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APRIL 1994




Political Will and Corruption               3
Chemical Controls                           4
Money Laundering                            5
Demand Reduction                            6
United Nations                              7
Cocaine                                     8
Opium and heroin                            9
Next Steps                                  12
Methodology                                 14
Status of Potential Worldwide Production    16
Cultivation and Production Charts           19
UN Convention signatories                   22
Country Summaries                           27

AND FUNCTIONAL BUDGET                       60


INTERNATIONAL TRAINING                      65


Drug Enforcement Administration             70
United States Coast Guard                   75
United States Customs Service               81

     1994 INCSR

     Policy and Program Overview for 1993
The world's drug control efforts in 1993 offer a decidedly mixed picture.  Multi-ton shipments of cocaine, which once flowed mainly to the United States and Canada, now reach every corner of the globe.  All major European capitals report a growing influx of the drug, with Russian authorities seizing over a metric ton of Colombian cocaine in St. Petersburg alone.  No place seems exempt.  The heroin situation is no more reassuring.  The drug which cocaine displaced in the 1980's is making a comeback everywhere.  In order to cash in on changing tastes and potential new markets, the cocaine cartels of South America have diversified into opium poppy cultivation.  Meanwhile, heroin brokers in Southeast and Southwest Asia collaborate with Nigerian drug enterprises to emulate the marketing success of the Medellin and Cali cocaine cartels.

Yet this bleak picture is misleading.  In endemic problems of global proportions the magnitude of the threat tends to overshadow the efforts to counter it.  By themselves, the achievements of individual countries may seem insignificant.  Small steps do not make headlines.  The  innumerable routine drug seizures, the individual drug labs or airstrips destroyed every day, the arrests of corrupt officials, or the improved performance of police and judicial authorities benefitting from USG assistance receive only fragmentary coverage in the world media.  But these small steps add up to important and lasting gains at the expense of the drug traffickers.  In the long run, this steady advance sustained over time offers the best hope for reducing a potential threat to the stability of nations to a tolerable nuisance.

Important gains.  There have been noteworthy accomplishments in 1993 and early 1994.  In the Western Hemisphere, where cocaine still poses the greatest drug threat, persistent efforts by various governments against cocaine trafficking organizations have begun to pay off.  The year's most spectacular event was the death of Medellin cartel founder Pablo Escobar Gaviria.  After a seventeen month manhunt, Colombian authorities killed the Medellin cartel leader in a shoot-out on December 2, 1993.  Escobar's elimination effectively dealt the coup de grace to the organization that had dominated the cocaine trade for over a decade.  Although this leaves the dangerous Cali cartel to contend with, the hunt for Escobar demonstrates the value of international cooperation, persistence, and tenacity in destroying the myth of an invincible drug trade.

Other trafficking organizations also suffered important losses.  On December 25, Bolivian Drug trafficker Domingo "Meco" Dominguez was recaptured and returned to La Paz.  More significantly, in early January 1994, Colombian authorities caught and deported to Peru Demetrio Chavez Penaherrera, alias El Vaticano.  El Vaticano had formed a powerful  organization that became the main supplier of Peruvian cocaine to the Cali cartel.  By neutralizing Chavez Penaherrera's organization before it grew into a full-fledged cartel, the Peruvians dealt a critical blow to a potentially serious new drug threat.  Peruvian President Fujimori said that in the battle against narcoterrorism in Peru the capture of El Vaticano was in its way as significant as the detention of Shining Path founder Abimael Guzman, now serving a life sentence in prison.

The capture of these drug "kingpins" underscores the value of international cooperation. Trafficking organizations can only thrive when they have safe havens and protection.  They seek both in regions where central government authority is weak and/or local insurgencies are relatively strong.  An important element in the President's February 1994 National Drug Strategy has been to strengthen such international cooperation to deny drug cartels the environment in which they flourish.  The neutralization of three important drug lords over the space of a month is further proof that sustained cooperation over time is a key to results in the international antidrug campaign.

Peru's coca crop shrinks.  Also encouraging is the news of a reduction in Andean coca cultivation due to a significant fall in Peru's coca crop.  Any decline in Andean coca is significant since, unlike the opium poppy which grows the world over, traditional coca cultivation is geographically restricted.  It is confined to Peru (approximately 56 percent), Bolivia (24 percent) and Colombia (about 20 percent).  It is therefore theoretically possible--and technically feasible--to reduce the actual supply of the raw material.  For a crop that in the 1980's was increasing by as much as 20 percent annually, containing the expansion  is an important achievement; if permanent, reversing the rise would be an important success.

In 1993, largely natural causes produced a 16 percent drop in Peruvian coca cultivation, most of it in the Upper Huallaga Valley (UHV), where until recently an alliance between drug traffickers and Shining Path guerrillas had kept the central government at bay.  A fungus, fusarium oxysporum, which has been attacking coca plants during the past few years, took a heavier toll than usual in the UHV.  At the same time, throughout 1993, Peruvian antidrug units, with USG counternarcotics assistance, maintained pressure against trafficker aircraft, broke up trafficking rings, and limited the opportunities for coca farmers to market their crop.   As a result, coca farmers have abandoned their plantations, moving to more remote areas.  Coca cultivation in Peru is now at its lowest level in six years: 108,800 hectares, compared to the all-time high of 129,100 hectares in 1992.  Whether from manmade or natural causes, 1993 dealt a blow to the coca trade in Peru.  It is  imperative to ensure that this is not merely a temporary reverse for the traffickers.  While the USG is under no illusion that supply reduction alone holds the solution to the Western Hemisphere's drug problem, it is also clear that squeezing supply is an indispensable component of a successful drug strategy.

The USG also recognizes the practical difficulties of scaling back a drug crop like coca, which is deeply entrenched in the economy, politics, and culture of the major coca producers.  It is difficult to ask a government to eliminate an illegal but profitable crop in the face of popular opposition.  It is difficult to ask governments with limited  security forces to choose between attacking trafficking organizations or insurgents.  The USG, along with other countries, seeks to provide support which will broaden the options of foreign governments so that they do not have to implement unpopular alternatives.  At the same time, we expect them to show the political will to make the difficult decisions against drug production.


At the heart of the drug problem lie the issues of government corruption and political will.  Of the many threats which the international drug trade poses, the greatest is its almost unlimited capacity to corrupt legitimate political institutions.  Illicit drugs generate revenues on a scale for which there is no historical precedent.  On the streets of the US, a metric ton of cocaine is worth between $100 million and $200 million.  By that measure, the nearly 108 MT tons seized by US authorities in Fiscal Year 1993 would have pumped between $10 and $20 billion, more than the gross domestic product of many countries in the hemisphere, into international underworld channels.  The drug trade thus gives criminal and terrorist organizations access to money on a scale not available to most national governments.  In addition to financing arms purchases for anti-government groups in places as different as Colombia and Burma, drug revenues give trafficking organizations the capacity to buy influence and protection at almost every level of government.  The poorer the country and greater the disparity in incomes, the more vulnerable the government will be to such temptations.

The best defense against drug corruption is a strong sense of national  integrity expressed as political will.  This, then, is the dilemma:  how to encourage the political leadership in economically troubled countries to give up the vast revenue from a lucrative but illegal industry in exchange for limited foreign assistance, international recognition that it has made the right moral choice, and the promise of future benefits for a drug-free society.  There is the added complication that in most developing countries bribery and other forms of petty corruption are often seen as the only way to function in red tape-bound bureaucracies.

Yet just as small crimes often lead to greater ones, petty corruption spreads from paying protection money to the police, to bribing judges to dismiss cases against drug traffickers or corrupt officials, to suborning  cabinet officials.  Various chapters in the INCSR show that corruption, especially drug corruption, is a disease which spares no region.  The only differences are in degree and in the willingness of governments to tackle the problem.  Some governments have demonstrated the political will to acknowledge and strike out against corruption; others have been more reticent.  Colombia is investigating the fourth highest official of the Attorney General's office for ties to the Cali cartel; the Jamaican government has stated that it is cracking down on official corruption; the Government of Mexico has mounted a campaign against corruption at every level; the Zambian Foreign Minister resigned from office in early January 1994 following drug allegations.  Costa Rica's Ambassador to Poland was arrested with 12 kg of heroin in his possession.  But for every piece of encouraging news, there are innumerable disturbing reports of governments failing to take action or removing drug enforcement officials from office when they do their jobs too well.  The reports cite drug corruption as a factor in such diverse countries  as Bolivia, Burma, Kenya, Lebanon, Nigeria, Panama, Syria, Thailand, Venezuela, and Zambia, to name only a few.  Most countries could certainly do more to combat corruption.

Drug corruption poses a special threat to democracy in developing countries.  Democratic institutions function in environments which favor integrity, fairness, and openness.  There can be no effective democracy when drug cartels have the means to buy protection, support, or votes at every level of government and society; nor can there be democracy when the guardians of the system invite, or least fail to discourage, bribery.  Fortunately, in nearly every country there is a cadre of honest officials and political leaders who have the political will to challenge corruption--especially drug corruption--and nourish a democratic system.  An important aspect of United States antidrug policy is to work with these leaders, to strengthen their political will to reform institutions, to provide material assistance, and thereby to consolidate democracy.


In 1993, there was greater international acceptance of the need to regulate major precursor and essential chemicals to prevent their diversion to illicit drug manufacture.  At the same time, the difficulty of denying chemicals to traffickers became more apparent.  An effective chemical diversion control strategy has two key components:  (a) verification of  the legitimate end-use of a regulated chemical before a specific shipment, and (b) the authority to suspend the transaction if  the legitimate end-use cannot be confirmed.  While simple in concept, effective diversion control of essential chemicals having widespread commercial use must meet three conditions.  It cannot impose a large and expensive enforcement structure or unduly burden legitimate commerce; it must develop commonly acceptable procedures for diversion control; and it must implement such procedures universally and uniformly.

 We entered 1993 halfway over the second of these hurdles and had cleared it by the end of the year.  Under USG leadership, the 24 governments which made up the Chemical Action Task Force (CATF) had developed a consensus that regulation of commercial chemical transactions was feasible.  They also agreed upon common procedures based on the chemical control provisions of the 1988 Convention.

The April 1993 meeting of the United Nations Commission on Narcotic Drugs (CND) adopted, and the UN Economic and Social Council approved, a USG resolution calling on all governments to establish effective measures to implement the chemical control provisions of the 1988 UN Convention, "taking into consideration the recommendations contained in the final report of the Chemical Action Task Force."  The resolution promotes uniformity in chemical regulation by urging governments to consider fully the CATF recommended procedures as they establish the chemical control measures required by the 1988 UN Convention.  It recognizes the need for financial, technical and material assistance, including training, to implement chemical control regimes.  In addition, it strengthens the central role of UN organizations in chemical control by requesting UNDCP to provide chemical control assistance and to coordinate the assistance provided by others.  While it underscores the  International Narcotics Control Board (INCB)'s central role in gathering and disseminating effective diversion control information, it also allows the CATF to phase out as an organization, thereby avoiding institutionalization of an ad hoc organization.  In the implementation phase, the United States will increase its emphasis on multilateral cooperation in chemical diversion control, and on providing assistance to developing countries subject to the requirement that they establish and implement control regimes.

The United States in 1993 undertook a number of bilateral and multilateral initiatives to promote and assist the adoption and implementation of effective chemical control regimes based on the CATF recommendations.  These included two major conferences.  The first, held in Rome in June 1993, focused on chemical operations and identified urgent actions that governments must undertake to integrate national chemical control regimes into an international network of cooperation that will effectively stem chemical diversion.  There was participation by police, customs and regulatory officials from 49 governments in Western and Eastern Europe, the Newly Independent States of the former Soviet Union, Latin America, and Asia.  The second conference, held in Bangkok in September 1993, was a senior level chemical control seminar and training course on the practical aspects of implementing a chemical control regime for the countries of Southeast Asia.  The USG also contributed to OAS/UNDCP chemical training seminars in the Caribbean, Central America and South America.


As money laundering methods and activities become more sophisticated, the USG and its principal economic allies must adapt their policies and strategies accordingly.  This is as true for money laundering seemingly unrelated to the international drug trade as it is for the  direct proceeds of drug trafficking.  Criminal organizations of all kinds increasingly layer illegal profits through investments in legitimate businesses.  They use every component of the international financial system, from holding companies and brokerages through the spectrum of non-bank financial institutions.

The financial systems of those countries and territories with strict bank secrecy regulations and weak banking and criminal laws are most vulnerable to exploitation.  Whether or not they themselves have a role in generating criminal funds, such world-class financial centers attract growing numbers of professional illegal-money managers.  One of our greatest challenges, therefore, lies in developing the economic and other intelligence, analysis, and implementation resources necessary to identify and deny access to such centers, as well as to the plethora of alternative systems used to move criminal proceeds of all types.

In 1993, the USG and its fellow members of the Financial Action Task Force (FATF) conducted six seminars in Eastern Europe, the Middle East, Asia, and the Caribbean.  These seminars offered a total policy perspective, as well as implementation and evaluation guidance, on specific national and regional anti-money-laundering issues.  Members of the banking community, regulatory, enforcement and other officials  worked with the FATF to press for the adoption of the 1988 UN Convention, the FATF 40 Recommendations, and other measures against-money laundering pertinent to their respective nations.

Five FATF "Donor" Members (the US, UK, France, Netherlands, and Canada) continue to finance and support the Caribbean Financial Action Task Force (CFATF), including the funding of the CFATF Secretariat, established in Port-of-Spain, Trinidad, late in 1993.  The CFATF Secretariat plans to evaluate compliance measures and progress among its member governments in 1994-95; a major task is to implement recommendations to counteract money laundering.

The FATF is considering the formation of other regional groups.  Goals include working with nations in Southeast and Southwest Asia, again to secure the endorsement and implementation of FATF recommendations, and to measure progress in efforts against money laundering.  Initiatives are planned for groups in South America, Southwest Asia and Africa, and in Eastern Europe as well.  The FATF and OAS plan to collaborate on seminars in Latin America during 1994.

Various other high-level missions included visits of senior FATF officers to countries including Israel and the People's Republic of China.  Similar meetings are planned with Malaysia, Mexico, Morocco, Taiwan, and Thailand, among others, in 1994.  FATF strategy supports the development of a "futures paper," which would broaden the mandate of the FATF to include money laundering from all kinds of serious criminal activity, including drug trafficking.


Almost all of the major drug-producing and transit countries now have significant, often expanding addict populations, which not only sap the political, social and economic stability of a nation, but offer new markets to the drug trade.  The USG has been working with many of these countries to reduce demand and prevent drug abuse.

In 1993, the USG addressed the question of international demand reduction through continuing bilateral and multilateral efforts.  Bilaterally, INM funded programs on training (prevention, treatment, research), public awareness and education in Latin America, Southeast and Southwest Asia.  It conducted bilateral programs in 1993 with the Bahamas, Brazil, Colombia, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Guatemala, Jamaica, Mexico, Pakistan, Panama, Thailand, and Venezuela, as well as with less significant drug producing and transit countries.

Multilaterally, the USG worked closely with the European Community, the UNDCP, OAS-CICAD, the Colombo Plan and ASEAN on such projects as enhancing or creating regional demand reduction training centers in Argentina, Malaysia, Thailand and Barbados, and drug prevention services for "street children" in Brazil and Peru.

Significant demand reduction training accomplishments include the following:

           Colombia developed a pilot project for a prison-based drug treatment program, organized a national coalition of fifty drug treatment programs, and organized four community partnerships for drug prevention.

           Thailand is building and staffing a $14 million, residential drug treatment complex and training center (9 buildings on 32 acres) and a regional demand reduction training center for Southeast Asia.

           Following INM/OAS regional training in Barbados, the participants formed a regional association of drug counselors that conducts follow-up training in the Caribbea  region.

            INM, DEA, and major league baseball organizations collaborated with the Dominican Government and U.S. Embassy on the establishment of a sports-based drug prevention program that includes funding from the private sector.


The UN International Drug Control Program (UNDCP) has increased the number of projects as well as expanded the scope of its effort during 1993.  The reorganization of the UN drug effort has led to better coordination between UNDCP, the International Narcotics Control Board (INCB), and the Commission on Narcotic Drugs (CND).  

In 1993, the budget of approximately $82 million, financed by the voluntary contributions by the 17 major donor nations, enabled the  provision of financial and technical assistance to 67 countries, through 118 national-level drug-control projects.  Although forty percent of the total budget in 1992 went for supply reduction (alternative development), UNDCP expanded its support for institution building and demand reduction in 1993.

The UNDCP has targeted new drug threats.  In 1993, it opened an office in Tashkent, Uzbekistan and is designing an assistance program for the Newly Independent States (NIS) to identify problems and drug control needs.  It has also begun establishing programs in Lebanon and Afghanistan.  

The UNDCP supports the treaty-based functions of the INCB.  The INCB secretariat, housed in UNDCP, is establishing a database on chemical exports.  It has also prepared a model legislation package to assist governments to implement the UN drug conventions.  This package has already been used by countries from Latin America to the NIS.  Using a US contribution, UNDCP also established a data base of worldwide drug abuse statistics 

UN Convention.  By the end of February 1994, 96 countries had become parties to the 1988 UN Convention.  Twenty-four states completed adherence formalities in 1993:  Antigua and Barbuda, Argentina, Armenia, Azerbaijan, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Brunei, Burundi, Croatia, Czech Republic, Dominica, Mauritania, Dominican Republic, El Salvador, Fiji, Germany, Guyana,  Malaysia, Netherlands, Romania, Slovakia, Sudan, the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, Zambia, and Zimbabwe.  Latvia acceded in 1994.  At the same time, there are 27 which have signed, but not yet ratified the Convention.  This group includes countries with major financial centers.  Thirty-nine governments have neither signed, ratified, nor adopted legislation to enact the Convention.  If there is to be effective international drug control, especially an effective system to identify and eliminate international money laundering, drug trafficking, and other serious criminal activity, all the major financial powers must be parties to-and, more important, must implement the provisions of-the 1988 UN Convention.


While the demand for cocaine has been declining in the United States, it remains at the head of the USG's antidrug priority list.  Cocaine, especially crack cocaine, is one of the most immediately addictive drugs known to man.  One or two experiments with crack can lead to heavy dependence, if not complete addiction.  Rampant cocaine use, which was once a peculiarly American phenomenon, is now a worldwide scourge.  From Spain to Russia to Vietnam and Zimbabwe the "white poison of the Andes" has surfaced as a potential threat to countries unprepared to deal with a new drug epidemic. Ireland this year reported its first influx of cocaine. Transit countries, such as Nicaragua and Honduras, where cocaine consumption was not considered a domestic threat, now face rapidly spreading addiction from traffickers who pay their local agents in cocaine rather than cash.  Refining of coca products, which used to be a Colombian monopoly, has become an international enterprise.  Cocaine HCl laboratories now operate routinely in Bolivia and Peru and even in such diverse locations as the United States and Lebanon's Beka'a valley.  The cocaine threat is one that no country can afford to ignore.  Now more than ever, governments of drug producing, transit, and consuming countries alike share a common responsibility to end the worldwide cocaine epidemic.

Colombia  achieved mixed results in 1993, a year which may best be remembered for the pursuit and death of Pablo Escobar in December.  Escobar's elimination--and the crippling of the Medellin cartel--could not have occurred without a massive investment of Colombian resources, complemented by intelligence, materiel, and technical assistance from the USG.  Despite the shift of some of its forces to counter the growing opium and heroin threat, the Government of Colombia eradicated 793 hectares of coca in 1993, leaving in place an estimated 37,900 hectares of coca at the end of the year.  Colombian authorities also seized over 21 MT of cocaine HCl.  

The government of Bolivia failed for the third consecutive year to meet its coca eradication target.  Bolivian authorities did eliminate 2,400 hectares of coca, leaving an estimated 47,200 hectares under cultivation at the end of 1993--a four percent increase over 1992's estimate of 45,500 hectares, but still lower than any of the other preceding six years.  The  government missed its target more for political than for resource reasons, and the USG is hopeful that with a more forceful display of political will in 1994 Bolivian authorities will reduce the crop to the minimum size required to supply legitimate coca needs.  On the positive side, Bolivian enforcement authorities showed a 57 percent increase in seizures of cocaine base: 12.1 MT in 1993 versus 7.7 MT in 1992.

In Peru, the world's largest coca producer, drug control efforts registered mixed results in 1993.  As noted earlier, a natural fungus, combined with USG-assisted efforts to deny the Upper Huallaga Valley to traffickers, brought the annual estimate of coca cultivation in 1993 to 108,800 hectares, a six-year low.  This may be a short-lived reduction, however, as growers move into areas less susceptible to government control.  Seizures of cocaine base and HCl fell by 17 percent from 6.9 MT in 1992 to 5.8 in 1993, indicating that corruption and a shortage of  resources continue to hamper effective action against the Peruvian criminal drug industry.

