Return to: Index of "International Narcotics Control Strategy Reports"
Index of "Treaties and Legal Information" || Electronic Research Collections Index || ERC Homepage


INTERNATIONAL NARCOTICS CONTROL STRATEGY REPORT, APRIL 1993
US DEPARTMENT OF STATE
BUREAU OF INTERNATIONAL NARCOTICS MATTERS

DEPARTMENT OF STATE PUBLICATION 10047
RELEASED APRIL 1993

This publication is for sale by the Government Printing Office, Superindendent of Documents.  Stock No.:  044-000-02370-9


          EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

POLICY AND PROGRAM OVERVIEW FOR 1992
April 1, 1993

In 1992, despite some setbacks, the international anti-drug effort gained further strength, forcing a highly adaptable international drug trade to shift tactics and operations.  Under the leadership of the United States, more countries have joined the battle against the drug trade in earnest.  Closer coordination between governments--particularly in training and police enforcement activities-- increasingly effective multilateral action against money laundering and essential and precursor chemicals, as well as continuing reforms of national legal regimes to meet the requirements of the 1988 UN Convention, have kept the major drug trafficking organizations on the defensive.

There has also been some inevitable bad news.  Despite stepped-up programs, hundreds of tons of cocaine and heroin continue to flow to the United States and to Europe, while consumption rises in Latin America.  The Western Hemisphere's most notorious cocaine trafficker, Pablo Escobar, still on the loose after his July 1992 escape from a Medellin prison, has launched a campaign of terror and violence.  While Peru's coca cultivation has remained stable over the past two years in areas where the government has control, growers have begun planting coca in isolated areas less accessible to the authorities.  As a result, the crop may be expanding.  In Europe and Central Asia, the break-up of the old Soviet empire has opened new frontiers for venturesome drug traffickers, as the free market economy offers the potential of new drug markets in the former Soviet states.  There are reports that ethnically based smuggling rings from the Baltics to Kazakhstan are gearing up to cash in on the heroin flowing abundantly from Southeast and Southwest Asia.

If there appears to be a loss for every gain in the drug war, it is largely because an annual review looks at progress in a relatively narrow slice of time and tends to obscure long-term progress.  Long-term gains such as stronger anti-drug cooperation between governments, reduction of drug crops, tightening of money laundering restrictions and curbing chemical shipments do not always make exciting reading.  Yet the drug trade knows that without a steady source of drugs, money and chemicals it cannot long survive.  More than anything, trafficking organizations fear concerted action across borders by governments committed to attack the grower-to-user chain at every link.  It is in these areas that there has been progress in the international anti-drug effort; it is also in these areas where greater efforts need to be made.  

Close cooperation at the highest levels between the United States and the governments of the major drug producing and transit countries in the Western Hemisphere has intensified pressure on the cartels.  The February 1992 San Antonio Drug Summit broadened the multilateral cooperation initiated at the earlier Cartagena summits by linking the Andean nations, Mexico, and the United States against the trafficking organizations. There is now an acknowledged community of interest at the highest level of the key drug-affected governments.  Multilateral air control operations between the USG and Andean governments, as well as bilateral counternarcotics assistance programs with all the front-line drug countries, are forcing traffickers to delay shipments and switch transportation methods and routes more frequently to stay in business.  Fewer seizures in 1992 of multi-ton air shipments of cocaine suggest that trafficking organizations may now be relying more heavily on sea and land transport to move cocaine to the United States.

Unlike other illicit drugs which grow in almost all regions of the globe, significant coca cultivation is confined to Peru (61 percent), Bolivia (21 percent) and Colombia (18 percent).  In 1992, for the third successive year, overall coca cultivation has been kept from expanding.  One should bear in mind that until 1989 the Andean coca crop had been increasing annually at a rate of 10 to 20 percent, despite active crop suppression programs.  Without these, coca cultivation probably would have doubled.  At the end of 1992, an estimated 211,700 ha of coca were under cultivation, the same amount estimated to be growing in 1990.  While this number is 3 percent higher than last year's estimate of 206,000 ha, it falls within the statistical margin of error of the estimating process.  

This levelling-off is particularly important in light of Peru's  unwillingness to attack coca fields in the insurgent-infested Upper Huallaga Valley, Bolivia's inability to meet its coca eradication quota, and Colombia's decision to divert suppression resources in part from coca to its rapidly expanding opium poppy fields.  Even with such impediments, the major coca-producing countries have managed to hold down the spread of coca.  This indicates growing political commitment on the part of the governments of those countries.

Chemical Controls

An important area in which the international community is making progress is the control of the chemicals necessary for drug refining.  Without adequate supplies of chemicals such as ether and acetic anhydride, coca leaf and opium gum cannot be transformed into cocaine or heroin.  For this reason, regulation of legitimate commerce to deny traffickers the chemicals they need is one of the most valuable tools in the battle against drug criminals.

The USG has been a pioneer in organizing an international effort to keep such chemicals from the drug trade.  The US-chaired Chemical Action Task Force (CATF) has developed and gained widespread international acceptance of a set of measures to be incorporated into national chemical regulatory regimes to bring countries into compliance with the chemical control provision of the UN Convention.  Encouraging progress was made in 1992 in the adoption of regulatory regimes incorporating these measures.  The European Community amended its chemical regulation to make such measures binding on Community members on January 1, 1993.  Japan, in mid-1992, adopted a chemical regulatory regime based on the CATF measures.  The Andean cocaine producing countries and many other Latin American countries have chemical regulatory regimes based on the CATF measures and the more comprehensive Organization of American States (OAS) Model Chemical Regulations.   In 1992, an international working group, led by the UN's International Narcotics Control Board, prepared a set of practical guidelines based on the CATF measures for governments to follow in drafting and implementing chemical regulatory regimes.  The CATF has established a policy framework to identify changes that may be required in chemical regulatory regimes to attack new methods of using chemicals and new diversion techniques, and to bring under control chemicals being used as substitutes for regulated chemicals.   Success will, of course, depend on effective implementation of these chemical controls, but these steps are encouraging.   

Persistence and Success

In spite of the ground gained over the past few years in all these areas, the illegal drug trafficking industry continues to be strong, rich, and able to adapt to changing circumstances.  We are dealing with some of the best-financed, best-armed, and most ruthless organizations in the world.  These groups have the wherewithal, the experience, and the determination to exploit the weaknesses of governments beset by economic crises, political instability and social unrest.  While there is no question that the trafficking organizations have suffered from concerted government action, they have also shown that they can absorb heavy losses and still thrive.  Success depends on an integrated attack, sustained over time, on every stage of the drug-producing, marketing and distribution process.

Corruption and Political Will

The international anti-drug effort is in many ways a collective assault on drug-generated corruption, which left unchecked could destroy democratic governments already sapped by internal economic and social crises.  Since the only defense against such corruption is a strong sense of national political will and purpose, a main objective of USG anti-drug policy is to help strengthen political will in the most vulnerable front-line drug countries.

Although any lucrative criminal enterprise can threaten order in a country with underpaid law enforcement or military officials, the drug trade, because of its enormous wealth, poses a threat of a much greater magnitude:  drug profits can carry corruption to the highest levels of government.  Cocaine and heroin are currently the most abundant, lucrative commodities in the world.  Cultivation is cheap, processing relatively simple, and profit margins enormous.  At average street prices of $100 a gram, a metric ton of cocaine is worth $100 million once in the United States.  By this measure, the estimated 150-175 mt of cocaine alone which the US market consumes annually would put as much as $15-$17.5 billion into criminal hands.  The cartels therefore have access to sums of money available to few governments, and, unlike governments, they are not accountable to any authority except themselves for the way in which they spend their funds.

It is clear that  those countries most affected by the drug trade are engaged in a defense of national sovereignty against very powerful enemies.  With billions of dollars available to them, traffickers, often allied with insurgent groups, are theoretically in a position to buy themselves a controlling interest in governments which they cannot overthrow by force.  A major goal of US anti-drug policy is to ensure that this does not happen.  By supporting those democratic governments which show the necessary political resolve to take on the drug cartels, the United States is investing in the future democratic stability of the hemisphere.

Such an investment, however, can only pay dividends when it supplements another government's determination to carry out its own anti-drug campaign.  The USG can only help another government fight the international drug trade; it cannot do the job for it.  Front-line governments must attack drug corruption out of genuine national self-interest.  Where governments have realized this, there is progress against the drug trade;  where they have not, the traffickers prosper.

Demand Reduction

At one time, many important drug source countries took comfort in a sense that drug addiction was a rich country's disease.  There was a belief that poor countries were immune to the type of drug epidemic which fueled international demand for cocaine and heroin.  Experience, however, has taught otherwise.  All of the major drug-producing and transit countries now have significant, often expanding, addict populations, which not only sap the political, social and economic stability of a nation, but offer new markets to the drug trade. The USG has been working with many of these countries to reduce demand and prevent drug abuse. 

