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INTERNATIONAL NARCOTICS CONTROL STRATEGY REPORT, APRIL 1993
US DEPARTMENT OF STATE
BUREAU OF INTERNATIONAL NARCOTICS MATTERS
DEPARTMENT OF STATE PUBLICATION 10047
RELEASED APRIL 1993
The Report is for sale by the Government Printing Office,
Superindendent of Documents. Stock No.: 044-000-02370-9
This segment of the INCSR represents individual reports for the
Asian Nations
SOUTHWEST ASIA
Afghanistan
Bangladesh
India
Iran
Nepal
Pakistan
Sri Lanka
SOUTHEAST ASIA AND THE PACIFIC
Australia
Brunei
Burma
China
Hong Kong
Indonesia
Japan
Korea
Laos
Malaysia
New Zealand
Philippines
Singapore
Taiwan
Thailand
Vietnam
Other Asia and Pacific
[EDITOR'S NOTE: Charts referenced to in brackets [ ] are
available only in hard copy of report.]
SOUTHWEST ASIA
AFGHANISTAN
I. Summary
Afghanistan remains the second largest producer of illicit opium,
after Burma. According to USG estimates, the area of opium poppy
cultivation in Afghanistan in 1992 increased some 12 percent to
19,470 ha which would yield a potential 640 mt of opium. If all
of this potential opium were refined, it would equal 64 mt of
heroin. About 20 percent of the heroin consumed in the U.S. comes
from Southwest Asia, particularly Afghanistan and Pakistan; most
of the heroin exported from the region goes to Europe. Since the
end of the Soviet occupation, the Government of Afghanistan (GOA)
has publicly stated its opposition to drug production, trafficking
and abuse. Preoccupation with other issues and a lack of control
of large areas of the country by the GOA, however, has prevented
it from taking effective concrete measures against the illegal
narcotics trade. For the same reason, Afghanistan has not made
any significant progress in implementing the provisions of the
1988 UN Convention, which it ratified in February 1992. The USG
has official contacts with the government in Kabul in accord with
efforts to promote a stable government. The lack of central
authority, however, has permitted only extremely limited USG
initiatives in support of Afghan counternarcotics efforts.
II. Status of Country
Afghanistan, with poppy cultivation in 14 of its 30 provinces, is
second in the world to Burma in potential opium production. Two
provinces, Nangarhar and Helmand, traditionally have accounted for
75 percent of the country's total. In 1992, Nangarhar Province
alone accounted for over 60 percent of Afghan cultivation, while
the Helmand Valley accounted for an additional 20 percent.
Increases in opium poppy cultivation in 1992 may be attributed
primarily to deteriorating economic conditions which encourage
farmers, and returning refugees, to produce opium as a cash crop.
A significant portion of Afghanistan's raw opium production is
shipped to laboratories in Pakistan's Khyber Agency and
Baluchistan Province, where it is refined into heroin and morphine
base. Much of this is consumed as heroin and opium by a regional
addict population which extends from Iran to India; the remainder
is exported, primarily to Europe but to North America as well.
Afghan opiates are also exported in large quantities to Iran for
transshipment to illicit heroin laboratories in Turkey. There is
increasing international concern, too, that Afghan traffickers are
transporting opiates into and through Tajikistan, Turkmenistan and
the Caucuses.
II. Country Actions Against Drugs in 1992
Policy Initiatives. During its first meeting with U.S. officials
in June 1992, GOA officials promised to formulate a strong anti-
narcotics policy, stating that narcotics control is in
Afghanistan's own interest. Then Interim-President Rabbani
publicly pledged that "by fully observing international
commitments, and in order to wage an extensive and comprehensive
struggle, the Islamic State will prevent drug trafficking,
production, smuggling and use." In October, the GOA issued a
decree on its campaign against the production, trafficking and
illegal use of narcotics. It creates an inter-ministerial
Counternarcotics Commission headed by the Minister of Interior and
affirms Afghanistan's "duty to eradicate this illegal drug and
fight against it with all the available resources and fully
cooperate with all countries of the region, the world and related
international organizations." The first mandate of the Commission
was to develop a national counternarcotics strategy. The USG
doubts, however, that sufficient planning has taken place to
ensure that those elements of the decree which advance objectives
of the 1988 UN Convention can be implemented as proposed by the
GOA under current circumstances.
Afghan representatives reiterated this policy against illegal
narcotics at two UN conferences: the September Technical
Consultations on Drug Issues in Southwest Asia, held in Islamabad,
and the October Ministerial Conference on Illicit Drug Traffic and
Related Matters in the Middle and Far East, held in Tehran.
During the Islamabad meeting, the Afghan delegation solicited
international assistance to stem the drug problem and assured the
delegates that, once the political situation in Afghanistan is
more stable, the government would seek to develop remedial
programs. Similarly, media coverage of the Tehran meeting
reported the Minister of Repatriates' assertion that his country
is determined "to adopt measures at national, regional and
international scenes to combat narcotics."
Accomplishments. Political instability in Afghanistan prevented
any major counternarcotics achievements, but a number of events
signaled an interest in beginning to tackle the problem. In
October, Nangarhar Province Governor Hajji Akdul Qadir announced
the start of an anti-opium poppy campaign throughout the province.
As part of this effort, the official "Nangarhar Daily" initiated a
series of articles on the problem and efforts to deal with it,
including programs undertaken by the UNDCP aimed at eliminating
illicit crop cultivation. Sample headlines from August through
November read, "Drug Abuse is an Un-Islamic Activity and the
Struggle Against it is Necessary," "Nangarhar Jehadi Council
Launches Struggle Against the Fatal Disease of Illicit Drugs," and
"All Mujahideen and Muslims Are Obliged to Completely Prevent Drug
Abuse."
In other antidrug activity associated with Nangarhar Province,
officials of the Pakistan-based Afghan Narcotics Control
Organization (ANCO) NGO reported to USG officials in December that
ANCO, with UNDCP funding, had achieved considerable success in
reducing poppy cultivation in Hesarak District of Nangarhar
Province. A reduction in poppy cultivation from 35 to 5 percent
of the arable land was achieved as a result of an ANCO irrigation
project in Hesarak District, according to these NGO officials.
Despite indications of increased GOA political will to combat
drugs, and signs of fledgling regional counterdrug programs,
Afghanistan has not seriously begun to curb opium production.
Further, it will be difficult for leaders in Kabul to pursue
significant counternarcotics operations soon, given their lack of
influence beyond the Afghan capital. The lack of central
government control over much of Afghanistan's drug producing
regions has fostered the rise of several warlords, such as Mullah
Rosoul Akhundzada in the Helmand Valley, who have reportedly
amassed political power and wealth through drug trafficking.
Corruption. The GOA, as a matter of policy, does not encourage or
facilitate illicit production or distribution of drugs or other
controlled substances. However, recurrent reports allege
involvement of narcotics production and trafficking by some
regional and provincial leaders.
Cultivation and Production. Opium poppy cultivation and yield
estimates for Afghanistan are based on USG satellite imagery
surveys. The 1992 cultivation total of 19,470 ha represents a
moderate increase over 1991's cultivation of more than 17,000 ha
of opium poppy with a potential production of some 570 mt of
opium. While a significant increase, the 1992 potential yield of
640 mt is still well under the 1988 high for Afghanistan of 750 mt
of opium produced from some 23,000 ha. Favorable weather
prevailed throughout the country during the 1991-92 opium poppy-
growing season and the resulting yields were better than normal.
There was a slight increase in opium poppy production in the
Helmand Valley in 1992 as growers continued to recover from the
low of only five mt of potential production in 1990 when a major
cultivation ban was in effect. Helmand cultivation has increased
since the ban was lifted in 1991, to 3,630 ha in that year and to
3,740 ha in 1992, but it still remained considerably below the
1988 high for the valley of 7,870 ha.
Ranking far behind Nangarhar and Helmand are Bamian, Kemar,
Oruzgan, Paktia and Herat provinces, each of which cultivated
between 500-700 ha of opium poppy in 1992. Cultivation continued
to grow dramatically in Bamian and Herat, increasing over 500
percent in these provinces since 1990. The growers in the Herat
area, while not returning in large numbers during the 1992 growing
and harvesting season, may have returned temporarily to sow and
harvest opium poppy as a first step toward reestablishing their
lives in Afghanistan.
Opium poppy yields in Afghanistan are among the highest in the
world. Poppy can be grown on a variety of terrains with or
without irrigation, and the opium can be stored indefinitely and
easily transported, making this crop ideal for the primitive
conditions of Afghanistan. A bumper opium poppy crop is likely in
1993 as returning refugees look to opium to rebuild their lives.
Major increases are likely not just in the major growing areas,
but also in Konar, Kandahar, Herat and Bamain, as local tribal
leaders struggle to support the swelling numbers of returning
refugees and rebuild the rural infrastructure shattered by the
devastating guerrilla war.
Agreements and Treaties. Afghanistan is a party to the 1961 UN
Single Convention on Narcotics Drugs, but not to the 1972 UN
Protocol amending the Convention. It is also a party to the 1971
UN Convention on Psychotropic Substances, and, on February 14,
1992 became a party to the 1988 UN Convention. In October, the
Iranian press claimed the government had signed an antidrug
cooperation agreement in Kabul, which included a mutual exchange
of liaison officers.
IV. U.S. Policy Initiatives and Programs
Bilateral cooperation in narcotics control with Afghanistan is
problematic because of limited USG contact with the central
government. It is also hampered by the GOA's lack of authority
much beyond the capital. Nevertheless, the USG undertook several
initiatives in 1992, especially to persuade other donor nations
and international organizations to take an active interest in
narcotics control in Afghanistan. While waiting for the political
situation to stabilize, initial USG goals and objectives for
Afghanistan are:
--With approval of the GOA, to seek opportunities for
decentralized narcotics control cooperation with local leaders who
can enforce commitments to take action against drug production and
trafficking.
--To encourage donor nations, particularly Europeans who are the
key targets of the Afghan drug trade, to enter into cooperative
agreements with Afghanistan to control narcotics.
--To find ways to ensure that international developmental support
to Afghanistan is linked to reducing and eliminating poppy
cultivation by including opium poppy clauses in all project
agreements.
--To help Afghanistan evaluate the extent of its narcotics
problem, recommend concrete counternarcotics programs and begin
compliance with the 1988 UN Convention.
The USG provided financial support for UNDCP's September Technical
Consultation on Drug Issues in Southwest Asia which was held in
Islamabad. The USG also backed the range of findings of the
conference, attended by more than 20 nations and international
organizations. The conferees agreed that in Southwest Asia:
--UNDCP operational activities should provide resources to
facilitate law enforcement and demand reduction initiatives.
--Drug issues must be tied to the UNDP's programs and funding
associated with Afghanistan's reconstruction and rehabilitation.
--Existing international bodies, such as the Economic Cooperation
Organization, should be used to advance narcotics control in the
region.
--Governments and the UN should share opium poppy crop production
estimates for systematic monitoring and updating.
--Nations in the region should exchange information on the broad
range of crop control law enforcement, drug abuse and demand
reduction issues.
--Joint training should be organized for narcotics law
enforcement, drug rehabilitation and demand reduction.
--Support should be provided for a subregional "joint working
group" to develop a master plan for narcotics control.
The USG also was able to initiate a small, cross-border narcotics
control project in 1992 in Kandahar Province. The narcotics
letter of agreement, signed with the Kandahar NGO, Relief
Institution for the Reconstruction of Afghanistan, provided
$164,000 for various agricultural and infrastructure projects in
the province, but tied to agreements of local authorities not to
permit cultivation of poppy or other illicit crops, and to combat
narcotics manufacture, trafficking and abuse. The USG provided
matching funds to UNDCP which will also be used in Kandahar,
making a U.S. drug control contribution to the area of more than
$300,000.
The Road Ahead. As the political situation settles in
Afghanistan, the USG will seek to expand gradually policies and
programs designed to help Afghanistan implement effective
narcotics control measures. A first objective would be to
conclude an umbrella bilateral narcotics control agreement. The
USG might also consider bilateral funding, principally to help
Afghanistan start to build effective institutions. Possible
programs include training, equipment procurement and technical
assistance, such as help with the establishment of a
counternarcotics police unit. The USG will also continue to
encourage European and other donor nations, as well as
international organizations, to help Afghanistan combat its
illicit drug problem.
[Chart - Afghanistan 1993 Statistical Tables]
(###)
BANGLADESH
I. Summary
Bangladesh is not a significant producer of narcotics, but has
the potential to become a significant transshipment point for
heroin because of its proximity to producing areas and its
extremely limited interdiction capability. The Bangladesh
Government's (BDG) Department of Narcotics Control (DNC) takes the
lead on narcotics issues, but law enforcement is hampered by
inadequate resources and a lack of coordination between government
departments. Thus far, international support for the BDG's
fledgling narcotics control efforts has been limited. However, a
proposed $1.7 million UNDCP project for Bangladesh, along with
increased bilateral assistance, should enhance the BDG's
capabilities. Bangladesh is a party to the 1988 UN Convention.
II. Status of Country
As international enforcement efforts focus on traditional transit
drug routes in the region, Bangladesh is becoming an attractive
alternative for Southeast Asian heroin destined for international
markets. In addition to past cross-border smuggling, unconfirmed
reports indicate that Muslim Rohingya refugees from Burma are
smuggling small quantities of heroin into Bangladesh.
The BDG is also concerned that acetic anhydride (AA), a precursor
for heroin manufacture, is moving from India through Bangladesh to
mobile heroin laboratories in Burma. There are an estimated
100,000 drug addicts in Bangladesh, principally users of "brown
sugar" heroin, usually from India. The only illicit drug
cultivated in Bangladesh is cannabis, which was declared illegal
in 1983. The DNC estimates that in 1984, the last year of legal
cultivation, 34 mt of marijuana were produced. No recent
estimates for production are available. Most marijuana is sold
for local consumption.
III. Country Action Against Drugs in 1992
Bangladesh has signed and ratified the 1988 UN Convention, the
1961 UN Single Convention on Narcotics Drugs Act, and the 1990
SAARC Convention on Narcotics Drugs and Psychotropic Substances.
Bangladesh has signed a number of protocols that include pledges
for increased bilateral narcotics cooperation. The 1990 Narcotics
Control Act updated drug laws and brought them into accord with
the 1988 UN Convention.
BDG narcotics control efforts are hampered by limited material and
human resources, and lack of coordination among BDG agencies. The
Narcotics Control Board, formed in 1989 to design a national drug-
control strategy, was deactivated following the fall of the Ershad
regime in 1990.
The year's most significant heroin seizure occurred in February at
Dhaka's Zia International Airport when an American citizen was
arrested for possession of 3.7 kg of heroin No. 4. A Nigerian and
a South African were also arrested. All three are currently under
trial in Dhaka, and if convicted, face the possibility of the
death penalty. Other seizures in 1992 were of low-quality "brown
sugar" heroin, locally cultivated cannabis, and small amounts of
imported opium.
The BDG has no evidence of money laundering. Possible official
corruption appears to be limited to border areas and related to
the smuggling of "brown sugar" heroin.
The BDG has taken some steps to promote drug awareness. These
include antidrug campaigns including public meetings, television
and radio advertisements, and books and pamphlets on the dangers
of drug abuse.
The UNDCP plan for Bangladesh, still to be approved by the
government, focuses on demand reduction, treatment, and the
development of a long-term narcotics control strategy. The DNC
has expressed confidence that the UNDCP project, along with
increased bilateral assistance, will enhance its narcotics control
capabilities.
IV. U.S. Policy Initiatives and Programs
The primary USG interest in Bangladesh is to help the BDG prevent
the country from becoming a transshipment point for Burmese
heroin. The USG seeks to strengthen BDG agencies responsible for
narcotics detection and interdiction by providing some basic
training and equipment. In 1992, the USG sent five BDG officials
to Nepal for a two-week DEA training course. The USG also signed
a letter of agreement (LOA) with the BDG to provide $20,000 for
narcotics control equipment for the DNC.
(###)
INDIA
I. Summary
India's importance to the international drug trade is as a transit
route for heroin and other illegal opium derivatives from
neighboring producing countries. Other important drug control
problems are diversion from its licit opium industry to illicit
channels, illegal cultivation, and illicit export of essential and
precursor chemicals. Despite good cooperation with the U.S. on
individual cases of trafficking and greater efforts to curtail
diversion from licit cultivation, the Government of India (GOI)
needs to raise the priority of antidrug programs and take stronger
measures to control the transit of drugs and to prevent licit
opium diversion. India is a party to the 1988 UN Convention and
is making progress in meeting its goals and objectives.
II. Status of Country
Situated between the world's two largest opium-producing regions,
India traditionally has been a transit country for illicit
narcotics from Afghanistan, Pakistan, and Burma. Destined
primarily for Europe, and also for the U.S., this traffic grew
when the Gulf War disrupted the traditional land routes to Turkey.
India is the world's largest producer of licit opium for
pharmaceutical purposes, but also produces heroin from diverted
licit opium and illegally grown opium. Most diverted narcotics
probably are consumed domestically, but there have been reports of
processing for export of some of the diverted production.
Diversion occurs in Madhya Pradesh (M.P.), Rajasthan, and Uttar
Pradesh (U.P.), the three states in which the GOI licenses poppy
cultivation. Poppies are grown illicitly in the Himalayan
foothills of U.P. and in northeast India near the Bangladeshi and
Burmese borders. India produces acetic anhydride (AA), the
essential chemical used by illicit labs throughout South Asia to
convert opium into heroin. "Heroin base" remains the drug of
choice, except in the northeast state of Manipur, where increased
intravenous use of Burmese No. 4 heroin has spread the AIDS virus.
Indian "heroin base" is readily available in Nepal, Bangladesh,
Sri Lanka, and Maldives.
III. Country Actions Against Drugs in 1992
Policy Initiatives. The Central Bureau of Narcotics (CBN) and the
Narcotics Control Bureau (NCB), responsible respectively for
coordinating licit and illicit drug control, have not been
provided the political support or funds to carry out their tasks
effectively. Nevertheless, in its poppy-cultivation guidelines
for the 1992-93 crop year, the GOI made more stringent the
provisions on licit opium production to reduce diversion. New
measures included: (1) raising by about 12 percent the minimum
amount of opium which growers must sell to the GOI in order to
obtain a license for the next crop year; (2) tightening terms of
the crop-damage clause; (3) reducing the amount of allowable
excess cultivation; (4) raising the GOI purchase price for licit
opium, and (5) paying incentives to growers who sell to the GOI
more opium than the 1991-92 average yield of almost 4.5 kg per
plot (the highest average yield on record). In addition, at the
turn of the year, the GOI announced creation of a new senior-level
position of Special Secretary for Narcotics, who will supervise
both the CBN and the NCB.
Accomplishments. The GOI says it uproots illicit opium poppy
whenever it is discovered, although the amount of opium poppy
eradicated in 1992 declined by more than 80 percent from the
previous year. The press has reported on government uprooting of
illicit poppy plants (allegedly grown for its seed, not opium
content) in the Himalayan foothills. Continued reports of
diversion and illicit production, however, suggest that the GOI
needs to improve controls. Although the GOI has become more
concerned with illicit opium production, GOI seizures fell to
1,813 kg in 1992 from 2,145 kg in 1991. Heroin seizures, however,
rose to 1,034 kg in 1992 from 622 kg in 1991. Indian law
enforcement agencies (the NCB, CBN, Central Board of Excise and
Customs, Directorate of Revenue Intelligence, the Border Security
Force, and various state-level agencies) made 11,540 arrests under
the Narcotic and Psychotropic Substances Act during the year, more
than double the 5,300 arrests made in 1991.
Law Enforcement Efforts. The CBN's staff of about 1,400 has
remained static, even though the number of licit growers continues
to decline, from over 250,000 a decade ago to about 137,000 today;
thus, the ratio of enforcement officers to growers actually has
increased. The Special State Narcotics Courts mandated by the
1988 drug law to expedite the trials of traffickers have been
established only in Maharashtra and West Bengal. Lack of funds
prevents their full operation in these two states as well as the
establishment of additional courts in other states. The GOI has
regulations controlling sale and possession of AA within 50 km of
the Indo-Pakistani border and 100 km of the Indo-Burmese border.
However, smuggling of AA into Pakistan and Burma continues. The
GOI announced in early 1993 that initial steps towards national AA
control have been instituted to identify manufacturers and
distributors.
No new law enforcement measures were enacted during 1992.
