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APRIL 1994

AFRICA AND THE MIDDLE EAST                  409  
     Cote d'Ivoire                          411  
     Egypt                                  413  
     Ghana                                  415  
     Israel                                 418  
     Kenya                                  421  
     Lebanon                                424  
     Morocco                                427  
     Niger                                  430  
     Nigeria                                432  
     Saudi Arabia                           436  
     Senegal                                437  
     Syria                                  439  
     Tunisia                                443  
     Other Africa                           444  
          Algeria                           444  
          Botswana                          444  
          Cameroon                          444  
          Cape Verde                        445  
          Jordan                            445  
          Lesotho                           446  
          Liberia                           446  
          Mauritius                         446  
          Sudan                             447  
          Togo                              447  
          Zambia                            448  
          Zimbabwe                          448  


I.  Summary

Cote d'Ivoire is a transit route for Asian heroin and South American cocaine destined for European and North American markets.  There is minimal production of cannabis for domestic consumption, but drug abuse, particularly heroin and cocaine abuse, is increasing.  Cote d'Ivoire's counternarcotics effort, coordinated by the National Drug Police (NDP), is hampered by a lack of resources.  Cote d'Ivoire is a party to the 4988 UN Convention.  Senior Government of Cote d'Ivoire (GOCI) officials recognize that narcotics are a growing problem and are working effectively with the U.S. to fulfill the Convention's goals and objectives.

II.  Status of Country

Abidjan is a regional hub for international airline travel.  It is also a financial center for West Africa, it is a probable site of illicit drug money laundering.  Heroin and cocaine abuse appear to be growing.  There is limited cultivation of cannabis for local consumption. 

III.  Country Actions Against Drugs in 1993

Policy Initiatives and Accomplishments.  The National Gendarmerie created a twelve-man drug control unit to augment the efforts of the NDP and Customs service.

Corruption.  The GOCI has arrested and prosecuted lower-level police officials for corruption, but no senior officials were indicted for drug-related corruption.  The government does not encourage or facilitate the illicit production or distribution of illegal drugs or other controlled substances.  There is no evidence that senior officials have engaged in the production or distribution of drugs, or the laundering of drug proceeds.

Agreements and Treaties.  The GOCI is a party to the 1961 UN Single Convention and the 1971 Convention on Psychotropic Substances, and works to meet its goals and objectives.  The GOCI ratified the 1988 UN Convention in 1991.  The USG signed Letters of Agreement with the GOCI in 1992 and 1993 to assist efforts to combat narcotics transiting the Abidjan airport. 

Cultivation and Production.  Cannabis is grown in eastern Cote d'Ivoire in limited quantities for internal consumption.  The Ivorian drug police have no reliable data on domestic production of cannabis.

Drug Flow/Transit.   The use of Abidjan's airport as a transit site for the flow of heroin and cocaine to European and North American destinations remains Cote d'Ivoire greatest trafficking challenge.  While there is no reliable data base on the volume of drugs transiting the country, it is likely they have increased as a result of the suspension of direct flights from Lagos to the U.S.

Domestic Programs.  Demand reduction and drug treatment programs are severely limited by a lack of resources.  There are reports of a modest demand reduction program, primarily in news articles on drug abuse in the government-owned media, but its effectiveness is limited. 
IV. U.S. Policy Initiatives and Programs.

Policy Initiatives.  USG counternarcotics goals in Cote d'Ivoire center on limiting the use of Abidjan as a transit point for international traffic, and forestalling the use of Cote d'Ivoire for money laundering operations.
Bilateral Cooperation.  Bilateral agreements were signed in 1992 and in August; the latter provided for the procurement of goods and services to support narcotics law enforcement vehicles.  INM funds U.S. Customs training for GOCI customs officers in Abidjan.  A GOCI drug officer attended the DEA international narcotics enforcement management seminar in the U.S.  The bilateral agreements helped the GOCI to field law enforcement officers, and fostered cooperation and information sharing between the USG and GOCI law enforcement officials.

Road Ahead.  The GOCI has expressed its interest in furthering cooperation with the USG on joint operations against traffickers based in Abidjan, as well as those transiting the airport.  Training and some equipment will be provided to improve airport security.


I.  Summary

Egypt is a transit route for heroin destined for Europe and North America.  Egypt cultivates small but increasing amounts of opium poppy and cannabis, but there is no evidence of refining.  Drug abuse is not a serious problem, although there is growing concern about recent increases in heroin addicts.  Hashish use is widespread.  Authorities strictly enforce drug laws and there are severe penalties for drug trafficking.  The Egyptian Government (GOE) ratified the 1988 UN Convention in 1991, but has not passed implementing legislation. 

II.  Status of Country 

Egypt is a transit point for heroin and opium moving from Southeast and Southwest Asia to Europe and the U.S.  Heroin from Turkey and hashish from Lebanon now enter Egypt through Libya, as a result of the opening of the land border between the two countries in 1990.  The GOE maintains an active interdiction effort at Cairo International Airport, but has no program to interdict illicit drug shipments transiting the Suez Canal.

Opium poppy is cultivated primarily along the Nile river in southern Egypt and in the northern Nile delta.  Cocaine first appeared in 1983, but its use is limited.  Authorities reported no arrests for cocaine trafficking in 1993.  Of much greater concern to Egyptian authorities is the apparent increase in the use of heroin among young Egyptians, primarily in university circles and among affluent professionals.

III.  Country Actions Against Drugs in 1993

Policy Initiatives.  Egyptian laws severely penalize drug use, including capital punishment for producers and traffickers of hard drugs.  The 1991 USG-GOE narcotics control agreement was amended in 1993 to provide additional funding to the Egyptian Anti-Narcotics General Administration (ANGA), whose responsibilities roughly parallel those of DEA.

Accomplishments.  The DEA-ANGA airport interdiction program virtually halted the transit of drugs through the Cairo International Airport by West Africans in transit from Bangkok to Lagos.  Couriers have been forced to seek alternate routes.

Law Enforcement Efforts.   ANGA's 100-man force works in coordination with other enforcement agencies, including the Frontier Police, Customs, and police narcotics units in the provinces.

Corruption.  The GOE does not encourage or facilitate the production or distribution of illicit drugs or other controlled substances, or the laundering of drug money.  No senior GOE official appeared to be engaged either in the production or distribution of drugs or the laundering of drug proceeds.  There is no evidence of significant corruption among Egyptian drug officials.  Nevertheless, low salaries make law enforcement officials vulnerable to payoffs from traffickers.  
In 1991, an opposition party accused ten parliamentarians in the People's Assembly from the ruling National Democratic Party (NDP) of drug trafficking.  The NDP leadership's investigation of the allegations resulted in the expulsion in November of two assembly members and the resignation of a third.

Agreements and Treaties.  The extradition treaty between the GOE and the U.S. dates from the Ottoman Empire.  It was last used successfully in 1989 when an Israeli was extradited from Egypt to the U.S.  Egypt ratified the 1988 UN Convention in 1991.

Cultivation/Production.  Opium poppy is cultivated in the arable land along the Nile River in southern Egypt and in the northern Delta.  The Sinai is attractive to opium producers because of its remoteness and lack of regular policing.  Authorities seized over 175 million opium poppy plants in the Sinai in 1993.  The GOE conducts a yearly eradication program during the winter opium harvest.

Drug Flow/Transit.  Egypt's Suez Canal is probably the world's busiest waterway with an estimated 18,000 ships transiting the canal each year.  Narcotics seizures range from as little as six kgs of heroin and opium to multi-ton quantities; the majority of seizures involved several metric tons of narcotics.  There also have been numerous seizures in Europe and the U.S. from vessels that  transited the Canal with large consignments of drugs from Asia.

Domestic Programs.  There is no reliable data on drug use in Egypt; estimates are based on anecdotal evidence and projections from drug seizures or patients seeking treatment in rehabilitation centers.  However, there is general agreement and growing concern that drug use in Egypt is increasing.  President Mubarak's National Drug Awareness campaign against drug abuse continues, along with almost daily reports on drug issues in the national media.  This is in sharp contrast to virtual silence by the GOE on drug matters as recently as 1987.  Pride International of Egypt is the only private anti-drug organization devoted to prevention.  In 1993, Pride implemented a "drug free work place" program for factory managers and employees in five pilot programs.

U.S. Policy Initiatives and Programs.  The USG increased information exchanges with the GOE on trafficking through Egypt to the U.S. and Europe.  USG assistance to ANGA was designed to detect and interdict heroin shipments transiting Egypt; to provide narcotics control training and equipment to Egyptian law enforcement personnel; and to implement a Suez Canal intelligence/interdiction program for the detection of drugs moving from Asia to Western consumers.  Three ANGA officials attended an anti-drug executive observation program in the U.S. in 1993.

Road Ahead.  The USG will seek full implementation of its 1991 agreement with the GOE and its subsequent amendments.  Upon successful conclusion of current joint operations, the USG hopes to make significant payments to the GOE under our asset forfeiture-sharing program.  The USG will work to alleviate GOE concerns regarding the proposed Suez Canal interdiction program, and to move forward with its implementation.


I. Summary

Ghana addressed the problems of narcotics and drug trafficking in 1989, after domestic narcotics consumption had risen steadily for several years.  Narcotics traffickers had made drugs accessible to the local market instead of merely transshipping them.  The Government of Ghana (GOG) has instituted international cooperation, enforcement, rehabilitation, and education programs.  Ghana is a party to the 1988 UN Convention.

II. Status of Country

Cocaine and heroin transit Ghana bound for Europe and the U.S.  Trafficking is largely organized by Nigerian drug rings and carried out by Ghanaian carriers; Ghana is used as a transit point for repacking and forwarding.  Many Ghanaian entrepreneurs have their own operations.  Ghana now is second only to Nigeria in the number of narcotics carriers in West Africa. 

