultimately it is democratic government itself that is at stake in any contest with a powerful and entrenched drug trade.

                                   * * *


Cocaine still poses the greatest immediate drug threat to the country.  In its smokable form--crack--cocaine is one of the most immediately addictive drugs known to mankind.  Its stimulant and euphoric properties not only induce very rapid addiction, but can also provoke violent behavior in users.  Much of the worst violence in America's large cities stems from the cocaine trade.  Despite the USG's efforts, cocaine continues to pour into the United States, often in multi-ton shipments, by land, sea, and air.  Prices remain low, availability high, and use distressingly constant.

But the United States is not alone.  Realizing that no market is eternal, the major trafficking organizations have targeted the European public, as the enormous loads of cocaine that surface in European capitals attest.  Italian authorities seized over six metric tons of cocaine in 1994, including the largest single European cocaine seizure on record, a shipment of 5.5 metric tons. Portugal reported 1.6 metric tons seized in the first ten months of the year.   French authorities seized 1.5 metric tons of cocaine in Southwest France, their largest single seizure to date.  Other European countries, including those in Eastern Europe and the Confederation of Independent States (CIS), have reported rising cocaine imports.  Poland, now a transit point for the Cali syndicate, seized ten times more cocaine in 1994 than in 1993.  There are reports of increasing cocaine abuse in cities as distant as Bangkok and Johannesburg.  Ghanaian authorities made their largest cocaine seizure in September.  Thus, what began primarily as a US problem has now become a global threat with serious implications for other governments already struggling with major social, health, and economic difficulties.  And the cocaine flow shows no immediate sign of abating, though we have the technical means to cut it off at the source.

The Case for Coca Eradication.  The expansion of cocaine exports, and our collective inability to interdict enough to put a serious dent in the market, underscores the importance of eliminating the coca crop on the ground.  Unlike the widely dispersed opium poppy, the coca bush grows in a finite geographic area in three Andean countries.  The US, which has pinpointed the major growing areas, has spray aircraft and a safe herbicide that can destroy illegal cultivation in a matter of months.  Since the coca bush does not fully come "on-line" until it is 18 months or two years old, these simple measures could deprive the cocaine trade of its basic material, crippling it if not destroying it entirely.  We need the necessary cooperation of the two largest coca growing countries to carry out this simple, but effective, crop control measure.

Source and Transit Highlights.  US-bound cocaine traffic from South America shifted repeatedly during 1994, as the traffickers alternated routes to evade interdiction efforts.  The heavy US military presence in the central Caribbean during the blockade of Haiti diverted much of the traffic to the Eastern Caribbean and Central America.  The Eastern Caribbean in particular appears to loom large in traffickers' plans for opening new routes to both the United States and Europe, since it also includes territories still linked to the United Kingdom, France, and the Netherlands.  
Although Colombia reported spraying over 4,900 hectares of coca, by year's end the crop had increased by 13 percent to 45,000 hectares, only slightly less than Bolivia, the world's second largest grower.  While current evidence indicates that Colombian coca generally is of the low-yield epadu variety, with half the yield of Bolivian coca, the expansion of the crop is a disturbing development since it gives the Colombian drug syndicates a growing source of raw material as a hedge against possible crop destruction in Peru and Bolivia.  Colombian authorities seized 62 metric tons of cocaine products (30 metric tons of cocaine hydrochloride (HCl) and 32 metric tons of cocaine base) nearly twice as much as the year before but not as much as the 1991 record of 86 metric tons.  

For the fourth consecutive year, Bolivia missed its 5,000 to 8,000 hectares coca eradication target by the widest margin to date, eradicating only 1,058 hectares.  By the end of the year, there were under cultivation 48,100 hectares of coca, more than in the previous three years but below the 1989 record of 52,900 hectares.  As in previous years, the main impediments to eradication were political.  We hope that the Bolivian government will overcome its political trepidation and meet its target in 1995.   Seizures of cocaine base (approximately 6 metric tons) and cocaine HCl (1.02 metric tons) were up over the 5.3 metric tons seized in 1993.  

In Peru, the world's largest coca grower, total cultivation remained stable at 108,600 hectares, thanks in part to the cumulative law enforcement activities of previous years, and to a fungus that struck in the principal coca-growing area of the Upper Huallaga Valley.  The government eradicated coca seedbeds equivalent to nearly 5,000 hectares of mature cultivation.  At the same time, coca cultivation spread to outlying areas where drug  cultivation and trafficking was minimal.  Peruvian authorities seized over 10 metric tons of cocaine paste, base, and HCl.

In Mexico, cocaine seizures fell to their lowest level in six years, as the assassination of two political leaders, the revolt in Chiapas, and a change of administration diverted law enforcement efforts from counternarcotics efforts.  Mexican authorities seized 19.8 metric tons in the first ten months of 1994, not quite half of what they had seized during the same period in 1993.  Since Mexico is one of the major staging areas for US-bound cocaine, any decline in seizures almost certainly meant an increase of cocaine flowing to US markets last year.

In Panama, on the other hand, cocaine seizures rose to 8.1 metric tons, a 42 percent increase over last year's 5.7 metric tons.  It included one seizure of 3.5 metric tons, a record for Panama.  For the second year running, in a joint effort with the USG, Panamanian spray aircraft eradicated 90 hectares of coca in the Darien region.  This operation not only checked potential new cultivation outside a traditional coca-growing area, but again demonstrated the feasibility and safety of aerial crop destruction.  Costa Rica seized 1.5 metric tons of cocaine HCl in 1994, only slightly less than its 1992 record high of 1.8 metric tons and nearly three times as much as it seized in 1993.  Belize may be emerging as a potentially significant cocaine transit area.  The withdrawal of British Forces from Belize in October 1994 removed a major deterrent to drug transit through this largely uncontrolled territory.   Although Belizean police had seized only 141 kg of cocaine by the end of 1994, in early 1995 they made a record haul of over half a metric ton.  While this increase in the quantity of cocaine seized may simply reflect more effective performance, it also suggests that traffickers are looking for weak points through which to divert routes blocked by USG and other interdiction forces.

This was certainly the case in the Eastern Caribbean, a gateway to drugs entering the US Virgin Islands and Puerto Rico.  In 1994, the region emerged as a major transit corridor for US-bound drugs.  The success of US interdiction efforts in The Bahamas and Turks and Caicos islands, as well as US military activity around Hispaniola, contributed to the use of the area, which also includes British, Dutch, and French territories offering excellent conduits to Europe.  The growing presence of drug traffickers also shook the political stability of the region, as drug lords attempted to muscle in on governments.  The most violent events occurred in St. Kitts, where a deputy Prime Minister resigned after one son was killed and another two were arrested on drug trafficking charges.  While the security forces of the seven independent Eastern Caribbean countries are grouped in a Regional Security System, their capability is limited.  We can expect the drug trade to keep pressure on this region, especially if US, UK, and Canadian funding for regional interdiction forces declines as projected.


Judging from the quantities seized and the efforts to expand opium cultivation, the world's craving for heroin did not diminish in 1994.  Heroin, which has long been the hard core addict's preferred drug in Europe and Asia, has gradually been staging a comeback in the United States.  The US heroin addict population, which had remained stable at about 500,000 persons for nearly two decades, has grown to about 600,000 and may well be higher.  A disturbing trend of multiple drug use suggests that more of America's 2.1 million hard-core cocaine addicts are using heroin to cushion the "crash" that follows the euphoria of crack use.  The availability of a more potent, high purity heroin that can be snorted or smoked instead of injected may also add to its appeal.  The drug trade appears to be counting on heroin's track record as a drug that can be used over longer periods of time.  Unlike cocaine, which burns out its addicts in five years or less, heroin destroys its victims more slowly, in some cases allowing users to take the drug for decades.  

Heroin is also taking its toll outside of the Western Hemisphere.  Europe continues to suffer massive heroin addiction problems as larger shipments of the opiate move to the farthest reaches of Northern Europe and the countries of the former Soviet Union.  Heroin markets are emerging in the Czech Republic, Hungary, and other countries in Eastern Europe, as more open borders facilitate transit of the drug.  Heroin seizures are now commonplace in Africa, where Nigeria plays a pivotal role as a distribution center.  In Southeast Asia, more addicts are switching from opium to heroin.  China's addict population is on the rise, while Thailand has reported that heroin has replaced opium as the main drug of addiction among the hilltribes.

Wholesale Advantage.  One should not overlook the economics of the heroin trade.  Although heroin and cocaine are priced competitively at the street-level (sales per gram), at the wholesale level heroin provides a much higher return to the drug syndicates.  A kilo of cocaine sells wholesale for between $10,500 and $40,000; a kilo of heroin brings in between $150,000 to $250,000.  As heroin gains in appeal in the US, the South American cocaine trafficking syndicates are well positioned to take advantage of the wholesale profitability of the heroin trade.

Source and Transit Highlights.  In the Western Hemisphere, Colombia again towered above other countries as the major opium poppy cultivation center, with an estimated 20,000 hectares of poppies under cultivation.  While the opium gum yield is probably low--a yield study has yet to be conducted--Colombia may now be growing three and a half times more opium poppy than Mexico, even after the Colombian police reported eradicating nearly 4,700 hectares.  Opium poppy cultivation in 1994 also spread across the border to Venezuela, where government authorities effectively eliminated incipient opium poppy cultivation by eradicating over 1,000 hectares in the Serrania de Perija frontier region.  In Peru, the government destroyed numerous small poppy plots and in December made its first seizure of a commercial quantity of raw opium material.  This move toward opium poppy cultivation should be a major source of worry to all governments concerned, since it represents an escalation of Latin America's already serious drug production problems.  It is also a matter of concern to the United States, since the quality of South American heroin is improving.  In its 1993 NNICC Report, issued in August 1994, the Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA) noted that South American heroin had the highest purity (average 59.3 percent) of any samples analyzed under its Domestic Monitor Program.