In 1992, the USG addressed the question of international demand reduction through continuing bilateral and multilateral efforts.  Bilaterally, INM funded programs on training, public awareness and education in Latin America, Southeast and Southwest Asia.  INM conducted bilateral programs in 1992 with the Bahamas, Brazil, Colombia, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Guatemala, Jamaica, Mexico, Pakistan, Panama, Thailand, and Venezuela.  Multilaterally, the USG worked closely with the European Community, the UNDCP, OAS-CICAD, the Colombo Plan and ASEAN on such projects as setting up regional demand reduction training centers in Argentina and Thailand and drug prevention services for "street children" in Brazil and Peru.

The United Nations

The USG has long had a close working relationship with the United Nations International Drug Control Program (and its predecessor UNFDAC) as part of the USG strategy to promote active anti-drug cooperation on a global scale.  Most recently, the USG has intensified its efforts to engage the entire UN system, particularly the specialized agencies, in drug control issues.  The USG has been working to further the aims of the UN System-Wide Action Plan on Drug Abuse Control (SWAP), adopted by the Economic and Social Council in 1990.  The goal of the SWAP has been to make drug control an integral part of UN programs, especially those of the UN specialized agencies involved in development, health, labor and children.

1988 UN Convention

Seventy-two states have now ratified or acceded to the 1988 UN Convention Against Illicit Traffic in Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances, an increase from the 58 states reported in the 1992 INCSR.  As of January 21, 1993, states parties to the Convention include:  Afghanistan, Australia, Bahamas, Bahrain, Bangladesh, Barbados, Belarus, Bhutan, Bolivia, Brazil, Bulgaria, Burkina Faso, Cameroon, Canada, Chile, China, Costa Rica, Cote d'Ivoire, Cyprus, Czechoslovakia, Denmark, Ecuador, Egypt, France, Ghana, Greece, Grenada, Guatemala, Guinea, Honduras, India, Iran, Italy, Japan, Jordan, Kenya, Luxembourg, Madagascar, Mexico, Monaco, Morocco, Myanmar, Nepal, Nicaragua, Niger, Nigeria, Oman, Pakistan, Paraguay, Peru, Portugal, Qatar, Romania, Russian Federation, Saudi Arabia, Senegal, Seychelles, Slovenia, Spain, Sri Lanka, Suriname, Sweden, Syria, Togo, Tunisia, Uganda, Ukraine, United Arab Emirates, United Kingdom, United States, Venezuela and Yugoslavia.  The European Community confirmed Article 12.  (See listing of countries later in this publication.)

COCAINE  

Cocaine, particularly in its most addictive form crack, still poses the most immediate threat to the United States.  While there has been encouraging data that cocaine use by certain sectors of American youth has dropped, hundreds of tons of cocaine continue to flow to the United States.  As the nerve center of the cocaine industry, Colombia continued to play a pivotal role against the drug trade in 1992.  The Gaviria government's decision in July to challenge the corruption which allowed drug lord Pablo Escobar to run his Medellin cartel out of a luxury prison was a sign of government determination to challenge a potential threat to its sovereignty.  The Medellin cartel's violent response appears to have strengthened the government's resolve to put an end to the cartel's operations.

Throughout 1992, the Colombian government maintained an active enforcement and crop suppression program.  Because the government had to shift limited resources from coca and cocaine control operations to destruction of the country's rapidly expanding opium poppy crop, year-end data for coca suppression and cocaine seizures were lower than projected.  Nonetheless, they show progress.  Area under coca cultivation dropped to 37,100 ha, a slight decline from 1991's estimate of 37,500 ha.  Cocaine HCl seizures fell to approximately 32 mt from approximately 77 mt last year.  To a large extent, the seizure rate was a casualty of shifting enforcement resources, including aircraft, to the anti-poppy campaign. 

Although the Government of Bolivia only eradicated three-quarters of its 7,000 ha target for 1992, the country's coca cultivation showed a net decline and is now at its lowest in five years.  At the end of 1992, there were an estimated 45,500 ha under cultivation, a 14 percent drop from 1989's high of an estimated 52,900 ha.  This steady reduction underscores the importance of the combination of political determination and a regular crop control program in turning back the spread of an illegal drug crop.  Even a modest display of political will can produce important results.

In counternarcotics operations, Bolivian enforcement actions led to record seizures of coca leaf, paste, base, and precursor chemicals.  An important accomplishment was the seizure of approximately 50 mt of "agua rica" paste and base.  "Agua rica", a weakly acidic suspension of cocaine which can apparently last indefinitely without spoiling, is a relatively new product.  Since it can readily be converted into finished cocaine HCl, seizures of this magnitude have an important impact on drug flows.

Peru continues to be the country where counternarcotics progress faces its greatest challenges.  Since Peru is also the source of the bulk of the drug trade's coca leaf, it is the key country in the anti-cocaine effort.  Although more than 60 percent of the world's coca is cultivated in Peru, the Fujimori government has not taken effective anti-drug action in the face  of continuing insurgent violence, economic chaos and political uncertainty.  Last year, Peru's coca cultivation rose by seven percent from an estimated 120,800 ha in 1991 to an estimated 129,100 ha in 1992.  Most of the expansion was in insurgent areas.  Unless the Government of Peru takes more aggressive action, further expansion of the Peruvian coca crop will offset hard-won gains in Bolivia and Colombia.

Enforcement authorities in Ecuador scored a major success in June 1992 by dismantling the Jorge Reyes Torres narcotics organization, one of the continent's important trafficking organizations.  Thanks to an operation along the Colombian border in February, Ecuadorian police seized nearly 4 mt of cocaine, over three times the quantity captured in any of the previous years.  

In Mexico, the Salinas government continued to pursue a vigorous anti-drug policy.  Mexican authorities seized 38.8 mt of cocaine during 1992, as well as large amounts of marijuana and heroin.  The Northern Border Response Force (NBRF), working closely with USG agencies, was responsible for a record 28.7 mt of cocaine, nearly 70 percent of the total seizures.  Mexico also continued to make important reductions in its opium poppy crops.

Law enforcement authorities in most of the Central American countries have been carrying out active anti-drug efforts.  Though the volume of drugs seized has been relatively small, in Honduras cocaine seizures tripled from half a metric ton in 1991 to nearly one-and-a-half metric tons in 1992.  In Panama, in July 1992, government authorities seized 5.3 tons of cocaine in the Colon Free Zone, the largest single cocaine seizure to date in Central America and the Caribbean.  Over 10 mt were seized in Panama in 1992.  In Guatemala, anti-drug operations were responsible for the seizure of 9.5 mt in the country.

In the Caribbean,anti-drug actions continued to show results. In Jamaica, cocaine seizures rose from 60 kg in 1991 to nearly a half a metric ton in 1992.  Although cocaine seizures dropped slightly in the Bahamas to 4.8 mt from 5.3 mt in 1991, they remain higher than in 1990.  Since the government has maintained a high level of effort, the lower seizure rate may reflect a shift in modes or routes by the drug trade.

OPIUM

Amid signs that the US cocaine market may be levelling off, Latin American trafficking organizations appear to be looking to heroin as the drug of the nineties.  In contrast to stimulants such as cocaine, which burn out their users in anywhere from a few months to a few years, a depressant such as heroin can be used over decades or longer periods.  Heroin is also considerably more lucrative to the drug wholesaler than cocaine.  Where a kilo of cocaine might fetch between $15,000 and $30,000 wholesale, an equal amount of heroin could sell for between $180,000 and $200,000.  New forms of heroin are also showing up on the market.  Although most heroin used in the United States is injected, the fear of AIDS and the convenience of eliminating hypodermic needles may enhance the appeal of the smokable variety, heroin No. 3.

Traditionally, most of the heroin consumed in the United States has come from Southeast and Southwest Asia (refined white heroin) or Mexico (brown tar).  In the past few years, however, Colombian cocaine cartels apparently have been experimenting with diversification by cultivating opium poppies in the Andes.  They have been expanding their operations rapidly.  The estimated 2,300 ha discovered in Colombia in 1991 exploded to an estimated 32,000 ha in 1992.  Thanks to an active and costly poppy spraying program, the Colombian government has destroyed an estimated 12,700 ha of the crop.  While the remaining 20,000 ha theoretically could produce as much as 20 mt of heroin, it seems that the inefficiencies of the "learning curve" are keeping production low.  Since some fields have also been found in Ecuador, and there are reports of incipient cultivation in Peru, the USG is working closely with the concerned governments to ensure that the opium industry does not gain a firm foothold in South America.

Such action is especially important because most of the world's opium grows in Burma, Afghanistan, and Laos, countries in which the USG and other Western governments have limited influence.  If all its potential poppy cultivation were processed into heroin, Burma alone could satisfy the world's known demand for the drug.  Since the break-up of the Soviet empire, there are indications that some of the Central Asian countries could also become illicit opium producers.  Economic difficulties and the presence of well organized smuggling groups raise the specter of new heroin trafficking networks to Europe and perhaps the United States.