In Mexico, the "Mexicanized" (i.e., financially autonomous) antidrug program made significant progress.  Mexican authorities seized  46.2 MT of cocaine in 1993, more than any country except the United States.  This quantity represents an 18 percent increase over 1992's seizures and approaches Mexico's 1991 record of 50.3 MT.  Across the border in Guatemala, Guatemalan law enforcement agencies, working with the USG in Operation CADENCE, a cocaine interdiction program, seized 7.6 MT of cocaine.  While this figure is lower than 1992's total of 9.5 MT, the drop may be attributable to the deterrent effect of Operation CADENCE.  In Panama, a joint US-Panamanian aerial spraying operation destroyed 70 hectares of coca in the Darien region bordering Colombia.  This effort demonstrated that aerial eradication of coca is both feasible and safe.  Seizures slipped, however, as the government seized 5.7 MT of cocaine in 1993, significantly less than the nearly ten tons seized in each of the preceding two years.  And the Panamanian government continued to show a disappointing lack of political will to address drug corruption and money laundering concerns.


Although cocaine still poses the most immediate threat to America's drug users, heroin is running a close second.  In the past five years, there has been a steady increase in the flow and purity of heroin to the US, suggesting that the taste for the drug is growing.  This is a logical consequence of more than a decade of cocaine abuse, since stimulants and  depressants tend to succeed one another as drugs of choice. A stimulant, such as cocaine, will burn out its victims in a relatively short period, usually within five years.  A depressant such as heroin, however, can hold its prey for decades.  In addition, heroin combined with cocaine offers drug users the effects of both drugs simultaneously, while opening new marketing possibilities for traffickers.  Meanwhile, despite the encroachment of cocaine, heroin use persists in other parts of the world, including Europe and Asia.

 The economics of the heroin trade are also important.  While at US street prices cocaine and heroin are competitive, at the wholesale level heroin has a strong advantage.  A kilo of cocaine wholesales for between $10,500 and $40,000; a kilo of heroin will fetch on average between $50,000 and $250,000.  With the likelihood that heroin will be to the 1990's what cocaine was to the 1980's, Latin American trafficking organizations are poised to cash in on a heroin epidemic.

Until a few years ago, Mexico and Guatemala were the only important Western Hemisphere sources of heroin.  Now Colombia is the center of an aggressive effort by the cocaine trafficking organizations to diversify into opium and heroin.  There are an estimated 20,000 hectares of opium poppy remaining in Colombia after a major eradication effort by the Colombian police.  Although the yield of Colombian opium poppies remains low, Colombia now has more illicit poppy cultivation than Mexico.  There are also indications that yields are rising as growers improve their methods.  And Colombia is not alone.  Traffickers have other countries in their sights.  As the country chapters show, there is also incipient poppy cultivation in Peru and Ecuador. Ecuadorian police destroyed several hectares of opium poppy along the Colombian border, and another hectare just outside Quito.  The USG is working with the governments of these countries to prevent the emergence of a heroin industry on the scale of cocaine trafficking  cartels from developing in the Western Hemisphere.

In 1993, there was further evidence that trafficking organizations from Nigeria are becoming the service industry of choice for the heroin trade.  Almost every country reporting heroin seizures notes the involvement of Nigerian drug traffickers.  Nigerians have been arrested in Thailand, the United States, Germany, Saudi Arabia, Poland--anywhere that drugs are seized.  Even Pakistani groups have been using Nigerian couriers to run heroin to Europe, while in Pakistan itself Nigerian citizens top the list of foreign drug arrestees.

In Europe and Central Asia, enforcement authorities are confronting a formidable influx of  heroin and more primitive opiates, such as poppy straw extract.  Since the break up of the former Soviet Union three years ago, trafficking groups have taken advantage of the fragmentation of enforcement authority to move large amounts of heroin from the Golden Crescent area of Afghanistan, Iran, and Pakistan through Eurasia to points in Western Europe and beyond.  Russia has become a central marketing point for heroin from this region.  Criminal organizations in Russia have set up supply routes to Hungary, the Czech Republic and Slovakia.  Other supply lines move drugs on to Baltic ports for shipment to Western Europe.  Russian authorities believe that 75 percent of the heroin seized is of Afghan origin.

There is also the possibility that Central Asia itself could become an important source of drugs, as well as a major transit point.  The USG will probably not complete a survey of the area until 1995, but pockets of opium poppy cultivation may exist in some of the Central Asian  republics.  These regions have the potential to supply the raw material for drug networks that have sprung up throughout the former Soviet Union.  (It is also likely that cannabis will become a more important drug commodity, since it grows easily in parts of Central Asia and the Ukraine.  Kazakhstan's Chu Valley has long been known for its expanses of wild cannabis.  After finding illegal cannabis fields in Ukraine's Kherson Oblast, authorities expressed fears of the area becoming another Chu Valley.)

A major difficulty in controlling heroin at the source is that the greatest opium producers are countries where the USG has limited political leverage or physical presence, or where central governments have only nominal control of poppy growing areas.  Burma, whose repressive regime has made all but the most basic diplomatic relations impossible, is the world's largest opium producer, supplying perhaps 60 percent of the US heroin market.  With an estimated potential production in 1993 of 2,575 MT of opium gum, it alone could satisfy most of the world's heroin demand.  To put this number into proportion, Afghanistan, with an estimated 685 MT of opium gum in 1993, is a distant second, followed by Laos (180 MT), Pakistan (140 MT), and all of Latin America (73 MT).  The combined production of all these countries is less than half of Burma's.  Clearly without some progress in Burma heroin control efforts elsewhere will have only limited effectiveness.

On a brighter note, experience shows that opium poppy controls do work when governments have the will and capacity to enforce them.  Through aerial spraying and manual eradication, Colombia has kept poppy  cultivation from expanding.  Guatemala and Mexico have persevered in long-standing opium eradication campaigns which have kept poppy crops down and growers on the move.  Detectable Guatemalan cultivation is at its lowest level in several years, as police destroyed 426 hectares of opium poppy in remote areas of the country.  Mexican cultivation appears to be up slightly as growers move to more protected terrain, but is still well below the levels of 1989 and 1990.  Mexican eradication forces destroyed 7,820 hectares of opium poppy in 1993.

In Southwest Asia, efforts to control opium production showed mixed results.  In Pakistan, enforcement authorities seized over four metric tons each of opium and heroin.  This represents a 21 percent increase in opium and nearly a 50 percent increase in heroin seizures.  At the same time, vigorous government enforcement of the opium poppy ban, coupled with local development projects, helped bring down Pakistani opium poppy cultivation by 23 percent.  In Afghanistan, however, poppy cultivation went up by slightly over eight percent to 21,080 hectares, leaving the country as the world's second largest illicit opium source country after Burma.

In the Golden Triangle area of Southeast Asia, opium cultivation increased significantly in 1993, continuing a trend which began five years ago.  The USG estimates that total opium poppy cultivation grew by seven percent in 1993 over the previous year.  This increase is attributable largely to the Government of Burma's unwillingness to take serious poppy control measures, while seeking political accommodation  with insurgents in the growing areas.  As in past years, drug seizures in 1993 were disproportionately low compared to potential production.  Pakistan, with one-twentieth the potential opium production of Burma, seized more than twice as much opium.  This suggests less than full commitment to stopping the drug flow on the part of the Burmese government.  Since Burma accounts for approximately 60 percent of worldwide opium production, the USG continues to urge the Burmese government to play a more effective and responsible role in curbing the international opium trade.

In Laos, opium poppy cultivation remained unchanged, and poor weather in 1993 was responsible for a 22 percent drop in the USG estimate of opium gum to 180 MT.  Laos remains the third largest illicit opium producer.  Since hectarage has not declined, a good growing season could easily increase production.  Drug arrests and seizures have risen somewhat in the past year, but Lao authorities have devoted much of their attention to cannabis eradication, avoiding the politically sensitive target of opium production or heroin trafficking.  The USG would like to see the Government of Laos demonstrate a greater willingness to go after the opium trade.

Thailand, the primary conduit for Golden Triangle heroin shipped to the US, also had a mixed drug control record in 1993.  While heroin seizures rose by nearly 50 percent to 1.5 metric tons in 1993, that figure remains distressingly low in proportion to the amount of US-bound heroin transiting the country.  Although Thailand is no longer a significant opium producer, the USG estimates that opium poppy cultivation in 1993 increased by nearly 40 percent, while opium yield, favored by good weather, rose by 75 percent from 24 metric tons in 1992 to 42 metric tons in 1993.


The USG will continue to exercise its leadership in the international cooperative effort to cripple the drug trade.  In keeping with the President's February 1994 National Drug Control Strategy, the USG will focus on strengthening institutions in countries which show the political will to combat drug trafficking.  It will also concentrate on destroying trafficker organizations and interdicting drug flows at every stage from source to destination.  At the same time, the USG will attack trafficking organizations at their most vulnerable point, in their financial operations.  Illegal drugs and their criminal profits form an ever expanding vicious circle.  Drugs generate vast profits which ensure the expansion of the drug trade, which in turn produces even more cash.  Breaking the circle is difficult; it is not impossible.  Since most of the cash must pass through legitimate banking systems theoretically subject to government oversight, trafficking organizations are particularly vulnerable in their financial transactions.  If governments effectively exercise their oversight functions, the international community can check this cash flow and put the drug trade on the defensive.

Where cocaine is concerned, the USG will continue to work with the major coca producing, cocaine processing, and transit  countries to attack cocaine flows at every link of the grower-to-user chain.  We will continue to provide support to those countries that demonstrate the political will to stand up to the large cocaine cartels and their tributary organizations.  This will mean not only giving help to cooperating governments to eradicate  crops and seize drugs, but also fortifying judicial and law enforcement systems to eliminate the corruption which allows traffickers to thrive.  While we will tailor our assistance to the political and economic realities of the major coca producing, cocaine processing, and transit countries, we will encourage all countries to assume greater responsibility themselves for antidrug operations.  We have special hope for containing the cocaine problem, since coca has traditionally grown in a clearly defined geographic area.  It is technically feasible to reduce the crop to the minimum cultivation necessary for legitimate pharmaceutical or other medical purposes.  The question facing all the major coca-affected countries is whether their governments have the political will to take measures which in the short run will be politically and economically unpopular, but which are essential to the long-term political and economic health of each country.

Hurting the heroin trade is more difficult, since the opium poppy is not confined to one geographic area and the USG has only limited influence among many of the greatest opium producers.  As the President's Strategy notes, however, heroin may pose a greater long-term threat to the international community than cocaine.  Therefore, the USG will make every effort to work with the major opium producing countries, directly where possible, multilaterally where necessary, to bring down the size of total world opium production.  Since Burma is the world's largest opium gum producer, the USG will work with Burma's neighbors and the UNCDP to pressure the Rangoon regime to make more than token gestures at drastically cutting back its opium production.  We will also work closely with major opium producers in other parts of the world (e.g., Afghanistan, Pakistan, Mexico, Colombia) to reduce opium and heroin production and destroy heroin trafficking networks.

While the United States will continue to provide leadership and assistance in attacking the international drug trade, the success of the effort will ultimately hinge on the actions of the major drug producing and transit countries themselves. They must encourage development programs which will provide legitimate alternatives to farmers now raising illicit drug crops.  They must undertake demand reduction programs to avoid the risk of losing their youth to drug addiction.  Above all, they must exercise the necessary political will to defend their sovereignty against drug corruption by reforming and strengthening their judicial, law enforcement, legislative, and banking institutions.  The drug trade will thrive as long as it can divide governments and corrupt countries from within.  It cannot withstand a sustained effort by a coalition of countries individually committed to put an end to the international drug threat.

     * * *


How much do we know?  This report contains tables showing a variety of illicit narcotics-related data.  While these numbers represent the USG's best effort to sketch the dimensions of the international drug problem, the reader should be aware that the picture is not as precise as we would like it to be.  The numbers range from cultivation figures, relatively hard data derived by proven means, to crop production and drug yield estimates, much softer figures where many more variables come into play.  We publish these numbers with an important caveat: the yield figures are potential, not actual numbers.  Although they are useful for examining trends, they are only approximations.  They should not be treated as hard data.

Since much information is lacking on yields, the numbers are subject to revision as more data become known.  The nature of the illegal drug trade, in which the traffickers take great pains to maintain the security of their activities, makes it difficult to develop precise information.  This is particularly relevant when one considers the tremendous geographic areas which must be covered, and the difficulty of collecting reliable information in diverse and treacherous terrain.

What we know with reasonable certainty.  The most reliable information we have on illicit drugs is how many hectares are under cultivation.  For more than a decade and a half, the USG has estimated the extent of illicit cultivation in a dozen nations using proven methods similar to  those used to estimate the size of licit crops at home and abroad.  We can thus estimate the area under cultivation with reasonable accuracy.

What we know with less certainty.  Where crop yields are concerned, the picture is less clear.  How much of a finished product a given area will produce is difficult to estimate, since small changes in such factors as soil fertility, weather, farming techniques, and disease can produce widely varying results from year to year and place to place.  In addition, most illicit drug crop areas are inaccessible to the USG, making scientific information difficult to obtain.  Moreover, we must stress that even as we refine our methods of analysis, we are estimating potential crop available for harvest.

These estimates do not allow for losses, which could represent up to a third or more of a crop in some areas for some harvests.  Thus the estimate of the potential crop is useful in providing a theoretical, comparative analysis from year to year, but the actual quantity of final product remains elusive.

Since cocaine has been at the top of the USG's drug-control priority list, the USG has been trying to develop better yield data.  USG confidence in coca leaf yield estimates has risen in the past few years, based upon the results of field studies conducted in Latin America.  Three years ago, after completing preliminary research, the USG for the first time began  to make its own estimate of dry coca leaf yields for Bolivia and Peru instead of relying solely on reports from the governments of those countries.  Additional research and field studies may help refine these estimates and make similar improvements possible in estimates of other drug crops.  In all cases, multiplying average yields times available hectarage indicates only the potential, not the actual final drug crop available for harvest.  

Harvest Estimates.  Estimating the quantities of coca leaf, opium gum, and cannabis actually harvested and available for processing into finished narcotics remains a major challenge.  While we are making progress, at this time we cannot accurately estimate this amount for any illicit crop in any nation.

While farmers naturally have strong incentives to maximize their harvests of what is almost always their most profitable cash crop, the harvest depends upon the efficiency of farming practices and the wastage caused by poor practices or difficult weather conditions during and after harvest.  Up to a third or more of a crop may be lost in some areas during harvests.

In addition, mature coca (three to six years old), is more productive than immature or aging coca.  Variations such as these can dramatically affect potential yield and production.  Furthermore, if we continue to see limitations in the expansion of new coca we may begin to see dramatic declines in the next few years in productivity of existing fields.  Factors such as this will produce fluctuations in estimates.

Additional information and analysis may enable us to make adjustments for these factors in the future.  Similar deductions for local consumption of unprocessed coca leaf and opium may be possible as well through the accumulation of additional information and research.

Processing Estimates.  The wide variation in processing efficiency achieved by traffickers complicates the task of estimating the quantity of cocaine or heroin which could be refined from a crop.  These variations occur because of differences in the origin and quality of the raw material used, the technical processing method employed, the size and sophistication of laboratories, the skill and experience of local workers and chemists, and decisions made in response to enforcement pressures.

The USG continues to estimate potential cocaine production as a range based on processing efficiencies that appear to be most common.  But we must stress that these estimates are still soft.  We are currently undertaking a detailed study of this part of the cocaine production process.  (See Yield Estimates below.)

The actual amount of dry coca leaf or opium converted into a final product during any time period remains unknown, given the possible losses noted earlier.  There are indications, however, that cocaine processing efficiencies may not be as high as previously supposed, leaving traffickers with considerable room for improvement.  Nevertheless, increasing seizure rates eat into the future profitability of the industry, and raise the cost of doing business.
Figures will change as techniques and data quality improve.  The reader may ask: are this year's figures definitive?  The reply is, almost certainly not.  Additional research will produce revisions to USG estimates of potential drug production.  This is typical of annualized  figures for most other areas of statistical tracking--whether it be the size of the U.S. wheat crop, population figures, or the unemployment rate--that must be revised year to year.  For the present, however, these statistics represent the state of the art.  As new information becomes available and as the art improves, so will the precision of the estimates.


In weighing the figures below, one must bear in mind that they are theoretical.  They represent estimates of potential production, the amounts which the USG estimates could have been produced if, and only if, all available crops were to be converted into finished drugs.  Since these estimates make no allowance for losses, actual production is probably lower than our estimates.  The figures shown are mean points in a statistical range.

Potential Opium Production.  In Southeast Asia, estimated opium cultivation and production in the Golden Triangle countries rose substantially in 1993.  According to USG estimates, in 1993, growers in Burma, Laos, and Thailand cultivated an estimated 194,720 hectares of opium poppies, potentially yielding 2,800 MT of opium gum.  This is a seven percent increase in estimated cultivation and a ten percent increase in production over the 181,370 hectares and 2,534 MT estimated for 1992.

In Burma, estimated opium poppy cultivation increased by some eight percent to 165,800 hectares over the 153,700 reported for 1992.  Estimated production grew by 13 percent to 2,575 MT over the 2,280 MT reported last year.  Favorable weather conditions and the absence of meaningful poppy control measures contributed to the expansion of the crop.  In Laos, on the other hand, while estimated cultivation increased by two percent to 26,040 hectares from the 1992 figure of 25,610 hectares, estimated production fell by 22 percent to a five-year low of 180 MT.  While this drop is dramatic, much of the decrease is attributable to below average rainfall during the sowing  season and periods of frost before harvest.  Estimated opium poppy cultivation in Thailand increased by approximately 40 percent to 2,880 hectares from the 2,050 hectares observed last year.  Unlike Laos, Thailand had a nearly perfect growing season, with an estimated production of 42 MT--75 percent more than the 24 MT estimated in 1992. The USG is still examining the extent of opium cultivation in Vietnam.

After large increases in 1991 and 1992, opium poppy cultivation in Southwest Asia leveled off.  Total hectarage in Afghanistan and Pakistan dropped by one percent, from 27,640 hectares in 1992 to 27,360 hectares at the end of 1993.  Afghanistan remains the world's second largest opium producer.  Afghan hectarage increased from 19,470  hectares in 1992 to 21,080 hectares in 1993. This represents a rising trend from the 17,790 hectares that were under cultivation in 1989.  Potential production rose from an estimated 640 MT in 1992 to 685 MT in 1993.  In Pakistan, opium cultivation was significantly lower in 1993, after remaining more or less steady for nearly three years.  Hectarage dropped from 8,170 hectares in 1992 to 6,280 hectares at the end of 1993.  Estimated potential production fell correspondingly from 175 MT in 1992 to 140 MT in 1993.  We have no firm data about poppy cultivation or opium production in Iran.  The USG estimated in 1992 that Iran had approximately 3,500 hectares of opium poppy with a potential yield of 35 MT to 70 MT.  There has been no new information in 1993.

The USG is still examining the illicit drug crop situation in Russia, the Baltics, and the Central Asian countries formerly part of the Soviet Union.  While some of these countries may be able to produce significant opium poppy harvests, the USG still lacks sufficient data to identify and measure all suspected cultivation areas.  We do not expect to have conclusive results before mid to late 1995.

In the Western Hemisphere, the opium poppy growing countries have maintained active crop control efforts in face of a campaign by criminal organizations to expand the area under cultivation.  In Colombia, the government kept total 1993 opium poppy cultivation to approximately 20,000 hectares by aerial destruction of 9,821 hectares.  Alkaloid content remains low, though there are indications that yields have markedly increased as farmers have improved their methods.  Mexico's opium poppy cultivation in 1993 was an estimated 3,960 hectares, after eradicating 7,820 hectares.  The potential yield is 49 MT, up more than 20 percent from 1992's estimate of 40 MT.  Guatemala's poppy cultivation remains at minimal levels after government efforts eradicated 426 hectares, nearly half of the amount detected.  By the end of 1993, there were an estimated 438 hectares left, capable of producing less than four MT of opium.

Coca Cultivation.  Worldwide coca cultivation dropped to 195,700 hectares in 1993, an eight percent decline from 1992's high of 211,700 hectares.  The greatest change came in Peru, where a 33 percent fall in cultivation in the Upper Huallaga Valley brought total 1993 cultivation in Peru to 108,800 hectares.  In 1992, the figure was 129,100 hectares.  Colombia eradicated 793 hectares of coca in 1993, leaving an estimated 39,700 hectares of coca in place at the end of 1993.  This was a seven percent increase over the 1992 total of 37,100 hectares.  In Bolivia, government forces eradicated 2,400 hectares of coca, leaving an estimated 47,200 hectares under cultivation at the end of 1993.  This is a four percent increase over 1992's estimate of 45,500 hectares.  Some  coca is cultivated in inaccessible areas of Brazil, but its extent is unknown.  Ecuador has only negligible amounts of coca.