Competing and occasionally overlapping jurisdictions of law
enforcement and other governmental agencies continue to hinder
effective action against traffickers, illicit cultivators, heroin
labs, and licensed licit cultivators who divert part of their
crop. Although existing laws are adequate to conduct effective
counternarcotics operations, stronger rules on asset seizure,
conspiracy, and money laundering would aid in fighting
international trafficking. Increased efforts are needed to
address official corruption which facilitates diversion of licit
opium.
Given Indian efforts to control illegal cultivation, production
and trafficking as well as other activities covered by the 1988 UN
Convention, the USG believes that the GOI is making some progress
in meeting the goals and objectives of the Convention.
Corruption. Corruption among police, government officials, and
local politicians is widely alleged but seldom prosecuted. The
USG has seen reports of corruption within the various GOI agencies
responsible for drug enforcement, but the USG cannot verify the
extent of corruption in the Indian government fully or
independently. CBN field officers are now shifted among the licit
growing areas to break ties among CBN officers, traffickers, and
farmers who divert. For the first time, CBN staff have been
dismissed or suspended because of corruption. Such actions were
taken against five percent of the CBN staff in 1992. India does
not encourage corruption as a matter of government policy. The
USG is not aware that any senior official encourages or
facilitates trafficking or money laundering.
Agreements and Treaties. Extradition of fugitives between the
U.S. and India is covered by the U.S.-UK Extradition Treaty of
1931. India and the UK signed a new extradition treaty in 1992.
Neither the GOI nor the USG made any drug-related extradition
requests during 1992.
Cultivation and Production. India is the world's largest producer
of licit opium for pharmaceutical use. Unlike other narcotic raw
material suppliers, India produces only opium gum. In 1992, the
GOI set up a committee to study the feasibility of partial
conversion to concentrated poppy straw (CPS). Lack of alternative
employment to poppy cultivation and poor infrastructure in the
growing areas appear to be major constraints to any change in
production methods, but the GOI is considering construction of a
pilot CPS plant.
The GOI also continues to withdraw licenses from farmers who do
not sell the GOI the required minimum yield. About 5,500 farmers
permanently lost licenses in 1992, bringing the number of licit
growers down to about 137,000. Each licensed farmer is limited to
poppy cultivation on 1/10 of a hectare and must sell the GOI at
least 3.8 kg of opium at 70-degree consistency (30-percent
moisture) in M.P. and Rajastan and 3.6 kg in U.P. These minimum
yield levels were set in 1992 and represent an increase of more
than ten percent from previous minimum yields. The GOI is
considering continued raising of the minimum yields for the next
few years.
The Department of Revenue in the Ministry of Finance has
responsibility for licit opium cultivation, operation of opium
factories in Neemuch and Ghazipur, prevention of diversion into
illicit channels, and counternarcotics police work on the national
level. The creation in early 1993 of a Special Secretary for
Narcotics should focus more attention on the issue.
Security at both opium-processing factories, which also stockpile
opium prior to sale, is generally good. The stockpile had been
reduced from 2,057 mt in 1990, to 1,541 mt in 1991 and 1,185 mt in
early 1992; it is expected to fall below 1,000 mt (the approximate
level of world opium demand for one year) for the first time since
1979. The 1991-92 licit opium crop harvested in the spring of
1992 was 495 mt at 90-degree consistency (10-percent moisture).
Average yield (i.e., opium sold to the GOI) was the highest on
record, about 4.5 kg per licit plot. It is known that some
farmers do not sell their entire crop to the GOI, as provided by
law, and illegally sell amounts of opium varying in weight from a
few grams to several kg to traffickers for as much as several
hundred times the GOI purchase price. Unsubstantiated estimates
of the amount diverted are from 10 to 30 percent of the total
crop. The area under licit poppy cultivation has been reduced by
about 80 percent, from 66,000 ha in 1978 to just under 14,000 ha
in 1992.
Drug Flow/Transit. India has long been a major transshipment
point for heroin from Afghanistan and Pakistan, and from the
Burma/Laos/Thailand region. NCB statistics on heroin seizures
made between January and October show that possibly as much as 80
percent of the 1,034 kg of the heroin was identified as being of
Southwest Asian origin. The figure for all of 1991 was 77
percent. Although intelligence gathered in 1992 indicates a rise
in transshipment through and use of Southeast Asian heroin, NCB
seizures show a drop in the percentage of heroin originating in
Southeast Asia from just under 2 percent in 1991 to about 0.6
percent during the first 10 months of 1992. The rise in recent
years in HIV cases in the northeast, which are directly linked to
greater use of injectable heroin, raises doubts that enforcement
measures in the region accurately reflect the transit of Southeast
Asian heroin through India and Bangladesh.
Demand Reduction Programs. There are no GOI data on the magnitude
of opium and heroin addiction, but estimates of the number of
addicts range from one to five million for opium and about one
million for heroin. The GOI is concerned about growing heroin
addiction by the middle class and among urban workers. The Health
and Welfare Ministries, the UNDCP, and police groups support
treatment and rehabilitation centers. NGOs conduct demand
reduction and public awareness programs, but lack adequate funding
and staff.
IV. U.S. Policy Initiatives and Programs
Policy Initiatives. The USG works with the GOI to focus more
political attention and financial resources for counternarcotics
programs to reduce the flow of heroin transiting India and to stop
diversion from the licit opium industry. We have urged the GOI to
focus on major trafficking organizations, to improve cooperation
with Pakistan and Burma, to increase minimum yields and incentives
to sell opium to the government, and to strengthen controls on AA.
The USG has urged the GOI to update its domestic antidrug laws to
comply with the obligations of the 1988 UN Convention particularly
those related to forfeiture.
Bilateral Cooperation. The USG continues to fund training
programs for enforcement personnel and the Indian Coast Guard.
Relations between the DEA and NCB continue to be good, with
emphasis on exchanges of narcotics information and cooperation on
controlled deliveries from India to other countries. Pursuant to
the U.S.-India Narcotics Agreement of 1990, India and the U.S.
signed a letter of agreement September 25, 1992, to establish a
trafficker profile system at Bombay Airport. This is the first
time the GOI has accepted bilateral U.S. counternarcotics funding,
although it has accepted UNDCP assistance in interdiction and
demand reduction. India is a party to the 1961 UN Single
Convention on Narcotic Drugs, its 1972 Protocol, the 1971 UN
Convention on Psychotropic Substances, and the 1988 UN Convention.
The Road Ahead. Effective drug control will require the GOI to
strengthen political support for counternarcotics efforts and
devote greater resources to the drug problem. Such reforms appear
even more difficult in the wake of nationwide civil unrest caused
by the destruction of the Mosque in Ayodhya, which is near licit
opium growing areas in U.P. and the Ghazipur Opium Factory.
Nonetheless, the GOI appears to be gradually changing its view of
narcotics control, especially with regard to the importance of
controlling diversion of licit opium. The USG will urge the GOI
to continue the policies enunciated for the 1992-93 opium poppy
crop year.
[Chart - India Statistical Tables]
(###)
IRAN
I. Summary
Iran is a major transshipment point for illegal opiates from
Pakistan and Afghanistan destined principally for Europe but also
the U.S. The USG estimates that approximately 3,500 ha of opium
poppy were under cultivation in Iran in 1992. The Government of
Iran (GOI) claims success in combatting the illegal drug trade.
However, since the break in U.S.-Iranian diplomatic relations in
1979, the USG cannot verify these assertions. Iran ratified the
1988 UN Convention in 1992, but the USG does not have sufficient
information to indicate whether Iran is meeting the Convention's
goals and objectives.
II. Status of Country
Iran is a traditional opium-producing and consuming country, and a
major conduit for large quantities of illicit opiates produced in
Afghanistan and Pakistan. These are sent for processing into
heroin in Turkey and onward shipment to Europe and the U.S.
Finished heroin is also moved through Iran. Although the GOI
maintains that opium poppy has been eliminated after cultivation
was banned in 1980, the USG 1992 survey shows that it continues.
Morphine base and heroin reportedly also are processed in
northwestern and southwestern Iran. The GOI, however, denies that
there is any drug processing in Iran.
III. Country Action Against Drugs in 1992
Policy Initiatives. The GOI adopted tough antidrug laws in 1989.
The Anti-Narcotics Headquarters, established in 1989, is
supervised by the President and includes participation of several
ministries and the General Prosecutor. The Islamic Revolutionary
Corps, under the Ministry of Interior, is responsible for law
enforcement in all drug-related crimes and the protection of
Iran's borders from drug smuggling. In October, Iran hosted the
UN Ministerial Conference on Illicit Drug Traffic and Related
Matters in the Middle and Near East.
Law Enforcement Efforts. According to the Iranian press, drug
addicts and traffickers receive swift sentences from revolutionary
courts. Traffickers face the death penalty and confiscation of
all their property if caught in possession of more than 5 kg of
opium or 30 grams of heroin. According to a Tehran radio report,
which cannot be independently verified, Iranian police arrested
17,000 drug traffickers and 35,600 addicts in 1992. However, the
USG believes that some of those arrested on drug offenses may also
be political prisoners who oppose the government. Figures
published in a 1992 UN human rights report state that of 884
executions reported in the local press, 670 were for narcotics
trafficking. According to the Iranian press, morphine base
seizures in Iran were as high as 10 mt between April 1992 and
February 1993, roughly parallel to confirmed interdictions in
Turkey; however, the USG cannot verify these reports. Other
reported GOI narcotics control measures which have not been
verified were detailed in a report presented to the 1992 UN
Technical Consultation on Drug Issues in Southwest Asia held in
Islamabad to which the GOI sent representatives. The report
described efforts to reinforce the Iranian-Pakistani border
against drug smuggling, including an extensive road project. A UN
team which visited the new highway in 1991 told U.S. officials
they were "impressed" with the effort.
Corruption. A number of reports received by the USG indicate that
official corruption adversely affects GOI efforts to combat
narcotics. There are, for example, allegations that border guards
accept bribes from traffickers moving drugs from Afghanistan to
Iran, and that arrested traffickers have paid officials to gain
release. However, detailed information on official corruption
involving illegal drug activity in Iran is not available to the
USG.
Agreements and Treaties. Iran is a party to the 1961 UN Single
Convention on Narcotic Drugs, but not to its 1972 Protocol. It
signed the 1988 UN Convention and ratified it on December 7, 1992.
The U.S. has no bilateral narcotics agreement with Iran. After
the October UN conference in Iran, the Iranian government signed a
memorandum of understanding (MOU) with the Government of
Afghanistan. As part of this agreement, drug liaison officers
will reportedly be stationed in Kabul and Tehran. Iran also has
concluded drug cooperation agreements with Azerbaijan and several
other Central Asian States, Persian Gulf countries, Germany,
Italy, Turkey, Nigeria, and Thailand.
Cultivation and Production. According to a recent USG survey,
Iranian opium poppy cultivation in 1992 was approximately 3,500 ha
in traditional growing areas, with an estimated potential opium
yield of between 35 mt and 70 mt. The DEA reports that opiates
are stored and some are processed into morphine base or heroin by
Baluchi tribesmen in the southeast and by Kurds and Azerbaijanis
in the northwest.
Drug Flow/Transit. Opiate seizures in Pakistan's Baluchistan
province suggest that the drugs may have been intended for Iran.
A significant amount of opiate seizures in Turkey and Europe have
transited Iran. One technique used by traffickers is to move
drugs by truck caravan, loaded at Mirjaveh, near the Pakistani
border, to the Turkish border and onward shipment. According to
Pakistani and Iranian press reports during the past two years,
well-armed trafficker trucks are able to get through Iranian guard
stations in the southeastern part of the country. The USG also
believes that Iranians based in Istanbul have become important
international heroin brokers. According to the DEA, they use
their links to Iran to acquire opiates and refined heroin and work
closely with their Turkish counterparts to supply distributors in
European and U.S. cities.
Demand Reduction Programs. The USG estimates there may be 2-3
million drug abusers in Iran. The GOI in 1991 told visiting UN
officials that the country had some 200,000 heroin and 400,000
opium addicts. However, the USG believes that, in light of harsh
penalties, addicts are reluctant to declare themselves and that
the official figures represent only "registered" addicts. While
first-time offenders are assigned to one of 17 rehabilitation
centers, those arrested more than once face harsh penalties,
including imprisonment or execution.
IV. U.S. Policy Initiatives and Programs
The USG has no diplomatic relations with Iran and has taken no
narcotics control initiatives. However, the USG encourages
counternarcotics cooperation among countries in the region, as
well as antidrug programs in the Middle East and Southwest Asia
under UN auspices.
(###)
NEPAL
I. Summary
Nepal's open border with India and its proximity to Pakistan and
Burma make it an alternate transit route for heroin from the
Golden Crescent and Golden Triangle to Europe, other points in
Asia, and the U.S. Although Nepal produces marijuana for the
domestic market, there is no evidence of any significant Nepalese
production of illicit drugs entering international markets. The
democratic Government of Nepal (GON) has continued its 18-month-
old commitment to narcotics control by forming a dedicated
Narcotics Law Enforcement Unit, and signing a Narcotics Master
Plan agreement with the UNDCP. Cooperation with the U.S. and
other countries on enforcement, training, and legal assistance
also increased. Nepal is a party to the 1988 UN Convention.
II. Status of Country
The increase in counternarcotics operations resulting from the
recent formation of the Narcotics Law Enforcement Unit has
provided initial indications that South, Southwest, and Southeast
Asian heroin is smuggled into Nepal in larger quantities than was
originally suspected across the porous Indian border and through
the Kathmandu International Airport. The major domestic narcotics
problem in Nepal is the abuse of heroin, primarily "brown sugar",
by urban youth. During the past year, the USG assisted two
Nepalese nongovernmental organizations, DAPAN and Youth Vision, to
conduct the first detailed studies of domestic drug abuse.
According to these assessments, Nepal is estimated to have 25,000
heroin addicts and casual users. GON crop eradication, which also
included the first detection of a small amount of opium poppy
cultivation, reached its highest level in 1992.
Policy Initiatives. Nepal is not a significant producer of
narcotic drugs or psychotropic substances, although cannabis is
cultivated for local consumption and some of it reaches
international markets in the form of hashish. The GON has
increased cannabis eradication as part of its narcotics control
initiative. There has been some ad hoc cooperation with India in
these efforts. The Narcotics Master Plan Agreement signed with
the UNDCP includes a demand reduction component; initial
implementation is anticipated in 1993.
Accomplishments. The Narcotics Master Plan and establishment of
the Narcotics Law Enforcement Unit mark fundamental advances in
fulfilling the objectives of the 1988 UN Convention.
International law enforcement cooperation has also been enhanced,
including with the U.S. Increased Nepalese participation in the
South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation and other Asia
regional drug control activities offers further opportunities for
international cooperation.
Drafting of an amendment to Nepal's narcotic drug control act to
bring it into conformity with the 1988 UN Convention is currently
underway. The law, which already includes an asset seizure
section, will also facilitate implementation of mutual legal
assistance agreements.
Law Enforcement Efforts. The formation of the Narcotics Law
Enforcement Unit in March 1992 has increased the capability of the
GON to counter drug trafficking. Although resources committed
under the Master Plan have been slow in coming from UNDCP, the USG
and Germany have provided assistance, and the new unit has begun
to pursue its mandate aggressively. The judiciary as well as the
executive have taken a heightened interest in narcotics
prosecutions, and the assignment of a lawyer from the Attorney
General's office to the unit has facilitated presentation of
narcotics cases in court.
Corruption. The GON does not encourage or facilitate the
production or distribution of illicit narcotics as a matter of
policy. No senior official was indicted for narcotics-related
corruption in 1992, and the USG is unaware of instances of senior
officials facilitating narcotics trafficking.
Agreements and Treaties. Discussion between the USG and GON on a
cooperation agreement on narcotics to facilitate judicial
exchanges began in 1992. Topics for inclusion include mutual
legal assistance based on Article 7 of the UN Convention.
Drug Flow/Transit. Information regarding heroin transit through
Nepal will remain largely anecdotal, pending organization of the
intelligence wing of the police Narcotics Law Enforcement Unit.
There are substantial indications that quantities of Southwest and
Southeast Asian heroin transit Nepal en route to Europe and the
U.S., overland across the Indian border and through the Kathmandu
International Airport. Evidence includes the arrest of two Thai
citizens in possession of nearly 10 kg of heroin on a flight from
Bangkok, the presence of a large number of West Africans suspected
of drug trafficking in Kathmandu, and the travel of known Indian
and Pakistani drug traffickers to Nepal.
Nepalese and international drug enforcement officials conclude
that the previous lax enforcement environment and good air links
within and outside the region make Nepal an ideal alternate to the
more heavily used international heroin trafficking routes.
Demand Reduction Programs. The GON and NGOs continued to make
significant strides in heightening public awareness to the dangers
of narcotics abuse. GON anti-narcotics strategy led by the
Ministry of Health focused on expanding GON support to NGO-
sponsored drug abuse prevention activities. The Drug Abuse
Prevention Association of Nepal's survey of secondary and
university student drug abuse was published in 1992. This USG-
funded study has been distributed in the Kathmandu valley and
other cities in the country in an effort to bring further public
awareness to the dangers of drug abuse. A second contributor to
the survey report, Youth Vision, has begun a five-city school-
based drug awareness campaign covering three of the five regions
of Nepal.
IV. U.S. Policy Initiatives and Programs
U.S. Policy Initiatives. The U.S. works with members of the
cabinet, Parliament, and police in support of the UNDCP Narcotics
Master Plan, amendments to the Narcotics Control Act, coordination
with other donor nations on effective assistance, anti-narcotics
training, and USIS and other media programs.
Bilateral Cooperation. The 1992 bilateral narcotics control
program with Nepal included start-up training for the narcotics
unit, hosting the regional advanced narcotics seminar in Nepal,
funding of two drug abuse studies and a drug awareness program,
and provision of mobile communications equipment to the Narcotics
Unit.
The Road Ahead. The USG will continue to support the GON's strong
commitment to drug control. This will include additional DEA
collaboration with the Narcotics Law Enforcement Unit, regular
consultations with the GON on revision of the Narcotics Control
Act, negotiation of a cooperation agreement, and further provision
of training and equipment.
[Chart - Nepal 1993 Statistical Tables]
(###)
PAKISTAN
I. Summary
The Government of Pakistan (GOP) had mixed results in its
narcotics control efforts during 1992. Cooperation with USG
agencies in investigations and enforcement operations remained
good and resulted in the arrests of several persons in Pakistan
charged with violating U.S. drug laws. Since 1991, two fugitives
have been found extraditable by the courts in Pakistan and one
case has been appealed to the Supreme Court. In all, six persons
were arrested at U.S. request and their extradition proceedings
are underway in Pakistan. Imports of heroin into the U.S. on
Pakistan's international airlines continue to be a problem. From
1987 to mid-1992, more than 165 kg of heroin was seized on
incoming flights.
The GOP's record of local prosecutions against major traffickers
was minimal, and its commitment to expand and enforce the opium
poppy ban had limited impact. The hectarage devoted to the
cultivation of opium decreased by .4 percent from 1991 to 1992 and
potential opium production fell by 2.8 percent. Comprehensive
legislation to bring Pakistani law into conformity with the 1988
UN Convention, which it ratified in 1991, still awaits passage by
the Parliament. Action is also pending on strengthening existing
asset-forfeiture laws. The GOP reported it closed 12 heroin labs
in the Northwest Frontier Province (NWFP) during 1992. However,
no prosecutions resulted from their closure.
II. Status of Country
Pakistan remains both a producer and an important transit country
for opiates and hashish destined for international drug markets.
Pakistan's remote Northwest Frontier area processed much of the
opium grown across the border in Afghanistan. The USG estimates
that 20 percent of the heroin consumed in the U.S. comes from
Southwest Asia, a large amount of which is processed in illegal
labs in Pakistan. USG agencies estimate that during 1992
Pakistani growers devoted 8,170 ha to the illegal cultivation of
opium poppy, which could potentially produce 175 mt of opium, down
only slightly from the 1991 potential yield of 180 mt. Abundant
rainfall during the fall of 1992 may result in higher opium yields
for the 1993 harvest. Heroin and hashish processing continues
virtually unhampered in the politically autonomous tribal areas of
Pakistan's NWFP, where the government has little control and has
not applied its antidrug laws. As a result, the tribal areas long
have been sanctuaries for heroin and hashish manufacturers. The
government has reaffirmed its commitment to attack and destroy
heroin labs, and reports the destruction of 12 such facilities
during 1992. This effort does not appear to have achieved any
perceptible disruption in heroin processing or trafficking. The
government has yet to prosecute any heroin lab operator.