Another disturbing development is the emergence of Nigerian drug trafficking organizations which seek to control heroin distribution in the way that the Colombian cartels dominate the cocaine trade. There are reports of Nigerian drug couriers turning up in capitals from Tokyo to Addis Ababa, not to mention the growing numbers arrested annually by US Customs.  The USG is working with the Nigerian government to curb the growth of an international "Nigerian connection," and focus enforcement efforts on Nigerian drug barons rather than on low-level couriers.

The good news in opium and heroin control is that in those areas where governments have been willing to destroy crops systematically, cultivation has declined markedly.  Mexico's sustained crop control program over the past three years has reduced poppy cultivation to its lowest level in nearly a decade.  As all significant reduction has taken place under the Salinas administration, there is a clear correlation between the exercise of political will and accomplishment.  In Guatemala, there were also dramatic results from an aggressive crop control program.  In 1992, with USG assistance, Guatemalan authorities virtually eliminated a crop which a year earlier potentially could have yielded nearly 12 mt of opium.

In Southwest Asia, there was limited progress in controlling opium production.  Although Pakistan, which produces about one-fifth of the heroin coming to the United States, reduced opium poppy cultivation slightly, the government lost momentum in attacking traffickers.  In 1992, there were only two prosecutions of major traffickers, while less stringent banking regulations made it easier for trafficking organizations to launder their profits.  In Afghanistan, the second largest opium producer after Burma, poppy cultivation increased in 1992 by 12 percent.  The USG is working with local Afghan leaders and other donor nations to help Afghanistan reduce its opium poppy cultivation.

In the Golden Triangle area of Burma, Laos, and Thailand, where three-quarters of the world's opium originates, total cultivation was down by approximately six percent, primarily as a result of weather.  Burma, which continues to account for about 60 percent of potential worldwide opium and heroin production, took few effective measures to curb either poppy cultivation or heroin trafficking.  Opium poppy cultivation expanded in some insurgent-controlled areas where previously Burmese government crop suppression campaigns had made important inroads.  These are areas where the Burmese government reached a political accommodation with certain ethnic groups to permit poppy cultivation and drug trafficking.  Burmese authorities have made only half-hearted attempts to curb the drug trade.  Seizures remain insignificant, while major traffickers in some cases openly associate with senior military officials.  The current Burmese government seems more interested in maintaining a truce with former insurgent groups linked to the drug trade than in curtailing heroin production.  The USG continues to urge the Government of Burma to move against the trafficking organizations.

Laos, the world's third largest opium producing country, is the only one of the top three to reduce its potential opium production in each of the past three years.  Thanks to USG and UNDCP assistance, better enforcement, and an active public information program, estimated opium production declined 13 percent in 1992 from 1991, bringing the total crop reduction since the initiation of USG and UNDCP-funded rural development/opium replacement programs in 1989 to 39 percent.  

Once a source country for opiates, Thailand has sustained an active opium poppy crop control program, with total cultivation declining by 50 percent since 1989.  Opium poppy hectarage in 1992 was at its lowest in more than twelve years.  Thailand, however, remains the primary conduit for heroin from the Golden Triangle sold in the United States.

NEXT STEPS 

Under USG leadership, the international anti-drug effort must continue to focus on the drug trade at its four most vulnerable points: at the source, in processing, in the distribution system, and in the financial area.  Except for crop destruction at the source, the drug trade is most vulnerable in its finances, since not only are financial flows potentially subject to the greatest degree of intergovernmental control, but they lie at the heart of the enterprise.  The drug cartels are part of a large money-generating machine, which itself is fueled by money.  Without fuel, the machine can neither function nor produce more money.  If through joint action concerned governments can cut the flow of illicit drug money for long enough, they can deal a strong blow to the drug trade.

More effective action and cooperation with other countries in the Chemical Action Task Force is also important in order to deprive the drug processors of the chemicals they need to transform raw materials into finished drugs.  The USG will continue to support OAS efforts to foster adoption and effective implementation of the OAS model regulations on precursor chemicals controls and on money laundering and asset forfeiture.  The USG will also work with the UNDCP and OAS/CICAD in strengthening the judicial systems of Latin American and Caribbean states.  

Reducing the demand for drugs overseas will continue to be an important focus of USG anti-drug policy, helping developing countries reduce or prevent the growth of addict populations.  While the USG will strengthen its bilateral demand reduction programs, it will also promote a strong United Nations effort, working with the major industrialized countries to implement the UN's System-Wide Action Plan.  We will give special attention to working with the UN specialized agencies such as UNICEF to promote effective drug abuse prevention programs in those countries of Latin America where large numbers of young people, especially "street children," are at risk.

While promoting short- to medium-term success requires  assistance from the United States, Europe, and other donors, long-term progress in suppressing the drug trade depends on the commitment of the front-line drug countries themselves.  The drug trade has prospered because for many years the major drug-producing and transit countries felt neither responsible for or threatened by the drug problem.  In less than a decade, attitudes have altered dramatically.  The front-line drug countries recognize the threat which the drug trade poses to their national sovereignty.  Only a few, however, have the economic resources and political determination to crack down on the drug trade on their own.

We must work to change this situation.  Although the USG will provide the leadership, as well as many of the resources, in attacking the international drug trade, we cannot be the sole driving force.  The front-line drug producing and transit countries themselves must take the initiative to protect their national sovereignty by attacking drug-related corruption before it undermines the core of democratic government.  They must strengthen judicial and legislative institutions partially tainted by drug money, as well as reform financial institutions to prevent money laundering.  They must also focus on the damage which drug consumption is doing among their own youth and create effective demand reduction and treatment programs to protect a generation which otherwise could be lost to addiction.

In summary, success depends on joint action driven by individual national commitment.  If we can build on our achievements in denying the drug trade the necessary raw materials, in restricting its area of operations, and, more importantly, in eliminating any useful market for its products, in a few years we may be able to downgrade illicit drugs from serious threat to manageable nuisance.

    * * *

METHODOLOGY

Methodology for Estimating Illegal Drug Production:  How much do we know?  This report contains tables showing a variety of illicit narcotics-related data.  While these numbers represent the USG's best effort to sketch the dimensions of the international drug problem, the reader should be aware that the picture is not as precise as we would like it to be.  The numbers range from cultivation figures, relatively hard data derived by proven means, to crop production and drug yield estimates, much softer figures where many more variables come into play.  We publish these numbers with an important caveat:  the yield figures are potential, not actual numbers.  Although they are useful for examining trends, they are only approximations.  They should not be treated as hard data. 

Since information is lacking on yields, the numbers are subject to revision as more data becomes known.  The nature of the illegal narcotics industry, in which the traffickers take great pains to maintain the security of their activities, makes it difficult to develop precise information.  More so, when one considers the tremendous geographic areas that must be covered, and the difficulty of collecting reliable information in diverse and difficult terrain.

What we know with reasonable certainty.  The most reliable information we have on illicit drugs is how many hectares are under cultivation.  For more than a decade, the USG has estimated the extent of illicit cultivation in a dozen nations using proven methods similar to those used to estimate the size of licit crops at home and abroad.  We can thus estimate the size of crops with reasonable accuracy. 

What we know with less certainty:  Where crop yields are concerned, the picture is less clear.  How much of a finished product a given area will produce is difficult to estimate, since small changes in such factors as soil fertility, weather, farming techniques, and disease can produce widely varying results from year to year and place to place.  In addition, most illicit drug crop areas are inaccessible to the USG, making scientific information difficult to obtain.  Moreover, we must stress that even as we refine our methods of analysis, we are estimating potential crop available for harvest.  

These estimates do not allow for losses, which could represent up to a third or more of a crop in some areas for some harvests.  Thus, the estimate of the potential crop is useful in providing a theoretical, comparative analysis from year to year, but the actual quantity of final product remains elusive. 

USG confidence in coca leaf yield estimates has risen in the past two years, based upon the results of field studies conducted in Latin America.  Two years ago, after completing preliminary research, the USG for the first time began to make its own estimate of dry coca leaf yields for Bolivia and Peru instead of relying solely on reports from the governments of those countries.

Additional research and field studies may help refine these estimates and make similar improvements possible in estimates of other drug crops.  In all cases, multiplying average yields times available hectarage indicates only the potential, not the actual final drug crop available for harvest.  Nor is there a reliable means to determine production, where many factors can alter the final total.

Harvest Estimates.  Estimating the quantities of coca leaf, opium gum, and cannabis actually harvested and available for processing into finished narcotics remains a major challenge.  We currently cannot accurately estimate this amount for any illicit crop in any nation.  

While farmers naturally have strong incentives to maximize their harvests of what is almost always their most profitable cash crop, the harvest depends upon the efficiency of farming practices and the wastage caused by poor practices or difficult weather conditions during and after harvest.  Up to a third or more of a crop may be lost in some areas during harvests.  

In addition, mature coca, from years three to six, is more productive than immature or aging coca.  Variations such as these can dramatically affect potential yield and production.  Furthermore, if we continue to see limitations in the expansion of new coca we may begin to see dramatic declines in the next few years in productivity of existing fields.  Factors such as this will produce fluctuations in estimates.