Cocaine Yield Estimates

The cocaine yield figure is offered with the same caveat as the crop harvest yield data:  it is a figure representing potential production.  It is a theoretical number.  It does not in every case allow for losses or the many other variables which one would encounter in a "real world" conversion from plant to finished drug.  In fact, the amount of cocaine HCl actually produced is probably lower.  A USG team that studied cocaine processing in Bolivia's Chapare region in 1993 found that in the laboratories under observation processing efficiency was lower than previously thought.  The estimate for Bolivia has been reduced accordingly and the figure published as a point estimate rather than as a range.  The Drug Enforcement Administration will publish the findings of this study separately. 

In 1993, taking into account estimates of local consumption and local seizures, the USG calculates that if virtually every coca leaf were converted into cocaine HCl, and there were no losses because of inefficiencies, bad weather, disease, or the deterrent effects of law enforcement, between 770 MT and 805 MT of cocaine HCl theoretically could have been available from Colombia, Bolivia, and Peru for worldwide export.  This figure includes between 450 MT and 485 MT potentially available from Peru, 255 MT* potentially available from Bolivia, and approximately 65 MT potentially available from Colombia.  In publishing these ranges, we repeat our caveat that these are theoretical numbers, useful for examining trends.  Though research is moving us closer to a more precise cocaine yield estimate for Latin America, at this stage we do not know the actual amount available for distribution.

* DEA believes that the actual (as opposed to the potential) yield figure is 193 MT, based on the findings of a recently completed study.  This information will be published separately by DEA.

Consumption data

Most of the chapters in this report contain some user or consumption data.  For the most part, these are estimates provided by foreign  governments or informal estimates by USG agencies.  There is no way to vouch for their reliability.  They are included because they are the only data available and give an approximation of how governments view their own drug abuse problems.  They should not be considered as a source of data to develop any reliable consumption estimates.

Marijuana Production  

Cannabis cultivation dropped significantly in Mexico in 1993 to 11,220 hectares with a potential yield of 6,280 MT.  This is a third less than 1992's figure of 16,420 hectares.  Mexican law enforcement agencies eradicated 9,970 hectares of cannabis in 1993.  In Colombia's traditional cannabis growing zones, where intensive eradication in previous years had virtually destroyed the crop, there was a resurgence of cultivation in 1993 to an estimated 5,000 hectares.  Crop yield is estimated at 4,125 MT for 1993.  Jamaica's cannabis crop was also up in 1993 to 744 hectares, compared to 1992 figure of 389 hectares.  The 1993 potential yield was 502 MT, nearly double the 1992 figure of 263 MT. We recognize that there may be considerable undetected cannabis cultivation in Central and East Asia.  As we gather more accurate information, we will report on significant findings in future INCSRs.

[Production Chart:  Worldwide Cultivation Totals]


Opium Yield Information.  An opium yield study conducted in Thailand from December 1991-February 1992 indicated that yield was about 28% lower than previously supposed. (11.6 kg/ha, instead of 16 kg/ha.)  We have adjusted the Thai opium estimate to reflect this new yield.  While there has been no comparable study in Burma, the USG believes that similar yields may apply in Burma.  If this proves to be the case, we will reflect the change in a future INCSR.  

Coca yield information.  After analyzing field studies conducted in Peru and Bolivia, in 1991 we concluded that we were underestimating the potential yield of the coca crop in Bolivia and particularly in Peru.  The 1991 analysis revealed that mature coca bushes--those that are two to fifteen years old and capable of producing full leaf harvests three or four times a year--have average yields of 2.7 metric tons per hectare in Bolivia's Chapare region and 2.3 metric tons per hectare in Peru's Upper Huallaga Valley.  Mature plant yields elsewhere in these two nations appear to be 1.0 and 1.14 metric tons per hectare, respectively.  New coca bushes--those planted in the last two years--have very low yields and are often not even harvested.  Based on this analysis, we have been able to distinguish between new coca and mature coca in our cultivation estimates.  We have calculated the potential dry coca leaf crop in Bolivia and Peru for each of the last five years by multiplying the average mature coca plant yield times the estimate of the hectarage of mature coca under cultivation.  The previous yield estimate for the lowland coca variety grown in Colombia--800 kilograms per hectare--is still believed to be accurate and is used to calculate that country's potential.  The mature coca plant yield estimates highlight the fact that changes in dry coca leaf production will always lag behind changes in the area of coca under cultivation by two years.  The data for previous years in Bolivia and Peru have been adjusted to reflect a ratio of 1.14 mt of leaf per hectare, in place of an earlier ratio of 1.03 mt of leaf per hectare.


[Chart:  Countries which have signed and/or ratified/acceded to the UN Convention]



Afghanistan.  Afghanistan is the world's second largest producer of opium after Burma.  According to USG estimates, cultivated opium poppy acreage in Afghanistan in 1993 increased by 8.3 percent, to 21,080 hectares, with a potential yield of 685 metric tons of opium.  If all of this opium were refined it would yield about 68.5 metric tons of heroin.  Up to 20 percent of the heroin consumed in the US now appears to come from Southwest Asia, particularly Afghanistan and Pakistan.  Most of the heroin exported from the region goes to Europe.  Since the end of the Soviet occupation, the Government of Afghanistan (GOA) has publicly stated its opposition to drug trafficking and abuse.  However, the persistent failure of Afghanistan's competing factions to achieve an overall political settlement continues to deny the GOA control over much of the country, and has prevented it from taking effective concrete measures against the illegal narcotics trade.  For the same reason, Afghanistan has made no significant progress in implementing the provisions of the 1988 UN Convention, which it ratified in February 1992.  The USG has official contacts with the government in Kabul in accord with efforts to promote a political settlement and a stable government.  The lack of central authority, however, has permitted only very modest USG initiatives in support of Afghan counternarcotics efforts.

Albania plays a relatively minor role in the drug trade.  There is little information on the extent of drug trafficking or domestic consumption, but Albanian and foreign government authorities note an increase in heroin and cocaine smuggling along the borders with Greece and Macedonia, and through the Tirana airport.  Smuggling operations are carried out by Greek, Italian, and Albanian groups. There have also been reports of domestic cannabis cultivation, and West European authorities believe some Southwest Asian heroin is transiting Albania in route to Western Europe.  There has been a sharp increase in crime following the collapse of communism.  Long stretches of the border between Albania and Greece are unpatrolled, and customs officials at border crossings, sea and air ports have little experience detecting drug shipments.

Algeria produces a small amount of cannabis for local consumption; studies suggest abuse is increasing.   Strict narcotics enforcement along Morocco's northern border has encouraged some drug traffickers to transit Algeria to reach European markets.  Algeria has signed but not ratified the 1988 UN Convention.

Antigua and Barbuda.  See Eastern Caribbean.  

Argentina is primarily a transit route for Andean narcotics sent to the US and Europe.  As elsewhere in the region, domestic consumption of narcotics has risen with increased trafficking.  Government and public awareness of the threat posed by narcotics trafficking, money laundering and other attendant ills has increased.  The Argentine Government has taken important steps to combat the problem on its own, and in cooperation with neighboring countries and the United States.  The Secretariat for Programming for Drug Prevention and the Fight Against Narcotics Trafficking, under the direction of Dr. Alberto Lestelle,  coordinated all aspects of Argentina's narcotics control efforts, and is pursuing legislative  reforms to strengthen cases against traffickers and money launderers.  Limited Argentine resources and the lack of adequate laws are obstacles to a more effective counternarcotics strategy.  Argentina ratified the 1988 UN Convention in 1993. 

Armenia.  There is little information on the extent of drug trafficking, cultivation, or abuse in Armenia, suggesting that Armenia's role in the drug trade may be minor.  Armenian authorities report that there is no illicit opium poppy cultivation in Armenia, although both hemp and opium poppy continue to grow wild in Armenia.  Both opium and heroin are brought into Armenia from central Asia for local use and, possibly, for transshipment to neighboring countries. The Armenian government (GOA) believes that most serious crimes in Armenia are drug-related.  Moreover, the GOA acknowledges that international drug organizations operate in Armenia.  This is underscored by the seizure of 12 kilograms of South American cocaine in 1992.  Most drug smuggling is controlled by several organizations, which are exploiting weak state control of transportation and inadequate government resources for combatting crime, according to Ministry of Internal Affairs (MVD) officials.  These officials also note strong ties between Armenian networks and organized crime groups in Russia.  The GOA believes it is likely that narco-profits are laundered through Russian banks.  Further, Armenia's chemical industry, one of the largest in the Newly Independent States (NIS), could attract attention as a supplier of precursor and essential chemicals for illicit drug production, although no diversions were reported in 1993.

Australia.  Australia is primarily a narcotics-consumer country, which is becoming more significant as a transit point; however, illicit drug use (primarily marijuana and amphetamines, although heroin and cocaine use is increasing) is recognized as a growing problem in Australia.  Some heroin may be transiting Australia bound for the US market, while some amphetamines are smuggled into New Zealand.  Cocaine is being shipped from the US and South America to and through Australia.  Hashish from Lebanon and Southwest Asia is also a concern.  The Government of Australia (GOA) pursues a vigorous international anti-drug policy and strongly supports international action and cooperation against drug trafficking.  The 1993-97 National Drug Strategy Plan, part of the National Campaign Against Drug Abuse (NCADA), outlines in detail the GOA's domestic approach to drugs, using a harm minimization approach.  This plan emphasizes alcohol and tobacco use reduction, with illicit drug use a secondary issue by comparison.  However, GOA law enforcement agencies strongly pursue anti-drug efforts because drug use is a significant cause of social disruption, and a concern to the community.  Australia is an active participant in the Commission on Narcotic Drugs and the Dublin Group.

Austria is primarily a transit country for drugs destined for larger markets in Western Europe.  Most of the drugs enter Austria from its eastern neighbors.  Data is not yet available for 1993, but Austria recorded a record 45 percent increase in the number of drug-related indictments in 1992.  The Government of Austria (GOA) does not keep statistics on drug use, but is concerned that the problem is becoming more severe; it is especially concerned about a significant increase in drug-related deaths and the increase in AID's cases.  Austria is not a significant producer of chemicals used to manufacture illicit drugs.

Austrian authorities believe some drug money is laundered in Austria but does not know the extent.  The GOA made money laundering a  punishable crime in 1993, and enacted legislation that prohibits the opening of anonymous accounts by nonresidents; the law entered into force on January 1, 1994.  Austria signed the 1988 UN Convention in 1989, but has not yet ratified it.

Azerbaijan.  Narcotics trafficking and abuse in Azerbaijan increased markedly in the past year as its location and open borders make it an increasingly attractive transshipment point.  Azerbaijan has promoted cross-border trade and travel with Russia and Central Asia, and has opened its border with Iran to encourage contact with the 12 to 20 million Azeris resident in northern Iran.

Information on the drug trafficking groups in Azerbaijan is limited, but there are Newly Independent States (NIS) press reports that Azerbaijani criminal networks, headquartered in Baku and other key cities, control 80 percent of the drug distribution operations in Moscow.  While local officials note that money laundering has not become widespread because of the limited banking system, they believe that some drug profits are laundered through local businesses.

The Bahamas.  Although Bahamian and joint US-Bahamian drug enforcement initiatives over the past ten years have significantly reduced the volume of drugs detected moving through the country, The Bahamas remains a major transit country for US-bound Colombian cocaine and Jamaican marijuana.  The Bahamas was the first country to ratify the 1988 UN Convention and has instituted laws and procedures to implement it, including controls for precursor and essential chemicals but with the exception of adequate money laundering controls.  The Government of the Commonwealth of The Bahamas (GCOB) works to fulfill the goals and objectives of US-Bahamian bilateral counternarcotics accords, including extraordinary cooperation with US drug interdiction efforts.  In the future, the USG will urge the GCOB to assume more responsibility for interdiction activities.  The USG seeks full cooperation with the GCOB on the complete range of counternarcotics efforts, including better coordination in extradition matters and more effective seizure and forfeiture of drug trafficking proceeds.

The Baltics.  The drug trade is gaining a foothold in the Baltic states, Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania.  Initially, the open borders and proximity to Scandinavia prompted Southwest Asian heroin trafficking networks to expand routes into the Baltic states.  Central Asian and Russian crime groups also established smuggling networks in the three countries.  Illicit amphetamines produced in Latvia continue to appear in West European markets.  However, health authorities in all three countries believe that, while drug abuse is increasing, it is still a relatively minor problem.

Economic and political issues continue to dominate the agendas of the three governments, limiting their attention to the expanding drug problems, although there are some signs that the three nations, and particularly Latvia, are increasing their antidrug efforts.  But each of the nations faces manpower and resource shortages, hampering drug control progress.
Only Latvia has become a party to the 1988 UN Convention, although Estonia and Lithuania recognize the need to change their laws to accede to the UN conventions.  The UNDCP assisted all three governments to draft updated penal codes which will take the UN drug conventions into consideration; these are in various stages of review.  In the interim, the USSR's 1961 penal code remains in place.

Bangladesh is not a significant producer of narcotics. It has the potential, however, to become a major transshipment point for heroin since it borders on important drug producing areas and has limited detection and interdiction capability.  The Department of Narcotics Control (DNC), an element of the Home Ministry, is the principal agency within the Bangladesh Government (BDG) responsible for confronting this threat.  As a party to the 1988 UN Convention, as well as the South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC) Convention on Narcotics, the BDG has enacted strict laws against narcotics production, trafficking, and use.  It has no bilateral agreements with the United States.  A severe lack of resources and weak coordination with other government departments hamper the DNC's enforcement capability.  The UNDCP is scheduled to complement current, modest bilateral support to improve Bangladesh's narcotics control efforts with a $1.7 million, five-year project beginning in 1994.

Barbados.  See Eastern Caribbean. 

Belgium. Belgium is mainly a transit country for illicit drugs bound for larger markets in Western Europe.  Authorities seized twice as much cocaine in 1993 as they did the year before, and seized significant amounts of cannabis and heroin as well.  Heroin use appears to be stabilizing, but the use of synthetic drugs may be increasing.  Belgium is not a significant producer of precursor and essential chemicals, but drugs do transit the port of Antwerp.  The Government of Belgium (GOB) created a special police financial unit to investigate suspicious financial transactions because of a suspected increase in drug money laundering.  Belgium participates in several international drug control organizations and has signed the 1988 UN Convention.  Ratification is expected in 1994.

Belize.  The Government of Belize (GOB) recognizes cocaine transit and use as the country's major problems.  To a lesser extent, cannabis cultivation and trafficking, and money laundering, are also problems.  The GOB is committed to eliminating drug trafficking, which it views as a danger to its democratic institutions.  The GOB fully supports USG counter-narcotics programs and regional efforts.  On its own initiative the GOB organized and hosted a Central American Counter-Drug Summit in 1993.  Belize is not yet a party to the 1988 UN Convention.

Bolivia is a major drug producing country, responsible for nearly one-third of the world's raw coca leaf production.  The election of a new president in mid-year marked the twelfth year of a democratically-elected government in Bolivia.  In 1993, the Government of Bolivia (GOB) did continue to make some progress in interdiction, conducting nearly 45 percent of operations without direct USG participation.  However, Bolivia fell far short of meeting coca eradication goals set in bilateral agreements with the United States.  Government transition and other factors contributed to a particularly low  rate of coca eradication.  The outgoing administration's eradication performance declined considerably during the election campaign due to opposition from coca farmers, while the new administration's efforts lagged even more because of preoccupation with government reorganization.  The GOB also failed to comply with its international legal obligations in the area of extradition.  In the final analysis, success in some law enforcement activities did not adequately compensate for failure to attack the root cause of Bolivia's contribution to the drug problem, the cultivation of coca for the illicit market.

Botswana.  Botswana is a transit country for illegal narcotics, mainly methaqualone (Mandrax), marijuana, and some cocaine, from India through Kenya, Zimbabwe, Zambia, and into South Africa.  Small quantities of drugs have recently been identified as bound for the United States.  Botswana is a party to the 1961 and 1971 Conventions and the 1972 Protocol, but not to the 1988 UN Convention.  Although we have no information about Botswana's plans to ratify the 1988 Convention, it has made several advances toward meeting the goals and objectives of the Convention, including stringent antinarcotics legislation, cooperation with South African authorities, and a proposed expansion of the capabilities of its Criminal Investigation Division's antinarcotics personnel. 

Brazil.  President Franco declared that 1993 would be the "year to fight narcotics," but little was done to realize that goal, and drug trafficking in Brazil continued to increase.  The Government of Brazil (GOB) failed to apply significant new resources to curb drug trafficking and abuse, but it cooperated with the USG on law enforcement, extradition requests, and demand reduction programs.  With substantial USG assistance, the Federal Police improved its investigative abilities and interdicted 7.7 metric tons of cocaine transiting Brazil.  It also provided information which enabled Spanish authorities to seize two metric tons of cocaine.  The GOB established a new anti-drug secretariat, which will be responsible for formulating drug policy.  Brazil is a party to the 1988 UN Convention.  The GOB has not yet increased the operating budget of the Federal Police anti-drug unit (DPF/DRE).  The agency remains severely undermanned and under-funded, though the GOB did hold the first entrance exam for police agents in eight years.  Legislation which would substantially improve narcotics enforcement has languished in congressional committee since 1981.  The GOB did not address Brazil's inadequate financial control laws which facilitate money laundering, nor its weak chemical control regulations.

Bulgaria.  Traffickers expanded routes and diversified operations through Bulgaria in 1993, especially as a conduit for Southwest Asian heroin.  International sanctions against Serbia increased the use of smuggling routes through Bulgaria.  Heroin traffickers also are targeting Bulgarian air and sea ports, and expanding land routes to circumvent improved security at West European airports.  Bulgarian authorities are concerned about increased domestic drug use.  The Government of Bulgaria (GOB) completed the process of ratifying the 1988 UN Convention and will review a draft criminal code once the new Bulgarian judicial law passes.

Burma.  The Government of Burma has not undertaken serious or sustained narcotics control efforts since 1988, despite frequent public statements and some law enforcement actions.  Burma is the world's largest source of illicit opium and heroin:  estimated potential opium production in 1993 was a record 2,575 metric tons, as estimated hectarage increased over seven percent.   The insurgent Kachin ethnic group did reduce opium cultivation and production in areas under its control.  Approximately 60 percent of US heroin comes from Southeast Asia, and almost all of that from Burma. 

The government continued its political and military accommodations with several insurgent/trafficking groups. However, there was no evidence of the reduced opium production which the government claims is the objective of these arrangements.  Burma did permit efforts by UNDCP to implement its regional strategy (involving Burma, China, Laos, and Thailand), and showed increased activity in law enforcement.  However, seizures and arrests were insignificant compared to the extent of the narcotics trade.  UNDCP crop reduction projects have yet to make meaningful progress, and are on such small scale that they can only serve as models for actual progress in Burma.  Burma failed to fulfill its commitment to conduct a baseline aerial survey of the UNDCP project areas.  Burma is a party to the 1988 UN Convention. 

Cameroon.  Cameroon is not a major trafficking country, although its economic recession, large number of unemployed urban youth, government corruption, and long border with Nigeria, a major drug transit country, make it vulnerable to the drug trade.  There is some evidence of drug shipments between Nigeria and Chad crossing northern Cameroon.  While Cameroon has acceded to the 1988 UN Convention, government compliance with its goals and objectives is inadequate.  The National Drug Fighting Committee, created in 1992, coordinates narcotics control efforts.  These efforts have declined, however; for example, there was only one drug seizure (marijuana) by Cameroonian airport police in 1993, less than in past years.  The USG withheld narcotics assistance in 1992, as part of the overall suspension of assistance because of Cameroon's inadequate record in democratization, human rights, and economic reform.  The narcotics aid was not released in 1993 because of the unwillingness of the police to furnish drug data to the USG. 

Canada is a both a conduit and a destination for illicit drugs transiting the US and Canada, as well as a haven for drug money laundering.  Canadian law enforcement officials seized record quantities of cocaine and heroin in 1992.  While 1993 statistics are not yet available, authorities are concerned that cocaine use may be increasing, but believe heroin use has stabilized.  Canada is a source of precursor chemicals used in the manufacture of illicit drugs in the United States.  

The Government of Canada (GOC) is committed to the international and domestic fight against drug trafficking, but budget constraints are forcing it to reduce its support to international anti-drug organizations in 1994.  And although Canadian special anti-drug-money laundering teams comprised of Royal Mounted Police (RCMP) officers, full time prosecutors, administrative staff and local police officers became fully operational in 1993, the GOC may also reduce the number of police assigned to counternarcotics work.  Canada emphasizes demand over supply reduction.  The GOC does plan modest increases in expenditures for demand reduction and drug treatment.