According to DEA, Pakistan has not traditionally been a major
center for international money laundering, but 1991 changes in the
GOP's foreign exchange regime may alter this assessment. These
changes, an element of Pakistan's economic reform program, were
designed to draw foreign exchange into the banking system and
encourage the repatriation of foreign exchange held abroad. They
have produced a substantial increase in the foreign exchange
assets of Pakistani banks. The anonymity which the regulations
confer on banking clients makes it impossible to determine how
much of this new money may be drug related. GOP officials have
recognized the money laundering potential of the new regulations
and have begun to consider ways to combat such activities, but
planning remains at the early stages. In any case, the vigorous
informal financial sector continues to provide a ready alternative
should strong financial disclosure and enforcement measures be
implemented.
Pakistani addicts consume about two-thirds of the heroin produced
in the tribal areas, and the growth of the addict population
mirrors the explosive growth of the local heroin manufacturing
industry. There were virtually no heroin manufacturers or heroin
addicts in Pakistan in 1979, but GOP and international experts
estimated in 1988 that Pakistan had a heroin addict population of
1.2 to 1.7 million, an estimate that has not been updated. The
government's demand reduction efforts continue to suffer from
inadequate funding.
III. Country Actions Against Drugs in 1992
Policy Initiatives. The committee formed in 1991 to draft a
chapter on drug abuse control for Pakistan's Five-Year Plan (July
1993-June 1998) completed its work. It recommended extensive
reforms in policy, administration and legislation, as well as the
allocation of significant budgetary resources to narcotics control
efforts. It also recommended the establishment of a policy review
board to oversee country-wide policy implementation, and a
narcotics interdiction review board to coordinate the actions of
law enforcement agencies, an especially urgent need. The plan as
a whole has yet to be formally submitted to the National Assembly
for approval. Comprehensive legislation that would bring
Pakistani law into conformity with the 1988 UN Convention has been
drafted and submitted to the UNDCP for comments. The Assembly has
yet to act on legislation that would strengthen the drug-asset
forfeiture provisions of existing law by lowering the minimum
sentence triggering such forfeiture from life to two years, and by
making the violation of any antidrug law--Pakistani or foreign--
the basis for forfeiture. Action is also pending on legislation
to give permanent status and authority to the Narcotics Ministry's
Anti-Narcotics Task Force (ANTF). The ANTF has had to depend on
temporary presidential ordinances, renewed every four months, to
continue operating.
Accomplishments. The GOP's narcotics control effort competes with
other pressing demands on resources and has not consistently
received the highest priority. Even though the GOP's narcotics
budget for 1991-92 was increased by 26 percent (from the
equivalent of $1.4 million to $1.8 million), narcotics control
spending still represents less than one percent of overall GOP
expenditures. Large military expenditures and budget deficits,
coupled with the need to meet stringent fiscal targets, have
severely limited the allocation of the material, personnel and
financial resources to implement an effective program. Programs
to recover from widespread destruction resulting from severe
flooding in much of the country in September are likely to tax
government resources further during the coming year.
Pakistan increasingly cooperates with U.S. and other foreign law
enforcement agencies, especially on cases involving the
international movement of narcotics. Since the last INCSR, six
fugitives have been arrested for extradition to the U.S. and
another who has been in custody since 1991 is fighting the
extradition order in the Supreme Court. The GOP is presently
considering six extradition requests from the USG, two of which
have been found to be extraditable. The GOP continues to support
DEA investigations which have resulted in the arrest of several
Pakistani traffickers in the U.S. Three drug fugitives for whom
requests have been made remain at large. The GOP brought four
prosecutions, started against major traffickers in 1991, to
successful conclusions in 1992. In September, the Karachi Speedy
Trial Court sentenced drug kingpin and former provincial minister
Amanullah Kundi, arrested in 1991, to life imprisonment for heroin
trafficking. In December, the appeals court upheld the 1991
conviction of Iqbal Baig and Anwar Khattak, leading traffickers
who were initially convicted with strong U.S. backing. Earlier in
the year, Haji Abdullah, an associate of reputed Baluchistan drug
trafficker Sakhi Dost Jan Notezai, was also sentenced to life
imprisonment, although in December the appeals court reduced the
sentence to two years.
The GOP initiated two prosecutions of major traffickers in 1992,
both through the PNCB. The first, of reputed trafficker Waris
Khan, initially brought a conviction, but was reversed on appeal.
The second, of accused trafficker Bakht Munir, began in August as
a result of an investigation launched in May 1991. There has been
no verdict yet in this case.
In a widely publicized ceremony in March, the GOP inaugurated its
1991 pretrial destruction law by burning 3,230 kg of heroin and
39,021 kg of hashish seized in 1991.
Law Enforcement Efforts. Despite successful prosecutions of some
traffickers, the performance of GOP narcotics law enforcement
agencies during 1992 was not consistently strong. As in the past,
these agencies continued to focus on drug seizures, rather than on
the investigation and prosecution of major drug traffickers, but
their performance declined significantly compared with previous
years. The USG estimates that 1992 seizures of heroin and opium
will be only about 46 percent and 65 percent of 1991 levels.
These agencies lack institutional initiative and resources to
follow-up on seizures with case preparation. Political
interference in the administration of justice frequently stalls
prosecutions and undermines the commitment of investigators. Also
important is continuing bureaucratic rivalry and ineffective
coordination among the more than ten GOP agencies which share
responsibility for narcotics law enforcement.
Corruption. Illicit drug money has affected Pakistan's economy
and continues to generate reports of drug-related corruption at
various levels of the government and the judiciary. Existing
anti-corruption legislation is not vigorously enforced. No senior
GOP official has ever been indicted for narcotics-related
corruption. All but the most senior law enforcement personnel are
poorly paid, undereducated, and susceptible to bribes from drug
traffickers and others. At least three national parliamentarians
are reportedly involved in drug trafficking.
Agreements and Treaties. Pakistan is a party to the 1961 UN
Single Convention on Narcotic Drugs, which it ratified in 1965.
It is also a party to the UN 1971 Convention on Psychotropic
Substances and the 1988 UN Convention, which it ratified in
October 1991. Legislation to bring Pakistani law into conformity
with the 1988 UN Convention is pending. The U.S. provides anti-
narcotics assistance to Pakistan under the terms of bilateral
letters of agreement which are subject to annual renewal.
Extradition between the U.S. and Pakistan takes place under a
treaty signed between the U.S. and the UK in 1931, made applicable
to India in 1942, and whose terms Pakistan accepted at
independence. U.S. Customs and Pakistan International Airlines
(PIA) are negotiating a carrier agreement to provide better
measures to deter smuggling on PIA aircraft. There are no pending
negotiations on any other narcotics-related agreements.
Cultivation and Production. Nearly all opium poppy cultivation is
found in the tribal areas of the NWFP (bordering Afghanistan), on
both irrigated and non-irrigated land. Cannabis grows wild
throughout Pakistan and is cultivated in Chitral and perhaps other
areas. The GOP states it has expanded the area affected by the ban
on the cultivation of opium poppy by some 140,000 ha, and that it
eradicated 977 ha of opium poppy during 1992. Expansion of the
ban, however, has had little significant effect on poppy
cultivation or opium production, in part because cultivation has
moved into new, politically and physically inaccessible areas.
Persistent cultivation in areas where the ban has been in effect
for some years also remains a problem. USG agencies estimate that
during 1992 Pakistani growers devoted 8,170 ha to the cultivation
of opium poppy and could have produced 175 mt of opium. Acreage
estimates for 1992 represent a 0.4 percent decrease compared with
1991, and a 0.6 percent decrease compared with 1990. Estimated
potential opium production during 1992 fell by 2.8 percent
compared with 1991, but increased by 6.1 percent compared with
1990. Given the size of the crop, however, and the margin of
error in the estimation process, these variations are negligible.
The remote tribal areas of the NFWP also contain an estimated 100
labs producing heroin from both Pakistani and Afghan opium. DEA
estimates that production of equivalent pure heroin is
approximately 70 mt per year, two-thirds of it destined for
consumption in Pakistan. Heroin producers have not been visibly
affected by the GOP's limited efforts to halt their activities.
These efforts, in any case, are severely constrained by the GOP's
inability to apply its laws to the tribal areas.
Drug Flow/Transit. Heroin, opium and hashish move from growing
and processing areas of the NFWP to markets in all parts of
Pakistan and in foreign countries. Most raw opium is converted to
heroin for consumption in Pakistan and abroad. From laboratories
in the NFWP, heroin moves by road through Balochistan to Iran and
Europe, as well as through Afghanistan. In addition, heroin is
transported by road, rail and air to Karachi, Islamabad and
Lahore, where it is routed by air and sea, sometimes via India,
Africa or Turkey to the U.S. and Europe. A recently discovered
transshipment route involved the smuggling of heroin produced in
Pakistan through Afghanistan into the newly independent Central
Asian Republics of the former Soviet Union and eventually to
markets there and in Europe.
Demand Reduction Programs. Pakistani and international experts
estimated in 1988 that there were 1.2 to 1.7 million heroin
addicts in Pakistan, consuming a possible 50 mt of heroin each
year. There has been no update of the 1988 survey. There are 30
drug treatment centers in Pakistan, with both inpatient and
outpatient facilities. These centers focus on detoxification and
management of withdrawal symptoms, but reportedly have a relapse
rate of over 90 percent.
The GOP channels its demand reduction efforts through the USG-
funded Drug Abuse Prevention Resource Center (DAPRC) and the
USG/UNDCP-funded Integrated Drug Demand Reduction Project (IDDRP).
These two projects coordinate their initiatives with,
respectively, the Narcotics Control Ministry and the PNCB and
receive the cooperation of other GOP ministries, such as Health
and Education, as appropriate. DAPRC works with the Home
Department of the NWFP Provincial Government in organizing annual
pre-planting campaigns to persuade farmers not to grow opium
poppy, as well as more broadly targeted anti-narcotic media
campaigns. During 1992, according to USAID, DAPRC organized a
campaign to discourage farmers throughout the NWFP from growing
opium poppy. DAPRC-organized public awareness campaigns through
electronic and print media, as well as anti-drug workshops,
continued during the year. IDDRP produced and tested teacher
training materials, ran a series of treatment workshops, and
organized a network of local NGOs. IDDRP is also working on a
mobile media campaign to bring the counternarcotics message to
isolated areas, and is negotiating with Pakistan radio to
broadcast a series of programs dramatizing the narcotics issue.
IV. U.S. Policy Initiatives and Programs
U.S. Goals and Objectives. Through diplomatic initiatives, anti-
narcotics assistance programs, and law enforcement activities, the
USG seeks to achieve the following objectives:
-- Increased willingness of the GOP to devote energy and resources
to combatting the illicit narcotics trade in all its aspects and
the development of a coordinated, comprehensive long-term GOP
national counternarcotics strategy.
-- Arrest and prosecution of heroin manufacturers, destruction of
their facilities and confiscation of their property;
-- Interdiction of heroin and opium traffic, the arrest and
prosecution of major traffickers in GOP courts, and seizure of
drug-related assets.
-- Passage of comprehensive legislation bringing Pakistani law
into conformity with the 1988 UN Convention and of strengthened
asset-forfeiture laws.
-- The provisional arrest and extradition of major traffickers
sought to stand trial in the U.S.
-- Improvement of controls to deter heroin smuggling at airports
in Pakistan and on PIA flights .
-- The elimination of the smuggling of essential and precursor
chemicals, and enforcement of controls on their domestic
production, import, transport and use to prevent diversion.
-- Expansion of the area of enforcement of the opium cultivation
ban in the NFWP.
-- The development and implementation of bank regulations to
prevent the laundering of drug money.
-- Elimination of corruption in GOP law enforcement agencies and
of the influence of drug traffickers on policy and judicial
process.
-- Broadened and intensified public support in Pakistan for
narcotics control initiatives.
Bilateral Cooperation. Additional anti-narcotics development
assistance through USAID is now prohibited by the Pressler
Amendment, and pre-existing assistance will end in 1993. However,
under letters of agreement, which are renewed annually, the USG
provides other narcotics control assistance to the GOP under
three broad categories: law enforcement, opium poppy ban
expansion, and demand reduction. Given the institutional
weaknesses in GOP law enforcement agencies, the USG has continued
to channel its assistance to law enforcement agencies or their
components that demonstrate the ability and willingness to
undertake effective anti-narcotics operations. This approach has
resulted in agreements with sub-units of the PNCB, Customs, and
the Frontier Corps. The USG supplies commodities (vehicles,
communications, investigative and office equipment), provides
training, and funds certain operational costs for these agencies.
USG-supported projects in the opium poppy growing areas of the
NWFP, focusing on roads and other infrastructure, are designed
specifically to open up politically inaccessible areas to the
authorities. The object of these projects is the gradual
expansion of the opium poppy ban and the elimination of heroin
labs, greater access to GOP political authorities and law
enforcement agencies, increased economic viability of substitute
crops, and more comprehensive development activities by the GOP
and others.
The demand reduction element of USG programs seeks to increase
awareness within Pakistan of its domestic heroin addiction problem
and encourage the growth of an antidrug constituency. This
element of the program is mainly implemented through financing 50
percent of the UNDCP's Integrated Drug Demand Reduction Program.
The Road Ahead. The USG will continue to press the GOP to raise
the priority of its narcotics control activities. With respect to
law enforcement, recognizing that the unit-by-unit approach to
support for GOP law enforcement agencies cannot address the
systemic problem of inadequate law enforcement institutions, the
USG will continue to seek opportunities to support GOP efforts to
strengthen and coordinate drug law enforcement. The reforms
recommended in the draft chapter on drug abuse control in the
Fifth Development Plan may present such opportunities. In the
meantime, however, the long-awaited establishment of the USG-
funded Anti-Narcotics Task Forces may also provide an
institutional focus for continued assistance. The USG also will
maintain its long-term commitment to helping open up inaccessible
areas of the NWFP to GOP law enforcement agencies in order to
continue expansion of the opium poppy ban, and to provide leverage
to persuade the GOP to move against heroin lab operators. The
USG will continue efforts to strengthen GOP demand reduction
initiatives, mainly through proven organizations such as DAPRC and
IDDRP. An additional initiative may be partial funding to update
the 1988 Survey of Drug Abuse in Pakistan, both to provide policy
makers with the most recent information, and to create a catalyst
around which to invigorate public support for narcotics control
efforts.
[Chart - Pakistan 1993 Statistical Tables]
(###)
SRI LANKA
I. Summary
Sri Lanka has a growing narcotics problem resulting from the flow
of Southwest Asian heroin to meet local demand and for
transshipment to other countries. Illicit cannabis continues to
be grown as well. Money laundering could become a serious problem;
a 1989 law permitting numbered currency accounts increased the
local banking system's vulnerability, but there is little
awareness of the issue outside law enforcement circles. Law
enforcement agencies combatting the illegal drug trade are
hindered by a shortage of trained manpower, a serious backlog at
the main drug analysis laboratory, and antiquated legislation.
Nonetheless, the number of arrests for narcotics-related offenses
increased during the year with USG-trained personnel playing a
major role. Sri Lanka is a party to the 1988 UN Convention.
II. Status of Country
Several factors account for Sri Lanka's continuing role as a
transshipment center for Southwest Asian heroin. Sri Lankan
Muslims with ties to Pakistan or India apparently are involved in
transporting heroin to Sri Lanka along traditional smuggling
routes. In addition, the war against Tamil separatist guerrillas
has forced the concentration of Sri Lanka's limited naval and air
force assets on the northern part of the island, leaving the
remainder of the country open to smuggling by sea. Similarly, the
war has prompted the security forces to focus their activities at
the airport and harbor on interdicting terrorists and weapons.
The relatively uncomplicated procedures which help make the
Colombo harbor a center for container traffic also contribute to
the island's vulnerability to narcotics transshipment. Numbered
foreign currency accounts have increased Sri Lanka's attraction
for money laundering.
III. Country Action Against Drugs in 1992
Policy Initiatives. The National Dangerous Drugs Control Board
(NDDCB) was authorized in 1992 to establish a drug control plan to
allocate counternarcotics resources over the next 5-10 years.
NDDCB officials established task forces to deal with several
issues, including the amendment of local laws concerning evidence,
the registration of precursor chemicals, and the expansion of
demand reduction activities.
Accomplishments. Despite the absence of a comprehensive legal
framework, the Government of Sri Lanka (GSL) has made strides
toward the implementation of the 1988 UN Convention. The GSL has
continued to cooperate with regional and other law enforcement
agencies, including those of the U.S., the UK, Australia,
Singapore, the Maldives, Japan, Germany, and the Netherlands.
The 1991 bilateral narcotics control agreement with the Police
Narcotics Bureau (PNB) was implemented with the arrival in
December of USG-supplied computer equipment. The PNB will use the
equipment to establish an anti-narcotics monitoring network with
other South Asian states. Further narcotic control equipment
purchases will be made for the NDDCB under the terms of the 1992
bilateral accord.
Law Enforcement Efforts. Sri Lanka's law enforcement agencies are
making use of their limited resources, particularly in combatting
drug trafficking through the international airport. Law
enforcement agencies are only beginning to focus on problem areas
such as money laundering and drug transshipments through the
harbors. The NDDCB's anti-narcotics action plan will address
issues such as jurisdictional problems and the "revenue
collection" focus of the various enforcement institutions. The
Sri Lanka Anti-Narcotics Association estimates that over 50
percent of the country's school age population is exposed to its
drug awareness publicity during an average year.
IV. U.S. Policy Initiatives and Programs
The USG seeks to maintain and expand cooperative relations with
local law enforcement agencies press for needed changes in
narcotics control legislation encourage greater awareness of the
threat posed by money laundering and secure increased involvement
of the Customs Service in anti-narcotics work. Toward meeting
this goal, U.S. Customs will conduct an INM-funded Overseas
Enforcement Training Course in Sri Lanka in 1993. The program
will be tailored to the highest threat areas and will seek to
involve Sri Lankan Customs more actively in drug interdiction
activities.
In March, five Sri Lankan Police officials received training under
a USG-sponsored program in Nepal.
The Road Ahead. Implementation of the two bilateral agreements
will enable the USG to press for changes in local narcotics laws
and to raise GSL awareness of the dangers posed by money
laundering. The USG encourage increased attention by the Customs
Service to anti-narcotics efforts with a view toward heightening
controls at the container harbor.
(###)
SOUTHEAST ASIA AND THE PACIFIC
AUSTRALIA
I. Summary
Australia is primarily a narcotics-consumer country, although
there are indications that traffickers are beginning to use it for
transshipment as well. Some heroin may transit Australia to the
U.S., while cocaine is being shipped from the U.S. and South
America possibly destined for Southeast Asia: Australian
authorities made two recent record seizures which confirm the
South American link. Australian enforcement authorities do
recognize the seriousness of the narcotics threat. Reliable
statistics on domestic use are not available. Australia plays a
leading role in the Financial Action Task Force (FATF).
II. Status of Country
Illicit drug use is a growing problem in Australia, and is treated
as such by the Government of Australia (GOA). Domestic production
of illicit drugs consists of locally grown cannabis and
clandestinely manufactured methamphetamine and amphetamine. These
drugs appear intended for the domestic market, but some also are
smuggled into New Zealand. Marijuana is the predominant illicit
drug with domestic production supplying much of the market.
Southeast Asian marijuana from Thailand and Papua-New Guinea is
also in demand. Heroin remains a serious problem, while cocaine,
smuggled in from both the U.S. and South America, is a growing
concern. South American traffickers are attempting to use
Australia as a transshipment point for cocaine bound for the Asian
market. Hashish from Lebanon and Southwest Asia is an occasional
problem. Tasmania's licit opium poppy industry has effective
controls against diversion and poses no threat.
III. Country Actions Against Drugs in 1992
Policy Initiatives. The GOA pursues a vigorous international
antidrug policy, and strongly supports international action
against drug trafficking. In April, it announced a national drug
strategy based on a demand reduction approach. It focuses on
alcohol and tobacco abuse, with illicit drug use of secondary
importance. However, law enforcement authorities strongly pursue
antidrug efforts, and recognize the seriousness of the threat to
Australia from international narcotics traffickers. On November
20, the GOA ratified the 1988 UN Convention. Discussions with the
USG on a mutual legal assistance treaty continue.