Additional information and analysis may enable us to make adjustments for these factors in the future.  Similar deductions for local consumption of unprocessed coca leaf and opium may be possible as well through the accumulation of additional information and research.

Processing Estimates.  The wide variation in processing efficiencies achieved by traffickers complicates the task of estimating the quantity of cocaine or heroin which could be refined from a crop.  These efficiencies vary because of differences in the origin and quality of the raw material used, the technical processing method employed, the size and sophistication of laboratories, the skill and experience of local workers and chemists, and decisions made in response to enforcement pressures.

The USG continues to estimate potential cocaine production as a range based on processing efficiencies that appear to be most common.  But we must stress that these estimates are still soft.  We are currently undertaking a detailed study of this part of the cocaine production process.

The actual amount of dry coca leaf or opium converted into a final product during any time period remains unknown, given the possible losses noted earlier.  There are indications, however, that cocaine processing efficiencies improved during the 1980s, and that traffickers still have considerable room for improvement.  Nevertheless, increasing seizure rates eat into the future profitability of the industry, and raise the cost of doing business.
Figures will change as techniques and data quality improve.  The reader may ask: are this year's figures definitive?  The reply is, almost certainly not.  Additional research will produce revisions to USG estimates of potential drug production.  This is typical of annualized figures for most other areas of statistical tracking--whether it be the size of the U.S. wheat crop, population figures, or the unemployment rate--that must be revised year to year.  For the present, however, these statistics represent the state of the art.  As the art improves and as new information becomes available, so will the precision of the estimates.

STATUS OF POTENTIAL WORLDWIDE PRODUCTION

In weighing the figures below, one must bear in mind that they are theoretical.  They represent an estimate of potential production, the amount which the USG estimates could have been produced if, and only if, all the available crop were to be converted into finished drugs.  Since these estimates make no allowance for losses, actual production is probably lower than our estimate.  The figures shown are mean points in a statistical range. 

Potential Opium Production.  The estimate of potential opium production was down by approximately four percent in Southeast Asia, as opium poppy cultivation declined in the Golden Triangle countries.  Burmese poppy cultivation dropped from an estimated 160,000 ha in 1991 to 153,700 ha in 1992.  Estimated poppy fields under cultivation in Laos fell from 29,625 ha in 1991 to 25,610 ha in 1992, maintaining the downward trend of the preceding year.  In Thailand, the 3,000 ha found in 1991 dropped to 2,050 ha in 1992.

Total estimated potential opium production for Southeast Asia fell from 2,650 mt in 1991 to 2,534 mt in 1992, a decline of about four percent.  Estimated opium production in Burma dropped from 2,350 mt in 1991 to 2,280 mt in 1992.   Laotian production dropped from an estimated 265 mt in 1991 to an estimated 230 mt in 1992.  Thai production declined from 35 mt in 1991 to 24 mt in 1992, based on information from a December 1991-January 1992 opium yield study.  A lower yield may also apply to Burma.  If so, we will reduce the estimate of Burmese opium production accordingly.

This year, for the first, we are reporting on Russia, the Baltics, and the Central Asian countries formerly part of the Soviet Union.  There are preliminary indications that some of these countries may be capable of producing important opium poppy harvests.  The USG is currently conducting surveys, the results of which we hope to report upon in next year's International Narcotics Control Strategy Report (INCSR).

The only increase took place in Southwest Asia as a result of an expansion of Afghan poppy cultivation in 1992.  Afghan hectarage increased from 17,190 ha in 1991 to 19,470 ha in 1992, bringing Afghanistan above its 1989 estimated hectarage of 17,790 ha.  In Pakistan, opium cultivation decreased slightly from an estimated 8,205 ha in 1991 to 8,170 ha in 1992.  The USG calculates that Afghan potential opium gum production rose from 570 mt in 1991 to 640 mt in 1992. 

In Pakistan, estimated production dropped from 180 mt of opium in 1991 to 175 mt in 1992.  Afghanistan's 640 mt and Pakistan's 175 mt combine with Iran's estimated 300 mt for a regional estimate of 1,115 mt of opium, up from 1991's Southwest Asian total of 1,050 mt.

In the Western Hemisphere, there has been progress as the major opium producing countries intensified their crop control efforts.   In Mexico, where the government already has an active eradication campaign, opium poppy hectarage fell 12 percent, from an estimated 3,765 ha in 1991 to 3,310 ha in 1992.  

Guatemala's  active crop control program has reduced opium poppy cultivation to minimal levels.  By the end of 1992, the USG was unable to detect any significant opium poppy fields.  

In Mexico, there has been a drop from an estimated potential opium production in 1991 of 41 mt to 40 mt in 1992.  In Guatemala, the estimate dropped from a potential 11.5 mt in 1991 to an insignificant amount in 1992.   In Colombia, government authorities discovered nearly 33,000 ha of opium poppy under cultivation.  After an active aerial spraying  program, 20,000 ha remained, capable of potentially yielding perhaps 16 mt of opium gum.

Coca Cultivation.  During 1992, the USG estimates that for the third consecutive year the overall hectarage of coca under cultivation remained stable.  With the exception of Peru, where coca cultivation expanded by seven percent to 129,100 ha, cultivation was down among the major coca producers.  Bolivia's 47,900 ha of coca under cultivation in 1991 declined to 45,500 ha as a result of the government's eradication program.  In Colombia, cultivation fell slightly from 37,500 ha under cultivation in 1991 to approximately 37,100 ha in 1992.

Coca eradication took place on the largest scale in Bolivia, where the government eliminated 5,149 ha through its eradication program.  Colombia eradicated 959 ha of coca.  While eradication of mature plants was negligible in Peru, the government helped contain crop expansion by destroying seedbeds potentially capable of producing nearly 6,138 ha of coca.  Because coca is cultivated in inaccessible areas of Brazil, its extent is unknown.  Ecuador has only negligible amounts of coca.  

Cocaine Yield Estimates.  Last year, the INCSR reported that revisions in estimated processing efficiencies (by which coca leaves are harvested and processed into cocaine HCl) in the Andean region had led to a significant increase in the estimated amount of cocaine potentially available in that year.  Additional information this year indicates that processing efficiency continued to improve.  

In 1992, taking into account estimates of local consumption and local seizures, the USG calculates that if virtually every coca leaf were converted into cocaine HCl, and there were no losses because of inefficiencies, bad weather, disease, or the deterrent effects of law enforcement, between 955 and 1,165 mt of cocaine theoretically could have been available from Colombia, Bolivia, and Peru for worldwide export.  This figure includes between 650 and 695 mt potentially available from Peru, 245 to 410 mt potentially available from Bolivia, and approximately 60 mt potentially available from Colombia.  In publishing these ranges, we repeat our caveat that these are theoretical numbers, useful for examining trends.  They do not represent what is actually available.  That amount remains unknown. 

Consumption data

Most of the chapters in this report contain some user or consumption data.  For the most part, these are estimates provided by foreign governments or informal estimates by USG agencies.  There is no way to vouch for their reliability.  They are included because they are the only data available and give an approximation of how governments view their own drug abuse problems.  They should not be considered as a source of data to develop any reliable consumption estimates. 

The cocaine yield figure is offered with the same caveat as the crop harvest yield data:  it is a figure representing potential production.  It is a theoretical number.  It does not allow for losses or the many other variables which one would encounter in a "real world" conversion from plant to finished drug.  The amount of cocaine HCl actually produced is probably lower.

Marijuana Production.  Cannabis cultivation has dropped in most of the major marijuana producing countries.  Thanks to an intensive eradication effort, estimated potential Mexican marijuana production declined in 1992 to 16,420 mt from a potential 17,915 mt in 1991 . Colombia's potential crop has remained steady at an estimated 2,000 mt.  Within Colombia's traditional cannabis growing zones, where intensive eradication was carried out in previous years, virtually no measurable growth was detected in 1992. 

In Jamaica, government eradication programs, carried out with USG assistance, destroyed over 800 ha of cannabis.  The estimated potential yield for 1992 was approximately 263 mt, substantially less than 1991's estimate of 641 mt.

We recognize that there may be considerable undetected cannabis cultivation in Central and East Asia.  As we gather more accurate information, we will report on it in future INCSRs.

[EDITOR'S NOTE:  Worldwide Cultivation Totals Chart and Worldwide Net Production Chart is available in hard copy only.]

                        NOTES FOR PRODUCTION CHARTS

Opium Yield Information.  An opium yield study conducted in Thailand from December 1991-February 1992 indicated that yield was about 28% lower than previously supposed. (11.6 kg/ha, instead of 16 kg/ha.)  We have adjusted the Thai opium estimate to reflect this new yield.  While there has been no comparable study in Burma, the USG believes that similar yields may apply in Burma.  If this proves to be the case, we will reflect the change in a future INCSR.  