Money laundering continues to be a problem.  The GOC calculates that $10-$12 billion in drug-related proceeds passes through Canada's financial institutions annually.  In 1993, the GOC issued regulations to implement the Proceeds of Crime Act against money laundering.  However, the record-keeping requirements do not create criminal violations comparable to those in US law. 
Cape Verde.  The Cape Verde Islands are strategically located on air and sea routes linking Africa and Europe with the Americas.  Local drug production and consumption remain low.  However, the Islands are used increasingly as a transit point for narcotics, primarily cocaine, shipped by boat and plane from South America and Africa to Europe.  Authorities continue to work with Interpol and Portuguese officials to curb the traffic to Europe.  Cape Verde continues to enjoy a low domestic demand for narcotics, and does not have a demand reduction program other than public health awareness programs.  Corruption is not generally a problem within government or law enforcement organizations.  The country is in the process of creating a Coast Guard, modelled on the United States Coast Guard.  Cape Verde is a party to the 1961 and 1971 UN Conventions and the 1972 Protocol, but not to the 1988 UN Convention.  The USG has no knowledge that Cape Verde plans to accede to the UN Convention.

Chile is a transit route for South American cocaine destined for the US, Europe, and Asia.  Chilean authorities report a noticeable increase of cocaine in the domestic market, and suspect that transit traffic is rising.  Chile also serves as a money laundering center and as a major supplier of precursor chemicals for cocaine processing operations in Bolivia and, to a lesser extent, Peru.  To enable the authorities to better combat the expanding drug trade, the Government of Chile (GOC) presented the congress with new anti-drug legislation in 1992.  The bill passed in the Chamber of Deputies in early 1993, but is still pending in the Senate.  Law enforcement authorities seized record amounts of cocaine products and marijuana in 1993, and cooperated with the USG on several investigations.  In recognition of the growing threat posed by drug trafficking, the government issued a national drug control strategy in May.  Chile is a party to the 1988 UN Convention. 

China.  The leaders of the People's Republic of China (PRC) have taken a tough stance against narcotics trafficking and use.  China is a major export route for Golden Triangle heroin and, with drug addiction on the rise, a consumer of narcotics as well.  Growing investment increases opportunities for money laundering.  China launched a major anti-corruption campaign which may aid narcotics control efforts.  China has met or is seeking to meet the goals and objectives of the 1988 UN Convention by enhancing law enforcement measures and increasing public education and international cooperation.  It expanded regional narcotics cooperation in a Memorandum of Understanding signed this year with Burma, Laos, Thailand and the UNDCP.

Although China expresses a desire for increased counternarcotics cooperation with the US, the level of US-PRC cooperation has been limited by the unresolved case of smuggler Wang Zongxiao, a Chinese drug trafficker who requested political asylum in the US in 1990, after Chinese authorities sent him to the US to testify in a narcotics prosecution known as the "Goldfish Case."  However, DEA has been able to continue liaison and training activities in China, and some Chinese narcotics officials indicate that the newest US court ruling prohibiting the USG from returning Wang to China should not stand in the way of increased bilateral cooperation.  The USG will appeal this ruling.  China is a party to the 1988 UN Convention. 

 Colombia is the geographic heart of cocaine processing and trafficking for the world; it also produces heroin.  The Government of Colombia (GOC) cooperates with the USG on a broad range of narcotics control activities.  However, its efforts to prosecute key traffickers have produced, at best, mixed results.  Eighteen months after his escape from prison, Medellin Cartel chief Pablo Escobar was located and killed following an extensive manhunt and clash with Colombian police.  The Medellin Cartel lost control of its trafficking empire due to both GOC actions and rival trafficker retribution.  The Cali Cartel, however, is still strong.  The GOC has conducted several operations to seize records, financial data, and assets, but most major Cali traffickers remain free.  Cocaine seizures declined in 1993, while seizures of cocaine base and marijuana increased.  Heroin seizures decreased slightly.

Although security forces seized only a small percentage of Colombia's estimated cocaine exports, authorities eradicated drug crops, both manually and with herbicides.  Colombia achieved many of the objectives set forth in our bilateral drug control agreement, particularly in opium poppy eradication and an increased police presence throughout the country.  However, seizures of cocaine and base declined 16 percent from 1992 levels, and the Colombian National Police's (CNP) counternarcotics airwing (DISAP) was not at optimum operational levels.  The CNP is cooperating closely with neighboring countries.  The Department of Administrative Security (DAS) also participated in several successful cases in Europe, leading to a number of arrests and some significant drug seizures.  GOC agencies regularly participate in international fora on money laundering, chemical controls, and drug abuse prevention.  Colombia issued its first comprehensive national drug survey in April, and approved for ratification the 1988 UN Convention.  It will be formally ratified only after favorable review by the constitutional court.

Costa Rica. Costa Rica lies on the Central American transit route for cocaine and heroin moving between Andean producers and North American and European consumers.  The Costa Rican market for illegal narcotics is expanding, and there is growing public awareness of the threat posed by drug consumption.  Costa Rica's economic growth has increased opportunities for money laundering.  In recent years, the Government of Costa Rica (GOCR) modernized its counternarcotics laws to conform to the 1988 UN Conventions to which it is a party, streamlined narcotics control enforcement, and encouraged demand reduction activities.  However, scarce resources, the lack of a fully professional police force, and judicial bottlenecks hamper more effective drug control.

Cote d'Ivoire.  Cote d'Ivoire is a transit point in the international narcotics trade for Asian heroin and South American cocaine destined for European and North American markets.  There is minimal production of low-grade cannabis for domestic consumption.  Domestic use of illegal drugs (particularly heroin and cocaine) is increasing.  Cote d'Ivoire's counternarcotics effort, coordinated by the National Drug Police (NDP), is hampered by a lack of resources.  Cote d'Ivoire has ratified the 1988 UN Convention.  Senior Government of Cote d'Ivoire (GOCI) officials recognize that narcotics are a growing problem, and are working effectively in cooperation with the US to fulfill the Convention's goals and objectives.

Cuba.  Cuba is strategically located astride key drug routes into the United States, but it is difficult to measure the quantities of drugs which transit in or near Cuban territorial waters or airspace.  The Cuban government continues to give a high profile to its anti-drug policies, and has undertaken a modest level of counternarcotics effort.  Cuba cooperated with US drug enforcement on an ad hoc basis in 1993.  Continuing shortages of fuel and essential spare parts limit the Cuban government's ability to interdict drug trafficking.  Cuba has signed, but not yet ratified, the 1988 UN Convention, and is working to meet many of the Convention's goals and objectives.

Cyprus.  While Cyprus neither produces nor consumes significant amounts of narcotics, its location in the eastern Mediterranean, and its well-developed facilities for business, tourism and international communications, make Cyprus a convenient brokering site for traffickers.  Accordingly, enforcement efforts are increasing.  In 1993 Cypriot authorities made 123 narcotics-related arrests, compared to 62 in 1992.  The Government of Cyprus (GOC) ratified the 1988 UN Convention in  1990.  Cyprus developed a broad range of laws to meet the goals and objectives of the 1988 UN Convention.  Police and customs authorities strictly enforce these laws, and cooperate closely with the USG and other foreign governments.  Authorities control the movement of bullion and currency, which deters traffickers from using Cyprus as a financial haven.  The Central Bank monitors monetary activities, preventing widespread drug money laundering activities. 

The Czech Republic.  Drug trafficking through the Czech Republic is accelerating.  Western European seizures reveal that Turkish drug traffickers are using the Czech Republic to circumvent the former Yugoslavia en route to West European markets.  Czech officials believe that production of illegal amphetamines, which began in Czechoslovakia, continues in the Czech Republic.  Authorities also are concerned that drug traffickers may be using the banking industry to launder funds.  Trafficking groups are expanding domestic Czech drug markets and are reportedly recruiting couriers from the Czech population.  The Czech Government adopted a comprehensive drug control strategy emphasizing an approach with more emphasis on demand reduction.  The demise of Czechoslovakia prompted the creation of a more efficient drug law enforcement apparatus, and there have been some advances made in chemical control.  The government has made little progress, however, in implementing the 1988 UN Convention.  Drug-related threats, such as money laundering, are largely ignored, and not all drug possession is illegal in the Czech Republic.

Denmark's excellent transportation facilities make it a locus for drug traffic to the Nordic area.  Traffickers use Copenhagen as a transit point for heroin moving from Southwest Asia to Scandinavia, Western Europe and the United States.  Significant amounts of South American cocaine transit Denmark bound for other European countries.  Danish officials are concerned that illicit drug use may be growing, particularly the use of cocaine and the synthetic drug "ecstasy."  Danish authorities are actively involved in domestic and international narcotics control fora.  They are assisting the Baltic states in their efforts to combat narcotics trafficking and use.  In 1993, Denmark passed new money laundering legislation, and introduced a program to control the shipment of precursor chemicals.  Denmark became a party to the 1988 UN Convention in 1991.

Dominica.  See Eastern Caribbean.  

The Dominican Republic is a transshipment country for illegal drugs destined for the United States.  The country's geographical location, underdeveloped status, and economic problems make it an ideal venue for drug trafficking.  While money laundering is not a major problem, businesses in the Dominican Republic are reportedly using assets from drug-related activities in the United States to improve their "legitimate" business operations.  Good local law enforcement and drug abuse prevention and education programs have been instituted in an attempt to keep drug consumption down.  The USG's decision to deny the issuance of visas in response to reports of drug-related corruption has proven somewhat effective in thwarting corruption.  Cooperation between the Government of the Dominican Republic (GODR) and the USG is excellent.  The GODR acceded to the 1988 UN Convention in 1993.  

Eastern Caribbean: Antigua and Barbuda; Barbados; Dominica; Grenada; St. Kitts and Nevis; St. Lucia; St. Vincent and the Grenadines.  Drug use and trafficking threaten the stability and economic development of the countries of the eastern Caribbean.  Successful US interdiction efforts elsewhere have intensified drug trafficking pressure on this region.  Increased focus by US counternarcotics agencies on the eastern Caribbean has revealed that sophisticated and organized drug rings from South America are making use of the traditional advantages the area has to offer: geographic location, easy navigation, inadequately patrolled coastlines and waters, an ample network of airline and cruise ship connections, a large and mobile volume of tourists, as well as the inherent difficulties of policing a group of island mini-states.

The security services of seven independent eastern Caribbean countries are grouped in the Regional Security System (RSS), and participate in the Regional Maritime Movement Information System (RMMIS).  Barbados also has a Joint Information Coordination Center (JICC); RMMIS and JICC data entries are compatible.  The RSS has focussed increasingly on narcotics control and enforcement efforts with some success; in 1993, individual seizures of cocaine and marijuana were larger than in years past.  However, enforcement capabilities are likely to decrease in coming years as a result of significant cuts in US and UK funding.

The region's governments generally recognize the seriousness of their drug problems.  With few exceptions, cooperation with US authorities and agencies is excellent.  Officials of the seven states have asked for public support in combatting narcotics, and generally welcome outside assistance.  Area governments acknowledge that improvements in law enforcement, legal and judicial institutions are sorely needed in order to catch up with the growing load of drug-related cases.  They are addressing this problem with USG support.  The Bridgetown Group of international donors, a mini-Dublin group, coordinates regional assistance.  

Antigua and Barbuda, Barbados, Dominica and Grenada have acceded to the 1988 UN Convention, while St. Kitts and Nevis, St. Lucia and St. Vincent and the Grenadines have requested and received USG and UN assistance in making the legislative changes necessary for their accession.  St. Kitts, St. Lucia and St. Vincent are parties to the 1961 Convention and the 1972 Protocol.  In general, implementation of the Convention is hampered by lack  of training and consequent failure to understand the legislation: problems persist in the collection and presentation of evidence, the prosecution of cases, effective use of conspiracy laws against drug ringleaders, and in the development of uniform sentencing guidelines.

In all the countries of the eastern Caribbean, corruption among public officials, including that involving drug-related activities, is punishable by law--although that law is rarely applied.  To our knowledge, senior officials are not engaged in the drug trade.  There are, however, continuing allegations that public officials in St. Vincent and Antigua participate in, are knowledgeable of, or are acquiescent to the continuation of drug-related activities.  In St. Vincent and Antigua, as in all the eastern Caribbean nations, official government policy promotes neither the illicit production or distribution of drugs nor money laundering.

Ecuador is a transit country for processed drugs shipped from Colombia to the United States and Europe, as well as for precursor chemicals smuggled into Colombia.  The Cali cartel has expanded its drug transport operations in Ecuador, and the USG estimates it ships at least 30 metric tons of cocaine per year through Ecuador's poorly monitored ports.  Drug trafficker aircraft regularly overfly Ecuador between Peru and Colombia.  Ecuador is also a money laundering site for Colombian narcotics traffickers.  

The Government of Ecuador (GOE) continues to cooperate with the USG in counternarcotics efforts.  In 1993, the USG and GOE negotiated an asset sharing agreement which is expected to be signed early in 1994.  In 1993, Ecuadorian judges and prosecutors participated in training sessions on the narcotics law.  The GOE also arrested members of four narcotics trafficking groups.  The government has enacted legislation to meet the goals and objectives of the 1988 UN Convention, which it ratified in 1990.

Egypt is a significant transit point for heroin destined for Europe and North America.  Small but increasing amounts of opium and cannabis are grown locally.  However, there is no evidence that any refining of narcotics takes place in Egypt.  There does not appear to be a serious drug abuse problem, although there is growing concern over the recent increase in the number of heroin addicts.  While there is little evidence of cocaine use, hashish use is widespread.  Egyptian drug laws are strictly enforced, and provide severe penalties for drug trafficking.  The Egyptian government (GOE) ratified the 1988 UN Convention, but has not passed implementing legislation.  Egypt is working to meet the goals and the objectives of the Convention.

El Salvador lies on the major land, sea and air shipment routes for narcotics, primarily cocaine, moving from South America to the United States.  President Cristiani made narcotics control a priority throughout his administration, and the Executive Anti-narcotics Unit (UEA), which he established early in his presidency, has been incorporated into the new National Civilian Police (PNC) and remains an effective, motivated force.  Marijuana production for domestic consumption is the only illicit drug produced in El Salvador.  Cocaine use is limited, but increasing.  Despite El Salvador's weak legal regime and liberal currency laws, the USG is not aware of any significant money laundering activity.  El Salvador is now a party to the 1988 UN Convention. 
Estonia.  See the Baltics.

Finland.  A small amount of narcotics trafficking takes place in Finland, both to supply the local addict population, and in transit to third countries.  Finish authorities believe illicit drug use in Finland increased in 1993. Finland does not produce narcotic substances or precursor chemicals. Finnish law enforcement officials believe that some money laundering occurs in Finland.  A draft bill making money laundering illegal, and a punishable offense, has been sent to Parliament for review and vote.  Finland has not yet ratified the 1988 UN Convention.

France is an important transit country for narcotics originating in the Middle East and Southwest Asia, and cocaine from South America.  Vigorous enforcement efforts by the French police have led to significant drug seizures.  For example, cocaine seizures increased 95 percent in 1992, as compared to 1991.  However, while cocaine use is increasing, French government officials believe heroin use remains the largest problem.  The French government closely monitors the shipment of precursor and essential chemicals, and adopted the European Union's (EU) chemical regulation in 1993.

French authorities believe money laundering takes place in France despite its having been outlawed since 1987.  France is an active member in the Financial Action Task Force (FATF).  The Government of France (GOF) continues to be active in international anti-drug organizations, including the Dublin Group, where it assumed the chair in 1994.  France is also a contributing member of the UN Drug Control Program (UNDCP).  It has been a party to the 1988 UN Convention since 1990. 

French Caribbean.  Martinique, Guadeloupe, and French Guiana are departements (provinces) of France, and are subject, therefore, to French laws and to the 1988 UN Convention, to which France is a party.  With the resources of France behind them, the governments of these territories are meeting the goals and objectives of the Convention.  Nevertheless, drug traffickers and money launderers are active, especially on the French half of St. Martin, part of the departement of Guadeloupe, whose free port status, heavy flow of tourists, offshore banking facilities, and easy access to the relatively less-controlled Dutch half of the island make it the most susceptible to narcotics trafficking and money laundering.  A small amount of marijuana is grown in French Guiana for local consumption, but most marijuana available there comes from Suriname and Guyana.  

Georgia.  Rising drug trafficking and abuse have recently prompted high-level concern in Tbilisi.  Georgian officials have noted an increased smuggling of opiates and hashish, but most concrete information comes from Western authorities.  According to Georgian authorities, illicit drugs from Afghanistan and Central Asia are smuggled primarily from Iran via Azerbaijan and Armenia.  Georgian officials also report that opiates are often smuggled in from Russia through southern Ossetia, which is under Russian protection.  Concern over drug-related corruption prompted the Government of Georgia (GOG) to conduct a series of investigations, which led to the arrest of 17 government officials on charges of drug trafficking, corruption, and use.
 Until January 1994, Georgia's nascent antidrug efforts have been hampered by limited resources and by the outbreak of war in Abhazia.  However, in an unprecedented move, the Ministry of the Interior has sponsored a counterdrug operation in nine regions of Georgia for 1994. 

Germany. The Federal Republic of Germany (FRG) remains an important drug trafficking and consuming country.  Heroin represents the largest volume of illicit trafficking in the FRG, usually shipped to or through Germany from Southwest Asia via Turkey, Bulgaria, Hungary, Poland, Romania, and Austria.  German officials believe heroin remains the primary drug of abuse, but cocaine consumption is increasing.  The FRG is also a significant consumer of amphetamines from Poland and the Netherlands.  Germany is a source of chemicals used in illicit drug manufacturing, while German brokers have been identified as arranging chemical shipments.  Germany is implementing the European Union (EU) chemical regulations that came into effect in 1993.

In 1993, Germany ratified the 1988 UN Convention.  Recent legislation improved the authorities' ability to trace illicit profits and seize trafficker's assets, but prosecutors are still learning how to apply these new tools.  The FRG actively participates in various anti-drug fora, including the Dublin Group, for which it organized a meeting on counternarcotics assistance to Eastern Europe and a meeting on how alternative development contributes toward counternarcotics objectives.

Ghana addressed the problems of narcotics and drug trafficking in 1989, after domestic narcotics consumption had risen steadily for several years.  Narcotics traffickers had made drugs accessible to the local market instead of merely transshipping them.  The Government of Ghana (GOG) has instituted international cooperation, enforcement, rehabilitation, and education programs.  Ghana is a party to the 1988 UN Convention.

Greece is a transit route for narcotics from drug producing nations in the Middle East and South Asia, destined primarily for Western Europe and, to a lesser extent, the United States.  Greek officials believe domestic drug abuse is becoming a larger problem, especially with locally grown marijuana and imported hashish and heroin.  Greece is not a major supplier or transshipment point for chemicals used to manufacture illicit drugs.

Although Greece is not an important financial center for the eastern Mediterranean region, nor an important tax haven, USG and GOG authorities suspect drug-related money is being laundered.  Greece is a party to the 1988 UN Convention.  The Government of Greece (GOG) passed legislation in July which strengthened penalties for drug trafficking and use.  The law also established a state-controlled agency, Okana, chaired by the Ministry of Health, to coordinate demand reduction efforts.  Cooperation is good between Greek enforcement authorities and USG agencies.  The GOG participates in various international antidrug organizations, including the Dublin Group where it chairs the regional working group for the Balkans/Near East.

Grenada.  See Eastern Caribbean. 

 Guatemala.  Guatemala is a major transit country for cocaine, as well as being an opium- and marijuana-producing country.  The Government of Guatemala (GOG) recognizes the threat to its sovereignty and public health posed by illicit drugs.  As a result, GOG cooperation with the USG is excellent.  Guatemalan law enforcement agencies have worked closely with the US Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA) in Operation CADENCE, an enhanced cocaine interdiction program combining the assets and intelligence of various USG agencies.  The Guatemalan Treasury Police carry out the ongoing opium poppy eradication campaign, with support from the USG.  Increasing cooperation between Guatemalan and Mexican authorities on their border offers the opportunity for more effective action against drug trafficking.  In 1993, combined USG-GOG interdiction operations seized 7.6 metric tons of cocaine, while eradication operations destroyed about 426 hectares of opium poppy grown in remote areas of Guatemala's interior.

Guyana, bordering the countries of Venezuela, Suriname, and Brazil, has a densely forested, scarcely populated interior dotted with small airstrips, which facilitates the shipping of cocaine to the Caribbean, the United States, and other international destinations.  In 1993, the amount of cocaine seized was over 1,000 per cent higher than in 1992, and officials expect additional increases as narcotics traffickers attempt to skirt drug interdiction efforts in the Caribbean.  An undetermined amount of marijuana is grown here year-round.  The Guyana Police Force (GPF) employs 28 of its authorized strength of 31 officers in a drug enforcement unit.  The Guyana Defense Force (GDF) employs one helicopter in marijuana eradication missions in cooperation with the GPF.  The airport uses its five drug detector dogs, three donated by the USG, to locate and seize drugs.  Guyana is a party to the 1988 UN Convention.  

Haiti continues to be used by Colombian trafficking organizations as a base of operations and transshipment point for the movement of South American cocaine to the United States.  The Government of Haiti (GOH) has had little success in attacking the problem, and clearly has inadequate interdiction and enforcement capabilities.  Compared to trafficking indicators in other areas such as The Bahamas or Mexico, the current level of detected air and maritime drug-related activity in Haiti is low.  We do not have an accurate assessment, however, of the extent of cocaine transiting Haiti.  Our best estimate is that one or more multi-hundred kilogram loads pass through the country monthly.  President Aristide's ouster in the September 1991 coup d'etat halted close bilateral narcotics control cooperation in Haiti, which in turn reduced opportunities to enhance host government capabilities.