Accomplishments. The GOA is conducting a strong anti-drug
campaign, endorses UN counternarcotics goals, and ratified the UN
Convention after bringing its domestic legislation into line with
Convention goals. The Australian Federal Police (AFP) and DEA
maintain representatives in each other's country to coordinate
efforts against drug trafficking.
Law Enforcement Efforts. Six state and three federal agencies
devote considerable resources toward combatting the drug problem,
but criminal penalties for trafficking in illicit drugs are weak
and asset forfeiture efforts are still developing.
Corruption. Political and police corruption is routinely reported
in the press. There was a significant increase in reports of
drug-related corruption by police in 1992. Strong actions are
taken to prosecute the accused, but it remains a serious issue in
controlling organized trafficking.
Agreements and Treaties. Australia has signed and ratified the
1988 UN Convention, signifying that its legal system meets the
goals and objectives of the Convention. A protocol amending the
U.S.-Australia Extradition Treaty recently entered into force.
Australia cooperates with the U.S. and other countries to counter
money laundering, and is taking a leading role in the FATF.
Cultivation/Production. Cannabis is the only known cultivated
illicit drug in Australia. It is grown primarily in New South
Wales and Queensland. The GOA continues its active eradication
efforts.
Drug Flow/Transit. DEA reporting indicates that Australia is
being targeted by South American cocaine trafficking organizations
as a transit point for narcotics destined for the Asian market, as
well as a new market for cocaine in itself.
Demand Reduction Programs. The April national drug strategy
spells out an aggressive substance abuse program. The GOA is also
taking action to counter international drug traffickers attempting
to use Australia as a transit point.
IV. U.S. Policy Initiatives and Programs
Policy Initiatives. The primary USG goals are improvements in
assessments of trafficking trends between Australia and the U.S.,
through assistance to the GOA in intelligence gathering on drug
trafficking groups.
Bilateral Cooperation. The GOA and USG exchange narcotics-related
intelligence information and continue to extradite narcotics
criminals between the two countries. The FBI and the Australian
Federal Police are forming a joint working group on organized
crime and illicit drugs. The FBI and the DEA make USG
counternarcotics training available to GOA law enforcement
authorities.
Road Ahead. The U.S. will continue to discuss the exchange of
drug trafficking information with the GOA to further bilateral
cooperation.
(###)
BRUNEI
I. Summary
Brunei has few drug abuse or other drug-related problems. Of the
258 drug-related arrests in 1992, the vast majority were for the
possession of excessive quantities of cough medicine containing
codeine, which is the drug abused most. Small amounts of
marijuana, cocaine and heroin have been intercepted in Brunei, but
in all cases to date, the quantities involved have been below the
legally established thresholds distinguishing personal consumption
from drug trafficking, the penalty for which is death. Two of the
258 drug-related arrests involved third-country laborers, who were
allegedly growing marijuana for their personal consumption. To
date, no one has been put to death in Brunei for drug trafficking.
II. Status of Country
The incidence of drug abuse and other drug-related offenses was
relatively minor in 1992, and is not expected to increase
significantly in the future. The very limited drug offenses are
the result of a combination of many factors, including strict law
enforcement, a high level of community cooperation with law
enforcement officials, tight immigration and customs controls, a
small market (only 270,000 total population), a ban on firearms
(violation of which carries the death penalty), a ban on the
public sale and consumption of alcohol, and the application of the
death penalty for drug trafficking.
III. Country Actions Against Drugs
Policy Initiatives. The Brunei Government has signed, but not yet
ratified, the 1988 UN Convention. The government has concentrated
its antidrug efforts in the areas of law enforcement, drug abuse
awareness, prevention, education, and therapy.
Accomplishments. Based on the low incidence of drug problems, the
USG believes that Brunei is meeting the goals and objectives of
the 1988 UN Convention, which the Bruneian Government has signed,
but not yet ratified.
Law Enforcement Efforts. Judging by the relatively low incidence
of drug abuse and drug-related offenses, enforcement efforts
appear to have been equal to the task.
Corruption. The Brunei Government is adamantly against illicit
drugs in all its forms. The USG has no evidence of any drug-
related corruption within the ranks of government employees.
Agreements and Treaties. There are no drug-related treaties with
the U.S. and none are currently anticipated.
Cultivation and Production. Apart from a few patches of marijuana
surreptitiously sown by third country laborers for their alleged
personal consumption, there is no cultivation or production of
illicit drugs in Brunei, nor is there evidence that Brunei is a
transit point for the trafficking of illicit drugs.
Demand Reduction Programs. These are carried out primarily
through TV and radio ads, and antidrug awareness campaigns in
public and private schools.
IV. U.S. Policy Initiatives and Programs
Given the limited nature of drug-related problems in Brunei, and
with little prospect for significant change, the USG simply
monitors the situation by maintaining contact with the Narcotics
Control Board and local police officials.
(###)
BURMA
I. Summary
Burma accounts for over 50 percent of worldwide illicit opium
production. Following the 1988 coup and the suspension of most
foreign narcotics control aid, the Government of Burma (GOB)
focused on domestic political problems and sharply reduced its
already limited counternarcotics program. Potential opium
production nearly doubled within one year, and has remained near
that level since them. In 1989, the GOB arranged cease fires with
major insurgent/trafficking groups. Although it claims that these
accords include long-term opium poppy crop substitution goals,
there has been no decline in opium poppy cultivation in areas
controlled by these groups.
The GOB acceded to the 1988 UN Convention in 1991 and continues to
claim it is committed to eliminating narcotics production. Recent
indications of official attention to the problem include
destruction of a few surrendered heroin refineries, action against
some corrupt officials, greater narcotics enforcement in Rangoon
and select provincial towns, limited cooperation with the DEA,
participation in a USG-funded opium yield study, and permission
for increased multilateral involvement in the GOB's border
development program. However, these efforts have not reduced
Burma's vast narcotics production. Seizures remain insignificant,
given the size of the crop; major traffickers, to date, have been
exempt from exempt from arrest and in some cases openly associate
with senior military officials. Due to accommodations reached
with the GOB, former insurgent groups exercise security and
militia functions and engage in the narcotics business in areas
they control.
The USG currently provides no direct assistance to the GOB;
bilateral counternarcotics cooperation is limited to working-level
DEA/GOB liaison. An effective counternarcotics strategy in Burma
would meld long-term development and crop substitution with law
enforcement efforts, including opium poppy eradication,
interdiction, and prosecution of major traffickers. There are few
signs that the GOB will seriously adopt and implement such a
strategy in the near future. Should it do so, international
support might be forthcoming.
II. Status of Country
Burma's opium poppy crop is cultivated mostly in the rugged
mountainous areas of the Shan State. For decades, much of this
remote area has been outside central government control and under
the sway of insurgents or private armies that support themselves
partly through the sale of narcotics.
Since 1989, the GOB has reached accommodations with Wa and Kokang
trafficking groups, offering them limited political autonomy and
development assistance in exchange for ending their insurgencies.
The GOB claims these accords permit border development programs
designed eventually to end these groups' reliance on opium for
their livelihoods. They have not reduced overall cultivation,
however; only areas controlled by the Kachin Independence
Organization, which has not reached an accord with the government,
show a decline. Credible reports also suggest that these
arrangements effectively permit extensive Kokang and Wa business
activities, at least partially capitalized by drug sales. Burma's
military rulers continue to ascribe a higher priority to
political accommodation with these former insurgents than to
combatting narcotics.
While Thailand remains Burma's largest narcotics conduit to the
world market, heroin also exits via southern China to Hong Kong
and through southern Burma to Malaysia and Singapore. Some drugs
also flow to India and Bangladesh.
III. Country Actions Against Drugs
Until 1988, combatting illicit narcotics was a GOB objective
because narcotics revenue supported many insurgents, particularly
the Burmese Communist Party (BCP). In 1988, the military
government sharply repressed political opponents and concentrated
its police and army resources on internal control. It all but
abandoned eradication and maintained only minimal narcotics law
enforcement efforts. Opium poppy cultivation rose sharply in
areas west of the Salween River, including areas where GOB access
is greatest, and which had been subject to USG-funded aerial
eradication programs in the 1980s. The greatest increases in
opium poppy cultivation, however, have come in the Wa area, which
was never targeted for aerial eradication because it was under
firm BCP control until 1989. As a result of its cease-fire with
the GOB, the Wa now operate large narcotics refineries along the
Chinese border. The Kokang Chinese, despite participation in GOB-
sponsored development efforts, continue as major traffickers.
The Shan United Army (SUA) also remains a powerful drug
trafficking and heroin refining organization. As part of its deal
with the Wa, the GOB since early 1990 has provided direct military
support for the Wa's ongoing war with drug trafficker Khun Sa's
SUA. With Rangoon's support, the Wa have enlarged their sphere of
control to include significant drug turf along the Thai border.
The GOB has also conducted episodic military operations against
the SUA, leading to heavy casualties but few drug seizures. The
SUA, however, remains well-entrenched in its enclaves along the
Thai/Burma border.
Policy Initiatives. In May 1991, the GOB officially legitimized
several drug-trafficking insurgent groups. Burmese officials say
that peasant farmers under control of these groups lack economic
alternatives to opium, which border development programs are
designed to provide. The GOB says its anti-narcotics focus will
be on long-term rural pacification and development to create
alternative incomes for opium poppy growers. To this end, the GOB
has sought assistance from the UN in cooperation with Thailand and
China. While such development is necessary, it must be coupled
with strong law enforcement to reduce opium poppy output.
However, expansion of the GOB's writ into the opium poppy
cultivation belt, an unstated goal of the program, will be slow
and may ultimately fail precisely because of the arrangements
Rangoon has struck with ethnic groups. Permitting several ethnic
insurgent groups to transform their armed forces into local
militias all but precludes effective GOB law enforcement.
Accomplishments. Burmese efforts to combat narcotics production
and trafficking remained minimal. The GOB continued to take small
counternarcotics steps on its own and to view claimed narcotics
control activity as a means to improve its international image.
It is clear that the fight against illicit drugs is not the GOB's
highest priority.
The GOB claims to have eradicated about 1,215 ha of opium poppy in
1992 (less than one percent of the estimated cultivation);
publicly destroyed 225 kg of heroin and over five mt of opium,
plus other drugs and precursor chemicals; and destroyed a heroin
refinery surrendered by Wa leaders. These largely cosmetic
efforts had scant impact on overall narcotics production. Foreign
participants in GOB-arranged trips to the border region continued
to observe that Burma has only minimal control over the heavily
armed Wa and Kokang militias. They also saw some evidence of the
nascent development efforts designed to effect a phase-out of
opium poppy cultivation.
Since 1990, there has been an increase in enforcement activity by
police narcotics task forces and army personnel in Rangoon and
some northern provincial towns, and additional police narcotics
task forces have been established. According to GOB 1992
statistics, seizures of opium increased by 25 percent and of
heroin by 50 percent over 1991.
During 1992, Burma signed separate trilateral agreements with the
UNDCP and China, Laos, and Thailand for counternarcotics
cooperation and subregional border development, which included
crop substitution, law enforcement and health, drug treatment, and
AIDS prevention components. Foreign Minister U Ohn Gyaw and Home
Minister Lieutenant General Phone Myint participated in an
unprecedented trilateral meeting in Bangkok to discuss narcotics
control with ranking Thai and Lao officials. In April, the UNDCP
established small offices in the northern towns of Kengtung and
Tachilek. Implementation of the Burma/Thai and Burma/China border
programs, with UNDCP contributions estimated at $4.5 million and
$7.7 million over the next three years, began in late 1992.
The GOB and UNDCP agreed on the need for an aerial opium survey of
project areas, to be conducted during the 1992-93 crop season.
The GOB has since delayed this survey for another year, however.
Law Enforcement Efforts. Burmese antidrug legislation is broad
but inadequately enforced. The 1974 Narcotics and Dangerous Drug
Act was replaced by a new law promulgated on January 27, 1993,
which closed several gaps in the previous legislation, such as
criminalizing money laundering. The law is clearly intended to
move Burma toward compliance with the 1988 UN Convention. Many
details remain unclear, however, and the interpretation and
enforcement of the law will be more important than its text.
Burmese anti-narcotics policies and activities are coordinated by
the Central Committee for Drug Abuse Control, chaired by the Home
Affairs Minister. Key enforcement agencies are the People's
Police Force, the Burmese Army and the Burmese Air Force. Others
involved in narcotics control are the National Intelligence
Bureau, the Directorate of Defense Services Intelligence, and the
Bureau of Special Investigation. Since 1988, the Burmese military
has assumed direction over narcotics control, though operational
responsibility remains with the police.
The GOB has noted the USG's indictment of SUA leader Khun Sa, but
it refuses to extradite him to the U.S. because it denies that a
valid U.S.-Burmese extradition treaty exists. The GOB has
declared Khun Sa a criminal under Burmese law, and professes a
willingness to prosecute him in Burma if caught.
Corruption. Narcotics-related corruption is a serious problem in
Burma. Multiple, reliable reports confirm that lower-level
civilian, Police, Customs and Army personnel frequently acquiesce
or participate in drug trafficking in exchange for payoffs;
corruption among ranking officials also has been alleged by
plausible but unsubstantiated reports. The GOB carried out
several crackdowns on anti-narcotics police forces in 1992 which
led to forced resignations or transfers. However, no senior Army
personnel were arrested for narcotics-related corruption, although
credible reports indicate that some army units actively assist in
Wa and Kokang drug trafficking activities.
Agreements and Treaties. The GOB is a party to the 1988 UN
Convention, but made reservations on extradition and the
submission of disputes to the World Court. Burma has also acceded
to the 1961 Single Convention on Narcotic Drugs but not the 1972
Protocol to the Convention or the 1971 Convention on Psychotropic
Substances. It has no bilateral narcotics agreement with the U.S.
The GOB's January narcotics law addresses important areas with
regard to financial investigations, corruption, conspiracy, money
laundering and international cooperation. Depending on its actual
implementation, the law represents an important step toward
bringing the GOB into compliance with the objectives of the UN
Convention.
Cultivation/Production. Far and away the world's leading opium
poppy cultivator, Burma produced an estimated potential of 2,280
mt of opium on 153,710 ha in the 1991/92 crop season -- over 50
percent of the world's potential illicit output. Although opium
poppy is grown in Kachin, Chin, and Kayah states, the chief
growing area is the Shan Plateau -- extending almost the full
length of the mountainous Shan State, with an average elevation of
1,000 meters. Fields range from 0.1 to 4.0 ha, averaging 0.5 ha.
Residents in the growing areas are largely dependent on income
from opium poppy for survival, although local chiefs also are
believed to coerce them to cultivate as much poppy as the labor
supply allows. No longer concentrated along the Thai/Burma
border, heroin refineries now also range along the PRC frontier in
areas controlled by the Wa and the Kokang Chinese.
While the GOB's nascent rural development program may ultimately
provide the infrastructure and other facilities necessary to
enable poppy growers to find other sources of income, the
obstacles -- including lack of resources and difficulty of access
-- are considerable. In the meantime, as Rangoon remains
preoccupied with political/security concerns, high production and
trafficking levels will certainly continue.
Demand Reduction Programs. Preventive education is carried out by
the Ministries of Education and Information. The Ministry of
Health manages drug treatment and detoxification, supervising 28
centers with an estimated annual capacity of 3,500-4,000 addicts.
The Ministry of Social Welfare oversees drug rehabilitation
efforts.
Domestic addiction remains a serious problem. Addicts must
register and undergo compulsory treatment/rehabilitation,
including six weeks of detoxification treatment for heroin
addicts, but relapse rates are high. According to Health Ministry
figures, there are approximately 13,000 registered addicts to
heroin, 34,000 to opium, and 5,000 to other substances. Some
Burmese and UN observers put the total addict population at
150,000 or more, out of a population of 42 million. While opium
and heroin are frequently smoked, widespread heroin injection has
resulted in many drug-related AIDS cases and positive HIV tests.
There are no reliable figures for overdose deaths, nor is it
possible to estimate accurately illicit narcotics consumption.
The USG has repeatedly drawn official attention to the rise in
local consumption.
Some knowledgeable observers believe that the GOB's increasing
concern about AIDS, especially among military personnel, has been
a factor in the modest increase of counternarcotics activity over
the past two years. Official statistics indicate that, of recent
heroin addicts tested for HIV, up to 82 percent were positive.
IV. USG Policy Initiatives and Programs
U.S. Policy Initiatives. From 1990 to 1992, the USG did not
certify Burma as cooperating fully or taking steps on its own to
control narcotics under the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, as
amended. The USG has strongly encouraged the GOB to play a
responsible role in curbing the production, processing and
trafficking in opium and heroin on its territory. To this end,
the USG is prepared to support appropriate multilateral efforts
through the UNDCP and other UN agencies, provided Burma
demonstrates its serious commitment and allows adequate access to
project areas and requisite monitoring of progress by UN
officials. The USG maintains close contact with UNDCP, which has
a local representative and two field workers in Burma.
Bilateral Cooperation. Bilateral counternarcotics cooperation is
principally limited to activities of the DEA, which maintains
contact and exchanges information with enforcement officials. In
1992, the Burmese military used DEA-supplied intelligence in a
corruption investigation, and worked with the DEA on a joint
undercover operation targeting major traffickers. This case
culminated in early 1993 with the arrest of several persons on
narcotics charges and the seizure of several properties believed
acquired with narcotics earnings, although no heroin was seized or
major trafficker arrested. In February 1993, the USG carried out
a scientific collection of opium poppy samples to improve
assessment of Burmese opium production. Since 1988, the USG has
provided no direct counternarcotics assistance to the GOB.
The Road Ahead. The future of USG counternarcotics activities
rests upon Burma's readiness to engage in serious law enforcement
and to fulfill its international commitments under the 1988 UN
Convention. Any USG support would be predicated on serious
Burmese steps toward meeting the Convention's objectives,
including unrestricted access to the areas for aid workers, far
more opium poppy eradication and opium interdiction, destruction
of many more refineries, and arrests of major traffickers. An
effective assistance program could then mesh rural development and
crop substitution with training and equipment to allow GOB
agencies to carry out their law enforcement responsibilities.
[Chart - Burma 1993 Statistical Tables]
(###)
CHINA
I. Summary
The People's Republic of China (PRC) has become a major narcotics
transit route for heroin and other opiates from neighboring Burma,
Laos and Vietnam. Increasingly, it is also an opium producer
itself. Although much of the heroin which transits China is
destined for the U.S. and other overseas markets, a growing amount
is consumed in China, where drug abuse has spread from border
provinces to the interior. In 1992, the PRC mounted a nationwide
crackdown against crime, including narcotics trafficking. China
has made efforts to enhance law enforcement measures, public
education, and international cooperation.
The PRC is a party to the 1988 UN Convention, as well as the 1961
Single Convention, its 1972 Protocol, and the 1971 Convention on
Psychotropic Substances. U.S.-China bilateral counternarcotics
cooperation still remains restricted by Chinese views on the
situation of Wang Zongxiao, a Chinese drug trafficker who sought
political asylum in the U.S. after Chinese authorities, in
accordance with a USG request, had sent him to testify in the
"Goldfish" trial. USG officials stress that this still-unresolved
case should not block improved bilateral cooperation. PRC
officials insist that Wang be returned to China.
II. Status of Country
China has become a major narcotics transit route because of its
location adjacent to the Golden Triangle, its extensive borders
with Burma and Vietnam, and its transport and communication links
with drug transit areas such as Hong Kong and Macao. Burma is the
source of most heroin transiting China. Although a large
proportion of it is shipped by road from Burma via Yunnan, Guangxi
and Guangdong provinces to Hong Kong for overseas distribution,
air and rail routes are increasingly used and trafficking networks
are spreading into interior provinces, such as Sichuan. The
quantity of narcotics per seizure has been increasing and
traffickers are turning to firearms to resist inspection and
seizure. Ethnic Chinese trafficking networks operating in Asia
and the U.S. are using China as a base of operation.
PRC officials have raised their estimate on the number of
registered addicts to 250,000, but the number of unregistered and
untreated addicts is certainly much higher. Most of China's
provinces and autonomous regions now have voluntary treatment
programs. PRC officials claim that addicts who have committed
crimes receive treatment while in reeducation camps. PRC
officials have also raised the number of HIV-positive cases to
969, the majority located in Yunnan province where the rise in the
number of addicts injecting heroin has contributed to the spread
of AIDS.
