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INTERNATIONAL NARCOTICS CONTROL STRATEGY REPORT, APRIL 1993
US DEPARTMENT OF STATE
BUREAU OF INTERNATIONAL NARCOTICS MATTERS

DEPARTMENT OF STATE PUBLICATION 10047
RELEASED APRIL 1993

The Report is for sale by the Government Printing Office, 
Superindendent of Documents.  Stock No.:  044-000-02370-9

THIS SEGMENT OF THE INCSR REPRESENTS INDIVIDUAL REPORTS FOR SOUTH 
AMERICA, MEXICO, CANADA, CENTRAL AMERICA AND THE CARIBBEAN


SOUTH AMERICA
  Argentina
  Bolivia 
  Brazil
  Chile
  Colombia
  Ecuador
  Paraguay
  Peru
  Uruguay
  Venezuela

MEXICO AND CENTRAL AMERICA 
  Belize
  Canada 
  Costa Rica
  El Salvador
  Guatemala
  Honduras
  Mexico
  Nicaragua
  Panama 

THE CARIBBEAN
  Bahamas
  Cuba
  Dominican Republic
  Guyana 
  Haiti
  Jamaica
  Netherlands Antilles and Aruba
  Suriname
  Trinidad and Tobago
  Eastern Caribbean
     Antigua and Barbuda
     Barbados
     Dominica 210
     Grenada
     St. Kitts and Nevis
     St. Lucia
     St. Vincent and the Grenadines
  French Caribbean
  UK Dependent Territories in the Caribbean
     Anguilla, Montserrat, and British Virgin Islands
     Cayman Islands
     Turks and Caicos Islands


[EDITOR'S NOTE:  Charts referenced to in brackets [ ] are 
available only in hard copy of report.]

SOUTH AMERICA


ARGENTINA
I.  Summary 
Argentina is primarily a transit country for Andean narcotics en 
route to the U.S. and Europe, although there is some small-scale 
cultivation and processing as well.  It is also a major producer 
of essential and precursor chemicals, but the Argentine government 
(GOA) is trying to control their sale and production.  Domestic 
drug abuse is on the rise.  Over recent years, government and 
public awareness of the threat posed by the illicit drug trade has 
increased.

The GOA has taken important steps to combat the drug problem, on 
its own and in cooperation with neighboring countries and the 
United States.  The Secretariat for Programming for Drug 
Prevention and the Fight Against Narcotics Trafficking coordinates 
many aspects of Argentina's antinarcotics efforts.  The Argentine 
military has expressed its desire to increase its involvement in 
supporting counternarcotics operations.  Limited resources and the 
lack of effective legislation are major impediments to a more 
successful effort.

II. Status of Country 

Argentina is an important route for cocaine from Bolivia and Peru. 
The total of 1.2 mt seized by authorities in 1992 was about the 
same amount as in 1991.  Although the amount of marijuana 
confiscated in 1992 nearly doubled over the previous year, 
cultivation and production of narcotics is very modest compared 
with some of Argentina's Andean neighbors.  Internal consumption 
of narcotics reportedly increased; small seizures grew sharply, 
with six times more LSD seized than in any previous year.

Argentina is one of the largest South American producers of 
precursor and essential chemicals.  Joint Argentine-DEA 
investigations reveal that chemicals are often purchased in 
Argentina and transported to Bolivia, where they are illegally 
diverted to narcotics production.  

Inadequate record-keeping and expertise impede analysis of money 
laundering.  It is impossible to determine its scope or its 
effects on the economy.  USG and Spanish investigations have 
provided evidence that money laundering is occurring on a large 
scale.  

III. Country Actions Against Drugs in 1992

Policy Initiatives.  The Argentine military forces have started to 
become involved in narcotics control, providing logistic and 
communications support for antinarcotics operations, and 
conducting airspace control operations in border areas.  A joint 
information command communications (JICC) network, manned by 
members of the Argentine police forces, is being established with 
INM and DEA support.  The JICC is designed to improve information-
sharing among GOA authorities.  Argentine officials have met with 
their counterparts in neighboring countries to improve cooperation 
and information exchange. 

Accomplishments.  The Argentine Congress is considering 
legislation that would authorize the use of undercover agents in 
investigations.  Currently the Drug Secretary's office is forming 
legislation which will be submitted to Congress on the use of 
informants, plea bargaining and controlled deliveries.  General 
political acceptance grew for permitting the armed forces to 
provide logistic and communications support in antinarcotics 
operations.  In 1992, the GOA began enforcement of a 1991 law 
controlling the manufacture and distribution of precursor and 
essential chemicals.  

Law Enforcement Efforts.  Law enforcement agencies improved their 
effectiveness over the past year.  According to the Drug 
Secretariat, over 10,000 drug-related arrests were made in 1992, 
compared with just under 6,000 in 1991.  This increase reflects 
greater awareness of the drug problem, high-level interest in a 
more aggressive effort, and greater professionalism resulting from 
training provided by the USG to various law enforcement agencies.  

The relatively steady level of cocaine seizures over the past few 
years may be attributed to the government's emphasis on 
intelligence-gathering and investigative work.  The police seek to 
develop cases against the organizations' leaders.  Fewer 
witnesses, however, are coming forward to volunteer information 
since an informant, in compliance with Argentine law, was denied 
anonymity and prosecuted in a highly publicized 1991 drug case.

Corruption.  The extent of drug corruption is difficult to gauge.  
The narcotics control agencies are concerned that trafficker 
resources permit them to corrupt government and law enforcement 
officials.  In late 1992, a witness of dubious credibility accused 
the Argentine Drug Secretary of corruption in press interviews, 
but the allegations have not been substantiated and President 
Menem continues to publicly defend him.  Where allegations have 
been substantiated, the GOA has acted to punish corruption related 
to trafficking.  Individuals accused in the 1991 "Yomagate" 
corruption case, involving in-laws of the President, remain in 
jail or are out on bond while prosecutors await evidence expected 
to become available from U.S. and Spanish courts in 1993.  

Agreements and Treaties.  The U.S.-Argentina Mutual Legal 
Assistance Treaty (MLAT), signed in 1990, was ratified by both 
countries in 1992 and entered into force February 9, 1993.  The 
Argentine legislature also ratified the 1988 UN Convention in 
1992.  The GOA is taking adequate steps to comply with the 
convention.  We are seeing greater efforts to seize narcotics, and 
the GOA is seeking to increase the awareness of the business 
community by sponsoring money laundering seminars with USG 
assistance.  The GOA is conducting joint investigations with DEA 
and joint aerial surveillance missions; these  demonstrate its 
efforts to meet the goals and objectives of its commitments.  The 
first successful USG asset sharing effort with the GOA was 
concluded in March 1993.  The U.S. has a long-standing extradition 
treaty with Argentina; it is used frequently.

Cultivation and Production.  Because chewing coca leaves is a 
legal and accepted traditional custom in northwest Argentina, 
police tend to overlook small coca plots and the illegal 
importation of leaves.  There is no known major cultivation of 
coca or opium poppy; the GOA and the DEA conducted a joint aerial 
surveillance in northern Argentina in 1990 to determine its 
possible extent, but was handicapped by the lack of accurate 
intelligence information.  There is some production of cocaine in 
small "kitchen" laboratories.

Domestic Programs.  Argentine narcotics consumption reportedly is 
rising.  According to GOA estimates, consumption has increased 30 
percent since 1989.  The GOA estimates that more than 70,000 
Argentines are addicted to illicit drugs and many others to licit 
pharmaceuticals.

Demand reduction is a major element of the GOA's narcotics control 
strategy.  Under the direction of the Drug Secretariat, the GOA 
established prevention programs in the school system.  Greater 
interest in learning about U.S. programs has led to frequent 
requests for visits by U.S. drug experts.  USIS programs have 
played an important role in increasing public awareness about the 
drug problem. 

International organizations, such as the OAS, the UNDCP, and the 
IDB, have provided funds to the GOA and private organizations for 
prevention and rehabilitation.  The Drug Secretariat is 
negotiating a training agreement with the Daytop Village 
therapeutic community of New York.  Argentina has many private 
organizations that work in the area of drug abuse, most of them in 
Buenos Aires.  At the provincial level, resources are scarce, and 
more needs to be done.

IV. U.S. Policy Initiatives and Programs 

Policy Initiatives.  USG goals are to heighten GOA awareness of 
the threat posed by drug trafficking and increase its capabilities 
to respond.  The GOA's efforts to increase the Argentine banking 
community's awareness of the problem through a money laundering 
seminar, as well as joint investigations conducted with the DEA, 
and training for its personnel, demonstrate efforts to accomplish 
these objectives.

Bilateral Cooperation.  The Drug Secretariat and police and 
internal security organizations have cooperated effectively with 
the USG.  In FY 1992, INM provided $360,000 in assistance for 
detector dogs and training for the police in eight provinces, and 
for the airport police.  Law enforcement equipment was provided 
for police in four provinces as well as for the Coast Guard.  DEA 
continues to conduct major investigations jointly with Argentine 
authorities.  

The Road Ahead.  The USG hopes to encourage greater inter-agency 
cooperation within the GOA, using USG multiagency training 
programs.  It also seeks to encourage the GOA to direct more of 
its own resources to antidrug efforts.  The USG will continue to 
consult with Argentina about legal obstacles affecting the 
prosecution of traffickers. 

[Chart - Argentina 1993, Statistical Tables]
(###)

BOLIVIA

I.  Summary

Bolivia is a major producer of coca leaf and coca derivatives.  In 
1992, the Government of Bolivia (GOB) continued to make progress 
in narcotics law enforcement, carrying out a number of major law 
enforcement operations, most notably "Ghost Zone," which 
challenged trafficker aircraft access to the Chapare region and 
disrupted trafficker activities on the ground.  Seizures of coca 
leaf, cocaine base, and cocaine HCl increased.  Although the GOB 
extradited one trafficker to the U.S. in July, in December the 
Bolivian Supreme Court denied a U.S. request for a second accused 
trafficker.  The USG would like to sign a new extradition treaty 
with Bolivia.  In contrast to the genuine progress realized in law 
enforcement and interdiction in 1992, the GOB failed to meet the 
coca eradication goals set in bilateral agreements with the U.S.  
However, there may have been a small net reduction in the crop.  
The problems surrounding coca eradication point to the limits in 
GOB political will and capability to support counternarcotics 
activities.

II.  Status of Country

Bolivia is the world's second-largest producer of coca leaf after 
Peru, and the second-largest producer of cocaine HCl after 
Colombia.  Bolivia is not a major producer of chemicals used in 
processing cocaine. These are smuggled in from neighboring 
countries, or diverted from legitimate use to the traffickers.

The Chapare is Bolivia's primary region for the production of coca 
leaf for refinement into cocaine products.  Pressure from 
Operation "Ghost Zone" on trafficking activities has decreased the 
number of buying organizations in the Chapare, as small leaf-
buying organizations have disbanded or merged with other 
trafficker networks.  A disturbing development in 1992, however, 
was the increased presence of Colombian traffickers.  Colombians 
are now directly involved in purchasing and processing coca leaf, 
making their influence felt down to the lowest level of leaf 
purchase.  The Colombian preference for cash transactions weakens 
Bolivian control of buying and processing activities by 
undermining the usual Bolivian practice of extending credit for 
drug activities.  As a result, there are fewer Bolivian networks 
buying and processing leaf.

There was also a significant increase in illegal coca activity in 
the Yungas, a region which supplies much of the legal traditional 
coca market.  The move of some traffickers away from the Chapare 
is attributed to the effective interdiction efforts of "Ghost 
Zone."

III.  Country Action Against Drugs During 1992

Policy Initiatives.  The Bolivian counternarcotics effort is based 
on the 1987 USG-GOB bilateral counternarcotics agreement, and the 
1988 Bolivian Coca and Controlled Substances Law (Law 1008).  The 
bilateral agreement is updated annually by an exchange of 
diplomatic notes and accompanying annexes.  The strategic goal of 
the counternarcotics program is to reduce, and ultimately 
eliminate, Bolivian production of illicit coca and refined cocaine 
products and the demand for narcotics.

Under the terms of the bilateral agreement, the GOB agreed to 
provide the necessary political support, personnel and material 
resources within its available means, in return for USG technical 
and financial support to implement the enforcement program.  The 
principal objective of the program is to enforce all provisions of 
Law 1008.  This includes disrupting trafficking organizations, 
seizing assets, arresting and prosecuting the leaders of key 
organizations, and inflicting financial damage to those engaged in 
purchasing and processing coca leaf, and in transporting cocaine 
products out of the country.

To achieve these goals, the GOB is conducting a campaign to 
intercept, seize and destroy significant quantities of coca leaf, 
coca products, laboratories, and other property used in drug 
trafficking; to regulate the supply, sale, and transportation of 
chemicals for processing refined cocaine; to destroy processing, 
storage, and transit sites; and to investigate, arrest and 
prosecute major traffickers.  Under the provisions of Law 1008, 
Bolivia is obligated to plan and implement a program of compulsory 
coca eradication.  The USG and GOB are also committed to pursue 
requests for extradition, according to the proper procedures, law, 
and regulations of each country.

Law 1008 established coca eradication targets of 5,000-8,000 ha 
per year through 1993.  The GOB goal for 1992 was 7,000 ha.  As in 
previous years, 1993 USG Economic Support Funds (ESF) balance of 
payments assistance will be conditioned on quantitative and 
qualitative measures of counternarcotics performance.

Accomplishments.  Bolivia made significant progress in 1992 toward 
meeting counternarcotics goals.  It seized record amounts of coca 
leaf and coca products.  Increased arrests further attest to 
improved law enforcement efforts.  Even more important is the 
inclusion of several high-level traffickers among those arrested.

Operation "Ghost Zone," begun in March, resulted in significant 
seizures of contraband, and the disruption of trafficking 
organizations and transportation networks out of the Chapare.  A 
significant achievement was the dismantling of the Celimo Andrade 
organization, a major Colombian trafficking network associated 
with the Cali cartel.  Two USG-funded intelligence projects, 
managed, staffed, and operated by Bolivian personnel, are 
providing invaluable operational intelligence in direct support of 
counternarcotics law enforcement.

Operation "Golden Bear," designed to build upon the success of 
"Ghost Zone" by inserting quick response teams at known 
transshipment and laboratory sites, yielded a large seizure of 
cocaine HCl and the arrest of Bolivian and Colombian traffickers.  
Enforcement actions have prompted violent confrontations between 
traffickers and law enforcement personnel.

All Bolivian counternarcotics units improved their capabilities 
during 1992.  The National Police Rural Mobile Patrols (UMOPAR), 
fundamental to the success of "Ghost Zone," are undertaking more 
independent operations.  The Bolivian Navy counternarcotics unit 
(Blue Devils) exerts a continuous presence on river systems 
critical to the transport of narcotics and  precursor chemicals.  
The U.S. Coast Guard has been very active in training the Blue 
Devils in the Waterways Law Enforcement (WLE) program, including 
establishment of a WLE school in Bolivia.  The Air Force 
counternarcotics helicopter unit (Red Devils) demonstrated 
increased self-sufficiency and continued to build an excellent 
flight safety record.

In 1991, the GOB issued a decree to encourage key traffickers to 
give up voluntarily their illegal activities.  The surrender 
decree offered traffickers immunity from extradition to the U.S. 
and the possibility of reduced sentences if they agreed to certain 
terms, including cooperation with enforcement authorities.  Eight 
traffickers surrendered under the terms of the GOB decree, but 
later recanted their original confessions and pleaded guilty to 
lesser charges.  All eight have been convicted.  Seven are now 
serving less than six-year prison terms, but retain protection 
from extradition to the U.S.  One convicted trafficker died in 
prison.  The Bolivian Attorney General is handling the request to 
appeal the convictions and light sentences. 

The GOB eradicated a total of 5,149 ha of coca in 1992.  Although 
short of the GOB 7,000 ha target, the GOB did achieve a small net 
reduction in the amount of coca under cultivation for the third 
consecutive year, bringing  coca cultivation to below the 1988 
potential harvest level.  Many factors affect the eradication 
effort, including the weather or the government's reluctance to 
face the opposition of coca grower organizations.  Despite the 
stipulations in Law 1008 regarding voluntary and compulsory coca 
eradication, GOB progress on eradication has been limited.

Law Enforcement Efforts.  The GOB has not systematically enforced 
all aspects of Law 1008.  This is most obvious in illegal coca 
cultivation and eradication.  Although some important enforcement 
measures have been taken, the GOB continues to refrain from 
employing measures of forced, uncompensated coca eradication.

Corruption.  The GOB does not condone the participation of its 
officials in any activity related to narcotics trafficking.  It 
does, however, acknowledge publicly that narcotics corruption 
exists.  When confronted with clear evidence of drug-related 
corruption, especially involving senior government officials, the 
GOB has taken forceful steps to address the situation.  For 
example, in a still unfolding case, three special narcotics court 
judges were fired for accepting gifts of travel and hospitality 
from narcotraffickers and may face criminal charges.  In general, 
the GOB deals with such incidents of corruption behind the scenes, 
rather than in public prosecutions.

Agreements and Treaties.  Bolivia is a party to the 1961 Single 
Convention on Narcotic Drugs, the 1972 Protocol thereto, the 1971 
Convention on Psychotropic Substances and the 1988 UN Convention.  
Continuing GOB actions in the areas of bilateral cooperation, 
reduction in the amount of coca under cultivation, chemical 
control, and participation in joint operations to curtail 
trafficking, indicate the GOB is making progress toward meeting 
the goals and objectives of the UN Convention. 

At the same time, it is clear that the GOB still has considerable 
ground to cover to meet Convention objectives such as the 
extradition of narcotics traffickers.  Although the 1900 U.S.-
Bolivia Extradition Treaty does not include narcotics violations 
as extraditable offenses, the USG has made requests to the GOB 
based on the 1900 treaty in conjunction with 1988 UN Convention.  
In July, relying on these instruments, the GOB extradited Asunta 
Roca Suarez.  In December, however, the Supreme Court dismissed 
the extradition request for alleged trafficker Ronald Iriarte to 
stand trial in the U.S. on the grounds that his alleged offenses 
took place prior to the 1988 UN Convention entering into force in 
Bolivia.  The Bolivian Supreme Court also announced that the 
existing 1900 USG-GOB extradition treaty is not applicable because 
it does not include a provision on narcotics violators.  This 
Supreme Court decision underscores the need to sign the 
extradition treaty negotiated in 1990.

Cultivation and Production.  Bolivia accounts for nearly one-
quarter of the world's coca leaf production.  The Yungas and the 
Chapare are the principal regions where coca is grown.  The use of 
coca leaf for tea, chewing, and in traditional ceremonies has a 
long history.  For these purposes, and within certain regulations 
regarding production, transport and sale, coca is legal.  
Historically, traffickers processed coca leaf into coca paste and 
cocaine base primarily for export to Colombia or Brazil for 
processing into cocaine HCl.  However, there has been a trend in 
recent years to process cocaine HCl in Bolivia.

Prior to 1990, traffickers processed coca leaf into agua rica 
(literally "rich water"), a weak liquid acidic mixture used to 
suspend coca paste.  Cocaine products suspended in agua rica 
extend the shelf life and permit traffickers to stockpile large 
quantities for shipment to laboratories for further processing 
into HCl.  Paste or base are extracted from the agua rica prior to 
shipment.  In late 1991, traffickers began employing a new form of 
agua rica which enhances processing by eliminating the need for 
some chemicals, and reduces the time it takes to process coca leaf 
directly into cocaine base.  

There are several factors which contribute to the continuing 
marginal success of the eradication program:  a lack of GOB 
political will to enforce all provisions of Law 1008, including a 
program to forcibly eradicate coca in the Chapare; effective 
opposition by the coca-growing organizations to any GOB 
eradication effort; management problems in the GOB agency 
responsible for eradication (DIRECO); and unseasonable rainfall in 
the Chapare. 

Demand Reduction Programs.  The growing domestic drug abuse 
problem has only begun to receive significant government attention 
in recent years.  Several key drug awareness programs receive USG 
assistance, including the two private agencies of SEAMOS (the 
Educational System Against Drug Addiction and for Social 
Mobilization) and CESE (the Narcotics Education Center).  
Additionally, two GOB agencies, DINAPRE and SUBDESAL, address 
domestic drug issues.

IV.  U.S. Policy Initiatives and Programs.

Policy Initiatives.  The U.S. goal in Bolivia is to reduce, and 
ultimately eliminate, the production of coca paste and cocaine HCl 
for export or for domestic abuse.  The USG-supported programs, as 
detailed in the existing bilateral agreements, oblige the USG to 
provide technical training and material support to the GOB's 
counternarcotics effort.  The long-term policy objective is to 
provide Bolivia the physical infrastructure and technical 
capability necessary to conduct independent, effective narcotics 
law enforcement activities.

Bilateral Cooperation.  As indicated above, the GOB is taking 
adequate steps to comply with the 1987 counternarcotics agreement 
with the U.S.  This agreement, updated annually, satisfies the 
conditions of the Chiles Amendment.  The 1992 revision, signed in 
August, contained GOB commitments on alternative development 
programs, coca reduction, and law enforcement.  The level of 
bilateral cooperation remained high throughout 1992, especially in 
the area of law enforcement.  Sustained implementation of the full 
range of counternarcotics policies remains a challenge for 1993, 
especially in light of the June national elections.   

[Chart - Bolivia INCSR 1993 Statistical Tables]
(###)

BRAZIL

I.  Summary

Brazil is both a major transit country for cocaine and a major 
producer of essential and precursor chemicals.  A severe political 
crisis, coupled with chronic economic problems, has kept the 
Government of Brazil (GOB) from effectively addressing a rising 
drug trafficking and consumption problem.  Comprehensive 
antinarcotics legislation languished in committee while the 
congress devoted its energies to investigate, impeach, and try 
President Collor.  The instability caused by power struggles over 
key senior government positions, such as Justice Minister, 
hampered the operation of narcotics law enforcement in 1992.

In April, the Secretary and Director General of the Federal Police 
(DPF), positions held concurrently for seven years by Romeu Tuma, 
were separated, and Amaury Galdino, a 19-year veteran of the DPF, 
became Director General.  In October, the new Justice Minister 
asked Tuma to resign and designated Galdino as the sole head of 
the agency.  In the aftermath of the Collor resignation, the 
reorganized DPF, including the narcotics unit, continues under new 
President (former Vice President) Itamar Franco.  President Franco 
declared 1993 a "year to combat narcotics trafficking."

II.  Status of Country  

Concentrated counternarcotics efforts in the Andean countries, 
such as Operation "Support Justice," have led traffickers to use 
Brazil as an alternate route to U.S. markets and as the principal 
route to Europe.  USG information indicates that the number of 
Colombian and Bolivian traffickers establishing branch operations 
in Brazil increased in 1992.  The ability of the Federal Police to 
patrol Brazil's massive border region with Colombia, Peru, and 
Bolivia is limited, not only by geography, but by a lack of GOB 
personnel and other resources.

The GOB has imposed limited controls over domestically produced 
precursor and essential chemicals, but not on imported chemicals.  
Brazilian law does not restrict the purchase or storage of such 
chemicals, although the police occasionally investigate 
individuals who purchase large quantities.  Provisions in pending, 
comprehensive legislation would give the police the means to 
conduct criminal investigations of transactions of specific 
chemicals used in the production of illicit narcotics.  

Information on money laundering is limited, but major ongoing 
investigations point to links with Brazil.  The Brazilian 
congressional ad hoc committee on governmental corruption has 
recommended that banking laws be revised to permit more ample 
disclosure.  While the impetus for these revisions is to improve 
tax compliance and is not narcotics-related, passage would enhance 
the ability of the police to investigate drug money laundering.  
Passage of these revisions, however, is very uncertain.  

Coca is grown in Brazil but on a small scale, of poor quality, and 
not of major concern.  The Brazilian police do not have sufficient 
resources to eradicate the cannabis which is widely cultivated for 
the domestic market, especially in northeastern Brazil.

III.  Country Action Against Drugs in 1992 

Policy Initiatives.  Although the GOB experienced serious 
political problems, there were two notable counternarcotics policy 
initiatives.  In mid-year, the President signed a decree which 
clarified the law regarding expropriation of land being used for 
growing illegal drug crops.  Landowners are now subject to 
forfeiture of their entire acreage, rather than just the portion 
with the illicit cultivation.  Shortly after a USG-sponsored money 
laundering control seminar in Brasilia attended by several high-
level central bank officials, the National Monetary Board 
established regulations for reporting deposits of over $10,000.

Accomplishments.  Although only modest gains were achieved in 
1992, many organizations did participate in counternarcotics 
initiatives.  Brazil held an increased number of auctions of 
seized property and agreed in principle to work with the UNDCP to 
improve the assets proceeds program.

Law Enforcement Efforts.  Internal dissension, the political 
crisis in government, and continued lack of resources hindered 
Federal Police efforts to carry out counternarcotics programs.  
According to DPF records, the Narcotics Division (DRE) seized 2.81 
mt of cocaine and other coca products in 1992, including a 600 kg 
seizure of cocaine HCl in Fortaleza.  Although this is short of 
the 1991 cocaine seizure record of 3.7 mt, reorganization of the 
DRE has led to increased cooperation with international law 
enforcement agencies and a renewed interest in efforts to improve 
operations.  With assistance from the DEA and the U.S. Embassy 
Narcotics Affairs Section (NAS), the DPF/DRE began to use more 
fully the USG-supplied Boston Whaler fastboats in counternarcotics 
activities.  To assist the DPF/DRE, a U.S. Navy Mobile Training 
Team (MTT) conducted a two-week basic course in piloting and small 
boat repair.  Shortly after this training, DPF/DRE agents 
intercepted a high-speed trafficking  boat on the Solimoes River, 
encountered armed resistance resulting in the death of one of the 
two traffickers, and seized 15 kg of cocaine.  An additional 85 kg 
of cocaine reportedly had been thrown overboard.

Corruption.  The GOB does not condone illicit production or 
distribution of drugs, or the laundering of drug money: no senior 
GOB officials engage in or encourage such activity.  In June, the 
President signed an anti-corruption law that conditions 
appointment to any public position on a declaration of assets.  
The special Congressional ad hoc Committee on Governmental 
Corruption has made further recommendations to strengthen laws to 
curb corruption in government.  On the state and local level, 
corruption continues to hamper counternarcotics law enforcement 
efforts. 

Agreements and Treaties.  In September, the GOB signed a 
memorandum of understanding on narcotics control with the USG 
outlining the use of USG assistance.  Its goals of reducing 
trafficking of illegal drugs transiting Brazil and reducing the 
production, processing and consumption of drugs, are  being met 
through joint efforts.  Although cocaine seizures and narcotics 
arrests declined somewhat from 1991, marijuana seizures more than 
doubled to almost 20 mt.  The GOB has several cooperative 
agreements with neighboring countries, and has ratified and is 
taking steps to comply with the 1988 UN Convention.  Additional 
steps toward meeting the goals and objectives of the Convention 
will depend upon passage of the new narcotics legislation in 
congress.  Nevertheless, within strict budgetary limitations, the 
GOB continues to cooperate on extraditions, counternarcotics 
investigations, control of chemicals, and interdiction. 

Demand Reduction Programs.  The GOB, through its Federal Drug 
Council (CONFEN), supports projects developed by state or city 
drug councils.  These local councils are very active, but short on 
financial resources.  CONFEN continues to rely heavily on foreign 
assistance to conduct seminars and training.  Federal and state 
governments, in conjunction with private foundations, assumed 
complete funding of drug awareness initiatives in the states of 
Sao Paulo and Ceara under a USAID project.  CONFEN instituted 
several organizational reforms so that funding for demand 
reduction projects, administered by CONFEN under a bilateral 
agreement, is now reaching local governments and NGOs.

The U.S. has cooperated in demand reduction, as illustrated in the 
DARE (Drug Abuse Resistance Education) initiative in Rio de 
Janeiro.  With USG assistance, seven Los Angeles Police Department 
officers taught the Rio State Police the DARE concept, which uses 
police to teach primary school children how to resist the lure of 
drug use and trafficking.  Following the intensive two-week 
course, the police began its own program; and, in December, with 
partial funding from a NAS grant administered by CONFEN, over 
3,000 school children from 13 schools in the poorer sections of 
the city completed the course.  This program has been 
enthusiastically received by parents, teachers, children, and the 
police.  

The USG also supports, through donations to CICAD, a pilot program 
to work with street children in Campinas to remove them from an 
environment conducive to drug abuse and involvement in low-level 
trafficking activities.

IV.  U.S. Policy Initiatives and Programs 

Policy Initiatives.  Brazil is a major cocaine transit country and 
an important producer of essential and precursor chemicals.  The 
USG provided $1.5 million in narcotics control assistance in FY92.  
USIS funded seven international visitor grants in narcotics to 
Brazilian policy makers and sponsored three Americans on visits to 
Brazil to address audiences on narcotics-related topics.  USAID 
concentrated its counternarcotics efforts on demand reduction 
projects in Sao Paulo and Ceara.

The USG provides training, equipment, and advice to support 
DPF/DRE efforts to disrupt narcotics trafficking through Brazil, 
curb illegal traffic in precursor and essential chemicals, and 
investigate money laundering activities.  U.S. assistance also 
supports the Brazilian Customs canine drug detector program,  as 
well as demand reduction programs of state and local governments 
and NGOs.

Bilateral Cooperation.  The USG and GOB continue to cooperate in 
counternarcotics efforts.  The DPF/DRE, Customs, and CONFEN have 
instituted internal financial controls.  GOB agencies with 
counternarcotics responsibilities have begun to review programs to 
improve efficiency, and to prevent fraud, waste, and 
mismanagement.  In 1992, Brazil extradited two persons to the U.S. 
to stand trial for narcotics trafficking offenses.  Two USG 
extradition requests and ten provisional arrest requests are 
pending.  

The Road Ahead.  The GOB has declared 1993 Anti-Narcotics Year.  
USG funds will focus on support for DPF/DRE counternarcotics 
interdiction activities.

[Chart - Brazil Statistical Tables]
(###)

CHILE

I.  Summary

Traffickers increasingly use Chile as a transit route for South 
American cocaine destined for the U.S., Europe, and Asia.  Chile 
is also used to launder drug-related money, and is a major source 
of essential and precursor chemicals for cocaine processing in 
Bolivia and, to a lesser extent, Peru.  The Government of Chile 
(GOC) in 1992 introduced antidrug legislation which provides 
penalties for important drug-related crimes not covered by 
existing narcotics laws, including money laundering and the 
shipment of chemicals for illicit use.

II.  Status of Country

Chile exports significant quantities of chemicals that are then 
illegally diverted for use in cocaine processing in Bolivia.  
Because of its growing, open-market economy and bank-secrecy laws, 
Chile is an attractive haven for money laundering.  Moreover, 
traffickers run minimal risks since it is not now an offense under 
Chilean law to invest proceeds from criminal activities.  With 
improved counternarcotics efforts in the Andean region, South 
American traffickers appear increasingly to be using Chile's 
maritime industry to transship cocaine to world markets.  
Trafficking is largely centered in the north, where Chile shares a 
long, porous border with Peru and Bolivia.  The domestic 
consumption problem is most serious in the northern regions as 
well.

III.  Country Actions Against Drugs in 1992

Policy Initiatives.  The GOC developed a comprehensive 
counternarcotics legislative package, which the congress is 
expected to approve in 1993.  It includes laws on money 
laundering, essential and precursor chemicals, police undercover 
activities, forfeiture of trafficker assets, penalties for drug 
use, and reduced sentences for traffickers who cooperate with 
authorities.  Much of this legislation breaks new ground for 
Chile.  Many of the proposed laws are based on recommendations and 
model legislation from the 1988 UN Convention and the CICAD.