Coca yield information.  After analyzing field studies conducted in Peru and Bolivia, in 1991 we concluded that we were underestimating the potential yield of the coca crop in Bolivia and particularly in Peru.  In 1990, we estimated the average yield for the entire coca crops in Bolivia and Peru as 1.6 and 1.14 metric tons per hectare, respectively, based on a small number of local sources.  The 1991 analysis revealed that mature coca bushes--those that are two to fifteen years old and capable of producing full leaf harvests three or four times a year--have average yields of 2.7 metric tons per hectare in Bolivia's Chapare region and 2.3 metric tons per hectare in Peru's Upper Huallaga Valley.  Mature plant yields elsewhere in these two nations appear to be 1.0 and 1.14 metric tons per hectare, respectively, close to our previous yield estimates for these other areas.  New coca bushes--those planted in the last two years--have very low yields and are often not even harvested.  Based on this analysis, we have been able to distinguish between new coca and mature coca in our cultivation estimates.  We have calculated the potential dry coca leaf crop in Bolivia and Peru for each of the last five years by multiplying the average mature coca plant yield times the estimate of the hectarage of mature coca under cultivation.  The previous yield estimate for the lowland coca variety grown in Colombia--800 kilograms per hectare--is still  believed to be accurate and is used to calculate that country's  potential

The net effect of this analysis has been to increase the estimated potential dry coca leaf harvest in the Andean region by about one third in each of the last six years.  The mature coca plant yield estimates highlight the fact that changes in dry coca leaf production will always lag behind changes in the area of coca under cultivation by two years.  

The data for previous years in Bolivia and Peru have been adjusted to reflect a ratio of 1.14 mt of leaf per hectare, in place of an earlier ratio of 1.03 mt of leaf per hectare. 

[EDITOR'S NOTE:  Charts: Coca Cultivation 1988-1992; Estimated World Opium Production 1988-1992;  Countries which have signed and/or ratified/acceded to the UN Convention is available in hard copy only.]



                             COUNTRY SUMMARIES

Afghanistan remains the second largest producer of illicit opium, after Burma.  According to USG estimates, the area of opium poppy cultivation in Afghanistan in 1992 increased some 12 percent to 19,470 hectares which would yield a potential 640 mt of opium.  If all this potential opium were refined, the result would be 64 mt of heroin.  About 20 percent of the heroin consumed in the U.S. comes from Southwest Asia, particularly Afghanistan and Pakistan.  Most of the heroin exported from the region goes to Europe.  Since the end of the Soviet occupation, the Government of Afghanistan (GOA) has publicly stated its opposition to drug production, trafficking and abuse.  Preoccupation with other priorities and a lack of control of large areas of the country by the GOA, however, has prevented it from taking effective concrete measures resulting in positive results against the illegal narcotics trade.  For the same reason, Afghanistan has not made any significant strides in implementing provisions of the 1988 UN Convention, which it ratified in February 1992.  The USG has official contacts with the government in Kabul in accord with efforts to promote a stable government.  The lack of central authority, however,h as allowed only extremely limited USG initiatives in support of Afghan counternarcotics efforts.

Albania appears to play a relatively minor role in the drug trade although there is little information on the extent of trafficking, production, or domestic consumption.  West European authorities believe that some Southwest Asian heroin transits Albania to Western Europe.  The Government of Albania (GOA) recognizes the threat drugs can pose and is assembling a narcotics coordinating comprised of representatives from Customs, and the ministries of Economy and Finance, Financial Police, Public Order,Health, and Education.  

Algeria.  Although Algeria is the second largest country in Africa, its drug consumption and trafficking problems are relatively modest.  Algeria does not produce opium or heroin, and cannabis production is largely for local use.  Most trafficking is in marijuana or hashish, although heroin, cocaine and barbiturates have, on occasion, been seized.  Algerian authorities believe that drug problems have grown in recent years because of expanded travel and trade between Algeria and Morocco since the 1988 opening of their border.  Moreover, recent tightening of the Spanish-Moroccan border has encouraged traffickers from Morocco to exploit the Algerian-French link.

Anguilla, the British Virgin Islands, Cayman Islands, Montserrat, and Turks and Caicos Islands are the UK's Caribbean Dependent Territories.  Bilateral agreements between these islands and the U.S. are negotiated with the HMG on behalf of the islands concerned.  The USG provided them some counternarcotics assistance, including law enforcement training, in 1991 and 1992.  There is no significant drug production on these islands, but, situated en route from the drug-producing countries of South America to the markets of the U.S. and Europe, they are convenient way stations for traffickers.  They are also tempting for drug-related financial dealings, especially the Cayman Islands with its immense offshore banking sector and bank secrecy laws.  The governors and some senior police and customs officials come from the UK which enjoys considerable freedom from high-level corruption.

In keeping with British policy on narcotics, territorial governments neither condone nor facilitate illicit drug activity.  The UK ratified the 1988 UN Convention in 1991, and is presently working with the territories on legislation needed for full compliance.  This is in place, with the exception of asset forfeiture legislation in the British Virgin Islands (BVI).  Upon completion of that legislation, expected early in 1993, the UK's ratification of the 1988 Convention will be extended to the territories.  With the exception of BVI asset forfeiture, the territories already are meeting the goals and objectives of the 1988 UN Convention in its entirety.  The U.S./Cayman Islands mutual legal assistance treaty (MLAT) has been extended to the other territories.  In June 1992, the Cayman Islands designated the U.S. as a country that can request seizure and confiscation of drug assets pursuant to the Misuse of Drugs Law and the Misuse of Drugs (drug Trafficking Offenses) (Designated Countries) Order 1991.  

Tortola in the BVI is the center of the territories' drug intelligence gathering network, with links to the JICC system and the El Paso Information Center (EPIC).  The central data base in Tortola provides a mechanism for local regional analysis, although the islands have cited a lack of feedback from EPIC.  The UK will establish a direct link between Tortola and the London-based National Criminal Intelligence Service, a British joint police and Customs unit which coordinates investigations of organized crime, including drug trafficking.  

Antigua and Barbuda.  This two-island nation, particularly Antigua, is a drug transit country.  The Government of Antigua and Barbuda (GOAB) increased drug interdiction, demand reduction, and awareness efforts during 1992, but uncertainties caused by infighting within the ruling party and public allegations of corruption created an impression of weakening resolve.  There was evidence of increased shipments in 1992; the Antiguan Coast Guard seized 500 kg of cocaine during the year.  The Antiguan airport is still used by traffickers, as indicated by drug seizures at destinations in the U.S. and Europe.  The country relies on offshore banking to augment its foreign exchange earnings, and its banks are money laundering targets.  There is no evidence of cannabis cultivation.

The GOAB has a narcotics control agreement with the U.S., under which the DEA, the U.S. Customs, the U.S. Coast Guard, and the military provide training and undertake cooperative efforts. The GOAB conducted a survey of domestic drug use and awareness under this arrangement.  The GOAB has not yet acceded to the 1988 UN Convention.  In 1992 it proposed legislation on asset seizure, government ethics, and offshore banking.  The GOAB's enforcement efforts, cooperation with U.S. agencies, and legislative initiatives are all consistent with the 1988 Convention's goals and objectives.

Argentina is primarily a transit country for Andean narcotics in route the U.S. and Europe, although there is some small-scale cultivation and processing as well.  It is also a major producer of essential and precursor chemicals, but the Argentine Government (GOA) is trying to control their sale and production.  Domestic drug abuse is on the rise.  Over recent years, government and public awareness of the threat posed by the illicit drug trade has increased.

The GOA has taken important steps to combat the drug problem, on its own and in cooperation with neighboring countries and the United States.  The Secretariat for Programming for Drug Prevention and the Fight Against Narcotics Trafficking, coordinates many aspects of Argentina's anti-narcotics efforts.  The Argentine military has expressed its desire to increase its involvement in supporting counternarcotics operations.  Limited resources and the lack of effective legislation are major impediments to a more successful effort.

Armenia.  There is little information on the extent of drug trafficking, cultivation, or abuse in Armenia, suggesting that Armenia's role in the drug trade may be minor.  Armenian authorities report that there is no illicit opium poppy cultivation in Armenia.  There are unconfirmed press reports that Afghan hashish and opium poppy straw from Central Asia are now smuggled through Armenia.  The opening of roads to Turkey and Iran is likely to expand such smuggling operations.  Moreover, the Armenian government (GOA) acknowledges that international drug organizations operate in Armenia.  This is underscored by the seizure of a 12 kilograms of South American cocaine last year.  The GOA believes that the proceeds from drug operations are laundered through local businesses.  Armenia's chemical industry, one of the largest in the NIS, could attract attention as a supplier of precursor and essential chemicals for illicit drug production.  

Australia is primarily a narcotics-consumer country, which traffickers are beginning to use for transshipment.  Some heroin may transit Australia bound for the U.S., while cocaine is being shipped from the U.S. and South America to Australia, and possibly onward to other Asian markets.  Australian authorities made two recent record seizures, which confirm the South American link.  Australian enforcement authorities recognize the seriousness of the narcotics  threat.  Reliable statistics on domestic use are not available.  Australia plays a leading role in the Financial Action Task Force.  