Since Guatemala has successfully eliminated all but a negligible amount of poppy cultivation--another testimonial to the critical importance of aerial eradication--Mexico remains the second largest Latin America grower of opium poppy.  At the end of the year, the Mexican government had eradicated over 6,600 hectares, leaving approximately 5,800 hectares under cultivation.  Mexico's cultivation levels in 1994 were the highest since 1989, when the Salinas government began an aggressive campaign to reduce opium production.

Nigeria remained a center for heroin trafficking networks in 1994.  Nigerian couriers move heroin to all points of the compass, especially to Europe.  Like Colombians in the cocaine trade, Nigerians are all but ubiquitous figures in heroin distribution networks.  Nigerian trafficking organizations have been using Ethiopia as a regional hub to move heroin to and from Europe via Pakistan and India.  Pakistani authorities arrested eight Nigerians with heroin aboard an Addis Ababa-bound flight in October.  Ethiopian officials, in turn, arrested five Nigerian heroin traffickers in Addis Ababa in December.  In addition, Thai prisons are full of Nigerians arrested for supplying heroin to US-based distribution rings.

Heroin continued to pour into Europe in 1994 along the "Balkan route," a network of roads and water conduits that carry drugs from Turkey to Western Europe. According to the Drug Enforcement Administration's 1993 NNICC Report, three quarters of all the heroin seized in Europe in the  past few years has moved along this route.  The original Balkan Route, which ran from Turkey to Austria through the former Yugoslavia has now forked into a Southern Route through Greece to Italy and a Northern Route running through Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, and Romania to Germany.  Much of the traffic is controlled by Turkish drug syndicates working with distributors in ethnic enclaves in large European cities.  

The countries of the Commonwealth of Independent States(CIS) have also seen a growing influx of heroin, much of it coming up from Afghanistan and Pakistan through the Central Asian Republics, as well as from offshoots of the Balkan Route.  All countries in the region report growing addiction to opiates ranging from crude products such as extract of poppy straw to high purity heroin.  The breakdown of central authority in many countries has left the field open to drug traffickers, who are taking full advantage of the situation.  It is also likely that opium poppy cultivation is spreading in many of the CIS countries, since many had once had traditional poppy plots.  Ukraine reported an increase in poppy cultivation in its Ciscarpathian region, where a crude, potent, and cheap poppy extract reportedly has been competing successfully with more costly Pakistani opium.  Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, and Uzbekistan are important poppy growing regions whose scarce enforcement resources, and in some cases civil wars, allow trafficking bands under local "khans" to operate with relative impunity in the region's remote mountainous areas.  According to Russian authorities, in 1994 increasing amounts of opium from Tajikistan moved through Kyrgyzstan and on to Russia and the Baltic countries.

Southwest Asia experienced an expansion of opium poppy cultivation thanks to favorable growing conditions and minimal government intervention.  Afghanistan set a new record of 29,100 hectares, more than double the 12,370 hectares reported in 1990, when active intervention by tribal leaders significantly reduced the crop.  Most of the expansion in 1994 came from a tripling of cultivation in Helmand province.  The USG estimates that the 1994 Afghan opium poppy crop potentially could have produced 950 metric tons of opium gum, six times more than Pakistan, which had 7,270 hectares under cultivation at the end of 1994 with a potential yield of 160 metric tons of gum.  Pakistan did not conduct a significant eradication effort in 1994, eliminating just over half the amount eradicated in 1993.  DEA estimates that half of all the opiates arriving in Turkey were transshipped from Karachi or the Makram coast of Baluchistan.  A USG crop survey revealed that India in 1994 had 5,500 hectares of illicit opium poppy under cultivation, with a potential yield of 82 metric tons of opium gum, equal to 20 percent of the licit opium that Indian farmers produce for pharmaceutical use in India and overseas, principally the US.  

Despite poor growing conditions in the Golden Triangle area of Southeast Asia, there was no shortage of opium.  The 2,157 metric tons of opium potentially available could have yielded over 202 metric tons of heroin.  Burma remains the undisputed leader in world illicit opium output, providing over 50 percent of known global illicit production.  Even with a 21 percent drop in potential production over 1993's estimate, Burma's 2,030 metric tons of opium gum alone would probably meet most of the world's heroin needs.  While there were modest signs of greater Burmese  government counternarcotics efforts, these efforts fell far short of the measures necessary to make serious progress against the drug trade in Burma.  As in previous years, heroin seizures (one third of a metric ton) were disproportionately low in comparison to either the total potential crop or achievements of other countries. 

China is a major transit route for heroin from Burma, Laos, and Vietnam to the US and other overseas markets.  In 1994, the USG completed a crop survey of China's Yunnan Province showing 1,965 hectares of illicit opium poppy, with an estimated potential yield of 25 metric tons of gum.  China led its neighbors by a wide margin in heroin seizures--over three metric tons in the first nine months of 1994.  In Laos, opium poppy cultivation dropped to an historical low of 18,520 hectares, yielding an estimated potential 85 metric tons, less than half the 1993 estimated yield of 180 metric tons.  Seizures in Laos remained disappointingly low at less than 62 kilos seized in the first eleven months of 1994.  This was an improvement over 1993, however, when Laotian authorities seized less than one kilo.  Thailand, the main transit route for drugs from the Golden Triangle, is no longer a significant producer of opium gum.  It had 2,110 hectares of opium poppy under cultivation in 1994, with a potential yield of 17 metric tons of gum.  In a precedent-setting cooperative law enforcement operation pursuant to a USG extradition request, the Thai government arrested and is processing US extradition requests for ten of drug warlord Khun Sa's most important associates.  Thai authorities seized nearly a metric ton of heroin during the first ten months of 1994.


At the end of 1994, 105 countries were parties to the 1988 UN Convention.  During the year, nine countries--Colombia, Ethiopia, Kyrgystan, Latvia, Norway, Panama, Poland, St. Vincent and the Grenadines, and Sierra Leone--ratified or acceded to the Convention.  We hope that those countries that are not yet parties to the Convention will become parties in 1995.


International organizational efforts continue to be a key component of the overall US counternarcotics strategy.  Through multilateral organizations the United States has the opportunity to multiply contributions from other donors and decrease the perception that drugs are exclusively a US problem.  The US participation in multilateral programs also supports indigenous capabilities in regions where the US is unable to operate bilaterally for political or logistical reasons.  Moreover, US contributions to the United Nations Drug Control Program (UNDCP) have had significant impact on the operations and expansion of UN counternarcotics programs and policy.  

UNDCP.  UNDCP has increased the number of projects as well as expanded the scope of its effort to include emerging drug source areas such as Vietnam, Cambodia, and the Central Asian states.  Although forty percent of its total budget in 1993 went for supply reduction (alternative development), UNDCP expanded its support for institution building and demand reduction in 1994.   

In addition, it:

--   continued the first sub-regional projects between Thailand-Burma and China-Burma to eliminate opium poppy and increase interdiction efforts; 

--   established a pilot project in the Wa-controlled area of Burma;

--   developed a follow-up program for remote and larger opium growing areas in Dir Pakistan, a key poppy growing area where significant opium poppy eradication has taken place in conjunction with UNDCP provided assistance;

--   expanded UNDCP activities to provide chemical control investigative training;

--   established a regional training project in the Caribbean to train prosecutors and judges in order to improve conviction rates on narcotics-related cases;

--   coordinated bilateral and multilateral assistance to Eastern Europe and the NIS, and providing advice and legal expertise to the Newly Independent States to implement 1988 UN Convention, to bolster law enforcement and customs institutions;

At USG urging UNDCP is seeking to bolster its programs and revamp many of its field operations to more effectively focus on drug control objectives.  UNDCP is strengthening efforts to focus programs and gain recipient commitment, including requiring specific in-kind contributions from the recipients.  Stronger monitoring requirements are also included and projects are required to fit into the master plan approach which is a planning tool that outlines assistance needs and areas for recipient commitment.

Despite these efforts UNDCP is facing significant budget constraints.  Increased contributions from donors such as Japan, did not make up for a $23 million deficit caused by a drop in contributions from the largest donor, Italy.  

The USG is strongly backs UNDCP's efforts to work within the UN to garner increased support from other UN bodies such as UNDP, FAO, UNICEF, and the International Financial Institutions.  The financial and political power of other multilateral organizations would lend increased support to the UN drug effort.

UNDCP continues to support the treaty-based functions of the International Narcotics Control Board (INCB).  Through the INCB secretariat which is housed in UNDCP, there has been increased efforts to establish a database on chemical exports.  It has also prepared a model legislation package to assist governments to implement the UN drug conventions.  This package has already been used by countries from Latin America to the NIS.  

Organization of American States (OAS).  The USG strongly supports OAS's anti-drug commission (CICAD) and increased interest has resulted stimulated increased aid from other donors.  The OAS program concentrates on developing policy and program tools and training which can benefit all OAS Member States, rather than field projects.  Some of the direct results of US contributions to OAS/CICAD:

--   the development of model regulations on the control of precursor and essential chemicals and working with UNDCP to assist governments with implementation;

--   the development of model regulations on control of money laundering and asset forfeiture which will be followed up by a series of subregional implementation workshops;

--   assisting governments and non-governmental organizations to develop public awareness and drug abuse prevention campaigns;

--   the provision of demand reduction prevention and awareness funded training in the area of drug treatment;

--   implementation of a legal development program in Central America to assist countries to develop stronger laws, and better legal infrastructures, and to facilitate cooperation;

--   the development of standardized statistical systems throughout the hemisphere a regional epidemiological survey was conducted in Central America.


Almost all of the major illicit drug producing and transit countries now have significant drug abuse problems, which not only degrade the political, social, and economic stability of a nation, but offer new markets to the drug trade.  The USG has been working with many of these countries to reduce demand and prevent drug abuse.

