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International Narcotics Control Strategy Report, April 1993
US Department of State
Bureau of International Narcotics Matters

Department of State Publication 10047
Released April 1993

The Report is for sale by the Government Printing Office, Superindendent of Documents.  Stock No.:  044-000-02370-9

This segment of the INCSR represents individual reports for Africa and the Middle East.

  Cote d'Ivoire
  Saudi Arabia
  Other Africa 

[EDITOR'S NOTE:  Charts referenced to in brackets [ ] are available only in hard copy of report.]



I. Summary

Algeria is the second largest country in Africa, but its drug consumption and trafficking problems are relatively modest.  Algeria does not produce opium or heroin, and cannabis production is largely for local use.  Most trafficking is in marijuana or hashish, although heroin, cocaine, and barbiturates, on occasion, have been seized.  Algerian authorities believe that drug problems have grown in recent years because of expanded travel and trade between Algeria and Morocco with the 1988 opening of their border.  Moreover, recent tightening of the Spanish-Moroccan border has encouraged traffickers from Morocco to exploit the Algeria-France link.

II. Status of Country

Consumption of marijuana or hashish, while not a widespread problem, appears to be increasing, especially among poorer elements of Algerian society.  The Algerian media have played an important role in helping to sensitize the public to the dangers that narcotics pose.  The Government of Algeria (GOA) encourages the establishment of youth associations and has increased its budget for youth activities in an effort to lure young people away from the attractions of the drug counterculture.

III. Country Actions Against Drugs in 1992

The GOA enforces existing anti-narcotics laws rigorously and imposes stiff prison sentences on convicted drug traffickers.  Recently, a court handed down ten-year-plus sentences to three Dutch nationals who were apprehended transporting marijuana from Morocco through Algeria.  These cases highlight a coordinated Customs and Police campaign to curb the transit of marijuana and hashish from Morocco and Nigeria to French ports.

The GOA has imposed strict border procedures, more rigorous Customs inspections at points of entry, tighter controls on overland shipment of goods, and greater surveillance of suspects, including European tourists transiting the country.  Their activities produced some spectacular narcotics seizures during 1992, including a 2.5 mt seizure of hashish being ferried into Algeria, and a 400 kg marijuana seizure at the port of Algiers.

Algeria is a signatory to the 1988 UN Convention.  The GOA has not yet ratified the Convention, but its narcotics control actions are adequately meeting the Convention's goals and objectives.  It is a party to the 1961 Single Convention on Narcotic Drugs (but not its 1972 Protocol) and the 1971 Convention on Psychotropic Substances.  Algerian authorities cooperate with enforcement officials in other countries on narcotics-related issues.  Algeria is a member of the Customs Cooperation Council, in which European and Maghreb countries exchange information on drug trafficking.  Algeria's police force also cooperates closely with Interpol.  INM funded participation of Algerian law enforcement officials in a region-wide DEA seminar held in Morocco last year.


I.  Summary

Cote d'Ivoire's international airport in Abidjan is a transit point in  the international narcotics trade, primarily for Asian heroin and some South American cocaine headed toward Europe and North America.  Ivorian production of illicit drugs is limited to small amounts of low-grade cannabis for domestic consumption.  Domestic use of illegal narcotics, particularly heroin and cocaine, increased in 1992.  Cote d'Ivoire's counternarcotics effort is coordinated by the National Drug Police (NDP).  The Ivorian government recognizes that narcotics are a growing problem, but is unable to devote the resources necessary to make a major impact on the problem.  Cote d'Ivoire signed a bilateral agreement with the U.S. in 1992.

II.  Status of Country

Because of the numerous international flights through Abidjan, Cote d'Ivoire is an important transit country for Asian heroin and some South American cocaine destined for Europe and North America.  Abidjan also is a regional financial center and probably the site of money laundering activities.  The only local illicit drug production is of small quantities of cannabis.

III.  Country Actions Against Drugs in 1992

Policy Initiatives and Accomplishments.  A new director of the NDP, who has improved the organization's morale and operational capability, was appointed in 1992.  The Government of Cote d'Ivoire (GOCI) increased its cooperation with the DEA, sharing intelligence and conducting joint operations.

Law Enforcement Efforts.  Cote d'Ivoire concentrated its efforts on reducing use of Abidjan's airport as a narcotics transit point and as a supply point for domestic drug use.  Three kg of heroin bound for New York were seized at the airport in the last two months of 1992 as a result of increased attention to transit passengers.  

Law enforcement programs are relatively well-organized but suffer from a critical lack of resources.  Drug offenders receive mandatory five-year sentences for consuming and ten-year sentences for trafficking.

Corruption.  Several officers in the NDP were removed on grounds of corruption in 1992, and the new director made considerable efforts to clean up the force.  There is no evidence that any senior GOCI official has engaged in the production or distribution of drugs, or in money laundering.

Agreements and Treaties.  Cote d'Ivoire is a party to the 1961 UN Single Convention and the 1971 UN Convention on Psychotropic Substances.  It ratified the 1988 UN Convention in 1991, and has implemented counternarcotics enforcement programs and tough penalties for drug consumption and trafficking, thereby making efforts to meet the goals and objectives of the 1988 Convention.  

Cultivation and Production.  Cannabis is grown in eastern Cote d'Ivoire in small quantities, solely for local consumption.  Production in 1992 appears to be relatively unchanged from previous years.

Demand Reduction Programs.  Domestic consumption of heroin and cocaine increased in 1992, continuing the pattern of the past several years.  There is a modest demand reduction program, and government-owned media have featured articles on drug abuse.  Nonetheless, funding of demand reduction and drug treatment programs is so low that they are essentially ineffective.

IV.  U.S. Policy Initiatives and Programs

Bilateral Cooperation.  Cote d'Ivoire signed an agreement with the U.S. in September to combat narcotics trafficking at the Abidjan airport.  The USG agreed to provide funds for communications and computer equipment.  The GOCI has worked closely with the USG to reduce the flow of illegal drugs to the U.S. by sharing information and conducting joint operations.

The Road Ahead.  The USG will focus on interdiction at the international airport through the implementation of the 1992 bilateral agreement.


I.  Summary

Egypt is a transit country for heroin destined for Western Europe and North America.  Egypt does not yet have a serious problem with the abuse of hard drugs, although there is growing concern about the increase in the number of heroin addicts.  The use of hashish is widespread.  Small amounts of opium poppy and cannabis are grown locally.  In 1991, Egypt became a party to the 1988 UN Convention, but implementing legislation has not yet been passed.  The 1991 U.S.-Egyptian bilateral narcotics control agreement was amended in 1992 to provide additional INM funding to the Egyptian Anti-Narcotics General Administration (ANGA), whose responsibilities roughly parallel those of DEA.  Egyptian drug laws are strictly enforced and provide severe penalties for drug trafficking.

II.  Status of Country

Egypt is a natural transit point for heroin and cannabis moving from Southwest and Southeast Asia to Europe and the U.S.  Lebanon is the principal supplier of hashish for domestic Egyptian consumption.  Heroin coming from Turkey and hashish from Lebanon enter Egypt overland through Libya--one consequence of opening the border between the two countries in 1990.  The Government of Egypt (GOE) maintains an active interdiction program at Cairo International Airport, but has no program to interdict shipments passing through the Suez Canal.

Hashish is the most widely used drug in Egypt and is readily available.  GOE authorities estimate that up to two million Egyptians are regular users.  There is a growing, but still modest, problem of heroin and some cocaine use among affluent young Egyptians; barbiturates and prescription drugs are widely abused.  

III.  Country Actions Against Drugs in 1992

Accomplishments.  Egyptian laws severely penalize drug use, including capital punishment for both producers and traffickers of hard drugs.  Egyptian laws also provide for the seizure of "unexplained" assets.  The law is not specifically designed to deal with narcotics activities, but drug enforcement officials can refer suspects to a special prosecutor who determines whether the evidence merits asset seizure.  Seized property can be held for up to five years and then is returned if the accused has not engaged in further suspected illegal activities.  Vehicles, including boats, seized in the course of drug operations are usually turned over to ANGA, which may use them while the case is pending. 

ANGA is the lead drug agency and is the oldest organization of its kind in the world.  ANGA's over 100-man force works in coordination with a range of other agencies, including the Frontier Police, Customs, and police narcotics units in the provinces.

Agreements and Treaties.  Egypt signed the 1988 UN Convention in 1991, but the People's Assembly has yet to enact enabling legislation to implement some of the Convention's provisions on subjects such as asset seizure, money laundering, extradition, and mutual legal assistance.

Corruption.  There is no evidence of significant corruption among Egyptian antidrug officials.  ANGA carefully selects and monitors its agents, but low salaries make law enforcement officials vulnerable to payoffs from narcotics traffickers.  A special GOE unit, the Administrative Control Authority, investigates allegations of government corruption and reports to the President.  In 1991, a major drug trafficking scandal in the People's Assembly resulted in the expulsion of two members and the resignation of a third.

The GOE does not encourage or facilitate the production or distribution of illicit narcotics, nor does the USG know of any senior GOE official engaged in the production or distribution of drugs or in money laundering.

Cultivation and Production.  Egypt is not a major drug producing country.  Domestic cultivation of opium poppy is almost entirely restricted to the arable land along the Nile River.  The GOE conducts a yearly eradication program during the winter harvest.  In the first ten months of 1992, authorities eradicated more than 3.5 million opium poppy  plants.  The fertile northern Delta poses the greatest potential for significant cultivation, but its dense population and good communication links discourage large-scale, clandestine cultivation.

Drug Flow/Transit.  Heroin seizures at the Cairo International Airport from West African couriers in transit between Bangkok and Lagos have declined because the ANGA airport interdiction program, supported by DEA, has forced traffickers to seek alternate routes.  The program is supported by an INM-procured X-ray machine and a U.S.-trained drug-detecting dog and handler team.

Demand Reduction Programs.  Estimates of drug use are based on anecdotal evidence and projections based on drug seizures and the number of patients seeking treatment.  There is general agreement that hard drug use (heroin) is increasing in Egypt among young Egyptians.

The President's national drug awareness campaign continues unabated.  PRIDE International of Egypt, the only private organization in the country devoted to prevention, conducts broad public awareness campaigns.  In 1993, PRIDE plans to implement a "drug-free workplace" program for factory managers and employees.

IV.  U.S. Policy Initiatives and Programs

Bilateral Cooperation.  Under the terms of the 1992 amendment to the 1991 bilateral agreement, INM is providing surveillance equipment to improve law enforcement capabilities.  In October, the director of ANGA's Special Operations Unit attended a  DEA-sponsored drug enforcement seminar in the U.S.  And in February, U.S. Customs conducted drug interdiction training programs in Cairo and Alexandria for a total of 55 agents from ANGA, Egyptian Customs, and the Airport Police.  

The Road Ahead.  In 1993, the USG will work closely with ANGA under the terms of the bilateral agreement and will consider a special program to interdict narcotics shipments passing through the Suez Canal. 

[A Statistical Tables Chart for Egypt appears here in the hard copy].


I.  Summary  

Ghana is a transit route for cocaine from Latin America and heroin from Southeast and Southwest Asia en route to the U.S. and Europe.  These drugs largely are handled by Nigerian trafficking organizations using Ghanaian couriers.  However, some Ghanaian entrepreneurs have begun to smuggle narcotics directly from source countries to Western markets or into Ghana.  Ghana ranks second to Nigeria as the source of narcotics couriers in West Africa.  Marijuana remains the most abused drug in Ghana.  Ghana is a party to all the UN antidrug conventions and is meeting the goals and objectives of the 1988 UN Convention.

II.  Status of Country

Use of Ghana for narcotics smuggling has been accompanied by a steady rise in consumption of cocaine and heroin.  Crack cocaine appeared among seizures for the first time in 1992.  Cannabis grows naturally in Ghana's climate.  There has been an aggressive police effort involving destruction of cannabis fields, but the degree of success is unknown.  

III.  Country Actions Against Drugs in 1992

Policy Initiatives.  In 1990, the Government of Ghana (GOG) established the Narcotics Control Board (NCB) to coordinate the work of Customs, Immigration, the Police, and the security services in counternarcotics efforts.  The NCB is effective in enforcement matters, as well as in encouraging programs for demand reduction.  