Austria is a narcotics transit country for heroin and cocaine destined for Western Europe.  Drug seizures in 1991 (1992 figures are not yet available) increased over the previous year.  Heroin seizures rose 33 percent to 102 kg and cocaine seizures more than doubled to 84 kg.  The number of drug-related indictments and deaths also increased.  Austria's National Bank issued a stricter code of conduct in February to tighten banking standards against money laundering.  In December, consistent with the requirements of the 1988 UN Convention, the Government of Austria (GOA) drafted a bill criminalizing money laundering.  Parliament is reluctant to pass the bill until implementation guidelines are developed, and loopholes in the bill are closed.  The extent of money laundering is unknown, but the current legal situation makes it a potentially serious problem.

Azerbaijan.  Narcotics trafficking and abuse in Azerbaijan increased markedly in the past year as its location and open borders make it an increasingly attractive transshipment point.  Azerbaijan has promoted cross-border trade and travel with Russia and Central Asia and has opened its border with Iran to encourage contact with the 12 to 20 million Azerbaijanis resident in northern Iran.  Information on the drug trafficking groups in Azerbaijan is limited but there are NIS press reports that Azerbaijani criminal networks, headquartered in Baku and other key cities, control 80 percent of the drug distribution operations in Moscow.  Before the USSR's collapse, all antidrug efforts were orchestrated from Moscow.  Azerbaijan has signed antidrug agreements with Iran, Georgia, and Russia.    

The Bahamas is an important transit country for Colombian cocaine as well as Jamaican marijuana destined for the U.S.  In 1992 the Government of the Commonwealth of The Bahamas (GCOB) continued to combat this traffic, a daunting task in a 700-island archipelago.  Although Bahamian and combined U.S.-Bahamian drug enforcement initiatives over the past ten years have reduced the volume of drugs transiting the country, The Bahamas continues to be an important drug transit country.  The government that assumed power in August 1992 announced its commitment to maintain and enhance its counternarcotics cooperation with the U.S.  The Bahamas was the first country to ratify the 1988 UN Convention.  In past years the GCOB has created or strengthened laws and agreements relating to sentencing of traffickers, drug asset forfeiture, and mutual legal assistance.  The Bahamas instituted tight controls on precursor and essential chemicals in 1992.  The GCOB amended its laws for the confiscation of laundered assets and upgraded the reporting requirements for corporations, but this area needs careful scrutiny or The Bahamas could become more of a target country for drug money launderers.  The Baltic Countries. The drug trade is beginning to emerge in the Baltic states of Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania, as conduits for smuggling drugs to Western Europe.  The open borders and proximity to Scandinavia have prompted Southwest Asian heroin trafficking networks to expand routes into the area.  Central Asian and Russian crime groups have established smuggling networks in the three countries.  In addition, large quantities of illicit amphetamines produced in Latvia have appeared in West European markets.  Health authorities in all three countries believe that drug abuse is on the rise, but that it is still a relatively minor problem. 

Economic and political issues continue to dominate the three governments, limiting high-level attention to the drug problem.  Manpower and resource shortages have hampered progress on antidrug strategies.  Experts from the three governments met in June to discuss the drug problem and agreed to increase regional cooperation.  

The Soviet Union was a party to the 1988 UN Convention, the 1961 Single Convention on Narcotic Drugs and its 1972 Protocol, and the 1971 Convention on Psychotropic Substances.  Based on these undertakings and the relevant principles of international law, the USG has reached the conclusion that these states are bound by these instruments.  Nonetheless, the USG has urged each of these states to take the necessary actions to accede to the conventions, so that the depository will include them on its list of parties.  

The USG has limited information to make an assessment of the Baltic states' performance in meeting the goals and objectives of the 1988 UN Convention.  Each has taken limited measures against drug trafficking and, while these actions are consistent with the convention's goals, the three will need to take additional steps to meet these goals fully.

All three governments have recognized the need to change their domestic legislation and formally accede to the international drug conventions.  They have reported efforts to draft updated penal codes that will take the UN drug conventions into consideration.  In the interim, the USSR's 1961 penal code remains in place.  Moreover, the UNDCP plans to hold a legislation drafting workshop for the Baltics early in 1993.  (See individual country entries below).

Bangladesh is not a significant producer of narcotics, but it has the potential to become a significant transshipment point for heroin because of its proximity to producing areas and its extremely limited interdiction capability.  The Bangladesh Government's (BDG) Department of Narcotics Control (DNC) takes the lead on narcotics issues, but law enforcement is hampered by inadequate resources and a lack of coordination between government departments.  Thus far, international support for the BDG's fledgling narcotics control efforts has been limited.  However, a proposed $1.7 million United Nations Drug Control Program (UNDCP) project for Bangladesh, along with increased bilateral assistance, should enhance the BDG's narcotics control capabilities.  Bangladesh is a party to the 1988 UN Convention.

Barbados.  Government officials link an unusual rise in the crime rate to increased drug use and trafficking, and a decline in the country's economic mainstay, tourism.  Historically, cocaine has arrived by commercial airline, but trafficking by small boats is now increasing.  There are also indications that cruise ship crews carry cocaine to the U.S. Virgin Islands and Puerto Rico for onward shipment.  In October 1992, Barbados became a party to the 1988 UN Convention.  As exemplified by its drug seizures and a more dedicated approach to law enforcement, the government is moving toward compliance with the convention's goals and objectives.  

Belarus.  Drug trafficking groups are expanding smuggling operations through Belarus, while domestic drug use is reportedly increasing.  Traffickers seeking new routes to Russia and Western Europe are moving heroin, hashish, and/or opium from Afghanistan and Pakistan by rail.  Health authorities believe that this transit trade is fueling an already extensive domestic drug market.  There is some cultivation of poppy in Belarus, although the extent is not known.  The Government of Belarus (GOB) has noted concern about the increased drug threat, but has not yet devoted high-level attention to the problem.  There has only been limited progress in enacting a comprehensive antidrug strategy and possession of drugs for personal use is legal.  Nevertheless, Belarus has become a party to all international drug conventions, including the 1988 UN Convention.  While Belarus has made only limited progress in meeting the goals and objectives of the 1988 UN convention, efforts are underway to change domestic legislation to promote its implementation through pending antidrug legislation, which will make possession of small quantities of drugs for personal use illegal.

Belgium is an increasingly significant entry and transit point for heroin, cocaine, marijuana, and hashish into Europe and the United States.  Belgium enacted comprehensive money laundering legislation in 1991 and expects 1992 drug investigations will provide the foundation for drug money laundering prosecutions in 1993.  Belgium justice and police organizations are aggressively pursuing drug traffickers and money launderers.  

Belize.  The government of Belize (GOB) recognizes that transit of cocaine and, to a lesser extent, cultivation and export of marijuana, are the major drug problems in the country.  The GOB also recognizes the danger the illicit drug problem poses to its long established democratic institutions.  The GOB has shown a serious commitment to the fight against drugs by its own initiatives and actions and by its support of USG counternarcotics programs.

Benin.  Southeast and Southwest Asian heroin transits Benin to Nigeria, and ultimately Europe and the U.S.  Locally grown cannabis is used to a limited extent, and anecdotal evidence indicates growing use of crack cocaine among youth in Cotonou.  Benin is a party to the 1961, 1971 and 1972 UN conventions and protocol, but not to the 1988 UN Convention.  Although the USG has no information about Benin's plans to ratify the 1988 Convention, it has taken certain measures that are consistent with the goals and objectives of the convention.  

Bolivia is a major producer of coca leaf and coca derivatives.  In 1992, the Government of Bolivia (GOB) continued to make progress in narcotics law enforcement, carrying out a number of major law enforcement operations, most notably "Ghost Zone", which challenged trafficker aircraft access to the Chapare region, and disrupted trafficker activities on the ground.  Seizures of coca leaf, cocaine base, and cocaine HCl increased.  Although the GOB extradited one trafficker to the U.S. in July, in December the Bolivian Supreme Court denied a U.S. request for a second accused trafficker.  The USG would like to sign a new extradition treaty with Bolivia.  In contrast to the genuine progress realized in law enforcement and interdiction in 1992, the GOB failed to meet the coca eradication goals in bilateral agreements with the U.S.  However, there may have been a small net reduction in the crop.  The problems surrounding coca eradication point to the limits in GOB political will and capability to support counternarcotics activities. 

Botswana is a transit country for illegal narcotics -- mainly methaqualone (Mandrax), marijuana, and some cocaine -- from India through Kenya, Zimbabwe, Zambia, and into South Africa.  Small quantities of drugs have recently been identified as bound for the U.S.  Botswana is a party to the 1961 and 1971 Conventions and the 1972 Protocol, but not to the 1988 Convention. 

Burkina Faso is neither a major drug producing nor consuming country, but drug use in certain sectors such as mining has grown rapidly in recent years.  There is heroin trafficking from Nigeria to Cote d'Ivoire and Ghana.  Traffickers also transit Ouagadougou by air from India and Ethiopia to Nigeria.  Burkina Faso ratified the 1988 UN Convention in 1992.  Although there is sufficient information to evaluate how well it is meeting the goals and objectives of the 1988 Convention, Burkina Faso has set up antidrug units in its two largest cities, an action which is consistent with the Convention.  