In 1994, the USG addressed the question of international demand reduction through continuing bilateral and multilateral efforts.  Bilaterally, INL continued to fund programs on demand reduction training (education, prevention, treatment, research) and public awareness, primarily in Latin America, Southeast and Southwest Asia.  Increased assistance was provided to Eastern Europe, South Africa, and the Commonwealth of Independent States.  It conducted bilateral programs in 1994 with Brazil, China, Colombia, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Guatemala, India, Jamaica, Malaysia, Mexico, Pakistan, Panama, Peru, Thailand, and Venezuela, as well as with less significant drug producing and transit countries.

Multilaterally, the USG continued to work closely with the European Union, the UNDCP, UNICEF, the Inter-American Development Bank (IADB), OAS-CICAD, the Colombo Plan, the Pan American Health Organization (PAHO), and ASEAN on such projects as enhancing or creating regional demand reduction training centers in Argentina, Sicily, Thailand, and the Caribbean, and drug prevention services for "street children" in Brazil, Peru, Colombia, Ecuador, Bolivia, and Venezuela.

Significant accomplishments in the areas of demand reduction training and collaborative initiatives with other donors include the following:

--   Thailand continued to build and staff a $14 million, residential drug treatment complex and training center close to Bangkok.

--   Thailand also developed a major community outreach program in Rangsit that includes re-entry, adolescent day care, and adult outpatient services, in addition to a 24 hour hotline.  It also started treatment programs in northern and southern Thailand.  There are plans for the construction of a second residential treatment program in Bangkok.

--   Colombia continued to expand its national coalitions of treatment and prevention programs.  The government convened a major treatment conference/training session for Latin American programs in Cartagena in July 1994.

--   Malaysia, India, and Nepal developed prison-based drug treatment programs, while Pakistan established residential treatment programs in Peshawar and Islamabad, following INL/Colombo Plan training.

--   Hungary developed residential drug treatment programs in Szeged and Pesc.

--   Based on INL/Center for Substance Abuse Prevention (CSAP) drug prevention training, India (Madras) formed a South Indian Citizens Forum Against Drug Abuse that includes senior Government officials and NGOs and established a school-based drug awareness program.

--   Japan co-funded demand reduction projects with INL in South Africa (prevention and treatment), in addition to providing funds to an Andean street kids initiative developed by INL and OAS-CICAD.

--   The IADB provided substantial funding to the network of street kids organizations in the State of Sao Paulo, Brazil, that were originally developed with INL and  European Union (EU) funding.

--   INL projects designed to develop community partnerships/coalitions of drug prevention programs in Asia received collaborative funding from the EU, UNDCP, and Colombo Plan.

--   INL and the UNDCP developed plans to provide UNDCP funding for INL's sub-regional training center in Brazil for street kids, workers, and health care workers providing prevention/treatment services to adolescents.  The center will include training slots for other Latin American countries.

--   INL and the UNDCP also developed plans to provide UNDCP funding for INL's Sicily-based regional training center for Eastern Europe.


In early 1994, the Departments of Justice (including DEA), Treasury (including Customs) and State cooperated to review progress to date in chemical control and to develop a forward-looking strategy for an expanded US and international program to control diversion of precursor and essential chemicals.

The participants concluded that:  "domestic and international efforts in chemical control are on the right path.  The problem of chemical diversion has received increased international attention at policy and operational levels.  Governments and international organizations have achieved a consensus on appropriate international controls, and the US and many other countries have enacted adequate national laws.  There have been some encouraging recent signs on both domestic and international fronts.  However, the global system of controls remains less than wholly efficient because it has not been fully implemented.  The reasons for this vary from country to country, but generally include:  (1) insufficient time to create the necessary administrative infrastructures, (2) lack of political will, (3) lack of resources, (4) lack of training, and (5) lack of communication internationally and between domestic enforcement agencies."

The strategy addresses these problems at both the policy/political and operational levels.  It emphasizes multilateral cooperation in recognition of the international nature of the issue, usually involving diversion from commercial chemical transactions between third countries, and the need to enlist international support for chemical control training and assistance programs.  Some of the most important developments in 1994 supportive of this policy include:

--   The Inter-American Drug Control Commission (CICAD) of the Organization of American States (OAS) reconvened its chemical experts' group in May 1994 to assess progress in adopting and implementing the OAS Model Chemical Regulation.  In response to a US suggestion, representatives from the European Union (EU) were invited.  The meeting recommended, inter alia, that the EU and the CICAD meet and agree on the basis for cooperative agreements between the EU and OAS member states for controlling chemical commerce to prevent diversion.  The fall 1994 CICAD meeting endorsed the chemical experts' recommendation, and it was one of the items cited for special support during the December 1994 Miami Summit of the Americas.  The CICAD/EU discussions on the basic elements of agreements are underway.

--   In February 1994, the UNDCP and the INCB held the first of two workshops on precursor control in Southeast Asia.  The workshop was hosted by the Government of Thailand and funded in part by a special financial contribution from the United Kingdom.  The second workshop was held January 30-February 3, 1995, in Manila hosted by the Government of the Philippines and with continuing financial support from the United Kingdom.

--   UNDCP in August 1994 disseminated "Guidelines for Use by National Authorities in Preventing the Diversion of Precursors and Essential Chemical."  The Guidelines build on the chemical control provisions of the 1988 UN Convention and draw on the recommendations of the Chemical Action Task Force (CATF).  They provide the basis for national implementation of comprehensive, complementary chemical control regimes that will permit the inter-governmental cooperation essential for chemical diversion control.

--   In October 1994, DEA, with significant financial support from the European Union, held a conference in Austria on drug and chemical diversion control for policy- and senior-level officials from ten CIS countries.  The conference helped to establish a dialogue with CIS policy-level officials on the problems of illicit drug transit, manufacture, and uncontrolled trade in pharmaceuticals, steroids, and chemicals.  Major topics of discussion were the need for adequate legislation and international treaty compliance, and the need to establish or strengthen national frameworks for administering drug and chemical regulatory and enforcement programs.

--   Beginning in the fall of 1994, six South American countries--Bolivia, Peru, Chile, Brazil, Argentina, and Paraguay--cooperated in a joint operation - "Border Crunch" - to stem the flow of cocaine essential chemicals into Bolivia.  Conducted with US support and assistance, the operation was directed at stopping the smuggling of chemicals into Bolivia by establishing or beefing up checks on cargo moving into the country.  It succeeded in temporarily disrupting that traffic.  

--   India and Pakistan held discussions under the auspices of UNDCP to improve bilateral counternarcotics cooperation.  In late 1994, the two governments signed an agreement to cooperate in controlling the smuggling of chemicals and narcotics between the two countries.

--   In March 9, 1994, the Colombian National Police, in coordination with other national law enforcement authorities, raided the offices and storage facilities of Hollanda Chemical International.  Authorities seized 1,754 metric tons of chemicals, enough to process 135.5 metric tons of cocaine.  The raids were based on information developed by the US (DEA) and Colombian law enforcement authorities.

--   Operational cooperation between US and German authorities increased, with the result that German authorities suspended three additional shipments of regulated chemicals to Latin America.  Additionally, German authorities have on several occasions provided intelligence to the USG regarding proposed critical chemical shipments to sensitive areas.  Cooperation with Dutch authorities at the operational level is also improving.


There were a number of significant accomplishments in the world of money laundering in 1994, and a number of new and/or intensified concerns:

Accomplishments.  The Financial Action Task Force (FATF) completed the evaluations of each of its 26 member governments, all conducted by outside experts and all culminating in recommendations for changes and improvements which will be monitored through continuing examinations beginning in late 1995.  The willingness of these leading financial centers to be examined by these experts testifies to the political will of FATF member governments, while reinforcing the universality of FATF's 40 recommendations and setting an example FATF urges other governments to emulate.

FATF took a major policy step in broadening the scope of its mandate to include money laundering from all serious crime, not limited to just drug trafficking, and its members began amending their laws to follow suit.  FATF also took this broader approach on the road, urging adoption of its policy recommendations at seminars in Latin America, Asia and Europe.

Several financial center governments, such as Singapore and Panama, have adopted broad, new anti-money laundering policies and/or laws, and a number of governments were in the final stages of presenting/adopting new legislation.  Russia and Eastern Europe received a continuing high level of bilateral and multilateral attention in 1994. 

The successful cooperation between the US and foreign governments on multinational investigations, demonstrated earlier in Operation Green Ice, was manifest again in 1994 through Operations Primero and Dinero (which drew heavily for their successes on Spain, France, Italy, Canada and the UK).

The US also strengthened its domestic and international capabilities through the 1994 Money Laundering Suppression Act which applies the various US anti-money laundering measures to all money transmitters, while also promulgating wire transfer regulations, and reorganizing the Financial Crimes Enforcement Network and adopting a more comprehensive strategy for the Internal Revenue Service with respect to financial crimes.

Justice, Treasury and the Postal Service signed a memorandum of understanding establishing a mechanism for coordinating international drug money laundering undercover operations.

The money laundering issue continued to receive attention from major international policy making bodies, like the G-7, the Commission of the European Communities, the OAS and others, as well as specialized groups such as the Summit of the Americas and the UN-sponsored crime conference in Naples.

Concerns.  Although more governments have ratified the 1988 UN Convention, and many important financial centers have adopted legislation to curb drug-related money laundering, far too many priority financial centers have yet to adopt needed legislation and/or to adhere to the Convention.  Overall, the pace of implementation of these laws has been too slow.

Offshore banking, with the assurance of absolute secrecy by many jurisdictions which license such facilities, and, the manipulation of trade practices to move and conceal or generate illicit proceeds, were of increasing concern at year's end.  Also of concern are the counterfeiting of currencies and other monetary instruments, especially bonds; the boom in contraband smuggling; the covert and sometimes overt buying of banks and other financial institutions by suspected criminal groups; the resort by criminals to the use of smaller, less-monitored banks; and the sophisticated use of such new phenomena as direct access and pass-through banking, and electronic cash systems.

There is continuing concern, given that financial crimes and money laundering are occurring with varying degrees of regularity in more than 125 jurisdictions, that some affected and/or vulnerable governments still have not criminalized money laundering.  Some governments have not given sufficient regulatory authority to their central banks and other institutions to deal with this problem; many do not have adequate data systems to monitor trends and methods used in their territories, and many have not made adequate provision for mutual legal assistance.