Accomplishments.  Government authorities seized record amounts of 
cocaine and marijuana in 1992, and signed antidrug agreements with 
Peru and Bolivia to improve cooperation in law enforcement.  The 
proposed revisions to Chile's drug law should provide authorities 
new tools to combat narcotics-related crimes, as prescribed in the 
1988 UN Convention.

Law Enforcement Efforts.  The government increased the number of 
antidrug units and personnel dedicated to narcotics control.  It 
also allocated more equipment and training for law enforcement and 
customs officials, particularly in Chile's north where the problem 
is most acute.  The proposed new laws permitting plea-bargaining 
and police undercover operations should increase the effectiveness 
of law enforcement operations.

Corruption.  Chilean authorities have a reputation for honesty, 
but has not been immune to the corrupting effects of drug money.  
As a matter of policy, the GOC does not condone corruption.  Where 
it is revealed, the government takes the necessary actions.  A 
former senior official of the Investigations Police was indicted 
in the U.S. on drug charges.  However, the Chilean Supreme Court 
denied the U.S. extradition request in 1992.  The government 
disciplined several police agents and prison management personnel 
who were found to have engaged in drug trafficking.

Agreements and Treaties.  The GOC ratified the 1988 UN Convention 
in 1990 and is moving toward compliance.  For example, the 
proposed additions to its narcotics control statutes would bring 
it into compliance and are indicative of the GOC's efforts to meet 
the Convention's goals and objectives.  The 1992 bilateral 
cooperation agreements with Peru and Bolivia facilitate the 
exchange of narcotics law enforcement information and data on the 
shipment of essential and precursor chemicals from Chile to Peru 
and Bolivia.  There is also active law enforcement cooperation 
between the USG and the GOC.  The existing extradition treaty 
between the U.S. and Chile is used frequently.  

Cultivation and Production.  A small amount of cannabis is 
cultivated in Chile for domestic consumption.  The government 
destroyed 50 ha of the areas licensed for legal hemp production 
when police discovered that the cannabis was being sold for 
illicit use.

Drug Flow/Transit.  There has been a noticeable increase in the 
past year in the flow of cocaine HCl and cocaine base through 
Chile.  Cocaine traffic is working its way south toward Santiago 
where the profits are higher.  Bolivian cocaine is probably 
transshipped through northern Chilean ports;  Bolivian exports, 
under a special treaty between the two countries, transit Chile 
without inspection.

Cocaine has been seized as far south as Punta Arenas, where 
authorities in October discovered 15 kg on a ship bound for 
Europe.  The shipment, loaded in Valparaiso, confirmed for the 
first time that traffickers use the Straits of Magellan, as well 
as the more common route through the Panama Canal, to reach 
European markets.

The largest cocaine seizure linked to Chile occurred January 1992 
with the seizure of five mt aboard a vessel off of Florida.  The 
ship had a Chilean crew, was Chilean-owned (but Panamanian-
flagged), and the voyage originated in Valparaiso.  A U.S. court 
sentenced the Chilean captain to life imprisonment.

Demand Reduction Programs.  There is now general agreement in the 
GOC regarding the importance of drug abuse prevention and 
education, and the need to build more effective programs.  The 
national uniformed police, the Carabineros, have a long-standing 
program of prevention training, primarily for school teachers.  
The Ministries of Health and Education have begun training 
programs for social workers and teachers; the University of Chile 
has a pilot program underway to provide advanced training for 
those already working in prevention and rehabilitation.

Funding for demand reduction programs is insufficient, and there 
is no coordinated nationwide strategy.  Northern communities such 
as Arica, Iquique, Antofagasta, and La Serena, where drug 
consumption already has reached alarming levels, are mobilizing to 
organize their own prevention efforts.  Some businesses have 
contracted private consultants to provide drug and alcohol abuse 
education programs for their employees.

IV.  U.S. Policy Initiatives and Programs

Policy Initiatives.  The USG seeks to assist in the detection and 
interdiction of cocaine and essential and precursor chemical 
shipments, support improved Chilean and Bolivian control of such 
chemicals, support efforts to reduce money laundering, provide 
training and equipment to Chilean Police and Customs 
counternarcotics units, and strengthen Ministry of Health demand 
reduction programs.

Bilateral Cooperation.  Chile and the U.S. signed a narcotics 
cooperation agreement in September authorizing $200,000 in 
assistance.  The USG provided training and equipment which 
contributed to increased law enforcement efficiency and record 
drug seizures.  DEA also works closely with Chilean 
counternarcotics agencies.

The GOC has made good faith efforts in the area of extradition.  
In 1992, Chile extradited a Chilean national who had been 
convicted in the U.S. for drug trafficking and then escaped from a 
U.S. prison.  The GOC also supported the USG attempt to extradite 
a second trafficker.  However, in June, the Supreme Court denied 
the U.S. extradition request for a suspected trafficker and former 
senior police official, claiming there was insufficient evidence 
implicating him in criminal activity.  Three other USG extradition 
requests are currently pending before the Supreme Court.

The Road Ahead.  The USG plans to expand cooperation with Chilean 
law enforcement by providing money laundering investigations 
training.  Once the new counternarcotics legislation is enacted, 
the USG also will promote regular exchanges of information on 
money laundering and on the flow of essential and precursor 
chemicals to Peru and Bolivia.  The USG will continue to support 
demand reduction training as well.
(###)

COLOMBIA

I.  Summary  

Colombia maintained its aggressive policies against drug 
production and trafficking despite new challenges from violent 
drug trafficking organizations and their increasing efforts to 
establish a heroin industry.  Colombia continued to cooperate 
closely with the USG on a broad range of narcotics control issues.  
For the Colombian government (GOC), Pablo Escobar's escape from 
prison in July was a major embarrassment which was politically 
costly at home and abroad.  President Cesar Gaviria, however, 
responded quickly, ordering the censure, retirement, or indictment 
of officials believed responsible.  The GOC also initiated a 
manhunt of unprecedented proportions in its search.  Although 
Escobar remained at large at the end of the year, many of his key 
associates had been killed or captured or had returned to prison 
voluntarily.  

The GOC made a difficult political decision to eradicate opium 
poppy with the aerial application of herbicide, while observing 
strict environmental standards.  This decision, coupled with the 
Colombian National Police's (CNP) aggressive manual spraying 
effort, began to stabilize the extent of opium poppy cultivation.  
The GOC, however, needs additional resources to curb the spread of 
opium poppy and to discourage the replanting of eradicated poppy 
fields.  The USG provided $15 million in additional resources 
during the year for this purpose.  For the third successive year, 
the GOC achieved a net reduction in coca cultivation.  Cannabis 
cultivation remained minimal.

The GOC opened its new Prosecutor General's office July 1, an 
important step in criminal justice reform and in improving the 
prosecution of narcotics cases.  Colombia signed the UN Convention 
in 1988; ratification is a high priority for the Gaviria 
administration, but it has faced strong opposition in congress.  
The Senate's Committee on International Relations unanimously 
rejected the Convention in June over legal and sovereignty 
concerns.  The Gaviria administration resubmitted it to the 
present congressional session and is continuing its efforts to win 
ratification by June 1993.  Although the convention is still 
unratified, which impedes certain counternarcotics efforts, the 
discussion below demonstrates that the GOC is generally meeting 
its goals and objectives. 

Colombian law enforcement and military components participated 
fully in bilateral and multilateral air interdiction and in money 
laundering and asset seizure operations, many targeted at the Cali 
cartel.  The CNP and Venezuelan security forces conducted a 
successful cross-border interdiction operation.  Colombia is 
conducting its first national-level drug abuse survey.  Strong 
political will to combat narcotics is clearly evident at the 
highest echelons of the GOC.  However, the scope and complexities 
of the well-entrenched, violent trafficking structure, sometimes 
working in concert with insurgent elements, in addition to a legal 
infrastructure composed of inadequately trained and underpaid 
judiciary, prosecutors' offices and law enforcement components, 
make elimination of the drug problem a long-term prospect.  

II. Status of Country

Colombia is the world's leading supplier of cocaine HCl.  Drug 
traffickers rely heavily on bulk supplies of cocaine base from 
Peru and Bolivia, but also use limited quantities of base from 
Colombia's own estimated 37,100 ha of low-yield coca.  Colombian 
traffickers, who specialize in the final stage of cocaine 
processing, must import most essential and precursor chemicals.  
They also exercise ruthless control over sophisticated 
international wholesale distribution and marketing systems.  Most 
of their drug profits remain outside Colombia, although there 
appeared to be an increase in proceeds flowing into Colombia in 
1991 and early 1992.  A major supplier of marijuana through most 
of the 1980s, Colombia effectively eradicated most of the cannabis 
crop; only about 2,000 ha remain under cultivation.  

III. Country Actions Against Drugs in 1992

Opium poppy cultivation gained a foothold in 1991, but may have 
stabilized at about 20,000 ha with the introduction of aerial crop 
suppression.  As yet, there is little evidence that Colombian 
heroin production has reached major proportions, but there is such 
a danger if the current situation is not dealt with effectively 
and quickly.  GOC forces are now seizing relatively small 
quantities of opium gum and morphine base, although heroin 
seizures have been on the rise.  

Drug abuse is a problem among Colombia's youth.  A national survey 
now underway should provide the first reliable data on the 
dimensions of the problem.  Basuco, a smokable, highly addictive 
and toxic form of cocaine base, is popular among Colombian youth.  

Policy Initiatives.  The GOC is pressing the Colombian Congress to 
ratify the 1988 UN Convention  Colombia is already meeting most of 
the goals and objectives of the Convention.  Its basic narcotics 
statute, Law 30 of 1988, provides adequate sanctions against 
narcotics trafficking and other narcotics-related activities.  As 
part of an ambitious judicial reform program, Colombia's new 
Prosecutor General's Office is bringing about changes in the 
criminal justice system.  The office is aggressively developing 
its skills in evidence sharing, asset seizure/forfeiture, plea 
bargaining and other techniques to effect judicial resolution of 
drug cases.  It has revived 70 percent of formerly dormant cases.  

In December, Pablo Escobar failed to appear for a summons and can 
now be tried in absentia.  The Prosecutor General then formally 
charged Escobar with the 1989 murder of presidential candidate 
Luis Carlos Galan and two others killed in the attack, the fourth 
murder indictment against Escobar since the Prosecutor General's 
office began functioning in July.  It was the GOC attempt to 
relocate Escobar to a different, more secure prison which prompted 
his escape.  

Accomplishments.  Colombia has addressed most aspects of the 
declaration signed at the San Antonio Summit.  The GOC authorized 
aerial spraying of opium poppy, and sprayed nearly 9,400 ha during 
1992.  It participated fully in both bilateral and multilateral 
enforcement and money laundering operations resulting in the 
interdiction of nearly a dozen drug smuggling aircraft during the 
year and the seizure of assets abroad, although not in Colombia.  
Many of these operations targeted the Cali cartel.  The government 
prosecuted a Colombian trafficker based on evidence derived solely 
in the U.S.  Sentences for traffickers, however, remain 
disappointing.  Colombia executed bilateral arrangements with its 
neighbors and successfully carried out its first joint 
interdiction operation in August/September with Venezuela, netting 
one mt of cocaine and a million-dollar aircraft.  The CNP trained 
25 foreign police officers from eight countries in a 60-day 
tactical interdiction course.  Colombia also is completing its 
first major national-level drug abuse survey.

Law Enforcement Efforts.  All Colombian security forces engage in 
narcotics control operations to some degree.  In addition to 
participating actively in operations "Support Justice" (detection 
and monitoring) and "Green Ice" (money laundering), security 
forces conducted thousands of routine operations throughout the 
year.  Led by the CNP's Directorate of Anti-Narcotics (DAN), 
security services in 1992 arrested more than 1,700 suspects, 
seized or destroyed almost 39 mt of cocaine HCl and cocaine base, 
over 200 cocaine labs, more than 6,000 drums of ether, acetone and 
MEK, 110 airstrips, and over 30 aircraft.  

The GOC initiated a manhunt of unprecedented proportions in its 
search for Escobar.  Although Escobar remained at large at the end 
of year, many of his key associates had been killed or captured or 
had returned to prison voluntarily.  In December, major Cali drug 
kingpin Ivan Urdinola was allowed to plea bargain to a sentence of 
55 months in prison.  Since Urdinola could have received a 17-year 
sentence, the result was disappointing.  Nevertheless, the GOC 
continues to develop a homicide case against him.  Intelligence 
units in several GOC organizations computerized their data 
collection and analysis systems, and were increasingly effective.

Corruption.  GOC policy does not encourage, condone, or facilitate 
illicit drug production, trafficking or money laundering.  The USG 
has no evidence that senior officials engage in or facilitate such 
activities.  Corruption nonetheless exists and adversely affects 
narcotics control operations.  The current Minister of Defense, 
however, appears committed to rooting out corruption.  Although 
mid-level field officers are often fired or court-martialed for 
corruption offenses (including in the Escobar escape case), 
charges of corruption against high-ranking military officers are 
rare.  There is concern over widespread corruption among Colombian 
air controllers, who frequently alert trafficker flights when air 
interdiction operations are taking place.  The office of the 
Attorney General provides oversight and investigates allegations 
of corruption, malfeasance or human rights abuses.  

Agreements and Treaties..  Colombia is a party to the 1961 UN 
Single Convention on Drugs, its 1972 Protocol, and the 1971 UN 
Convention on Psychotropic Substances.  It has signed but not yet 
ratified the 1988 UN Convention.  Colombia has reached bilateral 
agreements with the USG on asset sharing, chemical control, and 
money laundering.  In 1992,  Colombia received nearly $2.5 million 
in an asset-sharing transfer from the T case.  A tax information 
exchange agreement was initialled in February 1992 and may soon be 
signed.  Colombia participates actively in the OAS Caribbean Task 
Force meetings on money laundering.  

Colombia cooperates with the USG and other nations in carrying out 
its treaty and agreement obligations, and is meeting the goals and 
objectives of its yearly counternarcotics agreement with the U.S.  
Colombia's constitution prohibits extradition of Colombian 
nationals by birth.  The government extradites or deports non-
Colombians pursuant to Colombian domestic law.

Cultivation and Production.  Coca is Colombia's mostly widely 
cultivated illicit crop, totalling 37,100 ha according to a 1992 
aerial survey, a reduction from the 40,100 ha estimate of 1990 and 
37,500 ha of 1991.  Laboratory tests show Colombia's coca has a 
relatively low alkaloid yield (0.32 percent), about half that 
found in Bolivian and Peruvian coca.  Cultivation techniques yield 
only 800 kg of dry leaf per year per ha, with about 500 kg of dry 
leaf yielding one kg of cocaine base.  

Coca cultivation is located primarily in the Caqueta, Putumayo, 
and Vaupes regions.  It can yield about 30,000 mt of dry leaf or 
60 mt of base, equivalent to a potential 54 mt of HCl.  Domestic 
leaf and refined product consumption are not significant factors 
in potential production estimates.  Ministry of Defense forces 
destroyed 959 ha in 1992, but manual eradication is dangerous 
since much of the cultivation is found in guerrilla zones.  

Cannabis cultivation remains minimal at some 2,000 ha.  Overflight 
surveys reveal limited cultivation in traditional growing areas.  
However, seizures of cannabis seed and packaged marijuana in 
Cauca, Valle del Cauca, and Huila suggest new activity in those 
zones.  Some of the 179 mt bulk marijuana seized in 1992 is 
believed to be grown on the Venezuelan side of the Perija Mountain 
range on the Colombia/Venezuela border.

Illicit opium poppy cultivation, while documented as early as the 
mid-1980s, gained a foothold in 1991.  Aerial survey data is 
insufficient to make an accurate estimate of the cultivated area, 
and information on the crop cycle is incomplete.  Many fields 
contain plants of varying maturity.  Extensive aerial overflights 
associated with eradication, which began in February, suggest 
cultivation may have stabilized at around 20,000 ha. Potential 
production data is not yet complete.  Opium gum yields initially 
were low, but may improve as the growers gain experience.  The few 
tests conducted on the opium gum produced suggest the morphine 
content is relatively high.  (The USG currently assumes that each 
cultivated hectare is capable of yielding 8 kg of gum and has the 
potential to produce one kg of heroin.)  

Opium poppy cultivation is concentrated in Huila, Tolima, and 
Valle de Cauca departments with lesser hectarage in Narino and 
Boyaca.  Aggressive eradication, using a safe herbicide registered 
and widely used in Colombia, is monitored by a professional 
environmental staff which closely assesses  environmental impact.  
Current eradication efforts have minimal environmental impact, 
especially as compared to the damage caused by the slash-and-burn 
opium poppy cultivation itself.  The GOC in 1992 destroyed 9,396 
ha of opium poppy with aerial eradication and 3,319 ha manually.  
Although precise estimates of net opium poppy cultivation were 
unavailable in 1992, best available estimates indicated that 
15,000 - 20,000 ha were cultivated.

IV.  U.S. Policy Initiatives and Programs

Policy Initiatives.  USG programs address all aspects of the 
Andean Strategy, the Cartagena Accords, and the 1988 UN 
Convention, and support the GOC's strong commitment to narcotics 
control within Colombia's constitutional framework.

USAID is committing significant resources to Colombia's efforts to 
reform its judicial system.  Focus is on the criminal justice 
sector, especially support of the five courts charged with 
handling only narcotics and terrorism-related cases and on the 
Prosecutor General's office.  Protection of judicial personnel has 
been an important element of the program.  The program also trains 
instructors, investigators, prosecutors, and judges to apply new 
investigative techniques and equipment with the assistance of 
several USG agencies.  USAID supports programs to create 
opportunities for those displaced by interdiction and  enforcement 
programs.  In October, the Dublin Group met in Cartagena under 
U.S. chairmanship with senior GOC officials and issued a statement 
in support of the GOC's judicial reform and other counternarcotics 
efforts.  It initiated meetings among Dublin Group embassies in 
Bogota to coordinate assistance.

USG resources enhance the Ministry of Defense (MOD) and the 
Department of Administrative Security capabilities to interdict 
and investigate narcotics activities in compliance with Andean 
Strategy objectives.  All MOD forces are now engaged in narcotics 
control, and have seized significant quantities of drugs and other 
trafficker resources.  Bilateral and multilateral cooperation is 
excellent, including the Colombia/Venezuela border operation, and 
multilateral combined training, money laundering, and intelligence 
exchanges.  

The Road Ahead.  The GOC's political will to combat the narcotics 
threat is apparent.  But the scope of the deeply entrenched, 
sophisticated, corrupting, and violent trafficking structure, 
sometimes working in concert with well-armed insurgent forces, 
makes permanent success a long-term challenge.

[Chart - Colombia Statistical Tables]
(###)

ECUADOR

I. Summary

Ecuador is a transit country for illicit drugs as well as 
essential and precursor chemicals.  Chemicals move though Ecuador 
to Colombia, while processed drugs, primarily cocaine, return in 
route to the U.S. and Europe.  Ecuador is also used extensively 
for drug money laundering by Colombian traffickers.

The Government of Ecuador (GOE) continues to cooperate with the 
USG to reduce drug trafficking.  The GOE has enacted domestic 
legislation to implement the provisions of the 1988 UN Convention 
and OAS model regulations.  The GOE appears to be meeting the 
goals and objectives of the convention.  In 1991, Ecuador and the 
USG signed a chemicals control agreement.  In 1992, Ecuador 
entered into an agreement with the USG on money laundering.  The 
agreement entered into force by mutual agreement through 
diplomatic notes, not requiring ratification by the Ecuadorian 
Congress.  The USG and GOE began work on an asset sharing 
agreement as well.    The arrest of the leader and most members of 
the Jorge Reyes Torres organization, the largest narcotics 
trafficking organization in Ecuador, demonstrated the GOE's 
resolve against drug trafficking, and dealt a major blow to the 
drug trafficking industry in Ecuador.  The GOE also brought 
charges against a number of officials for money laundering in a 
military-owned bank and against two other officials.  In addition, 
the GOE sentenced a judge to five years in prison for illegally 
releasing Reyes Torres from jail in 1988.  Nevertheless, 
corruption remains a serious problem.  

The Ecuadorian military provided air support without charge to the 
police for counternarcotics operations.  The GOE also launched 
combined police/military operations against suspected drug 
traffickers on the Ecuadorian/Colombian border.  Ecuador 
participated with its neighbors and the USG in multinational 
military efforts to curb drug trafficking.  Ecuador has continued 
its participation in a regional air interdiction program.  

The GOE eradicated illicit coca in the mid-1980s and continues to 
conduct reconnaissance to locate and destroy any new cultivation, 
resources permitting.  Authorities destroyed several hectares of 
opium poppy near the Colombian border in November.  

The GOE does not have accurate drug abuse statistics.  However, 
there is some evidence that drug abuse may be rising, particularly 
in the cities of Esmeraldas and Guayaquil.

II. Status of Country

Ecuador has never been a major coca producing or processing 
country.  However, the GOE, with the support of the USG, maintains 
an active detection and eradication program.  Ecuador remains an 
important transit  country for processing chemicals and for semi-
processed cocaine being shipped from Peru to Colombia, and for 
processed cocaine HCl from Colombia destined for markets in the 
U.S. and Europe.  

Ecuador is concerned that drug trafficking and violence, including 
guerrilla violence, in neighboring countries, particularly 
Colombia, may spill over into Ecuador as antidrug pressures in 
those countries increase.  Several Ecuadorian drug networks with 
ties to the Cali Cartel, are known to move commercial quantities 
of drugs through Ecuador or to act as brokers through other 
countries.

There is strong evidence that significant narcotics proceeds are 
laundered in Ecuador as investments in property and goods or in 
transactions through local financial institutions.

III. Country Actions Against Drugs in 1992

Policy Initiatives.  The GOE has made a strong commitment to fight 
narcotics trafficking and money laundering.  The government 
conducts occasional aerial reconnaissance missions to locate and 
destroy any new coca cultivation and processing facilities.  For 
the first time, it launched combined police/military operations 
against suspected drug traffickers in a remote area of the 
Ecuadorian/Colombian border.  The Ecuadorian police and military 
have also participated with the USG and other nations to curb the 
movement of drugs.  Under Section 517 of the Foreign Assistance 
Act, the USG is transferring to the GOE two C-130B aircraft for 
antinarcotics uses.  The National Drug Council drafted a National 
Plan, encompassing all the goals of the agencies involved in the 
fight against drugs, demonstrating the GOE's intentions to curb 
drug abuse.  

Accomplishments.  In November, for the first time since the 1940s, 
Ecuadorian Interpol police destroyed several hectares of opium 
poppy near the Colombian border, suggesting that rising poppy 
production in Colombia could move into Ecuador.  As noted, Ecuador 
also entered into an agreement with the USG on money laundering.  
The Ecuadorian police, with USG assistance, arrested Jorge Reyes 
Torres and most of his associates, one of the largest disruptions 
of a narcotics trafficking organization.  The Ecuadorian military, 
for the first time, agreed to provide air support for 
counternarcotics police operations through the end of 1993.

Law Enforcement Efforts.  Ecuador has passed strong laws against 
the production, transport, and sale of controlled narcotic 
substances; the import, diversion and use of precursor and 
essential chemicals for illicit purposes; money laundering; 
intimidation or subornation of judicial and public authorities for 
drug crimes; and illegal association related to drug trafficking 
and profiteering.  It also centralized drug enforcement in the 
narcotics police; legalized a drug control role for the armed 
forces; entered into bilateral accords to control chemicals and 
money laundering; and established a ministerial-level Drug Council 
to coordinate national drug policy and efforts.  Execution of 
these laws, however, remains spotty.  Ecuador also plays an active 
role in regional, OAS and UN drug control initiatives.  Ecuador 
participated in the February 1992 San Antonio Summit, hosting a 
preparatory meeting, and participated in a July follow-up meeting 
in Washington.  

Authorities seized nearly 4 mt of cocaine HCl in 1992 and arrested 
over 1,800 Ecuadorians and 165 foreign nationals on drug charges.  
Drug enforcement agencies, however, are understaffed and 
underfunded, and lack good intelligence capabilities.  Interpol, 
the Ecuadorian narcotics police, has begun a training initiative, 
the new Counternarcotics Training Center, which is expected to 
improve its capabilities.  Interpol plans to include basic and 
advanced counternarcotics operations and intelligence training in 
the curriculum.  Both USG and Ecuadorian trainers from various 
agencies are expected to participate.  Beyond the seizure of 3.4 
mt of cocaine in one seizure at the Colombian border in February, 
seizures of illegal drugs and chemicals in 1992 were 
disappointing.

Corruption.  The GOE has taken a strong public stance against drug 
trafficking, bribery, and intimidation related to drug crimes.  
The 1990 drug law criminalized trafficking as well as bribes, 
corruption, and intimidation in drug investigations and trials.  
The GOE does not, as a matter of policy, encourage or facilitate 
illicit production or distribution of drugs or the laundering of 
drug money.  There is no evidence that senior officials engage in 
production or distribution of drugs, or money laundering of 
proceeds.  Nevertheless, corruption at lower and middle levels of 
the GOE remains a serious problem.

As a result of intelligence derived from the disruption of the 
Jorge Reyes Torres Organization, charges were brought against a 
number of officials in a military-owned bank for money laundering 
and against a high-ranking, now-retired army general for illegal 
enrichment.  A judge was sentenced to five years in prison for 
illegally releasing Jorge Reyes Torres from jail in 1988.  

Agreements and Treaties.  Ecuador ratified the 1988 UN Convention 
in 1990.  In 1992, the USG and Ecuador signed a money laundering 
agreement and concluded three bilateral project agreements on 
behalf of Interpol, the Military Customs Police and the National 
Drug Council.  The two governments also began negotiations on an 
asset sharing agreement.  In light of all of these initiatives, 
the GOE appears to be meeting the goals and objectives of the 1988 
UN Convention.  

The GOE supports extradition of non-Ecuadorian nationals in the 
case of drug crimes and has done so in several cases over the last 
several years.  The Ecuadorian Constitution, however, bars the 
extradition of Ecuadorian nationals.

Drug Flow/Transit.  Ecuador continues to be an important drug 
transit route for unrefined cocaine from northern Peru to Colombia 
and for processed cocaine from Colombia to markets in the U.S. and 
Europe.  Traffickers are believed to use the Pan-American highway 
heavily, but they also fly considerable quantities of cocaine 
paste and base from Peru through Ecuadorian airspace to Colombia.  
The GOE does not have the capability to detect and intercept these 
drug flights, although Ecuador cooperated with the U.S. Air Force 
in operating radars in the Ecuadorian Amazon region during 
regional air detection and interdiction exercises.  Traffickers 
also use container ships from Ecuadorian ports to ship cocaine to 
the U.S. and Europe.  Ecuador is an important route for moving 
essential and precursor chemicals into Colombia and Peru.

Demand Reduction Programs.  Drug consumption in Ecuador remains 
relatively low, but may be increasing.  Ecuadorian drug law and 
policy put a heavy emphasis on drug prevention, education, and 
rehabilitation.  Two NGOs, with the support of USAID, are involved 
in drug education and prevention programs.  In addition, the 
National Drug Council and the Ministries of Education and Health 
and Social Welfare are beginning to become involved in prevention 
campaigns.  The Catholic Church is increasingly involved in drug 
education and rehabilitation, particularly in provincial areas.  
All public institutions, including the military, are required to 
establish drug prevention programs in the workplace.

IV. USG Policy Initiatives and Programs

Policy Initiatives.  USG policy in Ecuador is designed to 
strengthen Ecuador's political will and capability to combat drug 
trafficking and money laundering.  In November, the USG co-
sponsored with the Superintendency of Banks a three-day seminar on 
money laundering for officials from both the public and private 
sectors.  The USG focuses on improving intelligence collection and 
analysis capability, dismantling trafficker organizations, 
controlling the flow of essential and precursor chemicals, curbing 
money laundering, improving the operational capabilities of both 
Interpol and the Military customs police, and providing drug 
education and prevention campaigns through the NGOs. The USG also 
encourages police/military cooperation in operations on the 
Colombian border. 

Equipment, training, funds and technical assistance are provided 
by INM, DOD, and DEA.  INM provides advanced training in drug 
prevention techniques.  USIS has significantly increased the 
coverage and placement of drug-related information in the media.  
USAID provides support to NGOs for drug education and prevention.  
The U.S. Embassy's  Narcotics Affairs Section projects are closely 
coordinated with other donors and the UNDCP.

Bilateral Cooperation.  USG/GOE cooperation has enhanced Ecuador's 
ability to fight drug trafficking.  USG assistance has enabled 
Ecuadorian drug enforcement agencies to expand drug police 
presence to all 22 provinces and establish a nationwide secure 
radio communications network.  With the technical assistance of 
the U.S. Coast Guard and INM, the police have for the first time 
been able to conduct anti-trafficker operations on Ecuador's 
remote northeastern river border with Colombia.  Ecuador now has 
detector dog programs at both major international airports and may 
expand them to other airports, major seaports, and to border posts 
with Peru and Colombia.  The police are receiving USG assistance 
to establish a professional counternarcotics intelligence center.  
The USG is also providing assistance in chemical control and 
financial investigations.

The Road Ahead.  During 1993 the Ecuadorians should have a greater 
capability to target narcotics trafficker organizations, collect 
and analyze drug intelligence, improve controls over the flow of 
precursor and essential chemicals, and target illegal financial 
transactions.  The new government has promised to continue the 
highly cooperative relationship with the  USG and with neighboring 
countries established by its predecessor.  Using Ecuadorian 
military air support, the police will be able to increase the 
number of aerial reconnaissance operations to detect illicit coca 
leaf cultivation and laboratories.

Signing of an asset sharing agreement is a strong possibility in 
1993, permitting the GOE to benefit financially from its 
cooperation with the USG against traffickers.  It would also 
assist the Ecuadorian police and military to operate more 
effectively against drug trafficking along Ecuador's river border 
with Colombia. 

[Chart - Ecuador Statistical Tables]
(###)

PARAGUAY

I. Summary  

Paraguay is a transit route for Andean cocaine shipped to Brazil 
and Argentina and onward to the U.S. and Europe.  Although 
marijuana is produced in significant quantities in the 
northeastern region of the country, little reaches the United 
States.  A diverse and growing financial sector provides greater 
potential for money laundering, especially through exchange 
houses.  Paraguay may be a transit route for precursor and 
essential chemicals.  The Government of Paraguay (GOP) has stated 
its commitment to combat trafficking, a commitment underscored by 
the inclusion of a narcotics control article in the new 
constitution.  In 1992, Paraguay initialed a draft financial 
information exchange agreement with the U.S.  Corruption is a 
serious problem impeding narcotics control efforts.

II. Status of the Country  

Paraguay's geographic position and porous borders offer a route 
for cocaine from Bolivia and other Andean producers to Brazil and 
Argentina for onward distribution.  A lack of reliable data on 
narcotics trafficking, however, makes it difficult to determine 
the magnitude of the problem.  Paraguay's extensive, unpatrolled 
land borders with Bolivia, Brazil, and Argentina and numerous 
unregulated airstrips, facilitate movement of contraband, 
including drugs.  With a diverse and growing financial sector, 
Paraguay has the potential to become a more significant money 
laundering center.  Paraguay may also be a transit route for 
precursor and essential chemicals from Argentina and Brazil to 
Bolivia.  There is no evidence of cocaine processing labs in 
Paraguay.