III. Country Actions Against Drugs in 1992
Policy Initiatives. In view of the worldwide increase in
narcotics production and demand, PRC officials no longer refer to
the target set in 1991 of eliminating drugs in China within three
years. Making a long-term commitment to fight narcotics
trafficking, in 1992 the PRC stepped up promotion of
counternarcotics activities throughout the country. The National
Narcotics Control Commission (NNCC), composed of representatives
from 16 government ministries and agencies, including Public
Security, Customs and Health, leads the fight against drugs and
directs policy, enforcement, research and international
cooperation. To improve law enforcement, China's police and
customs agencies have implemented plans to expand antidrug units,
provide training for counternarcotics staff and improve seizure
techniques.
In the first half of 1992, government officials publicly committed
themselves to protect China's progress in economic reform from the
social ills of crime, including narcotics trafficking. In June,
Guangzhou and Shanghai, major Chinese economic centers, cracked
down on prostitution, gambling, narcotics trafficking, and other
crimes. Although the campaigns resulted in arrests and received
nationwide publicity, the PRC will need to sustain its vigilance
beyond periods of intense anti-crime activity to disrupt drug
trafficking rings. The President of China's Supreme People's
Court said in March his court had empowered the provincial Higher
People's Court in Yunnan to levy the death sentence on serious
drug traffickers. In November, the Kunming (Yunnan) intermediate
court sentenced to death 10 drug traffickers, caught with amounts
of heroin ranging from 261 grams to 13.2 kg; the sentences were
carried out immediately.
China's narcotics control program, while not in all respects
sophisticated by world standards, indicates that the PRC has met
or is actively seeking to meet the goals and objectives of the
1988 UN Convention.
Accomplishments. During the first nine months of 1992, 4,696 drug
traffickers were convicted, of which 885 were given the death
sentence or suspended death sentences and life imprisonment. In
comparison, 5,285 drug traffickers arrested in 1991 were
convicted, of whom 866 received the death sentence or life
imprisonment. Many drug cases have been adjudicated expeditiously
and with maximum publicity, including public trials. Traffickers
from Thailand, Vietnam, Taiwan, Burma and other countries in the
region were given stiff sentences under China's 1990 drug law.
Suggesting a toughening in Chinese policy toward Western drug
offenders, five were found guilty on narcotics charges by Shanghai
courts in 1992; a Briton and an American were each sentenced to
15 years imprisonment and a fine for transporting hashish.
The PRC continues limited international cooperation with Interpol
to track organized crime syndicates involved in narcotics
trafficking. The PRC held discussions on counternarcotics
cooperation in June with Burma under the auspices of the UNDCP,
and in July with Thailand. China and Burma have signed an
agreement with UNDCP for a subregional project aimed at reducing
the production, consumption and trafficking of narcotics in the
China-Burma border area. The UN INCB and the PRC Ministry of
Public Health cosponsored a seminar in Beijing for drug control
administrators in Asia in June.
Law Enforcement Efforts. China dealt successfully with an
enormous drug abuse problem in the early 1950s, virtually
eliminating the sale and use of illicit drugs. Therefore, it did
not have a significant counternarcotics structure when narcotics
trafficking surged with the opening of the country and the growth
of foreign trade in the early 1980s. However, in the last few
years, the Chinese Government has put into place the basic
administrative, legal and public health structures necessary to
implement a successful drug enforcement program.
In 1990, the Standing Committee of the Peoples Congress passed an
anti-narcotics resolution which combined laws previously enacted
into one narcotics control edict. The comprehensive law covers
possession, trafficking, transporting and manufacturing of drugs,
and includes asset forfeiture and conspiracy sections, although
enabling legislation is not in place in all areas.
At the request of the Hong Kong Police Commissioner, the PRC
Ministry of Public Security in June set up a liaison unit in Hong
Kong to deal with growing cross border crime. The unit, while
exercising no jurisdiction in Hong Kong, will function as a
channel for exchange of information between the Hong Kong Police
and PRC Public Security officials. Some of the information
exchanged may involve the trafficking of narcotics between the PRC
and Hong Kong. Hong Kong customs officials maintain frequent
contacts with their Chinese counterparts in Guangdong on
counternarcotics activities.
Corruption. The PRC has taken a strong stand against official
corruption, and has laws dealing specifically with government
officials who are found guilty of the use, manufacture or delivery
of narcotics. Those convicted receive sentences on the same basis
as nongovernment offenders. In addition, in any government
department where such offenses occur, the head of the department
and the immediate officer in charge will be held responsible and
punished accordingly.
There is no reliable evidence of high-level official corruption or
involvement in narcotics trafficking, but there are numerous
reports of narcotics corruption among lower-level Chinese
officials. In September and October, a major drug and arms
smuggling network centered in Pingyuan, Yunnan, was disrupted in
an operation that involved 2,000 militia, public security and
police officers. The leader, a Vice Mayor of Pingyuan, and 854
others were arrested on drug charges. Illicit drugs totaling 981
kg and 353 illegal weapons were seized. As a result, central and
provincial government and Communist Party officials ordered a
reshuffle of local government and party leaders in the area.
Drug Flow/Transit. While the Burma-Yunnan-Hong Kong connection
remains the primary route for trafficking Southeast Asian heroin
through China, alternate routes have developed from Yunnan through
Sichuan and through Vietnam and Guangxi. In April, police
arrested five traffickers, including two Vietnamese. A Vietnamese
truck driver was detained after police discovered 3,000 kg of
dried opium poppy in his truck. According to NNCC statistics,
during the first six months of 1992, 10,138 drug trafficking cases
were uncovered, compared to 10,946 cases in all of 1991. During
the same period, 44,952 kg of precursor and essential chemicals
were seized. In 1991, China made its first seizures of
methamphetamines; Chinese officials reported the dismantling of
several clandestine methamphetamine laboratories in 1992.
Most domestic opium, produced in many Chinese provinces, is
consumed locally. In February, Harbin Radio reported a seizure of
8,100 grams of opium jelly, largely made from opium poppies
planted in Heilongjiang's mountain valleys. In June, Shanghai
police were reported to have destroyed 4,000 plants at 25 sites.
Demand Reduction Programs. The PRC encourages citizens to report
on possible cases of drug smuggling and use. In Yunnan, where
local efforts are most organized, antidrug organizations are
involved in identifying drug users, providing treatment, and
helping former addicts avoid returning to illicit drugs; however,
relapse rates are believed to be high.
The number of registered drug abusers has increased from 70,000 in
1990 to an estimated 250,000 in late 1992. According to an
epidemiological survey in Xian, 90 percent of the addicts are
males under 25. Drug addiction is spreading from the rural and
border areas to China's interior provinces and its cities. About
46,000 drug abusers received compulsory drug rehabilitation in
1992. Of the 969 cases of HIV infection in China, over 70 percent
are drug abusers. Although concentrated in Yunnan, HIV infection
is spreading to other areas.
Drug addicts in China are encouraged to register and receive
treatment at government treatment centers. Officials claim
addicts who have been seized for criminal acts can receive
treatment in reeducation facilities. The Ministry of Health
continues to pursue the integration of customary detoxification
methods with traditional medicine, acupuncture and other Chinese-
developed treatments, and also has sought assistance from
rehabilitation organizations such as Daytop Village. Public
Health is working to install a drug treatment center in Kunming,
using Daytop's therapeutic community approach to rehabilitation.
To improve dissemination of narcotics information, the National
Committee on Drug Prohibition has written material for students
about drugs, and the Ministry of Public Health plans to publish
pamphlets for health professionals. Public Health runs training
and public awareness seminars on drug abuse.
IV. U.S. Policy Initiatives and Programs
Policy Initiatives. The USG has sought to: (a) continue a
dialogue with PRC officials on the global and regional narcotics
situation; (b) encourage an exchange of information on trafficking
networks and narcotics-related cases; (c) encourage regional
cooperation and joint counternarcotics projects; and (d) continue
cooperation on demand reduction initiatives in China.
Bilateral Cooperation. Pursuant to the 1987 memorandum of
understanding, the PRC cooperates with the USG on a limited scale
in law enforcement activities. While recognizing the need for
further cooperation with the U.S., the PRC continues to cite the
Wang Zongxiao case as an obstacle to improved bilateral
cooperation. The Chinese insist that Mr. Wang be returned to
China to stand trial. Mr. Wang's asylum request is unresolved.
He has initiated his own action against the USG which has further
delayed the resolution of this matter. The USG has emphasized
with the PRC that, while Wang's case remains in the U.S. legal
system, it should not stand in the way of any efforts aimed at
attacking the worsening problem of international narcotics
trafficking in China.
In October, a DEA training team funded by INM conducted a law
enforcement training program in Nanning, Guangxi autonomous region
for 70 public security officers from throughout China. In
September, INM funded attendance of a forensic chemist at a DEA
seminar in the U.S. In June, a DEA special agent participated in
the enterprise crime conference in Shanghai. INM also funded a
demand reduction training program administered by Daytop Village
in Kunming.
DEA and PRC public security officials are working on ways to
expedite information exchange, with DEA emphasizing the need for
timely and useful feedback from the PRC. Cooperation with DEA
continues to be inadequate. Many DEA requests for or provision of
information to Chinese authorities go unanswered, or are not
passed to operating levels on a timely basis. Progress has been
made in expanding cooperation on health-related and law
enforcement training.
The Road Ahead. The PRC is increasingly concerned about drug
trafficking and abuse in China. The PRC's official commitment to
fight narcotics domestically and through international cooperation
has provided a strong framework for USG-PRC cooperation. But the
pace of expanded counternarcotics cooperation, on information
exchange in particular, has continued to fall well short of the
growing threat. The USG will seek to engage the Chinese in more
regional, as well as bilateral, counternarcotics efforts to stem
the flow of drugs at their source and in transit. In mid-1993,
U.S. Customs will conduct an INM-funded Overseas Enforcement
Training program in Qingdao for Chinese Customs officers.
[Chart - China 1993 Statistical Tables
(###)
HONG KONG
I. Summary
Hong Kong is an important center for brokering and transshipping
heroin from the Golden Triangle to the U.S. and elsewhere. Drug
traffickers also use it to launder narcotics earnings. Hong
Kong's counternarcotics effort represents substantial compliance
with the goals and objectives of the 1988 UN Convention, although
it is not party to the convention in view of its special legal
status.
Bilateral cooperation between USG agencies and their HKG
counterparts is exemplary. About $25 million in drug-related
assets has been confiscated both in Hong Kong and in the U.S.
under the U.S.-Hong Kong designation agreement since it came into
force in 1991. The Hong Kong courts ruled in January 1992 that
U.S. civil court forfeitures will be accepted by local courts
under the terms of the bilateral agreement, giving the U.S. the
ability to request the freezing of drug assets in Hong Kong by
either a civil or criminal forfeiture request. The Hong Kong
Government (HKG) is considering sympathetically a USG request for
the sharing of seized assets. In one setback, a Hong Kong court
ruling voided key sections of the financial disclosure laws; the
Hong Kong Government is appealing to the Privy Council.
As of early December 1992, 41 fugitives were extradited from Hong
Kong to the U.S. on drug charges. Cooperation between the DEA and
U.S. Customs and their HKG counterparts continues to be fruitful.
Hong Kong is an active participant in the Financial Action Task
Force (FATF).
II. Status of Country
Hong Kong remains an important transit point for drug trafficking
and for money laundering of drug proceeds. Most trafficking
involves heroin No. 4 brought from the Golden Triangle region by
trawlers from Thailand or overland through southern China and
other traditional smuggling means.
A key element of the HKG's fight against drugs is the 1989 Drug
Trafficking (Recovery of Proceeds) Ordinance, but a court
decision in August struck down elements of its money laundering
provisions as being in violation of the Bill of Rights. The
government has appealed to the UK Privy Council. In the interim,
reporting of large financial transactions has dropped greatly,
hampering financial investigations.
III. Country Action Against Drugs in 1992
The Narcotics Police and Customs are professional, active
enforcement organizations. The authorities reported 6,645 drug-
related arrests in the first nine months of 1992. Seizures
included 550 kg of heroin and over 2,950 kg of marijuana in the
first ten months. The USG is not aware of narcotics-related
corruption among senior government or law enforcement officials in
1992; the HKG does not protect or give haven to known traffickers
nor, as a matter of policy, does it permit corruption, money
laundering or trafficking.
The 1989 Drug Trafficking Ordinance empowered the government to
trace, freeze and confiscate proceeds of persons convicted of drug
trafficking. About $43 million in drug-related assets have been
frozen or confiscated in Hong Kong since its enactment. As noted,
bank reports of suspicious transactions dropped sharply since the
court ruling on the constitutionality of the law.
The HKG is beginning to set up law enforcement structures to be in
place post-1997, including negotiations with the U.S. and several
other countries on extradition and mutual legal assistance in
criminal matters. There is no evidence that the basic legal
system of Hong Kong will not remain in place, according to the
terms of Sino-British negotiations on the reversion of Hong Kong.
While Hong Kong is not covered by the legal regime established by
the 1988 UN Convention, Hong Kong's active counternarcotics effort
represents substantial compliance with its goals and objectives.
Hong Kong is an active participant in the FATF. The HKG has taken
a broad range of positive actions on prosecution of traffickers
and implementation of financial controls, and has cooperated
extensively with the USG.
The number of assumed active drug abusers in Hong Kong was about
35,700 in 1992. Heroin No. 4 remains readily available and is the
major drug of abuse. Cough medicine has replaced marijuana as the
second most widely-used drug by Hong Kong teenagers, and the
government has introduced legislation to place tighter controls on
its sale. There is some abuse of cocaine in the entertainment
industry and among the younger, affluent population. The HKG
maintains three major treatment and rehabilitation programs:
mandatory treatment carried out by the Correctional Services
Department, outpatient methadone maintenance under the Department
of Health, and a voluntary inpatient program conducted by the
Society for the Aid and Rehabilitation of Drug Abusers. Other
treatment, counselling and public education programs operated by
various volunteer agencies complement these major programs. In the
first half of 1992, about 6,300 individuals were admitted to
various treatment institutions.
IV. U.S. Policy Initiatives and Programs
Cooperation between USG and HKG enforcement agencies is excellent.
Asset seizures have risen sharply since 1991. The Hong Kong court
ruling accepting U.S. court forfeitures will permit the freezing
of drug assets in Hong Kong under U.S. civil or criminal
forfeiture requests. The HKG appears sympathetic to a pending USG
request for the sharing of seized assets in a particular case.
From January 1 through early December 1992, 41 fugitives were
extradited from Hong Kong to the U.S. on drug charges.
Cooperation between the DEA and U.S. Customs and the HKG continues
to be fruitful. USG counternarcotics goals remain focused on
increasing cooperation in drug interdiction, joint prosecution
efforts and combatting drug-related money laundering.
[Chart - Hong Kong 1993 Statistical Tables]
(###)
INDONESIA
I. Summary
Indonesia is not a major narcotics processing country or money
laundering center. Although marijuana is produced in large
quantities, little enters the U.S. market. Domestic drug abuse is
a small but growing problem, and the Government of Indonesia (GOI)
views drug abuse and trafficking as a major long-term threat to
social stability. U.S.-Indonesian cooperation is good, with the
USG providing funding for training and equipment procurement, and
the GOI cooperating with DEA in a number of areas. Indonesia has
signed, but is not yet a party to, the 1988 UN Convention.
II. Status of Country
The only illicit drug produced in significant quantities in
Indonesia is marijuana. While no accurate production estimates
exist, Indonesian authorities believe there has been no
significant change in marijuana production or use over the past
year; little, if any, enters the U.S. market. Indonesia's over
one million square miles of territorial sea and archipelagic
waters, however, include some of the world's busiest international
straits and provide countless opportunities for smuggling
narcotics and other goods.
There are some signs that, as other Southeast Asian countries
increase enforcement on heroin trafficking, Indonesia may be used
more by trafficking organizations. In 1992, heroin that transited
Indonesia was seized from two drug couriers at Boston's Logan
Airport. Drug abuse and trafficking in Bali continue to be of
concern as the government promotes tourism through easier
immigration and customs procedures, and the number of
international flights increases. The Indonesian National Police
(INP), in two separate incidents in Bali, apprehended West African
traffickers of sizeable quantities of heroin. Although Indonesian
law enforcement officials believe that foreigners are involved in
moving most narcotics out of Bali, tourists report being
approached openly by local vendors.
III. Country Actions Against Drugs in 1992
Policy Initiatives. The INP continued its efforts to combat
narcotics in Indonesia. We expect that this will continue as the
GOI seeks to increase tourism. In Bali, the INP has taken the
initiative against West African traffickers of heroin seeking to
develop a local market among the Balinese. The GOI also continues
to expel suspected American drug traffickers.
Law Enforcement Efforts. Indonesia's legislation and legal
structure are technically adequate to prosecute those involved in
the abuse, production, and trafficking of illicit drugs. The GOI
is examining possible additional legislation on money laundering,
conspiracy and asset forfeiture. Indonesia is not a signatory of
the 1971 UN Convention on Psychotropic Substances nor does
Indonesia's 1976 narcotics law cover psychotropic drugs. While
these drugs are regulated and trafficking in them is illegal, this
omission complicates police efforts to curb growing psychotropic
drug use. The GOI is working on legislation to bring Indonesia
into conformity with the 1961 Convention. The GOI is a signatory
to the 1988 UN Convention but has not yet deposited its instrument
of ratification. GOI committees continue to discuss options to
implement the Convention. While substantial work remains to be
done, Indonesia is moving toward fulfilling the goals and
objectives of the 1988 Convention.
Corruption. Although the Indonesian press has publicized
incidents of corruption, they have not included senior government
officials. Government policy does not encourage or facilitate
illicit drug production, distribution, or money laundering. The
USG has no evidence of senior government official involvement in
the production or distribution of drugs or in money laundering.
Agreements and Treaties. Indonesia has bilateral extradition
agreements with Malaysia, the Philippines and Thailand, but not
with the U.S. Drug offenders may also be extradited to other
countries under existing law. Indonesia participates in
international narcotics control efforts and is a member of the UN
Commission on Narcotic Drugs. In September, Indonesia joined in a
call for common anti-narcotics legislation in resolutions adopted
at the 13th General Assembly of the ASEAN Inter-parliamentary
Organization.
Cultivation and Production. Cannabis is cultivated in Sumatra,
Java, Bali, Nusa Tenggara, and Sulawesi. Most marijuana comes
from Aceh province in northern Sumatra, where it grows both wild
and under cultivation. The highest estimate ever cited for annual
marijuana production was 200 mt. An illicitly cultivated mushroom
of the psilocybin type has a small market among foreign tourists
in Yogyakarta (Java) and in Bali. There is no evidence that opium
poppies are cultivated. Indonesia is not a major processing
country for illicit narcotics, and police have not found heroin or
cocaine laboratories in the country. According to one report,
illegal heroin labs may be operating aboard fishing vessels in the
Straits of Malacca. Officials believe the heroin, opium,
morphine, and cocaine available locally comes from abroad.
Domestic Programs. Domestic drug abuse is a small but growing
problem among the young. According to police reports,
approximately 95 percent of drug abusers in Jakarta are between 15
and 26. Drug abuse is reportedly spreading from the affluent to
middle-and-lower class youth. Combinations of alcohol, sedatives
and marijuana are increasingly popular. Some adolescents have
turned to solvent abuse (paint thinner, gasoline, glue). There is
no registry of drug abusers nor are reliable indirect indicators
of abuse monitored. According to the INP, Indonesia now has
approximately 100,000 drug abusers. This estimate is based on
police statistics of persons detained for any period of narcotics
abuse multiplied by 10 on the presumption that police identify
only 10 percent of abusers. Various officials estimate that .05
to .06 percent of the population are drug abusers, a figure that
has remained stable over the past several years. The INP includes
alcohol abusers in its statistics.
The GOI views drug abuse and narcotics trafficking as major long-
term threats to social stability, and it coordinates efforts to
increase public awareness about the dangers of drug abuse through
the departments of Health, Education and Culture, Religion, and
Information. Youth and women's organizations are also active in
public awareness campaigns, and religious organizations are
involved in prevention, treatment and rehabilitation. It is
difficult to evaluate success of demand reduction activities
because of poor statistical data.
IV. U.S. Policy Initiatives and Programs
Policy Initiatives. The USG encourages the GOI to ratify the
applicable UN conventions and advocates increased cooperation
among ASEAN nations to control production and trafficking. The
U.S. Embassy in Jakarta and the DEA office in Singapore serve as
the points of cooperation with the GOI.