Honduras is a transit route for cocaine destined for the United States and Europe.  There is no coca or opium poppy cultivation, although crack cocaine and marijuana are produced for local consumption.  Cocaine consumption continues to increase as traffickers pay their Honduran accomplices in kind.  The Government of Honduras (GOH) has taken steps to combat drug trafficking, including the creation of a National Anti-Drug Council.  The Honduran Air Force effectively deters traffickers from  entering national air space, but the maritime and land transit of cocaine is virtually unhindered.  The GOH admits that widespread corruption is a serious impediment to its anti-drug efforts.  A 1988 US-Honduran bilateral agreement, renewed annually, governs anti-drug cooperation.  Honduras ratified the 1988 UN Convention in 1991.
Hong Kong.  Hong Kong is an important center for brokering and transshipping heroin from the Golden Triangle to the US and elsewhere.  Drug traffickers also use it to launder narcotics earnings.  Hong Kong's counternarcotics efforts represent substantial compliance with the goals and objectives of the 1988 UN Convention, although Hong Kong is not party to the Convention in view of its special legal status.

Hungary.  Drug traffickers expanded and diversified their operations through Hungary, out-pacing the government's interdiction and other drug control efforts.  Hungarian National Police officials believe that the opening of Eastern Europe increased drug smuggling throughout 1993.  Seizure reports indicate that the strife in the former Yugoslavia prompted traditional Balkan route heroin trafficking to move to parts of northern Hungary.  Drug organizations are now shipping more drugs, mostly heroin but also some cocaine, through Hungary to Western Europe.  Hungarian officials believe that drug traffickers also continue to take advantage of the banking industry to launder funds, although information is limited.

The Government of Hungary (GOH) stepped up interdiction efforts, but was hindered by shortages of trained customs and police personnel, equipment, and other resources.  Similar problems limit demand reduction programs.  Political and economic problems in the region prevented the emergence of a coordinated antidrug campaign among East European nations. Hungary has signed, but not yet ratified, the 1988 UN Convention. 

Iceland, with a population under 300,000, has a modest drug problem by international standards.  However, the continuing growth in illicit drug abuse is a matter of some concern, especially the combining of amphetamines with other drugs.  There is no legislation criminalizing money laundering, but the extremely small size of the Icelandic banking system makes it unattractive for money laundering.  Government of Iceland (GOI) officials are drafting new legislation which will serve as a deterrent.  The GOI has not become a party to the 1988 UN Convention.  However, an inter-ministerial committee continues to work on a package of implementing legislation to meet the requirements of the Convention; Iceland plans to become a party to the Convention following passage of the implementing legislation in 1994. 

India.  India is a transit route for heroin and other illegal opium derivatives from producing countries in Southeast and Southwest Asia.  It also faces the challenges of diversion of legally-produced opium, illegal poppy cultivation, and unauthorized export of essential and precursor chemicals, and of methaqualone.  The Government of India (GOI) cooperates with the USG on trafficking cases, and significantly increased its efforts to curtail cultivation diversion in 1993.  The GOI also expanded controls on acetic anhydride (AA), used to process opium into heroin.  While India recently initiated narcotics control discussions with Pakistan and Burma, it could do more in the area of international cooperation.  The GOI has raised the priority of drug control programs, but needs to take stronger measures to control drug transit and chemical diversion, and to prevent the production of opium and heroin.  India is a party to the 1988 UN Convention, and is making progress in meeting its goals and objectives.

 Indonesia is not a major narcotics processing country or a narcotics money laundering center.  Some heroin transits Indonesia to the US;  little of the domestic marijuana produced enters the US market.  Drug abuse is a small but growing problem, and the Government of Indonesia (GOI) views drug abuse and narcotics trafficking as major long-term threats to social stability.  USG-Indonesian law enforcement cooperation is good, and led to an increase in heroin seizures in 1993.  Indonesia has signed but is not yet a party to the 1988 UN Convention. 

Iran is a major transshipment point for illegal opiates from Pakistan and Afghanistan, destined principally for Europe but also for the United States.  The USG estimates that 1993 opium poppy cultivation was essentially the same as in 1992, about 3,500 hectares.  The Government of Iran (GOI) asserts it has made progress in combatting illegal narcotics.  The break in diplomatic relations in 1979 makes these claims difficult to verify.  The USG also does not have sufficient information to indicate whether Iran is meeting the objectives of the 1988 UN Convention, which the GOI ratified in 1992.

Ireland's long, infrequently patrolled coastline and the country's proximity to larger European markets make it attractive to narcotics traffickers as a transit base.  Government of Ireland (GOI) authorities seize shipments of cannabis, heroin and synthetic drugs, such as "ecstasy" and LSD.  In 1993, Irish law enforcement authorities made one of their infrequent seizures of cocaine; however, authorities believe cocaine is not widely used in Ireland.  Cannabis is the most commonly abused illicit drug, but there are also some heroin addicts in Dublin.  Ireland is neither a significant producer nor an importer of precursor and essential chemicals.  Irish officials are concerned about a possible increase in drug money laundering.  Officials believe parliament will pass a law against money laundering and ratify the 1988 UN Convention in early 1994.

Israel.  The Israeli National Police (INP) ranks drugs as its highest priority after internal security and public order.  Israel serves as a transit point for international trafficking in heroin and hashish, which are also the domestic drugs of choice.  Drug use and trafficking are illegal, and money laundering may be prosecuted in conjunction with a criminal conviction.  The INP cooperates closely with its foreign counterparts and has stationed drug-liaison officers in the US, Turkey, Holland and France.  Israel is signatory to the 1988 UN Convention, but the Knesset has not passed the necessary legislation for accession.  Both the Israeli Antidrug Authority (ADA) and INP predict the legislation, primarily concerned with money laundering, will be enacted in 1994.

Italy is a transit route for Southwest and Southeast Asian heroin destined for other parts of Europe and the United States.  The same Colombian traffickers supplying cocaine to the American market are increasing their efforts in Italy in an uneasy alliance with Italian organized crime.  Cocaine and other drug use appeared to increase in 1993, but heroin use and trafficking stabilized and even decreased in some areas.  Italian drug policy emphasizes demand reduction and treatment, but authorities also focus on law enforcement, particularly in Mafia-related activities.  In an April 1993 referendum, over half of Italians voted in favor of removing penalties for the personal use of drugs.  Italian law enforcement authorities believe this will allow them to concentrate on major traffickers rather than consumers.   Precursor and essential chemicals diversion is not a serious problem.  The Government of Italy (GOI) closely monitors such shipments.

Italian authorities believe that significant investments in the financial sector come from organized crime, including narcotics trafficking.  Italy has instituted a number of statutes to deter money laundering, including a 1993 law which increases money laundering penalties.  Italy is actively involved in several international drug control organizations including the Financial Action Task Force (FATF) and the Dublin Group, and is a major donor to the UNDCP.  Italy became a party to the 1988 UN Convention in 1990.

Jamaica plays a relatively minor role in the transshipment of cocaine from South America to the US, but it is an important producer and exporter of marijuana.  Minimal money laundering occurs, but there is no known trafficking in essential or precursor chemicals in Jamaica.  During 1993, the Government of Jamaica (GOJ) actively pursued the control of corruption, the extradition of narcotics offenders, and continued its drug-interdiction and demand-reduction efforts.  The GOJ made some but not enough progress on counternarcotics legislation; the GOJ has not yet ratified either the 1988 UN Convention or the US-Jamaica Mutual Legal Assistance Treaty.  The GOJ also fell short of its marijuana eradication goal.  

Japan is not a significant producer of narcotics.  The principal drug of abuse is methamphetamine.  Japan has ratified the 1988 UN Convention, and has enacted several laws in recent years to bring its legal system into conformity with the treaty.  Some money laundering takes place in Japan, though its scope is unclear.  Over the past two years, Tokyo has contributed over $23 million in overseas development assistance, targeted for counternarcotics programs.  The USG is not aware of any significant narcotics-related corruption.

Jordan.  The Middle East's ancient trade routes converge in modern Jordan.  Problems associated with the transshipment or consumption of illicit narcotics have been minor; however, abuse of over-the-counter drugs has resulted in the expanded regulation of pharmaceuticals.  Jordan does not produce opium, heroin, or cannabis.  The majority of trafficking has been in hashish, although heroin has been seized on rare occasions.  Jordanian authorities state that their primary concern lies in the continuing narcotics traffic from Lebanon, through Jordan and Syria, to Egypt and the Gulf states.  Cooperation with Egyptian law enforcement officials apparently remains adequate to address issues of such mutual concern.  Jordanian efforts to restrict and deter narcotics trafficking have increased despite severe budgetary and personnel constraints which circumscribe interdiction efforts.  The GOJ is committed to the rigorous enforcement of existing anti-narcotics statutes; drug seizures increased in the last quarter of 1993.  Jordan adheres to the tenets of the 1988 UN Convention, and Jordanian authorities coordinate enforcement efforts with foreign enforcement officials on international narcotics matters.

Kazakhstan.  Drug traffickers continued to exploit Kazakhstan's location, its fields of wild cannabis (particularly in the Chu Valley), and the fields of opium poppy, which were once cultivated for licit production.  Ministry of Interior (MVD) officials estimate that drug production and trafficking has increased 30 percent since 1992.  European officials believe that cannabis from this region is now exported to Europe by ethnic Greek and German  gangs.  Press reports claim that Colombian drug traffickers and Italian Mafia have been in contact with Chu Valley traffickers to purchase cannabis.  Moreover, because it is a crossroads for Central Asia and the NIS, most drugs, including opiates and hashish, from Southwest Asia are smuggled through Kazakhstan.  The Government of Kazakhstan (GOK) has drafted a new penal code which takes into account the international drug conventions, and which is expected to go to the Parliament for review.  In the interim, the GOK still relies on the USSR's Penal Code of 1961.  Effective implementation of the 1988 UN Convention, will require, inter alia, stricter controls on trafficking and production, more effective law enforcement, and the imposition of criminal penalties for narcotics possession.

Kenya acceded to the 1988 UN Convention in 1992, but has failed as yet to pass implementing legislation.  Compliance in reducing demand and combatting the drug trade has been limited by weak political will, inefficiency, corruption, lack of government resources and insufficient public awareness.  Kenya's strategic location and air connections with Asia, West Africa, southern Africa and Europe contribute to its status as a major transit point for heroin and methaqualone.

Kyrgyzstan. The drug trade is increasingly targeting Kyrgyzstan as a transshipment point for opiates going to Europe.  In 1993 alone, more than 100 kgs of opium entering the Kyrgyz republic from Tajikistan were confiscated.  Kyrgyzstan's location makes it attractive to increased transit trade as heroin and hashish traffickers seek new routes from Pakistan and Afghanistan to Russia and the West.  Kyrgyz officials also believe that opium cultivation is on the rise, although there are no reliable estimates on such cultivation.  Kyrgyzstan's licit opium cultivation, banned in 1973, once supplied more than 16 percent of the world's licit raw opium.  The GOK is also expected to pass antidrug legislation which will take into account the need to implement the UN drug conventions.  In the interim, Kyrgyzstan will rely on the USSR's Penal Code of 1961.  

Laos' estimated opium production declined 22 percent in 1993, principally as a result of adverse weather conditions.  The estimated area of cultivation, however, showed no decline.  Overall, though, opium crops have declined 50 percent and opium poppy hectarage 37 percent since the initiation of USG and UNDCP-funded rural development/opium replacement programs in 1989.  However, Laos is still the world's third largest producer of illicit opium.

Latvia.  See the Baltics.  

Lebanon.  Lebanon remains a production center for heroin, hashish, and cocaine despite recent successes in eradicating opium poppy in the Beka'a Valley.  Heroin is exported to the United States from Lebanon.  The political situation in Lebanon continues to hinder the full cooperation of the Government of Lebanon (GOL) with the United States on narcotics matters.  The Syrian occupation of the Beka'a, which began in 1976, continued in 1993, limiting the GOL's ability to take independent counternarcotics actions.  While the GOL has not become a party to the 1988 UN Convention, and has failed to meet many of its goals and objectives, the successful eradication of a major portion of Lebanon's opium poppy crop was a significant development in 1993.  The increased cooperation of the GOL and  the Syrian forces occupying the Beka'a is being credited for the successful eradication effort in 1993, a direct contrast with the international viewpoint of 1992, which held that the unusually harsh winter was largely responsible for the reduction in opium cultivation that year.  The GOL has not signed a bilateral narcotics agreement with the USG.

Lesotho is neither a major narcotics producer nor consumer country.  However, cannabis (called dagga locally) is grown as a cash crop in many areas of the country and is shipped to South Africa, and, to a lesser extent, to local markets for consumption.  There are growing indications that international narcotics traffickers are using Lesotho as a transit point for mandrax (often originating in India) and cocaine (generally from South America) shipments destined for South Africa.  Lesotho is not a party to the 1988 UN Convention.

Liberia.  Fragmented by civil war in 1989-1990 and by renewed hostilities from October 1992 through May 1993, Liberia is not a major drug producer.  Nevertheless, West African traffickers reportedly use the country to a limited extent as an alternate route for heroin and cocaine destined for the US and Western Europe.  Liberia is a party to the 1961 Convention and its protocol, but not the 1971 and 1988 Conventions.  Its counternarcotics efforts are insufficient to conform to the 1988 Convention's goals and objectives.  

Lithuania.  See the Baltics.  

Luxembourg is a transit route for small amounts of illicit drugs.  While the number of registered drug users in the country is modest, Government of Luxembourg (GOL) authorities believe drug use is growing.  Luxembourg is not a significant producer or exporter of precursor and essential chemicals.  Luxembourg is a major banking and financial center, where bank secrecy laws have fostered money laundering activities.  However, the GOL is working aggressively to control illicit money laundering.  In 1993, it toughened its money laundering law.  Law enforcement cooperation between American and Luxembourg authorities is excellent.  GOL officials belong to a number of international drug control organizations, including the Dublin Group.  Luxembourg is a party to the 1988 UN Convention. 

Malaysia is an important consumer and transit point for Golden Triangle heroin, some of which is also processed in the country from imported opium or derivatives.  Traffickers smuggle heroin base into Malaysia from Burma and Thailand and convert it to smokable heroin for local consumption; injectable heroin from Burma and Thailand transits Malaysia en route to markets in the United States, Australia and Europe.  Malaysia ratified the 1988 UN Convention in May 1993, and the Convention entered into force for Malaysia in September 1993.  Although it has not yet completely met all the objectives of the Convention, Malaysia has been drafting appropriate implementing legislation, in most cases to augment existing laws.

Malta neither produces nor consumes significant amounts of narcotics, nor is it likely to become an importer of precursor and essential chemicals.  There is no current evidence of money laundering activities, but the Maltese Parliament is reviewing new money laundering legislation to deter any such activity in the future.  Malta is not yet a party to the 1988 UN Convention.   

Mauritius.  The key narcotics-related problems affecting this island nation in the southwest Indian Ocean are heroin trafficking from India, the transshipment possibilities offered by good sea and air connections to Europe and Africa, and the potential for narcotics money-laundering presented by a thriving offshore banking industry.  The booming tourist industry and the high-turnover businesses associated with it provide ideal cover for drug-running and money-laundering activities.  The government of Mauritius is a signatory to the 1988 Vienna Convention and vigorously seeks to prosecute traffickers, but legal obstacles and loopholes, as well as inadequate resources to combat the well-financed major drug rings, continue to impede effective police action against suspected traffickers.

Mexico, a key country for US drug control policy, is a major source country for marijuana and heroin, as well as the principal transit route for cocaine entering the United States.  In 1993, Mexico completed full assumption of financial responsibility for its antidrug programs and activities.  Under Mexicanization, the Government of Mexico's (GOM) performance in areas such as aviation maintenance and cocaine seizures surpassed 1992 levels.

Former Mexican Attorney General Carpizo intensified the reform efforts of his predecessor and initiated aggressive attacks on corruption among Mexican officials.  The GOM refocused and expanded its counternarcotics efforts by establishing a National Institute for the Fight Against Drugs (INCD).  At the GOM's request--and with GOM funding--the USG provided technical advice and training to INCD personnel.  US and Mexican law enforcement agencies cooperated extensively on drug investigations, intelligence sharing, and tracing seized weapons.  This cooperation contributed to an 18 percent increase over 1992 levels in Mexico's cocaine seizures.  Despite close cooperation and progress, entrenched corruption remains the GOM's principal challenge.  The GOM also needs to improve its legal tools for combatting money laundering and controlling the trade in precursor and essential chemicals.

Moldova plays a relatively minor role in the drug trade.  Moldovan authorities believe that narcotics cultivation, production, trafficking and domestic consumption are growing, although there are few statistics on the problem.  Southwest Asian heroin is transiting Moldova en route to Western European markets, according to authorities in Chisinau.  Moldova is also becoming an important transit point for opium cultivated in the Newly Independent States (NIS).  According to Moldovan authorities, gypsies control drug smuggling in the northern region and are also involved in production of opium and psychotropic drugs. The USG has only limited information on whether Moldova is meeting the goals and objectives of the 1988 UN Convention.  However, the GOM is preparing updated penal codes which will allow it to take elements of the UN drug conventions into consideration.  

Morocco is one of the world's largest producers of cannabis, most of which is consumed in Europe and North Africa as hashish.  Latin American cocaine and Asian heroin are transshipped through Morocco en route to Europe and, to a lesser extent, North America.  The Government of Morocco (GOM) continued the enhanced enforcement and interdiction efforts initiated in late 1992 and early 1993.  However, by year's end, budgetary constraints, poor  interagency coordination, and corruption had overtaken the progress made at the start of 1993.  Morocco is a signatory to the 1988 UN Convention.  However, progress toward meeting the goals and objectives of the Convention was minimal in 1993.

Nepal.  Nepal's open border with India and its proximity to Pakistan and Burma make it an alternate transit route for illicit narcotics from the Golden Crescent and Golden Triangle to Europe, other points in Asia, and the United States, as well as a convenient escape route for drug traffickers.  USG evaluations of the arrest of Nepalese and other foreign traffickers or couriers reveal that heroin is funneled into Nepal from India, from Pakistan through India, from Burma, Thailand, and Hong Kong, and onward to Europe and the United States.  Heroin seizures in 1992 surpassed the combined total of the previous three years, and seizures in the first eight months of 1993 ran about the same.  However, there is no evidence of any significant Nepalese production of opiates.  Cooperation with the United States and other countries on enforcement, training, and legal assistance increased during the past year.  Recent ratification of the South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC) Convention on Narcotic Drugs should help enhance regional cooperation.  Nepal is a party to the 1988 UN Convention.

The Netherlands.  Dutch drug policy continues to make a distinction between "hard" drugs, such as heroin and cocaine, and "soft" drugs, particularly cannabis products.  Dutch policy is to treat drug use as a medical and health problem, with an emphasis on prevention and treatment.  Narcotics and dangerous drugs are illegal, but the use of "soft" drugs by adults is tolerated under specific conditions.  The Dutch Government strongly opposes narcotics trafficking, and works closely with other countries to combat it.  There is growing concern about the use of the Netherlands as a transit point for South American cocaine and Southwest Asian heroin destined to other European countries, and as a drug money laundering site.  The Dutch are tightening aspects of their domestic drug legislation.  Although the Parliament voted against changing the current drug policies in 1993, it did ask for stricter regulation of coffeehouses, where cannabis is openly sold to adults for personal use.

Dutch authorities are concerned about increased money laundering activities through the country's financial facilities.  The Parliament passed an addendum to the criminal code providing for the prosecution of financial officers involved in money laundering.  The GON became a party to the 1988 UN Convention in 1993.  It also ratified the 1990 Convention of Strasbourg on money laundering and confiscation.  The lower house of Parliament is to debate a US-Netherlands agreement on asset sharing in 1994.

The Netherlands Antilles and Aruba are important cocaine transshipment points for drugs trafficked from South America to the United States and Western Europe and for chemicals destined for South America.  Close political and economic ties to the Netherlands allow cocaine traffickers access to Western Europe through Dutch ports.  There has been a dramatic increase in drug-related violence on Curacao.  Both Curacao and nearby Aruba appear to serve as a meeting point for Colombian, Dutch, Surinamese, Antillean and US drug traffickers.  Money laundering organizations use the tourism and off-shore banking industries in Curacao, the Dutch half of St.  Maarten, and Aruba to transfer and deposit drug proceeds.  Inertia on the part of several Government of the Netherlands Antilles (GONA) officials has hampered progress on counterdrug initiatives in this region.  Although the GONA and the Government of Aruba (GOA) have taken steps to combat precursor chemical trafficking and to develop demand reduction programs on their respective islands, local law enforcement agencies in Curacao and other islands in the Netherlands Antilles must cooperate more effectively to interdict drugs and chemicals transiting these islands.  