Marijuana is produced in the northeastern region of the country, 
bordering Brazil (departments of Amambay, Canendeyu, Alto Parana, 
Concepcion, and San Pedro).  It is consumed domestically as well 
as exported to Brazil and Argentina.  Aerial reconnaissance 
reveals a pattern of small plots (0.5 to 1.0 ha) in the midst of 
dense forests.  The GOP estimates that approximately  2,300 ha may 
be under cultivation.  The USG cannot confirm this figure.

III. Country Actions Against Drugs in 1992

Policy Initiatives.  Paraguayan efforts to improve 
counternarcotics capabilities centered on strengthening 
enforcement agencies, consolidating prevention efforts, and 
broadening the legal framework for the government's antidrug 
activities.  President Rodriguez repeatedly reaffirmed his 
government's commitment to the fight against narcotics, and he 
attended several burnings of confiscated drugs.  The most 
significant policy initiative was the inclusion in the new 
constitution of Article 71 which requires the government to 
suppress the production and trafficking of narcotics, to combat 
money laundering, and to establish programs of drug education, 
prevention, and rehabilitation.

Accomplishments.  The National Antidrug Secretariat (SENAD) 
increased the number of field operations.  A U.S.-trained, INM-
funded 35-man joint military/police strike force and the narcotics 
police (DINAR) received substantial support from military units in 
these operations.  SENAD officials worked closely with the 
Parliament's Narcotics Commission on draft changes to the 
narcotics law.  Using training received in an INM-sponsored 
workshop, officials from the executive and judiciary, voluntary 
organizations, and the media implemented a national drug abuse and 
demand reduction program under SENAD auspices.  The Parliament is 
currently examining CICAD-drafted model legislation on asset 
seizures and money laundering as part of a reform of the national 
narcotics law.  The GOP also has initialed a financial information 
exchange agreement with the U.S.

Law Enforcement Efforts.  SENAD's joint police/military strike 
force carried out 30 operations to eradicate cannabis cultivation, 
check unregistered airstrips, and mount roadblocks for random 
checks of vehicles in suspected trafficking areas along the 
eastern border with Brazil.  These efforts were especially 
successful in disrupting cannabis cultivation and trafficking 
activities.  Cocaine seizures for the year totaled 67 kg.  The 
largest single seizure of cocaine was 19 kg in the border city of 
Pedro Juan Caballero.

Corruption.  Paraguay began to take action against contraband 
activity and other corruption.  Some high-ranking military 
officers and civilian politicians are being brought to trial for 
their illicit business activities.  The public is more aware of 
the threat corruption poses to the democratic process, and is far 
less tolerant of bribery and other crimes.  The legislature and 
the judiciary have begun to investigate and punish criminal 
activity.  Because it has always been difficult to differentiate 
between non-drug contraband and narcotics-related traffic, greater 
public awareness of and general opposition to this illicit 
activity should help to curtail drug trafficking.  The GOP does 
not, as a matter of policy, facilitate the production or 
distribution of illicit drugs, nor is there evidence that senior 
officials engage in such activities.

Agreements and Treaties.  Paraguay ratified the 1988 UN Convention 
in 1990.  Since then, it has taken important steps to meet the 
Convention's goals and objectives by strengthening enforcement 
agencies and broadening the scope of the government's antidrug 
activities.  Of particular significance was the inclusion of 
Article 71 in the new constitution requiring the government to 
suppress drug trafficking and production, combat money laundering, 
and create drug prevention and treatment programs.  Other actions 
noted above underscore the country's efforts to seek full 
compliance with the Convention's goals and objectives.

Paraguay has a tripartite narcotics control agreement with 
Argentina and Bolivia, and bilateral agreements with other 
countries, including Venezuela.  Paraguay is a member of CICAD.  
As noted, Paraguay in 1992 initialed a financial information 
exchange agreement with the U.S.  The GOP meets the requirements 
of the Chiles Amendment through a 1989 bilateral agreement with 
the U.S. geared toward strengthening Paraguayan institutions that 
combat narcotics trafficking.  The GOP is meeting the goals and 
objectives of that agreement, which has been extended annually.

Cultivation and Production.  Cannabis is the only illicit drug 
cultivated in Paraguay.  The warm climate and fertile soil allow 
at least two crops per year.  In 1992, law enforcement authorities 
eradicated an estimated 133 ha.  There is no evidence that 
marijuana produced in Paraguay is exported to the U.S.

Demand Reduction Programs.  Paraguay has a small, but growing 
substance abuse problem.  An epidemiological study, completed in 
November 1991, revealed that among urban Paraguayans ages 12 to 
45, 10.3 percent had abused prescription medicines, 1.9 percent 
inhalants, 1.4 percent marijuana, 0.3 percent cocaine, O.2 percent 
opiates, and 0.1 percent hallucinogens.  The study also revealed 
that 41 percent of young people between the ages of 12 and 24 do 
not have a clear understanding of the risks of drug abuse.  SENAD 
is responsible for the national prevention program and coordinates 
the work of the Ministries of Public Health and Education with the 
activities of the NGOs on education and prevention.

IV.  U.S. Policy Initiatives and Programs

Policy Initiatives.  U.S. objectives are to improve Paraguay's 
institutional capability to disrupt narcotics trafficking, to 
prevent Paraguay from becoming a money laundering center, and to 
increase public awareness that narcotics trafficking and 
consumption are serious Paraguayan problems.

Bilateral Cooperation.  The joint strike force improved its 
operational readiness through U.S.-provided training, 
communications and intelligence support, and assistance for four 
field operations.  The DEA, DINAR and SENAD cooperated on joint 
investigations leading to the seizures of 67 kg of cocaine.  
Counternarcotics scenarios are a regular part of the annual U.S.-
Paraguayan military exercises.  In 1992, INM provided $340,000 for 
narcotics detection dogs, transportation support, a new 
communications system, improved information management, DEA and 
U.S. Special Forces training, a port/river control project, and 
NGO abuse prevention and education programs.  In April, the USG 
transferred $70,000 of forfeited funds to the GOP in recognition 
of the GOP's assistance in the investigation of a major Bolivian 
cocaine trafficking ring in late 1991.  Using INM funding, a U.S. 
Customs training team provided instruction to Paraguayan Customs 
officers and DINAR agents on land, sea, and airport inspections.  
USAID continued to sponsor a narcotics awareness and education 
project.  

The Road Ahead.  During 1993, the U.S. will seek to conclude the 
financial information exchange agreement, train law enforcement 
and financial institution personnel in combatting money 
laundering, and work with the Parliament to improve narcotics 
control legislation. 
[Chart - Paraguay Statistical Tables]
(###)

PERU

I.  Summary

The suspension of constitutional democracy by President Fujimori 
on April 5 set back USG efforts to support Peruvian narcotics-
related law enforcement and alternative development efforts.  The 
strafing of a U.S. C-130 by Peruvian fighters (and the death of 
one U.S. crewman) while on a Peruvian-authorized narcotics mission 
also damaged bilateral relations.  While only small inroads were 
made against the flow of cocaine base out of Peru, the Government 
of Peru (GOP) brought significant resources and political will to 
bear on specific facets of the Peruvian narcotics industry to 
begin a campaign to disrupt narcotics trafficking operations in 
the Huallaga Valley.  These efforts also included enhanced civic 
action and alternative development activities.  Corruption 
remained a significant impediment to GOP counternarcotics efforts 
in the field.

Nearly two-thirds of the world's supply of cocaine comes from coca 
grown in Peru.  The ability of the GOP to control cocaine 
production and export is limited by terrorism, economic distress, 
and institutional debilitation, including corruption.  Because of 
increased GOP counternarcotics activities supported by the USG, 
coca cultivation and processing have moved beyond the traditional 
trafficking areas of the Upper Huallaga Valley (UHV), with a 
corresponding decline in UHV trafficking activities.  Peru 
ratified the 1988 UN Convention in January 1992.

With the completion of constituent assembly elections in November, 
the GOP began the process of restoring democratic constitutional 
government in Peru.  Continued progress on democracy, human 
rights, and narcotics control would allow the USG to increase its 
engagement with the GOP in the counternarcotics field, and provide 
expanded assistance to implement alternative economic development 
activities, coordinated with more effective law enforcement 
operations against trafficking organizations.

II.  Status of Country

The USG estimates that 129,100 ha of coca are cultivated in Peru.  
Just over half is in the Huallaga Valley, which USAID estimates 
has a population of 300,000, and where coca is the main cash crop.  
Processing of the coca leaf near the point of cultivation normally 
proceeds to the stage of cocaine base that is moved elsewhere, 
primarily by air to Colombia for cocaine HCl production.  HCl 
probably amounts to under ten percent of Peru's processed cocaine 
exports at this time, although this could increase as Peruvian 
trafficking organizations become more sophisticated.   Most 
chemicals used in cocaine processing are not produced in quantity 
in Peru; they enter primarily through legitimate commerce and are 
diverted for illicit drug production.  Peru is not a major money 
laundering center, but there is laundering of funds repatriated by 
drug trafficking organizations for raw material acquisition or 
personal consumption. 

The GOP's ability to control cocaine trafficking is limited by 
terrorism and corruption.  Terrorism by Sendero Luminoso (SL) and 
the Tupac Amaru Revolutionary Movement (MRTA) insurgents impairs 
both local and national government activities, including law 
enforcement.  Despite a comprehensive stabilization program, there 
is deep economic distress.  Institutions are weakened, especially 
the judiciary; endemic corruption by Peruvian security forces 
further impedes narcotics enforcement.  There is public 
recognition that cocaine production is a problem the GOP should 
eliminate.  While the state of the economy and terrorism are seen 
as more urgent issues, polls show that Peruvians realize that drug 
production is a significant factor in financing terrorist 
movements and impeding economic development.

In April, President Fujimori suspended the judiciary and congress 
and began a period of extra-constitutional rule.  USG military 
assistance was suspended.  Most economic assistance was suspended, 
including balance of payments aid linked to counternarcotics 
objectives and expanded alternative development assistance, INM-
provided narcotics assistance continued at a reduced level.  As 
part of the GOP plan for a return to democracy, the GOP held 
elections on November 22 for a constituent assembly.  OAS and USG 
observers believe the election was fairly conducted, even though 
two major opposition parties declined to participate.  The USG 
continues to assess GOP progress in restoring democracy and 
fulfilling U.S. congressionally-mandated human rights and 
narcotics performance conditions.

Shortly after the suspension of democratic government, a U.S. C-
130 conducting a Peruvian-authorized narcotics mission was strafed 
by Peruvian Air Force interceptors, wounding two crewmen and 
killing another.  This incident remained an unresolved bilateral 
problem which impeded direct collaboration between the U.S. and 
Peruvian armed forces for most of 1992.

III.  Country Actions Against Drugs in 1992 

Policy Initiatives.  Peru deposited its instrument of ratification 
of the 1988 UN Convention on January 16, 1992.  In July, the GOP 
signed an agreement under which the USG provided funding support 
for Peruvian law enforcement efforts.  The USG did not pursue 
other bilateral negotiations after the April 5 suspension of 
democratic government.

Consistent with the 1988 UN Convention, the GOP issued new 
legislation to make money laundering a crime and expand controls 
on essential and precursor chemicals.  The GOP's counternarcotics 
operations, and its more stringent controls to prevent money 
laundering and chemical diversion, demonstrate that it is taking 
adequate steps to address all aspects of the narcotics trade as 
specified in the UN Convention.

Stated GOP narcotics policy is to eliminate cocaine production 
progressively, as economic assistance provides coca growers with 
alternative livelihoods enabling them to relinquish cultivation.  
The GOP emphasizes counternarcotics actions against aerial 
narcotics traffic and trafficking organizations, and limits 
actions against coca farmers to manual coca seedbed eradication 
operations.  

Accomplishments.  President Fujimori directed the Peruvian armed 
forces to take a more active counternarcotics role, even though 
counterterrorism continued as its priority mission.  Military 
engineering battalions and small-scale USAID-supported alternative 
development activities expanded into narco-terrorist areas 
considered too risky in earlier years.  According to U.S. Embassy 
reporting based on discussions with local officials, there may 
have been a progressive diminution in insurgent-related violence 
and intimidation in many areas of the Huallaga Valley from levels 
observed in earlier years.  The September arrest of SL ideological 
head Abimael Guzman, and earlier arrests of key MRTA leaders, 
should help sustain a more favorable security environment.

Despite the suspension of USG military and most economic 
assistance, the GOP doubled the number of Army engineering 
battalions assigned to counternarcotics alternative development 
missions in the Huallaga region with associated security units, 
and made substantial budgetary contributions to alternative 
development, including about $8.75 million in local currency for 
road rehabilitation, community development and civic action.  The 
Peruvian Air Force (FAP) established an air defense zone command 
at Santa Lucia, assigned counternarcotics interceptors to the 
base, and deployed 50-man security units to several key municipal 
airstrips to prevent their use by trafficking aircraft.

Cooperation between the Peruvian police and military has improved, 
as exemplified by an incident in November in which police 
transported by Peruvian Air Force helicopters seized an aircraft 
and 350 kgs of cocaine base.  On several occasions, Army units 
have provided ground security for Peruvian National Police 
(PNP)/DEA activities.  Police efforts to close a key clandestine 
strip by placing concrete obstacles benefited from Army security.  
When these obstacles were removed by traffickers, the Army fenced 
it off, mined it, and placed security elements at the airstrip.  
USAID reports that the Huallaga Army command has been diligent in 
providing security for alternative development and road building 
in narcoerrorist regions.  The GOP has acknowledged the difficulty 
of sustaining these gains in the face of the continued insurgent 
threat and corruption in coca-growing areas.

From January through April, U.S. Air Force radars enabled FAP jets 
to intercept at least ten aircraft flying between Colombia and 
Peru.  The closure of municipal airstrips and the seizure of 
several aircraft by the FAP during 1992 forced traffickers to use 
clandestine airstrips, shifted their operations to the night hours 
to avoid FAP interceptors, and dispersed trafficking operations 
into outlying areas.

Law Enforcement Efforts.  The Peruvian National Police (PNP) in 
1992 consolidated drug investigative and enforcement functions in 
a single directorate (DIRANDRO).  The PNP reported seizures of .75 
mt of cocaine base, 230 kg of cocaine HCl, and the destruction of 
88 cocaine base laboratories.

By May, all USG-owned helicopters were operated by PNP pilots and 
air crews, meeting a U.S. congressional requirement.  U.S. 
aviation experts have lauded the skills of these PNP pilots and 
their energetic counternarcotics performance.

Corruption.  Corruption is endemic in virtually all GOP 
institutions.  President Fujimori recognizes that corruption 
impedes his ability to govern effectively.  The PNP removes 
personnel who are reliably reported to be corrupt from drug 
enforcement positions, but disciplinary action beyond transfer is 
not common.  Corruption of narcotics enforcement personnel is 
individual, not institutional.  The GOP does not as a matter of 
policy encourage or facilitate illicit production or distribution 
of drugs or the laundering of drug money.  There is no evidence 
that senior officials engage in the production or distribution of 
drugs, or money laundering of proceeds.

Agreements and Treaties.  In February, the GOP and USG exchanged 
notes to bring the 1990 bilateral chemical control agreement into 
force.  The GOP participated in the San Antonio Summit and its 
follow-up activities.  The GOP has bilateral narcotics cooperation 
agreements with a number of other countries, including its 
immediate neighbors, and held bilateral consultations with several 
others during the year.  It remained an active participant in 
CICAD during 1992.

Cultivation and Production.  Coca cultivation declined in the 
Upper Huallaga Valley in 1992, but expanded in the Central 
Huallaga and other areas.  The GOP does not eradicate mature coca 
plants.  The Interior Ministry eradication agency, CORAH, 
destroyed the equivalent of 6,138 ha of coca seed beds in the 
Upper Huallaga in 1992, contributing to the decline in that 
region.  This was less than the objective set under the GOP's 
agreement with the USG.  CORAH was willing to implement the 
program, but was constrained by a shortage of helicopters (three 
USG-owned helicopters were lost in accidents during 1992).  
Seedbed eradication in 1993 will depend on the availability of 
helicopters to extend it to areas where coca cultivation is 
expanding.

Drug Flow/Transit.  There have long been unconfirmed reports that 
cocaine products may move both ways across the Peru-Bolivia 
border.  There are also sporadic reports of direct export of 
Peruvian cocaine to European consumer countries as well as to the 
U.S.  No further information became available in 1992 to confirm 
these reports.

Demand Reduction Programs.  There is growing public awareness of 
cocaine abuse and concern over the quality of drug education and 
treatment.  While survey data are imprecise, 4.1 percent of 
respondents in a recent survey reported having abused some form of 
processed cocaine (up from 3.2 percent two years ago), and 7.7 
percent reported abuse of drugs in some form.  The most active 
agency in drug education and demand reduction is the USAID-
supported NGO, CEDRO.  An Education Ministry drug awareness 
program is incorporated in school curricula; the USAID-supported 
drug prevention program for high schools has been adopted by 114 
schools, provided training for 11,000 teachers, and reaches 97,000 
students.

IV.  USG Policy Initiatives and Programs

Policy Initiatives.  The primary USG drug control objective is to 
assist the GOP in reducing, and ultimately eliminating, the 
production of cocaine in Peru.  This will be accomplished through 
an integrated counternarcotics  strategy including law 
enforcement, alternative development, coca eradication, demand 
reduction and public awareness, as reflected in bilateral 
agreements with the GOP.  Development programs help provide the 
infrastructure and financial support for production and marketing 
of licit crops, and which provide alternatives to farmers and make 
possible eradication of coca that provides the raw material for 
cocaine production.  Enforcement activities by the PNP, armed 
forces, and civil regulatory and judicial authorities disrupt 
trafficking organizations engaged in the purchase, refining and 
export of raw or processed cocaine products.  This is intended to 
make coca cultivation less attractive relative to licit 
activities, encouraging growers to shift to other crops or to 
alternative activities provided by development programs.  

Bilateral Cooperation.  The C-130 strafing incident, the April 5 
suspension of congress and the judiciary, and specific unfulfilled 
human rights conditions imposed by the U.S. Congress on USG 
assistance impeded disbursement of military and most economic 
assistance in fiscal years 1991-92.  The INM program for FY-92 was 
carried on under an agreement concluded in July, albeit at reduced 
funding levels from the previous year.

The GOP must successfully install its constituent assembly as a 
functioning independent legislative branch.  Unless restoration of 
constitutional democratic institutions continues without 
impediment or retrogression, effective counternarcotics 
collaboration between the USG and GOP will not be feasible; 
domestic politics could impair GOP capabilities to sustain a long-
range national counternarcotics strategy.  Peru must also surmount 
major obstacles such as terrorism, a depressed economy, and 
corruption in order to implement an effective long-term narcotics 
policy.

The GOP appears to understand that law enforcement is essential if 
alternative development programs are to succeed.  In this regard, 
the increased activity of the military in civic action and 
airfield control in coca-growing areas, and greater coordination 
between the police and military are positive developments.  
However, an overall enforcement strategy is still needed to 
integrate individual programs such as aerial enforcement 
operations and  money laundering investigation into a 
comprehensive attack on major trafficking organizations.

The Road Ahead.  Realistic objectives for 1993, assuming continued 
progress in restoring democratic institutions and in making 
progress on human rights, will be:  (1) for the USG to resume at 
least some economic assistance and limited military cooperation, 
and negotiate an integrated set of counternarcotics program 
agreements for FY-93; (2) for the GOP to implement all aspects of 
an integrated national strategy where enforcement, alternative 
development, and other elements conform with USG strategic 
objectives; (3) for joint enforcement programs to have an 
observable impact in disrupting specific major trafficking 
organizations; (4) for economic programs to result in clear 
evidence of farmers abandoning coca cultivation in favor of other 
crops; and (5) for the GOP to expand law enforcement and seedbed 
destruction efforts into new growing areas and deny trafficker use 
of airstrips and airports. 

[Chart - Paraguay Statistical Tables]
(###)

URUGUAY

I.  Summary

Uruguay's banking stability, respect for customer confidentiality, 
and unrestricted currency exchange creates the potential for 
large-scale money laundering.  So far, however, USG law 
enforcement agencies have identified only a few money laundering 
cases.  While production of drugs or precursor chemicals is not a 
major problem, its location makes Uruguay an attractive transit 
point for drugs flowing through the region.  The Government of 
Uruguay (GOU) has cooperated with the USG on a number of narcotics 
investigations and drug control programs, and has cooperated on 
money laundering by tightening banking controls.  However, 
combatting the narcotics problem is not seen as critically 
important in Uruguay.  The lack of political will to confront what 
appears to be a growing problem, coupled with continuing domestic 
controversies over economic policy and political reforms, limits 
the government's support for drug control. 

II.  Status of Country

Previous investigations show that the Colombian cartels have 
laundered money in Uruguay in the past.  Money laundering itself 
is not a crime under Uruguayan law, unless police can establish 
that the launderers acted as accessories to a crime such as 
narcotics trafficking.  The GOU chaired the CICAD conference in 
1992, and the GOU delegation played an instrumental role in 
drafting the model legislation on money laundering.  The Uruguayan 
Parliament is working toward adoption of the CICAD model 
legislation.

III.  Country Actions Against Drugs in 1992

Policy Initiatives.  The National Commission for the Prevention 
and Repression of Illicit Traffic and Abusive Use of Drugs (the 
"National Commission") is compiling a database for use in 
prevention and enforcement programs.  The GOU and the USG have 
agreed to establish a joint information coordination center (JICC) 
in Uruguay.  Its installation is pending resolution of software 
problems and funding of an inspection and training visit by USG 
agencies.

Accomplishments.  In 1992, the GOU sent three police officers to 
the U.S. to testify in a major drug trafficking and money 
laundering case; it also froze about $630,000 in assets belonging 
to the defendant.  The GOU has approved three USG extradition 
requests in the last four years, including two involving narcotics 
offenses.  Two requests for extradition have been denied in the 
past four years: one for narcotics trafficking.  The GOU also has 
implemented controls against precursor chemical production and 
transportation. 

Law Enforcement Efforts.  Uruguayan law enforcement agencies in 
general are too ill-equipped, underpaid, and poorly trained to 
effectively enforce the laws against narcotics trafficking and 
money laundering.  In a reaction  against human rights abuses 
during the military dictatorship, the courts and the GOU strictly 
respect privacy rights, circumscribing police investigations.  
According to the GOU, Uruguayan authorities in 1992 made about 750 
arrests for drug crimes and seized only about 55 kg of marijuana 
and 3 kg of cocaine.

Corruption.  Uruguay's ethics law for public officials represents 
an effective deterrent against corruption.  However, low salaries 
for junior officials could lead to corruption.  As a matter of 
government policy, the GOU does not encourage or facilitate the 
illicit production or distribution of drugs or other controlled 
substances.

Agreements and Treaties.  The USG and the GOU have an extradition 
treaty signed in 1973.  Uruguay has signed but not ratified the 
1988 UN Convention, but the GOU is expected to work toward 
ratification in 1993.  Uruguay has moved toward meeting the 
Convention's goals through its actions to tighten controls on 
banks and implementation of controls on precursor and essential 
chemicals.  It has also signed but not ratified mutual legal 
assistance treaties (MLAT) with the USG, Spain and Brazil and a 
counternarcotics assistance treaty with the UK.  Ratification of 
the MLAT with the USG is impeded by the lack of a majority 
coalition in Parliament which affects all legislation.

Drug Flow/Transit.  In 1992, a DEA investigation documented that 
one drug trafficking organization was transporting up to 200 kg of 
cocaine per month from Bolivia through Argentina, Uruguay, and 
Brazil to the U.S. and Europe.  This case provided the first 
evidence that at least one drug trafficking organization uses 
Uruguay as a transit point for large shipments.  

Demand Reduction Programs.  Private organizations and local 
governments have implemented almost all demand reduction programs 
in Uruguay.  Lacking adequate funding, the National Commission has 
been unable to organize a comprehensive demand reduction program.  
An epidemiological study, partially funded by the USG, will mark 
the first major step toward establishing a national demand 
reduction program.  

IV.  U.S. Policy Initiatives and Programs

Policy Initiatives.  USG policy encourages the GOU to adopt 
stricter controls over financial institutions, outlaw money 
laundering, and strengthen police enforcement capacity against 
drugs and precursor and essential chemicals.  The USG is also 
supporting the establishment of a national demand reduction 
program.

Bilateral Cooperation.  USG assistance, transferred under a 
bilateral agreement, is used primarily to supply law enforcement 
commodities and training, especially in money laundering 
prevention.  Future cooperation will include the establishment of 
the JICC and the epidemiological study.  The GOU is meeting the 
goals of the bilateral agreement as demonstrated by its adoption 
of stricter controls over exchange houses, successful extradition 
and conviction of traffickers and money launderers, and better 
intelligence collection.  Anecdotal evidence suggests that these 
efforts might discourage traffickers from laundering money in 
Uruguay.

The Road Ahead.  The GOU and the Uruguayan public give only 
limited attention to the drug threat.  The USG will concentrate on 
persuading the GOU that money laundering, narcotics trafficking, 
and drug abuse pose serious threats to Uruguay's society and the 
integrity of the banking sector.  
(###)

VENEZUELA

I.  Summary  

Venezuela is a transit country for drugs coming from Colombia, and 
for essential and precursor chemicals diverted to Colombia to 
process cocaine.  Venezuela's location, its ties to Italian crime 
organizations, and its active financial sector have fostered drug 
money laundering, although there are no reliable data on its 
magnitude or trends.  The Government of Venezuela (GOV) entered 
into several antidrug accords with the USG in 1992, including two 
additional bilateral assistance agreements with the ministries of 
Justice and Interior to support investigative activities.  Several 
drug investigations by the Judicial Technical Police (PTJ) and the 
Directorate of Intelligence and Prevention Services (DISIP) led to 
significant seizures of drugs and documents both inside and 
outside Venezuela.  Corruption remains a significant problem 
impeding effective narcotics control programs.

Drug control initiatives announced by President Carlos Andres 
Perez in 1991 did not come to fruition, largely because of the 
February 4, 1992, coup attempt.  Promising policy initiatives, 
such as a national drug strategy and an operational unified drug 
command, were deferred as government attention focused on 
restoring domestic order.  A second coup attempt in November 
further heightened GOV preoccupation with internal security.  

II. Status of Country

Venezuela is a hub for Colombian drug traffic, a transit route for 
cocaine destined for the U.S. and other Western countries.  Small-
scale heroin traffickers are also known to operate in Venezuela.  
Although domestic GOV seizures in 1992 totalled slightly more than 
3 mt, seizures abroad of drugs transshipped through Venezuelan 
totalled more than 30 mt.  Venezuela is also a transit country for 
essential and precursor chemicals to process cocaine.  Chemicals 
from Europe and the U.S. enter through the ports of Puerto 
Cabello, Puerto la Cruz, Maracaibo and La Guaira, and are moved by 
front companies to Colombia overland or through the ports.  
Inadequate import/export controls on chemicals permit relatively 
risk-free transshipment. 

There are no solid data on the scope of drug money laundering in 
Venezuela.  However, several drug investigations during 1992  
revealed significant money laundering involving Italian criminal 
groups and Colombian drug cartels.  Illicit coca and cannabis grow 
in small plots (less than 2 ha) along the Venezuelan/Colombian 
border in the Sierra de Perija region.  There are indications that 
some processing occurs along that border as well.  Cultivation of 
coca and cannabis is illegal in Venezuela, as are drug possession, 
refining and trafficking. 

III  Country Actions Against Drugs in 1992 

Policy Initiatives.  Venezuela's invigoration in 1991 of its drug 
control policies dissipated following the coup attempt in February 
1992.  The  unexpected assault on the country's 34-year-old 
democratic system diverted government attention from illicit drugs 
to reestablishing internal stability and fortifying the democratic 
process.  A second coup attempt on November 27 intensified the 
government's preoccupation with stability, sidetracking other 
social issues.  Nevertheless, the GOV continued to work closely 
with USG drug enforcement agencies.  It recognized the need to 
expand the collaborative relations with the USG by signing two new 
Letters of Agreement (LOAs) for the ministries of Justice (MOJ) 
and Interior (MOI), in addition to the annual LOA signed with the 
Ministry of Defense (MOD).  The GOV participated in regional and 
bilateral efforts agreed upon at the 1992 San Antonio Summit. It 
also  negotiated with the USG several agreements to enhance 
narcotics control, identify money laundering operations, and 
control essential and precursor chemical shipments.  A small 
Administration of Justice program began in mid-1992 included 
assistance in drug trafficking cases.  

Accomplishments.  The former Minister of Interior cooperated with 
the USG on several drug control matters, including the signing of 
the three USG-GOV agreements,  expelling certain U.S. citizens and 
other foreign nationals charged with drug trafficking, and 
facilitating the conclusion of bilateral agreements on chemical 
control and asset sharing.  The USG shared $1.4 million with the 
GOV, resulting from a major drug trafficking case in which the 
DISIP played a key role.  PTJ and DISIP cooperation with USG 
enforcement agencies resulted in record seizures of drugs which 
had transshipped Venezuela.  

The executive and legislative branches sought to revise the basic 
1984 drug law.  The USG hoped the revised bill would be passed in 
1992, but its delay may help ensure eventual inclusion of a 
provision criminalizing money laundering, as public attention to 
this issue has grown.  Other proposed revisions include a more 
effective judicial and prosecutorial process for drug cases, 
adoption of chemical control measures in line with the 1988 UN 
Convention, and the confiscation of drug-derived assets.

Maritime interdiction cooperation grew in 1992 as a result of the 
implementation of the 1991 Maritime Cooperation Agreement.  The 
Venezuelan Coast Guard (VECG) has developed a maritime drug 
interdiction mission;  as a result, a USG assistance program will 
commence shortly.  

Law Enforcement Efforts.  Three institutions share drug 
enforcement responsibilities; the PTJ, the Guardia Nacional (GN), 
and the DISIP.  In 1992, PTJ and DISIP collaboration with the USG 
led to several large seizures of cocaine and financial documents 
both in Venezuela and abroad.  An ongoing investigation into 
possible corrupt activities by former officials of the GN antidrug 
division caused a significant decrease in investigative activities 
and in cooperation with the USG, partially accounting for the 
decline in domestic drug seizures during the year.  Several 
significant drug cases completed during 1992 advanced USG efforts 
to identify major trafficking and money laundering activities in 
Venezuela.  Working closely with DEA, the PTJ dismantled a major 
drug trafficking/money laundering group, the Cuntrera-Caruana 
organization.  The three Cuntrera brothers were expelled from 
Venezuela to Italy where they were arrested on  charges of drug 
trafficking and distribution.  The Cuntrera brothers were also 
wanted in Canada, and one faces charges in the U.S.  Over $30 
million in assets thus far have been seized, including bank 
accounts, hotels, homes and vehicles.  The PTJ and DEA continue to 
unravel the complexities of this major crime organization.  A 
second successful joint investigation -- the Jairo Echeverria case 
-- demonstrated the international character of this organization 
and led to major seizures in several countries. 

Corruption.  Corruption is a problem in Venezuela.  The GOV has 
begun to take steps to address its drug-related aspects.  The DEA 
arrested a Venezuelan Army general in mid-1992 attempting to sell 
70 kg of cocaine in Miami.  The GOV collaborated in the 
investigation and supports USG efforts to prosecute the general in 
Florida.  A GN general (the former head of the GN antidrug 
division) and several former colleagues are under investigation by 
the GOV for suspected drug trafficking activities.  The GOV does 
not, as a matter of policy, encourage or facilitate illicit 
production or distribution of drugs or the laundering of drug 
money.  