Because of these issues, countries which have legislative, regulatory and enforcement systems that are vulnerable to money laundering, or limited ability to react to money laundering or other financial crime (whether drug-related or involving other illicit proceeds) can be considered to be of concern.  Whether there is current evidence or not of drug-related money laundering in a given jurisdiction, the existence of or vulnerability to other financial crimes in that jurisdiction will eventually attract drug-related proceeds.


How much do we know?  This report contains tables showing a variety of illicit narcotics-related data.  While these numbers represent the USG's best effort to sketch the dimensions of the international drug problem, the picture is not as precise as we would like it to be.  The numbers range from cultivation figures, relatively hard data derived by proven means, to crop production and drug yield estimates, much softer figures where many more variables come into play.  We publish these numbers with an important caveat:  the yield figures are potential, not actual numbers.  Although they are useful for examining trends, they are only approximations.  They should not be treated as hard data.

Since much information is lacking on yields, the numbers are subject to revision as more data become known.  The nature of the illegal drug trade, in which the traffickers take great pains to maintain the security of their activities, makes it difficult to develop precise information.  This is particularly relevant given the tremendous geographic areas that must be covered, and the difficulty of collecting reliable information in diverse and treacherous terrain.

What We Know with Reasonable Certainty.  The most reliable information we have on illicit drugs is how many hectares are under cultivation.  For more than a decade and a half, the USG has estimated the extent of illicit cultivation in a dozen nations using proven methods similar to those used to estimate the size of licit crops at home and abroad.  We can thus estimate the area under cultivation with reasonable accuracy.

What we know with less certainty.  Where crop yields are concerned, the picture is less clear.  How much of a finished product a given area will produce is difficult to estimate, since small changes in such factors as soil fertility, weather, farming techniques, and disease can produce widely varying results from year to year and place to place.  In addition, most illicit drug crop areas are inaccessible to the USG, making scientific information difficult to obtain.  Moreover, we must stress that even as we refine our methods of analysis, we are estimating potential crop available for harvest.

These estimates do not allow for losses, which could represent up to a third or more of a crop in some areas for some harvests.  Thus the estimate of the potential crop is useful in providing a theoretical, comparative analysis from year to year, but the actual quantity of final product remains elusive.

Since cocaine has been at the top of the USG's drug-control priority list, the USG has been trying to develop better yield data.  USG confidence in coca leaf yield estimates has risen in the past few years, based upon the results of field studies conducted in Latin America.  Three years ago, after completing preliminary research, the USG for the first time began to make its own estimate of dry coca leaf yields for Bolivia and Peru instead of relying solely on reports from the governments of those countries.  Additional research and field studies may help refine these estimates and make similar improvements possible in estimates of other drug crops.  In all cases, multiplying average yields times available hectarage indicates only the potential, not the actual final drug crop available for harvest.  

Harvest Estimates.  Estimating the quantities of coca leaf, opium gum, and cannabis actually harvested and available for processing into finished narcotics remains a major challenge.  While we are making progress, at this time we cannot accurately estimate this amount with precision for any illicit crop in any nation.

While farmers naturally have strong incentives to maximize their harvests of what is almost always their most profitable cash crop, the harvest depends upon the efficiency of farming practices and the wastage caused by poor practices or difficult weather conditions during and after harvest.  Up to a third or more of a crop may be lost in some areas during harvests.

In addition, mature coca (three to six years old), is more productive than immature or aging coca.  Variations such as these can dramatically affect potential yield and production.  Furthermore, if we continue to see limitations in the expansion of new coca we may begin to see dramatic declines in the next few years in productivity of existing fields.  Factors such as this will produce fluctuations in estimates.

Additional information and analysis may enable us to make adjustments for these factors in the future.  Similar deductions for local consumption of unprocessed coca leaf and opium may be possible as well through the accumulation of additional information and research.

Processing Estimates.  The wide variation in processing efficiency achieved by traffickers complicates the task of estimating the quantity of cocaine or heroin that could be refined from a crop.  These variations occur because of differences in the origin and quality of the raw material used, the technical processing method employed, the size and sophistication of laboratories, the skill and experience of local workers and chemists, and decisions made in response to enforcement pressures.

The USG continues to estimate potential cocaine production as a range based on processing efficiencies that appear to be most common.  But we must stress that these estimates are still soft.  We are currently undertaking a detailed study of this part of the cocaine production process.  (See Yield Estimates below.)

The actual amount of dry coca leaf or opium converted into a final product during any time period remains unknown, given the possible losses noted earlier.  There are indications, however, that cocaine processing efficiencies may not be as high as previously supposed, leaving traffickers with considerable room for improvement.  Nevertheless, increasing seizure rates eat into the future profitability of the industry, and raise the cost of doing business.

Figures Will Change as Techniques and Data Quality Improve.  Are this year's figures definitive?  Almost certainly not.  Additional research will produce revisions to USG estimates of potential drug production.  This is typical of annualized  figures for most other areas of statistical tracking--whether it be the size of the US wheat crop, population figures, or the unemployment rate--that must be revised year to year.  For the present, however, these statistics represent the state of the art.  As new information becomes available and as the art improves, so will the precision of the estimates.


In evaluating the figures below, one must bear in mind that they are theoretical.  They represent estimates of potential production--the amounts that the USG estimates could have been produced if, and only if, all available crops were to be converted into finished drugs.  Since these estimates make no allowance for losses, actual production is probably lower than our estimates.  The figures shown are mean points in a statistical range.

Potential Opium Production.  In Southeast Asia, estimated opium cultivation and production in the Golden Triangle countries dropped substantially in 1994.  According to USG estimates, in 1994, growers in Burma, Laos, and Thailand cultivated an estimated 167,230 hectares of opium poppy, potentially yielding 2,132 metric tons of opium gum.  This is a 15 percent decrease in estimated cultivation and a 24 percent drop in production over the 194,720 hectares and 2,797 metric tons estimated for 1993.

In Burma, estimated opium poppy cultivation decreased by some 12 percent to 146,600 hectares over the 165,800 reported for 1993.  Estimated production fell by 21 percent to 2,030 metric tons compared to the 2,575 metric tons reported last year.  Unfavorable weather conditions were largely responsible for the decline of the crop.  In Laos, estimated cultivation decreased by 29 percent to 18,520 hectares from the 1993 figure of 26,040 hectares, estimated production fell by 53 percent to a six-year low of 80 metric tons.  While this drop is dramatic, much of the decrease is attributable to below average rainfall during the sowing season and periods of frost before harvest.  Estimated opium poppy cultivation in Thailand decreased by approximately 27 percent to 2,110 hectares from the 2,880 hectares observed last year.  Thailand had an estimated potential production of 17 metric tons--60 percent below the 42 metric tons estimated in 1993. The USG is still examining the extent of opium cultivation in Vietnam, though a Vietnamese government source reported 3,770 hectares cultivated during the 1993/1994 growing season.  In 1994, the USG for the first time conducted a survey of China's Yunnan Province and located 1,925 hectares of opium poppy, with an estimated potential yield of 25 metric tons of gum.

After levelling off in 1993, opium poppy cultivation in Southwest Asia shot up in 1994.  Total hectarage in Afghanistan and Pakistan increased by 33 percent, from 27,360 hectares in 1993 to 36,450 hectares at the end of 1994.  Afghanistan remains the world's second largest opium producer.  Afghan hectarage increased from 21,080 hectares in 1993 to 29,180 hectares in 1994.  This represents a rising trend from the 17,790 hectares that were under cultivation in 1989.  Potential production rose 39 percent from an estimated 685 metric tons in 1993 to 950 metric tons in 1994.  In Pakistan, opium cultivation was significantly higher in 1994.  Hectarage rose from 6,280 hectares in 1993 to 7,270 hectares at the end of 1994.  Estimated potential production climbed correspondingly from 140 metric tons in 1993 to 160 metric tons in 1994.  For the first time, the USG conducted a survey of India in 1994, detecting 5,500 hectares of opium poppy, with a potential yield of 82 metric tons of gum.  Based on USG data, in 1994 India vied with Laos for the position of the world's third largest potential producer of opium.  We have no firm data about poppy cultivation or opium production in Iran.  The USG estimated in 1992 that Iran had approximately 3,500 hectares of opium poppy with a potential yield of 35 metric tons to 70 metric tons.  There has been no new information in 1994.

The USG is still examining the illicit drug crop situation in Russia, the Baltics, and the Central Asian countries formerly part of the Soviet Union.  While some of these countries may be able to produce significant opium poppy harvests, the USG still lacks sufficient data to identify and measure all suspected cultivation areas.  We do not expect to have conclusive results before late 1995.

In the Western Hemisphere, the opium poppy growing countries have maintained active crop control efforts in the face of a campaign by criminal organizations to expand the area under cultivation.  In Colombia, the government kept total 1994 opium poppy cultivation to approximately 20,000 hectares by aerial destruction of 4,676 hectares.  Alkaloid content remains low, though there are indications that yields have markedly increased as farmers have improved their methods.  Mexico's opium poppy cultivation in 1994 was an estimated 5,795 hectares, after eradicating 6,620 hectares.  The potential yield is 60 metric tons, up 22 percent from 1993's estimate of 49 metric tons.  Guatemala's poppy cultivation remains at minimal levels after government efforts eradicated 150 hectares, three quarters of the amount detected.  

Coca Cultivation.  Worldwide coca cultivation rose very slightly to 201,700 hectares in 1994, still considerably lower than 1992's high of 211,700 hectares.  In Peru, cultivation remained essentially steady at 108,600 hectares.  Colombia experienced the greatest increase in coca cultivation, which, after eradication of 4,910 hectares was 44,700 hectares of coca in place at the end of 1994.  This was a 13 percent increase over the 1993 total of 39,700 hectares.  In Bolivia, government forces eradicated 1,058 hectares of coca, leaving an estimated 48,100 hectares under cultivation at the end of 1994.  This is a negligible increase over 1993's estimate of 47,200 hectares.  Some coca is cultivated in inaccessible areas of Brazil, but its extent is unknown.  Ecuador has only negligible amounts of coca.