Accomplishments.  Between January and September, Ghanaian officials seized 1,020 kg of marijuana, 6.6 kg of cocaine and 3.6 kg of heroin.  The NCB and Ghana's Bureau of National Investigation successfully cooperated in two controlled deliveries of narcotics in coordination with UK and Dutch customs authorities.  The GOG also requested DEA assistance in Bangkok in arranging with Thai authorities for the extradition of a Ghanaian national involved in drug trafficking.  The GOG regularly provides leads to the U.S. and EC governments on Ghanaians suspected of drug trafficking.

Law Enforcement Efforts.  Under current Ghanaian drug laws, possession or trafficking in any type of narcotics is subject to a mandatory ten-year prison sentence.  They also provide for asset seizure and forfeiture in drug cases; the GOG aggressively enforces the laws.  The NCB is recommending that they be amended to permit that 50 percent of seized assets be used in support of counternarcotics efforts.  

Corruption.  Ghanaian authorities are believed largely free of corruption.  No senior Ghanaian officials are known or suspected to be facilitating production, processing, or shipment of narcotics, or attempting to discourage narcotics investigations since a 1987 case involving the narcotics police. 

Agreements and Treaties.  Ghana in 1990 ratified the 1961 UN Single Convention on Narcotic Drugs, as amended by its 1972 Protocol, the 1971 UN Convention on Psychotropic Substances, and the 1988 UN Convention.  The GOG has aggressively supported these agreements, particularly the 1988 Convention, and adopted legislation for the seizure of assets belonging to drug traffickers convicted in Ghana or abroad.  

Ghana participates actively in UN international meetings on narcotic drugs, receives assistance from the UNDCP, and maintains active contacts on narcotics issues with the British, Canadian, German, and U.S. diplomatic missions in Accra.  

The 1931 U.S.-UK extradition treaty was reaffirmed between the U.S. and Ghana and entered into force in 1958.  The treaty covers 27 extraditable offenses, including drug trafficking.  

Cultivation and Production.  Cannabis is the only drug illegally cultivated in Ghana.  The GOG burns cannabis fields and destroys marijuana shipments.  In 1991, two mt of marijuana were destroyed.  From January through September, one mt was destroyed.

Drug Flow/Transit.  Drug trafficking in Ghana is increasing, but Ghanaian enforcement resources remain inadequate.  Smuggling is carried out by couriers and in cargo.  According to Ghanaian Customs, European nationals are becoming involved in the local trade which has been dominated by Ghanaians and Nigerians.  

Some heroin is abused in Ghana, but most is transshipped to the U.S. and Europe.  According to Ghanaian authorities, traffickers get their supplies from Thailand, Hong Kong, Nigeria, and Cote d'Ivoire; they enter the Ghana-Togo, Ghana-Cote d'Ivoire land borders or by air through Accra International Airport.  Arrests at the Ghana-Togo border and Accra airport indicate the carriers are most frequently connected with Nigerian drug trafficking organizations. The Togolese connection is also significant.  Recent arrests by Ghana Customs also indicate that between 150-200 Ghanaians, ostensibly stranded in Bangkok while in route to purported jobs in Korea and Japan, are in fact dealing in heroin.  They have used express mail firms to send parcels containing drugs to contacts in Ghana.

Cocaine seizures and arrests rose in 1992.  Ghanaian Customs seized two significant shipments of cocaine at Accra International Airport of 4.3 kg and 2.06 kg.  Both shipments originated in Rio de Janeiro, were smuggled by air first to Lagos and then to Accra, and were intended for transshipment to the U.S.

Drug traffickers inaugurated new routes from Ghana to Europe and the U.S. in 1992.  Presumably because of tighter airport enforcement measures at U.S. and UK airports, some narcotics shipments were sent from Ghana to Las Palmas in the Canary Islands for onward movement.  Ghanaian traffickers have begun travelling to Rio via Nigeria to obtain cocaine.  These traffickers, usually with Nigerian backing, are organized into small syndicates and act as agents for local distribution or export. 

According to the NCB, trafficking activities involving Nigerians in Ghana increased in 1991 and 1992.  Nigerian drug dealers may plan to make Ghana a center for trafficking activities.  

Marijuana that is not consumed locally is smuggled by truck or boat to Togo, Ivory Coast, Angola, and the Canary Islands. 

Demand Reduction Programs.  The GOG held an international day against drug abuse and illicit trafficking which included school programs, a radio and television contest, and public lectures on the effects of drug abuse.  A two-day workshop was held in Accra in September which included 15 government agencies and NGOs.

IV.  U.S. Policy Initiatives and Programs

Policy Initiatives.  The U.S. seeks to reduce Ghana's role as a transit point for narcotics and as a source of narcotics couriers by helping Ghana develop the capability to combat drug trafficking networks and domestic drug consumption.

Bilateral Cooperation.  Relations between the GOG and DEA, U.S. Customs and other USG organizations are excellent.  Ghana has provided information on Ghanaian resident's in the U.S. believed to be engaged in trafficking.  During 1992, the GOG extradited one Ghanaian national from Ghana to the U.S. on drug charges.  

Under its 1992 narcotics control agreement with the USG, Ghana received $25,000 for office and communications equipment to be used by the NCB in counternarcotics operations.  The U.S. Embassy in Accra hosted an INM-funded seminar on drug demand reduction which was attended by a broad spectrum of Ghanaian officials and private citizens. Ghanaian participants also received USG drug enforcement training under the USIA International Visitor Program.  In September, the chief of Ghana's National Police narcotics unit attended an INM-sponsored DEA seminar on the management of narcotics enforcement operations.

The Road Ahead.  The USG will provide appropriate assistance to strengthen Ghana's ability to pursue an aggressive counternarcotics program, support joint operations between Ghanaian enforcement authorities and the DEA, and promote Ghana's international cooperation on narcotics matters. 


I.  Summary

Israel is a transit country for heroin and hashish, which are also the drugs of choice in the modest, but growing, domestic drug abuse populace.  The Government of Israel (GOI) regards the war on drugs as a national priority; the police rank drug control as its third priority after internal security and public order.  The Knesset (Parliament) has enacted stricter laws for drug smuggling and trafficking and increased the severity of punishment for dealers.  Since Israeli drug-trafficking rings are spread throughout the world, the Israeli National Police strongly support cooperation with foreign police forces and has stationed drug liaison officers in Turkey, Holland and France.  Israel has signed, but not ratified, the 1988 UN Convention.

II.  Status of Country

Situated in a region where drug cultivation and production is abundant, Israel acts as a crossroads for drug trafficking from Lebanon, which produces and exports hashish and heroin to Egypt, Europe, and North America.  Drug abuse is a growing problem, with users estimated to increase by about 25 percent annually.  Although there have been few prosecuted cases of money laundering, Israel's well-developed financial infrastructure has the potential for such use.

III.  Country Actions Against Drugs in 1992

Policy Initiatives.  The Anti-Drug Authority (ADA), established in 1988, falls under the Office of the Prime Minister.  Members of the Knesset, ministries, local governments, and NGOs participate in anti-drug efforts.  The GOI and the NGOs have special programs to combat growing drug abuse among the Israeli Arab population, carried out jointly by government ministries, Arab local authorities, the "al Hillal" organization operating for the Arab sector, and the ADA.

Accomplishments.  The GOI has made substantial narcotics control progress and anticipates expanding law enforcement, education, treatment, and rehabilitation programs over the next five years.  In 1992 it opened 3,500 drug trafficking cases and 6,500 drug use cases.  Law enforcement operations seized 513 kg of hashish, 76 kg of heroin, and 7.5 kg of cocaine.

Law Enforcement Efforts.  The Knesset amended the Dangerous Drug Ordinance and the Drug Forfeiture Law in 1990 to give the police and courts stronger powers to bring drug offenders to trial and confiscate their property.  These stronger powers include:  police searches without a warrant if there are strong grounds for suspicion, an increase to 25 years maximum penalty for drug trafficking, an expanded authority of the Israeli Border Police, and an increase in the size of the Police unit guarding the Lebanese border.

The ADA exchanges information and maintains contact with international organizations, including NIH in the U.S., the World Health Organization, and the UNDCP, and centers in France, the UK, Sweden, and Italy.  

Corruption.  Drug-related corruption does not appear to be an issue in Israel.

Agreements and Treaties.  Israel signed, but has not ratified, the 1988 UN Convention.  The difficulties over ratification are of a technical nature (conflicting pharmacological classifications) and are nearing resolution.  In the meantime, Israel's enforcement and education efforts, legislative initiatives, and international cooperation demonstrate that it acts in accordance with the Convention's goals and objectives.  Israel is a party to the 1961 Single Convention on Narcotic Drugs and its 1972 Protocol.

In 1991, the USG and the GOI signed a memorandum of understanding (MOU) on bilateral cooperation.  The MOU envisions annual meetings to coordinate antidrug efforts, joint participation in drug abuse and awareness research programs, and cooperation in developing drug treatment and rehabilitation models.  The GOI's law enforcement organizations and legislative committees have acted in conformity with the MOU's letter and spirit.

Israel has signed cooperative agreements with France and Italy.  In 1991, Hungary and Israel signed an MOU which consolidates enforcement cooperation on drug trafficking and training and exchange programs.

Cultivation and Production.  Israel does not produce or cultivate illicit drugs.

Drug Flow/Transit.  Hashish, cultivated mainly in Lebanon, is smuggled across Israel's northern border.  Heroin reaches and transits Israel from three major areas: the Bekaa Valley of Lebanon, Southwest Asia brought in through Turkey and Western Europe, and Southeast Asia brought in through Europe.  Some of the hashish and heroin is transferred via Israel to Egypt.  Both drugs are used in Israel where hashish is the drug of choice.  Cocaine, sometimes used as payment for heroin, reaches Israel from South America via the U.S. or Europe.

Demand Reduction Programs.  The ADA has initiated numerous programs to lower drug consumption, from the Ministry of Education's psychological counseling programs, through media and information campaigns, to treatment and rehabilitation centers set up by the Ministries of Health, Labor and Social Affairs.  The Knesset Committee on Drug Abuse increased funding for ADA.  

IV.  U.S. Policy Initiatives and Programs

Policy Initiatives.  The USG aims to enhance cooperation with the GOI, especially in law enforcement, education, prevention, treatment, rehabilitation, and professional training.

Bilateral Cooperation.  The U.S. Embassy in Tel Aviv hosted a seminar on drug demand reduction in 1991 attended by senior officials from the ADA and all GOI ministries.  USIS initiated numerous activities and programs in cooperation with local institutions, funding American speakers for the ADA's international conferences, sending Israelis and Arab Israelis to the U.S. under the International Visitors Program, and sending a national radio correspondent to participate in a Voice of America drug demand seminar.

The Road Ahead.  Close cooperation between USG and Israeli enforcement officials is likely to continue.  The USG plans to sustain its efforts to advance the goals outlined in the MOU by promoting drug-awareness programs and exchanging information and personnel.


Summary and Status of Country

Jordan does not produce illicit drugs; problems associated with drug transshipment have also been minor.  The majority of trafficking has been in hashish, although heroin has been seized on rare occasions.  Domestic consumption of hashish is limited at present and the level of narcotics addiction is low, but some Jordanian expatriate workers returning from abroad may bring acquired drug habits with them.  The primary concern for Jordanian authorities is narcotics traffic from Lebanon, through Jordan, to Egypt and the Gulf states.  Cooperation with Egyptian law enforcement officials remains adequate to address issues of mutual concern.  The Government of Jordan (GOJ) is imposing strict border-control procedures, stepping up customs inspections, tightening regulations on overland transport of goods, and increasing surveillance of suspects, in part as a result of its heightened enforcement efforts.  Narcotics enforcement coordination has been vested in the Pan-Arab Bureau for Narcotics Affairs.

Jordan is a party to the 1988 UN Convention and meets its goals and objectives.  Despite antiquated equipment and budgetary constraints which limit interdiction efforts, Jordan is committed to rigorous enforcement of anti-narcotics statutes.  The GOJ imposes lengthy prison sentences on convicted drug traffickers.  Official corruption is not tolerated in Jordan; there are severe penalties for misuse of official positions.  Jordanian law enforcement officers cooperate with enforcement officials on international narcotics control, including with Interpol and USG agencies.  The USG funded participation by Jordanian representatives in a DEA seminar held in the U.S. in 1992.  The GOJ is currently considering a narcotics prevention initiative and has requested information and assistance from the DEA.  