Agreements and Treaties.  Venezuela is a party to the 1961 UN 
Single Convention on Narcotic Drugs, as amended, the 1972 UN 
Convention on Psychotropic Substances and the 1988 UN Convention.  
In keeping with the 1988 Convention, Venezuela has signed with the 
USG agreements on money laundering, chemical control, and maritime 
cooperation.  Concerning the GOV's achievement of the 1988 UN 
Convention's goals and objectives, the GOV has participated 
effectively in interdiction activities, but has not passed 
legislation on money laundering, asset forfeiture, or chemical 
control.  

Negotiations with the USG on a tax information exchange agreement 
will resume in early 1993.  The GOV participates in OAS money 
laundering and chemical control discussions.  The GOV and USG have 
signed annual narcotics control agreements since 1987.  In 1992, 
for the first time, Venezuela participated in post-Cartagena 
Andean Summit conferences.  It entered into an agreement with 
Colombia establishing a joint defense ministry commission to stem 
the flow of drugs and halt insurgency activities along their 
border. 

An extradition treaty has been in effect with the U.S. since 1923.  
Venezuelan law, however, prohibits the extradition of Venezuelan 
citizens, and a reservation on this issue was included with 
Venezuela's ratification of the 1988 UN Convention.  Even for non-
Venezuelans, USG extradition requests to the GOV have not met with 
success.  In recognition of the need to build public awareness of 
and support for GOV/USG narcotics control efforts, the two 
governments signed in early 1992 a memorandum of understanding on 
public awareness.  The Venezuelan National Drug Commission 
(CONACUID) and the U.S. Embassy sponsored joint seminars to engage 
broader media and private sector participation in drug prevention. 

Cultivation and Production.  The USG and the GN conducted an 
aerial survey in January 1992 using two USG Thrush aircraft with 
Pathlink equipment.  The results confirm previous data indicating 
the cultivation  of cannabis and coca leaf in small plots (less 
than 2 ha) in an isolated mountainous region of the northeastern 
Sierra de Perija mountain range.  Data indicate approximately 101 
ha of coca leaf and 142 ha of cannabis were under cultivation 
along the Colombian border.  The data are not complete, however.  
GOV logistical problems prevented missions at the height of the 
growing season (August-October), when aerial surveillance would 
have permitted a more comprehensive estimate of the extent of 
cultivation.  There is no evidence of additional illicit 
cultivation elsewhere, although that cannot be ruled out given 
climatic conditions and the extreme isolation of large sections of 
Venezuela's territory.  

Drug Flow/Transit.  Illicit drugs enter Venezuela from Colombia in 
large quantities, much of it stockpiled for later shipment to 
other markets.  The majority of the drugs enter by land routes on 
the long, poorly monitored border.  Drugs are move onward via 
various air and surface mechanisms, including containerized cargo 
and couriers.  Methods of shipment and concealment are 
sophisticated, similar to those used in Colombia, and traffickers 
often establish "front" companies using false documents.  
Traffickers use key urban and port centers around Maracaibo, 
Maracay, Caracas, Barquisimeto and Puerto Cabello to temporarily 
store drugs, then evade local law enforcement by shipping them 
from these poorly monitored ports. 

Demand Reduction Programs.  The lack of reliable surveys precludes 
a good estimate of drug abuse in Venezuela.  However, law 
enforcement and demand reduction authorities believe it is 
increasing among all sectors of the population.  The Ministry of 
Education, the Ministry of the Family (MOF), and CONACUID have 
mandates to develop nationwide drug prevention programs.  The 
Fundacion Jose Felix Ribas (FJFR), a public organization under the 
auspices of the MOF but which receives private funds as well, is 
particularly active in school prevention programs.  FJFR has 
developed a family-oriented national drug prevention campaign 
funded by a $600,000 grant from the UNDCP.  CONACUID has opened 
several offices at the state level and focuses also on drug 
prevention in schools.  However, it lacks sufficient GOV funding 
to undertake much needed initiatives nationwide, including a 
national drug abuse survey. 

IV. U.S. Policy Initiatives and Programs 

Policy Initiatives.  USG policy focuses on strengthening drug 
intelligence collection and analysis and its tactical use by drug 
law enforcement agencies in interdiction.  The USG assists the GOV 
in interdiction, eradication, and the strengthening of border 
controls.  The GOV's high-level commitment to combat drug 
trafficking is still not reflected in widespread action.  However, 
enforcement effectiveness should be enhanced with the expansion of 
USG assistance to the PTJ, DISIP and entities of the MOD 
(primarily the naval branches).  Given the shared drug enforcement 
responsibilities of several GOV entities, the USG also presses for 
greater cooperation among these agencies. 

Bilateral Cooperation.  The USG's strong focus on improving GOV 
drug interdiction and excellent Venezuelan cooperation resulted in 
record seizures of drugs which had transited Venezuela.  Of 
particular significance were the Jairo Echeverria and Cuntreras 
cases.  The GOV deported to the U.S. two American citizens charged 
with drug trafficking and expelled the three  Cuntreras brothers 
to Italy.  To fortify GOV interdiction efforts, the USG entered 
into two new agreements with the MOJ and MOI for their drug 
enforcement units, the PTJ and DISIP.  Both units are receiving 
much-needed vehicles and investigative and communications 
equipment, which will enhance their efficiency in drug 
investigations. 

The USG and GOV also cooperated to monitor chemical shipments 
transiting Venezuela.  Acting on a tip by the Venezuelan Coast 
Guard, DEA and GN cooperation led to the seizure in February of 68 
mt of methyl ethyl ketone destined to Bogota for cocaine 
processing.  The bilateral chemical control agreement concluded in 
March provided a basis for improved GOV monitoring of chemical 
shipments and cooperation with DEA.  In April, the U.S. Embassy 
provided a list to the MOJ and MOD of chemicals it believes should 
be monitored; a GOV response is pending.  Much-needed regulations 
governing chemical control are contained in the draft revisions to 
the drug law, currently before congress. 

Cooperation with the MOD is growing.  The Minister approved a 
maritime interdiction project under which the USG will provide 
three patrol boats, radar, and search and seizure equipment for 
the Coast Guard.  The MOD has approved a second project with the 
Marines, also a branch of the Navy, providing for several patrol 
boats and communications equipment for the Marine battalion based 
in Puerto Ayacucho.  It will be complemented by the MOD's purchase 
of additional patrol boats.  This project would strengthen 
significantly the ability of the Marines to conduct riverine and 
border interdiction missions and promote a greater degree of 
collaboration with the Colombian authorities at the border.  A 
counternarcotics mission at Puerto Ayacucho would give the GOV 
greater presence in this strategic, but rugged and isolated 
region. 

As noted, past cooperation with the GN antidrug division has 
ceased temporarily pending the outcome of a corruption 
investigation.  The USG's aviation support program for the GN in 
Santa Barbara de Zulia was suspended in May and two USG-loaned 
helicopters were redeployed.  This action was taken after several 
unsuccessful attempts to conduct eradication and interdiction 
programs along the Sierra de Perija.  However, the USG does not 
preclude the reintroduction of aerial support if the MOD can 
assure their full-time use for counternarcotics programs. 

The Road Ahead.  Cooperation should continue to increase.  Large 
quantities of drugs are entering Venezuela from Colombia, and drug 
traffickers are likely to exploit the current domestic instability 
to expand their use of Venezuelan territory.   

[Chart - Venezuela Statistical Tables]
(###)

MEXICO, CANADA, CENTRAL AMERICA, AND THE CARIBBEAN

BELIZE 
I. Summary


The Government of Belize (GOB) recognizes that the transit of 
cocaine and, to a lesser extent, the cultivation and export of 
marijuana, are major drug problems in the country.  The GOB also 
appreciates the danger the illicit drug trade poses to its 
democratic institutions.  The GOB has demonstrated its serious 
commitment against illicit drugs by its initiatives and actions 
and its support for USG counternarcotics programs.

II. Status of Country

Belize's proximity to Guatemala and Mexico, dense jungle, 
extensive seacoast and inland waterways, large unpopulated areas, 
and an unsophisticated enforcement infrastructure make the country 
a potentially significant transshipment point.  The quantity of 
cocaine seized during 1992 rose dramatically, indicating an 
increase in transshipment, or perhaps improved Belizean 
interdiction capability.  A rise in drug arrests, street crimes, 
and drug-related deaths and murders suggests an increase in 
domestic consumption and trafficking.

Belize was once a major marijuana producer, but the GOB has 
reduced cannabis cultivation to negligible levels through a 
successful crop suppression program funded by INM.  There are 
reports of a possible resurgence, however, as recent crop removal  
operations indicate growers may be switching to new strains of 
cannabis and more carefully concealed cultivation methods.

III. Country Actions Against Drugs in 1992 

Policy Initiatives.  The GOB has not yet become a party to the 
1988 UN Convention, but many of its provisions already have been 
incorporated into Belize's 1990 Misuse of Drugs Act.  Belize's 
criminalization of illegal cultivation, production and 
distribution of drugs, and its cooperation with the USG and Mexico 
on cocaine transshipment indicate that the country is taking steps 
to meet the goals and objectives of the Convention.  The USG is 
urging Belize to accede to the UN Convention and expects it will 
do so in 1993.  Having become a member of the OAS in 1991, Belize 
now has a greater opportunity to become more involved in regional 
counternarcotics efforts.

Concerned by the rise in cocaine abuse and related crimes, the GOB 
has undertaken an aggressive narcotics control strategy.  The 
Belize Police and Defense Forces (BDF) worked jointly throughout 
the year and carried out operations and raids in various parts of 
the country in 1992.  An operation in June resulted in the seizure 
of 201 kg  of cocaine, 13 arrests (including four Colombians), and 
the first major drug convictions in the country.  There have since 
been even larger seizures.

Accomplishments.  Belize continues to conduct an aggressive aerial 
cannabis suppression program.  Aerial reconnaissance, aerial crop 
destruction, and insertion of BDF and Police Force units for 
manual eradication keep  cultivation at their current low levels.  
The USG has supported these activities, but many of the 
eradication missions are wholly Belizean initiatives and 
operations.

The Belize Police Force, through its Special Branch and Serious 
Crimes Squad (SCS), continues to improve its capability to collect 
intelligence about the transit and distribution of cocaine.  At 
this time, there is no indication that essential or precursor 
chemicals transit Belize.

Although not excluded by the U.S.-Belize Extradition Treaty, as a 
matter of policy, the GOB does not extradite Belizean citizens.  
The USG has had excellent cooperation, however, in the arrest and 
return to the U.S. of non-Belizean fugitives.

Law Enforcement Efforts.  Belizean officials seized 811 kg of 
cocaine in 1992, as compared to 13 kg in 1991.  The Belize Police 
Force is attempting to penetrate major drug organizations to 
combat the transit of cocaine.  The GOB also continues to patrol 
areas aggressively where crack cocaine is sold.  Belize and Mexico 
meet regularly and have increased police cooperation and 
information-sharing along their border.

Corruption.  There have been allegations of corruption against a 
few government officials, but no ranking members of government 
were implicated in narcotics-related corruption in 1992.

Agreements and Treaties.  Belize is a party to the 1961 Single 
Convention and its 1972 Protocol.  Extradition with the U.S. is 
governed by the 1972 U.S./UK treaty, which remained in force after 
Belizean independence.  The USG and GOB completed negotiations for 
a maritime memorandum of understanding which the U.S. Ambassador 
and Belizean Prime Minister signed on December 23.  This all-
inclusive agreement may serve as a model for other bilateral or 
multilateral maritime shiprider and interdiction agreements.

Money laundering, while not in itself a violation of Belizean law, 
is not considered a threat in Belize at this time.  Belize has 
laws regulating foreign currencies and bank-to-bank transfer of 
these currencies, but has no regulations controlling the actual 
movement of money in the country.  The International Business 
Companies Act (1990) allows for tax shelters and the use of bearer 
shares and other financial transactions which have the potential 
for abuse.  Authorities have seized large amounts of U.S. currency 
-- $265,000 in the largest incident, involving a German 
businessman.

Cultivation and Production.  Aggressive aerial eradication by INM 
Thrush spray aircraft and GOB assets has kept cultivation of 
cannabis in Belize under control.  Although seizures of domestic 
marijuana are down, intelligence indicates the continuing transit 
of significant quantities of marijuana.

Drug Flow/Transit.  Intelligence and seizure statistics indicate 
continuous or even increasing cocaine transshipment.  Main routes 
are by air or sea from Colombia, often with stopovers in Honduras 
and/or Guatemala, as well as overland from Guatemala.  Most major 
shipments move on to  Mexico en route to the U.S.  Small seizures 
of cocaine at the Belize airport and other ports of entry indicate 
continued transportation of smaller quantities directly to the 
U.S.

Demand Reduction Programs.  PRIDE Belize, a private voluntary 
organization originally affiliated with PRIDE, Inc. of Atlanta, 
has been implementing a drug awareness education project with 
USAID support since 1985.  The Belize program has included 
assistance and training to schools, communities, parents, 
businesses, and health education professionals in rural and urban 
Belize.  The GOB established the National Drug Abuse Control 
Council (NDACC) in 1990, which focuses on drug prevention 
education, alternatives, research and information, legal reform, 
and treatment and rehabilitation.

IV. Policy Initiatives and Programs

Policy Initiatives.  The U.S. supports the GOB's fledgling but 
dedicated narcotics control institutions.  In 1992, the USG opened 
a DEA office, provided equipment, training, detector dogs, and law 
enforcement expertise to Belizean Police, and assisted in aerial 
cannabis eradication and drug interdiction.

International Cooperation.  In addition to signing a bilateral 
maritime agreement with the U.S., the GOB has participated in 
eight trilateral interdiction exercises and coordinated training 
and support activities with the UK and USG.

The Road Ahead.  Aggressive interdiction programs in Guatemala and 
Mexico, combined with its long, unguarded coastline, leave Belize 
open to new incursions by drug traffickers.  Recognizing this 
threat, the GOB is in the process of reorganizing its maritime 
units, and has agreed to participate in USG-sponsored regional 
interdiction efforts.

Belizean Police and the BDF will continue to combat drugs 
aggressively, and will seek additional training and support from 
the U.S. and the UK.  Belizeans are scheduled to attend several 
DEA and U.S. Customs training courses, and the GOB has requested 
money laundering training and assistance. 

[Chart - Belize Statistical Tables]
(###)

CANADA

I.  Summary

Canada increasingly is a conduit for drugs destined for the U.S. 
as well as a haven for drug money laundering.  The Canadian 
government (GOC) is strongly  committed to narcotics control, and 
in 1990 ratified the 1988 UN Convention.  The GOC allocates 70% to 
80% of its drug control expenditures to demand reduction, with the 
balance for supply control.  Canadian law enforcement agencies 
cooperate closely with international agencies and foreign police 
forces.  

II.  Status of Country

Canada's primary drugs of abuse are cannabis products.  Multi-ton 
shipments of hashish from Pakistan, Afghanistan, India, and 
Lebanon, and marijuana from Southeast Asia are smuggled into  
Canada by sea on both coasts.  Authorities believe cocaine and 
crack availability and use are on the rise as indicated by a 300% 
increase in cocaine seizures.  One study estimates approximately 
700,000 Canadians over 14 have tried cocaine or crack.  Heroin use 
in Canada is stable with about 30,000 addicts.  Drug trafficking 
is growing faster than the GOC's capability to control it.  Canada 
shares a long, relatively open border with the United States, 
making Canada attractive as a transit route for cocaine and heroin 
destined to U.S. markets. 

Money laundering also is a growing problem.  The GOC estimates 
that Canada's drug trafficking entails about $10 billion annually, 
both from domestic sales and from the transfer of funds from the 
international operations of trafficking organizations.  The 
government responded in 1988 with its first legislation to control 
money laundering, including the seizure of assets.

Canada is not considered a major supplier of precursor and 
essential chemicals, but the problem is growing and Canada has 
placed a number of chemicals on its export controlled-substance 
list.  However, the chemicals are not listed as domestic 
controlled substances. 

III.  Country Actions Against Drugs in 1992 

Policy Initiatives.  GOC policy focuses more on prevention and 
demand reduction than on controlling supply.  However, the GOC has 
passed important laws on narcotics control, including on money 
laundering.

The GOC has two laws related to money laundering.  One permits the 
freezing and seizure of assets related to drug trafficking, and 
makes money laundering a criminal offense; the second requires 
financial institutions to maintain records on suspicious 
transactions, and make records available to law enforcement 
agencies.

The Solicitor General in 1992 formed special teams in Montreal, 
Toronto, and Vancouver, comprised of Royal Canadian Mounted Police 
(RCMP) officers, full-time prosecutors, administrative staff, and 
local police officers, to investigate and prosecute money 
laundering offenses.  Canadian law enforcement agencies cooperate 
fully with authorities in the U.S. and other nations on drug 
control. 

Accomplishments.  The GOC announced a number of successes under 
its five-year national drug strategy.  Seizures of heroin in 1991 
were up 60% over 1990, and the number of individuals charged with 
heroin-related offenses rose 15%; the heroin addict population 
remained stable; seizures of cocaine increased by 300 percent, 
although the number of persons arrested for cocaine abuse remained 
stable; and the use of tranquilizers and stimulants decreased 20% 
and 50% respectively.  Enforcement of the money laundering laws  
resulted in seizures of $12 million in assets in 1991, and of $10 
million in the first seven months of 1992.

Law Enforcement Efforts.  Enforcement agencies are dedicated, but 
the number of RCMP assigned to narcotics enforcement has remained 
almost constant over the last decade, despite rising trafficking 
trends.  Although money laundering legislation has been 
strengthened, enforcement would be enhanced by provisions for the 
administrative seizure of assets.  Canada has placed the 22 
chemicals listed in Tables I and II of the 1988 UN Convention on 
its Export Control List.  In addition, the Table I chemicals are 
controlled under stricter regulations dealing with precursor 
chemicals.

Corruption.  Public corruption is not considered a problem in 
Canada. 

Agreements and Treaties.  As noted, Canada ratified the 1988 UN 
Convention in 1990.  The U.S. and Canada have a mutual legal 
assistance treaty and have updated their extradition treaty.  
Canada is a member of the Dublin Group, the G-7 Chemical Action 
Task Force, the Financial Action Task Force, and participates in 
the CICAD of the OAS. 

Cultivation and Production.  Coca and opium poppy are not 
cultivated in Canada, but indoor cultivation of cannabis is 
estimated to supply 25 percent of Canada's domestic marijuana 
market. 

Drug Flow/Transit.  There is ample evidence that Canada is used 
increasingly to transship heroin from Southeast Asia to the U.S.  
The Cali and Medellin cartels also channel cocaine through Canada 
by private aircraft, commercial container vessels, fishing 
vessels, and coastal freighters.  In November, an aircraft was 
detained in Quebec with 4 mt of cocaine, the largest such seizure 
made in Canada. 

Demand Reduction Programs.  Canada's programs to treat various 
kinds of substance abuse form the core of its drug control 
strategy.  The Minister of Health announced in March that demand 
reduction funding would be increased by 18 percent over the next 5 
years to a total of $C229.5 million.  Under these programs, 
alcohol abuse has highest priority, followed by abuse of 
pharmaceuticals and street drugs.  Public education on the risks 
of abuse is central to the strategy.

IV. U.S. Policy Initiatives and Programs

Policy Initiatives.  Cooperation between the GOC and the USG is 
excellent, particularly in law enforcement.  Canadian and U.S. 
Customs work closely together to control drug smuggling, and share 
enforcement assets and  personnel in specific cases.  In addition, 
the two customs services have institutionalized an intelligence 
liaison officer exchange program.  Local Canadian police forces 
and the RCMP share information and coordinate on drug cases with 
the FBI, DEA, and local U.S. police forces.  The USG transferred 
over $800,000 in drug proceeds to the Canadian government in 1991 
and $807,109 in 1992 as a result of assistance provided by the 
RCMP to the U.S. in successfully prosecuting and dismantling a 
drug trafficking organization operating in the U.S. and Canada.  
The USG encourages the GOC to continue its antidrug efforts both 
domestically and internationally through such groups as the Dublin 
Group, FATF and the CATF.

The Road Ahead.  The USG will continue to work with the GOC to 
build on our excellent record of drug control cooperation, 
especially in the area of law enforcement, as traffickers continue 
to exploit Canada as a transshipment route to the U.S. market. 
(###)

COSTA RICA

I. Summary

Costa Rica has long been a transit point for Andean cocaine en 
route to the U.S, but traffic in heroin also appeared in 1992.  
Costa Rican concern is growing about domestic abuse of cocaine, as 
well as a possible increase in money laundering.  The Government 
of Costa Rica (GOCR) has modernized its counternarcotics laws and 
begun to coordinate demand reduction and enforcement activities.  
Although the GOCR added personnel to the counternarcotics force, 
police still lack adequate training and professionalism.  

II. Status of Country

In addition to the longstanding traffic in cocaine, heroin also 
began to move through Costa Rica in 1992; 6.7 kg were seized.  
Drug abuse has become a major public concern, particularly of 
crack cocaine which is cheap and easily obtainable.  Costa Rica 
has a tough antidrug policy, but lacks the capability to enforce 
it effectively.  With no military force, the under-equipped air 
and maritime sections of the Ministry of Public Security are 
responsible for controlling drug trafficking along the Pan-
American highway, remote border regions, and secluded landing 
points on Costa Rica's Pacific and Atlantic coasts.

The Minister of Public Security announced in November that 14 
companies were laundering money for Colombian cartels.  Factors 
which may be encouraging laundering include increased foreign 
investment, privatization of the banks, the reduction in exchange 
market controls as part of the economic liberalization policy, and 
a rapid influx of tourists.

III. Country Actions Against Drugs in 1992

Policy Initiatives.  President Calderon has affirmed his 
government's commitment to narcotics control and to deny 
traffickers the use of Costa Rican territory.  In December, the 
Ministers of Justice and Public Security released a 
counternarcotics plan which seeks to coordinate a broad range of 
antidrug actions among official agencies, including the Joint 
Antidrug Intelligence Center (CICAD) and the National Drug Council 
(CONADRO)--both of which are U.S.-supported.  Costa Rican leaders 
have also called for regional counternarcotics cooperation in 
Central America.

Accomplishments.  Pursuant to its asset-sharing program, the USG 
transferred to Costa Rica a yacht valued at $120,000, seized by 
U.S. authorities with assistance from the Costa Rican Police.  The 
GOCR is using the proceeds from the sale for narcotics control 
activities.  

The radar facility at Cerro Azul was added to the Caribbean Basin 
Radar Network (CBRN).  CICAD hosted a successful conference of 
JICC-Sentry users from the Caribbean and Latin America.  

The Ministry of Public Security has attempted to heighten 
community involvement in curbing substance abuse, and is working 
to establish a program of drug-free school zones.  Costa Rica's 
First Lady heads the country's DARE program.

Law Enforcement Efforts.  The first large-scale  U.S.-Costa Rican 
counternarcotics operation took place in February.  It involved 
mobile road blocks and searches along the principal routes from 
Panama, as well as joint maritime and aerial interdiction patrols.  
A USG-GOCR cannabis eradication effort in June destroyed 370,000 
plants.  The GOCR is seeking to expand the staff of the 
Directorate for Drug Enforcement (DNCD) to 200, and is improving 
salaries and job security.  It opened a new headquarters in 
December.  

The Legislative Assembly is currently reviewing a far-reaching 
measure that would professionalize the police forces.  CICAD has 
improved its collection and dissemination of narcotics 
information.  In March, police seized a record 1,092 kg of 
cocaine.  The air and maritime sections of the Ministry of Public 
Security conducted limited counternarcotics patrols, but are 
hindered by the lack of   ships, aircraft, fuel, and trained 
personnel.  Police arrested four Colombian suspects in San Jose in 
November as part of Operation "Green Ice", conducted in 
coordination with the DEA.

Corruption.  While the GOCR takes a strong stand against 
corruption and prosecutes offenders, law enforcement officials, 
particularly in the lower ranks, have engaged in corrupt 
practices.  In the most notable case, a court found insufficient 
evidence to proceed with the charges against Antonio Lopez-
Callejas, Director of the maritime section of Public Security.  
Lopez-Callejas nevertheless was dismissed and faces other charges.

Agreements and Treaties.  Instruments of ratification for the 1982 
U.S.-Costa Rica Extradition Treaty were exchanged in Washington in 
1991.  However, in early 1993, the Constitutional Chamber of the 
Costa Rican Supreme Court issued a decision that challenged the 
treaty under Costa Rican law.  It is not yet clear what the effect 
of this decision will be.

Costa Rica ratified the 1988 UN Convention in 1991.  The country's 
laws are consistent with the Convention's goals and objectives: a 
1988 antidrug law added modern definitions of money laundering, 
provided for forfeitures of assets, and denied bail to and 
provided for longer sentences for narcotics traffickers.  
Amendments in 1991 authorized  controlled deliveries, protection 
from prosecution for officers working undercover, and controls on 
the trade in commercially available essential and precursor 
chemicals.  Laws regulating police professionalization and 
wiretaps, if passed, will strengthen the legal framework against 
drug trafficking.  Costa Rica's laws and law enforcement 
performance in 1992 indicate that the country is meeting most of 
the goals and objectives of the 1988 UN Convention.  However, even 
with strict laws, Costa Rican courts have shied away from dealing 
severely with narcotics violators.

Cultivation and Production.  Cannabis, cultivated primarily along 
the Atlantic coast and the northern border region, is the only 
significant illicit production in Costa Rica; as many as 800 ha 
may be under cultivation.  Although there is no evidence of 
marijuana export, production appears to exceed the estimated 
domestic consumption.

IV. U.S. Policy Initiatives and Programs 

Policy Initiatives.  The principal USG goals are to assist the 
GOCR in the interdiction of cocaine shipments, strengthen its 
institutional capacity to deal with enforcement and corruption 
issues, and provide assistance to demand reduction programs.  Key 
USG program objectives include training and support for the 
counternarcotics police, training and maintenance support for 
CICAD, coordination of the link between the CBRN radar and CICAD, 
support for the Air and Maritime Sections, assistance to CONADRO, 
including completion of a drug-use survey, and support for the 
passage of legal and institutional reforms, particularly the 
authorization of wiretaps in drug cases.

Bilateral Cooperation.  Under the bilateral assistance agreements, 
the USG in 1992 provided the Ministry of Public Security air and 
maritime sections with aircraft support.  The DNCD received 
vehicles, office equipment, and communications support.  CICAD is 
receiving additional computer equipment to upgrade information 
processing.  The OIJ received various vehicles.  OIJ and DNCD 
personnel were trained by DEA.  The GOCR has used all equipment 
appropriately, and has met its obligations under the agreements.

The Road Ahead.  The USG will seek continued cooperation with the 
GOCR to minimize drug transit, to curb the spread of corruption 
and money laundering, and to encourage the GOCR to reduce domestic 
drug consumption.   
[Chart - Costa Rica 1993 Statistical Tables]
(###)

EL SALVADOR

I. Summary

El Salvador lies on major land, sea and air routes for narcotics 
moving from Colombia to the U.S.  President Cristiani has made 
narcotics control a priority by establishing and supporting the 
Executive Anti-Narcotics Unit (UEA), which has proven to be highly 
motivated and effective.

The only illicit drug produced by El Salvador is cannabis for 
domestic consumption.  Cocaine use is limited but increasing.  
Neither USG nor Central Bank officials are aware of any 
significant narcotics-related money laundering, despite El 
Salvador's weak legal regime and liberal currency laws.  DEA does 
have reports that trafficking groups are involved in moving drug 
proceeds from the U.S. to El Salvador, however. 

II.  Status of Country

There are reliable reports that traffickers are using the Pan 
American highway to move significant quantities of cocaine and 
smaller quantities of heroin through El Salvador destined for the 
U.S.  There are also indications of maritime transshipment.  
Airborne traffickers use Central America's Pacific coast corridor-
-where there is limited radar coverage--on their way to the U.S.  
Salvadoran Government (GOES) officials are concerned that 
trafficker aircraft increasingly will use Salvadoran territory to 
evade USG-supported counternarcotics forces based in Guatemala and 
Mexico; as of the end of 1992, there was some evidence this was 
occurring.

III. Country Action Against Drugs in 1992

Despite its small size, the UEA, created in 1990, has become a 
significant antinarcotics force.  In 1992, the UEA arrested 217 
suspects, seized 207 kg of cocaine and 241 kg of marijuana, and 
destroyed over 14,000 cannabis plants.  In addition, the UEA 
arrested several military officers suspected of narcotics 
trafficking and related crimes.  In early 1992, the UEA arrested a 
Salvadoran Air Force colonel and his associates for selling 
explosives to Colombian narcotics traffickers.

Despite its successes, the UEA's anti-narcotics mission has been 
diverted by President Cristiani's requests to conduct some non-
drug-related criminal investigations.  In addition, the UEA lacks 
air and maritime capabilities and must rely on the military for 
such support.  El Salvador's judicial system remains vulnerable to 
manipulation by influential, well-financed individuals.

The GOES Ministries of Justice and Treasury are reviewing the 1988 
UN Convention, and both are expected to recommend adoption.  El 
Salvador already has taken steps consistent with the goals and 
objectives of the convention.  The GOES also is committed to 
adopting as law model legislation developed by the CICAD for money 
laundering and precursor  and essential chemicals.  Under the 
bilateral extradition treaty, Salvadorans have been extradited 
from the U.S. to El Salvador; however, the constitution prohibits 
the extradition of Salvadoran citizens from El Salvador to other 
countries.

Both the Attorney General's office and the UEA have promoted 
modest demand reduction programs.  However, a private foundation, 
Fundasalva, has taken the lead in sponsoring demand-reduction 
publicity campaigns.

IV.  U.S. Policy Initiatives and Programs 

DEA established an office in El Salvador in 1992 which permits 
greater information sharing and professional exchanges.  These are 
key elements in addressing USG priorities of developing a more 
comprehensive understanding of narcotics trafficking and 
furthering the professionalization of the UEA.  The USG also 
supports UEA initiatives to cooperate with its counterpart 
agencies in Central America.  

FY92 funding from INM of $160,000 supported the UEA's detector-dog 
program, training exchanges with regional antinarcotics forces, 
and the acquisition of communication and office equipment, 
laboratory commodities, and vehicles.  U.S. Customs conducted two 
INM-funded training programs to improve the interdiction 
capabilities of the UEA at all points of entry.  The U.S. Embassy 
worked with Fundasalva on co-sponsorship of  Salvadoran demand-
reduction programs.