Bilateral Cooperation. DEA closed its country office in Jakarta
in 1987, in part because of lowered expectations that Indonesia
was becoming a transit country for traffickers. In 1992, INM made
a $40,000 grant for communications and transportation equipment
for the INP. An Indonesian official was sent for DEA training in
the U.S., and Indonesians participated in other counternarcotics
programs in the region. The INP also deported a suspected
American drug trafficker at USG request.
The Road Ahead. Indonesia will participate in several USG-
sponsored training activities. In February 1993, U.S. Coast Guard
maritime law enforcement training was given in Indonesian waters.
In April, the INP will take part in INM-sponsored DEA training at
three separate locations in Indonesia.
[Chart - Indonesia 1993 Statistical Chart]
(###)
JAPAN
I. Summary
Southeast Asian heroin transits Japan, but not on a large scale by
world standards. Methamphetamine is the drug of choice: some
estimate its methamphetamine addict population as about 400,000,
supplied by several Yakuza (organized crime) groups which earn
substantial profits from trafficking. There are signs that a
market for cocaine may be developing. Japan is a party to the
1988 UN Convention and has enacted several laws to conform with
the convention. As a result of limited currency control laws, one
of the country's most potentially significant narcotics-related
problems is money laundering.
II. Status of Country
Japan's demand problem is modest by international standards.
While a history of methamphetamine abuse predates World War II,
heroin and marijuana are not widely used. However, an increase in
recent years of travel by South American nationals, including
known members of Colombian cartels without clearly legitimate
business or tourism purposes, suggests an increase in cocaine
trafficking. There are also indications that heroin traffickers
are trying to exploit the situation: over the past five years,
Nigerian heroin rings have begun to use Tokyo as a transit point
for heroin originating in Southeast Asia. However, we have no
basis to estimate the volume of this traffic.
III. Country Actions Against Drugs in 1992
Policy Initiatives. The Japanese Diet ratified the 1988 UN
Convention on June 12, and the Government of Japan (GOJ) has
enacted several pieces of legislation to bring its legal system in
line with the Convention. The laws are intended to tighten
controls on organized crime, money laundering, and essential
precursor chemicals. The new laws also authorize, for the first
time, use of controlled deliveries in enforcing narcotics
legislation.
Accomplishments. Although it is too early to know what effect, if
any, the new anti-organized crime and money laundering laws will
have, DEA Tokyo reports that progress has already been made in the
control of precursor chemicals, and authorities are now authorized
to engage in controlled deliveries. The USG and GOJ have no
narcotics-specific bilateral agreements, but the bilateral
extradition treaty works smoothly.
Because of Japan's limited drug problem, legislation granting
national law enforcement authorities powers comparable to those
enjoyed by counterparts in the U.S. is relatively new. They are
significant steps, but more could be done. Asset seizure and
forfeiture is not used and only rarely do police conduct
undercover operations, since prosecutors will not bring cases to
trial based on covert evidence. Japanese reluctance to provide
law enforcement authorities with increased investigative powers is
cultural and historical, based on concern the police may become
too powerful. There are no indications of senior official
toleration of or involvement in narcotics trafficking or
corruption.
Legislation and Enforcement. Japan is a signatory of the 1988 UN
Convention and in October 1991 passed conforming legislation. The
new laws require banks to submit currency transaction reports for
single, domestic transactions of more than approximately $240,000,
and for overseas remittances of approximately $34,300 or more. So
far, there have been no arrests made under the new laws, and DEA
Tokyo does not believe the situation is likely to change greatly,
since traffickers can simply divide their transactions into
smaller amounts. Drug abuse prevention programs are not highly
developed.
IV. U.S. Policy Initiatives and Programs
U.S. agencies work with their Japanese counterparts to assist
Japanese police efforts (e.g., through criminal record checks and
training assistance), and to encourage further tightening of
currency transaction regulations to discourage money laundering.
The USG will continue to urge Japan to develop domestic drug use
surveys, as well as to undertake narcotics control initiatives
with the countries of Southeast Asia and the Pacific Rim. DEA
engages in controlled deliveries of drugs with its counterparts,
exchanges narcotics intelligence, and provides investigative
support and training. DEA is also providing background
information for Japan's development of a law to authorize wiretap
activity in Japan for drug investigations.
(###)
KOREA
I. Summary
While still modest by international standards, drug abuse in Korea
is increasing; methamphetamine is the most commonly abused drug.
There is little heroin or cocaine addiction. The Korean
Government (ROKG) actively discourages illicit drug production and
use. Korea has begun to implement the UN's drug abuse control
plan. The primary USG concern is Korea's role as a transshipment
point for Asian heroin destined for the U.S. and elsewhere. Korea
is not a party to the 1988 UN Convention.
II. Status of Country:
During the past year, Korea made its first arrests for cocaine and
LSD abuse, and there are some signs that Korea will face an
increase in illicit drug use in the 1990s. Drug abuse among U.S.
military personnel in Korea is dominated by marijuana and licit
drugs. The ROKG is building its first drug rehabilitation center,
to be completed by the end of 1993, and has designated 22 mental
hospitals as drug treatment and rehabilitation centers. While not
a party to the 1988 UN Convention, the government is preparing
legislation to meet its goals; the government intends to ratify
the Convention in 1993.
III. Country Actions Against Drugs
Illicit drug use is prohibited, and drug arrests are prominently
reported by the local media to educate the population on the
dangers of illicit drug use. The USG has no information
suggesting high-level narcotics-related corruption, or the
toleration or abetting of drug trafficking by senior government
officials.
IV. U.S. Policy Initiatives and Programs
The primary USG concern is Korea's role as a transit route for
Asian heroin. The Seoul airport and Pusan seaport are documented
transshipment points for international drug smugglers. The DEA
office in Seoul keeps abreast of drug trafficking trends and
supports the Korean Government and U.S. military authorities in
developing their capabilities and resources. USG goals include
increased cooperation among ROKG agencies and upgrading Korean
professional skills. The USG and the ROKG initialed a mutual legal
assistance treaty in September. The ROKG has expressed a strong
interest in negotiating an extradition treaty with the U.S.
(###)
LAOS
I. Summary
Laotian counternarcotics efforts expanded in 1992. Laos is the
world's third-largest opium producing country, but the only one of
the top three to reduce its potential opium production in each of
the past three years. Estimated opium production declined 13
percent in 1992 from 1991, bringing the total crop reduction since
initiation of USG and UNDCP-funded rural development and opium
poppy replacement programs in 1989 to 39 percent.
There were several significant law enforcement developments. The
Government of Laos (GOL) actively publicized narcotics-related
arrests and seizures during the past year, in contrast to past
practice. An increased number of both highland and lowland Lao
have been arrested on charges involving opium, heroin and
marijuana. In December, Laos arrested its first foreign heroin
trafficker. The Lao Customs Department established a separate
anti-smuggling unit in Vientiane with counternarcotics
responsibilities.
In August, the GOL Council of Ministers approved the establishment
of a counternarcotics police unit. In September, Laos and the USG
signed a letter of agreement (LOA) to provide support and training
for this unit. Progress in actual formation of that unit has been
minimal, but previously established counternarcotics efforts have
continued.
Laos' counternarcotics efforts remain modest, and its slowness to
establish the new police unit and accept USG assistance are
disappointing; but these aspects must be seen in the context of a
very poor country with a poorly developed administrative system.
Laos is not a party to the 1988 UN Convention. It has made only
limited formal progress toward meeting its goals and objectives.
It is translating materials on the legal requirements of the
Convention into Lao for legislative attention, and officials have
stated their intention to meet the Convention's standards.
Narcotics corruption among civilian and military personnel
continues to be a major problem, but there is no evidence that the
Lao government itself encourages or facilitates narcotics
activity. Senior Lao officials have repeatedly insisted that
anyone involved in the narcotics trade will be arrested and
prosecuted, but there is little evidence of aggressive action in
this regard.
II. Status of Country
The GOL has made progress on narcotics control. USG estimates
indicate that there has been a 14 percent decline in opium poppy
cultivation in 1992 alone, and a 39 percent decline since 1989.
Poppy cultivation in the USG-funded Houaphan project area has
dropped 50 percent since 1989. The GOL repeatedly has stated that
it is committed to decrease opium poppy production, but that this
must compete with other GOL priorities for funds and, perhaps more
importantly, limited management and administrative skills.
We attribute the reduction in opium poppy cultivation and
production to several factors: (1) in the target areas of the USG
and the UNDCP projects, pressure from district officials combined
with crop reduction by villagers in expectation of project
benefits; (2) increased arrests and seizures which deter buyers
and ultimately growers as well, and (3) a concerted public
information program by the GOL stressing the negative consequences
of illicit trafficking.
III. Country Action Against Drugs in 1992
Policy Initiatives. The GOL drew public attention to drug
trafficking by stepping up its public reporting of narcotics-
related arrests, seizures, and penalties, and by making
counternarcotics statistics publicly available. The GOL increased
somewhat the access it affords to the DEA, issuing longer,
multiple-entry visas to DEA officers stationed in Thailand. In
November, the GOL for the first time allowed DEA officers to visit
the districts targeted in the USG-funded Houaphan crop
substitution project, and in January, DEA officers travelled to
the opium-producing areas of Bokeo and Louang Namtha provinces.
The Lao Government also facilitated UNDCP crop substitution
projects in Vientiane and Xiang Khouang provinces. In February,
the GOL and the UNDCP agreed to an assessment of the drug problem
in Laos, including recommendations for a comprehensive drug
control program. A summary of the assessment's initial findings
has been submitted to the Lao Government. In March, delegations
from the GOL, Burma, and UNDCP agreed to develop a project
proposal for economic and social development in the provinces of
Bokeo and Louang Namtha to curb trafficking, eliminate opium poppy
cultivation, and reduce demand. The GOL also agreed in principle
to trilateral cooperation with Thailand and Burma, and the GOL
participated as an observer at the signing ceremonies in June of
Thai-Burma-UNDCP and China-Burma- UNDCP project documents in
Rangoon.
Accomplishments. In August, the GOL approved the establishment of
a police special counternarcotics unit, under the operational
control of the Ministry of Interior (MOI), but the policy control
of the Lao National Committee on Drug Control and Supervision. In
September, the USG and GOL signed the LOA for a law enforcement
project which will include training and resources for the unit and
activities to accelerate its operational readiness.
Law Enforcement Efforts. GOL narcotics-related arrests and
seizures increased during the past year and were highly publicized
by Lao authorities. The GOL has arrested both highland and
lowland Lao for possession of opium, heroin, and marijuana. The
GOL publicly burned seized opium in November as part of its
counternarcotics public awareness program. In December, Laos
arrested its first foreign heroin trafficker, a Singaporean with
over five kg in his possession. The Lao acted on information
provided by Thai officials who had arrested an associate
trafficker in Thailand.
Corruption. The USG continued to receive reports of military and
official corruption and collusion in narcotics production and
trafficking. There is no evidence, however, that the Lao
Government as a matter of policy encourages or facilitates the
illicit production or distribution of drugs or the laundering of
drug money, although some senior government officials are
certainly aware of these narcotics-related activities. The USG
does not have any solid evidence that senior officials directly
engage in, encourage, or facilitate the production or distribution
of illegal drugs. Senior Lao officials have repeatedly insisted
that no one in Laos is above the law, and that anyone involved in
the narcotics trade will be arrested and prosecuted.
Agreements and Treaties. The U.S. and Lao governments signed a
memorandum of understanding on counternarcotics cooperation in
1990. The GOL also signed the LOA with the USG in September to
support the Lao Police special counternarcotics unit. The USG
will provide up to $300,000 in training and equipment. The law
enforcement project will also assist the Lao Customs Department in
equipping regional anti-smuggling centers and the provision of
customs training.
Although the GOL does not have an extradition or mutual legal
assistance treaty with the USG, it has agreed informally to
cooperate in deporting drug traffickers. In May, the GOL deported
a U.S. narcotics fugitive into USG custody for return to criminal
proceedings. Laos has been a party to the 1961 Single Convention
since 1973. Although the Lao Government has not yet become a
party to the 1971 and the 1988 UN conventions, it is actively
cooperating with the UNDCP and with bilateral donors. Senior GOL
officials have stated to USG officials that they accept the 1988
Convention in principle, but the process of drafting and
implementing the legal structures to meet the goals and objectives
of the Convention is still at a relatively early stage.
Cultivation/Production. Opium production is spread throughout the
10 northern Lao provinces where opium is used as a medicine, and
as a cash or barter crop. The USG estimates that Laos
theoretically could have produced 230 mt of opium from 25,610 ha
in 1992, down from an estimated 265 mt potentially available from
29,625 ha in 1991. While the UNDCP estimates domestic
consumption at about 50 mt, a U.S. Embassy source believes it may
be as high as 100 mt.
Much of the opium poppy is grown by hilltribes over which the
central government has little control. The rural areas are
isolated and often inaccessible during the rainy season. Poverty
is severe, with child mortality rates of up to 40 percent. The
Lao Government has called for bilateral and multilateral
development assistance for crop substitution projects. It has
noted repeatedly that village-level opium cultivation cannot be
eliminated until the farmers have alternative incomes.
Drug Flow/Transit. According to the Lao Government, it has
limited ability to control the flow of illicit narcotics either
within or across its borders since it is severely constrained by a
lack of personnel, resources, and expertise. Laos manages
effective control over its lengthy borders with Thailand, Burma,
China, Vietnam, and Cambodia only at major population centers and
river crossings.
We are unable to establish the extent of domestic Lao trafficking
in narcotics nor the degree to which Laos is used for
transshipment of narcotics from neighboring countries. However,
Louang Namtha Province has been identified as a route for opium
and heroin from or through Laos to China, while Bokeo and Oudomsay
provinces on the Thai border serve as exit and transit areas in
northwest Laos. Opium from northeast Laos is reportedly shipped
through Vientiane and Bolikhamsay provinces to Thailand. The
extent of trafficking to or through Vietnam has not been
established.
Demand Reduction Programs. The Lao Government has undertaken a
public awareness program to emphasize the dangers of narcotics
usage and trafficking. With help from the USG and UNDCP, it also
has established integrated rural development projects to address
opium poppy cultivation and opium use through the development of
local agriculture, health, education, and other government
services. These projects, as well as the GOL'S public awareness
program, have reduced demand, although the extent has not been
quantified.
IV. U.S. Policy Initiatives and Programs
Policy Initiatives. The USG has two primary objectives in Laos:
to help the GOL eliminate opium poppy cultivation, and to suppress
illicit trafficking in narcotics. The Houaphan crop substitution
project has been the primary vehicle for the first objective.
Poppy cultivation has declined by half in the project area.
Senior Lao officials have called it the most successful project of
its kind in the country. It is now complemented by the new USG
program in support of counternarcotics law enforcement. We will
support the new police counternarcotics unit, along with Lao
Customs counternarcotics efforts, with the goal of assisting the
GOL to curb illicit narcotics trafficking.
Bilateral Cooperation. The Houaphan project has made substantial
progress toward its goals, and is on or ahead of schedule in all
areas. In addition to the creation of the police special
counternarcotics unit and the signing of the LOA on law
enforcement cooperation, there was progress in other areas of Lao-
U.S. narcotics control cooperation. In June, U.S. Customs
conducted a two-week training course in Vientiane for Lao Customs
officers and other officials. Senior GOL officials have urged the
USG to conduct further training. In November, the USG sponsored
six Lao police officers, including the chief-designate of the new
counternarcotics unit, at a two-week DEA training seminar in
Bangkok.
The Road Ahead. USG policy is to persuade the Lao Government to
act more aggressively on counternarcotics matters, including law
enforcement. The USG will continue to stress the importance of
Laos becoming a party to the 1988 UN Convention, as well as
meeting its goals and objectives. The USG also will continue to
press the Lao Government to take stronger measures against
narcotics-related corruption and collusion, with public punishment
for those involved.
[Chart - Laos 1993 Statistical Tables]
(###)
MALAYSIA
I. Summary
Malaysia is an important transit point for Golden Triangle heroin,
some of which is also processed in the country from imported opium
or derivatives. There is no known cultivation of opium poppy in
Malaysia. Heroin No. 3 and marijuana are the primary drugs of
domestic abuse. Marijuana is considered to be a significant
problem, but there are seldom significant arrests or seizures.
The Malaysian Government (GOM) recognizes the seriousness of the
narcotics threat both domestically and internationally, and has
active law enforcement, public education, and treatment programs.
During 1992, Malaysia arrested at USG request a major Southeast
Asian heroin trafficker and pursued extradition proceedings
against him. Although the extradition request was denied, the
trafficker was expelled from Malaysia and is now under arrest in
the U.S.
While low-level corruption facilitates persistent drug trafficking
and abuse, Malaysia pursues law enforcement efforts under one of
the most severe drug laws in the world. Malaysian narcotics
policy is generally serious, and relatively well-funded and well-
organized. Malaysia is actively moving to meet the goals and
objectives of the 1988 UN Convention, which it has signed but not
yet ratified.
II. Status of Country
No opium poppy is cultivated in Malaysia, but illicit heroin
processing and heroin trafficking continue to be serious problems.
Traffickers smuggle heroin base into Malaysia from Thailand and
Burma to produce heroin No. 3 for local consumption. Quantities
of heroin No. 4 pass through Malaysia en route to the U.S. and
other Western markets. Although Malaysian enforcement officials
seized heroin base and heroin No. 3 in 1991 and 1992, they have
made only one seizure of heroin No. 4 since 1990, from a mail
parcel returned from the U.S. as undeliverable. Seizures of raw
opium in 1992 increased from the amounts seized in 1990 and 1991.
Despite severe legal penalties for both drug use and trafficking,
Malaysian authorities have not significantly reduced drug
trafficking or laboratory operations. The immensity of the Golden
Triangle opium poppy crop and the effectiveness of local
enforcement determine the flow of opiates into Malaysia. The
combination of good harvests in the Triangle and enforcement
shortfalls in Burma, Thailand and Malaysia have allowed a steady
increase in the regional supply of opiates. Opiates remain
available at stable prices for the local addict population.
III. Country Actions Against Drugs in 1992
Policy Initiatives. The fight against drug abuse and trafficking
has been a GOM national security priority since 1983. An Anti-
Narcotics Committee reports directly to the Prime Minister, while
its executive arm, the Anti-Narcotics Task Force (ANTF), is the
key GOM coordinating body. Similar bodies operate at the state
and local level; their activities are closely coordinated by the
ANTF. The GOM's second five-year plan retains current priorities;
prevention and enforcement, rehabilitation, manpower development,
international cooperation, and coordination.
Accomplishments. The GOM's efforts to implement its narcotics
control plan fully continued, thus moving Malaysia towards
compliance with the goals and objectives of the 1988 UN
Convention, which it has signed but not yet ratified.
Law Enforcement Efforts. Malaysia's drug laws rank among the
world's most severe. The 1985 Dangerous Drugs Act mandates the
death sentence for narcotics trafficking. Possession of small
quantities of proscribed drugs (15 g of heroin or morphine, 200 g
of cannabis, one kg of opium) creates a legal presumption of
intent to traffic. From 1975 through 1992, Malaysia hanged 159
drug offenders, including 41 non-Malaysians. An additional 286
convicted traffickers, including 24 non-Malaysians, currently
await execution. The Dangerous Drugs Act empowers the government
to detain suspected drug traffickers without trial. Royal
Malaysian Police arrested 744 suspects for offenses under this act
during 1991; 466 of these were ordered detained under its
preventive detention provision. In 1990, Parliament extended this
provision of the act for five years.
The police have established a specifically designated antidrug
unit with 1,775 personnel. Nearly 1,400 Customs officers conduct
anti-smuggling operations, including narcotics control, but only
48 Customs officers in the Preventive Division formally specialize
in counternarcotics.
Malaysia has yet to enact adequate criminal conspiracy laws. Law
enforcement officials prefer to use preventive detention laws that
are easier to enforce. Asset-seizure legislation enacted in 1988
has proven to be ineffective, and legal procedures under this law
need to be clarified. During 1992, the GOM focused more intently
on asset seizure and efforts to counter money laundering, in part
as a result of domestic financial scandals and, in part, resulting
from USG-funded training in money laundering control.