I.  Summary 

Southwest and Southeast Asian heroin transits Kenya en route to Europe and North America.  Indian methaqualone (Mandrax) is also shipped by drug traffickers through Kenya on its way to South Africa.  Kenya acceded to the 1988 UN Convention in 1992, but its Parliament failed to pass implementing legislation.  Kenya is not a major producer of illicit drugs, although cannabis is cultivated and used extensively within the country.  The stimulant miraa, called khat in the Arab world, is grown legally and exported, primarily to Somalia.  During 1992, the Government of Kenya (GOK) assisted in the successful extradition of one drug suspect to the U.S., but a court allowed a suspect in another case to escape.  Corruption, inefficiency, lack of resources, and an apparent lack of political will to combat drug trafficking plague Kenya's judicial system and law enforcement agencies.

II.  Status of Country

African couriers continue to transit Nairobi's Jomo Kenyatta International Airport and, to a lesser extent, Mombasa's Moi International Airport, carrying Asian heroin destined for markets in Europe and America.  Moreover, USG authorities believe Kenya to be the principal transit point for Indian traffickers of the sedative methaqualone (Mandrax), which is consumed heavily in South Africa.  

The inability of Kenya's Navy and Coast Guard to effectively patrol Kenyan territorial waters allows narcotics to enter the country via the Indian Ocean.  Widespread corruption enables traffickers to undermine government counternarcotics efforts.  There are reports of money laundering in Kenya, but no definitive information specifically linking financial flows to the drug trade.

III.  Country Actions Against Drugs in 1992.

Policy Initiatives.  The GOK introduced a strong anti-narcotics law, proposing longer sentences for narcotics traffickers--including life imprisonment in some cases--and seizure and confiscation of property used in narcotics trafficking.  Parliament did not pass the bill before adjourning in October; the GOK will reintroduce it in 1993.

Accomplishments.  Law enforcement personnel made five seizures of heroin amounting to 2.6 kg in 1992.  The GOK also seized 648,700 tablets of Mandrax in eight separate seizures.

Law Enforcement Efforts.  A June conference in Mombasa, organized by the GOK with UN assistance, attempted to sensitize judges and administrators to the dangers posed by  drug money to the country's political and judicial systems.

Corruption.  It is widely believed that low-level corruption facilitates the transshipment of narcotics through the country.  While the GOK makes  periodic attempts to stiffen the country's anti-corruption laws, in practice the statutes are inadequately enforced; no high-level officials have been charged with corruption.  As a matter of policy, the GOK neither encourages nor assists in the production or distribution of illicit drugs.

Agreements and Treaties.  In October, Kenya acceded to the 1988 UN Convention, but its Parliament failed to pass legislation to implement provisions of the Convention.  The GOK has taken some measures towards meeting the Convention's goals and objectives, but much remains to be done.  The country needs to adopt the new anti-narcotics legislation discussed above and intensify its enforcement efforts, particularly against corruption.

Cultivation and Production.  Cannabis grows naturally throughout Kenya and the government does not keep statistics on production per hectare.  While most of the marijuana is consumed locally, significant amounts are shipped to Europe or are used in illicit barter trade with neighboring East African countries.  Miraa is grown in the area around Mount Kenya and is not illegal in Kenya.  It is exported in large quantities to Somalia and to a lesser extent to Yemen, where the leaves are chewed for their stimulative effect.  In 1992, police raided two small opium poppy farms near Nairobi.  The poppy had been cut in preparation for harvesting the resin, but the police were unable to discover any associated heroin production facilities.

Drug Flow/Transit.  Southwest Asian (brown) heroin and Southeast Asian (white) heroin are brought into Kenya's airports on direct flights from the Middle East (Yemen) and Asia (Karachi, Bangkok and Bombay).  The drugs are transferred to other carriers inside Kenya and ferried through Nigeria or other African countries en route to their final American or European destinations.  Methaqualone headed for South Africa also passes through Nairobi's airport from Karachi and Bombay.  Kenyan airport interdiction has not been effective.

Demand Reduction Programs.  The GOK does not have statistics on the extent of the drug problem in Kenya.  Police estimate the number of heroin addicts to be between 1,000 and 2,000, mostly in Nairobi and the Indian Ocean port of Mombasa.  Marijuana use is widespread.  Many rural Kenyans smoke the drug in connection with traditional religious ceremonies and for its perceived medicinal effects.  Middle and upper-class East Indian youths are the principal abusers of Mandrax.  The government launches periodic antidrug campaigns with funding from the UN and other international organizations.

IV.  U.S. Policy Initiatives and Programs

Policy Initiatives.  The principal goal of the USG is to encourage greater commitment and a more serious approach to counternarcotics by the  interdict narcotics transiting Kenya en route to the U.S.

Bilateral Cooperation.  In 1992, the USG provided the GOK with drug test kits to analyze narcotics seizures.  In September, the GOK extradited an American citizen to the U.S. to face charges of trafficking in  marijuana.  In March, however, a formal U.S. request for extradition of suspected Nigerian heroin trafficker was disrupted when a Kenyan judge released the man on bail and returned the $50,000 seized at the time of his arrest.  The suspect fled the country and has not been apprehended.

The Road Ahead.  The USG will work to promote greater cooperation, especially in the area of information exchange, between the two governments and will continue to provide training to Kenyan law enforcement personnel.  Finally, the USG will maintain pressure to combat corruption, which undermines much of the country's progress on antinarcotics efforts.


I.  Summary

Lebanon remains a major source country for illicit narcotics, despite efforts in the spring of 1992 by the Lebanese and Syrian security forces to eradicate poppy and cannabis cultivation at some sites in the Bekaa Valley.  Harsh winter weather and the eradication campaign destroyed much of the 1992 opium poppy crop.  Although Lebanon probably did not produce significant quantities of drugs for trafficking, the Bekaa Valley is the site of many hashish and heroin processing laboratories that continued to operate during the year.  Lebanese trafficking families also have maintained  alliances with South American traffickers, resulting in heroin-cocaine exchanges and a proliferation of cocaine processing laboratories in Lebanon.  Much of the cocaine appears to be destined for Middle East and European markets.  Officials seized heroin, cocaine, and hashish at Beirut International Airport as well as sites in the Bekaa Valley.

II.  Status of Country

The Bekaa Valley, which covers the eastern third of Lebanon, is a center of an international narcotics trade.  Cultivation of cannabis and opium poppy, and the production of hashish, opium, and heroin all occur within the valley.  In addition, cocaine base from Latin America is being transported for conversion to cocaine HC1.  Most of the cocaine, hashish and heroin produced in Lebanon is destined for Europe, although some does reach the U.S.

Opium, heroin, marijuana, hashish, cocaine, amphetamines, and prescription drugs are readily available throughout Lebanon.  Drug abuse is a growing problem, with hashish and heroin smoking common. Cocaine and amphetamine use is increasing.  

II.  Country Actions Against Drugs in 1992

Policy Initiatives.  The government of President Hrawi maintains that narcotics control is a high priority.  However, the unstable political situation and continuing presence of Syrian forces within the country means that Lebanon cannot engage in effective drug law enforcement without outside assistance, especially from Syria.  Lebanese and Syrian security forces participated in opium poppy and cannabis eradication in the Bekaa Valley in 1992.  The GOL also supported efforts by the UN to develop a crop substitution program to combat narcotics production in the Bekaa.  

Law Enforcement Efforts.  In addition to the eradication campaign waged by Lebanese and Syrian forces, Lebanese law enforcement officials made periodic seizures of drugs and processing laboratories.  In a December raid in the Bekaa, internal security forces seized 7.5 mt of hashish, as well as a cocaine processing laboratory and a small amount of cocaine.

Corruption.  The Lebanese government (GOL) does not, as a matter of policy, encourage or facilitate drug trafficking or money laundering. There were no arrests or prosecutions of senior GOL officials on drug-related corruption charges in 1992.  However, the USG continues to receive credible reports of corruption among Syrian officials, particularly among Syrian military in the Bekaa Valley and among intelligence units that exercise significant control over Beirut International Airport.  The Syrian government has acknowledged that individual members of its armed forces may be involved in the drug trade, and certain individuals stationed in Lebanon who facilitated drug trafficking reportedly have been transferred or relieved of their duties.  Nonetheless, Syria has yet to take effective action to address drug-related official corruption.

Agreements and Treaties.  Lebanon is a party to the 1961 UN Single Convention on Narcotic Drugs, but has not signed its 1972 Protocol, the 1971 Convention on Psychotropic Substances, or the 1988 UN Convention.  Despite apparent efforts to enhance law enforcement, Lebanon does not yet appear to be meeting the goals and objectives of the 1988 Convention, nor can it be  expected to do so as long as the GOL does not have full control of its territory.  

Following the UN Technical Consultation held in Beirut in October, the Lebanese have welcomed a UNDCP proposal to fund a two-part program to curb narcotics production and trafficking.  The first involves a $1 million law enforcement program to equip forensic laboratories and train enforcement personnel.  The second, aimed at shifting the economy of the drug cultivation areas through crop substitution, has been beset by technical problems and disputes among prospective donors.

Cultivation and Production.  In 1991, Lebanon had the capacity to produce an estimated 34 mt of opium from some 3,400 ha of poppy under cultivation.  This appears to have been reduced significantly following a harsh winter and the Lebanese-Syrian eradication campaign in early 1992 to destroy the remaining poppy crop.  

A UNDCP mission visited Lebanon in May, touring 15 sites known to have been under narcotics cultivation, and reported seeing no opium poppy or cannabis fields.  They saw evidence that some plots, in fact, had been plowed under.  The team concluded that Lebanon could not be producing enough opium for trafficking on any significant scale in 1992.  

Using technical means, the USG surveyed the area in the Bekaa Valley where the Syrians and Lebanese reportedly eradicated poppy fields and found virtually no poppy cultivation.  In the USG's view, a portion of the crop probably was eliminated in the eradication campaign.  However, the 1991-92 winter was the harshest in decades in Lebanon--with five major snowstorms--and much of the opium crop was destroyed by the weather.  Moreover, any of the surviving crop could have been harvested before the eradication campaign began or before the USG studied the area.

Lebanon had the capacity to produce an estimated 545 mt from 15,200 ha of cannabis under cultivation in 1991.  The USG has no information on estimated hashish production in 1992, although internal security forces reported a 7.5 mt seizure in the Bekaa in December.

Demand Reduction Programs.  The Maronite Church reportedly operates a drug abuse prevention and treatment center in a Christian area of Beirut.

IV. U.S. Policy Initiatives and Programs

Policy Initiatives.  The principal USG policy goal remains to convince the GOL to make a sustained effort to eradicate drug cultivation in the Bekaa and to curb drug trafficking.  The first and most important step is for the Syrians and the Lebanese to work together to formulate a comprehensive antinarcotics action plan.  The plan should include eradication goals for the Bekaa Valley with specific targets for opium poppy as well as hashish;  arrangements for observers, such as the UNDCP, to verify eradication results with periodic visits, especially during poppy planting season; a timetable for action to be taken against Syrian officials suspected of complicity in the drug trade; arrangements for officials from the U.S. Embassy and DEA to witness public burnings of seized narcotics, and to test samples of such narcotics; destruction of illicit drug production laboratories; action against trafficking in essential and precursor chemicals; and law enforcement efforts that target drug traffickers and their organizations.

Bilateral Cooperation.  During 1992, DEA continued to work with the GOL on narcotics investigations.  The chief of Lebanon's Judicial Police, who has responsibility for drug law enforcement in Lebanon, attended an INM-sponsored DEA training seminar in the U.S.  The USG would be willing to enter into discussions about a formal counternarcotics program in Lebanon if effective drug eradication and enforcement efforts appeared possible.

The Road Ahead.  Lebanese government officials have requested UNDCP counternarcotics assistance and crop substitution programs so farmers will not return to opium poppy and cannabis cultivation.  USG assistance might be considered on a multilateral basis as part of a serious, active drug control plan that can be monitored and will bring results.  


I.  Summary

Morocco is a significant producer of cannabis, most of which is consumed in Europe and North Africa as hashish.  Increasing amounts of cocaine and, to a lesser extent, heroin are transiting through Morocco to Europe.  During most of 1992, the Government of Morocco (GOM) did not conduct a vigorous anti-narcotics campaign despite widespread acknowledgement that the drug problem is increasing.  In October, King Hassan II called for a new effort to combat drugs.  As a result, the last three months of the year brought increased enforcement and interdiction, and an expression of will on the part of the GOM to do more.  However, poor interagency coordination, budgetary constraints, and corruption continue to plague Morocco's counternarcotics efforts.  Morocco ratified the 1988 UN Convention following the King's decree, and the Justice and Health Ministries drafted legislation to bring Moroccan laws into compliance with the Convention.  The legislation was being reviewed at year's end, but represents progress toward meeting the Convention's goals and objectives.