The Road Ahead.  The terms of the 1992 peace accords ending El 
Salvador's civil war mandate a restructuring of the Salvadoran 
police.  The GOES has determined--and the Farabundo Marti 
Liberation Front (FMLN) has agreed--that the UEA will be 
transferred into the New National Civilian Police (PNC) where it 
will become the PNC Anti-Narcotics Division.  The transfer of the 
UEA's personnel and equipment into the PNC is expected to occur in 
late 1993 or early 1994.  The USG will be working with the GOES 
and other interested parties to help ensure that the UEA's 
expertise and experience are effectively incorporated into the 
PNC. 
[Chart - El Salvador 1993 Statistical Tables
(###)

GUATEMALA

I. Summary

The Government of Guatemala (GOG) continues to make progress 
against drug production and trafficking.  Guatemala is a major 
transit country for cocaine and has been an important potential 
producer of opium.  Aerial and manual crop control operations 
destroyed about 470 ha of opium poppy under cultivation in 
Guatemala.  By the end of 1992, following an active Guatemalan-USG 
crop control effort, surveys were unable to detect any significant 
poppy cultivation--although small, scattered plots still exist.  
The GOG recognizes the security and health threat posed by illicit 
drugs and is committed to cocaine interdiction and opium poppy 
control.  Guatemalan law enforcement agencies have worked closely 
with the DEA in Operation Cadence, a cocaine interdiction program.  
Combined USG-GOG cocaine interdiction operations in 1992 seized 
9.5 mt of cocaine.  The Guatemalan Treasury Police are the 
principal beneficiaries of USG assistance and take the lead in 
eradication and enforcement actions.  Guatemala and Mexico are 
cooperating increasingly on narcotics control on their border.  
Drug-related corruption continues to be a problem challenging the 
GOG.

II. Status of Country

With negligible radar capability and hundreds of unmonitored 
airstrips, Guatemala has become a regular stopover and stockpiling 
point for overland drug shipments originating in Panama, and for 
direct air shipments from Colombia.  This probably has been 
because Mexican government enforcement operations have forced 
trafficker operations southward.  Cocaine typically moves through 
Guatemala in 500-1,000 kg loads by light aircraft, private boats, 
containerized maritime shipments, trucks and automobiles.  A 
seizure in Miami in April of 6.7 mt of cocaine loaded in Guatemala 
(not included in the 9.5 mt figure cited elsewhere in this report) 
and a 3 mt seizure in Guatemala City in July, demonstrated that 
Guatemala is the source of even bigger shipments.  In the Miami 
case, the cocaine had been shipped by sea from Guatemala hidden in 
a cargo of frozen broccoli.

Growers cultivate small opium poppy plots in the remote 
northwestern region, where guerrilla activity complicates 
eradication efforts.  The USG-sponsored aerial program destroyed 
350 ha, and manual eradication another 120 ha during 1992.  
Growers now camouflage or disperse plots to evade detection but 
this may reduce yields.  Increasingly, however, growers 
voluntarily eradicate opium if they believe aerial eradication is 
about to take place. 

Some reports indicate that traffickers convert raw opium gum to 
morphine base in Guatemala before onward shipment to Mexico, where 
it is processed into heroin.  There are no known heroin labs in 
Guatemala, nor confirmed reports of cocaine labs.

Cannabis is cultivated in significant quantities near the Belizean 
border, probably for export, and in small quantities throughout 
the country for  domestic consumption.  Treasury Police units 
burned marijuana drying sheds, made several arrests, and manually 
eradicated 30-40 ha during the year, but the extent of cultivation 
is unknown.  Most health and treatment experts believe that 
illicit drug use has increased markedly in the last two years.

III  Country Actions Against Drugs in 1992

Policy Initiatives.  President Serrano has spoken publicly on 
numerous occasions about the need to adopt more effective 
countermeasures to the drug threat.  The congress enacted 
comprehensive narcotics legislation, which should facilitate 
prosecution of drug traffickers.  The new law prohibits narcotics 
conspiracies, adopts stiff penalties for a broad range of crimes, 
and facilitates judicial seizure and forfeiture of traffickers' 
assets.  It represents the government's commitment to the goals 
and objectives of the 1988 UN Convention.

Accomplishments.  Major accomplishments in 1992 included 
extradition to the U.S. of three major drug traffickers, seizure 
of 9.5 mt of cocaine, the destruction of a significant portion of 
the cannabis crop, and the practical elimination of viable opium 
cultivation. 

Law Enforcement Efforts.  DEA works closely with the Treasury 
Police to conduct investigations against major cocaine 
transshipment organizations, and with a small task force of 
National Police on undercover and surveillance operations.  DEA 
also coordinates roadblocks with the Guatemalan military's D-2, 
which is responsible for collecting intelligence against 
traffickers.

The GOG and USG initiated Operation Cadence in 1991 to block the 
flow of cocaine through the region.  Cadence was expanded in 1992 
to provide assistance to Belize and Honduras.  Under the Cadence 
concept, DEA agents and Treasury Police use INM-funded  
helicopters to react quickly to trafficking information.  Cadence 
was involved in most of the 9.5 mt of cocaine and ten aircraft 
seized in 1992, as well as the arrests of members of two major 
trafficking organizations.  Guatemalan/U.S. cooperation during 
operations is excellent.  The rapid reaction of DEA and Treasury 
Police to fast-breaking information is an example of the excellent 
cooperation between the two governments. 

Since manual opium poppy destruction operations began in September 
1991, Guatemala has increased Treasury Police strength to more 
than 100 men in 2 units based in the northwestern San Marcos and 
Huehuetenango Departments.  In 1992, these INM-supported units 
arrested more than 46 growers and seized one kg of opium gum.  
They manually destroyed 120 ha of opium poppy, roughly 25 percent 
of the total hectares eradicated.  Guerrilla activity did not 
hamper counternarcotics activities significantly during 1992.

Narcotics are not processed in significant quantities in 
Guatemala.  Diversion of essential and precursor chemicals for 
domestic processing is not a problem, but significant quantities 
of chemicals entering Guatemala are resold to markets in other 
Latin American countries.  Treasury Police units monitor chemical 
shipments at border checkpoints and report statistics  to their 
headquarters.  The Finance Ministry and the Treasury Police, 
supported by the USG, audit chemical companies.

The GOG in 1992 extradited a former mayor of Zacapa and two 
associates to face drug charges in New York.  The extradition 
process in these cases moved rapidly, taking only 18 months 
following their arrest in December 1990, compared to five years in 
a previous case.  Progress on the four other drug-related 
extradition requests has slowed, however.

Corruption.  No senior officials of the current government are 
known to engage in, encourage, or facilitate the production or 
distribution of illicit narcotics.  The Serrano administration has 
taken a strong stance against narcotics-related corruption, 
dismissing over 1,000 police suspected of corruption or 
misconduct, and prosecuting officials of the prior government for 
corruption.  These figures indicate that a serious problem of 
drug-related corruption remains.  There are reports of corruption 
in the judiciary involving drug cases.

Agreements and Treaties.  Guatemala is a party to the 1961 UN 
Convention and its 1972 Protocol, the 1971 UN Convention on 
Psychotropic Substances, and the 1988 UN Convention.  The GOG's 
interdiction and eradication operations, its strict drug 
legislation, and its public awareness and prevention programs all 
demonstrate a strong commitment to the goals and objectives of the 
1988 Convention.  Implementation of judicial reform measures, 
contemplated for 1993, should bring Guatemala into full 
compliance.

Cultivation and Production.  Farmers grow opium poppy in 
northwestern Guatemala.  Opium poppy has been cultivated in 
Guatemala since the early 1980s; however, significant cultivation 
levels were not reached until 1988/89.  Most fields are small 
(approximately 0.17 ha), but represent a significant portion of 
the land holdings of the average farmer in the area.

An active suppression program by the Guatemalan government has 
reduced hectarage sharply.  The USG-supported aerial program 
destroyed a total of about 350 ha during the main growing season, 
virtually all that could be located by air.  Additionally, the 
Treasury Police's manual eradication operations, in the heart of 
the opium poppy growing region, destroyed an additional 120 ha and 
arrested 46 growers in 1992.  By the end of 1992, planted 
hectarage was down one-third from 1991, and many farmers opted not 
to plant the fall poppy crop or clear new fields, choosing instead 
to return to traditional cultivation.

Demand Reduction Programs.  According to public opinion polls, 
Guatemalans now are much more aware of the dangers of narcotics 
trafficking and drug abuse.  The Treasury and the National Police 
brief the media on antidrug activities.  Rotary Clubs, Partners of 
the Americas, professional medical associations, other private 
organizations, and public service drug hotlines in the larger 
cities are disseminating the drug abuse message.  

IV.  U.S. Policy Initiatives and Programs

Policy Initiatives.  Guatemala's major drug-control programs -- 
Operation Cadence, and aerial and manual suppression programs  -- 
rely upon USG technical assistance and funding, but their success 
depends on the GOG's political commitment and cooperation.  Other 
USG initiatives have included efforts to heighten public awareness 
of the drug problem.

Bilateral Cooperation.  In addition to other international 
operations noted previously, the joint military exercises, "King's 
Guard 92-II" in May and "King's Guard 93-I" in October on 
Guatemala's Pacific and Atlantic coasts, also focused on 
counternarcotics scenarios.

Asset Sharing.  In recognition of Guatemala's assistance in 
several drug trafficking investigations, during 1992 the USG 
transferred to the GOG more than $800,000 forfeited to the USG in 
those cases.

The Road Ahead.  The problem of local drug abuse is growing, 
despite increased public awareness of the threat.  Calls to the 
drug hotline and drug-related hospital emergency room cases 
indicate increasing abuse of amphetamines and barbiturates among 
the middle class.  Testimony from social workers indicates that 
substance abuse among street children remains high. 

Cocaine transshipment shows no signs of decline, and the Treasury 
Police in 1992 made its largest heroin seizure: 900 grams.  Money 
laundering is emerging as a significant drug-related activity in 
Guatemala.  In contrast to previous years when the U.S. and 
Guatemala concentrated on interdiction and eradication, Guatemalan 
security forces are now interested in more sophisticated 
investigating techniques--and expect continued USG support. 
[Chart - Guatemala 1993 Statistical Tables]
(###)

HONDURAS

I. Summary

Honduras is a transit route for cocaine destined for the U.S. and 
Europe.  Although the Honduran Air Force deters drug traffickers 
from using Honduran air space, transit by land and sea remains 
essentially unhindered.  Hondurans produce marijuana but do not 
grow or produce other illicit drugs.  Local cocaine consumption 
has increased markedly in recent years, perhaps as a result of 
traffickers paying their Honduran accomplices in kind.  The 
Government of Honduras (GOH) has paid increasing attention to the 
problem since 1989, adhering to the 1988 UN Convention as well as 
creating a National Antidrug Council.  Hondurans admit that 
widespread corruption is a serious impediment to drug control 
efforts.  U.S.- Honduran cooperation has been good; INM-funded 
programs have helped equip rapid reaction forces and established 
an information clearinghouse.

II. Status of Country

Andean cocaine transits Honduras by land and by sea, but Honduran 
Air Force radars and aircraft help to deter air shipments.  On 
three occasions (most recently in 1992), Honduran F-5 aircraft 
downed trafficking planes.  As Mexico and Guatemala intensify 
their anti-trafficking programs, traffickers may attempt to use 
Honduras as an alternate.  Despite increased GOH  efforts, 
however, some cocaine trafficking continues, and there is only 
minimal policing of Honduras' Bay Islands.  The GOH's difficulty 
in detecting land and sea shipments, the country's underpaid and 
undertrained police force, its weak judicial system, and 
widespread corruption undermine its narcotics control 
capabilities.  Although Honduras is not a money laundering center, 
some foreign investment in the service sector of the economy may 
be of illegal origin. 

III. Country Action Against Drugs in 1992

Policy Initiatives.  Honduras joined CICAD in 1992 and the 
Honduran armed forces adopted a new coordinated antidrug strategy.  
With U.S. support, the GOH is setting up a Joint Information 
Coordination Center (JICC) which should be operational in 1993.

Accomplishments.  The legislature initiated a reform of banking 
laws to hinder money laundering, and other legislation related to 
asset seizure has been introduced into the congress; its sponsor 
is confident that final approval by the congress will come 
shortly.  Legislation relating to money laundering and precursor 
chemicals is in the drafting process and its sponsor  expects it 
to be approved in 1993.  Honduras is also exploring the 
possibility of legislation to create a "common judicial area", 
permitting liberal admission of evidence obtained outside of 
Honduras for prosecuting drug offenses.  Honduras signed a customs 
agreement with the U.S. to enhance enforcement of customs laws.  
The GOH is a party to the 1988 UN Convention.  Honduras' strong 
deterrence of airborne trafficking and its intensified 
interdiction efforts demonstrate GOH commitment to the goals and  
objectives of the Convention.  Adoption and implementation of its 
money laundering and asset seizure legislation will be required 
for Honduras to achieve full compliance with those goals and 
objectives.

Honduras signed the regional antidrug agreement of Montelimar, 
Nicaragua, and hosted two of the corresponding follow-up meetings.  
Honduras also proposed the creation of the Central American 
Committee for Eliminating the Production, Traffic, Consumption and 
Illicit Use of Drugs and Psychotropic Substances (CCP); it is 
currently the seat of the CCP secretariat.

Law Enforcement Efforts.  Drug interdiction is a major priority 
for the police, working together with elements of the armed 
forces.  Honduras currently has 282 persons in prison for drug 
trafficking offenses.  During 1992, GOH authorities seized almost 
two mt of cocaine, including a small amount of crack, and 
destroyed 109,684 cannabis plants.  Authorities believe that 
cocaine seizures represent only a small portion of the total 
transiting Honduras.

Corruption.  The Honduran National Council on Narco-trafficking 
acknowledges that corruption is endemic, including in the judicial 
system.  The majority of Hondurans arrested on drug charges are 
released without serving substantial sentences.  Although official 
Honduran policy does not encourage or facilitate drug-related 
activity, it is widely believed that some prominent individuals 
are involved in drug trafficking.  A retired lieutenant colonel 
was arrested on drug charges in 1992.

Agreements and Treaties.  Annual updates to the U.S.-Honduras drug 
control agreement provide the basis for USG assistance.  Honduran 
is committed to the goals and objectives of this agreement.  
Honduras has an extradition treaty with the U.S. and bilateral 
agreements with Mexico, Colombia, and Venezuela. 

Cultivation and Production.  The only illegal cultivation is 
cannabis, almost exclusively for local consumption. 

Drug Flow/Transit.  Although trafficking aircraft avoid Honduras, 
there is evidence of substantial, but still unmeasured, maritime 
and land transit of cocaine.  Seizures have demonstrated 
considerable trafficker sophistication in concealing drugs in 
tractor trailers and truck frames.  We believe a significant 
amount of maritime trafficking involves the use of containers of 
seafood and other produce. 

Demand Reduction Programs.  Demand reduction activities are 
coordinated by the Honduras Institute for the Prevention of 
Alcoholism and Drug Abuse (IHADFA).  IHADFA works with the 
Ministries of Health and Education and the private sector in the 
production of multi-media public service announcements, and in the 
development of sports and cultural activities as alternatives to 
drug use.  IHADFA also works with the Ministries to stage seminars 
for teachers, journalists and parents on drug-related themes, and 
to disseminate antidrug materials. 

IV. U.S. Policy and Initiatives 

Policy Initiatives.  USG policy encourages intensified Honduran 
drug enforcement efforts, promotes efforts to combat narcotics-
related corruption, and urges the Hondurans to strengthen laws on 
asset seizure and money laundering, and pursue demand reduction 
programs. 

Bilateral Cooperation.  Accomplishments include progress in 
establishing the JICC; the creation of rapid reaction teams; 
greater coordination within the Honduran Government and armed 
forces, and in cooperating with the U.S. on cocaine seizures at 
border crossings (totalling nearly 1,000 kg); and draft 
legislation on asset seizure and money laundering.  In addition, 
the GOH and HOAF cooperated fully with the U.S. armed forces and 
other agencies in Operation "Support Sovereignty," a combined 
detection and monitoring exercise held in early 1992. 

The Road Ahead.  The GOH clearly understands the threat to its 
sovereignty posed by illicit trafficking and is taking  steps to 
intensify its efforts.  Institutions are weak, however; Honduras 
will require continued U.S. cooperation to stem the flow of 
illicit drugs. 
[Chart - Honduras 1993 Statistical Tables
(###)

MEXICO

I. Summary

Mexico continued its vigorous and comprehensive national campaign 
against the production, trafficking and abuse of illegal drugs, 
meeting the goals and objectives of the 1988 UN Convention.  In 
1992, the Government of Mexico (GOM) seized nearly 40 mt of 
cocaine and 97 kg of heroin and effectively eradicated 6,860 ha of 
opium poppy and 12,100 ha of cannabis.

Mexico is working with the U.S. to build a coordinated hemispheric 
response to the drug threat, as evident in President Salinas's 
participation in the February 1992 San Antonio Summit.  The GOM 
urges its neighbors to take greater responsibility for combatting 
trafficking in their countries.  In July, Mexico announced that it 
would set an example by assuming the remaining costs of 
counternarcotics programs previously supported by U.S. narcotics 
control funds.  USG support will instead concentrate on 
specialized training and technical assistance.  Mexico is a party 
to the 1988 UN Convention.

The USG and the GOM maintained close, effective counternarcotics 
cooperation in 1992, despite GOM indignation over what it viewed 
as violations of Mexican sovereignty and international law in the 
Alvarez Machain case.  These concerns led the GOM to revise the 
rules under which the DEA operates in Mexico.

Along with its successes, Mexico faces daunting obstacles.  
Corruption remains a deep-rooted and persistent threat to GOM 
antidrug programs, despite efforts by President Salinas to 
eliminate it.  Illicit drug-crop cultivation has spread to more 
remote areas, while South American cocaine traffickers have taken 
evasive measures to avoid detection.  Mexico's revitalized economy 
and unregulated money exchange houses make it an attractive venue 
for money laundering.  The GOM needs to enact money laundering 
legislation, which may be submitted to the Mexican Congress in 
April 1993.  Mexico also needs better chemical controls, although 
the size of its chemical industry makes monitoring of precursor 
and essential chemicals very difficult.

II.  Status of Country 

Mexico is both a major source country for heroin and marijuana and 
a transit country for South American cocaine destined for the U.S.  
It continues to play a critical role in efforts to control the 
flow of illicit drugs into the U.S.

Under the Salinas administration, Mexico has reduced opium poppy 
cultivation to the lowest level in nearly a decade.  The estimate 
for the amount of heroin potentially produced from Mexican opium 
gum has dropped from a high of seven mt in 1989 to about four mt 
in 1992.  Mexican heroin now accounts for about 23 percent of the 
U.S. market, down from over one-third in 1988.  Mexican marijuana, 
however, still constitutes the largest share of foreign-produced 
marijuana in the U.S. market.

The USG estimates that from 50 to 70 percent of the cocaine 
smuggled into the U.S. transits Mexico, entering Mexico from 
Colombia, primarily by private aircraft for transportation by land 
across the border.  GOM enforcement measures in 1992 disrupted air 
operations, forcing traffickers into alternate air, sea and land 
routes.

Drug abuse in Mexico has remained relatively low, although the GOM 
acknowledges that cocaine and heroin use is on the rise along the 
U.S./Mexico border, in major tourist areas, and in large 
universities.  The increasing number of street children in Mexico 
City using drugs, mostly inhalants, is another disturbing trend.

Mexico is used for illegal money laundering transactions.  The 
profusion of currency exchange houses along the U.S./Mexico 
border, as well as the lack of controls on large currency 
transactions, facilitates the laundering of profits from drug 
trafficking and other criminal activities.

Most precursor and essential chemicals for heroin production are 
purchased in Mexico.  Chemicals destined for cocaine laboratories 
in South America transit Mexican ports, but usually without 
passing Mexican Customs.  As a member of the CICAD and the IDEC, 
Mexico has committed itself to enact legislation governing the 
control, record-keeping and reporting requirements on precursor 
and essential chemicals.  Mexico is working on laws relating to 
chemical controls, but continues to address cases individually.

III.  Country Actions Against Drugs in 1992

Policy Initiatives.  President Salinas called on Mexico's 
governors to develop state programs to complement the national 
drug plan which addresses supply and demand reduction, as well as 
alternative economic development.  The GOM also began the process 
of criminalizing money laundering and drafting more stringent 
regulations, but has not yet completed the legislative package; 
the GOM plans to submit it to congress by mid-1993.

In March 1992, the former Attorney General, responding to concerns 
about human rights, created a citizens' advisory group to monitor 
enforcement activities.  As a result, the Office of the Attorney 
General (PGR) has taken steps to professionalize its officer corps 
by instituting a refresher training and random drug testing 
program.  The PGR is dismissing Federal agents who fail the drug 
test or who do not complete refresher training.

In June, President Salinas officially inaugurated the Mexican 
National Center for the Planning for the Control of Drugs 
(CENDRO).  Under the direction of the PGR, CENDRO is responsible 
for strategic planning, evaluation, operational coordination, and 
exchange of information among all GOM agencies with a 
counternarcotics role.  It includes representatives of 12 other 
agencies, among them the armed forces, the secretariats of 
Education, Communication, and Health, and the PGR.  CENDRO's 24-
hour operations center opened in October.

In August, the GOM confirmed its decision to assume financial 
support in 1993 for programs which previously received INM 
funding.  However, this policy of "Mexicanization" has not 
inhibited close bilateral cooperation with the USG.

Accomplishments.  Mexican authorities seized 38.8 mt of cocaine 
during 1992, a drop of about 10 mt from 1991.  GOM authorities 
also seized 97 kg of heroin, 170 kg of opium gum, and 405 mt of 
marijuana.  The air interdiction program netted a record 28.7 mt 
of cocaine, up 10 mt from 1991.  GOM personnel effectively 
eradicated 68 percent of the illicit opium poppy cultivation and 
42 percent of cannabis cultivation.

The PGR arrested several key traffickers, the most notorious of 
whom were Rafael and Eduardo Munoz Talavera, heads of the Juarez 
cartel, a group suspected of smuggling nearly 400 mt of cocaine to 
the U.S.  The PGR also arrested Javier Pardo Cardona, a major 
Colombian trafficker believed by U.S. officials to be a high-
ranking member of the Medellin cartel.  The GOM transferred Rafael 
Caro Quintero, Miguel Angel Felix Gallardo, Ernesto Carrillo 
Fonseca and other major traffickers from various prisons to the 
new federal maximum security facility at Almoloya de Juarez.

President Salinas participated in the San Antonio Summit in 
February, joining the work begun by the Andean nations and the 
U.S. at Cartagena in 1990; Mexico also participated actively in 
subsequent technical sessions.  Mexico hosted the UN Heads of 
National Law Enforcement Agencies conference in September.

Law Enforcement Efforts.  The PGR, through CENDRO, coordinates all 
GOM counternarcotics efforts.  The PGR has the lead role in 
interdiction, but also conducts aerial eradication of illicit 
crops.  The Mexican Army conducts extensive manual drug crop 
eradication, but it also supports law enforcement agencies in 
interdiction missions; the Air Force's ground-based radar system 
supports the Mexican air interdiction effort.  The Mexican Navy is 
responsible for maritime drug interdiction and eradication of drug 
crops in coastal areas.

The PGR's air interdiction program, the Northern Border Response 
Force (NBRF) or Operation "Halcon," seized 28.7 mt of cocaine, 
10.6 mt more than it seized in 1991, along with 17 aircraft, and 
62 vehicles.  NBRF teams arrested 96 suspected traffickers and 
killed seven during interdiction actions.  The GOM has worked to 
develop closer interdiction coordination with other countries in 
the hemisphere; NBRF information on air and maritime trafficking 
provided to other countries contributed to seizures of 55 mt of 
cocaine and 38 aircraft and the detention of 50 suspects, and 
another 13 killed.

The GOM reported that its combined eradication campaign destroyed 
11,583 ha (150,951 fields) of opium poppy and 16,872 ha (224,914 
fields) of cannabis.  The USG estimates the effective eradication 
rate--the total amount actually destroyed--at about 6,860 ha of 
opium poppy (68%) and 12,100 ha (42%) of cannabis.

In February, the GOM leased 12 UH-1H transport helicopters from 
the USG to support the mobile basing concept and increase safety 
and flexibility; this brought the UH-1H NBRF fleet to 21.  Through 
mobile forward bases, the GOM hopes to respond more quickly 
against suspect flights.  DEA and NAS advisers in Mexico worked 
closely with the PGR to enhance NBRF operations and the U.S. 
Customs Service provided advanced training to the pilots of the 
PGR's Citation II tracker aircraft.  The PGR began to require all 
of its pilots to sign a one-year contract of service following 
completion of their flight training in an effort to increase pilot 
retention.

Corruption.  Corruption in Mexico remains a persistent problem at 
many levels, although the Salinas administration has waged a 
concerted war on official corruption--particularly narcotics-
related--with some success.  Public officials convicted of drug-
related crimes often receive 25 to 40-year sentences with little 
chance of parole.  

Former Attorney General Ignacio Morales Lechuga made extensive 
personnel changes and restructured the PGR and Mexican Federal 
Judicial Police (MFJP) in an effort to improve respect for human 
rights, combat corruption, and enhance efficiency.  He conducted 
regional inspection tours as a deterrent to corruption.  He 
removed numerous PGR officials and MFJP agents throughout the 
country during 1992, and referred 270 for prosecution for alleged 
corruption, abuse of authority, human rights violations, and drug-
related crimes.  Mexico's new Attorney General, Jorge Carpizo, 
also has vowed to weed out corrupt PGR officials.  

The Ministry of Finance and Public Credit continues to pursue 
extensive reform efforts within the Mexican Customs 
Administration.  General procedural reforms are being instituted 
throughout Customs with special emphasis on reforming the Policia 
Fiscal (Customs Police).  Dismissals of personnel who do not meet  
integrity standards continue, despite the fact that the reform 
program is costly for the Ministry, and has created special 
difficulties for Customs in assuring adequate technical competency 
among the workforce.  

Agreements and Treaties.  Mexico has been a party to the 1988 UN 
Convention since 1990 and has taken steps to meet its goals and 
objectives; the pending money laundering legislation, if 
implemented, would bring it into full compliance.  

Mexico has signed counternarcotics cooperation agreements with 
some 18 countries.  It is currently negotiating an agreement with 
El Salvador.  As a member of CICAD and IDEC, Mexico has signed a 
number of international agreements, such as the Declaration of 
Ixtapa (1990), which commit signatories to enact money laundering 
and chemical control legislation and regulations. 

The U.S. and Mexico have a number of bilateral agreements to 
strengthen law enforcement cooperation, including the "Chiles 
Amendment Agreement" which entered into force in July 1990, and 
the mutual legal assistance treaty (MLAT), which entered into 
force in May 1991.  Other important agreements address tax 
information exchange (TIEA), extradition and prisoner exchange.

Cultivation and Production.  Opium cultivation (after eradication) 
in Mexico has dropped by 50 percent since 1989, from 6,600 ha to 
3,310 ha. The USG has detected some opium poppy cultivation in 
southwest Chihuahua, Morelos, northeast Sinaloa, Chiapas, Oaxaca, 
and Guerrero.  While the average yield of opium gum in Mexico is 
12 kg per hectare, conditions in Guerrero permit yields of 15 kg 
of gum per hectare.  There are also wide differences in yields of 
morphine base.  

Marijuana production increased in some areas in 1992 because of 
favorable growing conditions.  In Michoacan, for example, growers 
reportedly cut their prices in half because of a bumper crop and a 
shortage of buyers.  Overall cultivation, however, remained at 
about the same level as 1991 (but about 60 percent lower than 
1990).  The major cultivation areas were Sinaloa, Nayarit and 
Michoacan followed by Guanajuato, Sonora, Nuevo Leon, Jalisco, 
Oaxaca, Durango, and Veracruz.  In many areas, the crop has been 
difficult to detect because it is cultivated with corn or planted 
in small plots concealed by bushes and trees.  In Sonora, growers 
mixed fields of regular cannabis with the Afghanistan variety or 
mixed cannabis and opium poppy.  Cannabis yields vary widely; most 
areas yield 250 kg of marketable marijuana per hectare, but 
Michoacan and Guerrero fields yield as much 800 kg.

Longstanding GOM policy has been to eliminate illicit crops 
wherever found; the GOM made no crop estimates and set no 
destruction targets.  Under the Salinas administration, the 
military has expanded its eradication efforts and has initiated an 
aerial survey program.  The PGR has maintained a strong aerial 
spraying program, meeting demands of other law enforcement 
activities for limited air assets.  Over the past four years, the 
GOM crop control campaign has reduced theoretical potential heroin 
production by 40 percent and marijuana production by 75 percent.

Drug Flow/Transit.  The Mexican air interdiction program (NBRF) 
caused a shift in trafficking patterns in 1992.  The USG detected 
efforts by traffickers to evade Mexican forces through use of 
alternate delivery methods such as airdrops.  In 1992, there was a 
considerable increase in the number of airdrops to Mexico, 
representing a significant percentage of the total number of known 
air trafficking incursions into Mexico in 1991.  Airdrops over 
water were to vessels primarily near the Yucatan coast.  There 
were also numerous airdrops over land in southern Mexico.  By 
comparison, there were almost no airdrops to Mexico in 1991.  The 
increase in airdrops may be to reduce seizures of cocaine, as well 
as to lessen the risk to pilots and aircraft.  

In 1992, traffickers mainly used landing locations in southern 
Mexico.  Many flew west from Colombia before turning north to 
evade detection.   Suspected drug trafficking aircraft flew the 
eastern Pacific route at approximately twice the frequency of the 
western Caribbean route.  There also was an increase in air 
trafficking activity in Central America in 1992.  Generally, 
cocaine entering Central America via aircraft or maritime means is 
transferred to trucks for overland shipment north or flown to 
locations throughout Mexico for later transshipment to northern 
Mexico and across the U.S. border.  U.S. and Mexican authorities 
agree that the potential for traffickers to send more shipments 
via containerized and other maritime vessels and commercial 
aircraft is increasing.

Demand Reduction Programs.  President Salinas launched a national 
drug control program in January 1992, calling for the government 
and the public to work together to control drug abuse.  He said 
the antidrug fight must reach into the home, the workplace and the 
school, but without violating human and civil rights.  In 
February, Attorney General Morales announced that Mexico was fast 
becoming a drug consuming nation, despite having reduced drug 
production and transportation.  He cited economic hardships, rapid 
urbanization, and the collapse of the traditional family as 
primary causes of this growing threat.

Mexico now has compulsory drug education in schools, an extensive 
publicity campaign on prevention measures, and a program for 
assisting hospitalized drug addicts.  A growing number of 
government, voluntary, and community organizations are involved in 
drug prevention research, treatment and education programs, 
although many operate with minimal resources.

The Mexican National Council on Addictions (CONADIC) coordinates 
all GOM demand reduction activities.  It seeks to increase Mexican 
efforts to reduce drug consumption and develop its role as a 
regional leader in the demand reduction field.  CONADIC is also 
working to strengthen ties on the U.S./Mexican border by linking 
U.S. and Mexican counterparts in epidemiology and drug 
prevention/treatment.  The GOM began a drug-use survey in October, 
targeting known drug-use areas along the northern border.

In September, Mexico, the U.S. and Canada conducted a joint 
training seminar in Mexico City on school and community-based 
prevention programs for participants from four Central American 
countries and Mexico.  USIS sponsored drug awareness experts, 
academic specialist visits, and satellite teleconferences for 
information and educational programming for public and private 
prevention and treatment organizations. USAID sponsored an 
international teleconference on fraud and corruption in February 
that was well attended in Mexico by accountants from the private 
and public sectors.

IV.  U.S. Policy Initiatives and Programs 

Policy Initiatives.  The USG cooperates closely with the GOM to 
reduce the flow of illicit drugs from Mexico into the U.S.  
Specifically, USG policy supports GOM efforts to; (1) intensify 
interdiction operations, increase seizures, and disrupt major 
trafficking organizations; (2) improve the effectiveness of the 
crop control effort; (3) build an effective and efficient  field 
support infrastructure to support both crop control and 
enforcement activities; and (4) create a greater public awareness 
in Mexico of the negative effects of drug production and abuse on 
the health and welfare of society and on political stability.