Corruption. Corruption affects some of Malaysia's law enforcement
agencies, particularly in Penang where ethnic Chinese gangs
control most narcotics trafficking. In addition, official sources
report that some law enforcement officials have been intimidated
by death threats from Chinese gangs. Police agencies have
difficulty recruiting ethnic Chinese officers for narcotics work,
while ethnic Malay officers have been ineffective in penetrating
Chinese-controlled trafficking rings. Although no senior
government officials are known to engage in narcotics production,
distribution or money laundering, some police and prison officials
have been charged with corruption and involvement in narcotics
trafficking. Malaysian government policy does not encourage or
facilitate trafficking.
Agreements and Treaties. An original signatory of the 1988 UN
Convention, Malaysia has not yet ratified it. Efforts to
harmonize domestic legislation with the Convention are
continuing, and Malaysian officials have expressed the intention
to ratify soon. Malaysia is a party to the 1961 Single Convention
on Narcotic Drugs, the 1972 Protocol to the Convention, and the
1971 Convention on Psychotropic Substances. Malaysian and U.S.
officials have met periodically since 1988 to re-negotiate an
extradition treaty, but no agreement has yet been concluded. The
U.S. and Malaysia signed a memorandum of understanding in 1989 on
bilateral narcotics cooperation.
Cultivation/Production. Small quantities of marijuana are
cultivated in Malaysia, chiefly in the east Malaysian states of
Sabah and Sarawak. Information on total yields is not available,
but government officials and private experts believe yields to be
small.
Drug Flow/Transit. Narcotics smuggling in Malaysia is centered in
northwest Malaysia, chiefly on the islands of Penang and Langkawi,
and along the land border with Thailand. Increased controls on
this border have resulted in more smuggling by fishing and barter
boats between Thailand, Burma and northern Malaysia. In 1992,
reports continued that narcotics are being shipped directly to
Malaysia from Burma. Nigerian traffickers reportedly began to
smuggle heroin No. 4 from Thailand via Malaysia in 1990. However,
no known Nigerian traffickers or Nigerian-controlled couriers were
arrested in Malaysia during 1992.
Demand Reduction Programs. The GOM points to a decrease in the
growth rate of the new addict population as evidence of the
effectiveness of its active demand reduction policies: 14,624 new
addicts were registered in 1983, but only 7,825 in 1991, a
decrease of about 50 percent. About 59 percent of registered
addicts in 1991 were relapsed former addicts. At the end of 1992,
there were approximately 162,000 registered addicts in Malaysia.
The GOM has sought increased private sector participation in
primary prevention and treatment; business firms have funded
education and information programs, and have donated funds to the
GOM's anti-narcotics trust account. In addition, leaders of
Malaysia's major religious faiths also have become involved in
prevention activities. The GOM hosted the 15th meeting of senior
antidrug officials from the Association of Southeast Asian Nations
in July. The officials resolved to conduct dialogues with
authorities in Burma and Laos in an effort to stem illicit opium
and heroin production. The GOM also hosted the 14th annual
meeting of the International Federation of Non-governmental
Organizations in November which focused on action plans for
prevention, treatment, and rehabilitation in member countries.
About 40 percent of Malaysia's $20 million narcotics budget is
used for rehabilitation. Malaysia has 23 rehabilitation centers
with a total capacity of 9,080. Work is underway on four
additional centers with total capacity of about 2,600.
Rehabilitation services are also provided in small voluntary and
private centers. Approximately 60 percent of the annual budget is
allocated to enforcement, education, and prevention programs.
IV. U.S. Policy Initiatives and Programs
Policy Initiatives. U.S. narcotics control cooperation with the
GOM seeks to: (a) increase Malaysian narcotics law enforcement
effectiveness through appropriate grants for law enforcement
training and equipment; (b) provide pertinent drug law
enforcement intelligence; (c) assist the GOM to identify and
eliminate narcotics money laundering operations in Malaysia; and
(d) enhance cooperation in domestic drug prevention and
rehabilitation efforts.
Bilateral Cooperation. Cooperation between Malaysia and the U.S.
in 1992 included several demand reduction and law enforcement
programs financed by grants from INM. U.S. trainers in the
therapeutic-community concept conducted demand reduction courses
in May and November. In August, U.S. Customs provided the
instructors for a Department of Justice-led team that conducted
two highly successful seminars on money laundering control and
asset seizure and forfeiture. U.S. and Malaysian officials signed
a letter of agreement in September enabling the USG to provide
equipment to support drug enforcement efforts by the Royal
Malaysian Police and Royal Malaysian Customs and Excise
Department. It also provided equipment to the ANTF and the
Pharmacy Division of the Health Ministry.
The USG and GOM have made arrangements for U.S. Coast Guard
trainers to conduct maritime law enforcement courses and "train
the trainer" seminars in early 1993. In addition, the U.S.
Customs Service expects to conduct an overseas enforcement
training program in May. Malaysian drug law enforcement officials
are also expected to participate in a regional narcotics
investigation course and a regional asset forfeiture seminar to be
held in Kuala Lumpur during April.
The U.S. requested extradition of a major Burmese drug trafficker
in March. The trafficker was arrested by Malaysian authorities,
and the extradition case submitted to Malaysian courts. While the
extradition request was denied by a Malaysian court, the
authorities immediately expelled the individual from Malaysia, and
he was subsequently transferred to U.S. custody.
The Road Ahead. The U.S. intends to continue its program of
bilateral cooperation with the Government of Malaysia to: (a)
assist the GOM in arresting major drug traffickers and disrupting
their organizations operating in Malaysia; (b) seek GOM
ratification of the 1988 UN Convention and passage of appropriate
implementing legislation; (c) renew negotiations on a new
extradition treaty; (d) encourage GOM legislation to give
extraterritorial application to the Dangerous Drugs Act; (e)
explore negotiating a mutual legal assistance treaty; (f) conduct
drug enforcement and interdiction training for Malaysian law
enforcement agencies; (g) conduct demand reduction training for
GOM agencies; and (h) encourage further GOM participation in
regional and international drug control initiatives.
[Chart - Malaysia 1993 Statistical Tables]
(###)
NEW ZEALAND
I. Summary
New Zealand is not a major narcotics producing or trafficking
country; marijuana remains the dominant illicit drug. It has
received increasing attention by the New Zealand Government (GNZ).
The National Drug Intelligence Bureau (NDIB) is the lead agency in
these efforts. Resources remain limited for narcotics control,
but laws on asset seizure and legislation under consideration in
the area of money laundering are moving the GNZ toward full
compliance with the 1988 UN Convention.
II. Status of Country
Illicit drug production and trafficking are on the increase. The
NDIB, with the support of police, immigration and health
authorities, is pressed to cope with the problem.
III. Country Actions Against Drugs in 1992
Accomplishments. The NDIB has been in the process of developing a
system to increase involvement of local officials in the
eradication of narcotics production, public education and
rehabilitation. Legislation, which has yet to be tested in court,
went into effect mandating asset seizure in certain narcotics
cases. Legislation regarding money laundering is in the
preliminary drafting stages. The lack of money laundering
legislation, which is expected to receive resistance in enactment,
hampers GNZ efforts.
Corruption. The USG is unaware of instances of official
corruption involving illicit drugs. NDIB personnel are rotated
every three years, and the actions of GNZ officials are subject to
intense scrutiny.
Agreements and Treaties. The GNZ has no formal bilateral
narcotics agreements with other countries. It uses existing
customs, police and Interpol arrangements and informal
relationships. New Zealand and the U.S. are parties to an
extradition treaty that covers narcotics offenses, however,
efforts to extradite fugitives from New Zealand in recent years
have met with little success. New Zealand has signed the 1988 UN
Convention, but has not yet ratified it.
Cultivation and Production. Cannabis is cultivated in
comparatively large amounts for the internal market; GNZ
eradication in 1992 will likely exceed previous record totals, but
domestic supplies remain ample. Local production of other illicit
drugs largely meets local demand, with the exception of
amphetamines which are imported from Australia.
Demand Reduction Programs. Great emphasis is placed upon demand
reduction and rehabilitation programs. However, the NDIB has
become more effective in coordinating suppression activities with
some notable successes in 1992.
IV. U.S. Policy Initiatives and Programs
The USG seeks to encourage GNZ enforcement authorities to
eliminate drug production and control drug transit; assists by
providing training; and cooperates with the GNZ to monitor and
reduce the flow of drugs destined for the U.S. Even without a
formal narcotics agreement, the GNZ cooperates with the USG in
countering the production and trafficking of illicit drugs. The
USG encouraged the GNZ to enact asset forfeiture as well as money-
laundering legislation.
The Road Ahead. To encourage GNZ anti-narcotics efforts, the USG
will provide training, will share USG legislation for the
consideration of GNZ legislators, and will provide information on
narcotics trafficking through appropriate channels.
(###)
PHILIPPINES
I. Summary
Marijuana and, increasingly, hashish dominate illicit drug
production and export in the Philippines, but methamphetamine is
the most commonly abused drug. The country is a transit point for
heroin and methamphetamines destined for East Asia, the Pacific
and the U.S. The Philippines Government (GOP) cooperated with the
USG in demand reduction operations and law enforcement efforts
aimed at interrupting the flow of heroin and cocaine through the
Philippines. The Philippines signed the 1988 UN Convention, but
has not yet ratified it.
II. Status of Country
Ideal growing conditions, limited law enforcement resources, and
corruption permit a flourishing marijuana trade. In some areas,
Muslim and communist guerrillas may be involved in cultivating or
taxing cannabis to help finance their operations. Methamphetamine
is the most commonly abused drug among urban drug users, followed
by marijuana and cough syrup. Narcotics law enforcement personnel
intercepted shipments of methamphetamine originating from China,
arriving via Hong Kong and Taiwan, but there were no major heroin
seizures.
III. Country Action Against Drugs in 1992
Policy Initiatives. The government is committed to narcotics crop
eradication and to curbing drug abuse, but severe budgetary
constraints, inadequate training of personnel, and corruption
hamper its efforts. GOP law enforcement resources focused on
peacekeeping during the national elections campaign in 1992.
Nonetheless, the Dangerous Drugs Board (DDB) participated in
regional and international fora aimed at coordinating
counternarcotics and rehabilitation efforts. The Police Narcotics
Command (NARCOM), the law enforcement arm of the DDB, works
closely with the USG and other governments in interdiction and
other operations.
Accomplishments. Authorities reported they had identified and
targeted for eradication 28 cannabis cultivation sites containing
more than 357,000 cannabis plants and seedlings in the first five
months of 1992. In addition, more than 600 kg of marijuana was
seized and destroyed. In July, law enforcement officers
intercepted a 400-kg shipment of marijuana concealed in a
container of furniture destined for the U.S.
Corruption. A major issue in the May elections was graft and
corruption of government officials, including law enforcement
authorities. Efforts by the incoming Ramos administration to curb
corruption have concentrated on allegations of police involvement
in protection rackets, including gambling and drug trafficking,
and in kidnapping for ransom.
International and Bilateral Agreements. The GOP is a party to the
1961 Single Convention and its 1972 Protocol, and has signed the
1988 UN Convention but has not yet ratified it. It participates
in meetings of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN)
to discuss drug issues and regional efforts in interdiction and
rehabilitation of drug abusers. The Philippines has signed
extradition treaties with Indonesia, Thailand, Canada and
Australia, but does not have one with the U.S. The GOP has
cooperative bilateral narcotics relationships with the U.S.,
Canada, the U.K., Germany, the Netherlands, France, Japan,
Australia New Zealand, as well as with the ASEAN governments.
Cultivation and Production. The tropical climate of the
Philippines is conducive to the cultivation of high-grade
cannabis. Principal areas of cultivation include northern Luzon,
the Visayas, and Mindanao.
Domestic Programs. GOP agencies operate 44 residential and
outpatient rehabilitation centers which treat an average of 1,000
new patients a year. The NARCOM operates one of the largest such
programs (780 resident patients) and claims an 80-percent success
rate.
IV. U.S. Policy Initiatives and Programs.
Policy Initiatives. The USG's principal objective is to stem the
movement of drugs to the U.S. from and through the Philippines.
DEA works to improve the effectiveness of Philippines narcotics
interdiction efforts. The GOP is aware that the legislature must
move to bring the country's laws in line with the 1988 UN
Convention to be more effective in narcotics control, but progress
is extremely slow.
Bilateral Cooperation. DEA continues to try to improve GOP
narcotics investigative capability.
The Road Ahead. USG antidrug programs will seek to enhance drug
law enforcement performance. Extradition and mutual legal
assistance issues will continue to be addressed.
[Chart - Philippines 1993 Statistical Tables]
(###)
SINGAPORE
I. Summary
Singapore has some of the most stringent anti-drug laws in the
world. It is a significant transit country for narcotics
shipments, and an attractive financial center for money
laundering. Since becoming a party to the Financial Action Task
Force (FATF) in 1991, Singapore has participated in FATF meetings
and will host the next session in April 1993. The government has
passed legislation on asset forfeiture with a provision for money
laundering targeted against drug traffickers. Singapore's
domestic drug abuse problem is small. Singapore is not a party to
the 1988 UN Convention.
II. Status of Country
International traffickers use Singapore's major air and seaports
to transit of narcotics. Government of Singapore (GOS)
authorities have seized cannabis products and heroin from
oceangoing vessels in Singapore's harbor and from couriers
transiting Changi airport. In the last year, Singapore Central
Narcotics Bureau (CNB) officers arrested a number of Nigerian and
other third-country citizens carrying significant quantities of
narcotics from Thailand and Malaysia for distribution to couriers
en route the United States, Europe, and Nigeria. There have also
been several major heroin seizures involving couriers transiting
Changi airport en route to Europe and the U.S.
Domestic drug consumption of remains low, partly because of a
strictly enforced death penalty against dealers. The government
also has a rehabilitation program for addicts that discourages
recidivism.
III. Country Actions Against Drugs in 1992
Policy Initiatives. With encouragement from the USG, the GOS
passed legislation in 1992 against money laundering and permitting
asset forfeiture. The legislation received final approval in
October.
Law Enforcement Efforts. The CNB is effective in addressing
domestic drug use, but it has not addressed Singapore's transit
and money laundering role as effectively. Corruption is not
thought to be a major concern.
Agreements and Treaties. Singapore is now a member of the FATF.
The GOS has criminalized money laundering and passed asset seizure
legislation, meeting some of the goals and objectives of the 1988
UN Convention. It has not yet become a party, however, which
would require additional steps to meet fully the convention's
goals.
Demand Reduction Programs. Drug consumption (mostly heroin and
cannabis products) and the number of addicts appear stable. Three
factors are primarily responsible for Singapore's relative
success: harsh penalties; the island state's small size and
geographical isolation; and rigorous rehabilitation programs for
addicts.
IV. U.S. Policy Initiatives and Programs.
Policy Initiatives. The USG encouraged Singapore to pass asset
seizure and money laundering legislation in 1992. In August, DEA
sponsored a seminar on international forfeiture and assets
investigation for Singaporean officials.
Bilateral Cooperation. In 1992, Singapore authorities cooperated
in the extradition of one drug trafficker wanted for offenses in
the U.S.
The Road Ahead. With the passage of drug asset seizure
legislation, the USG will seek to persuade Singapore to become
party to the 1988 UN Convention; improve cooperation in
controlling precursor chemicals; monitor implementation of the new
drug asset seizure law; and negotiate a bilateral agreement
required under Singapore's legislation to permit exchange of
information.
[Chart - Singapore 1993 Statistical Tables]
(###)
TAIWAN
I. Summary
Taiwan is not a major heroin producer, but is used increasingly by
traffickers as a transshipment point, a safe haven, and a
production center for amphetamines. It also plays a role in money
laundering. Taiwan authorities are becoming more involved in
combatting narcotics abuse in Taiwan. Its enforcement system also
has begun to organize itself to enforce Taiwan drug laws, and to
work more closely with the international community to investigate
and prosecute narcotics traffickers.
II. Status of Territory
Heroin transits Taiwan's air and sea ports. In May 1991, U.S.
Customs seized in California 486 kg of Southeast Asian heroin
transshipped through Taiwan, the largest such seizure ever made in
the U.S. Since that time, Taiwan authorities have made
increasingly frequent seizures of heroin, suggesting an emerging
domestic heroin abuse problem as well.
Amphetamine consumption is a major problem. Press reports
indicate that in addition to the illegal amphetamine producing
labs in Taiwan, there are also several labs in mainland China
financed by traffickers from Taiwan.
III. Action Against Drugs in 1992
Policy Initiatives. Despite the absence of formal bilateral
counternarcotics agreements or inclusion in any UN-related
counternarcotics efforts, in October Taiwan signed a memorandum of
understanding (MOU) with the U.S. that will permit cooperation in
criminal investigations and prosecutions. The MOU was a major
step in permitting the U.S. and Taiwan to work together in
prosecuting criminals who commit crimes in either the U.S. or
Taiwan.
Accomplishments. Although Taiwan is pursuing greater
international cooperation in dealing with drug issues, it has made
no attempt to observe the letter or spirit of key provisions of
the 1988 UN Convention, such as control of essential and precursor
chemicals or increased investigation of money laundering. While
banks are required to keep records of large transactions, they are
not required to report them, and there is no monitoring system.
Also, the large informal banking sector operating through gold
shops is extremely difficult to control and offers great potential
for money laundering abuse. While Taiwan produces large
quantities of amphetamines for an emerging domestic market and for
export, principally to Japan, the Philippines and Hawaii,
penalties for methamphetamines trafficking recently were
increased.
Law Enforcement Efforts. Taiwan's Ministry of Justice
Investigation Bureau (MJIB) is the major law enforcement
organization that investigates illegal drug matters in Taiwan. In
1991, the MJIB organized itself to enforce Taiwan laws on
narcotics crime. In 1992, the organizational changes appear to be
taking effect, with the amount of heroin seized up 400 percent
over 1991. The MJIB has placed counternarcotics under its
economic crime unit with a ten-person task force responsible for
directing the bureau-wide enforcement of Taiwan drug laws.
Corruption. While corruption doubtless exists, it does not appear
to be a major factor in counternarcotics law enforcement in
Taiwan. The USG, however, continues to receive reliable
information that some Taiwan authorities maintain formal
relationships with drug trafficking groups along the Thai-Burma
border, including Khun Sa's Shan United Army and remnants of the
Chinese Nationalist forces involved in narcotics. Taiwan
authorities state that these links were severed many years ago.
Cultivation/Production. There is no significant cultivation of
poppy or cannabis in Taiwan. Six amphetamine and methamphetamine
drug labs were raided by Taiwan law enforcement authorities in
1992, resulting in the seizure of approximately 1,600 kg of
amphetamines and 310 kg of its raw materials.
Drug Flow/Transit. Heroin traffic into Taiwan appears to be
principally by ship, and is difficult to detect due to the large
number of commercial shipments; the MJIB estimates that Taiwan
Customs can only inspect about 13 percent of the containers in
transit. There have been some heroin seizures from passengers and
cargo on commercial airline flights as well, and couriers from
Thailand are increasingly using Taiwan as a transit point. The
heroin, usually No. 4, concealed in canned goods, machinery or
lumber, is largely reexported, although there is some domestic
consumption. Amphetamines seized in Taiwan are domestically
produced or smuggled from mainland China on fishing boats, both
for domestic consumption and reexport.
Demand Reduction Programs. Taiwan authorities estimate there are
20-30,000 heroin addicts, but the number is very uncertain.
Amphetamine usage is a growing problem among students, farmers and
laborers in Taiwan's fast-paced society. Based on press
reporting, 0.3 percent of female and 2.1 percent of male high
school students use amphetamines. Taiwan does carry out a media
program to discourage drug abuse.
IV. U.S. Policy Initiatives and Programs
The USG has discussed with Taiwan the need to enact laws to deter
narcotics traffickers from seeking safe havens in Taiwan. Since
the U.S. and Taiwan do not have an extradition agreement, the USG
is only able to gain custody of a fugitive in Taiwan when
authorities determine that the fugitive has broken Taiwan's
immigration laws.
Bilateral Cooperation. In 1992, the Taiwan authorities cooperated
with U.S. law enforcement authorities in the exchange of
intelligence and time-sensitive leads that resulted in the arrests
of six drug traffickers in Taiwan, eight in Hong Kong and four in
the U.S.
The Road Ahead. With the signing of an MOU on cooperation in
criminal investigations and continued exchange of drug leads,
future efforts must concentrate on bringing Taiwan into the
international community of counternarcotics enforcement. This can
best be accomplished by: a) encouraging Taiwan to develop
information exchanges with concerned countries; b) encouraging
legislation that would require the investigation of questionable
financial practices that disguise money laundering; c) persuading
Taiwan to review its passport laws in order to avoid becoming a
safe haven for international fugitives; and d) encouraging Taiwan
to expel drug fugitives to prosecuting countries.