II.  Status of Country

Morocco is one of the world's largest producers of cannabis, with most processed into hashish resin or oil and exported to Europe.  Moroccan cannabis products also flow into Algeria and Tunisia for consumption or reexport to Europe.  Credible estimates of the amount of the crop consumed domestically range from 15 to 40 percent. Moroccan officials have expressed concern that hashish smuggling networks are diversifying into cocaine and heroin trafficking.  However, GOM-reported seizures of the latter two drugs remained small in 1992.  Officials report that foreign narcotics smugglers, particularly Colombians, now appear to be paying for Moroccan hashish with cocaine in an effort to build a local market for the drug.  The GOM has evidence of increasing cocaine and heroin use in Casablanca, Tangier, Tetouan, and other cities.  Although the drugs are readily available on the street, they remain relatively expensive.  Ministry of Health officials continue to cite abuse of prescription drugs as the second most serious drug abuse problem. 

Much of the exported hashish moves into Europe in trucks and cars on the ferries from Morocco to Spain, Gibraltar, and France.  Authorities regularly seize European and Moroccan trucks loaded with Moroccan cannabis products in Spain, France, and Northern Europe.  Substantial amounts of hashish and other drugs are also smuggled into Spain by means of small boats plying Morocco's Mediterranean coast.  There are indications that Atlantic coast fishing boats are used as well to smuggle cannabis products, and possibly cocaine, into the Canary Islands for transshipment to Spain and the rest of Europe.  Most traffickers arrested are Moroccan, although authorities have detained many Europeans and a growing number of traffickers from the Americas and Africa.  

Until mid-1992, most cocaine traffickers arrested in Morocco arrived at the Casablanca airport on flights from Latin America and were generally seeking to transit Morocco en route to Spain or Portugal, and perhaps further into Europe.  Arrests of cocaine traffickers in the Tangier area increased in 1992, and GOM officials reported what they suspect is a developing transit link used by West Africans (particularly Senegalese) carrying cocaine via Casablanca to Europe.

III.  Country Actions Against Drugs in 1992

Policy Initiatives.  Until late in 1992, Morocco maintained its antinarcotics efforts at relatively limited levels.  In May, the GOM and the EC, at the EC's request, established a Joint Narcotics Experts Group in Rabat to examine methods of improving GOM efforts and bilateral cooperation.  In October, King Hassan issued a directive to senior GOM officials to substantially increase their antidrug campaign.  As a result of the directive, Morocco ratified the 1988 UN Convention and undertook the process of reforming its laws to meet the Convention's requirements.  By the end of the year, draft legislation was completed and being reviewed internally by the GOM.  The GOM also undertook a two-phase antidrug effort in the cannabis-producing Rif Mountain region.  The first phase involved increased enforcement activities, including deployment of military forces to patrol the Mediterranean coast, augmented inspection of trucks departing on ferries, and anti-corruption efforts.  The second phase, according to the GOM, will be eradication and crop substitution.  Government officials indicated that the pace of the second phase will depend on the amount of developmental assistance Morocco receives from abroad.  In December, King Hassan requested over $700 million in EC financing to undertake a massive development and crop substitution program in the Rif.  It is too early to assess the effectiveness of these new initiatives.

Accomplishments.  Following the GOM's announcement in October that it was ratifying the 1988 UN Convention, the Ministries of Justice and Health drafted modifications of the Moroccan law to make it comport with the Convention's requirements.  Ministry of Justice officials expected the revisions to be enacted into law in the first few months of 1993.  According to them, the revised laws contain more severe penalties for drug-related crimes, mechanisms to allow asset seizure and controlled deliveries, and controls on money laundering.  In the Rif Mountain region, the GOM began an extensive trafficking control campaign that included both internal controls--such as roadblocks--and increased surveillance and interdiction of marine traffic crossing the Strait of Gibraltar.  The regular Rio de Janeiro-Casablanca flight was cancelled, in part because of its use as a cocaine conduit.  The GOM installed new senior law enforcement officials in Tangier to lead the antidrug effort.

In terms of crop control, the GOM claimed it put an end to new cannabis cultivation by burning crops in fields not previously used.  The GOM said that eradication of older fields depended on the  provision of crop substitution and developmental assistance for the region.

Law Enforcement Efforts.  GOM officials state that budgetary constraints limited their enforcement efforts.  Prior to and even following the King's October directive, lack of coordination and cooperation among the Surete Nationale, the Gendarmerie Royale, Moroccan Customs and other agencies responsible for controlling narcotics also limited GOM success.  With Moroccan ratification of the UN Convention, Moroccan law enforcement officials expressed hope that amendments to Moroccan legal codes would allow previously forbidden undercover operations.  GOM officials are expected to retain strict control of such operations carried out on Moroccan territory.

Narcotics cooperation between Moroccan and foreign law enforcement agencies remained confined primarily to training and liaison.  The GOM did, however, conduct talks with neighboring countries on improving law enforcement, intelligence gathering, and information sharing.

Corruption.  In October, the GOM admitted for the first time that drug related corruption was a problem.  In June, the former chief of a regional anti-drug brigade and 15 others were convicted of drug-related crimes and imprisoned.  In October, a newly-installed senior police official in Tangier relieved several suspect law enforcement officers of their duties.  Also in October, the GOM struck from the electoral rolls the names of approximately 400 candidates for local office because of their suspected involvement in the drug trade.  Despite these efforts, however, allegations of involvement of government officials in the drug trade, including high-level officials, persisted.

Agreements and Treaties.  Morocco became a party to the 1988 UN Convention in October, and its new emphasis on counternarcotics measures, if carried out, would put it well on its way to meeting the Convention's goals and objectives.  The U.S. and Morocco signed a mutual legal assistance treaty (MLAT) in 1983; it was ratified by the U.S. in 1984, but still awaits Moroccan ratification, despite frequent and continuing U.S. urging.  In 1989, Morocco and the U.S. signed a bilateral narcotics cooperation agreement in compliance with the Chiles Amendment.  The agreement provides for cooperation in the fight against illicit production, trafficking, and abuse of narcotics.  Morocco also has bilateral antinarcotics or mutual legal assistance agreements with the EC, France, Germany, Italy, Portugal, Spain, and the UK, and is a member of Interpol.

Cultivation and Production.  Official GOM estimates of the area under cannabis cultivation in 1992 ranged from 35,000 to 45,000 ha.  Most cannabis is produced by small farmers in the Rif Mountain region of northern Morocco, although some production also occurs in the Souss Valley in the south.  Cultivation apparently increased in 1992, although the GOM said in December that it had moved to block further expansion.  GOM officials estimate that an average hectare of cannabis produces 8 to 12 mt of raw plant, known locally as kif.  Each mt of kif is estimated to yield 100 kg of hashish.  No figures were available for conversion ratios of kif to cannabis resin or hashish oil.  In October, the GOM reiterated its policy of total cannabis eradication.  It warned, however, that given the likelihood of social unrest if wholesale crop destruction were undertaken, large-scale eradication would take place only in conjunction with substitution of crops having  "almost the same profitability."  The UN-sponsored crop substitution project in Al-Hoceima Province, which neared completion in 1992, is the only site where the GOM has been systematically eradicating cannabis.  At the end of the year, start-up of phase II of the project, planned for Chefchaouen Province, was awaiting agreement between the GOM and the UNDCP.

Drug Flow/Transit.  The USG believes small amounts of heroin, presumably of Middle Eastern origin, transit through Morocco from Algeria en route to Spain and France.  The GOM also believes cocaine transits Morocco by several means, including Latin Americans and West Africans traveling through Morocco to Europe by air, and sea shipment into the ports of Casablanca and Tangier, then by truck or boat to Spain.  Although the amount of cocaine seized in Morocco remained small, GOM and other observers suspect that the amount of cocaine transiting Morocco increased in 1992.

Demand Reduction Programs.  Ministry of Health officials have established a library of technical drug abuse materials and a model drug treatment center in Rabat, both with EC funding.  Also with EC backing, the Ministry of Health has undertaken a study of drug abuse patterns in Morocco.  A number of private organizations and educational institutions are trying to develop antinarcotics education and treatment programs.  Because of claimed budgetary constraints, however, the GOM's financial contribution to the programs has been minimal.

IV.  U.S. Policy Initiatives and Programs

Policy Initiatives.  Only small amounts of narcotics produced in or transiting Morocco reach the U.S.  The goals of U.S. policy are to encourage Moroccan antinarcotics efforts; to cooperate with Moroccan law enforcement officials to curtail production and transit of drugs; to provide training in law enforcement techniques; to promote GOM adherence to the requirements of bilateral and international agreements; to provide Moroccan-European cooperation in this field; and to encourage greater international cooperation to control Moroccan production and exportation of drugs.

Bilateral Cooperation.  Pursuant to the 1989 agreement, the U.S. and Morocco have maintained a dialogue on antinarcotics law enforcement issues.  The U.S. also has provided training and antinarcotics intelligence information where possible, including sending a Moroccan Customs official to the U.S. in November for a month-long program on combatting drug trafficking.  The U.S. continues to encourage Morocco to ratify the 1983 MLAT.  The U.S. also participates in the Dublin Group, both at the ministerial level and at the working-group level in Rabat, in considering narcotics issues that pertain to Morocco.

The Road Ahead.  The U.S. will continue to monitor the narcotics situation in Morocco, cooperate with the Moroccan government in its antinarcotics efforts and, with our European partners, provide law enforcement training, intelligence, and other support where possible.  King Hassan's antidrug directive in October may have imparted a new will to Moroccan officials engaged in the fight against narcotics.  As the drug trade has brought substantial economic benefits for many in the Rif region and elsewhere in Morocco, the GOM anticipates that it will face considerable resistance to reducing or eradicating cannabis production.  In the face of that resistance and given continuing allegations of official corruption, the likely impact of the King's directive remains unclear. 

[A Statistical Tables Chart for Morocco appears here in the hard copy.]


I.  Summary

Nigeria is a major transit country for Asian heroin and the focal point for most West African heroin trafficking organizations.  Nigerian trafficking operations continue to expand, both inside Nigeria and throughout West Africa.  The Nigerian Drug Law Enforcement Agency (NDLEA) made more arrests in 1992, but focused almost exclusively on drug couriers rather than on the leaders of the drug groups.  NDLEA seized more cocaine and marijuana but less heroin in 1992 than 1991.  The USG requested the extradition of four Nigerians wanted on drug charges; one has been extradited and the other three are at large.  Corruption remains an obstacle to effective counternarcotics efforts.  The government is seriously concerned about increasing domestic drug abuse.  While legal mechanisms are in place to combat what appears to be extensive money laundering, there has been no significant attempt at enforcement.  Nigeria is a party to the 1988 UN Convention, but has not made an effective effort to achieve its goals and objectives.

II. Status of Country

Nigerian trafficking organizations control courier networks that move heroin from Asia to U.S. and European markets.  Nigerians operate sophisticated drug trafficking and money laundering rings spanning five continents.  As worldwide law enforcement techniques shift to counter new Nigerian drug trafficking methods and patterns, Nigerian drug organizations quickly find new means to evade detection and arrest.  Routes and methods used to smuggle heroin into the U.S. are altered and expanded.  Despite increasingly vigorous international law enforcement efforts, Nigerian trafficking in heroin and transfers of millions of dollars to source countries continue unabated.

Cocaine comes to Nigeria from South America, primarily through Brazil, for consumption in Nigeria as well as for reexport to Europe.  Cannabis, the only illicit drug grown in Nigeria, is also shipped to Europe, although the NDLEA reports that it seized record quantities in 1992.

III. Country Actions Against Drugs in 1992

Policy Initiatives.  The NDLEA concentrated its efforts on expanding and defining its responsibilities, authority, and personnel.  During a period when most agencies' budgets were cut, the Federal Military Government (FMG) sharply increased funding for the NDLEA as well as for public awareness and demand reduction programs.  These efforts, however, were not sustained by an effective national strategy designed to root out trafficking and substance abuse.

Accomplishments.  The FMG, primarily through the NDLEA, conducted drug raids and seized small amounts of drugs at airports, border posts, and seaports.  NDLEA statistics show that for the first seven months of 1992, arrests increased over 1991 by half to 291, cocaine and marijuana seizures doubled to 538 kg and 2.05 mt respectively, and heroin seizures declined by two-thirds to 81 kg.