The large volume of transit trafficking has prompted an increase in domestic cocaine and heroin consumption; however,  domestically grown cannabis is still the most abused drug in Ghana.  No accurate statistics are available, but drug abuse appears to be increasing especially in larger cities such as Accra, where the drug abuse has assumed serious proportions.  Cocaine seizures almost doubled from 1991 to 1992, from 4.4. to 7.3 kgs; with 18.3 kgs were intercepted in the first half of 1993.  Neither precursor chemicals diversion nor drug money laundering as yet pose problems.  

III.  Country Actions Against Drugs in 1993

Policy Initiatives.  The GOG actively supported the goals of the three UN drug conventions.  It has assets seizure legislation on the books.  Coordination of counternarcotics efforts is the responsibility of a central Narcotics Control Board (NCB), a small but effective organization which deals with enforcement as well as demand reduction, drug education and rehabilitation programs.  Ghana sends high-level representation to the annual meetings of the UN  International Commission on Narcotic Drugs.

Accomplishments.  Ghana distributed to its law enforcement officials 25 narcotics field test kits provided by the British Government.  In September, two narcotics officers participated in a three-week counternarcotics course in Cairo, and two took part in a two-week course in Germany; both courses were under German sponsorship.  The German and Italian governments have also provided material assistance.  This includes $10,000 worth of cameras and other technical equipment from Germany for use in counternarcotics efforts, and three vehicles from Italy for the NCB.  The GOG regularly provides investigations and identification to the US and EC governments on Ghanaian nationals suspected of drug trafficking in the U.S. or Europe.

Law Enforcement Efforts.  

The Ghana police counternarcotics unit in 1993 arrested two Ghanaian nationals wanted on drug charges by the U.S.  It is expected that they will be extradited in the near future.  A third Ghanaian wanted on U.S. drug charges is currently being sought.  When arrested, extradition proceedings will be initiated against him. 

Agreements and Treaties.  Ghana is a party to the 1961 UN Single Convention and its 1972 Protocol, the 1971 UN Convention, and the 1988 UN Convention.  Ghana has asset seizure and other counternarcotics legislation.  Ghana has reaffirmed the 1931 U.S.-UK extradition treaty, which covers 27 extraditable offenses, including drug trafficking.

A Letter of Agreement was concluded between the U.S. and Ghanaian governments in 1992 calling for measures to eliminate the illicit production, processing, trafficking and consumption of narcotics within Ghana and the transit of narcotics through the country.  A subsequent agreement was signed in September 1993, which provided $20,000 for training, education and publications programs, including the distribution of informational materials.  An additional $45,000 was provided for technical equipment for narcotics law enforcement programs.  

Law Enforcement Efforts.  The legislative and enforcement framework for narcotics control has been integrated under the National Narcotics Control Board.  Enforcement efforts adhere to the law and appear to work efficiently.  In 1993, the NCB recommended a provision in the law for mandatory minimum sentences for drug offenders.  This was in response to several court cases in which judges allowed convicted drug offenders to go free after paying heavy fines.  This recommendation is now under consideration by the Minister of the Interior.  

Ghana has in place asset seizure laws similar to those of the U.S., and aggressively enforces them.  Assets seized become the property of the state as a whole; an NCB recommendation that 50% of asset seizures and court-imposed fines be given to the NCB for enforcement and education programs is currently under review.

Corruption.  As a matter of government policy, Ghana neither encourages nor facilitates illicit production or distribution of drugs or laundering of proceeds.  Ghanaian enforcement and counternarcotics authorities are disciplined and believed largely free of corruption.  No senior official has been involved in proven or suspected cases of narcotics-related corruption for several years.  No official is currently known or suspected to be engaged in facilitating the drug trade or attempting to discourage narcotics investigations.

Cultivation/production.  Cannabis is the only illicit drug cultivated in Ghana.  The government has an active program to eradicate fields and to seize and destroy shipments.  In the first half of 1993, about 942 kgs  of marijuana were intercepted.

Drug flow/transit.  Narcotics trafficking increased in 1993, while government resources to counter it were scarce and dependent on outside assistance.  Smuggling techniques have become more refined, but the basic routes remain unchanged, aided by relatively porous borders and frequent international flights from Accra.  The eventual destinations for most transit shipments were the U.S. and Europe. 
Domestic Programs.  The NCB was active in organizing and participating in a wide variety of programs to encourage demand reduction.  It sponsored an international Day Against Drug Abuse and Illicit Trafficking and ensured extensive media attention as well participation by Cabinet officials to the observance of UN World Drug Day on June 26. 

NCB personnel lectured at a wide variety of law-enforcement training facilities on demand reduction.  The NCB also established a regular lecture series on drug abuse at the Ghana Institute of Management and Public Administration. 

IV. U.S. Policy Initiatives and Programs

Policy Initiatives.  The U.S. seeks to reduce Ghana's role as a transit point for narcotics and as a source of drug couriers; and to help the GOG develop the capability to combat trafficking and consumption.  The USG is sending a senior Ghanaian official to the U.S. on a DEA executive observation program.  It is also implementing the 1993 LOA on counternarcotics training program, and continuing to coordinate the extradition of narcotics fugitives sought by the USG.

Road Ahead.  The USG will encourage increased GOG attention to the drug issue and improved enforcement activities, promote Ghana's cooperation on international narcotics matters, and support professional training for counternarcotics officers and drug education specialists.


I. Summary

The Israeli National Police (INP) ranks drugs as its highest priority after internal security and public order.  Israel serves as a transit point for international trafficking in heroin and hashish, which are also the domestic drugs of choice.  Drug use and trafficking are illegal, and money laundering may be prosecuted in conjunction with a criminal conviction.  The INP cooperates closely with its foreign counterparts and has stationed drug-liaison officers in the U.S., Turkey, Holland and France.  Israel is signatory to the 1988 UN Convention, but the Knesset has not passed the necessary legislation for accession.  Both the Israeli Anti-Drug Authority (ADA) and INP predict the legislation, primarily concerned with money laundering, will be enacted in 1994.

II. Status of Country

Drug cultivation and production are abundant in surrounding countries, making Israel a crossroads for trafficking, particularly from Lebanon, a major producer of hashish and heroin), to Egypt.  Israel is not a major drug producer, but the ADA estimates the number of users at 180,000, and the number of addicts at between 18,000 and 20,000.  There have been few prosecuted cases of money laundering, but the DEA believes that Israel's sophisticated financial infrastructure is being used by money launderers.  At present, Israel lacks the legal means to combat money laundering.

III.  Country Action Against Drugs in 1993

Policy Initiatives.  The ADA, under the direct authority of the prime minister, continues to expand programs of education, prevention, treatment, and rehabilitation.  Drug-awareness programs are in place at more than one-third of the country's primary and secondary schools.  The ADA also is cooperating with government ministries, local Arab authorities, and the Red Crescent in special programs to combat increasing drug abuse among the Arab minority population.  A dramatic, almost six-fold, growth in treatment/rehabilitation institutions since 1989 was addressed in 1993 by regulatory legislation.  Some 4,500 addicts were treated by these facilities in 1993.

Law Enforcement Efforts.  The Knesset enacted legislation in 1993 to give police and the courts stronger tools to prosecute drug offenders and seize their property.  These included wider police latitude for searches without a warrant.  The legislation also raised the maximum penalty for drug trafficking to 25 years, and the minimum fine to $840.  A second drug conviction can result in loss of driving privileges.  Israeli law provides for civil and criminal asset seizure and forfeiture.  The defendant bears the onus of proving that the assets were not acquired with drug money.  In 1992, ADA received over $500,000 in proceeds from asset seizures for distribution to all the government agencies involved in drug enforcement.

Israel has extradition treaties with the U.S., the UK, France and Italy.  It does not extradite its own citizens, and is cautious about extraditing foreign Jews.  To circumvent this problem, Israel has applied the principle of universal jurisdiction, trying foreigners in Israel for crimes committed elsewhere.

Israel has acceded to the European convention on mutual legal assistance in criminal matters.  In addition, Israeli law permits legal assistance in the absence of a treaty.

The INP added over 250 to its drug division staff in 1992, installed a new, $850,000 drug lab, and initiated a drug detection canine program.  With USG assistance, this should be operational in 1994, first at Ben Gurion Airport, and later at all border crossings and ports of entry.

Plans call for Israeli liaison officers to be posted to Russia and to Colombia, bringing the total number posted abroad to six.  Israeli cooperation in 1993 with U.S., European and Russian authorities in Operation Acapulco resulted in the seizure of over one metric ton of cocaine in Russia.

As a sign of its desire to expand cooperation within its own region, Israel placed drug control on the agenda of the Israeli-Jordanian peace negotiations.  Israel has also proposed that the UN establish a regional subcommittee of HONLEA (Heads of Narcotic Law Enforcement Authorities), consisting of Egypt, Israel, Jordan, Lebanon and Syria.

Corruption.  Drug-related corruption does not appear to be an issue in Israel.

Agreements and Treaties.  The U.S. and Israel signed a Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) in 1991, calling for bilateral cooperation to combat illicit narcotics, trafficking, and abuse, by sharing knowledge and experience as well as training methods.  The MOU calls for annual meetings to coordinate counterdrug efforts, drug abuse and awareness research programs, and cooperation in developing drug treatment and rehabilitation models.  In 1993, the two governments signed a Customs cooperation agreement.  Israel acceded to the European Convention on mutual legal assistance in criminal matters, ratified the 1961 Single Convention on Narcotic Drugs and its 1972 protocols, as well as the 1988 UN Convention.  Israel signed cooperative agreements with France, Hungary, Italy, Chile, and Turkey.

Cultivation/Production.  Israel is neither cultivates nor produces illicit drugs.