Bilateral Cooperation.  The USG and GOM maintained close, 
effective counternarcotics cooperation in 1992, despite GOM 
indignation over what it viewed as violations of Mexican 
sovereignty and international law in the Alvarez Machain case.  
Because of these sovereignty concerns, however, the GOM revised 
the guidelines under which DEA activities may be conducted in 
Mexico.

While neither the U.S.-Mexico Binational Commission (BNC) nor the 
U.S./Mexico Mixed Permanent Commission Against Narcotics 
Trafficking and Drug Dependency (MPC) met in 1992, several other 
bilateral and multilateral law enforcement meetings were held, 
including discussions of regional cooperation, extradition, and 
counternarcotics programs.

Mexico and the U.S. are working to build a coordinated hemispheric 
response to the drug threat.  The GOM has urged its neighbors to 
take greater responsibility for combatting trafficking in their 
territories.  For its part, the GOM announced that under the 
concept of "Mexicanization" it would assume the costs of 
counternarcotics programs previously supported by USG funds.  
Future USG support will concentrate on specialized training and 
technical support.

Mexican and U.S. law enforcement agencies cooperated closely on a 
wide range of drug investigations and other criminal matters, 
including sharing intelligence on the activities of narcotics 
trafficking groups operating in Mexico and the U.S.  The MLAT, 
which entered into force in 1991, proved to be useful in these 
exchanges.  The PGR responded positively to most USG requests for 
investigative reports and court documents.  It also cooperated 
with the USG in apprehension, extradition and/or legal expulsion 
of U.S. citizen fugitives.

The USG continued to support the PGR in many of its 
counternarcotics initiatives, from information management to 
eradication enhancement.  It arranged technical support, training 
and other assistance to the PGR in establishing CENDRO.  A USG 
interagency team visited Mexico in early December to discuss ways 
to enhance information exchanges between CENDRO and USG agencies.  
PGR and USG personnel cooperated on technical programs to enhance 
crop control effectiveness.

The USG arranged for 20 PGR personnel to attend aviation 
maintenance training courses in the U.S. in 1992.  Other USG law 
enforcement training programs for GOM officials focused on air, 
land, and sea interdiction, money laundering investigative 
techniques, and customs procedures.  The Mexican Navy and the U.S. 
Coast Guard and Navy continued to conduct coincidental maritime 
counternarcotics operations in international waters in the Pacific 
and Gulf of Mexico.  

U.S. Customs has established a cooperative training project for 
the Customs Fiscal Police to assist their ongoing reform efforts.  
New Fiscal Police hires are receiving general inspections and 
narcotics enforcement training from  U.S. Customs  It is also 
assisting Mexican Customs in instructor training and the 
establishment of a central training facility and curriculum in 
Mexico City.  

USAID supported demand reduction activities by private-sector, 
community-based organizations in Mexico; projects focus on the 
northern border, certain resort areas, and Mexico City.  USAID 
initiated programs in Matamoros and Mexicali in 1992.  The U.S. 
Embassy and CONADIC agreed to cooperate in providing demand 
reduction training for Central American countries that 
participated in the September school-based prevention program 
sponsored by the U.S., Mexico, and Canada.  The Embassy also 
agreed to work with the Secretariat of Health on a drug abuse 
survey along Mexico's northern border.

The Road Ahead.  Despite GOM achievements in combatting drug 
trafficking and preventing drug abuse, traffickers continue to 
move drugs from and through Mexico into the U.S.; neither country 
has yet been able to stem this flow effectively.  South American 
cocaine traffickers have taken evasive measures to avoid 
detection.  Illicit drug crop cultivation has spread to new and 
more remote areas.  Mexico's revitalized economy and unregulated 
money exchange houses make it an attractive venue for money 
laundering.  Its extensive chemical industry will make control of 
precursors very difficult.  Finally, despite efforts by President 
Salinas to eliminate official corruption, it is a deep-rooted and 
persistent threat to his antidrug program.

Most important has been the Salinas administration's decision to 
make the drug issue a national security priority and to work 
closely with the USG to deal with it.  Both countries must 
continue to build on the confidence and cooperation developed in 
recent years, and engage other countries in the hemisphere in more 
effective narcotics control collaboration. 
[Chart - Mexico 1993 Statistical Tables
(###)
NICARAGUA

I.  Summary    While its drug control problems are still fairly 
modest, Nicaragua is vulnerable to greater inroads by traffickers, 
given the weakness of its counternarcotics forces and 
institutions.  The security apparatus has been drastically reduced 
since Violeta Chamorro's accession to office in 1990, and its top 
levels are staffed by individuals appointed by the Sandinista 
Liberation Front (FSLN).  Despite the Nicaraguan government's 
(GON) severe economic and political problems, it is aware that 
narcotics is a growing threat.  

II.  Status of Country 

The extent of Nicaragua's illicit drug problem is not fully known.  
Anecdotal evidence suggests significant cocaine consumption.  
There have been cases of narcotics transiting the country by sea, 
air and land; traffickers can also use the many small rural 
airstrips that remain from the civil war.  The GON's drug-control 
force consists of a small antinarcotics section within the 
National Police criminal investigation unit.  There is no evidence 
as yet of money laundering. 

III.  Country Actions Against Drugs in 1992 

Policy Initiatives.  The GON has created a part-time civilian 
coordinator for narcotics affairs in the Ministry of Government.  
The incumbent will head a narcotics commission once a new 
narcotics law is passed, but political problems have delayed its 
passage.  The law would bring Nicaragua into compliance with the 
1988 UN Convention, which it ratified in 1990.  In the meantime, 
the GON has taken some modest steps consistent with the goals and 
objectives of the Convention.

Accomplishments.  A new police organization law enacted in October 
authorized an antinarcotics unit in the National Police.  However, 
the unit will probably not be established until early 1993. 

Law Enforcement Efforts.  Besides the police, the armed forces, 
which control airport security, may be involved in some 
counternarcotics work.  The small naval force on the Atlantic 
coast has captured a few modest shipments of cocaine.

Corruption.  Feuding political factions brand one another as 
traffickers, but in 1992 there were no known arrests, 
prosecutions, or convictions of senior government officials for 
narcotics trafficking.  However, it is widely believed that 
corruption is a major problem.

Agreements and Treaties.  As noted, Nicaragua is a party to the 
1988 UN Convention but has not fully implemented it.  In addition 
to a bilateral agreement with the U.S., the GON signed narcotics 
accords with Mexico and Colombia in 1992.  It also signed a 
regional convention with the other Central American countries and 
hosted the meeting of the Central American Permanent Commission on 
Narcotics in November. 

Cultivation and Production.  The only known illicit cultivation in 
Nicaragua is of small plots of cannabis for domestic consumption.

Drug Flow/Transit.  Seizures indicate that drugs move regularly 
along the Pan American highway and the Atlantic coast; they 
probably transit the Pacific coast ports as well.  A suspected 
primary route is from the Colombian island of San Andres through 
Nicaragua's Corn Island to the port of Bluefields and up the coast 
to Honduras or out of the country through Managua.

Demand Reduction Programs.  The departments of Health, Education, 
Sports and Social Security have initiated small demand reduction 
programs. 

IV.  U.S. Policy Initiatives and Programs   

Policy Initiatives.  The U.S. is committed to assisting the GON 
adopt legislation comply with the 1988 UN Convention.  The U.S. is 
also encouraging efforts to create a professional antinarcotics 
enforcement unit.

Bilateral Cooperation.  Although the U.S. Embassy signed narcotics 
agreements with the Foreign Ministry in 1991 and 1992 to provide 
funds for training an anti-narcotics enforcement unit, the GON has 
not yet created the unit, nor have funds been disbursed.  INM 
helped defray the costs of GON attendance at a demand reduction 
conference in Mexico City and the hosting of the Central American 
Permanent Commission on narcotics crimes.  It also financed a U.S. 
Customs Service seminar in March. 

The Road Ahead.  Passage by the GON of a new narcotics law and the 
establishment of the antinarcotics enforcement unit remain the 
main narcotics control objectives.  Cooperation with the DEA and 
other USG agencies should increase as the GON antinarcotics effort 
is strengthened.  
(###)

PANAMA

I.  Summary

The Government of Panama (GOP) showed progress in counternarcotics 
efforts during 1992, although a continued and expanded commitment 
will be required to counter the large-scale drug problem in that 
country.  Panama remains a major narcotics money laundering and 
illicit drug transshipment nation; there is no evidence that 
either of these problems diminished during 1992.  However, the GOP 
did cooperate closely with the USG and other governments in 
counternarcotics efforts and enhanced the capabilities of its 
counternarcotics forces.  On July 15, GOP officials seized 5.2 mt 
of cocaine in the Colon Free Zone (CFZ), the largest cocaine 
seizure ever in Central America and the Caribbean.  Cocaine 
seizures increased in 1992.  The GOP also cooperated on the 
extradition of several alleged Colombian traffickers to the U.S. 
and took the initiative in implementing nationwide demand 
reduction programs.  In general, the Panamanian government 
continues to support U.S. counternarcotics policy objectives; 
however, charges of corruption against senior government officials 
disrupted law enforcement and the development of effective 
counternarcotics institutions.  Also, despite some indications of 
an intent to attack money laundering, launderers continued to 
evade GOP law enforcement.

II.  Status of Country 

Panama is a financial and commercial entrepot whose strategic 
location makes it an ideal conduit for the transshipment of drugs, 
especially cocaine, from the Andean region to the U.S. and Europe.  
Furthermore, its dollar economy, the presence of the CFZ, and 
uneven controls on cash and commodity imports/exports make Panama 
particularly attractive for the laundering of drug profits.  A 
discovery near the Colombian border in early 1993 of a coca 
plantation estimated by DEA to be about 90-120 ha in size 
indicates that there was some Panamanian production of illicit 
drugs in 1992.

III.  Country Actions against Drugs in 1992

Policy Initiatives.  Continued policy and budgetary support for 
counternarcotics measures in 1992 reflected a general recognition 
among policy makers in the Endara administration that narcotics 
are a significant threat to the fabric of Panamanian society and 
to its fledgling democratic institutions.  Law 23 of 1986 
addresses many of the goals and objectives of the 1988 UN 
Convention; it criminalizes a broad range of narcotics trafficking 
and money laundering activities and provides for the seizure and 
forfeiture of trafficker assets.  However, implementation has 
shown the law to be fraught with inconsistencies.  For example, it 
is more effective for the initial seizure of a suspect bank 
account than for subsequent legal action leading to forfeiture of 
the account.  A redrafted version, with tighter enforcement 
provisions, is still under review.

Accomplishments.  Cocaine seizures increased measurably during 
1992, to include the one 5.3 mt seizure and another 900 kg in two 
other seizures.  There were generally improved performances by 
most key counternarcotics agencies.  Panamanian authorities also 
seized significant amounts of cash used in illicit narcotics 
transactions, as well as records detailing international money 
laundering activities.  However, U.S. Postal Inspectors have 
discovered that $180 million of U.S. postal money orders, 
purchased in New York in a structured pattern typical of drug 
money launderers, were cashed by CFZ merchants during 1992.

The GOP extradited persons sought on narcotics trafficking charges 
to the U.S. for the first time in 1992, and continued to freeze 
bank accounts of suspected narcotics money launderers.  The 
Supreme Court also ruled that the frozen accounts must remain 
frozen until a judicial determination is rendered.  However, 
claiming he was bound by obligations in Law 23, Attorney General 
Cruz released some of the previously frozen accounts which are 
allegedly traceable to Medellin and Cali cartel leaders.  
Following a four-month investigation of criminal charges against 
the Attorney General, the independent Solicitor General suspended 
him (and the Drug Secretary) from office in December and 
instituted a full investigation aimed at resolving suits filed by 
various Panamanians against Cruz.

Panama inaugurated its Joint Information Coordination Center 
(JICC) in 1992 designed to coordinate, disseminate and encourage 
collection of intelligence data in support of narcotics 
operations.  On the international front, Panama responded 
positively to a Mexican request by arresting a Panamanian 
businessman accused of shipping over 1,500 kg of cocaine to 
Mexico. 

Law Enforcement Efforts.  Panamanian law enforcement institutions 
have improved their performance unevenly in the post-Noriega era.  
GOP actions included expanding the Narcotics Section of the 
Judicial Technical Police (PTJ) from 42 to 64 officers and opening 
a new PTJ academy, whose new inductees are better trained than 
their predecessors.  It is a time-consuming process involving the 
phasing out or retraining of less effective holdovers and 
replacing them with new recruits.  Panamanian Customs also hosted 
a U.S. Customs survey of Panamanian operations, which will provide 
the basis for a new INM assistance project in 1993.  INM provided 
a supplemental $400,000 allocation for Panama at the end of FY92 
for this purpose.

Corruption.  There have been many allegations, but no confirmed 
reports, of narcotics-related corruption involving high-level GOP 
officials.  Nevertheless, following a lengthy investigation, the 
Solicitor General ruled that there was sufficient evidence to 
suspend both the Attorney General and Drug Secretary following 
claims that the former illegally released bank accounts of 
suspected narcotics traffickers.  Similar charges against the Drug 
Secretary later were dismissed, although he remains on leave.  The 
Solicitor General recommended to the Supreme Court in February 
1993, however, that the Attorney General be tried on four criminal 
charges, including extortion, embezzlement, abuse of authority, 
and mishandling  public documents.  During much of 1992 mutual 
accusations of wrongdoing by the Attorney General and the Customs 
Director created an atmosphere of mutual suspicion between their 
bureaucracies and some divisions within the PTJ.  This situation 
eased considerably with the suspension and, at least, temporary 
removal of the Attorney General.  Counternarcotics institutions 
appear to have become refocused on more pressing issues.

Agreements and Treaties.  The GOP signed and ratified a mutual 
legal assistance treaty (MLAT) with the U.S. in 1991.  The treaty 
is awaiting U.S. Senate action.  Panama also signed the 1988 UN 
Convention in 1991, but has not yet presented it to the National 
Assembly for ratification.  The GOP has linked its submission to 
U.S. ratification of the MLAT.  Expecting that the MLAT will come 
into force, the Panamanians have set up a mechanism for processing 
requests for exchange of evidence.

Panamanian official policy discourages drug trafficking and money 
laundering.  The seizures in 1992 of illegal drugs and of cash, as 
well as the establishment of the JICC and provisions of Law 23, 
indicate that Panama is taking steps toward meeting the goals and 
objectives of the 1988 UN Convention.  However, evidence of 
continued money laundering indicates that considerably more needs 
to be done to control this problem.

Cultivation and Production.  There is no appreciable cultivation 
of coca or opium poppy in Panama, nor production of derivative 
narcotics.  A 90-120 ha coca plantation, however, and coca-leaf 
maceration pits found in the remote Darien region near the 
Colombian border were detected early 1993.  Small amounts of 
cannabis are grown for local consumption.

Drug Flow/Transit.  Panama is a major transshipment point for the 
flow of narcotics, especially cocaine from the Andean region, to 
the U.S. and Europe.  Seizures have risen this year, indicating 
that either the drug flow has increased or that GOP enforcement 
efforts have improved or perhaps both.  Most of the large seizures 
occurred in the CFZ, illustrating that area's leading role in drug 
transshipment.  These seizures have created concern within the CFZ 
and the GOP over the extent to which traffickers have manipulated 
Zone facilities.  During the past year, law enforcement 
authorities seized eight kg of heroin that was possibly produced 
in Colombia.

Demand Reduction Programs.  Public awareness of the dangers of 
drug abuse is high and is reinforced by an escalating addiction 
problem at all levels of society.  Unlike other drug transit or 
producer countries, illicit narcotics are not viewed essentially 
as a U.S. problem, but as a local threat as well.  The 1992 U.S. 
trial of Manuel Noriega further heightened public disapproval of 
the drug trade.

Several governmental and private agencies are involved in demand 
reduction efforts, led by the National Drug Prevention and 
Rehabilitation Committee (CONAPRED), the Ministries of Health and 
Education, and Cruz Blanca.

IV. U.S. Policy Initiatives and Programs

Policy Initiatives.  U.S. policy seeks to assist the GOP to 
improve the performance of its counternarcotics institutions 
through the provision of materiel, information, and training.  
This effort is aimed at disrupting the flow of illicit drugs and 
drug funds moving through Panama.  USG agencies seek to achieve 
this goal by targeting trafficking organizations and their 
affiliates operating in Panama, and by encouraging revision of 
Panamanian laws and regulations to counter trafficking and money 
laundering.

Bilateral Cooperation.  USG and Panamanian law enforcement 
agencies conducted joint investigations, shared information, and 
collaborated to interdict illegal narcotics shipments, such as the 
record 5.3 mt seizure in the CFZ.  The GOP also has cooperated in 
the extradition of certain individuals wanted on drug-trafficking 
charges in the U.S. and has provided some assistance to U.S. money 
laundering investigations and prosecutions.  

The GOP has accepted U.S. assistance to upgrade the efficiency of 
Panamanian narcotics law enforcement agencies.  Over 950 police 
officers were trained through U.S.-sponsored courses, both in 
Panama and in the U.S. Banking Commission officials attended a 
U.S.-funded financial controls seminar, and an Administration of 
Justice program was implemented to improve Panamanian judicial 
procedures and performance.  Maritime Service members received 
training on the operation of 11 boats supplied by the USG during 
1992 for counternarcotics purposes and receive advice regularly 
from the U.S. Coast Guard.

The U.S. and Panama have bilateral agreements on the control of 
chemicals, ship boarding, and maritime operations.  The latter 
allows U.S. Coast Guard vessels to train and operate jointly with 
Panama's National Maritime Service.  The PTJ has cooperated fully 
in providing information on companies suspected of transporting 
essential and precursor chemicals through Panama for illicit 
purposes.  The GOP extradited three Colombian nationals to the 
U.S. in accordance with the terms of the 1904 bilateral 
extradition treaty, the 1961 UN Single Convention as amended by 
its 1972 Protocol, and Panamanian law.  Other U.S. extradition 
requests resulted in the extradition of one person and departure 
of two others in early 1993.

The USG and Panama are negotiating a memorandum of understanding 
which would permit the continued operation of a Caribbean Basin 
Radar Net station in Panama after the year 2000.  It would enable 
the USG to share data and provide the GOP with an opportunity to 
assume a greater role in regional narcotics efforts. 

The Road Ahead.  Panama can correctly point to higher seizure 
statistics and involvement in joint counternarcotics ventures as 
evidence of its political will and cooperation.  But Panama is 
traditionally a banking haven and has benefitted from attracting a 
high volume of deposits from around the region--hundreds of 
millions of dollars of which are almost certainly narcotics 
related.  The investigations of the Attorney General and Drug 
Secretary for violating the spirit of money laundering laws might 
be a point of departure.  The ultimate handling of those cases, 
and follow-through on joint U.S./Panamanian initiatives, will 
indicate clearly the direction the GOP is headed in attacking 
money laundering. 
[Chart - Panama 1993 Statistical Tables

THE CARIBBEAN

THE BAHAMAS

I.  Summary

The Bahamas is an important transit country for Colombian cocaine 
as well as Jamaican marijuana destined for the U.S.  In 1992 the 
Government of the Commonwealth of The Bahamas (GCOB) continued to 
combat this traffic, a daunting task in a 700-island archipelago.  
Although Bahamian and combined U.S.-Bahamian drug enforcement 
initiatives over the past ten years have reduced the volume of 
drugs transiting the country, The Bahamas continues to be an 
important drug transit country.  The government that assumed power 
in August 1992 announced its commitment to maintain and enhance 
its counternarcotics cooperation with the U.S.  The Bahamas was 
the first country to ratify the 1988 UN Convention.  In past years 
the GCOB has created or strengthened laws and agreements relating 
to sentencing of traffickers, drug asset forfeiture, and mutual 
legal assistance.  The Bahamas instituted tight controls on 
precursor and essential chemicals in 1992.  The GCOB amended its 
laws for the confiscation of laundered assets and upgraded the 
reporting requirements for corporations, but this area needs 
careful scrutiny or The Bahamas could become more of a target 
country for drug money launderers.  

II.  Status of Country

The Bahamas obviously is vulnerable to drug trafficking.  At its 
closest point it is only 40 miles from south Florida, with 
hundreds of small, deserted islands to store drugs temporarily.  
Drug-laden vessels have a wide choice of waterways through which 
to move their cargoes.  Trafficker aircraft blend in with the many 
legitimate aircraft moving throughout the islands to the U.S. 
mainland.  The Bahamas is attractive to foreign investment, but is 
also vulnerable to money launderers, because of its nearly 400 
banking and trust institutions, 50,000 registered offshore 
companies, a stable government and currency, bank secrecy 
regulations, legalization of bearer shares, good communication 
lines, and proximity to the U.S.  It has instituted banking 
controls on would-be launderers, provided they are also personally 
involved in offenses, but needs to apply similar controls to other 
areas of the financial sector and make money laundering a crime 
per se.

III.  Country Action Against Drugs in 1992

Policy Initiatives.  The Bahamas has progressively instituted laws 
and programs to meet the objectives of the 1988 UN Convention to 
control drug trafficking and related illegal activity.  In past 
years the GCOB strengthened its narcotics control laws , while 
carrying out an extensive cooperative effort with the U.S. in drug 
transit control.  The GCOB places a high value on demand 
reduction, incorporating anti-drug education programs into school 
curricula through the National Drug Council.

Law Enforcement Efforts.  For over ten years, the Royal Bahamas 
Police and Defence Forces have conducted combined air and sea 
patrols with their U.S. counterparts against drug trafficking.  
Together with the U.S., the Bahamas has built three 
counternarcotics air bases dedicated solely to supporting drug 
control operations.

The GCOB has authorized, supported, and encouraged installation of 
detection and monitoring equipment. Currently, there is a fixed 
aerial detection base (aerostat) on Great Exuma Island, and a 
mobile ground-based radar on Great Inagua.  Construction of an 
aerostat balloon installation on Great Inagua and repair of one 
out of commission on Grand Bahama have been approved by the GCOB 
but are under review by the USG.  The GCOB fulfills its 
obligations under its bilateral agreement with the USG and its 
trilateral agreement with the USG and the UK (representing the 
Turks and Caicos Islands), both covering combined counternarcotics 
operations.  

The Bahamas has a 100-person drug enforcement unit.  Some 1,000 
persons are arrested each year on drug charges.  To deal with a 
backlog of court cases, the new Ingraham government plans to 
establish five additional magistrate courts, six supreme courts 
(courts of appeal), and a court of preliminary inquiry by mid-
1993.  Climaxing a seven-year legal struggle, in 1992 the GCOB 
extradited Bahamian lawyer Nigel Bowe to the U.S. to answer drug 
charges.

The major GCOB focus is on reducing the volume of drugs transiting 
The Bahamas and arresting the traffickers.  Drug seizures in 1991 
and 1992 were slightly higher than 1990, indicating a possible 
upswing in trafficking, or greater enforcement effectiveness.  No 
single explanation accounts for the increase, since trafficking 
and law enforcement patterns throughout the hemisphere affect drug 
movements through The Bahamas.  Although drugs now transit The 
Bahamas at a significantly lower rate than during the 1980s, at 
least as suggested by a reduction in quantities seized, The 
Bahamas remains an attractive conduit for traffickers.

Money laundering is considered a crime under the Tracing and 
Forfeiture of Proceeds of Drug Trafficking Act, but to date, 
sanctions remain untested in court for lack of investigations 
specifically targeting money laundering.  Bahamian money 
laundering laws contain no "due diligence" or "bankers negligence" 
clauses, making individual bankers responsible if their 
institutions launder money.  Instead, the GCOB, when faced with 
questionable activity, negotiates closure of the financial 
institution, as occurred once in 1991.  Under Bahamian law, the 
assets of a convicted drug offender are subject to forfeiture.  
The GCOB believes its asset forfeiture law is effective, although 
the lengthy appeals process can delay forfeiture.  In 1992, the 
police took steps to encourage closer coordination of drug and 
asset forfeiture investigations.

Corruption.  We have no evidence that senior officials of the GCOB 
engage in drug trafficking or related criminal activity, nor does 
government policy support or facilitate such activity.  The GCOB 
actively investigates corruption allegations.  In 1992, three 
police officers were arrested on charges relating to a planned 
break-in of the police evidence vault where confiscated drugs are 
stored.

Agreements and Treaties.  The bilateral mutual legal assistance 
treaty (MLAT) facilitates exchange of information, including on 
money laundering, and the USG has received such information 
through this mechanism.  Legislation to implement a new 
extradition treaty with the U.S. signed  in 1990 is presently 
before the cabinet.  After the cabinet gives approval, the House 
of Assembly and Senate will have to approve the implementing 
legislation before the treaty's instruments of ratification can be 
exchanged between both governments.  The multilateral Caribbean 
Zone Customs Mutual Assistance Agreement provides for information 
sharing concerning enforcement of Customs laws, including those 
related to the suppression of trafficking in narcotics and 
psychotropic substances.  

The GCOB's law enforcement, legislative and judicial actions 
against trafficking, and its demand reduction efforts, meet the 
goals and objectives of the 1988 UN Convention.  Further measures 
against money laundering may be required to combat the newer, more 
sophisticated money laundering techniques.  

Demand Reduction Programs.  These programs are fully established 
in the major cities of Nassau and Freeport, and are being extended 
to some of The Bahamas' out islands.  The National Drug Council 
has committed resources to establish drug education programs on 
three islands in 1993.

IV. U.S. Policy Initiatives and Programs.  

The USG is committed to efforts to intercept drugs in The Bahamas 
before they reach the U.S.  The USG has provided equipment and 
intelligence to support both our combined efforts as well as 
unilateral GCOB enforcement initiatives.  Over the past five 
years, the GCOB's own investigative actions have steadily 
increased.  The Joint Information Coordination Center, which began 
to compare data with the El Paso Intelligence Center in April is 
queried extensively by the Bahamian Police in support of 
unilateral investigations.  The GCOB has agreed that U.S law 
enforcement operations in the vicinity of The Bahamas will not be 
affected when The Bahamas becomes an archipelagic state 
(legislation is pending).  

The Road Ahead.  The Bahamas' location ensures that it will remain 
vulnerable to drug trafficking.  Although the USG recognizes that 
its support will be needed for some time, it aims at greater 
involvement of Bahamians in all aspects of narcotics control.  In 
1993, the USG will support a program of judicial enhancement to 
improve the efficiency with which the court system handles drug-
related cases.  Another 1993 initiative will be to continue 
discussing measures to enhance GCOB controls on money laundering

[Chart - The Bahamas 1993 Statistical Tables]
(###)

CUBA

I.  Summary 

There is some evidence that Cuba plays a role in the illicit drug 
trade, given its strategic location astride drug routes into the 
United States.  The Government of Cuba (GOC) continues to give a 
high profile to its stated anti-drug policies, some of which have 
been backed by action.  Cuba cooperated with drug enforcement 
authorities of other countries in 1992, including a limited 
exchange of law enforcement information with the United States.  
Shortages of fuel and spare parts due to Cuba's deepening economic 
crisis limited its ability to interdict drugs.  While there are 
persistent rumors that senior level Cuban officials are involved 
in drug trafficking, the USG does not have sufficient information 
to make a firm judgment on their validity.

II.  Status of Country 

The GOC claims that Cuba is neither a producer nor a consumer of 
illicit drugs.  There is little evidence, beyond an occasional 
arrest report for possession or cultivation of small amounts of 
illicit drugs, to refute these claims.  The GOC maintains that the 
primary drug users are foreign tourists, but it does not appear to 
take strong actions against tourist drug use.

International traffickers frequently transit Cuban airspace and 
territorial waters to avoid USG law enforcement aircraft and 
patrol craft operating in the Caribbean.  Smuggling primarily 
involves cocaine or marijuana, but its extent is difficult to 
gauge.  The GOC does not publish comprehensive data on suspected 
trafficking or its own drug control activities.  The only official 
announcements of seizures involve relatively small quantities of 
drugs.

III.  Country Actions Against Drugs in 1992 

Policy Initiatives.  Cuba claims to be implementing a strict 
policy of combating drug trafficking transiting passing through 
its airspace and territorial waters.  Drug-related arrests and 
drug seizures in Cuba remain very low, but the GOC states that it 
seeks to expand counternarcotics cooperation with other countries.  
It also has pursued informal information-sharing arrangements with 
the USG.

Accomplishments.  Members of two major Cuban drug smuggling groups 
were convicted of trafficking in cocaine and marijuana, most of 
which allegedly had washed ashore, as well as for cultivating 
cannabis.  The 37 defendants were sentenced to prison terms of up 
to 11 years.  Twelve traffickers from three other groups were 
arrested by the Cuban Border Guard during 1992.  Seven defendants 
from two of the groups received prison sentences ranging up to 17 
years.  The five defendants from the third group (four U.S. 
resident aliens and one U.S. citizen) were sentenced in January 
1993 to terms of 7 to 20 years.

According to Cuban officials, between October 1991 and August 1992 
(the only time period given), authorities seized 313 kg of cocaine 
and 404 kg of marijuana, as well as 724 kg of cocaine and 1,280 kg 
of marijuana washed ashore.

Cuba participated in the establishment of the Latin American 
Inter-Parliamentary Group for the Prevention of Drug Abuse in 
Ecuador in February.   In April, it formed with Venezuela a Joint 
Commission on Drug Trafficking and Abuse.  Cuba sponsored an 
international conference on "Drugs in Latin America and the 
Caribbean" in July attended by ten countries.  The UK and France 
provided drug detection assistance to the GOC as part of their 
narcotics enforcement programs for the Caribbean.

Law Enforcement Efforts.  Article 190 of the penal code provides 
for prison terms of three to eight years for illicit drug 
production or trafficking.  Simple possession is punishable by 
sentences of six months to three years, increasing to seven to 15 
years in cases involving large amounts of drugs.  Private land 
used to cultivate cannabis or other illicit crops is subject to 
confiscation.

Three of the five U.S. citizens known to be serving time in Cuban 
prisons at the end of 1992 were allegedly involved with drug 
smuggling.  Other Cuban-American dual nationals may also be 
imprisoned, but Cuba does not recognize dual nationality, and does 
not normally inform the USG of arrests of Cubans who are 
naturalized U.S. citizens.  According to GOC officials, over half 
of the smugglers arrested are Cuban nationals, resident in the 
U.S.

Antidrug law enforcement is coordinated by the National Commission 
on Drugs, an interagency body nominally under the Ministry of 
Justice.  It also includes representatives of the ministries of 
Interior, Foreign Affairs, and Public Health, as well as Customs 
and the Border Guards.  The actual lead agency is the Interior 
Ministry's Narcotics Department.

Corruption. The highly-publicized trial and execution of senior 
military and Interior Ministry officials on drug smuggling charges 
in 1989 confirmed that some high-level government officials were 
engaged in assisting traffickers to smuggle drugs into the U.S.  A 
number of exiles and defectors assert that officials continue to 
engage in trafficking, a charge the GOC vigorously denies.

Agreements and Treaties.  Cuba is a signatory to the 1961 UN 
Single Convention on Narcotic Drugs, the 1971 Convention on 
Psychotropic Substances (with reservation), and the 1988 UN 
Convention.  In addition, it has signed narcotics cooperation 
agreements with Mexico, Venezuela, and Colombia, and is 
negotiating agreements with other countries in the hemisphere.  
The USG has insufficient information to determine if, or to what 
degree, the GOC has met the goals and objectives of the UN 
Convention.