Law Enforcement Efforts.  Established in 1989, the NDLEA is a relatively new drug enforcement agency.  It has just completed the process of replacing police and Customs agents on loan and has increased its own staff from 800 to 2,200 NDLEA-trained agents.  By the end of 1992, five of the NDLEA's six national zones were operational.  NDLEA operations are supported by a Central Intelligence Unit and a Special Narcotics Task Force, the latter working in conjunction with the DEA.  NDLEA assigned four agents to the Lagos Interpol office to facilitate more timely intelligence sharing between the two organizations.  The NDLEA budget is slated to increase again in 1993.  

Despite this evidence of progress, the NDLEA's effectiveness remains limited.  Corruption continues to be a problem.  Lack of cooperation among NDLEA, the Police, and Customs hindered operations at Nigeria's international air and seaports.  While NDLEA statistics suggest that counternarcotics arrests were up in 1992, the NDLEA continued to focus on couriers rather than on those who control the trafficking networks.

The U.S.-Nigerian Joint Narcotics Task Force (JNTF), established under a 1989 memorandum of understanding (MOU), was involved in several operations during 1992, including the arrest of two suspects wanted on charges in the U.S.

Corruption.  The FMG does not, as a matter of government policy, facilitate the production or distribution of drugs or laundering of money.  Corruption, however, continues to limit the effectiveness of counternarcotics efforts.  Drug suspects are often released without proper court authorization.  Thefts of drug evidence have delayed prosecution of drug cases and have resulted in the release of drug suspects.  Some NDLEA, police and Customs agents have aided the escape of drug suspects.

The FMG began taking modest steps to combat corruption.  The Attorney General's office announced amendments to the drug law decree, imposing stiffer sanctions against law enforcement officials caught aiding the escape of drug suspects, or engaging in other corrupt practices.  Several NDLEA officials have been dismissed and arrested.  A chief intelligence officer of the NDLEA was sentenced to 30 years in prison after he was caught forging documents to obtain the release of a drug suspect in Singapore.

Agreements and Treaties.  Nigeria is a party to the 1988 UN Convention, the 1961 UN Single Convention and its 1972 Protocol, as well as the 1971 Convention on Psychotropic Substances.  The FMG takes certain measures that are consistent with the 1988 Convention's goals and objectives, but it needs to do more to enforce its criminal laws (especially with respect to money laundering) before it can be considered as adequately meeting those goals and objectives.  The UK, Germany and the Netherlands have programs with the FMG on counternarcotics issues.  Nigeria also hosted the UN African Regional Heads of National Drug Law Enforcement Agencies (HONLEA) meeting in May.

The 1931 U.S.-UK extradition treaty was extended to include Nigeria in 1935, and was the legal basis for the four U.S. extradition requests in 1992.  The U.S. and Nigeria signed a mutual legal assistance treaty in 1989, but  the U.S. Senate has not yet acted on it.  Nigerian Airways and U.S. Customs have entered into an Air Carrier Agreement which, when fully implemented, will act as a deterrent to those who seek to use the carrier's aircraft, equipment, and facilities in the trafficking of illegal drugs.  The agreement went into effect on March 1, 1993.  

The NDLEA continues to work with the Thai Embassy in Lagos to curtail Nigerian drug purchases in Thailand by requiring NDLEA clearances for certain Nigerian visa applicants.  According to the Nigerian government, far fewer Nigerians were arrested in Thailand on drug trafficking charges in 1992 than in previous years.

Cultivation and Production.  Cannabis is the only drug cultivated in Nigeria, and production and consumption are fairly widespread although statistics are unavailable.  Nigeria has no eradication program.

Drug Flow/Transit.  Nigeria is a major transit country for heroin traveling from Southeast and Southwest Asia to the U.S. and Europe.  Significant amounts of cocaine from South America also transit Nigeria to Europe.  Nigeria's importance as a transit country is growing, and its trafficking networks are expanding their operations to other West African countries.

Demand Reduction Programs.  As heroin trafficking through Nigeria has grown, there has been a corresponding increase in domestic drug abuse.  The FMG has made a genuine effort to attack the problem.  The NDLEA sponsored its second annual antidrug week, a coordinated effort between the FMG, schools, and private institutions to highlight the dangers of drug abuse through seminars and public meetings.  Seeking to publicize the economic impact of drug consumption, the NDLEA sponsored a series of lectures for businesses on the prevention of substance abuse in the work place.  The USG assisted the NDLEA and the Ministry of Education with a draft curriculum for antidrug education in all Nigerian schools.  With assistance from the UNDCP, the NDLEA opened two drug rehabilitation centers in 1992.

IV. U.S. Policy Initiatives and Programs.

Policy Initiatives.  The main goal of U.S. policy is to convince Nigeria to reduce trafficking by its citizens, particularly of heroin.  This will require the arrest and conviction or extradition of major traffickers and enactment of an anti-conspiracy law that will allow the organizers behind the couriers to be prosecuted.  This also will require operational cooperation among the Nigerian agencies involved in counternarcotics activity; it would be aided by improved U.S.-Nigerian cooperation through the JNTF.

Bilateral Cooperation.  Narcotics matters assumed a much more important role in U.S.-Nigerian relations during 1992.  Senior Nigerian officials, including the Foreign Minister, the Attorney General, and the Chairman of NDLEA, visited the U.S. to meet with senior U.S. officials and discuss ways to improve bilateral cooperation.  The JNTF participated in several operations during the year.  DEA provided the NDLEA with intelligence that led to the seizure of a heroin shipment to Lagos from Bangkok.

USIS sponsored an antinarcotics training team's participation in a drug workshop, a visit by a drug education specialist, and an expert in the development of antidrug curricula.  USIS also produced four Worldnet satellite teleconferences on drug issues and donated antidrug publications.  Under the terms of a bilateral agreement signed in 1990, the USG provided the NDLEA with radios and an automobile.  In September, the USG and the FMG signed an agreement for additional assistance to expand NDLEA's support capabilities.

In April, the USG requested that Nigeria extradite four individuals, two of whom were arrested by the JNTF, on drug-related charges.  The Magistrate's Court denied the extradition requests on the grounds that the defendants would not receive a fair trial in the U.S. and released both prisoners.  One of the four was rearrested and brought to the U.S. for trial in October.  The other three remain at large; the USG is pressing for their arrest and extradition.

The Road Ahead.  The USG will continue to seek the extradition of the three remaining subjects of the April request, as well as the extradition of other Nigerians wanted on drug charges.  In the coming year, the USG will provide equipment to improve the NDLEA's field investigative capabilities; generally support NDLEA efforts to become a more effective counternarcotics force; continue to urge the NDLEA to arrest and prosecute major traffickers as well as couriers; and urge the FMG to strengthen money laundering statutes and reform banking regulations to increase the accountability of financial transactions. 

[A Statistical Tables Chart for Nigeria appears here in the hard copy.]


Summary and Status of Country

During the past three years, Saudi Arabia has begun to face serious drug trafficking and addiction problems.  Saudi Arabia is used as a transit country, primarily for heroin moving from Pakistan and Southeast Asia to Nigeria and elsewhere in Africa, and onward to Europe and the U.S.  Saudi Arabia is increasingly involved in international drug trafficking in part because Muslim pilgrims easily obtain visas to visit the holy cities of Mecca and Medina, and traffickers use pilgrimage visas to travel from and through narcotics source countries.  Saudi Customs officials made several hundred drug seizures in 1992.  Saudi Arabia instituted a death penalty for convicted narcotics traffickers in 1988.  Some 48 Pakistanis were executed for trafficking in 1992.  Others executed last year for drug trafficking were nationals of Nigeria, Afghanistan, India, and Saudi Arabia.  

Saudi authorities also are concerned about rising domestic narcotics abuse.  While expatriate substance abusers are jailed and deported, the Saudi government has built several hospitals to treat Saudi drug addicts.  Treatment officials estimate that there are up to 10,000 Saudi heroin addicts; one clinic in Riyadh has treated over 6,000 in the past five years.  Marijuana, cocaine and amphetamines also are consumed in Saudi Arabia.

Saudi Arabia acceded to the 1988 UN Convention in January 1992 and is reviewing its laws to bring them into conformity.  In light of its vigorous drug law enforcement activities, the country already is moving toward meeting the Convention's goals.  Saudi narcotics officials regularly attend regional meetings of the UNDCP.  The USG sponsored a DEA training course in Saudi Arabia in 1990, and U.S. Customs has provided narcotics interdiction training to Saudi Customs since 1978.  In January 1992, the U.S. Customs Advisory Team introduced the Passenger Enforcement Roving Team (PERT) interdiction concept to Saudi Customs.  The use of teams resulted in 150 arrests of heroin smugglers.  Saudi Customs deploys more than 100 U.S. Customs-trained detector dog teams.  


I. Summary

Good air and sea connections to Europe and North America make Senegal an attractive transit point for Asian heroin.  Senegalese are increasingly involved in international narcotics activities, including the false document industry.  Most drug-related arrests occur at Dakar-Yoff International Airport.  Local drug abuse among youths is on the rise.  The principal obstacles to effective drug enforcement remain the inadequacy of local resources, corruption, weak border controls, and competing national priorities.  Senegal is a party to all major international conventions dealing with drug production and trafficking, including the 1988 UN Convention.  Although Senegal does take enforcement actions and cooperates with the USG, European, and international organizations on counternarcotics matters, it needs to do more about drug-related corruption to be considered as adequately meeting the goals and objectives of the 1988 Convention.  

II. Status of Country  

The only illicit drug grown in Senegal is cannabis, mostly for local consumption.  Senegal, in recent years, has become a more important transit point for Asian heroin bound for the North American and European markets.  The principal air trafficking routes remain the Bombay-Addis Ababa-Dakar Ethiopian Airlines flight and flights to or through Lagos and Abidjan.  Senegalese nationals are increasingly found in the international drug trade, as evidenced by the growing number involved in both fraudulent documentation and drug-related cases in France, Germany, and Italy.  Moroccan authorities also have identified growing numbers of Senegalese traffickers transiting Morocco.  Nigerian nationals continue to lead the list of narcotics offenders in Senegal, often coming to Dakar to either recruit or assist the onward travel of non-Nigerian traffickers who are less likely to attract attention from authorities at Western ports of entry.  The most common technique of smugglers is ingesting the drugs in capsules, balloons, or condoms ("body carries").  Although not a major money laundering center, Senegal is implicated in the BCCI money laundering scandal.

III.  Country Actions Against Drugs in 1992

Policy Initiatives.  Senegal sent representatives to a UN drug conference in Vienna and voted for several resolutions which introduced more restrictive drug controls.  Senegal also hosted Interpol's General Assembly in November.

Accomplishments.  Problems remain in persuading various government bodies that deal with drug trafficking to cooperate more effectively.  For example, under present laws, Senegalese Customs authorities are required to seize illegal narcotics immediately upon discovery.  The police would like to see legislation introduced which would allow controlled deliveries.  The National Commission on Narcotics, created three years ago, was a positive first step toward interservice cooperation, but it has met infrequently and is still bogged down on procedural questions.

Law Enforcement Efforts.  Most hard drug arrests result from searches and seizures at Dakar-Yoff Airport.  Although statistics for 1992 are not yet available, the number of such arrests has averaged around 20-30 per year.  In contrast, marijuana arrests countrywide number over 1,000, mostly users and low-level peddlers.  The most significant drug case involved the arrest of a major Ghanaian narcotics trafficker and four of his associates in December 1991 with 1.7 kg of heroin as they boarded an Air Afrique flight to New York.  They were released several months later due to "insufficient evidence."

Corruption.  Poorly paid civil servants are vulnerable to bribery from the large resources available to the traffickers. Instances of suspected drug-related corruption in the court system were mentioned in the press with more frequency in 1992 than in previous years.  In one case, a clerk of court was sentenced for selling hashish seized by the police.

Agreements and Treaties.  Senegal is a party to the 1961, 1971, and 1988 UN drug conventions and takes enforcement actions that conform to the goals and objectives of the 1988 Convention.  Senegalese authorities complain that their drug problems with The Gambia are directly related to the Gambian government's failure to ratify and enforce the 1988 Convention.  Senegal is a member of Interpol and relies heavily on drug information obtained through Interpol channels.