Drug Flow/Transit.  Israel lies on a drug transit route.  Virtually all the hashish and half the heroin entering Israel arrives through the Lebanese border, often simply tossed over the border fence and transported by car.  Heroin from Southwest Asia, via Turkey, and Southeast Asia, via Europe, enter at airports and seaports and transit Israel on the way to Egypt.  Both drugs also are consumed in Israel.  Cocaine, used as payment for heroin, reaches Israel from South America, either directly or indirectly via the U.S. or Europe.  LSD, imported from Europe and the U.S., is increasing in popularity; amphetamines are much less popular.

Distribution/Sale.  Penalties for drug trafficking are now among the stiffest on the books in Israel.  Distribution is nationwide and reaches all levels of society.  ADA acknowledges that, despite the government's intensified efforts, the quantity of narcotics in Israel has not diminished, but believes the number of users has  declined slightly in 1993, thanks at least in part to its education campaign.  ADA estimates that drug trafficking is a $3 billion business, while GOI anti-drug funds total only about $70 million.

IV.   U.S. Policy Initiatives and Programs

Policy Initiatives.  The USG enhancing antidrug cooperation with Israel, especially in law enforcement, education, prevention, treatment, rehabilitation and professional training.

Bilateral Cooperation.  The INP in 1993 sponsored a visit to Israel by the regional canine program manager of the U.S. Customs Service to discuss the establishment of a detector dog program at Ben Gurion Airport.

Road Ahead.  Close cooperation between Israeli and U.S. law enforcement officials is expected to continue.  The USG intends to sustain its efforts to advance the goals outlined in the MOU by promoting drug awareness programs and the exchange of information and personnel.


I.  Summary

Kenya acceded to the 1988 UN Convention in 1992, but has yet to pass implementing legislation.  Compliance in reducing demand and combatting the drug trade has been limited by a lack of political will, inefficiency, corruption, inadequate resources, and insufficient public awareness.  Kenya's strategic location and air connections with Asia, West Africa, southern Africa and Europe contribute to its status as a major transit point for heroin and methaqualone.

II.  Status of Country

Couriers from Africa and South Asia transit Kenya's two international airports, the Jomo Kenyatta International Airport in Nairobi, and the Moi International Airport in Mombasa, carrying heroin believed to be destined to the U.S. and Europe, and have made Kenya into a principal transit point for methaqualone, the basis of Mandrax which is used in conjunction with marijuana in southern Africa.  Kenya's navy and coast guard are unable to patrol territorial waters effectively, and illicit drugs enter the country via the Indian Ocean.

III.  Country Actions Against Drugs in 1993

Policy Initiatives.  The Attorney General reintroduced the Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances Control Bill to the National Assembly in July; it failed to reach the necessary third reading required for a vote.  If passed, the Bill would qualify as implementing legislation for the 1988 UN Convention.  For the first time, a comprehensive act would cover possession, trafficking, forfeiture of property, money laundering, rehabilitation and international assistance.

Accomplishments.  Kenyan law enforcement personnel seized 8,625 kgs of heroin in 23 arrests, and confiscated 150,000 Mandrax tablets in five arrests, according to GOK statistics.  Anti-narcotics unit records indicate that all of these cases were, or will be, prosecuted.  While no drug suspects were extradited to the U.S. in 1993, DEA maintains friendly relationships with narcotics officials on information exchange; however, enforcement cooperation has been limited.  Police arrested a suspect in October for manufacturing methaqualone from component chemicals, the first indication of potential precursor chemical problems in Kenya.  A UN-sponsored conference on demand reduction in east and southern Africa drew health and education experts from 15 countries.

Law Enforcement Efforts.  Interdiction efforts, particularly at the major airports and at entry points, are inadequate, given growing evidence that Kenya has become a major narcotics transit area. Disturbing reports from GOK police and USG authorities indicate that corruption and inefficiency have hampered efforts to curb trafficking.  For example, several major traffickers arrested in Nairobi earlier this year were suddenly released without explanation before hearings could be held.  In another case, a drug dealer wanted in South Africa was arrested in Kenya for possessing a stolen vehicle; investigative and judicial delays make it doubtful the case will ever reach court.

GOK and Italian authorities have noted with concern increasing Mafia-related criminal activity in Mombasa. However, police are held back from taking strong action, partly because of the economic importance of coastal tourism. 

Corruption.  The GOK's recent decision to demote and transfer the former head of the country's antidrug unit, who was widely believed to be involved in the drug trade, was a major step against corruption, even though no charges have been filed for lack of evidence.  There are unconfirmed reports that senior government figures intervened to prevent his dismissal.  Judicial corruptibility remains an enormous obstacle; police express frustration with the lack of effective prosecution of major drug cases.  The policy of the GOK neither encourages nor assists in the production or distribution of illicit drugs, and the USG has no evidence that government officials engage in the drug trade or in money laundering.

Agreements and Treaties.  Observers expect that the Kenyan parliament will pass legislation to implement Kenya's 1992 accession to the 1988 UN Convention.  No formal agreements with the USG were implemented or completed in 1993.

Cultivation/production.  Cannabis is grown illegally throughout Kenya, with commercial-scale production near the coast.  The government keeps no statistics on crop yields.  Most marijuana is consumed locally, but significant amounts are exported to Europe or used in illicit barter deals with neighboring countries.  Khat, or miraa, the leaves of which are chewed for their stimulative effect, is grown legally in Kenya and exported in large quantities to Somalia, Yemen, and occasionally to the U.S.

Drug Flow/Transit.  Brown and white heroin arrive in Kenya on direct flights from Yemen and from India, Pakistan and Thailand, where shipments are believed to be picked up by new couriers and taken through Nigeria and other African countries to Europe and the U.S.  Increasing flows of heroin into Ethiopia and Tanzania are being returned to Kenya's airports for onward shipment.  A barter trade in heroin and cocaine has arisen as a result of new direct air connections between Africa and South America.  Kenya is also a transshipment point for air and sea shipments of methaqualone bound from India to southern Africa, primarily South Africa, which has the world's largest methaqualone-consuming population.  Two shipments of hashish totaling some 7.5 mt, intercepted in 1993 in London and in Amsterdam, originated in Mombasa, according to the Customs Cooperation Council.  Kenyan police have identified as many as five drug syndicates operating in Nairobi, but are not certain if they work together.

Domestic Program.  Government officials see the public health threat of drugs as secondary to that of AIDS and other communicable diseases.  The government keeps no statistics on the extent of the drug abuse, but police estimate that the number of heroin addicts in Nairobi and Mombasa is between 500 and 1,000.  Marijuana use is widespread at all levels of society.  The government periodically puts on antidrug campaigns funded by external sources, but announced no major new initiatives in 1993.

IV.  U.S. Policy Initiatives and Programs.

Policy Initiatives.   The USG is continuing bilateral assistance to improving Kenya's interdiction capabilities and will encourage passage of the narcotics bill in the next parliamentary session.

Bilateral Cooperation.  The USG provided advanced drug enforcement training to two Kenyan officers in 1993, one of whom will head the antinarcotics unit in 1994.  The USG received cooperation from the GOK when it sought the extradition of a suspected narcotics trafficker from Zimbabwe.  The GOK responds to U.S. requests for information, but enforcement efforts based on  shared information have frequently been disappointing, with Kenyan authorities disregarding information or acting on it too late for successful interdiction of suspected traffickers.

Road Ahead.  The USG hopes that the replacement of the former narcotics unit chief with a capable successor will improve enforcement.  Judicial corruption continues to frustrate attempts to prosecute drug offenders.  The USG will continue training and information exchanges and will encourage passage and rapid implementation of the drug control bill.


I.  Summary

Lebanon is a production center for heroin, hashish, and cocaine, despite recent successes in eradicating opium poppy in the Bekaa Valley.  Heroin is exported to the U.S. from Lebanon.  The political situation continues to hinder the full cooperation of the Government of Lebanon (GOL) with the U.S. on narcotics matters.  The Syrian occupation of the Bekaa of 1976 continued in 1993, limiting the GOL's ability to take independent counternarcotics actions.  While the GOL has not become a party to the 1988 UN Convention and has failed to meet many of its goals and objectives, the successful eradication of a major portion of Lebanon's opium poppy crop was a significant development in 1993.  The increased cooperation of the GOL and the Syrian forces occupying the Bekaa is being credited for the successful eradication effort, a direct contrast with the international opinion in 1992 which held that the unusually harsh winter was largely responsible for the reduction in opium cultivation that year.  The GOL has not signed a bilateral narcotics agreement with the USG.

II.  Status of Country

The Bekaa Valley, which covers the eastern third of Lebanon, is a center of international narcotics trade.  Cannabis and opium poppy cultivations, and hashish, opium, cocaine, and heroin production all occur within the Bekaa.  There are also reports of highly mobile cocaine production laboratories operating elsewhere in Lebanon.  Domestic abuse is increasing of illicit drugs as well as of amphetamines and prescription drugs.

III.  Country Actions Against Drugs in 1993.

Policy Initiatives.  The GOL asserts that narcotics control is a high priority, but has had an uneven record in combatting the illicit trade.  Wide areas of the Bekaa Valley remain outside the control of the central government, and the continued presence of Syrian troops there and elsewhere in Lebanon means the GOL cannot engage in effective drug law enforcement without Syrian assistance.  A joint Syrian/Lebanese 1992 crop eradication campaign in the Bekaa continued successfully in 1993.  The GOL supported uncoordinated efforts by the UN and FAO to reorient the Bekaa economy from illicit to licit crop production, although neither program provided assistance to farmers before the 1993 planting season began in October.  The GOL also embarked on a major effort to subsidize the substitution of sugar beets for opium poppy cultivation.

Law Enforcement Efforts.  In addition to the joint Lebanese/Syrian eradication campaign, there were periodic seizures of drugs and processing laboratories.  European efforts to assist law enforcement agencies, however, suffered reverses with the theft of aid equipment. 