There are reports of serious corruption in the law enforcement system.  The Attorneys General of the GOA and the GONA have initiated an investigation focusing on such corruption and other criminal acts, but have not prosecuted any GONA or GOA officials to date.  The GONA and GOA are working towards ratifying the 1988 UN Convention.  Their respective parliaments have not yet passed legislation which would enable the GONA and GOA to ratify it.  Since the Netherlands ratified the UN Convention in December 1993, the terms will apply to Aruba and the Netherlands Antilles, which will then need to pass implementing legislation.

New Zealand.  New Zealand is not a major narcotics producing, trafficking, or money laundering country.  Cannabis is the principal focus of Government of New Zealand (GNZ) enforcement and demand reduction activities, although LSD is also being seized in significantly larger amounts.  The National Drug Intelligence Bureau (NDIB) is the lead agency in these efforts, though its resources are limited.  A recently-enacted asset seizure law is undergoing its first test in court, while draft money laundering legislation will, when enacted, move the GNZ closer to full compliance with the 1988 UN Convention, which the GNZ has signed but not ratified.  

Nicaragua. Nicaragua is a drug transit country that is also experiencing a growing domestic consumption problem.  In 1993, the police expanded and upgraded their anti-narcotics unit, which took some actions against trafficking organizations.  The Government of Nicaragua (GON) showed little progress in 1993 in complying with the 1988 UN Convention, which it ratified in 1990.  The GON passed no new narcotics legislation, took no steps against government corruption, and did not move forward on the bilateral and regional agreements signed in previous years.  

Nigeria.  Nigerian trafficking organizations control courier networks which move large quantities of heroin from Asia to the United States and European markets, and operate sophisticated money laundering rings.  Lagos-based criminal enterprises continue to expand their operations in West Africa and throughout the continent, undermining attempts in other African nations to improve governance and accountability.  Cocaine, imported primarily from Brazil, is reexported to Europe and to a lesser degree is consumed in Nigeria and other parts of Africa.  In October 1993, the United States presented a demarche to the former Head of State on the failures of Nigeria's counternarcotics performance.  Nigeria is a party to the 1988 UN Convention, but has continually failed to achieve the Convention's goals and objectives.

Norway is not a significant producer of drugs, but authorities believe it is becoming an increasingly important transit country for European-bound narcotics from Southwest Asia.  Nigerian groups and migrant workers  participate in these transit and trafficking operations.  While drug-related deaths declined in 1993, Norwegian officials are concerned that more urban youth are using drugs, particularly cannabis.  Drug money laundering and the diversion of precursor chemicals are not problems in Norway; the Government of Norway (GON) has a system of laws and voluntary controls to prevent them from becoming a problem.  Norway is a member of several international drug control organizations, including the Dublin Group and the UNDCP.  Norway has signed, but not yet ratified, the 1988 UN Convention.

Pakistan.  Partly as a result of political turmoil in 1993, the Government of Pakistan (GOP) took few new narcotics control policy or legislative initiatives, although Prime Minister Qureshi took action on several pending issues.  Pakistan, a party to the 1988 UN Convention, did cooperate with USG agencies on various investigations, enforcement operations and extraditions.  GOP enforcement efforts reduced harvestable opium poppy acreage by nearly 25 percent.  The GOP extradited six fugitives to the US and opened extradition proceedings against seven others.  However, although the GOP initiated a number of narcotics cases, only one was against a major trafficker.  The caretaker government, which held office from July to mid-October, did prevent the election of reputed narcotics traffickers to federal legislative seats, revived anti-narcotics talks with India, and did promulgate key (though temporary) anti-narcotics ordinances.  While the GOP claims to have eliminated 13 heroin laboratories during 1993 in the Northwest Frontier Province (NWFP), these closures were negotiated rather than imposed by government authorities reluctant to provoke unrest in the region.  There is no evidence that the closure deterred the operators from opening new labs.  

Panama. Panama made progress in some counternarcotics areas during 1993, but lagged in the critical area of money-laundering control.  The September seizure in Miami of five tons of cocaine originating in The Colon Free Zone (CFZ) was clear evidence that large-scale narcotics trafficking still takes place through Panamanian territory.  Government of Panama (GOP) narcotics enforcement agencies did carry out independent operations and seizures, and the GOP showed its overall policy support for international narcotics control by ratifying the 1988 UN Convention.  GOP and private demand reduction efforts continued to be active and widely supported.  Key business and financial sectors more readily acknowledged that Panama has a money laundering problem, but the GOP did not take decisive new action to better limit opportunities for money launderers.  The law needs strengthening; the agencies with money laundering control responsibilities are ineffective, and resources are inadequate.

Paraguay remains a transit route for Andean cocaine shipped to Brazil, Argentina and Europe and possibly onward to the United States.  Marijuana is produced in significant quantities in the northeastern region of the country, but there is no evidence that it reaches the United States.  The Government of Paraguay (GOP) recognizes that the country's diverse and growing financial sector provides potential for money laundering, and both the government and opposition parties have prepared anti-money laundering legislation for the March 1994 congressional session.  President Juan Carlos Wasmosy, who took office on August 15, 1993, as Paraguay's first democratically-elected civilian president, committed his government to combat narcotrafficking.  Official corruption remains the most serious problem impeding narcotics control efforts.  Paraguay is a party to the 1988 UN Convention.

Peru.  Nearly two-thirds of the world's cocaine supply originates in coca leaf grown in Peru.  The Government of Peru (GOP) has demonstrated the political will to act against cocaine trafficking, but will not eradicate coca cultivations without creating alternative development programs for coca growers.  Peruvian criminal law conforms to UN Convention obligations, but despite successes, GOP capabilities are insufficient for comprehensive enforcement actions.  The GOP has not taken appropriate measures, in keeping with the UN Convention mandates, to eradicate illicit coca cultivations.  Despite the lack of coca eradication in coca-growing communities, a 30 percent reduction occurred in the amount of coca leaf available for drug production in 1993.  This reduction was the result of a debilitating coca fungus, as well as cultivation shifts from traditional areas with high yield coca fields to new cultivation areas where leaf yields have yet to reach mature levels.  The GOP is in the process of defining a national counternarcotics strategy that integrates enforcement measures with alternative development activities, leading to coca eradication by or with the consent of producers.  While GOP counternarcotics efforts have succeeded in arresting key traffickers and disrupting trafficking operations, many successes have been marred by corruption in the judicial system and among military and police elements in the field.  Faced with terrorism and economic problems, the GOP only began to develop an integrated counternarcotics strategy in late 1993.

Philippines.  The Philippines is a transit point for heroin and methamphetamine destined for points in East Asia, the Pacific, and the United States.  The lack of money laundering and asset forfeiture laws hinders counternarcotics law enforcement.  In 1993, the Philippines cooperated with the USG in efforts to reduce marijuana cultivation and interrupt heroin flows through the country.  In November, the US and the Philippines agreed to negotiate extradition and mutual legal assistance treaties.  The Philippines has signed the 1988 UN Convention, but has not yet ratified it.

Poland is playing an increasingly important role as a drug transit area, an amphetamine producer, and a drug consumer market.  Southeast and Southwest Asian heroin networks are expanding routes through Poland to smuggle heroin to Western Europe.  A record seizure of 517 kgs of cocaine in January 1994 pointed to South American traffickers' efforts to establish a foothold in Poland as a route to Western Europe.  Heroin smuggling routes from Russia to Poland also are emerging.  There are signs that drug abuse in Poland is increasing.  The possession of drugs for personal use is not illegal in Poland.  Polish narcotics control laws lack key enforcement provisions, complicating arrests and convictions for drug-related activities.  Limited  manpower and resources have hampered the antidrug efforts of the Government of Poland (GOP). There has been little progress towards establishing a comprehensive anti-drug strategy. The GOP has signed, but not ratified, the 1988 UN Convention.  It is a party to the 1961 Single Convention on Narcotic Drugs, but not its 1972 Protocol, and the 1971 UN Convention on Psychotropic Substances.  

Portugal is a transit country for narcotics bound for Western Europe.  The most common illicit drugs are cocaine from South America, heroin from Asia through Angola, Mozambique and Cape Verde, and hashish from Northern Africa, primarily Morocco.  The rising consumption of cocaine is a concern among Portuguese authorities.  The number of heroin addicts is rising, as are drug seizures and arrests.  The Government of Portugal (GOP) traditionally has emphasized demand reduction through education and treatment.  Portugal produces some chemicals used in the manufacture of illicit drugs.  The diversion of chemicals to drug traffickers is not considered a problem.  The GOP ratified the 1988 UN Convention in 1991.

Romania.  Drug trafficking through Romania to Western Europe is increasing.  The relaxation of border controls, and the civil war in the former Yugoslavia have prompted heroin traffickers to reroute heroin shipments northward through Romania.  Seizures and other statistics indicate that Romania is now frequently used to smuggle Southwest Asian heroin from Turkey through the Balkans into Germany.  The Romanian National Police believe that the drug industry is dominated by well-established Turkish-based trafficking organizations, but that East-European networks, Italian and Chinese organized crime groups and South American cocaine networks have also begun to establish connections in Romania.  The GOR has had little success in addressing official corruption, which is alleged to be a serious problem.  On January 23, 1993, the GOR has become a party to the 1988 UN Convention, the 1961 Convention and its 1972 Protocol, and the 1971 UN Convention.  Effective implementation of the 1988 Convention will require stricter law enforcement efforts, controls for monitoring the shipment of chemicals and financial transactions, anti-corruption initiatives, and tougher penalties for drug trafficking.  

Russia.  Russia's drug problems grew in 1993.  The economic situation, a general lack of senior level coordination over narcotics matters, and the loosening of border security have attracted drug smugglers seeking new routes from Asia to West European drug markets.  Drug seizures in the first ten months of 1993 were 50 percent above 1992's total; the number of drug-related crimes doubled and showed no sign of abating.  Authorities believe that drug abuse also is expanding at a dramatic rate, fueling a growing domestic drug market, the largest among the Newly Independent States (NIS) of the former Soviet Union.  While resource constraints place clear limits on progress, the Government of Russia (GOR) is developing a comprehensive antidrug strategy.  Russia is making modest gains in bolstering its law enforcement efforts, and is drafting new drug control legislation.  Russia is a party to the 1988 UN Convention, the 1961 Single  Convention on Narcotic Drugs (but not its 1972 Protocol), and the 1971 UN Convention, and is taking steps to meet the goals and objectives of the 1988 UN Convention.  Moscow is promoting implementation of the 1988 UN Convention by the other NIS.

St. Kitts and Nevis.  See Eastern Caribbean. 

St. Lucia.  See Eastern Caribbean. 

St. Vincent and the Grenadines.  See Eastern Caribbean. 

 Saudi Arabia is used as a transit country, primarily for heroin moving from Pakistan and Southeast Asia to Nigeria and elsewhere in Africa, and onward to Europe and the United States.  Saudi Arabia is continues to be involved in international drug trafficking; frequently, traffickers use pilgrimage visas to mask travel from and through narcotics source countries.  Saudi Arabia instituted a death penalty for convicted narcotics traffickers in 1988.  Twenty-five Pakistanis had been executed as of November 26, 1993.  Others executed for drug trafficking last year were nationals of Saudi Arabia, Nigeria, Afghanistan, Iraq, Jordan and Yemen.  Saudi Arabia acceded to the 1988 UN Convention in January 1992 and has been revising its laws to bring them into conformity.  In light of its vigorous drug law enforcement activities, the country has made  progress in meeting the Convention's goals.

Senegal.  Good air and sea connections to Europe and North America continue to make Senegal an important transit point for narcotics.  The termination of direct commercial flights between Lagos and New York in 1993 enhanced Dakar's importance as a transit route for Nigerian narcotics trafficking to the United States.  Most drug-related arrests take place at Dakar-Yoff International Airport.  Drug abuse among local youth is increasing; according to the DEA, heroin and cocaine abuse is burgeoning in Dakar.  Senegal is a party to the 1988 UN Convention; however, it needs to do more to meet the goals and objectives of the Convention.

Singapore.  Singapore does not produce or process narcotics, but international traffickers use Singapore as a storage and transit point.  The government effectively directs its enforcement resources, mainly against domestic drug traffic and abuse.  The authorities have increased efforts to intercept traffickers transiting Singapore, and are sharing intelligence with other countries in the region. The government also stepped up its attention to addict rehabilitation.  Singapore hosted the April, 1993, Financial Action Task force (FATF) meetings, and introduced legislation that could lead to sharing financial information about money launderers.  Singapore has not acceded to the 1988 UN Convention. 

Slovakia.  While there appears to be less drug trafficking through the Slovak Republic (Slovakia) than its neighbors, Slovak authorities believe that drug traffickers are using the country to smuggle Southwest Asian heroin to Western Europe markets.  Trafficking groups which once targetted the former Czech and Slovak Federal Republic (CSFR) appear poised to expand domestic Slovak drug markets and recruit couriers.  The USG, however, has little information on the actual extent of the Slovak drug situation.  West European authorities report seizures of amphetamines that they believe originated in the Slovak Republic.  The Slovak Republic has inherited all treaty and other international obligations of the former CSFR, including the 1988 UN Convention.

Spain is a major transit country for South American cocaine entering Europe.  The USG estimates that approximately 75 percent of the cocaine destined for Europe transits Spain.  Cocaine and heroin seizures were up for the first 10 months of 1993.  Heroin remains the primary drug of abuse in Spain, but cocaine use is growing, along with public concern about illicit drugs.  Spanish authorities are also concerned about an increase in the availability and consumption of the designer drug "ecstasy."  The Government of Spain (GOS) has traditionally emphasized demand reduction  and rehabilitation rather than law enforcement and criminal prosecution.  Spanish law does not penalize personal possession or use of small amounts of drugs.  The Spanish Parliament passed new money laundering legislation in December 1993.  Spain ratified the 1988 UN Convention in 1990.

Sri Lanka.  The Government of Sri Lanka (GSL) has ratified the 1988 UN Convention and is approving legislation to implement all aspects of it.  Sri Lanka has a modest but growing drug problem, aggravated by the 10-year war with insurgents in the north and east of the country.  Cannabis is grown and consumed domestically.  The GSL's greatest concern, however, is the increasing amount of heroin entering Sri Lanka both for transshipment and for domestic consumption.  The GSL took several steps in 1993 to curb the problem.  With the assistance of the UNDCP, the government drafted an anti-narcotics strategy to coordinate enforcement, demand reduction, treatment and rehabilitation efforts.  The Police Narcotics Bureau (PNB) has established an international drug information monitoring office, through which the narcotics enforcement agencies of the region share interdiction data.  

Sudan is neither a major producer nor consumer of illicit drugs, but it is involved in drug transshipment.  Sudan's strategic location at the crossroads of Africa, Asia, the Middle East, and Europe makes it an attractive target for traffickers.  The principal drug grown in Sudan is cannabis.  However, Sudan also has a problem with heroin, which reaches the country from the Far East and is used primarily by wealthy Sudanese and expatriates.  Sudan is also a transit point for heroin shipments destined for other countries.  There is also evidence of cocaine and synthetic drug abuse, mostly barbiturates, among the Sudanese.  The GOS signed the 1988 UN Convention in 1993. 

Suriname is a transshipment point for cocaine from South America to Europe, primarily to the Netherlands, and for precursor chemicals destined for South American processing facilities.  Few narcotics are trafficked from Suriname to the United States.  Narcotics-related corruption hampers the Government of Suriname's (GOS) ability to move against those suspected of drug trafficking, although authorities are taking steps to indict those against whom there are substantiated charges.  In 1992, the GOS ratified the 1988 UN Convention, but it has a long way to go in meeting the Convention's goals and objectives.  The GOS is slowly continuing its efforts to strengthen narcotics laws, increase law enforcement capabilities, and foster cooperation with other governments against narcotics trafficking.

Sweden is not a significant drug producer or transit country for US-bound drugs, or a money laundering center; however, Swedish authorities are concerned about increasing amounts of heroin brought to Sweden through Russia and the Baltics.  Amphetamines and cannabis/hashish are the primary drugs abused, although heroin and cocaine are available.  Swedish officials believe new drug use by young Swedes may have stabilized.  The Government of Sweden (GOS) emphasizes drug abuse prevention, and subsidizes private initiatives to distribute information on the dangers of alcohol, narcotics, and tobacco use.  Sweden has a number of laws to deter both chemical diversion and money laundering.  Sweden is active in a variety of international anti-drug fora, including the UNDCP and the Dublin Group.  Cooperation with USG law enforcement agencies continues to be excellent.  Sweden ratified the 1988 UN Convention in 1991.

Switzerland does not produce illicit narcotics, but authorities acknowledge an abundant supply exists in the country.  Most of the drug trade is controlled by non-Swiss traffickers.  While drug abuse continues to be a problem in some major cities, the number of drug-related deaths declined for the first time in 1993.  Switzerland produces some precursor and essential chemicals, but diversion is not considered a problem.  As a major international financial center, Switzerland has been used by traffickers for money laundering.  The Government of Switzerland (GOS) has anti0money laundering laws and has implemented a number of enforcement measures.  Cantonal governments have autonomy on various aspects of narcotics policy, within Switzerland's Federal structure, and, in general, French-speaking cantons take a tougher line against addicts than do officials in German-speaking cantons.  Switzerland has signed, but is not a party to, the 1988 UN Convention, primarily because of a lack of national consensus on punishing narcotics users.

Syria is a transit point in a regional narcotics trafficking network for heroin and hashish.  Syrian military presence in Lebanon makes Syria at least partly accountable, with Lebanon, for the cultivation and processing of Lebanese heroin, hashish, and cocaine destined for Europe, the Gulf and the United States.  There continue to be reports of some Syrian military officials assisting in and profiting from the drug trade, although this is not Syrian government policy.

In 1993, Syria cooperated with the Lebanese to eradicate most of the opium poppy cultivation in the Beka'a Valley.  Syrian and Lebanese officials claim that their forces destroyed most of the marijuana crop, although US estimates indicated there was a slight increase in the amount of marijuana produced in 1993.  Syrian also instituted a tough domestic anti-narcotics law in June 1993, including provisions for the seizure of assets obtained through trafficking.  The Syrians did not significantly reduce trafficking through Syria in 1993, although they believe the 1993 law has begun to dissuade some traffickers.  Despite the Syrian's assertion that it remains ready to investigate reports of cocaine and heroin processing laboratories in the Beka'a, it has launched only sporadic, ineffectual efforts against the laboratories.  The Syrian government also failed to investigate, arrest, or prosecute Syrian officials reported to be engaged in narcotics trafficking.  Syria met some but not all of the goals and objectives of the 1988 UN Convention.  

Taiwan is a market and transshipment point for Southeast Asian heroin, a safe haven for drug fugitives, and increasingly plays a role in money laundering.  Taiwan also produces illicit amphetamines.  Authorities are increasingly involved in combating the rapidly growing drug abuse problem.  Taiwan's drug laws are being strengthened.  Taiwanese authorities are working with the international community to investigate and prosecute traffickers.  The National Police Administration's Criminal Investigative bureau (CIB) cooperated with DEA in a controlled delivery operation which resulted in prosecutions.  Taiwan is pursuing greater international cooperation in dealing with drug issues, but there have been only limited efforts to implement key provisions of the 1988 UN Convention, such as the control of precursor chemicals, and increased investigation of money laundering operations.  

Tajikistan's uncontrolled frontier areas, and the conflict in northeast Afghanistan suggest Tajikistan may emerge as a preferred conduit for opium trafficking.  Drug traffickers are already exploiting Tajikistan to smuggle opiates from Afghanistan, Pakistan, and possibly Iran and India to other NIS states and to a lesser extent, Western Europe.  Political upheaval, open borders, and a rise in Afghan opium production across the border have left Tajikistan vulnerable to the drug trade.  Government of Tajikistan (GOTI) authorities indicate that 60 percent of the opium from Afghanistan's Badakhshan province is smuggled through Tajikistan and into Kyrgyzstan.  Until new antidrug legislation is passed to implement the provisions of the international drug conventions, Tajikistan will continue to rely on the USSR's Penal Code of 1961.  

Thailand is still the primary conduit for heroin from the Golden Triangle sold in the US, but is no longer a primary producer of opiates for the international market.  In 1993 Thailand increased its resources devoted to narcotics interdiction, public education, and drug treatment.  It sought regional cooperation with Laos and Burma, worked well with Malaysia, and cooperated actively with US law enforcement agencies.  Some police counternarcotics functions have improved through a recent reorganization.  The US and Thailand have an extradition treaty, although extradition of Thai nationals is discretionary.  The US and Thailand exchanged instruments of ratification of a Mutual Legal Assistance Treaty in 1993.