Cultivation and Production.  Senegal produces cannabis (yamba) and a somewhat more potent West African variant known as lopito.  Most of this is grown along the northern border of The Gambia and in the marshy Iles-du-Saloum region.  

Drug Flow/Transit.  Drug trafficking through Dakar is believed to be rising.  The government occasionally publishes statistics on drug arrests and seizures, usually in connection with a drug burning and destruction exercise held each spring to which the foreign diplomatic corps is invited.  The last published annual compilation of drug seizures was for 1989 when 14.5 kg of heroin reportedly were seized.  Based on subsequent drug destruction lists, the quantity of heroin seized may have increased to 20-30 kg per year in 1990-1991, but a knowledgeable police source believes that less than 2 percent of the trade through Senegal is intercepted.

Demand Reduction Programs.  Authorities are concerned about the increase in drug use among youth.  In June, the GOS sponsored a drug awareness week which includes a number of television spots and commercials on drug abuse.  The Senegalese Boy Scouts and several voluntary and religious organizations also sponsor antidrug programs.

IV.  U.S. Policy Initiatives and Programs.  

Policy Initiatives.  The U.S. drug policy objective is to curb the transit of narcotics through Dakar to North America and Western Europe.  Inadequate resources and corruption in Senegal are the principal obstacles.  In addition, Senegal's economic problems relegate drug control to a relatively low priority for the government.

Bilateral Cooperation.  During 1992, the USG provided narcotics test kits to the Senegalese Narcotics Brigade and donated training aids.  The USG kept Senegalese authorities apprised of narcotics-related arrests of passengers who had embarked at Dakar-Yoff Airport in an effort to encourage tighter controls at the point of embarkation.

The Road Ahead.  The USG will continue to encourage more effective drug law enforcement measures and invite Senegalese officials to participate in drug enforcement training programs.


I.  Summary

Heroin and hashish produced in Lebanon transit Syria in small quantities destined for Europe and the U.S.  Morphine base and opium from Southwest Asia enter Syria via Turkey en route principally to processing labs in the Bekaa Valley of Lebanon, although small amounts also may be processed into heroin in Syria.  Heroin, hashish, and psychotropic substances also cross Syria for other markets in the Middle East, including the Persian Gulf states.  Syria is not a major producer of narcotics, nor is it a site for international money laundering. 

In 1992, President Bush did not certify Syria as cooperating with the USG in narcotics matters because of Syria's continued failure to take effective actions on its own in 1991 to curb the involvement of Syrian military and security officials in the Lebanese drug trade, and its failure to formulate a comprehensive narcotics eradication and interdiction effort in conjunction with Lebanon.  The Syrian government did little to meet U.S. concerns about the involvement of its personnel in the Lebanese drug trade in 1992.  There were, however, signs of greater Lebanese and Syrian cooperation to control drug production and trafficking in the first half of 1992, in which unfavorable weather destroyed substantial areas of opium cultivation in the Bekaa Valley and Syria.  Lebanese forces eradicated much of the rest.  In both Syria and Lebanon, Syrian security forces reportedly staged or participated in operations that resulted in sizeable drug seizures of heroin and hashish in 1992.  The U.S. Government in 1992 continued its discussions with the Syrian government on narcotics cooperation and maintained a liaison relationship between the DEA and the antinarcotics branch of the Syrian National Police.  The standing contradiction between Syria's claimed counternarcotics policy and the involvement of its military and security personnel in aspects of the Lebanese drug trade remains, however, an obstacle to greater cooperation. 

II.  Status of Country 

Syria's significance in international narcotics derives from its status as a transit country and from the involvement of its military and security personnel in the Lebanese drug trade, centered in Lebanon's Bekaa Valley.  Reports continue to indicate that Syrian officers and soldiers protect and facilitate, for personal gain, the production and transportation of drugs out of the Bekaa, which Syria controls.

III.  Country Actions Against Drugs in 1992

Policy Initiatives.  Syrian forces in Lebanon cooperated with the Lebanese government in carrying out eradication efforts against some cannabis and opium crops in the Bekaa Valley, assisted Lebanese authorities in implementing a ban on further cultivation of illicit crops, participated in narcotics seizures and raids on drug processing laboratories inside Lebanon, and arrested individuals (later turned over to Lebanese police) attempting to carry drugs through Syrian checkpoints.  Within Syria, the government is reportedly moving to enact tougher legislation to deal with traffickers and has tried to allocate more resources to enable the Syrian Police to apprehend drug traffickers operating on Syrian territory.  Syrian Interior Minister Harba has repeatedly stated in public that Syrian authorities have orders to seize and destroy narcotics found in Syria as well as to help the Lebanese in their drug control efforts. 

Accomplishments.  There is no U.S.-Syrian bilateral agreement on narcotics.  However, the Syrian government has cooperated with its neighbors, various European governments, and the USG through established liaison channels to carry out controlled delivery operations and furnish information to assist in police investigations. 

Syria has taken some steps to meet certain goals and objectives of the 1988 UN Convention, inasmuch as it has cooperated with Lebanon to restrict the illicit cultivation, production, sale, transport, and financing of narcotics.  Syria is also considering additional legislation in accord with the 1988 Convention.  Current Syrian narcotics law calls for the seizure of assets held by persons arrested for narcotics production and trafficking offenses.  Through public demand reduction campaigns over state-owned media, the Syrian government stresses the dangers of and tough penalties for drug use.  The government, moreover, seeks to exploit the social and family stigma attached to drug use in Syria to reduce demand.  At the same time, however, toleration for drug-related corruption severely undercuts the goals and objectives of the 1988 Convention.

There is no extradition treaty between the U.S. and Syria.  The USG has no information concerning the experience of governments having such treaties and seeking extraditions.  Syrian-U.S. cooperation in the areas of legal assistance, law enforcement, and transit cooperation have been minimal but satisfactory.  The USG does not have information about the implementation of agreements Syria has with Cyprus, Jordan, Saudi Arabia, Iran, Egypt, and Turkey nor of multilateral agreements Syria has signed. 

Syria has not taken serious measures to investigate or punish senior government officials who are believed to be involved in the drug trade by facilitating the production, processing, and shipment of narcotic and psychotropic substances, or by discouraging the investigation or prosecution of such acts. 

Law Enforcement Efforts.  Syrian law enforcement efforts have been adequate to prevent domestic drug abuse from escalating out of control, but they have not deterred traffickers from transporting drugs into and across Syria, although departing drug traffickers periodically are arrested at Damascus airport.  Police officials seized a record amount of narcotics in 1992 and project larger seizures in 1993.  Syrian troops backed up Lebanese efforts earlier in the year to eradicate drug crops in Lebanon's Bekaa Valley and to enforce a Lebanese government order to farmers not to cultivate illicit crops. 

Corruption.  Syria does not, as a matter of stated government policy, encourage or facilitate production or distribution of drugs or other controlled substances or the laundering of drug money.  Syrian officials acknowledge the involvement of individual members of the Syrian military  and security forces in the Lebanese drug trade and claim that accusations of illegal activity are investigated by a competent military judicial authority.  The Syrian government has routinely denied that its senior officials are involved in the drug trade but credible evidence suggests that some officials have links to the Lebanese drug trade, and have used their positions to facilitate the production and transportation of illicit narcotics.  The Syrian government has not taken steps to investigate or punish senior government officials believed to be involved in the drug trade or who might be in a position to prevent the investigation or prosecution of criminal activity related to narcotics trafficking.  

Agreements and Treaties.  In December 1991, Syria deposited its instrument of ratification for the 1988 UN Convention.  Syria also is a party to the 1961 narcotics convention and its 1972 amending Protocol, as well as the 1971 Convention on Psychotropic Substances.  Syria has concluded agreements on the control of drug trafficking with Germany, the Netherlands, Iran, and Jordan and has agreements on combating drugs with Saudi Arabia, Jordan, Turkey, and Cyprus.  Syria is a member of Interpol, and Syrian representatives occasionally attend monthly liaison meetings in Cyprus of narcotics enforcement officers representing the U.S., Europe, and other Mediterranean countries.  There are at this time no negotiations underway or planned to conclude an agreement between the U.S. and Syria. 

Cultivation and Production.  No significant quantity of illicit drug crops is produced in Syria. 

Demand Reduction Programs.  Syrian government efforts to prevent drug abuse are essentially two-fold: increasing public awareness of the dangers of drugs through government-controlled media, and encouraging educational institutions and family pressure to rehabilitate addicts or stop casual use.  The Syrian government has imposed extremely stringent laws against the consumption, possession, and sale of illicit drugs.  These laws, in conjunction with family pressures of Syria's close knit society, have helped the Syrian government limit domestic use of cannabis.  However, growing government concern about abuse of harder narcotic substances and the influence of the comparatively stronger drug culture in neighboring Lebanon--felt mainly through Syrian military personnel returning from duty there--have prompted the government to deliver strong public warnings about the social consequences of drug abuse.  The USG is unaware of any public drug treatment facilities in Syria.

IV.  U.S. Policy Initiatives and Programs 

Policy Initiatives.  The USG has articulated two goals for its narcotics policy toward Syria: (1) that Syria should cooperate closely with the Government of Lebanon to eradicate cannabis and opium poppy cultivation and  processing in Lebanon, and (2) that Syria should investigate military and security personnel suspected of involvement in the Lebanese drug trade and punish those found guilty. 

Bilateral Cooperation.  The USG has no bilateral narcotics agreement with Syria and will not negotiate one until there is more tangible evidence of Syria's intention to deal with internal corruption and work with Lebanon to control the Lebanese drug trade.  In the meantime, the DEA, through its Nicosia regional office, has established a liaison relationship with the Syrian National Police.  The DEA uses this relationship to exchange information about active investigations and operations to stem the flow of drugs out of Lebanon. 

The Road Ahead.  In 1993, the USG will review with the Syrian government efforts made in 1992 and stress the need for greater activity to reduce drug production and trafficking.  USG efforts will reflect the UNDCP's analysis and the UN's apparent readiness to provide Syria and Lebanon tangible assistance.

[A Statistical Tables Chart for Syria appears here in the hard copy.]


II.  Status of Country

Moroccan hashish transits Tunisia to Libya or Europe, although the Health Ministry estimates about ten percent of it is consumed in Tunisia.  There is evidence of small quantities of heroin and cocaine transiting Tunisia to Europe.  Tunisian authorities believe that increased air links with other Middle Eastern countries offer opportunities to move heroin through Tunisia to European consumers.  In a well-publicized February 1992 case, authorities seized 6.4 kg of cocaine at the Tunis-Carthage Airport.  The Italian Embassy in Tunis raised concerns in 1991 about the use of Tunisian waters by fishing and pleasure boats smuggling drugs into Italy.  Tunisia recognizes that it has a problem in this regard and is stepping up interdiction efforts. 

III.  Country Actions Against Drugs in 1992

Production/Cultivation.  Cannabis is cultivated in scattered, individual plots in northern Tunis, but the drug rarely enters commercial channels.  Consumers are generally older farmers;  the use of marijuana and cannabis resin ("chira") was legal in pre-independence Tunisia.  

Law Enforcement Efforts.  Tunisia's interagency National Bureau of Dangerous Drugs, chaired by the Minister of Public Health, coordinates the government's antinarcotics initiatives.  The Bureau, created in 1986, includes representatives from the paramilitary National Guard (Interior Ministry), the Customs Service (Finance Ministry), and the Ministries of Justice, Foreign Affairs, and Youth.  

Corruption.  Tunisia is a relatively non-corrupt society.  While small facilitative payments do occur, outright bribery or illegal enrichment is not the norm.  In November, a French court sentenced President Ben Ali's brother, Moncef, in absentia to a ten-year prison term for money laundering activities.  The President had encouraged the Justice Ministry to investigate his brother's activities.  

Agreements and Treaties.  Tunisia is a party to the 1961 Single Convention on Narcotic Drugs and its 1972 Protocol, to the 1971 Convention on Psychotropic Substances, and was an early ratifier of the 1988 UN Convention.  In mid-1992, the Tunisian government approved new legislation significantly raising penalties on convicted drug traffickers to include life imprisonment and fines of over $1 million.  The law also provides for asset seizure, denial of certain civil privileges to those convicted, and barring of entry of foreigners ever convicted of drug offenses.  It also allows for addicts or certain first-time offenders to be enrolled in detoxification programs.   

While there are no U.S.-Tunisia counternarcotics agreements, Tunisia plays a positive role on the UN Commission on Drugs and has been generally supportive of USG narcotics-related initiatives in international organizations.  Tunisia is meeting its obligations under the 1988 UN Convention.