The cocaine yield figure is offered with the same caveat as the crop harvest yield data:  it is a figure representing potential production.  It is a theoretical number.  It does not in every case allow for losses or the many other variables that one would encounter in a "real world" conversion from plant to finished drug.  In fact, the amount of cocaine HCl actually produced is probably lower.  A USG team that studied cocaine processing in Bolivia's Chapare region in 1993 found that in the laboratories under observation processing efficiency was lower than previously thought.  The estimate for Bolivia has been reduced accordingly and the figure published as a point estimate rather than as a range.  The Drug Enforcement Administration will publish the findings of this study separately. 

In 1994, taking into account estimates of local consumption and local seizures, the USG calculates that if virtually every coca leaf were converted into cocaine HCl, and there were no losses because of inefficiencies, bad weather, disease, or the deterrent effects of law enforcement, 840 metric tons of cocaine HCl theoretically could have been available from Colombia, Bolivia, and Peru for worldwide export.  This figure includes 500 metric tons potentially available from Peru, 270 metric tons* potentially available from Bolivia, and approximately 70 metric tons potentially available from  Colombia.  In publishing these numbers, we repeat our caveat that these are theoretical numbers, useful for examining trends.  Though research is moving us closer to a more precise cocaine yield estimate for Latin America, at this stage we do not know the actual amount available for distribution.

*DEA believes that the actual (as opposed to the potential) yield figure is 211 metric tons, based on methodology published last year by DEA.


Most of the chapters in this report contain some user or consumption data.  For the most part, these are estimates provided by foreign  governments or informal estimates by USG agencies.  There is no way to vouch for their reliability.  They are included because they are the only data available and give an approximation of how governments view their own drug abuse problems.  They should not be considered as a source of data to develop any reliable consumption estimates.


Cannabis cultivation dropped in Mexico in 1994 to 10,550 hectares with a potential yield of 5,540 metric tons.  This is a six percent drop from 1993's figure of 11,220 hectares.  Mexican law enforcement agencies eradicated 8,495 hectares of cannabis in 1994.  In Colombia's traditional cannabis growing zones, where intensive eradication in previous years had virtually destroyed the crop, there was a resurgence of cultivation in 1993 to an estimated 5,000 hectares.  That estimate did not change in 1994.  Crop yield is estimated at 4,138 metric tons for 1994.  Jamaica's cannabis crop was down in 1994 to 308 hectares, from 744 hectares in 1993.  The 1994 potential yield was 208 metric tons, less than half the 1993 figure of 502 metric tons. We recognize that there may be considerable undetected cannabis cultivation in Central and East Asia.  As we gather more accurate information, we will report on significant findings in future INCSRs.

[CHART:  Worldwide Cultivation Totals]
[CHART:  Worldwide Production Totals]


Opium Yield Information.  An opium yield study conducted in Thailand from December 1991-February 1992 indicated that yield was about 28 percent  lower than previously supposed. (11.6 kg/ha, instead of 16 kg/ha.)  We have adjusted the Thai opium estimate to reflect this yield.

Coca yield information.  After analyzing field studies conducted in Peru and Bolivia, in 1991 we concluded that we were underestimating the potential yield of the coca crop in Bolivia and particularly in Peru.  The 1991 analysis revealed that mature coca bushes--those that are two to fifteen years old and capable of producing full leaf harvests three or four times a year--have average yields of 2.7 metric tons per hectare in Bolivia's Chapare region and 2.3 metric tons per hectare in Peru's Upper Huallaga Valley.  Mature plant yields elsewhere in these two nations appear to be 1.0 and 1.14 metric tons per hectare, respectively.  New coca bushes--those planted in the last two years--have very low yields and are often not even harvested.  Based on this analysis, we have been able to distinguish between new coca and mature coca in our cultivation estimates.  We have calculated the potential dry coca leaf crop in Bolivia and Peru for each of the last five years by multiplying the average mature coca plant yield times the estimate of the hectarage of mature coca under cultivation.  The previous yield estimate for the lowland coca variety grown in Colombia--800 kilograms per hectare--is still used to calculate that country's potential, though the yield may be improving.  The mature coca plant yield estimates highlight the fact that changes in dry coca leaf production will always lag behind changes in the area of coca under cultivation by two years.  The data for previous years in Bolivia and Peru have been adjusted to reflect a ratio of 1.14 metric tons of leaf per hectare, in place of an earlier ratio of 1.03 metric tons of leaf per hectare.

[GRAPHIC:  Andean Coca Cultivation 1989-1994]
[Graphic:  Comparative Potential Opium Production 1990-1994]
[CHART:  Countries which have signed and/or ratified/acceded to the UN Convention]


The Department of State's International Narcotics Control Strategy Report (INCSR) has been prepared in accordance with 489 of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, as amended (22 U.S.C. 2291).  

The 1995 INCSR is the ninth annual report prepared pursuant to the FAA.  In addition to addressing the reporting requirements of FAA 489, the INCSR provides the factual basis for the Presidential narcotics certification determinations for major drug producing and/or drug-transit countries required under FAA 490.  FAA 490 requires that fifty percent of certain kinds of assistance be withheld at the start of each fiscal year from such countries, pending the President's March 1 certification determinations.  If a country is not certified, most foreign assistance is cut off and the United States is required to vote against multilateral development bank lending to that country.

Among other things, the statute asks, with respect to each country that received INM assistance in the past two fiscal years, for a report on the extent to which the country has "met the goals and objectives of the United Nations Convention Against Illicit Traffic in Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances."  FAA 489(a)(1)(A).  Similarly, the President's certification determination depends in part on whether a country, during the previous year, has cooperated fully with the United States, or has taken adequate steps on its own, to achieve full compliance with the goals and objectives established by the 1988 UN Convention.  FAA 490(b)(1)(A).  

Although the Convention does not contain a list of goals and objectives, it does set forth a number of obligations that the parties agree to undertake.  Generally speaking, it requires the parties to take legal measures to outlaw and punish all forms of illicit drug production, trafficking, and drug money laundering, to control chemicals that can be used to process illicit drugs, and to cooperate in international efforts to these ends.  The statute lists action by foreign countries on the following issues as relevant to this evaluating performance under the 1988 UN Convention:  illicit cultivation, production, distribution, sale, transport, and financing, and money laundering, asset seizure, extradition, mutual legal assistance, law enforcement and transit cooperation, precursor chemical control, and demand reduction.

In attempting to evaluate whether countries are meeting the goals and objectives of the 1988 UN Convention, the Department has used the best information it has available.  The 1995 INCSR covers countries that range from major drug producing and drug-transit countries, where drug control is a critical element of national policy, to mini-states, where drug issues and/or the capacity to deal with them are minimal.  The reports vary in the extent of their coverage.  For key drug-control countries, where considerable information is available, we have provided comprehensive reports.  For some smaller countries where only sketchy information is available, we have included whatever data the responsible post could provide.

The country chapters report upon actions, including plans, programs, and where applicable, timetables towards fulfillment of Convention obligations.  Because the 1988 UN Convention's subject matter is so broad, and availability of information on elements related to performance under the Convention varies widely within and between countries, the Department's views on the extent to which a given country is meeting the goals and objectives of the Convention are based on the overall response of the country to those goals and objectives.  

Some countries are not yet parties to the 1988 UN Convention.  For such countries, we have nonetheless considered actions taken by those countries in areas covered by the Convention, and plans (if any) for becoming parties and for bringing their legislation into conformity with the Convention's requirements.  For some of the very smallest countries, the Department has insufficient information to make a judgment as to whether the goals and objectives of the Convention are being met.  In those instances, available information on counternarcotics activities has been provided.  

Except as noted in the relevant country chapters, INL considers all countries with which the USG has bilateral narcotics agreements to be meeting the goals and objectives of those agreements.

As in the past, this year's INCSR provides the factual basis for the President's 1995 certification determinations made pursuant to FAA 490(b).  It contains information in accordance with 489 of the FAA and 804 of the Trade Act of 1974, as amended. 

Statement on Certification 

FAA 490(b)(2) requires that,in making determinations regarding full certification, the President consider the extent to which each major drug producing or drug transit country has: 

--  met the goals and objectives of the United Nations Convention Against Illicit Traffic in Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances including action on such issues as illicit cultivation, production, distribution, sale, transport and financing, and money laundering, asset seizure, extradition, mutual legal assistance, law enforcement and transit cooperation, precursor chemical control, and demand reduction;

--  accomplished the goals described in an applicable bilateral narcotics agreement with the United States, or a multilateral agreement; and

--  taken legal and law enforcement measures to prevent and punish public corruption--especially by senior government officials--that facilitates the production, processing , or shipment of narcotic and psychotropic drugs and other controlled substances, or that discourages the investigation or prosecution or such acts.

The statute provides, alternatively, that a country that cannot be certified under the foregoing standard may be certified on the grounds that  "vital national interests of the United States require" that assistance be provided to and the United States not vote against multilateral development bank lending to such country.  FAA 490(b)(1)(B).

Major Drug Producing, Drug Transit, Significant Source, Precursor Chemical and Money Laundering Countries.

Section 489(a)(3) requires the USG to identify:  (A) major illicit drug producing and major drug transit countries, (B) major sources of precursor chemicals used in the production of illicit narcotics; and (C) major money laundering countries.  These countries are identified below.

Major Drug Producing and Drug Transit Countries:

A major illicit drug producing country is one in which:  (A) 1,000 hectares or more of illicit opium poppy are cultivated or harvested during a year; (B) 1,000 hectares or more of illicit coca are cultivated or harvested during a year; or (C) 5,000 hectares or more of illicit cannabis are cultivated or harvested during a year, unless the President determines that such illicit cannabis production does not significantly affect the United States. FAA 481(e)(2).