Corruption.  Although the GOL does not encourage drug trafficking or money laundering, it made little effort to arrest or prosecute officials on drug-related corruption charges in 1993.  The USG continues to receive credible reports of corrupt activities by Syrian officials, particularly among Syrian military and intelligence units in the Bekaa Valley.  Despite the Syrian Government's expression of concern, it also took no effective action to address drug-related corruption in Lebanon.

Agreements and Treaties.  Lebanon is a party to the 1961 UN Single Convention on Narcotic Drugs, but has not signed the 1972 Protocol, the 1971 Convention on Psychotropic Substances, or the 1988 UN Convention.  Despite apparent efforts to enhance law enforcement, the GOL does not yet appear to be meeting the goals and objectives of the 1988 Convention, nor is it likely to do so until it gains full control of its territory. 

Cultivation and Production.  A Washington estimate of opium poppy cultivation in the Bekaa Valley indicates that some 440 ha of poppy were available for harvest this year with, a potential opium yield of four mt.  Although this is an increase over estimated opium production in 1992, when severe winter weather enhanced eradication efforts, it is a substantial drop from the estimated 3,400 hectares and 34 mt of opium available from the 1991 crop.  Most of the 1993 crop in the Bekaa was cultivated north and west of Balabakk where the Lebanese and Syrian presence is not as extensive as in the central part of the valley.  Prior to 1993, 85 percent of the poppy in the Bekaa was cultivated in a region that included Balabakk, and extended west across the Plains of Haouch Barada and north to Al Hirmil.  Balabakk and its immediate environs accounted for more than one-third of all cultivation; this year the same area was almost devoid of opium poppy cultivation.  Marijuana control is apparently a lower priority for the GOL.  An estimated 15,700 ha were under cultivation in 1993, potentially yielding 565 mt of hashish.  This is a slight increase over the 15,200 ha and 545 mt tons estimated for 1991; no estimate is available for the 1992 crop.

Demand Reduction.  Three drug abuse prevention and treatment centers operate in Lebanon.  Their research reveals a small increase in local use of illicit drugs in recent years.

IV.  U.S. Policy Initiatives and Programs

Policy Initiatives.  The principal USG goal remains is to convince the GOL to make a sustained effort to eradicate drug cultivation in the Bekaa and to curb drug trafficking.  The GOL should work with the Syrians to move beyond this year's opium crop eradication effort to formulate a comprehensive antinarcotics action plan. The plan should include eradication goals for the Bekaa with specific targets for opium poppy as well as hashish; arrangements for observers, such as the UNDCP, to verify eradication results; a timetable for action to betaken against Syrian officials suspected of complicity in the drug trade; destruction of illicit drug production laboratories; action against trafficking in essential and precursor chemicals; and law enforcement efforts against drug traffickers.

Bilateral Cooperation.  DEA continued to work with the GOL on narcotics investigations in 1993.  The USG would be willing to explore increasing cooperative efforts and enter into discussions about a formal counternarcotics program in Lebanon if effective drug eradication and enforcement efforts appear possible.

The Road Ahead.  Programs of aid agencies and various branches of the Lebanese Government for crop substitution and assistance to the Bekaa economy have been poorly coordinated and under-funded.  The USG will continue in multilateral fora to insist upon development strategies for the Bekaa that emphasize government attention to infrastructure, including irrigation, rather than intrusive and transient proposals to manage crop production and marketing.

[Chart:  Statistical Tables]


I.  Summary

Morocco is one of the world's largest producers of cannabis, most of which is consumed in Europe and North Africa as hashish.  Latin American cocaine and Asian heroin are transshipped through Morocco in route to Europe and, to a lesser extent, North America.  The Government of Morocco (GOM) continued the enhanced enforcement and interdiction efforts initiated in 1992.  However, by year's end, budgetary constraints, poor interagency coordination, and corruption had overtaken the earlier.  Morocco is a signatory to the 1988 UN Convention but made little progress toward meeting its goals and objectives in 1993.

II.  Status of Country

Over one-half of Morocco's cannabis is exported to Europe.  Most is processed into hashish resin or oil and exported to Europe, Tunisia, and Algeria for consumption or re-export.  An estimated 15 to 40 percent of the crop is consumed domestically.  Moroccan officials recognize that hashish smuggling networks have diversified into cocaine and heroin, though seizures of these drugs are still small.  Cannabis typically is exported motor vehicle departing Morocco's Mediterranean Coast by ferry to Spain or France.  Cannabis and other drugs also are exported to Spain on small Mediterranean fishing boats or through the Canary Islands on larger vessels.

Moroccan officials and health care workers report increasing levels of cocaine and heroin addiction in Casablanca, Tangier, and other cities.  Most people arrested for trafficking are Moroccan, although nationals of Latin American, European, and other African countries (particularly Senegalese) also have been arrested.

III.  Country Actions Against Drugs in 1993

Policy Initiatives.  The GOM undertook two complementary antidrug initiatives.  King Hassan ordered an interdiction and eradication effort in the cannabis growing Rif area of northern Morocco in late 1992 which continued into 1993.  The GOM deployed military units to establish internal control points and patrol the Mediterranean Coast; reorganized the ranks of customs officers seeking a more rigorous inspection of trucks boarding ferries bound for Europe; and strengthened cannabis eradication and crop substitution programs.

In January 1993, the Ministry of the Interior announced a comprehensive economic development and drug control initiative for the Rif, "Project Derro."  Project developers anticipated an expenditure of $2.2 billion over five years, to be jointly financed by the GOM and the European Union (EU).  The initial phase consists of $100 million for six crop substitution projects, and significant additional resources to improve the agricultural infrastructure.  In April, the GOM contributed the first $100 million; the EU contributed its first $13 million in December.  However, none of these contribution was earmarked for specific drug control projects.

Cultivation and Production.  Most Moroccan cannabis is cultivated on small holdings by Rif farmers, although there is also some cultivation in the Souss Valley in the south.  In February 1993, the King estimated that  50,000 hectares of cannabis were cultivated in the Rif, reflecting an apparent increase, despite government efforts to eradicate cannabis.  Although the GOM has announced a commitment to the total eradication of cannabis production, the potential for social unrest renders total eradication unlikely unless accompanied by a program of heavily subsidized crop substitution.  However, neither the GOM nor the EU appears able or willing to commit the requisite resources for such a subsidy program.

Law Enforcement.  As part of the King's antidrug initiative, the GOM deployed 3,000 troops to the Rif area to man some 200 internal checkpoints.  The navy instituted routine sea patrols.  Drug seizures, however, actually decreased from last year's level.  The GOM has not yet amended Moroccan law to permit asset seizure or undercover  operations involving the controlled delivery of illegal drugs.  Lack of coordination in the field among Surete Nationale, Gendarmerie Royale, Moroccan Customs, and other agencies limited GOM success in controlling narcotics.  Cooperation between Moroccan and foreign law enforcement agencies in drug matters is limited primarily to training and liaison.  The GOM has long sought intelligence-sharing arrangements with neighboring countries.  Authorities did not participate in any drug related extraditions, joint operations, or investigations during the year.  Commercial air service between Rio de Janeiro and Casablanca, once popular drug smuggling route, remained suspended throughout 1993.

Agreements and Treaties.  Morocco is a signatory to the 1988 UN Convention.  The GOM's announced drug control programs would, if fully implemented, would bring it substantially into compliance with the Convention's goals and objectives.  However, progress was minimal in 1993.  Morocco ratified the 1984 mutual legal assistance treaty with the U.S. in September.  Morocco and the U.S. concluded a bilateral narcotics cooperation agreement in 1989 to comply with Chiles Amendment requirements.  Morocco also has narcotics cooperation or mutual legal assistance agreements with the EU, France, Spain, Germany, Italy, Portugal, and the UK.  Morocco is a member of Interpol.

Corruption.  The GOM does not promote drug production or distribution as a matter of policy.  However, there continue to be credible reports of the involvement of senior GOM officials in the drug trade.  Only a few low-level officials were prosecuted in 1993.

Drug Flow/Transit.  Cocaine is transshipped across Morocco to Europe by several means, including Latin Americans and West African couriers traveling by air, and by ships with port calls in Casablanca and Tangier, where drugs are off loaded to trucks bound for Europe by ferry.  The USG believes that small amounts of heroin, presumably of Middle Eastern origin, are transshipped through Morocco from Algeria to Europe.

Demand Reduction.  The GOM does not acknowledge a significant hard-drug addiction problem, despite a Ministry of Health study of consumption patterns in Morocco, which showed an increase of abuse among young people.  The GOM does not actively promote demand reduction for cannabis.  Ministry of Health officials have established a library of technical drug abuse materials and a model drug treatment center in Rabat, both with EU funding.  A number of private organizations and educational institutions operate small narcotics education and treatment programs.
IV.  U.S. Policy Initiatives and Programs

Policy Initiatives.  The U.S. encourages Moroccan antinarcotics efforts; cooperates with Moroccan law enforcement officials to curtail production and transshipment of drugs; provides training in law enforcement techniques; promotes GOM adherence to bilateral and international agreements; provides support for existing Moroccan-European drug cooperation; and encourages greater international cooperation to control Moroccan production and exportation of drugs.

Bilateral Cooperation.  Pursuant to the 1989 agreement, the U.S. and Morocco  maintained a dialogue on drug issues.  The USG provided training and narcotics intelligence where possible, including sending a group of Moroccan law enforcement officials and health workers to the U.S. in April for consultations with American experts.  

The Road Ahead.  The U.S. will monitor the narcotics situation in Morocco, cooperate with the GOM in its narcotic control efforts, and, together with our European partners, provide law enforcement training, intelligence, and other support where appropriate.  