Brazil is both a major transit country for cocaine and a major producer of essential and precursor chemicals.  A severe political crisis, coupled with chronic economic problems, has kept the Government of Brazil (GOB) from effectively addressing a rising drug trafficking and consumption problem.  Comprehensive anti-narcotics legislation languished in committee while the Congress devoted its energies to investigate, impeach, and try President Collor.  The instability caused by power struggles over key senior government positions, such as Justice Minister, hampered the operation of narcotics law enforcement in 1992.  In the aftermath of the Collor resignation, the reorganized security force, including the narcotics unit, continues under new President (former Vice President) Itamar Franco, who has declared 1993 a "year to combat narcotics trafficking."

Brunei has few drug abuse or other drug-related problems.  Of the 258 drug-related arrests in 1992, the vast majority were for the possession of excessive quantities of cough medicine containing codeine, which is the drug abused most.  Small amounts of marijuana, cocaine and heroin have been intercepted in Brunei, but in all cases to date, the quantities involved have been below the legally established thresholds distinguishing personal consumption from drug trafficking, the penalty for which is death.  Brunei is meeting the goals and objectives of the 1988 UN Convention, which the Bruneian Government has signed but not yet ratified.  

Bulgaria 's role as a conduit for smuggling Southwest Asian heroin grew over the past year, as traffickers expanded routes and diversified operations.  In an effort to circumvent improved security in West European airports, traffickers, especially Nigerian heroin trafficking organizations, are now targeting Bulgaria as an entry point to the continent.  The Government of Bulgaria (GOB) expanded its antidrug efforts in 1992, reflected in increased seizures, the ratification of the 1988 UN Convention, and a stated policy that the drug trade was no longer only a foreign problem. 

Burma  accounts for about 50 percent of worldwide opium and heroin production.  Following the 1988 coup and the suspension of most foreign narcotics control aid, the Government of Burma (GOB) focused on domestic political problems and sharply cut back its already limited counternarcotics program.  Potential opium production nearly doubled within three years.  In 1989, the GOB struck deals with major insurgent/trafficking groups.  Although it claims that these accords include long-term opium poppy crop substitution goals, there has been no decline in opium poppy cultivation in areas controlled by these groups.

Cameroon is not a major drug transit, producing, or money laundering country.  Drug trafficking seems unlikely to reach significant levels in the near future, although Cameroon's political instability, corruption, and long border with Nigeria make it vulnerable.  Cameroon is a party to the 1988 UN Convention and meets some of its goals and objectives.  In keeping with the Convention, Cameroon has instituted airport interdiction and public education programs and increased inter-ministerial coordination through a newly created national drug fighting committee.  

Canada increasingly is a conduit for drugs destined for the U.S. as well as a haven for drug money laundering.  The Canadian Government (GOC) is strongly  committed to narcotics control, and in 1990 ratified the 1988 UN Vienna Convention.  The GOC allocates 70% to 80% of its drug control expenditures to demand reduction, with the balance for supply reduction.  Canadian law enforcement agencies cooperate closely with international agencies and foreign police forces.  

Cape Verde  is used increasingly as a transit country for narcotics from South America and Africa to Europe.  DEA reports indicate that Colombian cartels recruit Cape Verdian nationals to smuggle cocaine into Portugal by air and sea.  Local drug production and consumption is low.  Cape Verde is a party to the 1961 and 1971 Conventions and the 1972 Protocol, but not to the 1988 Convention, nor is the USG aware of Cape Verde's plans to accede to the accord.  

Chad's long and uncontrolled borders, especially its border with Nigeria, make it a transit country for international narcotics.  Nigerian drug smugglers move some Asian heroin to or from Nigeria into Chad and other West African countries for onward shipment to the U.S. and Europe.  Although the Chadian Government does not encourage or facilitate illicit drug production or distribution, or money laundering, neither does it make a serious effort to prevent or punish the corruption that facilitates the cross-border narcotics trade.  Domestic consumption of illegal drugs is limited to locally grown cannabis and a hallucinogenic stimulant called "forty birds".

Chile.  Traffickers increasingly use Chile as a transit route for South American cocaine destined for the U.S., Europe, and Asia.  Chile is also used to launder drug-related money, and is a major source of essential and precursor chemicals for cocaine processing in Bolivia and, to a lesser extent, Peru.  The Government of Chile (GOC) in 1992 introduced antidrug legislation which provides penalties for important drug-related crimes not covered by existing narcotics laws, including money laundering and the shipment of essential and precursor chemicals for illicit use.  The GOC ratified the 1988 UN Convention in 1990 and is moving toward compliance.  

China has become a major narcotics transit route for heroin and other opiates from neighboring Burma, Laos and Vietnam.  It is also, increasingly, an opium producer itself.  Although much of the heroin which transits China is destined for the United States and other overseas markets, a growing amount is consumed in China where drug abuse has spread from border provinces to the interior.  In 1992, the PRC mounted a nationwide crackdown against crime, including narcotics trafficking.  To cope with the growing narcotics problem, China has made efforts to enhance law enforcement measures, public education, and international cooperation.  The PRC is a party to the 1988 UN Convention, as well as the UN 1961 accord on narcotics, and its protocol, as well as the 1971 convention on psychotropic substances.   U.S.-China bilateral counter-narcotics cooperation still remains restricted by Chinese views on the situation of Wang Zongxiao, a Chinese drug trafficker who sought political asylum in the US after Chinese authorities, in accordance with a US request, had sent him to the US to testify in the "Goldfish" trial.  USG officials have stressed that the still unresolved situation of Wang case should not block improved bilateral cooperation.  PRC officials insist that Wang be returned to China.

Colombia maintained its aggressive policies against drug production and trafficking despite new challenges from violent drug trafficking organizations and their increasing efforts to establish a heroin industry.  Colombia continued to cooperate closely with the USG on a broad range of narcotics control issues.  For the Colombian Government (GOC), Pablo Escobar's escape from prison in July was a major embarrassment which was politically costly at home and abroad.  President Cesar Gaviria, however, responded quickly, ordering the censure, retirement, or indictment of officials believed responsible.  The GOC also initiated a manhunt of unprecedented proportions in its search.  Although Escobar remained at large at the end of the year, many of his key associates had been killed or captured, or had returned to prison voluntarily.  

The GOC made a difficult political decision to eradicate opium poppy with the aerial application of herbicide, while observing strict environmental standards.  This decision, coupled with the Colombian National Police's (CNP) aggressive manual spraying effort, began to stabilize the extent of opium poppy cultivation.  The GOC, however, needs additional resources to curb the spread of opium poppy and to discourage the replanting of eradicated poppy fields.  The USG provided $15 million in additional resources during the year for this purpose.  For the third successive year, the GOC achieved a net reduction in coca cultivation.  Cannabis cultivation remained minimal.

The GOC opened its new Prosecutor General's office July 1, an important step in criminal justice reform and in improving the prosecution of narcotics cases.  Colombia signed the UN Convention in 1988; ratification is a high priority for the Gaviria administration, but it has faced strong opposition in Congress.  The Senate's Committee on International Relations unanimously rejected the convention in June over legal and sovereignty concerns.  The Gaviria administration resubmitted it to the present congressional session and is continuing its efforts to win ratification by June 1993.  Although the Convention is still unratified, which impedes certain counternarcotics efforts, the discussion below demonstrates that the GOC is generally meeting its goals and objectives.  

Colombian law enforcement and military components participated fully in bilateral and multilateral air interdiction, and in money laundering and asset seizure operations, many targeted at the Cali cartel.  The CNP and Venezuelan security forces conducted a successful cross-border interdiction operation.  Colombia is conducting its first national-level drug abuse survey.  Strong political will to combat narcotics is clearly evident at the highest echelons of the GOC, but the scope and complexities of the well-entrenched, violent trafficking structure, sometimes working in concert with insurgent elements, in addition to a legal infrastructure composed of inadequately trained and underpaid judiciary, prosecutors' offices and law enforcement components, make elimination of the drug problem a long-term prospect.  

Comoros is a transit point for drugs originating in Madagascar, destined for Africa and France.  Comoros is not a party to any of the international drug conventions, but has expressed an interest in acceding to the 1988 Convention.  

Costa Rica has long been a transit point for Andean cocaine en route to the U.S, but traffic in heroin also appeared in 1992. Costa Rican concern is growing about domestic abuse of cocaine, as well as a possible increase in drug-related money laundering.  The Government of Costa Rica (GOCR) has modernized its counternarcotics laws and begun to coordinate demand reduction and enforcement activities.  Although the GOCR added personnel to the counternarcotics force, police still lack adequate training and professionalism.  

Cuba.  There is some evidence that Cuba plays a role in the illicit drug trade, given its strategic location astride drug routes into the United States.  The Government of Cuba (GOC) continues to give a high profile to its stated anti-drug policies, some of which have been backed by action.  Cuba cooperated with drug enforcement authorities of other countries in  1992, including a limited exchange of law enforcement information with the United States.  Shortages of fuel and spare parts due to Cuba's deepening economic crisis limited its ability to interdict drugs.  While there are reports that senior level Cuban officials are involved in drug trafficking, the USG does not have sufficient hard information to make a firm judgment on the validity of these reports.