A major illicit drug transit country is one:  (A) that is a significant direct source of illicit narcotic or psychotropic drugs or other controlled substances significantly affecting the United States; or (B) through which are transported such drugs or substances.  FAA 481(e)(5). 

The following are major drug producing and/or drug-transit countries
Afghanistan, The Bahamas, Bolivia, Brazil, Burma, China, Colombia, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Guatemala, Haiti, Hong Kong, India, Iran, Jamaica, Laos, Lebanon, Malaysia, Mexico, Nigeria, Pakistan, Panama, Paraguay, Peru, Syria, Taiwan, Thailand, Venezuela, and Vietnam.  

Major Precursor Chemical Source Countries: 

The following countries are major sources of precursor or essential chemicals used in the production of illicit narcotics:  Argentina, Brazil, China, Germany, India, Mexico, and the Netherlands. 

Major Money Laundering Countries:

A major money laundering country is one whose financial institutions engage in currency transactions involving significant amounts of proceeds from international narcotics trafficking.  FAA 481(e)(7).  The following countries fall into this category:  Argentina, Aruba, Brazil, Canada, Cayman Islands, Colombia, Costa Rica, Ecuador, Germany, Hong Kong, India, Italy, Japan, Liechtenstein, Luxembourg, Mexico, the Netherlands, Netherland Antilles, Nigeria, Pakistan, Panama, Paraguay, Russia, Singapore, Spain, Switzerland, Thailand, Turkey, United Arab Emirates, United Kingdom, Uruguay, United States, and Venezuela. 

                            INTERNATIONAL TRAINING


International anti-narcotics training is managed and funded by INM, and carried out by DEA, the U.S. Customs Service, and the U.S. Coast Guard.  Major objectives are:  contributing to the basic infrastructure for carrying out counternacotics law enforcement activities in countries which cooperate with the U.S.; improving technical skills of drug law enforcement personnel in these countries; and increasing cooperation between U.S. and foreign law enforcement officials.

Almost 6,200 persons participated in the U.S. Government's international narcotics control training program in FY 1994, an increase of about one-third over last year's total.  Most of the increase in personnel trained can be traced to greater activity in the more specialized areas of counternarcotics expertise, such as carrier security, asset forfeiture and methods for combatting money laundering.  The totals include persons trained by DEA using funding from the Department of Justice's Asset Forfeiture Fund.

INM training has become increasingly focused on encouraging foreign law enforcement agency self-sufficiency through infrastructure development.  The effectiveness of our counternarcotics efforts overseas should be viewed in terms of what has been done to bring about establishment of effective host country enforcement institutions, thereby taking drugs out of circulation before they ever start their journey toward the U.S.  U.S. law enforcement personnel stationed overseas are increasingly coming to see their prime responsibility as promoting the creation of host government systems which are compatible with and serve the same broad goals that ours do.  Many U.S. Embassies and foreign governments commented during the course of the year on the benefits of INM-sponsored training, in terms of both the professionalizing effect it had on foreign law enforcement institutions, as well as increases in successful narcotics investigations and seizures.

During 1994, law enforcement training gave particular attention to the emerging problem of heroin trafficking and abuse.  Programs were provided to opium production and transit countries where USG access has improved recently (e.g., China, Vietnam, Cambodia and the Central Asian republics).  Another area of focus was in the countries of the Newly Independent States.  INM training has paved the way for a much broader program of USG law enforcement assistance now being carried out with the NIS.

INM-funded training will continue to support the major U.S. and international strategies for combatting narcotics trafficking worldwide.  Emphasis will be given to promoting training on a regional basis, and to contributing to the activities of international organizations, such as the UNDCP and the OAS.  Through the meetings of major donors, the Dublin Group, UNDCP and other international fora, we will coordinate with other providers of training, and urge them to shoulder greater responsibility in providing training which serves their particular strategic interests.
Programs dealing with financial crimes (i.e., methods for promoting asset seizure and combatting money laundering) will continue to expand.  INM will maintain its role of coordinating the activities of Washington agencies in response to assistance requests from U.S. Embassies.  This will avoid duplication of effort, and ensure that presentations represent the full range of U.S. Government policies and procedures.


                                     Number of              Number of
                                     Participants           Programs 

Drug Enforcement Administration 
Training in U.S.:
 Executive Observation Programs            8                  2
 International Visitors Program          470                 96
 Forensic Chemist Seminar                 20                  1
 Int'l Narcotics Mgt. Seminar             32                  1

Training in Host Countries:
 In-Country Drug Enforcement Seminar     398                 12
 Advanced Enforcement Seminar            291                  9
 Other                                 1,156                 28

Subtotal:                              2,375                149

U.S. Customs Service
Training in U.S.:
 Executive Observation Programs            6                  3
 International Visitor Program           265                104
 Mid-Management Seminar                   65                  3

Training in Host Countries:
 Overseas Enforcement Training           693                 26
 Contraband Enforcement Team             101                  3
 Train-the-Trainer Workshop              154                 12
 Money Laundering                        490                  5
 Carrier Initiative Training           1,379                 25

Subtotal                               3,153                181

U.S. Coast Guard    
Maritime Law Enforcement                 594                 24

Other INM-Sponsored Training
Narcotics Detector Dog Training           65                  9

TOTAL INM TRAINING FY 94               6,187                363


Section 489 (b)(2)(B) requires the INCSR submission to include a report specifying the assistance provided by the United States to support international narcotics control efforts.  In addition to the budget for INM, which is provided in the Executive Summary, the report is also to include information on assistance provided or to be provided by the Drug Enforcement Administration, the U.S. Customs Service, and the U.S. Coast Guard to various countries, and information on any assistance provided or to be provided by such governments to those agencies.  This information has been prepared by the three agencies and is provided in this section.


The preeminent responsibility of the Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA) is to reduce and ultimately minimize the impact posed by illicit drugs to our nation.  All cocaine and heroin as well as some marijuana and other dangerous drugs are produced outside the U.S. and smuggled from the sources of production, through other countries, to the U.S.  Therefore, the reduction of illicit drug availability in the U.S. requires a strong international counternarcotics strategy.  In cooperation and coordination with other and nations, as well as other U.S. agencies, we strive to concurrently suppress illicit drug production; disrupt the availability of these drugs in the distribution chain; arrest and prosecute those involved in any aspect of illegal drug trafficking; and seize their profits and assets. 

The primary contribution of DEA in implementing our international counternarcotics strategy is accomplished through the 72 offices that DEA maintains in 50 countries worldwide.  The DEA overseas mission is fivefold:  

(1) Conduct bilateral investigative activities, 

(2) Coordinate intelligence gathering, 

(3) Engage in foreign liaison, 

(4) Coordinate training programs for host country police agencies, and 

(5) Assist in the development of host country drug law enforcement institutions.  

In most countries where DEA maintains offices, DEA carries out all of the above functions with emphasis determined on the basis of the conditions existing in each country.  In a few cases, where the level of drug trafficking is minimal, or the Host Nation's drug enforcement system is advanced, DEA Country Office may limit its function to selected activities instead of the full range of programs indicated above.
With the exception of DEA's training mission which is addressed elsewhere, the following are a few examples of the assistance DEA provided host nation counterparts in furtherance of our mission during 1994:

(1)  Bilateral Investigations:

DEA's Country Offices work with elements of the Host Nations (HN) Law Enforcement Agencies (LEA) to investigate activities of drug traffickers that lead to indictments and prosecutions in either the host country, the U.S. or a third country.  Whenever appropriate and feasible, intelligence information on major traffickers operating in host countries is shared with HN LEAs to enhance their investigative knowledge.  Some examples of DEA's work with HN law enforcement agencies follow:

In Mexico, for instance, the operational and tactical intelligence in Northern Border Response Force operations is passed to the Center for Mexican Drug Control Planning (CENDRO) for immediate action resulting in many seizures and arrests.  DEA's successful efforts in Mexico are due largely to its effective cooperation with the Mexican authorities.

In Thailand, DEA initiated Operation Tiger Trap in support of the U.S. Embassy Country Team counternarcotics aim to increase the Thai Government's focus on drug trafficking as a national security issue.  Operation Tiger Trap is the most significant U.S. and Thai cooperative enforcement and prosecution effort directed at the hierarchy of the Shan United Army (SUA).  The goal of Operation Tiger Trap was to reduce the heroin supply to the United States by disrupting SUA heroin trafficking operations in Thailand.  Operation Tiger Trap included joint cooperative efforts from the Royal Thai Government, Department of Defense, Joint Interagency Task Force-West, Department of State, Department of Justice, Office of the U.S. Attorney Eastern District of New York (EDNY), Immigration and Naturalization Service, U.S. intelligence community, and DEA offices in Hong Kong and New York as well as Bangkok.  This operation resulted in the capture of ten of the most persistent and highest-level SUA heroin traffickers operating out of Thailand.  All ten who average approximately twenty years in the heroin trade, are the subject of indictments in the United States and are pending extradition.  

In March 1994, the Colombian National Police, with support from DEA, successfully raided eight field offices of the Holanda Chemicals International (HCI) company and seized 1,754 metric tons of essential chemicals.  Prior to this bilateral operation, HCI was one of Colombia's most important suppliers of essential chemicals.  To date, this remains the largest seizure of essential chemicals in history.  DEA's Bogota Country Office estimates that some 136 metric tons of cocaine could have been produced with these essential chemicals.  As a result of this enforcement action, HCI has agreed to discontinue exports of acetone, MEK, and isopropyl acetate to all Latin American countries.

Singapore and Hong Kong have taken the lead in the financial investigation of Sino-Asian heroin financiers and suppliers in coordination with DEA.  Recent initiatives have targeted the Chinese underground remittance system, which operates worldwide from the region.  DEA is continuing its bilateral cooperation with the LEAs in all Southeast Asian countries.