I.  Summary

Niger still has a relatively small but growing problem with narcotics trafficking, abuse and related corruption.  The primary narcotics problem in Niger is the use of imported amphetamines and cannabis, particularly in rural areas.  The government has detected some small- scale heroin trafficking in the past, but reported no seizures of heroin or cocaine during 1993.  There are unsubstantiated reports that drug traffickers from Nigeria transit Niger in route to Algeria and Libya.  The Government of Niger (GON) recognizes the dangers of narcotics trafficking and during 1993 established offices for the National Antidrug Center, with French and UN support.  Once equipped and staffed, the center will include officers from the Niger police, Customs and Gendarmerie to coordinate information and counternarcotics efforts.  In the context of Niger's very limited means and other economic and security problems, the government's drug control plans are realistic.  They reflect a sincere concern for narcotics problems, and a complete willingness to cooperate with the U.S. and with other counter-narcotics initiatives.  Niger is a party to the 1988 UN Convention.

II.  Status of Country

Niger does not play a significant role in narcotics production or trafficking, money laundering or the movement of precursor chemicals.  Niger does not produce or use most of the precursor chemicals, nor is convenient to major transportation routes.  Niger is a landlocked country with limited international trade; there are no direct commercial flights to the U.S.

III. Country Actions Against Drugs in 1993

Policy initiatives.  Niger became a party to the 1988 convention in 1992 and has begun to review its legislation to comply with the convention's obligations. Many of its requirements already are being applied.  Niger seeks additional resources, training, and aid (including from the U.S.) to reinforce its drug control efforts.

Accomplishments.  Niger established and provided a building for a National Antidrug Center which coordinates all narcotics-related law enforcement and public security organizations.  A computer donated by the USG in 1992 will be installed in the Center so establish a database on narcotics trafficking arrests, patterns and products.

Law enforcement.  In 1993, GON authorities reported seizing 126 kgs of cannabis and approximately 134,000 pills of various types of amphetamines or other illicit drugs.

Corruption.  The government, the media and civic groups strongly and frequently condemn drug abuse, production and trafficking and drug-related corruption.  Senior police officials convicted of diverting heroin seized in an arrest were released from prison during 1993.  The U.S. Embassy is urging the GON not to rehire officers unless they are formally and credibly cleared of the charges.  Other senior officials are not known or suspected of being involved in illegal drug activity.

Treaties and Agreements.   Niger has no agreements with USG on narcotics matters, aside from small assistance projects, nor are we aware of any major negotiation initiatives underway with third parties.  As noted, Niger became a party to the 1988 UN Convention in 1992. 

Cultivation and Production.  GON authorities have encountered little production of illegal drugs or narcotics in Niger.  A few small plots of cannabis have been found, but Niger is not an important producing country.

Drug flow/Transit. There is no recent evidence of heroin trafficking from Nigeria through Niger to North Africa and Europe. There were no reported seizures of heroin or cocaine during the year.  Nonetheless, Algerian officials and Nigerian authorities suspect continued traffic along land routes, suggesting that controls are inadequate at land border crossings.  Increased drug interdiction in Nigeria could prompt greater use of Niger for drug transit which the Niger authorities  Niger would be ill-equipped to detect or control.

Domestic Programs. Almost all of Niger's demand reduction programs are funded by foreign donors.  The government and the private media support efforts to reduce demand.

IV. US Policy Initiatives and Programs

Policy Initiatives.  The USG will assist the GON in establishing measures and techniques to discourage the use of Niger as a transit route for he shipment of drugs to Europe and the U.S., and encourage the GON to deal with domestic drug problems.

Bilateral Cooperation.  The USG funded Nigerian participation in international narcotics seminars and provided data processing equipment which will improve GON tracking and monitoring of drug cases and related information.  It also provided substance identification kits, and offers periodic updates on narcotics trafficking trends and patterns.

Road ahead.  The U.S. intends to provide assistance and advice, and through the exchange of information and possibly some training, to improve the GON's ability to limit drug transiting.


I.  Summary

Nigerian trafficking organizations control courier networks that move large quantities of heroin from Asia to the U.S. and European markets ass well as sophisticated money laundering operations.  Lagos-based criminal enterprises continue to expand their operations in West Africa and throughout the continent, undermining attempts in other African nations to improve governance and accountability.  Cocaine, imported primarily from Brazil, is reexported to Europe.  To a lesser degree it also is consumed in Nigeria and elsewhere in Africa.  In October, the U.S. presented a demarche to the former Nigerian head of state on the failures of Nigeria's counternarcotics performance.  Nigeria is a party to the 1988 UN Convention, but has failed to achieve the Convention's goals and objectives.

Official corruption remains a serious obstacle to effective counternarcotics efforts.  The Government of Nigeria (GON) in 1993 did not investigate any senior government officials for alleged involvement in the illicit drug trade.  Nigeria failed to apprehend and extradite several major fugitive traffickers under indictment in the U.S.  While some legal mechanisms are in place to combat what appears to be extensive money laundering, Nigeria has made no attempt to employ them.  Nigeria did not use USG-supplied narcotics assistance effectively.  Nigeria did not institute any significant new antidrug trafficking policy initiatives, nor did it develop a national antidrug strategy.

II.  Status of Country

Despite increasingly vigorous law enforcement efforts by the international community, Nigerian trafficking of heroin to the U.S. and its transfers millions of dollars to drug source countries continue unabated.  Cocaine enters Nigeria from South America, primarily through Brazil, for reexport to Europe and for domestic and regional consumption.  Cannabis, the only illicit drug grown in Nigeria, is shipped to Europe and West Africa.  International law enforcement techniques shift to counter new Nigerian drug trafficking methods and patterns, but Nigerian drug organizations have adapted quickly to evade detection and arrest.  Nigerian Drug Law Enforcement Agency (NDLEA) enforcement operations have focused almost exclusively on low-level drug couriers, not major traffickers.

III.  Country Actions Against Drugs in 1993

Policy Initiatives.  Nigeria did not undertake any significant new antidrug policy initiatives.  The NDLEA does not have a national strategy to curb trafficking or substance abuse and did not take any significant steps to formulate such a strategy.

Accomplishments.  The NDLEA provided the USG with statistics showing 151 narcotics arrests and 11 kgs of heroin seized during the year, down sharply from 1992 levels.  Acting on information provided by the Government of Thailand to DEA, Nigerian officials in December did arrest the consignee of two cargo shipments containing 258 kgs of heroin seized from the port in Lagos as it arrived from Thailand.  There were no  arrests or prosecutions for money laundering.  The NDLEA arrested and turned over to American law enforcement authorities two mid-level Nigerian traffickers wanted in the U.S.  DEA concerns about corruption in the NDLEA hampered further cooperation.  The NDLEA did not establish a credible demand reduction program, despite a modestly increased budget to the NDLEA for this purpose.  Precursor chemical control is not an issue for Nigeria.

Law Enforcement Efforts.  NDLEA operations are supported by a central intelligence unit and a special narcotics task force, the latter working in conjunction with the DEA office in Lagos.  The NDLEA created the special task force to locate fugitives sought by the U.S. for extradition, but three major traffickers sought by the U.S. since  1992 remain at large.

The government retired the head of the NDLEA in late 1993.  The NDLEA is being reorganized under its new leadership; some forty persons have been removed to date.  Nevertheless, corruption remains a problem.

Corruption.  The government does not, as a matter of policy, facilitate the production or distribution of drugs or encourage money laundering.  However, corruption in law enforcement bodies is a problem.  NDLEA screening and training procedures for recruits are  inadequate; some agents are known to be relatives of suspected drug traffickers.  The NDLEA is incapable of or unwilling to use effectively U.S. assistance.  Lack of cooperation between NDLEA, the police, and customs operations at Nigeria's international air and seaports fosters corruption.

The Nigerian Government did not investigate any senior official for involvement in drug trafficking, despite indications of high-level participation in narcotics trafficking.  In addition, drug suspects often have been released without proper court authorization.  Thefts of drug evidence have prevented prosecution of some drug cases.  NDLEA officials also have under-reported drug seizures, enabling them to sell the drugs back to the traffickers.  NDLEA, police, and customs agents have helped known traffickers clear the country's  ports of entry, and have aided the escape of trafficking suspects.

Agreements and Treaties.  Nigeria is a party to the 1988 UN Convention, the 1961 UN Single Convention, and its 1972 Protocol, as well as the 1971 Convention on Psychotropic Substances.  The 1931 U.S.-UK Extradition Treaty, extended to include Nigeria in 1935, is the legal basis for U.S. extradition requests.  The U.S. and Nigeria signed a mutual legal assistance treaty in 1989, but the U.S. Senate has not acted on it.

Cultivation and Production.  Cannabis is the only drug cultivated in Nigeria; production and consumption are widespread.  The government provided no statistics on the extent of the crop and has no eradication program.

Drug Flow/Transit.  Nigeria is a major transit country for heroin from Southeast and Southwest Asia destined to the U.S. and Europe.  Significant amounts of cocaine from South America, particularly Brazil, also transit Nigeria to Europe.  Nigeria's importance as a transit country is growing. Its trafficking networks are expanding their operations to other West African countries, and to the rest of the world.
Demand Reduction.  As trafficking through Nigeria has grown, there has been a corresponding increase in domestic drug abuse which is causing some concern.  The Nigerian Government has not established a credible demand reduction program.  NDLEA officers participated in a USIS-sponsored workshop in Nigeria on reducing drug demand and four officials attended demand reduction training programs in the U.S.

IV.  U.S. Policy Initiatives and Programs.

Policy Initiatives.  The main goal of U.S. policy is to persuade Nigeria to reduce drug trafficking, particularly of heroin, by its citizens.  Nigeria's leadership must make a vigorous and sustained commitment to arrest and convict or extradite traffickers and to enforce anti-conspiracy laws aimed at major traffickers.  The Nigerian Government must improve cooperation among Nigerian enforcement agencies.