Bilateral Cooperation.  The USG provided training to Tunisian drug enforcement officers in 1989, 1990, and 1992.  U.S. Customs held a regional enforcement seminar in Tunis in July 1990.  Tunisian Customs officials also attended a U.S. Customs and U.S. Coast Guard-sponsored maritime security course in the U.S. in 1990. 


Twenty-eight sub-Saharan African countries received USG counternarcotics assistance in the past two years; five (Cote d'Ivoire, Ghana, Kenya, Nigeria, Senegal) are treated more fully in this report.  The remaining 23 are not particularly significant in the international drug trade, and are neither important suppliers to the U.S. nor major money laundering centers.  They are variously parties to the 1961 Single Convention on Narcotic Drugs, its 1972 Protocol, the 1971 Convention on Psychotropic Substances, or the 1988 UN Convention.  The narcotics control strategy and convention status of each is discussed briefly.  Those countries that have signed bilateral narcotics control agreements with the USG are noted.

BENIN.  Benin is attractive as a drug transit country because of its porous borders with Nigeria and Togo, and because travellers from Benin do not attract the same degree of scrutiny from U.S. law enforcement officials as do those from Nigeria.  In 1992, Beninese Customs officials made a number of well-publicized narcotics seizures from travellers--including some Americans--attempting to depart Cotonou airport.  Cases typically involved a Nigerian connection.  In 1991, less than one kg of cocaine, less than two kg of heroin, and 17 kg of marijuana were reported seized by Beninese authorities.  (No statistics for 1992 are yet available.)  However, Southeast and Southwest Asian heroin transits Benin to Nigeria and ultimately to Europe and the U.S.  Locally grown cannabis is used to a limited extent, and anecdotal evidence indicates growing use of crack cocaine among youth in Cotonou.

Corruption has hampered effective drug law enforcement.  Ten out of twelve members of the antidrug squad (including the Chief and his Deputy) were arrested or relieved of duties in mid-1992 because of evidence they had been extorting money from drug traffickers.  The drug squad was restaffed, but has much catching up to do.  President Soglo publicly acknowledged that a Minister of State under the old regime was heavily involved in drug trafficking, and the former minister has been tried and imprisoned on charges of theft.

Benin is a party to the 1961, 1971 and 1972 UN Conventions and Protocol, but not to the 1988 UN Convention.  Although the USG has no information about Benin's plans to ratify the 1988 Convention, it has taken certain measures that are consistent with the goals and objectives of the Convention.  For example, Benin signed a bilateral narcotics control agreement with the USG in 1991, under which the USG purchased a number of radios for use in antinarcotics operations.  In May 1992, with USG sponsorship, Benin held its first demand reduction seminar bringing together professionals of diverse disciplines.  

BOTSWANA.  Botswana is a transit country for illegal narcotics, mainly methaqualone (Mandrax), marijuana, and some cocaine, from India through Kenya, Zimbabwe, Zambia, and into South Africa.  Small quantities of drugs have recently been identified as bound for the U.S.  Botswana is a party to the 1961 and 1971 Conventions and the 1972 Protocol, but not to the 1988 Convention.  Although we have no information about Botswana's plans to ratify the 1988 Convention, it has made several advances toward meeting the goals and objectives of the Convention, including stringent antinarcotics legislation, cooperation with South African authorities, and a proposed expansion of the capabilities of its Criminal Investigation Division's antinarcotics personnel.  

BURKINA FASO.  While Burkina Faso is neither a major drug producing nor consuming country, drug use in certain sectors such as mining has grown rapidly in recent years.  Trafficking of heroin occurs from Nigeria through Burkina Faso to such neighboring states as Cote d'Ivoire and Ghana.  Traffickers also transit Ouagadougou by air from India and Ethiopia to Nigeria.  Burkina Faso ratified the 1988 UN Convention in 1992.  Although we do not have sufficient information to evaluate how well it is meeting the goals and objectives of the 1988 Convention, Burkina Faso has set up antidrug units in its two largest cities, an action which is consistent with the Convention.  Four Burkinabe officials participated in a Regional DEA/U.S. Customs course in Cameroon in 1991.

CAMEROON.  Cameroon is not a major drug transit, producing, or money laundering country.  Drug trafficking seems unlikely to reach significant levels in the near future, although Cameroon's political instability, corruption, and long border with Nigeria make it vulnerable.  Most drug arrests and seizures in 1992 involved marijuana, although some amphetamines and heroin were seized as well.

Cameroon is a party to the 1988 UN Convention and meets some of its goals and objectives.  In keeping with the Convention, Cameroon has instituted airport interdiction and public education programs and has increased inter-ministerial coordination through a newly created national drug committee.  The USG does not have adequate information on whether Cameroon's antidrug laws meet the standards of the Convention.  To comply with it more fully, however, Cameroon must address corruption.  While the USG is unaware of any senior official involved in narcotics-related activity, USG officials have observed contraband, including suspected narcotics, being smuggled into Cameroon from Nigeria in plain sight of Customs officials.  The USG has no information on sanctions or criminal
prosecutions for corruption.  

During 1992, one Cameroonian police official attended a DEA course in Cairo and the USG conducted three narcotics workshops for Police and Customs officials in Yaounde.  In November, the USG suspended two-thirds of its assistance programs to Cameroon over democratization and human rights issues.  This has delayed the provision of equipment funded under a 1992 bilateral antinarcotics agreement.  If conditions for restoring the suspended aid are met, the USG will proceed with implementing its program.

CAPE VERDE.  The Cape Verde Islands off the coast of West Africa are used increasingly as a transit country for narcotics from South America and Africa to Europe.  DEA reports indicate that Colombian cartels recruit Cape Verdean nationals to smuggle cocaine into Portugal by air and sea.  Local drug production and consumption is low.  Corruption is not a problem within the Cape Verdean government or its law enforcement organizations.  

Cape Verde is a party to the 1961 and 1971 Conventions and the 1972 Protocol, but not to the 1988 Convention, nor is the USG aware of Cape Verde's plans to accede to the accord.  Cape Verde independently has demonstrated a strong commitment to the goals and objectives of the 1988 Convention.  The government approached several countries and Interpol for assistance in developing counternarcotics strategies for the airport, Harbor Police and newly-formed Coast Guard (modelled on the U.S. service).  Using boarding procedures taught by the U.S. Coast Guard, the Cape Verdeans are improving their capacity to pursue and board vessels at sea, and made several large seizures over the past three years.  They continue to work with Interpol and Portugal to curb trafficking to Europe.  Cape Verde also assigned two drug detector dogs to the international airport on the island of Sal.  Under a 1991 bilateral narcotics agreement, the USG provided x-ray equipment which is being used at the regional airport at Praia for screening flights to and from the African mainland. 

CHAD.  Chad's long and uncontrolled borders, especially its border with Nigeria, make it a transit country for international narcotics.  Nigerian drug smugglers move some Asian heroin to or from Nigeria into Chad and other West African countries for onward shipment to the U.S. and Europe.  Domestic consumption of illegal drugs is limited to locally grown cannabis and "forty birds," a plant that produces a hallucinogenic stimulant.  Chad is a party to the 1961 Convention but not to the 1971, 1972 or 1988 Conventions or Protocol, nor is it taking actions that would meet the 1988 Convention's goals and objectives.  For example, although the Chadian government does not encourage or facilitate illicit drug production or distribution, or money laundering, neither does it make a serious effort to prevent or punish the corruption that facilitates the narcotics trade.  

The Chadian National Police have a small antinarcotics brigade which, in August, confiscated 13.4 kg of heroin carried by a Nigerian transiting N'Djamena Airport from Thailand.  Under a 1990 bilateral agreement, the USG provided the antinarcotics brigade with training and some equipment. 

COMOROS.  No drugs are cultivated or produced in this small island-country, but it is a transit point for drugs originating in Madagascar, destined for Africa and France.  Comoros is not a party to any of the international drug conventions, but has expressed an interest in acceding to the 1988 Convention.  Signalling its commitment to the goals and objectives of the Convention, Comoros has used some of its limited resources to establish an antidrug unit to combat drug use and trafficking.  France is providing the necessary training for the unit.  In 1991, the USG gave ten drug test kits to Comoros Customs officials.  

ETHIOPIA.  Addis Ababa is the hub for Ethiopian Airlines and a major center of African air travel.  Lack of controls, particularly with regard to drugs, has made Ethiopian Airlines an attractive means of transporting illegal products to other markets.  The airport receives direct passenger and cargo flights from Thailand, Pakistan, and India.  Nigerian and other couriers regularly bring narcotics out of Southwest and Southeast Asia through Addis Ababa for onward shipment to Western Europe and the U.S.  Ethiopia also is a source of khat, a shrub whose leaves produce a mild stimulant effect when chewed.  Khat grows and is consumed in Ethiopia, and is legally exported to Djibouti.

Ethiopia is party to the 1961 and 1971 UN Conventions, but not the 1972 Protocol or the 1988 UN Convention.  Ethiopia's transitional government has stated its intention that the country become a party to the 1988 Convention, but prefers that this issue be addressed by a democratically-elected government.  As a strong first step toward achieving the Convention's goals, the transitional government created an Anti-narcotics Division in the Ministry of Internal Affairs in June, and plans to increase the size of the unit from 16 to 30 staff in 1993.  The USG provided Ethiopia one position at the DEA African Regional Drug Enforcement Seminar in Cairo in 1992.

THE GAMBIA.  The smallest country on the African continent, The Gambia is facing a growing problem of drug trafficking, primarily heroin, within and across its borders, largely by Nigerian traffickers.  Since the creation of a drug squad in 1986, however, law enforcement efforts have been better coordinated and more effective.  

The Gambia is a party to the 1961 Convention but not the other UN Conventions or Protocol.  Nonetheless, it has taken a number of independent actions that comply with the goals and objectives of the 1988 Convention.  The Gambian Law Reform Commission revised the Dangerous Drug Act to provide for asset seizure and stricter penalties for drug offenses; the revisions will go to Parliament during the 1993 session.  The Gambia also established a drug analysis laboratory in 1992 and works closely with its neighbor, Senegal, on drug enforcement matters.  The USG provided The Gambia with drug test kits, sponsored training for some law enforcement staff, and supported antidrug education programs.

LESOTHO.  Lesotho is a transit country for Mandrax moving from India to South Africa, as well as for small amounts of heroin and cocaine.  Cannabis is grown in some parts of Lesotho and also exported to South Africa.  The Royal Lesotho Mounted Police has a small unit to combat smuggling of drugs and diamonds, and relies heavily on assistance from the UK and South Africa.  This unit made some arrests and seized more than one mt of cannabis in 1992.  The head of the unit attended a DEA regional conference in Cairo in 1992.  Lesotho is a party to the 1961, and 1971 Conventions and 1972 Protocol, but not to the 1988 Convention.  In 1989, Lesotho established a National Narcotics Board under the Ministry of Health to deal with the small local abuse problem and to recommend measures to bring Lesotho's laws into accord with the Convention.  The Board has yet to be given any real authority, however, although it may become more important once a civilian government is elected in 1993.  We have no information on progress toward meeting the goals and objectives of the 1988 Convention.  

LIBERIA.  Fragmented by civil war in 1989-1990 and the renewed hostilities in the latter half of 1992, Liberia is neither a major drug producing nor transit country.  Nevertheless, to avoid increased security along more established routes, West African traffickers reportedly use the country as an alternate route for illicit drugs, especially heroin but also cocaine, destined for the U.S. and Western Europe.  War-induced stagnation of the legitimate economy and the perception that Liberians are viewed with less suspicion by U.S. authorities than are other West Africans has made Liberia potentially  fertile ground for recruitment of drug couriers.  Drug abuse, while not widespread, is noticeable among urban youth and the various warring factions.  Marijuana is the most commonly used drug, with increases in heroin and cocaine, especially in Monrovia.  During 1992, the rival administrations which controlled different sections of the country devoted few resources to drug enforcement or demand reduction.  

Liberia is a party to the 1961 Convention and its 1972 Protocol, but not the 1971 and 1988 Conventions.  Its counternarcotics efforts are insufficient to conform to the 1988 Convention's goals and objectives.  In FY 1991, one Liberian officer received training in a regional DEA course.  

MALI.  Mali is not a significant drug transit country, although its proximity to West African drug trafficking centers and lack of border and airport controls put it at risk.  The planned 1993 opening of a Bamako-New York Air Afrique flight could attract traffickers seeking an alternative route to the U.S.  Small quantities of cannabis are grown locally.  