(###)
THAILAND
I. Summary
While no longer a major source country for opiates (its production
potential was estimated as 24 mt of opium in 1992), Thailand
remains the primary conduit for heroin from the Golden Triangle
sold in the U.S. Thailand began to address some of its problems
with the August 1991 passage of narcotics conspiracy and
forfeiture laws; in 1992, the first arrests were made under these
statutes. In 1992, the Police Narcotics Suppression Bureau was
made a separate organization within the National Police and grew
to over 500 officers. Thai authorities arrested 52 major
traffickers, compared to 32 in 1991. A new extradition treaty
with the U.S. came into effect in 1991, and the exchange of
instruments of ratification of a mutual legal assistance treaty is
expected early in 1993. Widespread police corruption, expanding
cross-border trade with Burma, and the involvement of influential
Thai and Sino-Thai in the narcotics trade with the complicity of
some Thai officials are serious impediments to more effective
counternarcotics action.
While there are serious flaws in Thailand's counternarcotics
effort, Thailand is devoting increased resources to narcotics
interdiction, public education, and drug treatment. It has sought
to encourage regional cooperation with Laos and Burma, works well
with Malaysia, and continues to cooperate actively with U.S. law
enforcement agencies.
Thailand has in place nearly all the laws and regulations needed
for it to accede to the 1988 UN Convention. Royal Thai Government
(RTG) policy initiatives plus accession to the Convention will
mean that Thailand has moved significantly toward meeting its
goals and objectives.
II. Status of Country
Opium has long been cultivated by hilltribes in northern Thailand
for medicinal use; it became important also for cash income as
the heroin market grew. Development efforts over the past few
decades have integrated many of the hilltribes into the Thai
economy and provided economic alternatives to opium poppy growing.
There is still a ready internal market for Thai opium, however, as
well as for heroin production, principally in Burma.
Thailand also produces marijuana for the international market.
Cannabis is now cultivated increasingly in southern and northern
Thailand.
Thailand is an important drug trafficking center. Its superior
transportation and communications infrastructure, the rapid growth
in Thai international trade, particularly of sealed containers,
and widespread corruption facilitate drug smuggling, both through
Thailand's major ports and by land and sea to Malaysia and
Singapore. DEA and other law enforcement observers believe that
most Golden Triangle heroin destined for the U.S. and other
Western nations passes through Thailand.
Thailand was not believed to be a significant money laundering
center, but since enactment of the asset forfeiture legislation,
Thai enforcement authorities have become concerned that narcotics-
related financial transactions may be a much larger problem than
originally thought. This realization and the absence of Thai
money laundering laws have raised Thai awareness to the need to
take action. U.S. Treasury officials discussed money laundering
with Thai enforcement, Ministry of Finance, and Central Bank
officials during the year. The Thai indicated that they were
ready to address money laundering and seek enactment of needed
legislation.
Just as Thailand is the preferred route for heroin leaving the
Golden Triangle, Thai highways are the preferred route for
essential and precursor chemicals coming in. While a few
significant seizures were made in 1992, it has been difficult for
Thai officials to identify which legitimate industrial chemicals
are intended for narcotics production. The task of interdicting
chemicals headed for heroin labs is further complicated by
refiners' efforts to produce their own "final use" chemicals, such
as acetic anhydride, and import only basic chemicals even more
difficult to tie to narcotics production.
III. Country Actions Against Drugs in 1992
Policy Initiatives. The Thai are now entering the second year of
a five-year narcotics control plan. The comprehensive plan
includes crop reduction, interdiction and demand reduction goals.
The Thai spent an estimated $51 million on counternarcotics
programs in FY 1992 and are expected to spend at least that much
in FY 1993. Thai Government expenditures on narcotics control
have tripled in the past decade.
Law Enforcement Efforts. Statistics of the Office of Narcotics
Control Board (ONCB) as of September 1992 project heroin seizures
in Thailand for the year at approximately 600 kg, a drop from the
1,500 kg seized in 1991, when several large seizures were made.
Law enforcement activity remains high with over 72,500 arrests for
narcotics offenses expected in 1992. Marijuana seizures in 1992
rose to an estimated 87 mt, up more than 60 percent from 1991. In
1992, there were no confirmed reports of heroin refineries
operating in Thailand.
The U.S. law enforcement assistance program focuses on assisting
the RTG to dismantle drug trafficking organizations and arrest
high-level traffickers. In cooperation with DEA, Thai law
enforcement authorities pursued several major case investigations.
In the year ending September 30, cases had been initiated against
52 DEA-defined "major traffickers", an increase of about 20 over
the previous year. The new narcotics conspiracy and asset
forfeiture law came into force in 1991; one of the first two
arrests involved a corrupt employee of the ONCB.
In 1992, the new Police Narcotics Suppression Bureau (PNSB) grew
to a strength of over 500 of its authorized 621 personnel. More
than 200 officers who entered the unit without previous narcotics
experience are receiving training. Two new divisions are now
operational, one in the ONCB and the other in the PNSB, to focus
specifically on cases to be prosecuted under the new narcotics
conspiracy and asset forfeiture laws.
Corruption. The Thai Government as a matter of policy does not
encourage or facilitate the production or transit of illegal drugs
or the laundering of drug money. However, the widespread
perception that illegal drugs are a foreign rather than a Thai
problem and a social and legal system susceptible to pressure from
influential persons contribute to extensive narcotics corruption.
A candidate for Prime Minister, who had briefly been Deputy Prime
Minister, was forced to withdraw due to allegations of involvement
in narcotics trafficking; press and other reports suggest that
other influential politicians are also involved in narcotics
trafficking.
There is also a network of relationships among Thai military and
government officials and the ethnic/insurgent groups in Burma
which traffic in narcotics. Some Thai police, army and civilian
officials facilitate and profit from drug trafficking, and in
1992, DEA was forced to terminate one previously effective program
because of a corrupt commander. The Thai Government has said it
will take legal action when it has evidence it can use in court.
While one of the first cases to be filed under the new conspiracy
legislation was filed against an ONCB employee as a result of an
ONCB investigation, in general there has been little evidence of
active pursuit of allegations of official corruption. The current
Thai Government, however, has indicated that corruption will
receive more serious attention.
Cultivation and Production. Opium poppy has been grown in
northern Thai highlands for decades, principally by ethnic
minorities not part of mainstream Thailand. Opium is used by
these hilltribes medicinally, and also is a valuable cash crop in
remote areas. In recent years, opium poppy cultivation by
traditional growers has been supplemented to some degree by
commercial enterprises financed and managed by heroin traffickers.
Opium poppy cultivation in Thailand has been illegal since 1958.
The Thai Government seeks to reduce production by deploying army
patrols prior to the growing season and by manual eradication when
cultivation is found. The army's commitment to eradication is
limited by a desire not to alienate hilltribes: as a rule,
hilltribe opium poppy farmers are not arrested, though on occasion
police have taken action against commercial opium growers.
Eradication in 1992 removed more potential opium and heroin from
the market than was seized as heroin in law enforcement actions.
Some opium poppy cultivation does continue due to the ready market
inside Thailand and for heroin refineries in Burma. Cultivation
for the 1991/92 growing season was estimated at 3,630 ha, a 14-
percent reduction from the previous year. Opium production was
further reduced by the most successful eradication campaign to
date in which the USG estimates that 1,580 ha were destroyed, or
44 percent of the total hectarage. Based on an estimated
production of 11.5 kg per hectare of opium poppy, total net Thai
opium production for the 1991/92 season was approximately 24 mt,
the lowest since accurate records have been available.
Total hectarage of opium poppy cultivation in Thailand is
calculated by systematic aerial surveillance and technical
analysis by Thai and USG analysts. The yield estimate is based on
a comprehensive USG/Thai field study.
Treaties and Agreements. Thailand is a party to the 1961 Single
Convention on Narcotic Drugs, the 1972 Protocol to the Single
Convention and the 1961 Convention on Psychotropic Substances. A
new extradition treaty with the U.S. came into force in 1991.
Mutual legal assistance legislation was passed in 1992, which will
permit the Thai to implement a new mutual legal assistance treaty
with the U.S. Thailand was an active observer in meetings of the
Chemical Action Task Force in 1991; Thai officials are working to
conform their regulations to those recommended by the Task Force
and are planning to establish a multi-agency Thai/DEA task force
in 1993 to target essential and precursor chemicals. Thailand has
in place nearly all laws and regulations needed for it to accede
to the 1988 UN Convention. RTG policy initiatives and accession
to the Convention will mean that Thailand has moved significantly
towards meeting the goals and objectives of the Convention.
Thailand is meeting the goals established in bilateral agreements
with the USG.
Demand Reduction Programs. Drug prevention education is
integrated into the Thai curriculum in primary and secondary
schools and broadcast throughout the country in television spots
and on radio programs. Teachers in training must take at least
one course in drug prevention education and the schools operate
drug prevention outreach centers. Systematic surveys of target
groups are still in the early stages; it is difficult to gauge how
effective current prevention efforts are.
Thai drug treatment efforts include inpatient and outpatient
detoxification, therapeutic communities, religiously oriented
rehabilitation institutions, and self-help efforts. Thai health
authorities believe amphetamine and inhalant abuse are the most
widespread drug abuse problems, though particular attention is
also being given to the high incidence of HIV infection among IV
drug users. There is an awareness of the rapid increase of heroin
addiction among hilltribe youth in the north and among Muslim
youth and fishermen in the south, but many Thai continue to
believe heroin abuse is principally a Western problem.
IV: U.S. Policy Initiatives and Programs
Policy Objectives. The disruption of heroin trafficking remains
the foremost goal of USG narcotics policy in Thailand. The USG
also seeks to help the RTG eliminate opium poppy cultivation
through crop control and development of viable economic
alternatives for indigenous poppy farmers, and is involved in Thai
efforts to measure and curtail domestic drug abuse.
Bilateral Cooperative. Official Thai-American narcotics
cooperation is close and longstanding and includes USG-funded
projects in law enforcement, crop control and demand reduction.
The Thai generally allow greater DEA involvement in narcotics
control operations than the agency enjoys anywhere outside the
U.S. The Thai continue to cooperate with the USG on extradition
requests, but not for Thai nationals, limiting the usefulness of
this procedure. The USG also has experienced some difficulty in
persuading the RTG to act quickly to arrest traffickers as
required by the Treaty.
The USG makes a significant financial contribution to the Thai
anti-narcotics effort, providing enforcement equipment and almost
totally supporting the crop eradication effort. The Thai have
increased their own spending on many aspects of narcotics control
in recent years, and in 1993 are initiating a four-year, $8.4
million antidrug program in the Ministry of Interior.
The bilateral narcotics law enforcement effort involves a number
of USG enforcement elements. DEA has a major presence in Thailand
and works closely with the Narcotics Suppression Bureau, the
Provincial Police, and the law enforcement division of the ONCB.
It provides intelligence and operational support in most major
Thai narcotics cases. INM, through the U.S. Embassy's Narcotics
Affairs Section, provides substantial nonlethal commodity support
and training for law enforcement units. U.S. Customs provides
training for Royal Thai customs units. The U.S. Department of
Defense, through U.S. Customs, funded a regional center in Phuket,
Thailand, to monitor the movements of small vessels suspected of
running drugs. In addition, DOD provides services for narcotics
monitoring, surveillance and interdiction support.
Economic development of northern highland areas has long been a
cooperative effort between Thailand and foreign governments. The
USG urges other international donors to tie development assistance
to cessation of opium poppy cultivation. While most development
programs do not contain specific cultivation provisos, one of
their primary objectives is to replace opium poppy cultivation.
With the addition of the USG-funded crop control campaign, there
has been considerable success in the reduction of opium poppy
cultivation in northern Thailand.
INM and USIS work with the RTG, the media and private voluntary
organizations to raise public awareness of the dangers of
narcotics and build public support for more effective policies and
enforcement. USIS keeps the U.S. narcotics policies and programs
accurately on the public record. USIS also conducts seminars and
speaker programs, provides a narcotics data base for academics and
journalists, and conducts public opinion research on Thai
attitudes toward narcotics use, policy, and the U.S. cooperative
role.
The Road Ahead. Implementation of new conspiracy and asset
forfeiture laws holds the greatest promise to improve RTG
capability to reduce trafficking of heroin from Thailand by
bringing to justice the organizers and financiers of the heroin
trade. In 1993, the provision of conspiracy and financial
investigations training will continue to be a high USG priority.
After Thailand fully accedes to the 1988 UN Convention, as
expected in 1993, it will be in general conformity with
international legal standards and expectations for narcotics
control. Thailand plays a leading role in regional drug control
efforts, although the challenges posed by widespread drug-
producing and trafficking areas of the Golden Triangle limit the
potential of such efforts.
As the Thai appreciate more fully the dangers of drug abuse and
devote more of their own resources and energies to narcotics
control, Thailand can become more effective in curbing the flow of
heroin from the Golden Triangle.
[Chart - Thailand 1993 Statistical Tables]
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VIETNAM
Vietnamese officials have publicly stated that their country faces
a drug addiction problem and that opium production and use are
growing. While most opium seems to be consumed domestically,
there is growing evidence that Vietnam is being used as a transit
country for Golden Triangle opiates destined for Western markets.
Increasing international travel and trade to and with Vietnam will
increase the potential for narcotics trafficking.
The Government of Vietnam (SRV) has become increasingly concerned
with domestic narcotics production, trafficking and consumption in
recent years. Opium poppy, grown primarily by ethnic minority
groups in the northern highlands, is the principal concern;
cannabis is cultivated in southern provinces, where its abuse is
concentrated. There are no reliable estimates for opium poppy
production or use, but SRV officials publicly acknowledge that at
least 2,000 ha are cultivated with a potential yield of 15-20 mt
of opium annually. Given the uncertainty of these figures, the
USG plans to undertake its own estimate of Vietnamese cultivation.
To deal with its drug problem, the SRV sought assistance from the
UNDCP in 1991, and received a UNDCP fact-finding team in November
of that year. Further visits took place in 1992, and the UNDCP
has provided funds for the preparation of a comprehensive drug
control plan.
Vietnam has publicized incidents of low-level official involvement
in narcotics trafficking and corruption. The USG does not have
information suggesting that the SRV, as a government, permits or
engages in narcotics trafficking as a matter of policy, nor that
senior officials are engaged in or tolerate trafficking. Vietnam
is not a party to the UN drug conventions of 1961, 1971 or 1988,
but existing legislation covers some aspects of each of the
conventions, according to a UNDCP review of Vietnamese legal
codes. Vietnam has indicated a desire to strengthen its
counternarcotics legal structures.
During 1992, the SRV arrested a trafficker indicted in the U.S.,
and expelled him to Thailand for transfer to U.S. custody. Police
personnel with counternarcotics responsibility have established
relationships with Western counternarcotics personnel based in
Bangkok, and have indicated an interest in cooperation with and
training and assistance from Western narcotics law enforcement
agencies, including the DEA.
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OTHER ASIA AND PACIFIC
FIJI AND TONGA
Fiji, a popular tourist destination, has a large foreign community
and a major regional port. The country does not have a tradition
of drug use other than the drinking of yaqona a mild stimulant not
officially classified as a narcotic or psychotropic substance.
Alcohol abuse is also common in both Fiji and Tonga.
Both Fiji and Tonga face an incipient marijuana problem among
local youth stemming from contact with foreign travellers and the
many emigrant Tongans who return to visit home. Marijuana
cultivation occurs on some of the remote islands of both
countries. To date, however, there is no evidence of large-scale
local marijuana use nor of use of hard drugs by local citizens.
In both Fiji and Tonga, police/military surveillance and law
enforcement capabilities are extremely limited. Each country made
a major, chance seizure of marijuana in 1992, and there were also
initial indications that Fiji may be used as a center for money
laundering connected with the narcotics trade. Both the
governments of Fiji and Tonga impose relatively strict penalties
for drug use or trafficking and prosecute both local and foreign
offenders. Recently the government of Tonga provided excellent
assistance with the extradition of a New Zealand citizen wanted on
federal drug charges in the District of Rhode Island. We believe
this was the first extradition from Tonga, which acceded in 1966
to the U.S.-UK extradition Treaty (1931), although the fugitive
ultimately waived the formal process. The Tongan Government
received proceeds from the sale of a seized yacht at public
auction, a step that may prove an incentive to greater law
enforcement in this region. In 1992, the South Pacific Forum
sponsored a seminar on money laundering in Fiji which was well
attended. In 1992, both Fiji and Tonga became participants in the
U.S. Customs-sponsored "Project Cook".
No drug statistics are available for Tonga. For Fiji, police
statistics covering 1983 to 1991 show seizures of 32.1 kg of dry
cannabis, 16 g of hashish and 5,867 cannabis plants. During that
period 833 individuals were arrested for use, importation or
trafficking of marijuana. Police estimate the drug user community
in Fiji to number around 1,000 individuals, mostly 15-25 years
old, in a population of about 760,000. Hard drug seizures have
been rare.
Treaties Agreements. In early 1992, Fiji was ready to sign both
the 1961 and the 1988 UN Conventions. However, the new government
elected in May, the first general election since the 1987 coups,
relegated these conventions to a lower priority. The Government of
the Republic of Fiji maintains that it still plans to sign these
conventions. The Kingdom of Tonga, however, is not a member of
the UN. Neither country has made sufficient progress in
counternarcotics matters to meet the objectives of the UN
Convention.
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PAPUA NEW GUINEA
Papua-New Guinea (PNG) is not a significant drug producing,
trafficking, or money-laundering country. Like many other
countries in the region, however, Papua New Guinea has a small but
increasing problem of production and trafficking of high-potency
cannabis grown by farmers who find it more profitable than licit
crops. While this cannabis is primarily consumed domestically,
the Governments of both PNG and Australia are concerned by reports
of cannabis shipments to Australia in exchange for weapons
imported into PNG. A number of Australians have been arrested in
Australia in connection with such smuggling, including a senior
Australian police official in early 1992. The two governments are
taking steps to encourage bilateral police cooperation to stop
this traffic.
The National Parliament passed an act establishing a National
Narcotics Control Board in early 1992 to oversee the anti-drug
effort. As part of this effort, the PNG Government opened the
National Maritime Surveillance Center in Port Moresby in December
and has established a National Surveillance Monitoring Committee
to coordinate inter-agency efforts. The Royal PNG Constabulary
has established a criminal intelligence unit that will focus,
among other subjects, on drug trafficking. At the same time,
counternarcotics law enforcement programs do not currently appear
to receive high priority in government budgets, while demand
reduction programs are in their infancy. The National Narcotics
Bureau has drawn up a variety of proposed educational programs,
but lacks the funds to implement them.
There are no narcotics-related agreements or treaties under
negotiation with the U.S. PNG and Australia signed a Joint
Declaration of Principles (JDP) in 1987, which includes provisions
for mutual legal assistance in criminal cases. PNG has not yet
ratified the 1988 UN Convention, and has made little progress in
meeting its goals and objectives. The USG will encourage PNG to
update its counter-narcotics legislation so it can become a party
to the Convention.
The USG seeks to help PNG discourage the establishment of
widespread production and trafficking networks within PNG, given
the potential for production to shift from cannabis to higher-
value illicit drugs. In this regard, the USG has agreed to donate
portable radio equipment valued at $20,000 for PNG police to use
for counter-narcotics purposes.
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WESTERN SAMOA
Western Samoa is an independent, democratic island-state in the
south Pacific with a population of 160,000. The standard of
living and relatively high level of literacy belie the country's
annual per capita income of about $650, which makes it one of the
poorest countries in the world.
Western Samoa is not a significant producer, user or trafficker in
narcotics. An April 1992 U.S. Army aerial survey of the entire
country identified only a few small plots of cannabis which is
consumed by local youth. The Army study concluded that there was
no current need for USG work in this field in Western Samoa. The
Ministry of Health and the police authorities of Western Samoa are
alert to the possible expansion of narcotics use in the country
and the potential for transshipment; to date, however, there is
no evidence of the latter.
Western Samoa is not yet a signatory to either the 1961 UN Single
Convention or the or 1988 UN Convention.
[Chart - Other East Asia and Pacific 1993 Statistical Tables]
[EDITOR'S NOTE: Charts referenced to in brackets [ ] are
available only in hard copy of report.]
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