Bilateral Cooperation.  The level of cooperation between the U.S. and Nigeria in 1993 was far below U.S. expectations.  Despite repeated assurances, Nigerian law enforcement authorities did not make progress in arresting three major traffickers the U.S. had requested for extradition.  In addition, the NDLEA failed to make adequate use of previously provided U.S. assistance.

The U.S.-Nigerian Joint Narcotics Task Force (JNTF), established under a 1989 Memorandum of Understanding, conducted two successful operations in 1993.  The JNTF staged an operation against cocaine traffickers and apprehended and expelled to the U.S. a Nigerian wanted on drug charges.  DEA concern that NDLEA could not protect confidential information prevented more cooperation.

Although there was some improvement in the level of drug cooperation between Nigeria and the U.S. at the end of 1993, the Nigerians need to do more over a sustained period to demonstrate a serious commitment to the international narcotic control effort.

The Road Ahead.  The USG will continue to raise narcotics concerns with the highest levels of the Nigerian government, and seek the extradition of key traffickers as well as other Nigerians sought in the U.S. on drug charges.  Technical assistance to be provided by the USG may support NDLEA's efforts to become a more effective counternarcotics force by improving NDLEA capabilities to arrest and prosecute traffickers and couriers; and to enforce and strengthen money laundering, asset seizure and forfeiture laws. 

[Chart:  Statistical Tables]


Saudi Arabia is used as a transit route, primarily for heroin moving from Pakistan and Southeast Asia to Nigeria and elsewhere in Africa, and on to Europe and the U.S.  Saudi Arabia often is involved in international drug trafficking because traffickers use pilgrimage visas to mask travel from and to narcotics source countries.  

Saudi Arabia instituted a death penalty for convicted narcotics traffickers in 1988.  As of November, twenty-five Pakistanis had been executed during 1993.  The authorities also executed nationals of Saudi Arabia, Nigeria, Afghanistan, Iraq, Jordan and Yemen during the year. 

Saudi authorities are concerned about rising domestic narcotics abuse.  Treatment officials estimate that there are up to 10,000 Saudi heroin addicts; one clinic in Riyadh has treated over 65,000 users in the past five years.  Marijuana, cocaine and amphetamines also are consumed in Saudi Arabia.

Saudi Arabia acceded to the 1988 UN Convention in 1992 and has been revising its laws to bring them into conformity with the Convention.  In light of its vigorous drug law enforcement activities, the country has made progress in meeting the Convention's goals.

Saudi narcotics officials regularly attend regional meetings of the UNDCP.  The USG sponsored DEA training courses in Saudi Arabia in 1993; U.S. Customs has provided narcotics interdiction training to Saudi customs since 1978.  Saudi agencies sponsored a regional conference on money laundering in 1993. Saudi customs deploys more than 100 detector dog teams around the kingdom, trained by U.S. Customs advisors. 


I.  Summary

Good air and sea connections to Europe and North America continue to make Senegal an important drug transit route.  The termination of direct commercial flights between Lagos and New York in 1993 enhanced Dakar's importance as a transit site for Nigerian narcotics trafficking to the U.S.  Most drug-related arrests take place at Dakar-Yoff International Airport.  Drug abuse among local youth is increasing; according to the DEA, heroin and cocaine abuse is burgeoning in Dakar.  Senegal is a party to the 1988 UN Convention, but needs to do more to meet its goals and objectives.

II.  Status of Country

Senegal is an important transit point for Asian heroin bound for North America and Europe.  Nigerian nationals dominate narcotics arrests, and often come to Senegal to recruit couriers of other nationalities who will attract less attention at Western ports of entry.  The suspension in direct flights between Lagos and the U.S. has made Senegal more attractive to Nigerian traffickers, given the biweekly direct flights from Dakar to New York.  Senegalese citizens are involved in the international drug trade, as evidenced by the growing number involved in fraudulent documentation and drug-related cases in France, Germany and Italy.  Smugglers ingest drugs in capsules, balloons or condoms.  The only domestically grown drug is cannabis for local consumption.

III.  Country Actions Against Drugs in 1993

Policy Initiatives.  There were no major counternarcotics policy initiatives in 1993.

Law Enforcement Efforts.  The National Commission on Narcotics, created four years ago to promote inter-service cooperation, rarely met in 1993 and bogged down in procedural questions.  For example, customs authorities seize illegal narcotics immediately upon discovery, while the police would prefer to permit controlled deliveries in certain circumstances in order to identify distributors.  Most drug arrests stem from searches and seizures at Dakar-Yoff Airport.  Statistics for 1993 have not been released, but hard-drug arrests generally average 20-30 per year.  In contrast, annual cannabis arrests around the country total more than one thousand, mostly users and low-level peddlers.  There has been a steep growth in Senegalese involvement in the false document industry, often linked to the drug trade. 

Corruption.  Although difficult to document, it is likely that corruption plays an important role in the illicit drug trade in Senegal.  Poorly paid civil servants are particularly vulnerable to trafficker bribes.  The press occasionally reports incidents in which government or judicial officials have been linked to drug-related corruption.  

Agreements and Treaties.  Senegal is a party to the major UN drug conventions, including the 1988 Convention.  Senegal has extradition treaties with the Cape Verde Islands, the Gambia, Guinea-Bissau, Mali, Morocco, Tunisia and France.  Senegal is a member of Interpol, and relies heavily on drug information obtained through Interpol channels.
Drug Flow/Transit.  The last annual compilation of drug seizures was published in 1989.  However, the National Narcotics Brigade recently reported that in the period August-December, authorities seized 13 kgs of heroin at Dakar-Yoff airport, some of which was destined to the U.S.  Other police source estimate that less than two percent of the drug trade transiting Senegal is intercepted.  Senegalese doctors and social workers report that crack cocaine has been available in Dakar since 1991 and that its use is spreading.  Amphetamines are widely available and inexpensive.

IV.  U.S. Policy Initiatives and Programs

Policy Initiatives.  The USG encourages improvements in law enforcement efforts and in Senegalese participation in counternarcotics training.

Bilateral Cooperation.  The USG provided narcotics test kits to the Narcotics Brigade.  U.S. Customs is training 24 students from the police, customs and gendarmerie in drug interdiction methods and techniques in early 1994.

The Road Ahead.  U.S. policy will be to assist Senegal in curbing the transit of narcotics through Dakar to North America and Western Europe.  The principal obstacles will be the lack of resources and corruption among border control and law enforcement officials. Pressing economic problems also will continue to take precedence over drug control among government priorities. 


I.  Summary

Syria is a transit route for regional heroin and hashish trafficking networks.  The Syrian military presence in Lebanon makes Syria at least partly accountable, with Lebanon, for the cultivation and processing of Lebanese heroin, hashish, and cocaine destined for Europe, the Persian Gulf, and the U.S.  There continue to be reports of some Syrian military officials assisting in and profiting from the drug trade, although this is not Syrian Government policy.

In 1993, the Syrians cooperated with the Lebanese to eradicate most of the opium poppy cultivation in the Bekaa Valley.  Syrian and Lebanese officials claim that their forces destroyed most of the cannabis crop, although U.S. estimates indicated there was a slight increase in the amount of marijuana produced in 1993.  The Syrians also instituted a tough domestic anti-narcotics law in June, including provisions for the seizure of assets obtained through trafficking.  The Syrians did not significantly reduce trafficking through Syria, although authorities believe the 1993 law has begun to dissuade some traffickers.  Despite the Syrian's assertion that it remains ready to investigate reports of cocaine and heroin processing laboratories in the Bekaa, it has launched only sporadic, ineffectual efforts against the laboratories.  The Syrian Government also failed to investigate, arrest, or prosecute Syrian officials reported to be engaged in narcotics trafficking.

Syria met some, but not all, of the goals and objectives of the 1988 UN Convention.  The USG does not provide Syria with bilateral assistance and does not support loans for Syria in multilateral institutions.

II.  Status of Country 

Syria is used as a transit site for drugs cultivated or processed in Lebanon or imported from third countries.  While Syrian military forces participated in efforts to halt the transit trade, there were also reports of military and security officials personally profiting from this trade.

III.  Country Actions Against Drugs in 1993

Policy Initiatives.  Syrian forces in Lebanon increased their cooperation with Lebanese authorities to eradicate much of the opium poppy crop in the Bekaa Valley.  Syrian authorities claimed comparable inroads into hashish production, although USG estimates do not support this claim.  Syrian forces also participated in periodic drug seizures and interdiction efforts, including regular searches of travelers entering Syria at border crossing points.  Syrians arrested at Syrian checkpoints in Lebanon were transported to Syria for prosecution; Lebanese citizens were handed over to Lebanese authorities.  A new Lebanese-Syrian agreement is designed to enhance intelligence sharing on narcotics matters and investigative coordination.

Accomplishments.  As a result of joint Syrian-Lebanese eradication efforts, weather conditions, and changes in the political economy of the Bekaa, opium production in 1993 dropped 90 percent from 1991 levels to 4.4 mt, according to USG estimates.  However, estimates of hashish production  registered a slight gain over 1991 levels.  Syrian authorities believe hashish production was considerably lower than this estimate.  Lebanese and Syrian authorities issued an ultimatum to farmers in the Bekaa to destroy any narcotics crops by June, or face arrest.

Law Enforcement Efforts.  Syrian and Lebanese forces carried out periodic seizures of narcotics, including cocaine, in Lebanon, beginning with joint raids in late 1992 and early 1993.  The hashish seized reportedly was destined for Egypt, Jordan, and Saudi Arabia.  In May, Syrian and Lebanese forces reportedly bulldozed illegal shipping facilities along the Lebanese coast.  Syria also launched its own nationwide anti-smuggling campaign; while not targeted specifically against narcotics, it helped interdict some drug trafficking as well.