IV.  U.S. Policy Initiatives and Programs 

The U.S. Coast Guard and Federal Aviation Administration routinely 
provide to the Border Guard and the Havana Air Traffic Control 
Center nonsensitive, real-time information on suspicious aircraft 
and vessels in or near Cuban airspace or waters.  These exchanges 
are normally made by telex, occurring once or twice a month in 
1992.  Other law enforcement information exchanges occur on an 
individual basis.
(###)

DOMINICAN REPUBLIC

I.  Summary

The Dominican Republic is a transit route for cocaine and 
marijuana destined for the U.S.  Traffickers also use the country 
for storage, and as a base of operations.  The level of 
trafficking activities did not change significantly during 1992, 
despite Dominican interdiction and enforcement efforts.  There is 
a low incidence of domestic illicit drug use.  In 1992 the 
Government of the Dominican Republic (GODR) established a Legal 
Advisory Commission to oversee legislative changes prior to 
ratification of the 1988 UN Convention.  Cooperation between the 
U.S. and the Dominican Republic remained close and productive.  
Corruption continues to be a problem impeding more effective 
action against drug trafficking.  

II.  Status of Country

Use of the Dominican Republic by Colombian trafficking 
organizations continues to be the primary narcotics-related 
concern.  The country's location between Colombia and the U.S., 
its proximity to Puerto Rico, its long coastline with a very 
limited naval presence, numerous uncontrolled landing sites, and 
low wages for police and security forces make it a target for 
well-financed trafficking organizations.  Dominican trafficking 
organizations with links to criminal elements in New York City's 
large Dominican population play a role in the country's illegal 
narcotics trade.

The National Drug Control Directorate (DNCD) and the National Drug 
Council (CND), both created in 1988, coordinate and implement 
effective enforcement and prevention programs.  Money laundering 
is not yet regulated, but there is no evidence that large amounts 
of narcotics-related funds are laundered in the country.  Small 
cannabis plots are periodically discovered and destroyed.

III.  Country Actions Against Drugs in 1992

Policy Initiatives.  The GODR remains strongly opposed to drug 
trafficking.  The CND created a Legal Advisory Commission in July 
which is studying model OAS legislation, provisions from the 1988 
UN Convention, and laws from other countries in preparation for 
amending the 1988 Drug and Substance Control Law.

Accomplishments.  The GODR had numerous successes in its narcotics 
law enforcement activities.  For example, the DNCD was responsible 
for 4,748 narcotics-related arrests; 1,714 suspects were indicted, 
including 94 foreigners.  In addition, the DNCD seized 2.36 mt of 
cocaine, 6.45 mt of marijuana, $186,298 in currency, 202 weapons, 
211 vehicles, 197 motorcycles, and eight vessels.

The DNCD's 1992 budget was increased significantly, with a 
personnel increase from 700 two years ago to about 915.  The DNCD 
began construction of a new office and the CND moved into a new 
office building during the year.  The CND also expanded its staff.

The CND assumed its mandate to coordinate all drug use prevention 
programs in the country, and established its Court Watch program 
to combat corruption in the judiciary.  This will also increase 
the number and amount of trafficker assets confiscated by the 
courts, and will increase the resources available for prevention 
and treatment programs.

Law Enforcement Efforts.  The DNCD is successful in seizing multi-
hundred kg loads of cocaine in coordination with USG agencies.  
Numerous DNCD operations resulted in arrests and indictments of 
traffickers, dealers, and users.

The Dominican Air Force continues to cooperate in enforcement 
activities, but played a limited role in 1992 because of the lack 
of night-flying capability.  Most air trafficking now occurs at 
night.  The Navy became much more engaged in counternarcotics 
activities when a new Chief of Staff was appointed; he was the key 
player in two significant maritime seizures.  The Dominican legal 
system is somewhat effective and imposes stringent sentences cases 
involving small amounts of drugs, but is less effective against 
major traffickers.  Cases often take years to try, resulting in a 
large prison population of accused traffickers awaiting trial.

A USG inter-agency task force on money laundering found no 
evidence that traffickers are using the Dominican Republic to 
launder significant amounts of funds.  The DNCD established a 
financial investigations unit in 1991 and its agents worked and 
trained with DEA and the U.S. Customs Service.  Precursor and 
essential chemical imports are minor and closely controlled by the 
DNCD under provisions in the 1988 law.

Corruption.  The GODR does not encourage or facilitate the 
production or distribution of illicit drugs.  Although allegations 
of involvement of government officials are common, no senior 
government official has been indicted for corruption.  There have 
been cases of narcotics involvement by lower-level retired and 
active military and police personnel.  It is not known to what 
extent narcotics-related corruption exists in the judicial system, 
but the CND's Court Watch is intended to identify and reduce such 
corruption.  The GODR should strengthen its legal and enforcement 
mechanisms to prevent and punish public corruption.

Agreements and Treaties.  The GODR is a party to the 1961 Single 
Convention on Narcotic Drugs and the 1971 Convention on 
Psychotropic Substances, but has not signed the 1972 Protocol or 
the 1988 UN Convention.  Senior government officials are currently 
studying these two instruments and the OAS Inter-American 
Convention on Mutual Assistance in Criminal Matters (1992) and 
preparing recommendations for submission to the President and 
Senate.  The CND Legal Advisory Commission is tasked with 
preparing implementing legislation on money laundering, asset 
seizure, and chemical controls.  The GODR is working toward 
submitting the new legislation to Congress and ratifying the 1988 
UN Convention, as well as the 1972 Protocol.  These initiatives, 
as well as the country's enforcement activities, demonstrate that 
the GODR, though not currently meeting all of the goals and 
objectives of the 1988 Convention, is taking positive steps in 
that direction.

A 1909 extradition treaty is in force between the USG and the 
GODR, but it does not cover narcotics-related offenses.  GODR 
ratification of the 1988 Convention or the 1972 Protocol to the 
1961 Convention would remedy this problem.  Under either 
agreement, listed narcotics offenses are automatically 
incorporated into existing bilateral extradition treaties.  
Extradition of Dominican citizens is prohibited by Public Law 489.

The multilateral Caribbean Zone Customs Mutual Assistance 
Agreement provides for information sharing concerning enforcement 
of Customs laws, including those related to the suppression of 
trafficking in narcotics and psychotropic substances.  

The USG attaches great importance to the GODR's ratifying 
international conventions and adopting money laundering and assets 
seizure legislation, not only because these measures will help 
control drug trafficking through the Dominican Republic but also 
because they will help deal with the problems of Dominican 
immigrants who traffic drugs in the U.S.  These protective 
measures, when adopted, will limit the benefits to Dominican 
immigrants in remitting drug proceeds back to the Dominican 
Republic and fleeing there to escape U.S. justice.  

The Demand Reduction Programs.  A 1992 USAID-funded drug use 
survey found a low incidence of domestic illicit drug use and 
provided valuable information for national drug use prevention and 
public awareness campaigns that will reach those most at risk.  
Both civic and governmental agencies are active in drug prevention 
and treatment, but additional resources and programs are needed.

The DNCD Academy and CND conducted numerous prevention workshops 
and seminars throughout the country.  The CND continues to sponsor 
the Juvenile Prevention Council which holds prevention seminars 
twice a month for volunteer youth leaders.  An OAS prevention 
project is developing school curriculum and training materials for 
the next school year.  A UNDCP project with the DNCD continues to 
be active with prevention projects and a television media 
campaign.

IV.  U.S. Policy Initiatives and Programs

Policy Initiatives.  The U.S. supports GODR efforts to curb the 
transit of drugs and to enhance institutions that are essential 
for the long-term success of this campaign.  We are strongly 
encouraging the GODR to ratify key multilateral conventions that 
would permit extradition of drug offenders and to pass legislation 
to implement the provisions in the 1988 UN Convention.  In 
addition, we are seeking new ways to assist the GODR to improve 
its judicial system.

Bilateral Cooperation.  The GODR routinely permits USG pursuit of 
suspect aircraft and ships into Dominican airspace and territorial 
waters with prior notification.  Two U.S. radar facilities operate 
in the Dominican Republic, one of which provides on-line data to 
the DNCD.  U.S. military assistance has been directed toward 
training and maintaining air and naval assets which are critical 
for narcotics interdiction activities.

Amendments in 1992 to a bilateral letter of agreement (LOA) on 
international narcotics control outline joint support of GODR 
projects, including the Joint Information Coordinating Center, 
DNCD communications, canine and maritime/container units, the DNCD 
Academy, support for military interdiction, CND drug use 
prevention, Court Watch, and legislative reform projects.  The 
DNCD Academy, with USG financial and technical assistance, 
conducted a range of law enforcement training in 1992, and several 
DNCD officials received training in the U.S.  The USG also funded 
vehicles, computers and police equipment to enhance the DNCD's 
effectiveness and the GODR's ability to achieve UN Convention 
goals and objectives.  The GODR cooperates fully with the USG 
under the terms of the LOA.

The 1989 bilateral tax information exchange agreement is available 
to facilitate money laundering investigations, but has not yet 
been used.  Informal discussions with Dominican authorities have 
indicated receptiveness to a shiprider agreement.

The Road Ahead.  The USG will continue to support existing DNCD 
and CND projects and the Dominican military to improve their 
capabilities.  Training will receive the highest priority.  GODR 
ratification of the three key UN conventions and adoption of money 
laundering and assets seizure legislation will continue to be 
major U.S. objectives.  In furtherance of the CND Court Watch 
program, the USG will continue to seek ways to promote judicial 
reform. 

[Chart - Dominican Republic 1993 Statistical Tables]
(###)

GUYANA

I. Status of Country

Guyana's heavily forested and sparsely populated interior, with  
numerous small, remote airfields, provides ready access to 
traffickers shipping cocaine from Venezuela, Brazil and Suriname 
through Guyana to the Caribbean and the U.S.  Officials expect the 
volume transiting Guyana to increase as interdiction efforts in 
the Caribbean increase.  An undetermined amount of cannabis grows 
year-round, especially along waterways.  The Police Service has a 
31-person counternarcotics unit.  The Guyana Defence Force (GDF), 
which conducts joint operations with the police, has one 
helicopter to locate and destroy cannabis.  The airport has five 
drug detection dogs, three donated by the USG.

II. Country Actions Against Drugs

Guyana is a party to the 1961 Single Convention on Narcotic Drugs 
(but not its 1972 Protocol), and the 1971 Convention on 
Psychotropic Substances.  The Government of Guyana (GOG) stated 
its intention to ratify the 1988 UN Convention in 1993 after it 
adopts appropriate implementing legislation.  The GOG's actions to 
combat marijuana production and cocaine trafficking are consistent 
with the goals and objectives of the convention.

In 1992, the police and the GDF seized at the airport 41 kg of 
cocaine (compared to seven kg in 1991) and 93 kg of marijuana. 
They also destroyed 39.5 ha of cannabis.  Statistics are 
unavailable for the amount of cannabis and marijuana cultivated, 
harvested, consumed or exported, or the quantity of cocaine 
consumed domestically or transiting to foreign markets.

The police are active against persons involved with illicit drugs, 
and in 1992 charged 380 persons with possession of marijuana and 
64 with cocaine offenses.  There was no indication of high-level 
drug corruption, though an airport dog handler suspected of 
routing luggage containing marijuana around his dog was dismissed 
from the police.

 III.  U.S. Policy Initiatives and Programs

The USG provides training and equipment to the police and GDF to 
improve their ability to intercept cocaine transiting the country 
and to locate and destroy locally grown cannabis.  In 1992 this 
included enforcement and communications equipment, a small boat, 
and engines.  Four other boats donated by the USG patrol the 
country's waterways.

Officials of the newly installed government showed active interest 
in the October visit of a USG-sponsored expert on money 
laundering.  The police have no evidence, however, of any money 
laundering attempts in Guyana.  The USG's extradition treaty with 
Guyana, a continuation of the pre-independence U.S.-UK treaty, is 
used infrequently.  The U.S. has no pending requests for drug 
offenders.
(###)

 HAITI

I. Summary

Colombian trafficking organizations use Haiti as a base of 
operations and a transit point for cocaine en route to the U.S.  
The de facto Government of Haiti has not effectively attacked the 
problem.  The USG does not have an accurate assessment of the 
amount of cocaine transiting Haiti.  President Aristide's ouster 
in the 1991 coup d'etat halted close bilateral narcotics control 
cooperation with Haiti, except in certain areas of law 
enforcement.  Corruption of Haitian officials continues to be a 
major problem.  Haiti is not a party to the 1988 UN Convention.

 II. Status of Country

Colombian trafficking organizations use Haiti to store and 
transship cocaine.  The country's location between Colombia and 
the U.S., coupled with a long, unpatrolled coastline, a 
mountainous interior, and numerous uncontrolled airstrips, make it 
an ideal site for trafficking.  Inadequate enforcement and 
interdiction, and the susceptibility of poorly paid Haitian 
officials to corruption, also make Haiti desirable to traffickers.  
There are reports that drug activity has grown since the coup, 
with increases in both surface and air shipments of cocaine.  
Marijuana is also shipped through Haiti, but to a lesser extent 
than cocaine.

The current de facto government has undertaken some drug 
enforcement efforts, and ,made a number of cocaine seizures in the 
two to 60 kg range in 1992.  However, the larger loads from 
Colombia probably enter Haiti unimpeded.  The extent of money 
laundering is unknown.  The lack of currency regulations or money 
laundering laws, together with an open parallel currency exchange 
system, make Haiti vulnerable.

The Haitian legal system is ineffective in controlling illicit 
drug activity.  Although Haiti's narcotics control laws are 
relatively strong, implementation is weak and law enforcement and 
military resources are inadequate.  The weak judicial system has 
brought few traffickers to justice, even when arrests have been 
made.  Defendants are routinely released on technicalities within 
days of arrest and almost never go to trial.

III.  Country Action against Drugs 

Policy Initiatives.  There were no significant changes in the de 
facto government's international narcotics control policy during 
1992; political issues overshadowed narcotics concerns for those 
in power.

Accomplishments.  Control of illicit drug trafficking continues to 
be well beyond the capacity of the Haitian security forces.  The 
National Narcotics Bureau (NNB) directs law enforcement activities 
and reports to the Chief of Staff of the Haitian Armed Forces.  
The Center for Information and Coordination (CIC) is responsible 
for collecting, analyzing and disseminating information and 
intelligence on narcotics enforcement and interdiction  
activities.  Despite continued efforts under the de facto regime, 
the NNB and CIC have not had a substantial impact.  The Haitian 
Air Force and Navy were unable to engage in effective narcotics 
law enforcement activities in 1992.

Corruption.  It is not the de facto government's policy to 
encourage or facilitate the production or distribution of illicit 
narcotics, and no senior official has been directly linked to 
narcotics trafficking.  However, we continue to receive credible 
reports indicating involvement of government and military 
personnel in narcotics trafficking.  These reports indicate that 
narcotics-related corruption may have intensified since Aristide's 
overthrow.

In February 1992, the army command announced that any member found 
to be involved with narcotics trafficking would be expelled from 
the military and turned over to public authorities for 
prosecution.  Subsequently, several low-ranking officers and a 
number of enlisted personnel were expelled, but the civilian 
judicial system declined to prosecute.  If the de facto government 
intends to prevent and punish public corruption, it is clear that 
it must do so in the judiciary first.  Enhancement of law 
enforcement capabilities and legislative reforms will accomplish 
little until the prosecutors and courts are able to bring 
traffickers to justice.

Agreements and Treaties.  Haiti is a party to the 1961 Single 
Convention on Narcotic Drugs and its 1972 Protocol.  It has not 
signed the 1988 UN Convention, nor has it taken significant 
actions that would achieve the goals and objectives stated in the 
Convention.

A 1905 extradition treaty is in force between the U.S. and Haiti 
but does not obligate the parties to extradite their own 
nationals.  (Haiti's constitution forbids extradition of its 
citizens.)  Haiti has cooperated with USG officials in the past by 
deporting American and third-country national fugitives to the 
U.S., although no one was deported to the U.S. in 1992.  We would 
not expect to negotiate a mutual legal assistance treaty  or an 
amendment to the extradition treaty with the de facto government.

Demand Reduction Programs.  A 1991 USAID-funded study provided 
data for designing national drug use prevention and public 
awareness campaigns.  The nongovernmental Association for the 
Prevention of Alcoholism and Other Chemical Dependencies, with 
assistance from USAID, supports a variety of drug use prevention 
activities.  Additional programs and resources are needed to 
achieve significant results.

 IV.  U.S. Policy Initiatives and Programs

Policy Initiatives.  USG efforts to strengthen Haitian 
capabilities and institutions have been suspended until a 
satisfactory political solution to the current crisis is reached.

Bilateral Cooperation.  The de facto government cooperates, at the 
sub-ministerial level, with USG law enforcement agencies in 
narcotics investigations.  The U.S. Coast Guard continues pursuit 
of suspect aircraft and ships in and over Haitian territorial 
waters with the permission of the Haitian Embassy in Washington.  
A USAID-funded administration of justice project designed to 
strengthen the judicial system, promote human rights, and foster 
development of professionalism in the legal system, was in the 
design phase when it was suspended after the coup.

The Road Ahead.  When the USG is able to resume narcotics 
assistance, support could be provided for training, equipment and 
other support to advance a range of law enforcement and prevention 
projects.  The USG will also encourage the GOH to enact needed 
legislation, ratify key treaties, and address such vital issues as 
judicial reform and narcotics-related corruption.  USAID has plans 
to redesign its administration of justice project in FY 1993, if 
possible.  
(###)

JAMAICA 

I.  Summary

Jamaica is well situated for the transit of South American cocaine 
to the U.S.  It is also a marijuana-producing country.  In 1992, 
Jamaican counternarcotics agencies worked with DEA to target, 
arrest, and prosecute traffickers.  A U.S. National Guard 
temporary radar station, established in southwestern Jamaica in 
August 1991 to monitor suspect aircraft, has increased the 
country's detection capability.  The Jamaican Joint Information 
Coordination Center (JICC) increased its output of useful 
information, including identifications of trafficking aircraft, 
vessels, and individuals, by almost a quarter over 1991.  
Preliminary estimates indicate that cannabis cultivation decreased 
by a third.  Although crop destruction declined three percent, 
harvestable cultivation in 1992 was less than half that of 1991.  
Private sector organizations continued their narcotics education 
and awareness programs.  Jamaica is not a financial center nor an 
important money laundering site.  It has not ratified the 1988 UN 
Convention, but acts in accord with many of its provisions.  
Corruption continues to be a problem impeding the effectiveness of 
narcotics control efforts in Jamaica, although efforts to control 
it proceed.

II.  Status of Country

Jamaica is a transit point for South American cocaine in route to 
the U.S.  It is also a traditional source of marijuana destined 
for markets in the U.S., Canada, and Europe.  Jamaica's long 
coastline and thinly stretched security forces provide favorable 
conditions for drug traffickers.  Air traffickers take advantage 
of Jamaica's proximity to the U.S., the island's unsecured 
airstrips, and, to some extent, illegally-diverted aviation fuel, 
to move cocaine and locally produced marijuana to the U.S.  The 
island's many ports, harbors, and beaches provide loading sites 
for marijuana.  Couriers attempting to smuggle marijuana or 
cocaine on their bodies or in their luggage aboard commercial 
flights at Jamaica's two international airports are arrested 
daily.  Traffickers also hide marijuana, and sometimes cocaine, in 
containerized cargo shipments of legitimate exports.  In October, 
authorities broke up a Nigerian heroin trafficking organization 
that had been transiting Jamaica for several years.

III. Country Actions Against Drugs in 1992

Policy Initiatives.  Jamaica hosted the Caribbean Financial Action 
Task Force ministerial conference on money laundering in November.  
The Prime Minister opened the conference, pointing out that 
illegal drugs are a threat to national sovereignty and territorial 
integrity.  He urged greater cooperation among Caribbean nations 
and island dependencies.  He also called for more cooperation in 
intelligence gathering and analysis to combat corruption of 
financial institutions and public officials, and reaffirmed his 
government's intention to enact asset seizure legislation.  During 
the annual national drug awareness week, the Prime Minister 
reiterated his government's commitment to a vigorous 
counternarcotics program.  He said he had instructed his officials 
to cooperate actively with the USG and other governments.

Accomplishments.  In implementing the 1988 U.S.-Jamaican bilateral 
narcotics control agreement, the GOJ in 1992 achieved particular 
success in controlling cannabis cultivation.  It strengthened its 
efforts to intercept drug shipments, and carried out an ongoing 
demand reduction program.  Jamaica is meeting its obligations 
under this agreement.

The U.S. National Guard temporary radar station, established in 
southwestern Jamaica in November 1991 to monitor suspect aircraft, 
is linked with other regional surveillance systems to oversee 
Jamaican and adjacent airspace.  The radar increases the country's 
detection capability.  We are presently negotiating with the GOJ 
to incorporate Jamaica's permanent radar at Mt. Denham into the 
Caribbean Basin Radar Network (CBRN).  If an agreement is reached 
in 1993, the Mt. Denham radar will further increase the USG and 
GOJ ability to monitor and track suspected drug aircraft.  

The Jamaica JICC, established in 1990, collects intelligence on 
air and cruise ship passengers arrested while attempting to 
smuggle drugs through Jamaica's seaports and airports, and on 
suspect aircraft, fishing vessels, and pleasure craft.  This 
information goes to the police, military, and other relevant 
agencies for appropriate action.  After a slow start, in 1992, the 
JICC increased its output of useful information.  It identified 
581 individuals, boats, and planes as having some kind of 
narcotics association and alerted Jamaican and U.S. authorities 
for possible interception.  This was a 33 percent increase over 
1991.

Law Enforcement Efforts.  DEA has good working relations with the 
Jamaica Constabulary Force (JCF) Narcotics Division.  Their 
collaboration resulted in arrests in 1992 of 66 traffickers (of 
those, 32 were major class I and II violators by DEA criteria) as 
well as substantial cocaine seizures.

In 1992, Jamaican forces seized 490 kg of cocaine, 709 pieces of 
crack, 2.18 kg of heroin, 35 mt of dried marijuana, and 165 kg of 
hashish oil.  Under Operation Buccaneer, Jamaica's annual 
marijuana control campaign, local forces destroyed 811 ha of 
cannabis and 378,760 cannabis seedling plants.

The GOJ's Contraband Enforcement Team (CET) and the Port Security 
Corps (PSC) were key players in numerous drug interceptions at air 
and sea ports, seizing more than 5.9 mt of marijuana, and 27 kg of 
cocaine.  The USG funded an enforcement training course for the 
PSC and equipment for the CET.  As a member of Interpol, Jamaica 
shares criminal information internationally.

Corruption.  Although Jamaica has laws and regulations against 
bribery and other forms of corruption connected with drug 
trafficking, and takes some actions to enforce them, but low 
salaries make security force personnel engaged in counternarcotics 
activities particularly vulnerable.  To date, there have been no 
known instances of complicity or integrity violations in jointly 
conducted DEA/JCF narcotics division investigations.

Although the government does not always have the political will to 
deal decisively with corruption in the JCF, it does deal with all 
publicized cases of corruption by officials, albeit sometimes 
indirectly.  For example, an assistant superintendent, who headed 
the crime-fighting division of four parishes, was charged with 
accepting bribes and providing security for a major marijuana 
trafficking and distribution organization.  A magistrate ruled 
that the GOJ had failed to substantiate the charges, despite DEA 
and JCF narcotics division testimony, and the assistant 
superintendent was later reinstated to his former position.  
Criticism appeared in the media against DEA for "railroading" the 
police official.  In early 1993, the officer was quietly demoted 
and transferred from the North Coast to Kingston, the presiding 
judge was transferred to another parish, and the prosecutor in the 
case resigned his position.  

With the exception of this case, no other senior GOJ officials 
have been officially charged with engaging in production or 
distribution of drugs, or of laundering drug proceeds.

Agreements and Treaties.  The GOJ and the USG signed a bilateral 
narcotics agreement in 1988, which is amended annually.  A new 
USG/GOJ extradition treaty entered into force in 1991, replacing 
an earlier U.S.-UK treaty.  In 1989 the GOJ signed the 1988 UN 
Convention and a mutual legal assistance treaty (MLAT) with the 
U.S. but has yet to ratify them.  It is a party to the 1961 Single 
Convention on Narcotic Drugs and its 1972 Protocol, and the 1971 
Convention on Psychotropic Substances.

The U.S. ratified the MLAT in October.  The GOJ has drafted 
legislation required for implementation, and expects to ratify the 
MLAT in 1993.  In 1992 the GOJ also produced a second draft of 
legislation to toughen its asset seizure/money laundering laws.  
Under existing law, only assets actually employed in the 
commission of drug-related crimes may be seized.  The new draft 
would extend seizure to assets acquired with the proceeds of drug-
related crimes.

This draft legislation, and Jamaican enforcement activity 
generally, indicate that Jamaica is attempting to meet many of the 
goals and objectives of the 1988 Convention, even though it has 
not yet ratified the Convention.  Efforts are still needed, 
however, to curb corruption, strengthen enforcement efforts 
against major traffickers, and accelerate the legislative process.  
It will also be important to maintain vigilance on illicit crop 
control.

Cultivation and Production.  Cannabis is cultivated year-round and 
island-wide in Jamaica.  Traditionally, it has been harvested in 
two main seasons of five to six-month cycles.  Due to successful 
crop destruction campaigns since 1986, large-scale cultivation 
(one to eight ha plots) has practically ceased.  Most cannabis is 
now grown in plots of a half-hectare or less, and the focus of 
planting has moved from the more accessible wetlands of western 
and central Jamaica to remote sites in the mountains of eastern 
Jamaica.  Jamaicans grow the higher-priced sinsemilla and indica 
varieties of cannabis.  To counter government eradication, growers 
have largely discontinued the traditional practice of drying the 
harvested crop in huts adjacent to their plots.  They now 
generally remove all cut cannabis from their fields and take it in 
small amounts to several different locations for drying and 
packaging.

Based on aerial surveys throughout 1992, preliminary crop 
estimates indicate that 1,200 ha of cannabis were cultivated, 811  
were destroyed. The yield of the harvested remainder of 389 ha 
amounts to 263 mt, on the basis of .675 mt per ha.

Drug Flow/Transit.  In 1992 Jamaican forces seized 490 kg of 
cocaine, of which 412 kg was part of a DEA controlled-delivery 
operation, compared to 60 kg seized during 1991.  Jamaica broke up 
a Nigerian heroin-trafficking organization in 1992, seizing over 2 
kg of heroin and arresting six traffickers.  It was the first 
heroin seizure in Jamaica since 1982, when two kg were seized in a 
DEA undercover operation.

Demand Reduction.  The Jamaican National Council on Drug Abuse 
(NCDA), the GOJ agency charged with demand reduction in Jamaica, 
continued its public education and community empowerment programs.  
Through its Integrated Demand Reduction Program (IDER), begun in 
1991, the NCDA encourages society as a whole to attack drug abuse.  
The program is supported by a 1991 Swiss grant through the UNDCP 
of $1.1 million over three years.  The NCDA has not yet developed 
an information system to monitor the indicators of drug use.  
Although USAID no longer supports IDER, USG support, including 
USAID support, for private-sector-based programs and research will 
continue through other mechanisms.  

IV.  U.S. Policy Initiatives and Programs

Policy Initiatives.  The USG will continue to support GOJ 
enforcement efforts to stem the flow of drugs through Jamaica as 
well as the GOJ's marijuana control program to reduce the quantity 
of cannabis under cultivation for export to the U.S.  Finally, the 
USG, through public education and awareness programs, seeks to 
increase the public's attention to the threat that drug abuse 
poses to their country, and to reinforce the skills of health 
providers and counselors in the private sector in drug abuse 
prevention.

Bilateral Cooperation.  GOJ law enforcement and security 
personnel, in close cooperation with DEA, stepped up enforcement 
efforts at Jamaica's air and seaports.  In addition to other 
activities noted above,  U.S. Army Black Hawk helicopters and six 
DEA agents supported Jamaican military and police crop control 
activity in January and February 1992.

The Road Ahead.  The USG will continue to encourage cocaine 
trafficking enforcement, dismantling of cocaine smuggling 
networks, and enhancement of the GOJ's capability and willingness 
to counter cocaine trafficking.  Support will also continue for 
GOJ cannabis control efforts.  The public diplomacy and demand 
reduction program will support a variety of non-government 
organizations in their efforts to enhance private sector 
institutional capabilities and build political support for more 
aggressive GOJ counternarcotics efforts.  The USG will continue to 
urge Jamaican ratification of the MLAT and the 1988 UN Convention 
as well as passage of assets seizure and money laundering laws.  
The USG also will encourage support for laws against the diversion 
of aviation fuel to trafficking aircraft, and laws to hold 
landowners criminally liable for illegal airstrips on their 
property.  However, given the slow legislative process, we do not 
expect the latter to be enacted in 1993.

The GOJ will continue its enforcement activities in 1993, 
especially to control drug smuggling out of the country's two 
international airports and its seaports, and to reduce its role as 
a transit country for South American cocaine.  The GOJ will 
continue to upgrade its port security corps through increased 
training.   
[Chart - Jamaica 1993 Statistical Tables)
(###)

NETHERLANDS ANTILLES AND ARUBA

I.  Summary

Aruba, Curacao and the Dutch half of St. Maarten are increasingly 
important in cocaine trafficking from Suriname, Venezuela, and 
Colombia to the U.S. and Western Europe.  Aruba, and especially 
St. Maarten, are also sites of money laundering.  (The Netherlands 
Antilles, comprising the Dutch Caribbean islands, except Aruba, 
and Aruba separately, enjoy autonomous rule as members of the 
Kingdom of the Netherlands.)  The Government of the Netherlands 
Antilles (GONA) has pledged its commitment to combat drug 
trafficking and abuse; an investigation underway by its Attorney 
General could lead to numerous arrests.  Both the GONA and the 
Government of Aruba (GOA) actively participate in counternarcotics 
training programs.  A recent asset sharing and forfeiture 
agreement between the U.S. and the Netherlands applies to the 
Netherlands Antilles and Aruba.  

II. Status of Country

Curacao and the Dutch half of St. Maarten, and Aruba are important 
links in the cocaine trafficking pipeline to Western Europe 
through the Netherlands.  Drugs often arrive at the islands by 
small boat and at Curacao occasionally by plane at remote 
airstrips.  Large shipments leave by ship; smaller amounts are 
carried by commercial airline passengers.  The USG estimates that 
the volume is increasing.  There is no significant drug production 
on any of these islands.

St. Maarten's money laundering takes place among resorts, casinos 
and air and sea travel facilities, and reportedly has spread to 
other islands in the Netherlands Antilles, and to St. Kitts and 
the British Virgin Islands.

III. Country Actions Against Drugs in 1992

Policy Initiatives.  The Attorney General in Curacao has been 
investigating a vast network of corruption and criminal activity 
throughout the islands.  He works closely with his counterpart in 
Aruba because the network has led to that island as well; he has 
kept U.S. law enforcement agencies well informed about his 
investigation.  His efforts could lead to numerous arrests, and to 
imposition of harsher sentences as provided by recent legislative 
amendments.  The GONA and GOA both participate in regional 
meetings, such as the mini-Dublin Group.

Law Enforcement Efforts.  In late 1992, a joint operation by Dutch 
and Curacao police resulted in the arrest of three suspects in 
Curacao and three in the Netherlands, and the seizure of 50 kg of 
cocaine in the Netherlands and nine kg in Curacao. 