Spanish and Italian police have participated with DEA in Operation Dinero, aimed at penetrating the Cali Cartel's money-laundering activities in Italy and Spain.  Operation Dinero resulted in the seizure of over $800,000.00 and 5,400 kilograms of cocaine.  The operation also led to the arrest, in Madrid, of Claudio LOCATELLI, the principal figure in Operation Dinero, and his extradition to Italy.    

(2)  Coordinate Intelligence Gathering:

In January 1994, as a result of the cooperative effort of Peruvian and Colombian authorities and DEA, Demetrio CHAVEZ-Penaherrera, aka VATICANO, was arrested in Cali, Colombia, and subsequently expelled to Peru.  VATICANO was considered the top Peruvian drug trafficker and a major cocaine base supplier to the Cali Cartel in Colombia.

In Turkey, Operation Kulak supports international efforts to collect information on all aspects of drug organizations.  This has resulted in the seizure of two operational heroin laboratories near Istanbul.  DEA provided the necessary technical and operational expertise to this operation which is currently being expanded.  

In Colombia, DEA Special Agent advisors participating in Operation Double King provided 26 target packages for the Colombian National Police (CNP) resulting in multi-ton seizures of cocaine HCL and marijuana.  One operation referred to as PUMA netted 5.6 metric tons of cocaine HCL.  Another intelligence gathering operation resulted in the seizure of 1.2 metric tons of cocaine HCL in Miami.  Similarity, DEA provided intelligence to the Bolivian and Peruvian National Police which resulted in the seizure of large quantities of cocaine base and the destruction of several cocaine base laboratories.

Acting on intelligence information from the DEA Lagos Country Office (LCO), the Nigerian National Drug Law Enforcement Agency (NDLEA), in concert with the military and police, arrested fugitive John Okpala and others in Lagos.  On the request of the LCO, Nigeria is in the process of extraditing John Okpala and others to the U.S.  John Okpala is considered a heroin Kingpin in Nigeria.

Under Operation Ladin, a DEA initiated intelligence program, Syrian and Lebanese authorities mounted a large eradication operation during the past year.  Beginning in 1994, in addition to seizing drug crops and eradicating cannabis and opium poppy fields, authorities jailed and fined drug farmers.  The institution of punishment against drug farmers was a major factor in the success of the 1994 Syrian and Lebanese eradication operation.  

On June 5, 1994, acting on intelligence provided by DEA, Brazilian police raided a ranch in Tocantins, Brazil and arrested Vicente Wilson RIVERA Ramos, a documented chemical trafficker and money launderer.
 During the raid, police seized 7.3 metric tons of cocaine.  It is Brazil's largest cocaine seizure ever.  In addition to the 7.3 metric ton seizure, police seized arms and ammunition, the ranch, communications equipment, approximately $10,000 USD in local and US currency, two trucks, a tractor, and a twin-engine airplane.  On August 26, 1994, RIVERA was sentenced to serve 14 years and eight months of prison in Brazil.

(3)  Engage in Foreign Liaison:

With the initiative, assistance and participation of the DEA Cairo Country Office, for the first time ever, the Egyptian Anti-Narcotics General Administration and the Drug Unit of the Israeli National Police established direct liaison contact.  Discussions covered a review of cross border drug trafficking in the region, the impact of the turnover of Gaza and Jericho on the drug situation and plans for future contact cooperation.   

The Bonn Country Office has initiated Operation Polska which develops sources of information and maintains liaison with Polish counterparts concerning the transshipment and distribution of illicit drugs in and through Poland's two primary seaports.  Another phase of the operation will gather intelligence on the Russian Mafia and what part they play in controlling Polish port facilities.  One result of this operation was the seizure of 518 kilograms of cocaine at Gdynia, Poland.

Recently an electronic mail system came on-line linking DEA Headquarters Chemical Operations Section and the Commission of the European Union (EU) in Brussels, Belgium.  The primary purpose of this system is to allow DEA and EU counterparts to share real-time information on suspect chemical shipments and chemical diversion investigations that affect U.S. and/or European interests.

DEA Istanbul working in conjunction with the Narcotic Section of the Turkish National Police in Istanbul, Turkey and the Chief Coroner for the Beyoglu District of Istanbul, Turkey initiated and developed a Demand Reduction Program for presentation to secondary school students in the Istanbul area.  The program has been presented to over 2000 students since the initial development and has been accepted by the public school system in Istanbul.

The DEA Office of Diversion Control Officials visited key Latin American and European nations to promote effective international and national controls on precursor and essential chemicals.  The focus of these efforts was to prevent the diversion of cocaine essential chemicals into the Andean region and to prevent the diversion of ephedrine, a methamphetamine precursor, into Mexico.  This ephedrine is being smuggled into the U.S. and is also being used to produce methamphetamine in Mexico for the U.S. illicit market. 

In July, 1994 DEA's Office of Diversion Control hosted a onference in San Jose, Costa Rica, attended by 12 Latin American nations, to examine the problems and progress in the attack on chemical diversion in the Western Hemisphere.  One of the main goals of the conference was to promote regional cooperation in investigations and in intelligence sharing.   The conference produced a statement of findings and declarations which called upon governments to fully investigate prospective imports and exports, delay questionable shipments, and fully cooperate with control and enforcement authorities from other nations.

Under the sponsorship of DEA, in April 1994, senior drug law enforcement officials from 26 countries of the Western Hemisphere, met at the 12th annual International Drug Enforcement Conference (IDEC XIII) in Quito, Ecuador.  The conferees adopted a number of initiatives designed to promote coordinated operations among IDEC members.  One such operation' "Operation Border Crunch", conducted by seven South American Countries in the fall of 1994, demonstrated the viability of multinational operations by stemming the flow of cocaine precursor chemicals to Bolivia.

4)  Coordinate Training Programs for Host Country Police Agencies:

Addressed in the International Training Section

(5)  Assist in the Development of Host Country Drug Law Enforcement Institutions:

DEA continues to support the development of HNs law enforcement intelligence activities. The Joint Information Coordination Centers (JICC), sponsored by INM and coordinated by DEA, continue to improve HNs operations. For instance, the JICCs have established computer and communications network with Central American and Caribbean countries' enforcement agencies.

With the support of DEA, the Government of Bolivia (GOB) Special Forces in the Fight against Narcotics (FELCN) initiated Operation New Awakening, a broad enforcement operation designed to close all air, land and marine routes leading out of the Chapare and to reassert GOB control over that region.  The operation employed over 700 law enforcement and military personnel from the UMOPAR (rural police) and National Police, Bolivian Air Force (Red Devil Task Force), Bolivian Navy (Blue Devil Task Force), and the Bolivian Army (Green Devil Task Force).

Operation New Awakening was successful in disrupting the entry of buyers into the Chapare and the shipment of drugs from the region.  It had the additional objective of curtailing the flow of precursor chemicals from the Cochabamba area to the Chapare region.  Throughout the operation, intelligence sources reported a significant reduction in precursor chemical trafficking and the stockpiling of chemicals.  One particular enforcement operation highlights the success of Operation New Awakening.  On July 28, 1994, the FELCN/UMOPAR seized over three tons of precursor chemicals.  Operation New Awakening also forced the Chapare coca markets to effectively shut down during the course of the operation.

In Thailand, DEA is working closely with the Thai authorities to establish three multi-Thai agency task forces.  The task forces will bring together, at each location, elements of three Thai law enforcement and intelligence agencies.  The task forces will enhance intelligence access and exchange among the three Thai agencies, and thus increase their enforcement capacities.  
It should be noted that the investigative process in most South American countries is hampered by the fact that their legal systems do not permit enforcement authorities to use informants, undercover agents, and other investigative methods.  Legislative reform is needed in this area.  Some recent developments however, are encouraging:

(a)  The DEA Buenos Aires Country Office was instrumental in assisting the Argentine Government.  As a result, Argentina has recently enacted new legislation that permits the use of the above mentioned techniques, thereby empowering their police and prosecutors with the tools they need to be effective.  

(b)  Chile is close to approving similar legislation empowering law enforcement authorities to use these investigative tools in pursuit of drug traffickers.

(c)  Upon urging by DEA, many other South and Central American governments have identified the need for stronger, modern laws geared toward drug law enforcement.

In 1994, Finland initiated a new law which is designed to combat money laundering.  Although the law is not as comprehensive as the American version, it will give Finnish authorities power to act on a variety of illegal money transactions derived from criminal acts.  DEA's seminar on asset forfeiture and money laundering, held in Copenhagen in 1993, was instrumental in providing Finnish officials with the basis to initiate this legislation.

In 1994, DEA Country Attaches in Pakistan and India
assisted International Narcotic Matters, Department of State, in negotiating meetings between Pakistani and Indian law enforcement officers for the purpose of planning enforcement strategies to develop a working relationship on narcotic enforcement issues.  Another purpose was to develop methods and guidelines by which the two governments can collaborate on international narcotic enforcement and investigative issues.  Investigative issues would include border crossings, interdiction and follow-up investigations and cooperation. 

In the fall of 1994, DEA's Office of Diversion Control, in conjunction with the European Commission, hosted a drug and chemical diversion control conference in Salzburg, Austria for policy officials of the Commonwealth of Independent States.  This conference continued the diversion control liaison effort established in 1992 with a DEA conference for East European officials held in Poland.  Both conferences sought to establish on-going dialogue with these national authorities, and to provide guidance and assistance in developing legal and administrative infrastructures which will enable these governments to deter, combat and prevent drug problems of the magnitude experienced in countries of the West.

In 1994, in conjunction with police forces of the Bahamas and Turks and Caicos, DEA and other U.S. agencies, continued support of Operation Bahamas Turks and Caicos (OPBAT).  OPBAT was designed to address widespread cocaine smuggling through this region into southern Florida.  Over a twelve year period OPBAT has accounted for the seizure of 58,495 kilograms of cocaine and 316,192 kilograms of marijuana.  OPBAT continues as an effective deterrent to smuggling through this region.

[CHART:  Transfers to Foreign Countries]


International drug interdiction training is a vital segment of the activities, interests, and mission of the U.S. Customs Service.  Training is funded and approved by the Department of State and provided to drug control agencies with an interdiction responsibility in countries considered significant to U.S. control enforcement efforts.