The Syrians believe enhanced police enforcement efforts discouraged drug trafficking within Syria.  There was an almost 40 percent drop in the number of people charged in drug-related crimes in 1993, according to government statistics.  Syrian authorities believe this represents an actual decline in trafficking.  The 1993 narcotics control law includes stiff penalties for money laundering and provides for the seizure of profits and assets obtained through the drug trade, as well as equipment used in drug production and transportation.

Corruption.  Syria does not as a matter of government policy encourage the production or distribution of drugs.  However, we are unaware of any specific government efforts to bring to justice officials engaged in or profiting from drug trafficking, even though Syrian officials admit to the possibility of such involvement by individual members of the military and security establishments.

Agreements and Treaties. There is no U.S.-Syrian agreement on narcotics, nor an extradition treaty.  Syria is a party to the 1988 UN Convention, the 1961 UN Single Convention on Narcotics and its 1972 Protocol, as well as the 1971 Convention on Psychotropic Substances.  Syria maintains agreements on the drug trafficking with Germany, the Netherlands, Iran, and Jordan and has accords on combatting drugs with Saudi Arabia, Jordan, Turkey, and Cyprus.  Syria is a member of Interpol, and Syrian representatives attend various international meetings of narcotics enforcement officers.

Cultivation/Production.  There are no significant illicit crops grown in Syria.  While the USG believes some morphine and opium are processed in Syria, Lebanon's Bekaa Valley is the primary site of processing laboratories in territory under Syrian military control.  Syrian authorities claim that they investigated reports they received on possible heroin processing laboratories operating in Lebanese territory their military control and found nothing.  The USG is unaware of any significant Syrian moves during 1993 to close down laboratories which the USG believes to be operating in Syrian and Lebanese territory.

Drug Flow/Transit.  The USG strongly disagrees with the assessment of Syrian authorities that drug transiting has declined from last year's levels.  Heroin generally enters overland from Lebanon and Turkey in route to the U.S. and Europe; hashish enters overland from the same countries and also by sea at northern Syrian ports.  Arrest patterns indicate that cocaine transits Damascus airport on its way from Lebanon to Europe.
Syrian military control of much of the Bekaa makes Syria primarily responsible for the unimpeded operation of processing laboratories in areas under its control.  It also makes full Syrian participation necessary in eradication and other law enforcement efforts aimed at curbing the flow of drugs through the region.

Domestic Programs.  Drug abuse in Syria is limited by the social stigma attached by strong family traditions, government-controlled media campaigns, and strict laws.  In conjunction with the 1993 drug law, Syrian authorities augmented media efforts to increase public awareness of the dangers of drug abuse.  The new drug focuses particularly on youth by prescribing the death penalty for the sale or distribution of drugs on educational institution property, cultural centers, or military bases.  There are two public drug treatment facilities in Syria.

U.S. Policy Initiatives and Programs

Policy Initiatives.  The USG has urged Syria to continue joint operations with Lebanon to eradicate cultivation and eliminate production of cocaine, heroin and hashish in Lebanon, and to arrest and prosecute Syrian officials engaged in narcotics trafficking.  The U.S. has encouraged the UNDCP to involve the Syrian Government in the development of its program for Lebanon.

Bilateral Cooperation.  Although there is no U.S.-Syria bilateral narcotics agreement, the DEA, through its Nicosia Office, maintains a liaison relationship with the Syrian National Police.  The Syrian Government cooperated in exchanging information on ongoing investigations to interdict drugs coming from Lebanon.  However, there is no evidence that it closed down any processing laboratories in the Bekaa Valley.

The Road Ahead.  The U.S. will urge progress beyond crop eradication to include stronger measures against all aspects of drug production and trafficking.  The USG will encourage appropriate, effective UNDCP programs in both Lebanon and Syria.

[Chart:  Statistical Tables]


I.  Summary

Tunisia has a modest domestic demand problem.  The use of heroin and cocaine is rare, but there is some cannabis and hashish consumption in rural areas.  The Government of Tunisia (GOT) also is concerned about abuse of prescription drugs, and has an active drug education program with a special focus on youth.  Tunisia's use as a transshipment point is limited.  Some hashish does flow from Morocco through Tunisia to Libya and Europe.  There are also small quantities of hard drugs transiting Tunisia to Libya and Europe.  Tunisian authorities have confiscated small quantities of heroin in route to Libya carried by couriers travelling by air.

Tunisia has ratified the 1988 UN Convention, and the is making a sincere effort to comply with its provisions.  In mid-1992, the GOT approved new legislation, modeled on the 1988 Convention, significantly raising penalties on convicted drug traffickers, but also stressing prevention and treatment.

II.  Status of Country

Tunisia is not a significant producer of illicit drugs, nor  a manufacturer of precursor chemicals.  There is no evidence that Tunisia is becoming a money laundering center.  There is a risk that Tunisia will be used more as a transshipment point as other countries increase their interdiction efforts.

III.  Country Actions Against Drugs in 1993

The GOT's interagency National Bureau of Dangerous Drugs, chaired by the Minister of Public Health, coordinates the government's narcotics control initiatives.  The Bureau includes representatives from the paramilitary National Guard (Interior Ministry); the Customs Service (Finance Ministry); and the Ministries of Justice, Foreign Affairs, and Youth.  The Bureau's mandate includes prevention and rehabilitation, as well as arrests and prosecution.

While there is no U.S.-Tunisia narcotics agreement, Tunisia plays a positive role on the UN Commission on Dangerous Drugs and has been generally supportive of USG narcotics initiatives in international organizations.

Law Enforcement Efforts.  Tunisia has an active narcotics interdiction effort, although authority is spread among different agencies.


ALGERIA.  Algeria produces a small amount of cannabis for local consumption; studies suggest abuse is increasing.   Strict narcotics enforcement along Morocco's northern border has encouraged some drug traffickers to transit Algeria to reach European markets.  Algeria has signed, but not ratified, the 1988 UN Convention.

There is some trade in heroin and hashish destined to Europe, but a growing problem with cannabis cultivation and hashish consumption are Algeria's major narcotics challenges.  Algeria's counternarcotics efforts focused on strict border procedures, rigorous customs inspections at points of entry, tighter controls on overland shipment of goods, and greater surveillance of suspected traffic, including Europeans transiting the country.  The Government of Algeria (GOA) imposes stiff prison sentences on convicted drug traffickers.  

There is no evidence that senior officials are involved in narcotics production, distribution, trafficking, or in the laundering of drug proceeds.  There have been uncorroborated allegations in the press of corruption among local customs officials along the Moroccan and Tunisian borders.

Algeria has signed, but not ratified, the 1988 UN Convention.  Algeria is a party to the 1961 UN Single Convention (but not its 1972 Protocol), and the 1971 Convention on Psychotropic Substances.  Algeria does seek to meet the goals and objectives of the 1988 Convention through strict  enforcement of its drug laws.  Algeria is also a member of the Customs Cooperation Council, in which European and North African countries exchange information on drug trafficking.

BOTSWANA.  Botswana is a transit country for methaqualone or Mandrax, a trade name for methaqualone combined with an antihistamine.  Limited amounts of cocaine from South America transit Botswana in route to South Africa.  Some marijuana and heroin also transit the country.  Small amounts of the drugs go to the U.S.  Botswana is a party to the 1961 and 1971 UN conventions and the 1972 Protocol to the 1961 Convention, but is not a signatory to the 1988 UN Convention.  Nonetheless, the government vigorously enforced asset seizure and forfeiture legislation, and expanded the competency and capabilities of its criminal investigation division's anti-narcotics personnel.  

CAMEROON is not a major trafficking country, although its economic recession, large number of unemployed urban youth, government corruption, and long border with Nigeria, a major drug transit country, make it vulnerable to the drug trade.  There is some evidence of drug shipments between Nigeria and Chad crossing northern Cameroon.  
Cameroon has acceded to the 1988 UN Convention, but compliance with its goals and objectives is inadequate.  There was only one drug seizure (marijuana) by airport police in 1993, less than in past years.  The National Drug Fighting Committee, created in 1992, coordinates narcotics control efforts.  The USG is unaware of any senior GRC officials involved in narcotics production, distribution or money laundering.  However, the USG withheld narcotics assistance in 1992, as part of the overall suspension of assistance because of Cameroon's inadequate record in democratization, human rights, and economic reform.  The narcotics aid was not released in 1993 because of the unwillingness of the police to furnish drug data to the USG. 
CAPE VERDE.  The Cape Verde Islands are strategically located on air and sea routes linking Africa and Europe with the Americas.  Local drug production and consumption remain low.  However, the Islands are increasingly used as a transit point for narcotics, primarily cocaine, shipped by sea and air from South America and Africa to Europe.  Authorities continue to work with Interpol and Portuguese officials to curb the traffic to Europe.  Cape Verde enjoys little domestic demand for narcotics; it does not have any demand reduction program, beyond  public health awareness programs.  Corruption is not generally a problem within the government or among law enforcement organizations.  The country is in the process of creating a coast guard, modelled on the U.S. Coast Guard.  Cape Verde is a party to the 1961 and 1971 UN Conventions and the 1972 Protocol to the 1961 Convention, but not to the 1988 UN Convention. 

JORDAN.  Although the region's ancient trade routes converge in modern Jordan, the problems of transshipment or consumption of illicit narcotics have been minor.  Jordan does not produce illicit drugs.  The majority of trafficking has been in hashish, although heroin has been seized on rare occasions.  Jordanian authorities state their primary concern lies in the continuing drug traffic from Lebanon, through Jordan and Syria, to Egypt and the Gulf states.  Cooperation with Egyptian law enforcement officials remains adequate to address issues of such mutual concern.