Togo is a transit point for narcotics bound for Europe and the United States.  Togo's proximity to Nigeria makes it attractive to Nigerian trafficking organizations moving heroin, cocaine, and marijuana.  If civil unrest continues, Togo's role as a transit country could grow.  The Togolese drug unit, officially named the Department Police Judiciaire (DPJ), attempts to interdict narcotics shipments entering or transiting Togo.  No senior officials have been implicated in illicit drug production or money laundering.  Togo continues to cooperate with international law enforcement and drug interdiction efforts.  It is a signatory to the 1988 UN Convention, and appears to be meeting its goals and objectives.  Though Togo apparently has not revised its narcotics legislation after signing the UN Convention in 1990, preexisting laws provide stiff penalties for the trafficking or use of narcotics.  

Trinidad and Tobago is a transshipment point for drugs from South America to Europe and North America, as well as a producer of marijuana.  It is not highly significant from a money-laundering perspective.  The Government of Trinidad and Tobago (GOTT)'s Office of Strategic Services (OSS) coordinates counternarcotics efforts under the aegis of the Ministry of National Security.  Coordination is lacking, however, and neither the Police Service nor the Coast Guard has had much success in interdiction efforts.  Drug-related corruption is a continuing problem.  In 1993, the GOTT began the process of adopting implementing legislation for the 1988 UN Convention, which the GOTT signed in December 1989 but has not yet ratified.  

Tunisia has a minor problem with domestic demand for narcotics.  While the use of such drugs as heroin and cocaine is virtually non-existent, cannabis and hashish are consumed in rural areas.  Tunisia's use as a transshipment point is limited.  Some hashish does flow from Morocco through Tunisia to Libya and Europe.  There are also small quantities of hard drugs transiting Tunisia to Libya and Europe.  Tunisia has ratified the 1988 UN Convention.

Turkey, as a natural land bridge for Southwest Asian heroin destined for Europe and America, faces a rising tide of narcotics trafficking.  It is a telling sign of Turkey's importance in the trafficking trade that almost three-quarters of all drug seizures and arrests in Europe involve Turkish traffickers and narcotics coming through Turkey.  Keenly aware of its role as a narcotics gateway to Europe, the Turkish government is working aggressively to stop the drug trade.  Cooperation with the United States is particularly close.  In a noteworthy case of cooperation with the DEA, Turkish authorities seized 2.75 metric tons of morphine base and 13.5 metric tons of hashish aboard a Turkish merchant ship, the Lucky S, in January 1993.  US assistance focuses on enhancing Turkey's investigation and interdiction efforts with training and equipment.  More broadly, the US continues to urge Turkey to ratify the 1988 UN Convention, and to enact accompanying laws on money-laundering, asset seizure, and controlled transfer.

Turkmenistan.  Traditional cultivation and use of opium poppy, and open borders make Turkmenistan increasingly vulnerable to the drug industry.  Turkmenistan appears to have a sizable domestic opium addict population.  Some domestic processing and use of heroin may also occur.  Marijuana use is prevalent.  Opportunities for drug smuggling are expanding with the breakup of the Soviet Union and the opening of borders with Iran and Afghanistan; recent improvements in international transportation connections are increasing possibilities for drug trafficking.  Drug enforcement and rehabilitation programs to date have been minimal.  Efforts begun in 1992 by the Ministry of Health to formulate a national drug policy foundered in 1993.  To the extent possible, police forces under the Ministry of Internal Affairs (MVD) continue to enforce Soviet-era laws against opium poppy cultivation, and drug possession and use.  Turkmenistan has made no effort as yet to become a party to the any of the drug-related UN conventions in its own right. It has entered into no bilateral agreements with the US on drug-related issues.  Currently the GOTX relies on the USSR's Penal Code of 1961.  

Ukraine.  Drug traffickers appear to be stepping up efforts to target the Ukraine as a transit area and as a producer of illicit opium poppy straw, and possibly for the laundering of drug profits.  Government officials indicate that the severity of the drug problem is further demonstrated by a 33 percent increase in drug seizures in 1993.  Moreover, although official estimates of the numbers of consumers are low, Ukrainian authorities believe drug abuse is emerging as a serious problem.  According to DEA, some licit opium poppy cultivation occurs in the Ukraine, but the Government of Ukraine (GOU) has been working to reduce amounts of licit poppy produced.  Ukrainian security services continue to expand their counternarcotics capacities even as they seek additional advice and training from abroad.  

Ukraine is a party to the UN drug conventions, including the 1988 UN Convention.  Efforts are underway to change domestic legislation in order to implement the 1988 UN Convention.  Possession of small quantities of drugs for personal use is legal in Ukraine and the GOU will need to change this, and take additional counternarcotics actions, in order to meet fully the goals and objectives of the 1988 UN Convention.  

 United Kingdom.  The UK is mainly a consumer country for illicit drugs.  Since drug sales elicit higher market prices in the UK than in the US, the UK continues to attract cocaine and heroin traffickers.  British officials consider heroin their principal drug use problem, but they are also concerned about growing cocaine use.  Her Majesty's Government (HMG) follows a two-pronged strategy: to reduce the supply of drugs through improved international cooperation, and to reduce narcotics consumption through better drug abuse education programs and more effective rehabilitation and treatment programs.  In 1993, HMG introduced a tougher crime bill in response to an increase in drug-related crime levels, and strengthened UK money laundering laws to deter drug-related money laundering.  By the time HMG ratified the 1988 UN Convention in 1991, it had already passed legislation to implement the Convention's goals and objectives. 

United Kingdom Dependent Territories in the Caribbean.  Anguilla, the British Virgin Islands, Cayman Islands, Montserrat, and Turks and Caicos Islands comprise the Caribbean Dependent Territories of the United Kingdom (UK).  In 1993 the USG provided them some counternarcotics assistance, including law enforcement training.  Cooperation is provided for in numerous international agreements, including the US-UK MLAT concerning the Cayman Islands, the US-UK Customs Mutual Assistance Agreement, and the Caribbean Zone Customs Mutual Assistance Agreement.  There is no significant drug production on these islands, but, situated en route from the drug-producing countries of South America to the markets of the US and Europe, they are convenient way-stations for traffickers.  The Caribbean Dependent Territories, especially the Cayman Islands with its immense offshore banking sector and strict bank secrecy laws, are also tempting for drug-related financial dealings .

The governments of the territories are firmly opposed to narcotics-related corruption.  The USG is not aware of any corruption among senior police and customs officials.  In June 1993, the UK extended the 1971 UN Drug Convention to all the Caribbean Dependent Territories.  The UK ratified the 1988 UN Convention in 1991, and has almost completed work with the territories on legislation to enable them to comply fully with the requirements of the Convention.  The UK hopes to extend the 1988 Convention to the Caribbean territories by mid-1994.  The US/UK Mutual Legal Assistance Treaty (MLAT) concerning the Cayman Islands has been extended to the other territories.  Extradition relations between the Caribbean territories and the US are governed by the 1972 US-UK extradition treaty.  

Uruguay is an important financial center within the Southern Cone.  Economic stability, unrestricted currency exchange and strict bank secrecy laws also create the potential for large scale money laundering, although USG law enforcement agencies so far have uncovered only a few cases.  Previous investigations and trials conducted with Uruguayan authorities indicate that Colombian drug trafficking cartels have laundered money in Uruguay in the past.  DEA has also been found evidence of cocaine trafficking.  The country's location also makes it a useful transit point for drugs transported to markets in the US and Europe.  The Government of Uruguay (GOU) has cooperated with the USG on a number of narcotics investigations and control programs.  Uruguay has signed but has not ratified the 1988 UN Convention.

Uzbekistan's location in Central Asia and the relatively modern transportation system through Tashkent make it an increasingly attractive brokering center for drug operations.  Expanded smuggling activity and opium cultivation underscore Uzbekistan's attractiveness.  As evidenced by a record seizure of over 14 tons of Afghan hashish destined for the Netherlands in February of 1993 and another of 13 tons in 1992, Uzbekistan is already emerging as a central conduit for moving drugs to Russia and the West.  These operations, increased smuggling by air and increased indications that drug sales are funding armed groups in Afghanistan and Tajikistan, have heightened Government of Uzbekistan (GOU) concern.  GOU officials note that drug-related crime is rising steadily.  They also fear that the economic disruption following the collapse of the Soviet Union and its ruble, and the recent sudden introduction of a national currency will lure Uzbekistanis into the drug trade.  The GOU is still in the process of formulating a national drug strategy.  A new draft penal code, which will take into account the provisions of the international drug conventions is under review by the GOU.  In the interim, the GOU relies on the USSR's Penal Code of 1961.  

Venezuela is a transit country for narcotics moving from Colombia to the US and Europe, as well as for chemicals diverted to Colombia for use in cocaine processing.  It is also a financial center for money laundering.  Although Venezuela is not a source country for narcotics, there is some cultivation of marijuana and coca near the Colombian border.  Colombian traffickers and insurgent groups increasingly penetrate Venezuela's porous border.  In 1993, the  Government of Venezuela (GOV) enacted a narcotics law which made drug-laundering a crime in Venezuela, but does not effectively address other forms of money laundering.  Although the Guardia Nacional (GN) and the Technical Judicial Police (PTJ) scored several notable successes in 1993 against narcotics traffickers and money launderers, there were fewer drug seizures than in 1992.  Changes in the leadership of the GN led to revived cooperation with USG law enforcement agencies.

Corruption poses a threat to Venezuela's democratic institutions, and remains a significant problem impeding effective counternarcotics programs.  The removal from office of President Carlos Andres Perez for embezzlement in May 1993 shook public confidence in the GOV.  In the December 1993 general elections, voters elected Rafael Caldera president.  The degree to which the Caldera administration focuses on the drug issue will affect USG counternarcotics programs in Venezuela.  The GOV ratified the 1988 UN Convention, with reservations on extradition, in 1990.  

Vietnam.  Vietnamese officials have publicly stated that their country faces a drug addiction problem, and that opium cultivation and use are growing.  While most narcotics produced are probably consumed domestically, outside observers also believe that Vietnam is being used as a transit country for Golden Triangle opiates destined for Western markets.  Increasing international travel and trade to and with Vietnam will increase the potential for narcotics trafficking.  The SRV is preparing to adopt a UNDCP-prepared counternarcotics master plan.  It is also in the process of acceding to the three international narcotics conventions of 1961, 1971 and 1988, but seeks to resolve certain technical and financial questions before doing so.

Zambia.  Cannabis is the only drug cultivated in Zambia.  However, Zambia continues to be a transit point for illicit narcotics shipments, principally Mandrax (methaqualone), from the Asian subcontinent to South Africa.  The transshipment and trafficking of Southwest Asian heroin and South American cocaine are of growing concern to Zambian narcotics officials.  With direct and indirect air routes crossing to and from South America, Asia, and Europe, Zambia is strategically situated along established and developing narcotics trafficking routes.  West African heroin traffickers use Zambian documentation and couriers to ferry drugs to Europe and North America.  Money laundering by regional traffickers, made easier by economic liberalization, is a growing problem.  Narcotics-related corruption is a growing problem within the Customs and Immigration services, and the police force.  During 1993 there were persistent, credible reports of drug trafficking by high-level government officials.  Following strong intervention by the donor community, which raised the possibility of Zambia's becoming a major drug hub in the region, Zambian officials began to take steps to deal with the problem.  A strengthened narcotics law entered into force on November 1, 1993.  The new law provides for harsher penalties and streamlines asset forfeiture procedures.  Zambia ratified the 1988 UN Convention in 1993.

Zimbabwe.  Although Zimbabwe is not a producer of illicit drugs for export, excellent international airline connections have made Harare International Airport a very attractive transshipment point for drugs bound for Europe, South Africa and other destinations.  One of the drugs most often seized is methaqualone (Mandrax) bound for South Africa.  Police believe that most drug trafficking through Zimbabwe is controlled by Nigerians, many of whom travel with doctored or fraudulently obtained Zimbabwean passports.  Strict currency laws effectively discourage money-laundering activities.  Zimbabwe is not a signatory to the 1988 UN Convention.


[Chart:  FY-1993-1995 International Narcotics Control Program Fiscal Summary]

[Chart:  FY 1993-1995 International Narcotics Control Program by Functional Activity]


The Department of State's International Narcotics Control Strategy Report (INCSR) has been prepared in accordance with 489 of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, as amended (22 U.S.C. 2291).

The 1993 INCSR is the eighth annual report prepared pursuant to the FAA.  In addition to addressing the reporting requirements of FAA 489, the INCSR provides the factual basis for the Presidential narcotics certification determinations for major drug producing and/or drug-transit countries required under FAA 490.  FAA 490.requires that fifty percent of certain kinds of assistance be withheld at the start of each fiscal year from such countries, pending the April 1 certification.  If a country is not certified, most foreign assistance is cut off and the United States is required to vote against multilateral development bank lending to that country.

Among other things, the statute asks, with respect to each country which received INM assistance in the past two fiscal years, for a report on the extent to which the country has "met the goals and objectives of the United Nations Convention Against Illicit Traffic in Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances."  FAA 489(a)(1)(A).  Similarly, the President's certification determination depends in part on whether a country during the previous year has cooperated fully with the United States, or has taken adequate steps on its own, to achieve full compliance with the goals and objectives established by the 1988 Convention.  FAA 490(b)(1)(A).  

Although the Convention does not contain a list of goals and objectives, it does set forth a number of obligations which the parties agree to undertake.  Generally speaking, it requires the parties to take legal measures to outlaw and punish all forms of illicit drug production, trafficking, and drug money laundering, to control chemicals which can used to process illicit drugs, and to cooperate in international efforts to these ends.  The statute lists action by foreign countries on the following issues as relevant to this evaluating performance under the 1988 Convention:  illicit cultivation, production, distribution, sale, transport, and financing, and money laundering, asset seizure, extradition, mutual legal assistance, law enforcement and transit cooperation, precursor chemical control, and demand reduction.

In attempting to evaluate whether countries are meeting the goals and objectives of the Convention, the Department has used the best information it has available.  The 1994 INCSR covers countries which range from major drug producing and drug-transit countries, where drug control  is a critical element of national policy, to mini-states, where drug issues and/or the capacity to deal with them are minimal.  The reports vary in the extent of their coverage.  For key drug-control countries, where considerable information is available, we have provided comprehensive reports.  For many of the smaller countries where only sketchy information is available, we have included whatever data the responsible post could provide.
The country chapters report upon actions, including plans, programs, and where applicable, timetables towards fulfillment of Convention obligations.  Because the Convention's subject matter is so broad, and availability of information on elements related to performance under the Convention varies widely within and between countries, the Department's views on the extent to which a given country is meeting the goals and objectives of the Convention is based on the overall response of the country to those goals and objectives.  

Some countries are not yet parties to the Convention.  For such countries, we have nonetheless considered actions taken by those countries in areas covered by the Convention, and plans (if any) for becoming parties and for bringing their legislation into conformity with the Convention's requirements.  For some of the very smallest countries, the Department has insufficient information to make a judgment as to whether the goals and objectives of the Convention are being met.  In those instances, available information on counternarcotics activities has been provided.  

Except as noted in the relevant country chapters, INM considers all countries with which the USG has bilateral narcotics agreements to be meeting the goals and objectives of those agreements.

As in the past, this year's INCSR provides the factual basis for the President's 1993 certification determinations.  It contains information in accordance with 489 of the FAA and the following legislative requirements:

     --    Public Law 99-570 [Anti-drug Abuse Act of 1986]:  2015 (b)(3) (country chapters); 

     --    Public Law 100-690 [Anti-drug Abuse Act of 1988]:  4309 (Laos country chapter);  

Statement on Certification 

FAA 490(b)(2) of the FAA requires that,in making the determination for full certification, the President consider the extent to which the country has: 

     met the goals and objectives of the United Nations Convention Against Illicit Traffic in Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances including action on such issues as illicit cultivation, production, distribution, sale, transport and financing, and money laundering, asset seizure, extradition, mutual legal assistance, law enforcement and transit cooperation, precursor chemical control, and demand reduction;

     accomplished the goals described in an applicable bilateral narcotics agreement with the United States, or a multilateral agreement; and

     taken legal and law enforcement measures to prevent and punish public corruption especially by senior government officials- that facilitates the production, processing , or shipment of narcotic and psychotropic drugs and other controlled substances, or that discourages the investigation or prosecution or such acts.

The statute provides, alternatively, that a country that cannot be certified under the foregoing standard may be certified on the grounds that "vital national interests of the United States require" that assistance be provided and that the United States not vote against multilateral development bank lending to that country.  FAA. 490(b)(1)(B)

Major Drug Producing, Drug Transit, Significant Source, Precursor Chemical and Money Laundering Countries.

Section 489(a)(3) requires the USG to identify:  (1) the major illicit drug producing and major drug-transit countries, (2) the significant direct or indirect sources of narcotics and psychotropic drugs and other controlled substances significantly affecting the United States, (3) major sources of precursor chemicals used in the production of illicit narcotics; and (4) major money laundering countries.  These countries are identified below.

Major drug producing and drug-transit countries:

A major drug producing country is one that cultivates 1,000 hectares or more of illicit opium poppy, 1,000 hectares or more of illicit coca, or which cultivates 5,000 hectares or more of illicit cannabis significantly affecting the United States.  

A major drug-transit country is one (A) that is a significant direct source of illicit narcotic or psychotropic drugs or other controlled substances significantly affecting the United States;  or (B) through which are transported such drugs or substances.  
The following are major drug producing and/or drug-transit countries
Afghanistan, Bahamas, Belize, Bolivia, Brazil, Burma, China, Colombia, Ecuador, Guatemala, Hong Kong, India, Iran, Jamaica, Laos, Lebanon, Malaysia, Mexico, Nigeria, Pakistan, Panama, Paraguay, Peru, Syria, Thailand, and Venezuela.  These countries are identical to those which are significant direct or indirect sources of narcotics and psychotropic drugs and other controlled substances significantly affecting the United States

Major Precursor Chemical Source Countries: 

The following countries are major sources of precursor or essential chemicals used in the production of illicit narcotics:  Argentina, Brazil, China, Germany, India, Mexico, and the Netherlands. 

Major Money Laundering Countries:

A major money laundering country is one whose financial institutions engage in currency transactions involving significant amounts of proceeds from international narcotics trafficking.  The following countries fall into this category:  Aruba, Bahamas, Brazil, Burma, Canada, Cayman Islds, Colombia, Ecuador, Germany, Hong Kong, India, Italy, Japan, Liechtenstein, Luxembourg, Mexico, Netherlands, Nigeria, Pakistan, Panama, Paraguay, Russia, Singapore, Spain, Switzerland, Thailand, Turkey, United Arab Emirates, United Kingdom, Uruguay, United States, and Venezuela. 



International anti-narcotics training is managed and funded by INM, and carried out by DEA, the U.S. Customs Service, and the U.S. Coast Guard.  Major objectives are:  contributing to the basic infrastructure for carrying out counternarcotics law enforcement activities in countries which cooperate with the USG; improving technical skills of drug law enforcement personnel in these countries; and increasing cooperation between U.S. and foreign law enforcement officials.

More than 4,500 persons participated in the U.S. Government's international narcotics control training program in FY 1993, about the same number as in FY 1992.  This figure mirrors the funding level for law enforcement training, which was approximately $6.5 million in both years.  

The current emphasis for INM's law enforcement training is to promote the creation of strong, capable institutions overseas which cooperating nations can utilize for achieving their anti-narcotics missions.  Training is recognized as a key element in translating the political will to deal with the narcotics problem into concrete results, such as successful interdiction campaigns, investigations, or the development of local training infrastructure.

INM's training policy is to give greater emphasis to programs dealing with more advanced topics, such as executive and management development, asset forfeiture and financial investigations, use of special enforcement teams, counternarcotics security measures, chemical controls, and instructional techniques.  Basic instruction programs are provided only in countries which have limited experience with anti-narcotics activities.  Institution-building activities are reflected in the program developments during 1993:

      -- DEA created a new one-week course designed to bring together top career drug law enforcement officials in different geographic regions, to discuss the latest trends in management of drug enforcement programs.  DEA has also undertaken several projects for providing intensive developmental assistance to national drug enforcement units, most notably in Mexico, where program costs are being underwritten entirely by the GOM.

      -- U.S. Customs developed and initiated a course on internal controls and anti-corruption issues.  This Customs training is heavily oriented toward fostering the development of local institutions.

      -- The U.S. Coast Guard broadened its assistance on port security concerns, and scheduled a number of programs dealing with instructional techniques and management of interdiction programs.

In the future, U.S.-funded training will continue to support host governments' ability to eliminate drug production and trafficking, particularly in production and transit areas for drugs reaching the U.S.  INM and the training agencies are collaborating with other major donors in producing a training calendar, published several times a year by the United Nations International Drug Control Program.  This calendar helps to prevent duplication of programs, and to ensure the most efficient use of scarce training resources.

Law enforcement training will give particular attention to the emerging problem of heroin trafficking and abuse.  Programming has already taken place with countries in opium production and transit areas where USG access has improved recently (e.g., Cambodia and Central Asia), and efforts will continue to increase the range of programs which target the heroin problem.  Another area of focus will be in the countries of the former Soviet Union.  During the last two fiscal years, a limited amount of such counternarcotics law enforcement training has been made available, but the region still has pressing needs for assistance which have not been met.