Mali is a party to the 1961 UN Convention, but not to its 1972 Protocol or the 1971 or 1988 UN Conventions, nor do we have information about Mali's specific plans to become a party to the 1988 accord.  The new democratically-elected government has indicated its desire to give high priority to the fight against narcotics production and trafficking.  As a preliminary step toward compliance with the goals and objectives of the 1988 Convention, it has established an antidrug police unit.  In 1991, two Malians attended regional USG training courses; there are no current or planned USG drug-related programs with Mali.

MAURITANIA.  Mauritania has not been a drug transit country, but in recent years Mauritanian authorities have uncovered a number of attempts to import narcotics.  Increased trafficking is most likely the result of enhanced enforcement in Morocco, combined with Mauritania's location as a possible way station between Latin America and Europe, as well as the low salaries of local officials and the reputed corruptability of many of them.  It has no significant domestic drug problem, nor does it hold any attraction for money launderers.  The country's extreme poverty, its host of other problems, and the relative absence of a drug problem have meant that neither the government nor its traditional aid donors have paid much attention to narcotics issues.

Mauritania is a party to the 1961 and 1971 UN Conventions and the 1972 Protocol, and has signed but not ratified the 1988 UN Convention.  In 1992, the government drafted legislation on narcotics production, consumption, trafficking and money laundering, written as broadly as possible to facilitate enforcement and stiff prison sentences, which is expected to be proposed in the next session of the National Assembly.  Mauritania also plans to establish a separate antinarcotics unit in the National Police.  Despite this evidence of commitment to combat the drug trade, high-level officials are rumored to be involved in trafficking.  Enactment of the proposed legislation and increased enforcement activity will bring the country close to conformity with the Convention's applicable goals and objectives, especially if it is able to deal with the problem of corruption.  For its part, the USG will encourage the Mauritanian government's increased attention to deterrence.

MAURITIUS.  Mauritius, a small island nation in the Indian Ocean midway between South Africa and India, is a transit country for methaqualone (Mandrax) from India to South Africa.  Heroin also transits the country, and some is consumed locally.  There is a potential for money laundering in its offshore banking industry.  In December 1991, the head of its specialized Antidrug Smuggling Unit (ADSU) was made Police Commissioner.  Authorities seized four kg of heroin at the airport in 1991 and 5 kg in 1992.  Most of those arrested have been Indians recruited in Bombay to carry small amounts to Mauritius.

Mauritius is a party to the 1961 and 1971 Conventions, though not the 1972 Protocol.  Despite being one of the first countries to sign the 1988 Convention, Mauritius has not ratified it, but is expected to do so.  In fact, Mauritius' antidrug programs meet the goals and objectives of the 1988 Convention.  Mauritius has the death penalty for importing drugs; five drug smugglers are currently on death row, though the sentences are unlikely to be carried out.  The country has an effective cannabis eradication program and a well-financed demand reduction and substance abuse program.  In October, it seized the properties and funds of a convicted Mauritian trafficker.  The USG has provided DEA training to members of the ADSU.

MOZAMBIQUE.  Mozambique is not a major drug producer or transit country, although it is a transit point for drugs, primarily methaqualone (Mandrax) from India through Kenya and on to South Africa.  Marijuana use has long been common among rural Mozambicans and is cultivated and used for medicinal purposes.  While domestic narcotics consumption is minimal, use of marijuana and cocaine among urban, upper-class youth is rising.  

Mozambican authorities seized a total of 50 kg of marijuana and arrested 84 persons in 1992, but reported no Mandrax seizures.  Despite rumors of official involvement in drug trafficking, narcotics officials lack the evidence and means to investigate such allegations.  Mozambique is not a party to any of the UN drug conventions, nor does the USG have any information about Mozambique's actions to meet the goals and objectives of the 1988 UN Convention.

NIGER.  Niger is not a significant drug transit or producing country and has modest drug abuse and corruption problems.  A landlocked country outside major African transportation routes, Niger has little international trade and no direct flights to the U.S.  The main threat is posed by drug smuggling networks in neighboring Nigeria; Niger occasionally has seized heroin (in amounts under ten kg) moving from Nigeria through Niger to Europe.  Narcotics-related corruption is not tolerated by the Nigerian government.  In 1991, senior Nigerian police officials were imprisoned for diverting seized drugs for their own profit.  

Niger acceded to the 1988 UN Convention in November and has taken strong preliminary steps toward compliance with the Convention.  Niger has established a national commission to coordinate government action against trafficking and abuse.  In 1992, the government organized two narcotics seminars and sent delegations to regional UN-sponsored seminars.  Niger cooperates with the U.S., UN, France, and other European countries in counternarcotics matters.  The USG has funded Nigerian participation in international narcotics seminars and provided data processing equipment and drug test kits.

SEYCHELLES.  Seychelles is a small island group in the Indian Ocean whose only domestic drug problem is marijuana, grown on isolated plots of mountainous land.  While some hard drugs may transit its international airport, this is not a major problem.  The islands have a tourism-based economy with large numbers of European tourists, who are the only significant consumers of hard drugs.  The government nonetheless is very concerned about drug consumption and, in February 1992, acceded to the 1988 UN Convention.  Given the modest nature of the problem and the scarcity of resources available, Seychelles is adequately meeting its goals and objectives.  Penalties for sale or possession of any illegal drug, including marijuana, are severe.  A tourist was recently sentenced to five years in prison for possession of a small amount of marijuana.  

SIERRA LEONE.  Sierra Leone is becoming more attractive as a drug transit country to Europe and the U.S., but there are no relevant statistics.  Couriers passing through from other African countries, tourists, and ships calling at Freetown are the means of transshipment.  Limited effectiveness of officials at both the airport and the port enables traffickers to transit the country with relative ease.  Law enforcement agencies are hamstrung by corruption and inefficiency, and seizures are only of small quantities--less than five kg for hard drugs, up to 50 kg for marijuana--that are often lost before cases get to court.  It is not a drug-producing country.

Sierra Leone signed the 1988 UN Convention in 1989, but has not ratified it and currently has no initiatives to implement it, nor is Sierra Leone a party to the other international narcotics conventions.  Since the April coup, there have been several commissions of inquiry reviewing corruption under the previous government, but without any known impact on drug-related corruption.  Domestic programs are limited by lack of initiative, funds and qualified people.

Sierra Leone has a sizable diamond industry with associated smuggling, and there is suspected heavy triangular trade in diamonds, money and drugs.  The USG provides minimal assistance and in-country counternarcotics training.

SUDAN.  Sudan's transshipment role in the international drug trade is a consequence of being Africa's largest country, with vast open spaces, a long, undeveloped Red Sea coast, and borders with eight countries and Eritrea.  Cannabis is the main drug of abuse.  The Government of Sudan (GOS) only recently began to take a serious interest in narcotics matters, and is addressing eradication, prosecution, and treatment.  In 1989, it established a Drug Combat Administration (DCA), but it remains poorly staffed and under funded.  The GOS is drafting a new narcotics law which will for the first time deal with synthetic drugs and drug treatment, and lower the penalty for first time users.  Repeat violators of anti-trafficking laws, however, can be hanged; two drug dealers have been hung since the government took power in 1989.  

Sudan is a party to the 1961 Convention, but not its 1972 Protocol or the 1971 Convention.  It is a signatory but not a party to the 1988 Convention, which it plans to ratify during 1993.  With Sudan's tough antidrug laws and enforcement measures, it is meeting the goals and objectives of the 1988 Convention.  Sudan also recently signed cooperative agreements with Egypt, Saudi Arabia, and Turkey for fighting drug trafficking.  The USG sent one DCA official to the U.S. on an International Visitor's grant in 1992.  

TOGO.  While Togo is not a major producer of illicit narcotics, it is a transit country for heroin, cocaine, and marijuana to Europe and possibly to the U.S.  Its proximity to Nigeria makes it attractive to Nigerian trafficking networks, which appear responsible for most of the trafficking.  Although Togolese authorities from the Department of Judiciary Police make serious efforts to intercept narcotics shipments entering or transiting Togo, equipment shortages and a fluid political situation have limited their effectiveness.  In 1992, the antidrug unit seized 18.8 kg of cocaine and 4.7 kg of heroin.  No senior officials been accused of illicit drug production or money laundering.

Togo ratified the 1988 UN Convention in 1990 and appears to be meeting its goals and objectives.  Togolese laws provide stiff penalties and fines for use, production or traffic of narcotics.  Convictions for drug use carry penalties of one to five years in prison and fines.  The penalty for trafficking or production is five years to life.  Togo also participates in international drug law enforcement initiatives and recently sponsored a West African drug laboratory conference.  A small drug laboratory was established in Togo in 1988 with UNDCP funding and technical assistance.  

In September, Togo signed a letter of agreement with the USG and received funds for the purchase of a narcotics surveillance vehicle and communications equipment.

UGANDA.  Although Uganda is not a major drug producing or transit country, cannabis grows wild throughout the country where it is used for medicinal purposes.  It also is becoming an increasingly lucrative export crop, transported by road into bordering countries and by water via Lake Victoria into Kenya.  Some heroin and hashish are transshipped from South Asia and Europe through Kampala's Entebbe Airport for South Africa.  Enforcement at Entebbe is focused on internal security issues, not narcotics interdiction.  Uganda ratified the 1988 UN Convention but has done little to address the increasing use of, and trade in, illegal narcotics.  Thus, it is not fully meeting its obligations under the Convention.  Narcotics enforcement is under the jurisdiction of the Ministry of Health, which also has responsibility for other severe medical threats, such as malaria and AIDS.  Four Ugandan law enforcement officers received antidrug training in the U.S. in 1990.

ZAMBIA.  Zambia is centrally located in southern Africa and has long been a transit country for illicit narcotics, principally methaqualone (Mandrax) from Asia to distribution networks, mainly in South Africa.  Transshipment of Southwest Asian heroin and South American cocaine to markets in Europe and North America by West Africans using Zambian travel documents and couriers is a growing concern.  Cannabis is grown locally, is inexpensive,  and is the most widely abused drug in the country. 

The government, elected in October 1991, focused in 1992 on the economy and the effects of a drought; measures to combat the drug problem were not a high priority.  For 1993, the government plans to introduce new antinarcotics legislation, including harsher penalties for offenders.  

Zambia is a party to the 1961 UN Convention, but not its 1972 Protocol or the 1971 UN Convention.  It has signed but not ratified the 1988 Convention.  However, Zambia's 1989 Dangerous Drugs Act established the framework for implementing provisions of the 1988 Convention.  It set penalties for money laundering, provided for asset seizure, broadened police powers, and authorized cooperation with foreign governments and the extradition of narcotics offenders.  Ratification of the 1988 Convention and passage of the new legislation would move Zambia closer to meeting the Convention's goals and objectives.  

The 1989 Act also established the Drug Enforcement Commission (DEC), with both law enforcement and demand reduction responsibilities.  The USG has funded personal computers for the DEC and sponsored DEA and U.S. Customs training for DEC staff. 

ZIMBABWE.  Zimbabwe is a country with worsening, although still modest, drug trafficking and abuse problems.  Harare's excellent airline connections make Zimbabwe an attractive transit country for drugs from Asia and the Middle East going to Europe and, through South Africa, to the U.S.  The arrest of several Nigerians and the expulsion of several others suspected of illegal drug activity, as well as a recent spate of U.S. visa applications by Pakistanis and Sri Lankans who had transited the Middle East and Nairobi en route to Harare, lend some credence to police claims that drugs move through Harare airport regularly.

With a police drug squad of six officers to cover a country the size of Montana, drug law enforcement is only partially effective.  The USG has sent Zimbabwean police officers to training courses.  Efforts of the Customs and police also are frustrated by lack of basic equipment and facilities.  Zimbabwean Police seized 5.1 mt of cannabis, 4,332 methaqualone (Mandrax) tablets, and 48 grams of heroin in 1992.  Zimbabwe is a party to the 1961 UN Convention, but not to its 1972 Protocol nor to the 1971 and 1988 UN Conventions.  Zimbabwe has not acceded to the 1988 Convention, and its drug enforcement efforts are limited.  In the USG's view, Zimbabwe is not yet meeting the goals and objectives of the Convention.

[Statistical Tables Chart for Other Africa]


[EDITOR'S NOTE:  Charts referenced to in brackets [ ] are available only in hard copy of report.]

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