Corruption.  There are reports of serious corruption in the law 
enforcement system.  The Attorney General's investigation is 
focusing on corruption, as well as on other criminal acts.

Agreements and Treaties.  In November, the U.S. and the 
Netherlands signed an asset sharing and forfeiture agreement that 
applies to the Netherlands Antilles and Aruba.  The Netherlands 
has signed, but has not yet ratified, the 1988 UN Convention.  
When the Netherlands becomes a party to the Convention, it is 
expected that the Convention will be applicable to the Netherlands 
Antilles and Aruba.  Both governments endeavor to meet many of the 
goals and objectives of the Convention in international 
counternarcotics cooperation, training programs, demand reduction 
efforts, and the Attorney General's new emphasis.  On the other 
hand, anti-trafficking enforcement needs to be intensified, and 
money laundering activity, especially on Aruba and St. Maarten, is 
incompatible with the convention.  The Dutch Government is in the 
process of taking over the administration of St. Maarten, which 
should improve the money laundering situation.  The multilateral 
Caribbean Zone Customs Mutual Assistance Agreement provides for 
information sharing concerning enforcement of Customs laws, 
including those related to the suppression of trafficking in 
narcotics and psychotropic substances.  

Demand Reduction Programs.  Substance abuse has increased in 
Curacao, as well as on the smaller Netherlands Antilles islands of 
Bonaire, St. Eustatius and Saba.  This can be attributed to the 
availability of small amounts of narcotics, which may be payments 
in kind to transshippers, and which are sold openly to tourists 
and residents in downtown Willemstad, Curacao's capital.  The GONA 
takes a strong stand on combatting drug trafficking and abuse, and 
along with the GOA, has long-term drug prevention programs and 
information campaigns.

V.  U.S. Policy Initiatives and Programs

Bilateral Cooperation.  The GONA and GOA participate in U.S.- and 
Dutch-sponsored training programs for law enforcement officials.  
Two Aruban Customs agents recently participated in canine 
enforcement training in the U.S.  Curacao already has a canine 
enforcement program and is training its own handlers.  Another 
Aruban official participated in a recent Caribbean regional money 
laundering seminar, and U.S. Customs conducted a money laundering 
seminar for officials in Curacao and Aruba.  Curacao sent two 
participants to Caracas to participate in a USIA-sponsored seminar 
on prevention.

There is close military cooperation between the Netherlands forces 
in Aruba and Curacao, and the U.S. Navy and Coast Guard whose 
ships are involved in enforcement efforts.  By agreement between 
the U.S. and the Netherlands, 115 ships involved in 
counternarcotics operations are cleared on short notice for 
arrival at Aruba, Curacao, and St. Maarten.

The Road Ahead.  Both the GONA and the GOA are interested in U.S. 
assistance.  They are close to the source of cocaine, and they 
lack the experience and resources to deal with well-organized 
trafficking groups.  The USG will work with them to overcome these 
deficiencies.
(###)

SURINAME

I.  Summary

Suriname is a drug transit country for cocaine from processing 
areas in South America to Europe, primarily to the Netherlands.  
Precursor and essential chemicals destined for South American 
processing facilities may also pass through Suriname.  There is 
little apparent narcotics traffic through Suriname to the U.S.  
Corruption is widespread.  Traffickers reportedly enjoy the 
protection of the country's powerful military establishment.  The 
civilian government installed in 1991 has begun to strengthen 
narcotics laws, increase law enforcement capabilities, and foster 
cooperation with other governments against narcotics trafficking, 
but as yet with few practical results.  However, it did ratify the 
1988 UN Convention in October.

II.  Status of Country

Suriname's proximity to narcotics production areas, porous 
borders, remote airstrips, unprotected coastline, navigable 
rivers, and uninhabited interior make it attractive to 
traffickers.  Moreover, its well-established trade and 
transportation links with the Netherlands, and the 200,000 
Surinamese living there, provide ready easy access to European 
drug markets.  An insurgency that had rendered large areas of the 
interior off-limits to the police and other authorities ended in 
August with the signing of a peace accord, but efforts to 
reestablish a government presence there have proceeded slowly.  
Large areas of the country remain outside effective police 
control.  The former insurgent groups, some of which have links to 
the military and are suspected of involvement in the drug trade, 
are still a major force in the interior of the country.

Suriname's judicial system, law enforcement apparatus, and customs 
inspection regime are all ineffective in counternarcotics activity 
and highly corrupt.  Its weak currency and small financial market 
are not very attractive to money launderers.  However, under the 
previous militarily-installed regime, there were allegations that 
the Central Bank assisted foreign banks and corporations to evade 
normal reporting requirements.

III.  Country Action against Drugs

Accomplishments.  In September, the Government of Suriname (GOS) 
concluded an agreement with the U.S. for cooperation in drug 
control activities.  It commits the GOS to prepare a comprehensive 
drug for its drug control activities, and increase the size of its 
Police Narcotics Brigade and give it better facilities and 
equipment.  The USG is to provide equipment and training to the 
police and other narcotics control authorities.  The GOS's 
intention to strengthen its drug control efforts did not bear much 
fruit in 1992, however.  As the year ended, its cooperative 
activities with the USG were still in the organizational stage.  
Talks also were continuing with the Dutch Government about drug 
cooperation.

Law Enforcement.  The Military Police perform the immigration 
control function at Suriname's borders and airports.  Cooperation 
with the civilian police is minimal.  Suriname's Police Narcotics 
Brigade has not yet overcome the intimidating effects of the still 
unsolved 1990 murder of a respected police inspector who was 
investigating several drug cases, and of a 1991 fire that 
destroyed the Brigade's offices and files.  Improved cooperation 
between the police and customs is needed.  Narcotics enforcement 
efforts continue to be hampered by the perception that the 
prosecution of suspects beyond the lowest level of the drug trade 
is unlikely due to bribery and corruption.  Despite these 
impediments, Suriname has a cadre of committed police and other 
officials who continue their narcotics control efforts.

Corruption.  Suriname's government has not been able to prevent 
and punish drug-related corruption.  There are credible reports 
that senior members of the Surinamese military are involved in the 
drug trade, or at least provide protection for it.  In addition, 
drug-related corruption is reported to extend to elements of the 
police and Customs Service and to state-owned companies, as well 
as to the private sector.  It is stated GOS policy to eliminate 
illicit production and distribution of drugs.  However, extensive 
corruption makes that unlikely.

Agreements and Treaties.  Suriname concluded an antidrug agreement 
with the U.S. on September 15, and ratified the 1988 UN Convention 
on October 28.  The U.S. Ambassador and the Surinamese Minister of 
Justice and Police meet monthly to review progress in implementing 
the bilateral agreement.

Given the problems facing the government's counternarcotics 
efforts, it will not be easy for the government to meet the 
convention's goals and objectives, although activities described 
in this report demonstrate the intention to do so.  A Dutch expert 
is advising the GOS on bringing the existing opium law into 
conformity with the convention.  The 1904 U.S.-Netherlands 
Extradition Treaty is still in effect between the U.S. and 
Suriname.

Cultivation/Production.  Cannabis is cultivated in the eastern, 
southeastern and south central areas of the country, which are 
largely jungle and sparsely inhabited.

Drug Flow/Transit.  Surinamese police believe drug transshipment 
by sea and air to Europe, mainly the Netherlands, continues 
undiminished.  There were fewer drug seizures in 1992, both in 
Suriname and in the Netherlands, of drugs traced to Suriname.  
Through the first ten months of the year, the Dutch seized 89 kg 
of cocaine coming from Suriname.

Demand Reduction Programs.  The GOS conducts occasional public 
education campaigns warning of the dangers of drug abuse.  
Officials believe, however, that drug use in Suriname is confined 
largely to marijuana and is not widespread.

IV.  U.S. Policy Initiatives and Programs

USG objectives are to support the development of a comprehensive 
GOS narcotics control program, and to assist the GOS in its 
implementation.

Bilateral Cooperation.  In 1992 the USG concluded a narcotics 
cooperation agreement with the GOS, and established a mechanism to 
monitor its implementation.  The task now is to encourage the GOS 
to put its provisions and those of the 1988 UN Convention into 
practice.

Road Ahead.  Until the Surinamese military is brought under 
civilian control, the GOS will not be able to effectively prevent 
the transshipment of narcotics.  USG assistance under the 
bilateral agreement, including U.S. Customs training in drug 
control techniques, should enable the Police Narcotics Brigade to 
become more active.  The USG would welcome a decision by the Dutch 
Government to station narcotics control personnel in Suriname.
(###)

TRINIDAD AND TOBAGO 

I.  Summary

Trinidad and Tobago is a transit route for South American drugs 
bound for Europe and the U.S., although the volume of trafficking 
is difficult to quantify.  It also produces marijuana.  
Counternarcotics coordination is directed by the Office of 
Strategic Services (OSS), established in early 1992.  The 
Government of Trinidad and Tobago (GOTT) has received USG 
counternarcotics assistance but has been slow to use it.  Antidrug 
efforts have been hampered by allegations of major corruption in 
the police, some substantiated, and the Customs Service, 
legislative deficiencies, including failure to ratify the 1988 UN 
Convention, and a dearth of laws pertaining to such matters as 
money laundering.  There is a general lack of coordination in 
narcotics matters within the government, despite the formation of 
the OSS.  The government is moving to remedy these legislative 
problems.

II.  Status of Country 

As drugs increasingly transit Venezuela, the trend appears to be 
toward larger shipments.  The relatively unimpeded routes through 
Trinidad and Tobago are likely to attract of major traffickers.  
The disarray of the Police Service, and the problems of the 
Customs Service and Coast Guard, add to this vulnerability.

III.  Country Action against Drugs in 1992

Policy Initiatives.  The GOTT has established a timetable for 
drafting and enacting the requisite legislation prior to ratifying 
the 1988 UN Convention during 1993.  In the meantime, it is taking 
some measures consistent with the goals and objectives of the 
convention.  It is drafting new legislation on precursor and 
essential chemicals, money laundering, and asset seizure.  It has 
also tentatively begun to coordinate policies and finances among 
the Coast Guard, police, and intelligence collection services.

Accomplishments.  The GOTT established the OSS under the direction 
of a highly regarded former police official.  It also produced a 
comprehensive counternarcotics strategy, but has not yet developed 
an implementation plan.  The GOTT has instituted a public 
education program to promote drug awareness and demand reduction.  
Trinidad and Tobago works with the USG and with the UN, Canada, 
France, and the UK on counternarcotics activities.

Law Enforcement Efforts.  Law enforcement efforts have been 
erratic.  They have been successful against marijuana trafficking 
but not very successful against cocaine; fairly effective against 
low-level offenders, but not against major traffickers.  Coast 
Guard interdiction efforts achieved success with the provision of 
two patrol boats; the police narcotics unit is being reorganized 
with DEA assistance.  Trinidadians debated but did not implement 
legislative initiatives during the year.

Corruption.  The GOTT is making a concerted effort to root out 
corruption and reform the Police and Customs Service, the former 
with British help, and the latter with USG assistance.  A British 
team invited to review the situation uncovered some corrupt police 
officers providing protection to persons in the drug trade, but 
found no organized drug cartel.  There are widespread but 
unsubstantiated allegations that senior GOTT police officials are 
involved in the drug trade.

Agreements and Treaties.  Trinidad and Tobago hopes to ratify the 
1988 UN Convention during 1993.  Extradition is covered by a 1931 
U.S./UK agreement which remained in effect after Trinidad's 
independence.  The GOTT has been unresponsive to USG extradition 
requests, one of which (a non-drug case) dates back more than 
seven years.

Cultivation and Production.   Cannabis has been grown for 
generations on large tracts in eastern and southern Trinidad, 
although there are no accurate estimates of its extent.  The 
police have destroyed fields of up to about 80 hectares. 

Drug Flow/Transit.  No good data is available, but anecdotal 
evidence suggests an increase in the flow of drugs through the 
country.  Three comparatively large cocaine seizures in 1992 
(totalling about 60 kg) may reflect either increased cocaine 
trafficking or, perhaps, more effective counternarcotics efforts.

Demand Reduction Program.  The National Alcohol and Drug Abuse 
Prevention Program (NADAPP), a government organization, spent 
almost $500,000 of a UN grant on a local demand reduction program, 
with apparently minimal results.  Several private organizations, 
which operate excellent drug counselling and demand reduction 
programs, have complained that NADAPP has not been an effective 
clearinghouse for funding and educational materials.  The USG 
provided funds and expertise to produce educational materials and 
a series of antidrug television spots.

IV.  U.S. Policy Initiatives and Programs

Policy Initiatives.  The USG provided the Coast Guard with patrol 
boats, equipment, maintenance, and training, to help it patrol the 
country's coastal waters more effectively.

The USG helped form a mini-Dublin Group in Port-of-Spain along 
with other donors, especially Canada, the UK, France, the EC, and 
the UN, to assist with demand reduction efforts, preferably 
through local private groups.

Bilateral Cooperation.  A letter of agreement covers bilateral 
counternarcotics cooperation between the GOTT and the USG.  
Cooperative counternarcotics activity between the U.S. and 
Trinidad and Tobago increased in 1992, as did cocaine seizures.  
The GOTT has expressed some interest in maritime interdiction, but 
has taken few concrete steps to enhance their capabilities.  In 
the recent past the USG and the GOTT have discussed the 
possibility of an MLAT and an updated extradition treaty, but the 
GOTT has been unresponsive to USG requests.  

Road Ahead.  The USG will stress enforcement efforts, and will 
coordinate with other donors on demand reduction efforts.  It will 
focus on the Coast Guard and the OSS, and postpone assistance to 
the Police and Customs Service until their reorganizations are 
complete.  Future assistance will be tied to good-faith GOTT 
efforts to introduce meaningful money laundering and asset 
forfeiture legislation, ratify the 1988 UN Convention, and satisfy 
outstanding USG extradition requests.
(###)

EASTERN CARIBBEAN

The nations of the Eastern Caribbean are becoming more important 
in the international drug trade.  The success of U.S. narcotics 
control efforts in other parts of the Caribbean and in Central 
America, combined with easy navigation, ample commercial airline 
and cruise ship schedules, and the difficulty of policing these 
diverse mini-states, dependent territories, and French 
departments, have made them attractive to South American 
traffickers.  Upscale tourism in many of the islands creates an 
environment where traffickers can live lavishly without attracting 
attention.  The islands further north and west, those closer to 
Puerto Rico which is within the Customs territory of the U.S., 
pose greater threats to the U.S.  Significant quantities of 
cocaine and marijuana have been seized in the area, as well as in 
the U.S. of drugs that have transited the area.

Island governments are beginning to take the problem more 
seriously.  The security services of the seven independent 
countries -- Antigua and Barbuda, Barbados, Dominica, Grenada, St. 
Kitts and Nevis, St. Lucia, and St. Vincent and the Grenadines -- 
are grouped in the Regional Security System (RSS), and 
increasingly focus on anti-narcotics patrol and enforcement 
efforts.  The RSS receives military assistance from the U.S. and 
also some British assistance, but both are diminishing.  Each of 
the RSS countries currently participates in the Regional Maritime 
Movement Information System (RMMIS).  Barbados also has a Joint 
Information Coordination Center (JICC).  The USG supports efforts 
to make the information in the RMMIS compatible with the JICC 
system.  The six RSS countries without a JICC have all requested 
one, but no new JICC's will be installed until the existing system 
is improved.  The Bridgetown Group of international donors 
coordinates assistance to the area.  All the islands welcome 
outside assistance.  The  close-knit societies of the Eastern 
Caribbean invite a degree of corruption among enforcement 
personnel.

Barbados and Grenada are parties to the 1988 UN Convention.  The 
other five countries are parties to the 1961 Single Convention on 
Narcotic Drugs and its 1972 Protocol, and Dominica, St. Lucia, and 
St. Vincent and the Grenadines are moving toward accession to the 
1988 Convention.  Barbados and Grenada are attempting to implement 
the convention's provisions within their limited resources and 
capabilities.  Antigua and Barbuda, Dominica, St. Kitts and Nevis, 
St. Lucia, and St. Vincent and the Grenadines, all with very 
limited resources, do take a number of counternarcotics measures 
that are prescribed in the Convention.  The multilateral Caribbean 
Zone Customs Mutual Assistance Agreement provides for information 
sharing concerning enforcement of Customs laws, including those 
related to the suppression of trafficking in narcotics and 
psychotropic substances.  

(See separate INCSR sections on the Caribbean Dependent 
Territories of the United Kingdom for reports on Anguilla, the 
British Virgin Islands, and Montserrat; on the French Caribbean 
Departments for reports on Guadeloupe and Martinique; and on the 
Netherlands Antilles and Aruba for discussion of the Dutch islands 
in the Eastern Caribbean.)

ANTIGUA AND BARBUDA.  This two-island nation, particularly 
Antigua, is a drug transit country.  The Government of Antigua and 
Barbuda (GOAB) increased drug interdiction, demand reduction, and 
awareness efforts during 1992, but uncertainties caused by 
infighting within the ruling party and public allegations of 
corruption created an impression of weakening resolve.  There was 
evidence of increased shipments in 1992; the Antiguan Coast Guard 
seized 500 kg of cocaine during the year.  The Antiguan airport is 
still used by traffickers, as indicated by drug seizures at 
destinations in the U.S. and Europe.  The country relies on 
offshore banking to augment its foreign exchange earnings, and its 
banks are money laundering targets.  There is no evidence of 
cannabis cultivation.

The GOAB has a narcotics control agreement with the U.S., under 
which the DEA, the U.S. Customs, the U.S. Coast Guard, and the 
military provide training and undertake cooperative efforts. The 
GOAB conducted a survey of domestic drug use and awareness under 
this arrangement.  The GOAB has not yet acceded to the 1988 UN 
Convention.  In 1992, it proposed legislation on asset seizure, 
government ethics, and offshore banking.  The GOAB's enforcement 
efforts, cooperation with U.S. agencies, and legislative 
initiatives are all consistent with the 1988 Convention's goals 
and objectives.

BARBADOS.  Government officials link an unusual rise in the crime 
rate to increased drug use and trafficking, and a decline in the 
country's economic mainstay, tourism.  Historically, cocaine has 
arrived by commercial airline, but trafficking by small boats is 
now increasing.  There are also indications that cruise ship crews 
carry cocaine to the U.S. Virgin Islands and Puerto Rico for 
onward shipment.

Barbados examined its drug problems with renewed vigor in 1992, 
partly in response to a U.S. travel advisory issued in April 
(since revised).  That same month, it adopted a "Mutual Assistance 
in Criminal Matters Act" which can provide benefits equivalent to 
a mutual legal assistance treaty (MLAT).  In July, authorities 
seized 2.4 mt of marijuana aboard a fishing vessel.  In August, 
they arrested an airline passenger carrying two kg of cocaine.  In 
October, Barbados became a party to the 1988 UN Convention.  As 
exemplified by its drug seizures and a more dedicated approach to 
law enforcement, the government is moving toward compliance with 
the convention's goals and objectives.  The Justice Ministry plans 
to create a drug program oversight office, and has requested USG 
financing for computer equipment and court reporter training.  The 
USG, along with the UK and Canada, provided training for the 
Police, Customs and Coast Guard.

DOMINICA.  Drug activity is less significant in Dominica than in 
the other islands, partly because its tourist industry is 
relatively underdeveloped.  In June 1991, Dominica seized 1,300 kg 
of cocaine on a ship and arrested 12 Colombians on board.  In 
August 1992, it hosted a Regional Security System training course 
on rural patrol and enforcement.  The government has asked for UN 
and USG advice on legislative preparation for signing the 1988 UN 
Convention.  The expectation is that Dominica will try to bring 
itself into conformity with the convention's goals and objectives, 
within the limits of its resources and the low level of local drug 
activity.  The Police Commissioner has requested USG assistance 
for communications equipment and training.

GRENADA.  Illicit narcotics are a growing problem in Grenada.  
Enforcement resources are limited, and the open coastline is ideal 
for smuggling activities.  The chance seizure in June of nearly 
four mt of cured marijuana linked to a Venezuelan fishing boat 
indicates that major quantities may be transiting the island.  
Later that month another fishing boat was seized carrying five kg 
of cocaine and about 80 kg of marijuana.

Grenada is a party to the 1988 UN Convention, and senior officials 
have committed the government to the fight against narcotics.  The 
country's active antidrug measures indicate that it is meeting the 
goals and objectives of the convention.  It adopted two antidrug 
acts in 1992, significantly increasing penalties for drug crimes, 
criminalizing money laundering, and providing for asset seizure.  
In 1991-92 Grenada amended its commercial laws to restrict 
registration of offshore financial corporations, and de-registered 
scores of questionable corporations.

Grenada has an active drug awareness program, supported by the 
UNDCP and other donors.  The USG provided assistance for the 
Police and Customs in 1991 and 1992 and for the drug awareness 
program.  U.S. Military Information Support Teams and U.S. Customs 
have provided advice.  

ST. KITTS AND NEVIS.  This twin-island nation, the furthest 
northwest of the independent Eastern Caribbean countries, is for 
that reason well situated to be a transit point between the 
producing countries of South America and the consumer markets of 
North America.  Drug trafficking through the largely unprotected 
waters of St. Kitts/Nevis was underscored when its small police 
force and Coast Guard intercepted several drug-laden vessels and 
traffickers.  Increased seizures and arrests suggest and effort by 
the traffickers to exploit St. Kitts/Nevis and avoid the well-
monitored traditional routes.  From the Kittian waters fast boats 
can quickly reach the French departments of Guadeloupe and St. 
Martin,  and Puerto Rico, within U.S. customs territory, and thus 
evade European and U.S. Customs.  During 1992, the private sector 
took the lead in promoting drug awareness and demand reduction and 
developing a drug rehabilitation center.

 The USG and the Government of St. Kitts/Nevis expect to sign a 
narcotics control agreement in 1993, and have initiated 
discussions for a "hot pursuit" agreement to allow the U.S. Coast 
Guard and other USG agencies to enter territorial waters and 
assist in tracking and arresting suspected traffickers.  In 1992 
the Government also introduced asset-seizure legislation.  It has 
not ratified the 1988 UN Convention, but its enforcement efforts, 
counternarcotics cooperation with the USG, and introduction of 
asset-seizure legislation are all consistent with the Convention's 
goals and objectives.  There is some cultivation of cannabis for 
local consumption on St. Kitts, and there are unsubstantiated 
rumors of corruption.  Offshore banking and the attendant money 
laundering threat have not yet developed.

ST. LUCIA.  Government officials describe their drug problems as 
growing rapidly.  The island's expanding tourist industry brings 
in U.S. dollars, daily flights to and from the U.S. and Europe, 
and thousands of cruise ship passengers.  Authorities discovered 
cocaine destined for the U.S. on at least one cruise ship, but 
have made no major seizures.  St. Lucia is willing  to work with 
the UN and the USG on legislation needed to sign the 1988 UN 
Convention, but is as yet some distance from meeting the 
convention's goals and objectives.  The Police Commissioner was 
able obtain communications and computer equipment, as well as some 
20 new vehicles in 1992.  St. Lucia's forensic laboratory serves 
both St. Lucia and Dominica; it needs to be upgraded to handle its 
increasing responsibilities.

ST. VINCENT AND THE GRENADINES.  St. Vincent is especially 
vulnerable to narcotics trafficking because of its rough terrain 
and because the 20-plus tiny islands of the Grenadines are not 
adequately patrolled.  Cocaine from South America can easily be 
airdropped or landed by boat.  In July, authorities seized 17 kg 
of cocaine on a vessel at one of these islands.  More than 900 
flag of convenience ships are registered in St. Vincent under a 
system that makes owners untraceable; several have been the 
subjects of drug and weapons investigations.  In August, the 
Attorney General announced that St. Vincent intended to take a 
tougher stance on drug abuse and trafficking, and would soon 
accede to the 1988 UN Convention.  The government has asked for UN 
and USG assistance in drafting implementing legislation.  New 
court procedures are designed to expedite drug cases.  These 
initiatives signal St. Vincent's intention to bring its laws and 
action into accord with the goals and objectives of the 
Convention.
(###)

FRENCH CARIBBEAN 

The islands of Martinique and Guadeloupe, and French Guiana on the 
South American continent, are departements (states) of France, and 
subject therefore to French laws, and to the 1988 UN Convention to 
which France is a party.  With the resources of France behind 
them, they are meeting the goals and objectives of the convention.  
Nevertheless, drug traffickers and money launderers are active, 
especially on the French half of the island of St. Martin, part of 
the Department of Guadeloupe, whose free port status, a heavy flow 
of tourists, offshore banking facilities, and easy access to the 
relatively less-controlled Dutch half of the island, make it the 
most susceptible.

Cocaine seizures in 1990 totalled 1.2 mt, 990 kg of which was 
seized on St. Martin.  As a result, the French Judicial Police 
opened a branch on the island.  By 1992, seizures had fallen to 
109 kg, and St. Martin's share to roughly half of the total.  A 
rise in the number of the bales of drugs found in St. Martin's 
waters indicates that smugglers are increasingly resorting to 
airdrops.  French Guiana has been used by traffickers from 
neighboring Suriname, but there has been little activity in recent 
years.

The multilateral Caribbean Zone Customs Mutual Assistance 
Agreement provides for information sharing concerning enforcement 
of Customs laws, including those related to the suppression of 
trafficking in narcotics and psychotropic substances.  The French 
Customs Service and Coast Guard actively cooperate with the U.S. 
against narcotics smuggling via container shipments to Europe, or 
on the many pleasure craft visiting the islands.  In 1991, the USG 
provided authorities two seized vessels for counternarcotics use.  
The Attorney General of Martinique is interested in enhancing 
judicial and prosecutorial abilities, as well as law enforcement 
efforts.  Civil servants, drawn from the French civil service, 
have been able to avoid charges of any narcotics-related 
corruption.  U.S. Customs officers have taught at Martinique's 
regional training center.
(###)

UK DEPENDENT TERRITORIES IN THE CARIBBEAN

Anguilla, the British Virgin Islands, Cayman Islands, Montserrat, 
and Turks and Caicos Islands are the UK's Caribbean Dependent 
Territories.  The USG provided them some counternarcotics 
assistance, including law enforcement training, in 1991 and 1992.  
Because these islands are not united within one political unit, 
the U.S. has no bilateral agreements with them.  However, 
cooperation is provided for in numerous other international 
agreements, including the U.S.-UK MLAT regarding these countries 
(the U.S.-Cayman Islands MLAT), the U.S.-UK Customs Mutual 
Assistance Agreement, and the Caribbean Zone Customs Mutual 
Assistance Agreement.  There is no significant drug production on 
these islands, but, situated en route from the drug-producing 
countries of South America to the markets of the U.S. and Europe, 
they are convenient way stations for traffickers.  They are also 
tempting for drug-related financial dealings, especially the 
Cayman Islands with its immense offshore banking sector and bank 
secrecy laws.  The governors and some senior police and customs 
officials come from the UK which enjoys considerable freedom from 
high-level corruption.

In keeping with British policy on narcotics, territorial 
governments neither condone nor facilitate illicit drug activity.  
The UK ratified the 1988 UN Convention in 1991, and is presently 
working with the territories on legislation needed for full 
compliance.  This is in place, with the exception of asset 
forfeiture legislation in the British Virgin Islands (BVI).  Upon 
completion of that legislation, expected early in 1993, the UK's 
ratification of the 1988 Convention will be extended to the 
territories.  With the exception of BVI asset forfeiture, the 
territories already are meeting the goals and objectives of the 
1988 UN Convention in its entirety.  The U.S./Cayman Islands 
mutual legal assistance treaty (MLAT) has been extended to the 
other territories.  In June 1992, the Cayman Islands designated 
the U.S. as a country that can request seizure and confiscation of 
drug assets pursuant to the Misuse of Drugs Law and the Misuse of 
Drugs (Drug Trafficking Offences) (Designated Countries) Order 
1991.  

Tortola in the BVI is the center of the territories' drug 
intelligence gathering network, with links to the JICC system and 
the El Paso Information Center (EPIC).  The central data base in 
Tortola provides a mechanism for local regional analysis, although 
the islands have cited a lack of feedback from EPIC.  The UK will 
establish a direct link between Tortola and the London-based 
National Criminal Intelligence Service, a British joint police and 
Customs unit which coordinates investigations of organized crime, 
including drug trafficking.  

ANGUILLA, MONTSERRAT, AND THE BRITISH VIRGIN ISLANDS.  Operational 
contact between USG drug agencies and the BVI police and Customs 
is close.  The U.S. Coast Guard has a reciprocal shiprider 
agreement with BVI, which was extended in December to include the 
U.S. Customs Service.  The effectiveness of this cooperation is 
evident in the seizure statistics.  In the years 1988 -- when 
traffickers began using the airdrop technique -- through 1990, 540 
kg, 345 kg and 674 kg respectively of cocaine were seized in BVI.  
The 1991 and 1992 cocaine seizures  of 15 kg and 29 kg suggest 
that the USG-BVI counternarcotics effort may have driven the 
traffickers elsewhere.  The Government of BVI operates a drug 
surveillance aircraft, flown by a Royal Air Force officer.  

CAYMAN ISLANDS.  In December, the new, $16 million addition to the 
Caribbean Basin Radar (CBRN) network became operational in the 
Cayman Islands.  This state-of-the-art facility was cited by the 
Governor of the Cayman Islands as an excellent example of 
international cooperation in tackling drug trafficking.  The 
Cayman Islands CBRN site will monitor narcotics air traffic 
transiting the central Caribbean.  All data collected will be 
transmitted to the regional operations center in Key West.  In 
addition, U.S. Coast Guard aircraft involved in air interception 
operations in the western Caribbean use facilities in the Cayman 
Islands, with the cooperation of Cayman officials.

As a center of offshore banking with strict bank secrecy laws, the 
Cayman Islands is a prime target for money launderers.  Enhanced 
cooperation by Cayman Islands authorities, especially in employing 
the U.S./Cayman Islands MLAT, and antidrug features of the bank 
secrecy law have reduced the extent of money laundering activity.

TURKS AND CAICOS ISLANDS.  Turks and Caicos Islands (TCI), located 
at the southeast end of The Bahamas archipelago, is a participant 
in Operation Bahamas, Turks and Caicos (OPBAT), a trilateral 
cooperative effort of the U.S., The Bahamas, and TCI (UK), for air 
and maritime narcotics control.  USG support to TCI mainly covers 
fuel and per diem costs in support of their participation in 
OPBAT.  Communications equipment, a boat and motor, and limited 
drug enforcement training were also provided.

TCI cooperates fully with the USG on counternarcotics efforts.  
Its police work closely with DEA in The Bahamas, and TCI gave 
excellent support to the U.S. Air National Guard and its ground-
based radar at Providenciales until it was relocated by the USG in 
November 1992.  TCI supports U.S. Coast Guard cutters and 
aircraft, which occasionally use TCI facilities for refueling when 
conducting counternarcotics operations in the area.  TCI police 
also work independently against narcotics trafficking.  TCI police 
and customs work together to monitor transiting aircraft refueling 
en route from the Eastern Caribbean northwestward.  Like BVI, TCI 
operates a drug surveillance aircraft, flown by an officer of the 
Royal Air Force,  The aircraft was provided by the USG from those 
seized in counternarcotics operations.  
(###)

[EDITOR'S NOTE:  Charts referenced to in brackets [ ] are 
available only in hard copy of report.]

Contents of this publication are not copyrighted unless indicated.  
If not copyrighted, the material may be reproduced without 
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(###)
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