     * * * 
                              TRAINING STATISTICS

                                                Number of       Number of
                                                Participants    Programs 

Drug Enforcement Administration 

Training in U.S.:
     Executive Observation Programs                    28     4
     International Visitors Program                   658     154
     Forensic Chemist Seminar                          18     1
     Int'l Narcotics Mgt. Seminar                      33     1

Training in Host Countries:
     Basic Drug Enforcement Schools                   821     15
     Advanced Enforcement Schools                     189      5
     Other                                            572     16

Subtotal:                                           2,319     196

U.S. Customs Service

Training in U.S.:
     Executive Observation Programs                     3     2
     International Visitor Program                    335     146
     Mid-Management Seminar                            16     1

Training in Host Countries:
     Overseas Enforcement Training                    519     18
     Contraband Enforcement Team                       90     4
     Train-the-Trainer Workshop                        50     4
     Money Laundering                                 185     4
     Carrier Initiative Training                      440     18

Subtotal                                            1,638     197

U.S. Coast Guard    

     Maritime Law Enforcement                         535     15

Other INM-Sponsored Training

     Narcotic Detector Dog Training                    36     5

TOTAL INM TRAINING FY 93                            4,528     413


Section 489 (b)(2)(B) requires the INCSR submission to include a report specifying the assistance provided by the United States to support international narcotics control efforts.  In addition to the budget for INM, which is provided in the Executive Summary, the report is also to include information on assistance provided or to be provided by the Drug Enforcement Administration, the U.S. Customs Service, and the U.S. Coast Guard to various countries, and information on any assistance provided or to be provided by such governments to those agencies.  This information has been prepared by the three agencies and is provided in this section.


Assistance provided by DEA to various countries falls into six categories, while assistance received generally takes two forms:

Assistance Provided

DEA representatives helped identify training needs for foreign drug enforcement officials.  Training was provided by the DEA International Training Section to 2,383 foreign nationals from 45 countries in schools and seminars in Basic and Advanced Drug Enforcement Schools, Clandestine Laboratory Seminars, Intelligence and Analytical Methods Schools, Financial Investigative Methods Schools, and Judicial Seminars.  This training included both the instruction of foreign nationals within the US and overseas in 27 countries.  Since the inception of the DEA International Training Program in 1969, DEA has trained a total of 35,038 foreign officers and officials. 

DEA representatives

     -- helped identify the needs of drug control agencies for technical equipment and assistance necessary for the development of the needed drug control capability;

     -- assisted in developing sources of information;

     -- provided to the extent possible appropriate information which enabled host government officials to carry out investigations of or operations against international illicit drug traffickers;

     -- participated with host country officials in pursuing investigative leads; and

     -- collected, analyzed and provided drug intelligence to host country narcotics enforcement officials in order to integrate the data with enforcement activities in the host country and the United States.


The Drug Suppression Section's (OFS) mission is to assist host nation constabulary police counterparts in planning and executing law enforcement operations against the production and transportation vulnerabilities of the Targeted Kingpin Organizations (TKO) and their supporting organizations.  A second, but equally important mission is to build the host nation police capabilities to conduct these operations more effectively and safely.  OFS manages programs in countries throughout Latin America and the Caribbean.

In the source countries of Bolivia and Peru, Operation Snowcap has been ongoing since 1987.  In Peru, which accounts for 60 percent of cocaine base production worldwide, a 12-man Snowcap Team has been assisting a 160-man host nation (HN) police unit in the planning and execution of operations from a base camp in the center of cocaine production.  Due to these joint operations, traffickers have been disrupted and displaced to other parts of Peru.  In response, OFS is implementing a new "Mobile Basing Plan" with the Department of State which will provide HN counterparts with greater mobility and flexibility to sustain operations in various parts of Peru.

In Bolivia, a 16-man Snowcap Team, supplemented by US Border Patrol Agents, assist Bolivian constabulary police in airmobile, ground and waterway operations against the production and transportation activities in the Chapare and Beni regions.  Operating from two base camps, Chimore and Trinidad, the Teams advise and assist their counterparts in the planning and execution of police operations.

A recent development has been the introduction of a four-man OFS Team into Colombia to assist the Bogota Country Office and Colombian National Police in conducting operations in remote regions of Colombia; and to help the Barranquilla Resident Office to implement a coastal maritime program.  OFS assistance has helped provide the planning, logistical and communications support to allow the Colombians to sustain operations in these areas.

Additionally, OFS manages programs in the three principal transit zones:  The Bahamas and Turks and Caicos Islands, Mexico, and the northern tier countries of Central America (Guatemala, Belize, Honduras, and El Salvador).  These airmobile operations are supporting police counterparts in these countries to reduce the movement of cocaine HCI from Colombia to the United States.  Combined, these transit zone programs have resulted in the seizure of over 163 metric tons of cocaine, 112 aircraft and vessels, and the arrest of over 900 violators.

The OPBAT program in the Bahamas was the first, beginning in 1982, when the Caribbean was almost the exclusive route for cocaine into the United States, via South Florida.  OFS provides operational oversight to a DEA and Royal Bahamian Task Force, which utilizes US Coast Guard and Army helicopters to conduct enforcement activities at sites of suspected aircraft landings and airdrops, and against maritime smuggling.

Largely due to these law enforcement pressures in the Bahamas, trafficking patterns began to shift in the mid-eighties to Mexico.  In 1990, the Northern Border Response Force (NBRF), an other program  administratively managed by OFS, was credited with assisting the Mexico City Country Office in countering this threat.  NBRF operates as a task force composed of DEA, U.S. Customs, DoD, and ATF personnel which near real time information on suspect aircraft enroute from South America to Mexico, and in conducting follow-up investigations to NBRF services.

NBRF's success shifted traffickers flights to off-load in Central America, for overland movement through Mexico to avoid NBRF pressure.  In 1991, Central American Drug Enforcement Centers (CADENCE) were jointly instituted by DEA and the U.S. Department of State.  Based in Guatemala, with representatives in El Salvador, Belize, and Honduras, CADENCE assists HN police in the conduct of pre-planned and rapid response operations against air, vehicles and maritime smugglers.  Two U.S. Border Patrol agents are deployed with the teams to lend expertise in roadway interdiction technique. 



1.   In re seizure of 
     $39,480 and $63,000
     DEA Seizure Nos. 103598, 103599
     Recipient country:  Egypt

     In re seizure of $39, 480 and $63,000, $51,240 was transferred to the Government of Egypt for the contribution of Egyptian law enforcement authorities in the forfeiture of $102,480 in Savannah, Georgia.  The Egyptian Anti-Narcotics General Administration (ANGA) initiated the investigation that led to this seizure and the arrest of two Ghanian nationals.  Following the seizure of five kilograms of heroin at the Cairo International Airport, ANGA officials requested the assistance of the Cairo C.O. in the follow-up investigation.  This joint investigation demonstrates the closer working relationship that has developed between the DEA and Egypt's ANGA.

2.   U.S. v. Luyties
     (M.D. PA)
     21 U.S.C. 881
     Recipient country:  Switzerland

     In U.S. v. Luyties, $1,087,334.50 was transferred to the Government of Switzerland for the assistance of the Swiss law enforcement authorities in the civil forfeiture of $2,174,669 that had been deposited in Switzerland.  The account was in the name of Frediril J. Luyties, a convicted cocaine trafficker.  Switzerland made a significant contribution in this case by freezing Luyties' accounts.

3.   U.S. v. Newton/Ratz
     21 U.S.C. 881
     Recipient country:  Switzerland

     In U.S. v. Newton/Ratz Bloomfield, $8,183,626.10 was transferred to the Government of Switzerland, representing 50% of $16,367,252.20 proceeds forfeited in the Newton-Bloomfield civil forfeiture case.

4.   In re Seizure Nos. 120458 and 120461
     DEA-S.D. Fla
     21 U.S.C. 881
     Recipient country:  Bahamas

     In re Seizure Nos 120458 and 120461, $109,510, almost 75% of drug proceeds totaling $146,114, was transferred to the Royal Bahamas Police Force (RBPF) for their work in these two seizures.  The DEA has been involved in a joint investigation with the RBPF Drug Enforcement Unit regarding the importation activity of several Bahamian cocaine organizations, revealing a link with DEA fugitive Richard Goodman.  On May 21, 1992, officers of the RBPF/DUE arrested Goodman and several associates, from whom these seizures were made.  Custody of the reference property was given to the DEA, where it was subsequently forfeited administratively via DEA 294's dated November 6, 1992.

5.   U.S. v. Aron Roizis
     Seizure No. 132052
     Case No. C1910174
     Recipient country:  Romania

     In U.S. v. Aron Roizis, $23,750 was transferred to the Government of Romania, representing 50% of the net proceeds of the forfeiture in the United States.  The Romanian National Police assisted with the execution of a U.S. provisional arrest warrant and seized approximately $47,500 dollars in U.S. currency in the defendant's possession.

6.   In re Reyes-Torres Investigation
     Recipient country:  Ecuador

     In re Reyes-Torres Investigation, $330,316 was transferred to the Government of Ecuador.  This amount represents the contribution of Ecuadorian law enforcement authorities in the forfeiture of $660,663.93.


     INCSR Report (FY-93/94/95)



Subject to State Department approval and funding, and in response to foreign government requests for assistance, the USCG deploys mobile training teams (MTTs) to source and transit countries to improve law enforcement (LE) skills of indigenous maritime police forces. 

Most short-term LE MTTs consist of members from the International Maritime Law Enforcement Training Team (IMLETT).  The IMLETT usually deploys three or four of its nine members to perform class room and practical exercise maritime LE instruction to international maritime LE authorities (world wide) for one or two weeks at a time.  The IMLETT is located at the Maritime Law Enforcement School at the U.S. Coast Guard Reserve Training Center in Yorktown, VA.  They feature basic maritime LE training, and "train-the-trainer" courses.

When longer-term presence is warranted, the Coast Guard's International Maritime Law Enforcement Team (IMLET) deploys personnel for several months at a time to train international LE authorities (mostly in Latin America) in coastal and waterway counter-drug (CD) law enforcement.  IMLET is a 32 person team, which normally has at least half of its personnel deployed at any time.  The team continues to support the Waterways Law Enforcement (WLE) program, a U.S. Government initiative to disrupt the cocaine supply at its source.  Throughout FY-93 and FY-94, IMLET maintained a continuous 3-5 person team presence in Bolivia for WLE training.  Several deployments were also made for WLE 
training in Panama.  A Memorandum of Agreement (MOA) between DOS, DEA and USCG for IMLET training in Bolivia was formalized in January 1994.  A similar MOA for IMLET training in Panama should be formalized in FY-94.  Additionally, an officer from IMLET is temporarily assigned to Colombia to provide guidance and assistance in their efforts to create a Colombian Coast Guard.  When deployed, IMLET personnel are under the control of the U.S. Ambassador.  In addition to counter-drug training in Latin America, IMLET has provided basic maritime LE training in Bulgaria and Rumania.  

The USCG participates in foreign shiprider exchanges, participates in the US Navy UNITAS (South/Central America) and WATC (West Africa) combined exercise programs, conducts extended foreign port visits in Mexico and Caribbean basin countries, and hosts foreign maritime LE personnel at USCG facilities in order to train and familiarize foreign officials in maritime counter-drug tactics.  

For one month every spring, a Coast Guard medium endurance cutter, equipped with a helicopter and accompanied by a Coast Guard patrol boat, conducts combined LE exercises/operations and training with several nations in the Lesser Antilles.  This is known as Operation TRADEWINDS.  It has always proved beneficial because it involves on-the-job training and hands-on law enforcement experience.  The result is that these nations normally increase their own counter-drug efforts and are better able to conduct combined counter-drug operations with the Coast Guard in the future.
Several important changes are anticipated during the FY-94 program.  Based on significant interest from DOS and many countries around the world, the Marine Safety Training and Assistance Team (MSTAT) is now available to provide training in-country in a variety of skills.  The key areas of interest for counternarcotics are port safety and security and hazardous materials handling skills (most precursors are classed as hazardous materials).  They are scheduled to provide this type of training to Argentina, Bolivia, Colombia, Indonesia and Peru.

Combined Operations

In November 1993, a DOS letter to the British Embassy formalized the concept of deploying USCG Law Enforcement Detachments (LEDETS) aboard Royal Navy vessels in the Caribbean.  This allows for a significant counter-drug force multiplier in the Caribbean, particularly in the areas of British national interest (Belize and the Windward Islands).  Additionally, the USCG and DOS are currently evaluating the possibility of reaching an agreement for a similar concept of operations with Royal Netherlands Navy vessels operating in the Caribbean.  Such deployments would provide for an expanded law enforcement presence in the Netherlands Antilles and Aruba. 

Subject to approval of the DOS and in response to foreign government requests for assistance, the USCG deploys resources to operate with the maritime police forces of various source and transit countries.  In FY-93, LEDETs responded to requests by the governments of Montserrat and the Dominican Republic to provide technical maritime counter-drug boarding advice to their enforcement officials during their boarding of suspected narcotrafficking vessels. 

The USCG conducts planned "combined" operations with Caribbean basin and Latin American countries with the purpose of motivating and further developing indigenous interdiction forces.  Combined operations with foreign maritime interdiction forces results in on-the-job-training for both the foreign forces and USCG personnel.  Countries must have competent forces in order to be considered for combined operations with the USCG.  Combined operations have lead to bilateral agreements which facilitate counter-drug operations.  Types of agreements include overflight authority for USCG surveillance aircraft, permission to enter foreign territorial waters to carry out enforcement actions, shiprider agreements to facilitate coordination between forces, and shipboarding agreements to streamline the diplomatic communication necessary to board foreign flagged vessels.

An example of one such bilateral/trilateral agreement is the one which established Operation Bahamas and Turks and Caicos (OPBAT).  This unit provides airborne transport of Bahamian and Turks and Caicos law enforcement officials as well as U.S. Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA) agents.  In FY-93, OPBAT interdicted over 5,000 lbs of illegal narcotics.  OPBAT will continue to be an important part of the 1994 National Drug Control Strategy's international focus of interdiction in the transit country.

In addition to combined operations, the USCG conducts "coincidental" operations with the Mexican Navy in the Pacific as well as in the Gulf of Mexico.  During coincidental operations, USCG and Mexican Naval  assets operate simultaneously (as opposed to operating jointly) and exchange on-scene information which may assist in the interdiction of drug traffickers.  Through these operations, communications between the USCG and the Mexican Navy has significantly improved.  The improved level of communication between the two governments led to the November 1993 seizure of 14,971 lbs of cocaine.  

Other Activities

The USCG conducts other activities abroad that, though not necessarily funded by the Department of State, directly or indirectly benefit international narcotics control efforts.  The USCG maintains the ability to transfer decommissioned patrol boats to Caribbean and Latin American nations, and does so whenever possible.  USCG personnel are permanently stationed in several American Embassies located in source and transit countries.  These USCG positions are sponsored by various U.S programs.  Officers are posted in Antigua, the Bahamas, Panama, Costa Rica, Haiti, Jamaica, Mexico, Colombia, Bolivia and Venezuela.  In addition, the USCG often hosts various foreign dignitary visits to USCG training facilities and operational units.  


[Chart:  United States Coast Guard Assistance]


International drug interdiction training is a vital segment of the activities, interests, and mission of the U.S. Customs Service.  Training is funded and approved by the Department of State and provided to drug control agencies with an interdiction responsibility in countries considered significant to U.S. drug control enforcement efforts.

During FY 1993, 43 programs were conducted or coordinated involving 826 participants from 57 countries.  This annual schedule included 2 Executives Observation Programs (EOP); 14 Overseas Enforcement Training (OET) programs for individual countries; 5 Regional Overseas Enforcement Training (ROET) programs for two or more countries; 5 Train-the Trainer Workshops (T3W), in many cases linked to OET or regional OET programs; 4 Contraband Enforcement Training (CET) programs--3 with separate phases; 1 Mid-Management (M-M) Seminar; 1 Money Laundering Seminar (MLS); and 1 Short-Term Advisory (STA) project.  Additionally, four special enforcement programs were conducted for Mexican officers in the United States.

In addition to the normal schedule of International Narcotics Control Training Programs conducted under the Bureau for International Narcotics Matters (INM) auspices, U.S. Customs has carried out a number of narcotics control projects which are in response to high priority concerns, have required considerable development efforts or have made use of funding outside of the annual INM allocation.  Among these undertaking are the following:

     -- A Special Advanced Container Examination Course funded by Sweden at their port facility in Gothenburg, which was also attended by participants from Denmark, Norway, and Finland.

     -- Leadership of a T3W instructional team which presented a course under the auspices of the Caribbean Customs Law Enforcement Council in Martinique.

     -- Programs specially funded by INM including:  Train-the-Trainer programs for Czech and Slovak Republics, an overseas Enforcement Trainer Program in Poland, a Regional Overseas Enforcement Training Program in Uzbekistan for officers of the Central Asian Republics, and an OET emphasizing management and supervisory principles for the Hungarian Customs Administration.  The Central Asian ROET was proceeded by an INM-funded needs survey to several of the Republics.

     -- Training programs supported by U.S. Embassies in Jamaica and Paraguay.  The former undertaking was a Port Security Train-the-Trainer program and the latter a Contraband Enforcement Training program.  A narcotics threat survey was also supported with Embassy resources in Grenada.

     -- Short-Term Advisory Assistance made available to Laos to prepare that nation's customs officials to manage a major new bridge facility and to Turkish Customs in strengthening their operations and instruction at their training academy.  The former assistance was completed in FY 1994 and utilized specially provided funding from INM.

FY 1993 was the third fiscal year in which the Bureau for International Narcotics Matters has funded aspects of training in narcotics security techniques provided by U.S. Customs to managers and employees of private carrier companies under the Carrier Initiatives Program (CIP).  In
FY 1993, CIP training was presented to over 400 employees of 50 carriers.  These 18 programs were offered in 10 countries: Belize, Costa Rica, Dominican Republic, El Salvador, Germany, Guatemala, Guyana, Honduras, Japan, and Nicaragua.

Particularly noteworthy in assessing the past year's programs are the significant seizures and creations of new drug squads that were reported and are attributed directly to our training programs.  For example:

     -- An October 1992 cable from Jamaica strongly suggests a close tie between recent training and seizures as noted by an astounding increase of 775% in arrests and 613% increase in seizures over the previous year.  A June 1993 cable further amplifies this incredible level of performance in citing the seizure of over 9,971 kilos of marijuana by the CET and Port Security Corps, largely by U.S. Customs trained personnel...and using U.S. Customs search techniques.

     -- A narcotics coordinator in Tanzania reported on a recent seizure of 3.7 kilos of heroin attributed to training received from U.S. Customs.

Our international training efforts have, as in the past, also emphasized cooperation with other U.S. Government drug enforcement agencies, other nations, and international bodies.  U.S. Customs participation in providing the lead instructor in a Train-the-Trainer program presented by the Caribbean Customs Law Enforcement Council in Martinique and participation in three U.S. Drug Enforcement Administration anti-drug schools are representative of the importance we place on this cooperation.  U.S. Customs concluded a new bilateral Customs Mutual Assistance Agreement with France in 1993 and also brought one into effect with the Russian Federation.  These agreements lay the foundation for cooperation on a wide range of customs issues, and contain provisions for information and evidence sharing.  Customs Mutual Assistance Agreements greatly assist in the gathering of evidence for all violations of U.S. law enforced by Customs, including financial crimes.  

In FY 1993, the U.S. Customs Service shared financial assets on six occasions:

     Coordinated Law Enforcement Unit (Canada)     63,746.99
     Korps Politier Aruba                          92,702.40
     Royal Canadian Mounted Police                 68,805.60
     Royal Canadian Mounted Police                  7,016.80
     Royal Canadian Mounted Police                111,371.00
     Trinidad and Tobago                           40,329.60

     TOTAL                                        383,972.39

CBRN           Caribbean Basin Radar Network
CICAD          Inter-American Drug Abuse Control Commission
DEA            Drug Enforcement Administration
ESF            Economic Support Fund
FATF           Financial Action Task Force
FBI            Federal Bureau of Investigation
INCSR          International Narcotics Control Strategy Report
INM            Bureau of International Narcotics Matters
JICC           Joint Information Coordination Center
MLAT           Mutual Legal Assistance Treaty
NBRF           Northern Border Response Force
NNICC          National Narcotics Intelligence Consumers Committee
OAS            Organization of American States
OPBAT          Operation Bahamas, Turks and Caicos
UN Convention  1988 United Nations Convention Against Illicit Traffic in Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances
UNDCP          United Nations International Drug Control Program
USAID          Agency for International Development
USG            United States Government
ha             Hectare
HCl            Hydrochloride (cocaine)
kg             Kilogram
mt             Metric Ton
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