Domestic consumption of hashish is limited by cultural norms; narcotics addiction is rare.  In 1993, the Government of Jordan (GOJ) opened a halfway house for the treatment of addicts.  A hospital is to open in 1994 devoted to the treatment of drug-related problems.  Abuse of over-the-counter drugs prompted expanded regulation of pharmaceutical products.  The public security directorate instituted a drug awareness program in the schools, in an effort to avoid a more extensive drug problem in the future.

Jordanian efforts have been stepped up to restrict and deter narcotics trafficking, despite severe budgetary and personnel constraints.  Antiquated equipment also hampers government enforcement efforts.  The GOJ is committed to the enforcement of existing anti-narcotics statutes.  It imposes lengthy prison sentences on convicted drug traffickers.  The GOJ has imposed stricter border-control procedures, increased Customs inspections at points of entry, tighter regulations on overland transport of goods, and increased surveillance of suspected traffickers.  As a result, drug seizures increased in the last quarter of 1993.

Jordan adheres to the tenets of the 1988 UN Convention, and Jordanian authorities coordinate enforcement efforts with foreign enforcement officials on international narcotics matters.  GOJ police and security forces enjoy close cooperation with Interpol, and with USG enforcement agencies.  In 1993, the USG funded travel for a GOJ representative to evaluate drug abuse prevention programs in the U.S. for possible use in Jordan.  The GOJ will continue its current narcotics prevention initiatives, and has requested assistance from DEA representatives touring Jordan and Damascus.  Responsibility for narcotics enforcement coordination is vested in Major General Nour Al-Din Khair, Director of the Pan-Arab Bureau of Narcotics Affairs, and the Public Security Directorate's Anti-Narcotics and Counterfeiting Bureau. 

LESOTHO is neither a major narcotics producer nor a consumer country.  Cannabis is grown as a cash crop in many areas of the country, and is exported to South Africa, and to a lesser extent, is consumed locally. There are indications that international narcotics traffickers are using Lesotho as a transit point for mandrax, often originating in India, and cocaine, from South America, destined for South Africa.  Nigerian nationals appear to be growing in prominence in the cocaine traffic.  The Lesotho and South African police cooperate well on narcotics interdiction matters.  An officer of Lesotho's drugs and diamond smuggling unit attended a DEA-sponsored workshop in Harare in 1993.  Lesotho's narcotics control efforts are codified in a 20-year old law, but interagency narcotics control coordination is ad hoc.  Lesotho is not a party to the 1988 UN Convention.

LIBERIA.  Fragmented by civil war in 1989-1990 and by renewed hostilities from October 1992 through May 1993, Liberia is not a major drug producer.  Nevertheless, West African traffickers reportedly use the country to a limited extent as an alternate route for heroin and cocaine destined for the U.S. and Western Europe.  Illicit drugs enter Liberia by air or sea from other West African countries.  War-induced stagnation of the legitimate economy and the perception that Liberians are viewed with less suspicion by U.S. authorities than are other West Africans have also made Liberia fertile ground for recruiting drug couriers.  During 1993, air links to Nigeria increased. There also were increased suspicions about the possible involvement in narcotics traffic by members of the West African peacekeeping force in Liberia.  Drug abuse, while not widespread, has been noted among urban youth and the various warring factions.  Marijuana was the most commonly used drug.  During 1993, the rival administrations which controlled different sections of the country devoted few resources to drug enforcement or demand reduction.

Liberia is a party to the 1961 UN Convention and its 1972 Protocol, but not the 1971 and 1988 UN conventions.  Its counternarcotics efforts are insufficient to conform to the 1988 Convention's goals and objectives.  

MAURITIUS.  The main narcotics-related problems affecting this island nation in the southwest Indian Ocean are heroin trafficking from India, transshipment possibilities offered by good sea and air connections to Europe and Africa, and the potential for narcotics money laundering offered by a thriving offshore banking industry.  The booming tourist trade and the associated businesses provide ideal cover for drug trafficking and money laundering activities.  

The Government of Mauritius (GOM) is a signatory to the 1988 UN Convention and vigorously seeks to prosecute traffickers, but legal obstacles and legal weaknesses, as well as inadequate resources to combat the well-financed drug rings, impede effective police action.  Law enforcement authorities participate in Interpol and maintain liaison with Indian authorities in Bombay.  

The government has tightened its drug laws and created safeguards against money laundering.  Asset seizure and forfeiture legislation exists and is applied when sufficient evidence can be brought to bear.  There is no evidence of official, drug-related corruption, although there are unproven allegations of politicians accepting money from traffickers. 
As a matter of policy, the GOM does not facilitate the production or the distribution of illicit drugs.  Local production is limited to marijuana, grown for domestic consumption, and the crop is subject to effective, but sporadic, eradication efforts by the police.  A state coordinating body with a budget of about $325,000 works with the UNDCP and about 15 NGOs to maintain seven treatment rehabilitation centers which treat more than 1,000 drug users.  In 1993, USIS funded a one-year program for a Mauritian doctor to study drug prevention at Johns Hopkins University.  The program was co-funded by the National Institute on Drug Abuse (NIDA), and sponsored drug workshops as well as a one-week visit by an American drug-prevention specialist, who met with various NGOs and participated in a three-day training workshop.  

USG goals in Mauritius are to ensure that the banking sector is not used for money laundering and that Mauritius is not used as a drug transshipment point to the European or North American markets.

SUDAN.  Sudan is neither a major producer nor a consumer of illicit drugs, but it is involved in drug transshipment.  Sudan's strategic location at the crossroads of Africa, Asia, the Middle East, and Europe makes it an attractive target for traffickers.  The principal drug grown in Sudan is cannabis.  However, Sudan also has a domestic problem with heroin from Asia used primarily by wealthy Sudanese and expatriates.  Sudan is also a transit point for Asian heroin shipments destined for other countries.  There is also evidence of domestic cocaine and synthetic drug abuse, mostly barbiturates.

The Government of Sudan (GOS) is making genuine efforts to eradicate illicit drug crops, prosecute users and dealers, and treat addicts.  Its primary agency for narcotics control, the Drug Combat Administration (DCA), is poorly staffed and funded.  In 1993, the GOS doubled the DCA's staff, handled some 8,000 drug offenses, and signed the 1988 UN Convention.  

In 1993, the GOS drafted a law on narcotics and psychotropic substances to replace a 1924 law.  The new law addresses for the first time synthetic drugs and drug treatment and imposes a mandatory death sentence for repeat narcotic traffickers.  The law has been submitted for ratification to Sudan's Transitional National Assembly and is expected to be adopted in early 1994.

TOGO is a transit point for narcotics bound for Europe and the U.S.  Togo's proximity to Nigeria makes it attractive to Nigerian trafficking organizations.  If civil unrest continues, Togo's role as a transit country could grow.  The Togolese drug unit, the Department Police Judiciaire (DPJ), attempts to interdict narcotics shipments entering or transiting Togo.  No senior officials have been implicated in illicit drug production or money laundering.

Togo cooperates with international law enforcement and drug interdiction efforts.  Togo is a signatory to the 1988 UN Convention, and appears to be meeting its goals and objectives.  We have no information that Togo has enacted new narcotics legislation as a result of signing the UN Convention in 1990, but preexisting laws provide stiff penalties for the trafficking or use of narcotics.  Penalties for drug use, or contributing to drug use, range from one to five years in prison, and fines.  The penalty for trafficking or production is five years to life in prison with fines.
ZAMBIA continues to be a transit point for illicit narcotics shipments, principally Mandrax (methaqualone) from the Asian subcontinent in route to South Africa.  The transshipment and trafficking of Southwest Asian heroin and South American cocaine, are of growing concern to Zambian narcotics officials.  With direct and indirect air routes to and from South America, Asia, and Europe, Zambia is strategically situated along established and developing narcotics trafficking routes.  West African heroin traffickers use Zambian documentation and couriers to ferry drugs to Europe and North America.  Cannabis is the only drug cultivated in Zambia.  Money laundering by regional traffickers, made easier by economic liberalization, is a growing problem.

Narcotics corruption is a growing problem within the Customs and Immigration services, and the police force. During 1993, there were persistent, credible reports of drug trafficking by high-level government officials.   The Zambian Foreign Minister and other officials resigned in January 1994 in the face of drug allegations, causing the president to reorganize his cabinet.  Following strong representations by the aid donor community about the possibility of Zambia becoming a major regional drug hub, Zambian officials began to take steps to deal with the problem.

A strengthened narcotics law entered into force in November.  The new law provides for harsher penalties and streamlines asset forfeiture procedures.  Zambia ratified the 1988 UN Convention in 1993.

ZIMBABWE.  Although Zimbabwe is not a producer of illicit drugs for export, excellent international airline connections have made Harare International Airport a very attractive transshipment point for drugs bound for Europe, South Africa and other points.  One of the drugs most often seized is methaqualone (Mandrax), bound for South Africa.  Police believe that most drug trafficking through Zimbabwe is controlled by Nigerians, many of whom travel with fabricated or fraudulently obtained Zimbabwe passports.

Zimbabwe's narcotics control force is small but dedicated, and increasingly well trained.  Several significant seizures, including cocaine interdictions of one kg or more, have been made recently with the help of a team of drug-detection dogs, trained in October.  Initial results from their deployment have been impressive, but outdated training methods and the scarcity of high-quality dogs have impeded progress.

The USG is actively working to enhance the enforcement capabilities of the Zimbabwe authorities. The U.S. Embassy in June held a regional drug seminar for 36 drug enforcement officers, including 10 from the Zimbabwe Republic Police, and may sponsor another program in 1994.  including Zimbabwean law enforcement participants.  INM is continuing its canine drug detection program for Zimbabwe. 

Strict currency laws effectively discourage money laundering activities.  Zimbabwe is not a signatory to the 1988 UN Convention.

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