During FY 1994, 61 programs (excluding International Visitor) were conducted or coordinated involving 2,888 participants in 51 countries.  This annual schedule included 3 Executive Observation Programs (EOP), 24 Overseas Enforcement Training (OET) programs for individual countries; 2 Regional Overseas Enforcement Training (ROET) programs for two or more countries; 12 Train-the-Trainer Workshops (T3W)), in many cases linked to OET or Regional OET programs; 3 Contraband Enforcement Team (CET) Training programs - 2 with 3 separate phases; 3 Mid-Management Seminars (MMS); 5 Money Laundering Seminars (MLS); and 7 Short-Term Advisory (STA) projects.  It should be noted that 32 of the above programs were of the institution building type and contributed to a greater degree of self-sufficiency on the part of the target countries.

In addition to the normal schedule of International Narcotics Control Training programs conducted under the Bureau for International Narcotics Matters auspices, U.S. Customs has carried out a number of narcotics control projects which are in response to high priority concerns, have required considerable development efforts or have made use of funding outside of the annual INM allocation.  Among these undertaking are the following:

*The development of a video training program, "Arrest Techniques," which concerns safety practices required for making arrests.  This program is unique in that it is designed especially for foreign drug control officers.

*Training programs supported and funded by American Embassies in Jamaica and Grenada.  The Jamaica program was a Train-the Trainer Workshop for the Port Security Corps, and the Grenada program combined enforcement and management development training, with an emphasis on internal controls and integrity awareness.  Additionally, an extensive operational practical exercise on intensive container profiling and examination was conducted at six port locations at the close of the Venezuela CET program.  Post funding was utilized to conduct special drug interdiction training for international air and sea carriers at two locations in Brazil.

*USAID funding was utilized to conduct a combined OET and T3W in Macedonia and RT3W for the Baltic States.  

*OAS funding was utilized to conduct a T3W for the Peruvian Customs Service.

*Short Term Advisory Assistance was made available in Jordan to assist with border controls during the recent Israel-Jordan peace treaty meetings and to Turkish Customs in strengthening their operations and instruction at their training academy.  The former assistance was completed in FY 1994 and utilized specially provided funding from DOS.

FY 1994 was the fourth year in which the Bureau for International Narcotics Matters has funded training in narcotics security techniques provided by U.S. Customs to managers and employees of commercial transportation companies under the Carrier Initiative Program (CIP).  During FY 1994, CIP training was presented to 1,379 employees in 25 programs.  These programs were offered in nine countries:  Brazil, Chile, Ecuador, Guatemala, Jamaica, Mexico, Pakistan, Trinidad, and Turkey.

Particularly noteworthy in assessing the past year's program are the significant seizures and creations of new drug squads that were reported and are attributed directly to our training programs.  For example:

1.Measurable Results:  As the result of an OET program conducted in Kazakhstan in September 1994, the post reported, "we can observe that cases of drug seizures have increased over the last three months.  One of the reasons for this is the information which our officers received during the international seminar which was conducted by U.S. Customs specialists..."

2.Measurable Results:  Largely due to the institution building effect of the STA in Guatemala and a previous Contraband Enforcement Team Training Program held in February 1994, an impressive drug seizure of 266 kilos of cocaine was made by the Guatemala Cargo Inspection Unit in Port Santa Tomas.  The Embassy credits and thanks U.S. Customs for the hard work that has produced an effective and professional inspection unit that has made this significant seizure.

Our international training efforts have, as in the past, also emphasized cooperation with other U.S. Government drug enforcement agencies, other nations, and international bodies.  U.S. Customs participation in providing the lead instructor in a Customs Cooperation Council, now the World Customs Organization, funded management development school in Russia is representative of the importance we place on this cooperation.  In addition we have established an extensive network of drug control liaison contacts in a number of major donor countries.  These contacts have enabled us to avoid duplication of training and improved cooperation on joint projects.

In FY 1994, the U.S. Customs Service shared financial assets on four occasions:

Government of Nicaragua              58,586.32
Royal Canadian Mounted Police       116,685.44
Vancouver, Canada Police Department 134,498.38
Technical Judicial Police of Panama  39,970.78

TOTAL                               349,740.92


U.S. Customs Service

                                Participants    Programs
Training in the U.S.:
  Executive Observation Program     6             3
  International Visitor Program   265           104
  Mid-Management Seminar           65             3

Training in host countries:
  Overseas Enforcement Training   693            26
  Contraband Enforcement Team     101             5
  Train-the-Trainer Workshop      154            12
  Money Laundering Seminar        490             5
  Carrier Initiative Program    1,379            25

SUBTOTAL:                       3,153           183

                     INCSR Report (FY-94/95/96)



Subject to State Department approval and funding, and in response to foreign government requests for assistance, the USCG deploys mobile training teams (MTTs) to source and transit countries to improve law enforcement (LE) skills of indigenous maritime police forces. 

Most short-term LE MTTs consist of three or four personnel who conduct classroom and hands-on maritime LE instruction to foreign maritime LE authorities for one or two weeks at a time.  In FY 1994, MTTs provided their unique training to 762 foreign nationals in 23 countries.  This training features basic maritime LE procedures, equipment maintenance, and "train the trainer" courses.

When longer-term presence is warranted, the Coast Guard's International Maritime Law Enforcement Team (IMLET) deploys personnel for several months at a time to train international LE authorities (mostly in Latin America) in coastal and waterway counter-drug (CD) law enforcement.  IMLET continues to support the Waterways Law Enforcement (WLE) program, a US Government initiative to disrupt the cocaine supply at its source.  Throughout FY 94, IMLET maintained a continuous 3-5 person team presence in Bolivia for WLE training.  In addition, one IMLET officer is continuously assigned to the US Military Group in Colombia to provide guidance and assistance for the development of the the Colombian Coast guard.  In 1994, interagency Memoranda of Agreement (MOAs) concerning the use of Coast Guard personnel for training in Bolivia and Panama was formalized.  These MOAs allow IMLET personnel to accompany host nation personnel on operations in order to evaluate the results of USG training efforts.  When deployed, IMLET personnel are under the control of the US Chief of Mission.  

The USCG conducts foreign shiprider and classroom exchanges, participates in the US Navy UNITAS (South/Central America) and WATC (West Africa) combined exercise programs, conducts extended foreign port visits in Mexico and Caribbean basin countries, and hosts foreign maritime LE personnel at USCG facilities in order to train and familiarize foreign officials in maritime counter-drug tactics.  

Once a year, a Coast Guard medium endurance cutter, equipped with a helicopter and accompanied by a Coast Guard patrol boat, conducts combined LE exercises/operations and training with several nations in the Lesser Antilles.  This is known as Operation TRADEWINDS.  It involves on-the-job training and hands-on law enforcement experience.  The result is that these nations normally increase their own counter-drug efforts and are better able to conduct combined counter-drug operations with the Coast Guard.

Combined Operations

In November 1993, a DOS letter to the British Embassy formalized the concept of deploying USCG Law Enforcement Detachments (LEDETS) aboard Royal Navy vessels in the Caribbean.  This allows for a significant counter-drug force multiplier in the Caribbean, particularly in the areas of British national interest (Belize and the Windward Islands).  Additionally, the USCG and DOS are currently evaluating the possibility of reaching an agreement for a similar concept of operations with Royal Netherlands Navy vessels operating in the Caribbean.  Two trial deployments were conducted in October and November 1994, with more scheduled for 1995.  Such deployments provide an expanded law enforcement presence in the Netherlands Antilles and Aruba. 

The USCG conducts combined operations with Caribbean basin and Latin American countries to assist and further develop  indigenous interdiction forces.  Combined operations with foreign maritime interdiction forces result in on-the-job-training for both the foreign forces and USCG personnel. 

Combined operations have lead to bilateral agreements which facilitate counter-drug operations.  Types of agreements include overflight authority for USCG surveillance aircraft, permission to enter foreign territorial waters to carry out enforcement actions, shiprider agreements to facilitate coordination between forces, and shipboarding agreements to streamline the diplomatic communication necessary to board foreign flagged vessels.

An example is the agreement that established Operation Bahamas and Turks and Caicos (OPBAT).  TOPBAT is a multi-agency, multi-national law enforcement operation supporting US and Bahamian counternarcotics efforts in the The Bahamas and the Turks and Caicos Islands.  OPBAT will continue to be an important part of the 1995 National Drug Control Strategy's international focus of interdiction in the transit country.
In addition to combined operations, the USCG conducts coincidental operations with the Mexican Navy in the Pacific as well as in the Gulf of Mexico.  During coincidental operations, USCG and Mexican Naval assets operate simultaneously (as opposed to operating jointly) and exchange on-scene information which may assist in the interdiction of drug traffickers.  Through these operations, communications between the USCG and the Mexican Navy has significantly improved to such a level that arrangements are being pursued for a Mexican naval officer to be assigned as a liaison officer to USCG command centers in Los Angeles and New Orleans. 

Other Activities

The USCG conducts other activities abroad that, though not necessarily funded by the Department of State, directly or indirectly benefit international narcotics control efforts.  The USCG maintains the ability to transfer decommissioned patrol boats to Caribbean and Latin American nations, and does so whenever possible.  For instance, the USCG decommissioned the 180 foot medium endurance cutter CITRUS and transferred it to the Mexican Navy.  USCG personnel are permanently stationed in several American Embassies located in source and transit countries.  These USCG positions are sponsored by various U.S programs.  Officers are posted in Antigua, the Bahamas, Panama, Costa Rica, Haiti, Jamaica, Mexico, Colombia, Bolivia and Venezuela.

In addition, the USCG often hosts various foreign dignitary visits to USCG training facilities and operational units.  In FY 1994, the USCG hosted 145 delegations from 59 nations.  The nature of these visits varied, but most were a general USCG familiarization and provided an overview of all USCG missions, including counternarcotics.

[CHART:  United States Coast Guard Assistance]
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