Cyprus' location, together with its well-developed commercial and tourism facilities, it an attractive meeting point for traffickers.  Heroin transits Cyprus by container cargo and air to and from Europe.  The Government of Cyprus (GOC) continues to adopt and strictly enforce strong laws in accordance with the 1988 UN Convention.

Czech and Slovak Federal Republic.   Political changes over the past several years left the Czech and Slovak Federal Republic (CSFR) vulnerable to heroin traffickers seeking new routes between Southwest Asia and Western Europe.  This was reflected in the ten-fold increase in heroin seizures between 1991 and 1992, most destined for Western Europe.  CSFR authorities also continued to interdict numerous couriers headed West with small quantities of cocaine.  The CSFR also emerged as a significant producer of illegal amphetamines.  Trafficking groups expanded domestic Czech and Slovak drug markets and recruited  couriers from the CSFR.  The authorities believe that drug traffickers may target the CSFR banking industry to launder funds as well.  The country was one of the first East European nations to establish antidrug cooperation with Western Europe and the U.S.  Although the division in 1992 of the CSFR into independent Czech and Slovak republics diverted government attention, interdiction operations and demand reduction efforts continued.  

Denmark.  Although Denmark is not a producer of illicit drugs,  its excellent transportation facilities make it a hub for drug traffic to the Nordic area.  Danish officials are concerned that narcotics abuse may be growing.  Government officials estimate there are approximately 10,000 addicts in Denmark.  There were 188 drug related deaths in 1991, an increase of 64% from 1990.  The main drugs of abuse are hashish and heroin.  As elsewhere in Europe, Danish Government officials are also concerned about increased use of the synthetic drug "ecstasy."

Dominica.  Drug activity is less significant in Dominica than in the other islands, partly because its tourist industry is relatively underdeveloped.  The government has asked for UN and USG advice on legislative preparation for signing the 1988 UN Convention.  

The Dominican Republic is a transit route for cocaine and marijuana destined for the U.S.  Traffickers also use the country for storage, and as a base of operations.  The level of trafficking activities did not change significantly during 1992, despite Dominican interdiction and enforcement efforts.  There is a low incidence of domestic illicit drug use.  In 1992 the Government of the Dominican Republic (GODR) established a Legal Advisory Commission to oversee legislative changes prior to ratification of the 1988 UN Convention.  Cooperation between the U.S. and the Dominican Republic remained close and productive.  Corruption continues to be a problem impeding more effective action against drug trafficking.  

Ecuador is a transit country for drugs and precursor chemicals.  Precursor chemicals move though Ecuador to Colombia, while processed drugs, primarily cocaine, return from Colombia en route to the United States and Europe.  Ecuador is also used extensively for drug money laundering by Colombian narcotics traffickers.

Egypt is not significant in drug trafficking or production, money laundering, or the manufacture of precursor drugs.  Nevertheless, it is a transit country for some heroin destined for Western Europe and North America.  Egypt does not yet have a serious problem with the abuse of hard drugs, although there is some concern about an increase in the number of heroin addicts.  There is little evidence of cocaine use, but the use of hashish is widespread.  Small amounts of opium poppies and cannabis are grown locally.  In 1991 Egypt became a party to the 1988 UN Convention, but implementing legislation has not yet been passed.  The 1991 U.S.-Egyptian bilateral narcotics control agreement was amended in 1992 to provide additional INM funding to the Egyptian Anti-Narcotics General Administration (ANGA), whose responsibilities roughly parallel those of DEA.  Egyptian drug laws are strictly enforced and provide severe penalties for drug trafficking.

El Salvador lies on major land, sea and air narcotics shipment routes for narcotics moving from Colombia to the U.S.  President Cristiani has made narcotics control a priority of his administration by establishing and supporting the Executive Anti-narcotics Unit (UEA), which has proven to be highly motivated and effective.

The only illicit drug produced by El Salvador is marijuana for domestic consumption.  Cocaine use is limited but increasing.  Neither USG nor Central Bank officials are aware of any significant narcotics-related money laundering, despite El Salvador's weak legal regime and liberal currency laws. DEA does have reports that trafficking groups are involved in moving drug proceeds from the U.S. to El Salvador, however. 

Estonia.  The drug trade is gaining ground in Estonia, but the problems of trafficking, cultivation, and abuse are still minimal.  Estonia's location and lack of border controls make it increasingly vulnerable.  Law enforcement authorities indicate that drugs from Southwest Asia are smuggled to Estonia by land, sea and air.  Often the opium and hashish cargoes are transferred to Estonian ships bound for Europe, particularly Scandinavia.  Police authorities also have noted, for the first time, that small quantities of cocaine are transiting Estonia to Western Europe.  Most drug operations involve criminal groups from Southwest and Central Asia.  Police have discovered several Russian crime groups that include Estonians and are suspected of drug smuggling.  They also note that drug money is laundered through hard currency auction, the buying and selling of rare metals, and through the purchase of raw materials in Russia for hard currency.  Because there is no effective state control over exporting of essential or precursor chemicals Estonia could be targetted.  There have already been some reports of small quantities of illicit exports of acetone and acetic anhydride to Finland.

Ethiopia . Addis Ababa is the hub for Ethiopian Airlines and a major center of African air travel.  Lack of controls, particularly with regard to drugs, has made Ethiopian Airlines an attractive means of transporting illegal products to other markets.  The airport receives direct passenger and cargo flights from Thailand and Pakistan and India.  Nigerian and other couriers regularly bring narcotics out of Southwest and Southeast Asia through Addis Ababa for onward shipment to Western Europe and the U.S.  Ethiopia is a party to the 1961 and 1971 UN Conventions, but not the 1972 Protocol or the 1988 UN Convention.  

Fiji and Tonga face an incipient marijuana problem among local youths stemming from contact with foreign travellers and the many emigrant Tongans who return to visit home.  Marijuana cultivation occurs on some of the remote islands of both countries.  To date, however, there is no evidence of large-scale local marijuana use nor of use of hard drugs by local citizens.  Fiji has not yet signed the 1988 UN Convention.  Tonga is not a member of the UN.

Finland  Modest narcotics trafficking to Finland supplies the domestic addict population and transit to third countries.  The Finnish Government has a good record in enforcing its narcotics laws which cover most offenses except money laundering.  However, Government of Finland officials (GOF) expect that money laundering legislation will be enacted in early 1993.  Demand reduction and prevention programs are actively pursued by the government.  The USG supports Finnish narcotics law enforcement and provides some training.  The Finns are training Estonian officials in drug control techniques. 

France is an important as a transit country for drugs from the Middle East and Indian Subcontinent.  Vigorous enforcement resulted in significant drug seizures by police, including over 3 mt of cocaine seized in 1992.  Cooperation between the French Central Narcotics Office, the DEA, and other international law enforcement agencies is good.  Heroin and cocaine use is on the rise.  Recent French legislation has facilitated police undercover activity, especially in money laundering investigations.  France is active in international antidrug organizations, including the Financial Action Task Force (FATF) where it served as its first president, the Chemical Action Task Force (CATF), and the Dublin Group.  France ratified the 1988 UN Drug Convention on December 31, 1990.  It is a contributing member of the UNDCP. 

The Gambia is facing a growing problem of drug trafficking, primarily heroin, within and across its borders, largely by Nigerian traffickers.  Since the creation of a drug squad in 1986, however, law enforcement efforts have been better coordinated and more effective.  The Gambia is a party to the 1961 Convention but not the other UN conventions or protocol.  Nonetheless, it has taken a number of independent actions that comply with the goals and objectives of the 1988 Convention. 

Georgia.  Georgian officials have recently expressed concern that drug trafficking and abuse may be escalating.  Press reports stated that opium poppy and hashish are being brought into or through Georgia from Central Asia and Azerbaijan but most information on smuggling operations is anecdotal.  Official statistics report 4,000 registered drug addicts in Georgia, but health authorities believe the number is much higher and that use is expanding.  They cite the use of hashish, opium, morphine, and even heroin.  Police officials indicate that expanded drug activity is prompting a rise in burglaries, robberies, assaults, and even murder.  Georgia's antidrug campaign appears to have come to a halt with the break up of the Soviet Union.  

Germany is increasingly affected by narcotics trafficking.   Overdose deaths reflect the expanding domestic market for illicit drugs.   Germany's federal and state governments have moved to combat drug abuse on several fronts, following the promulgation in 1990 of a comprehensive national program on drug abuse control.  In 1992, the number of drug therapy sites in the FRG increased by 18 percent.  FRG legislature passed an organized crime law that made money laundering illegal, permitted the seizure of illicit assets, and widened the application of existing FRG narcotics control laws.  In addition, bills on tracing illicit profits and on implementation of the 1988 UN Convention advanced in the legislative process.  To streamline inter-agency coordination, the federal government in 1992 created the position of national drug coordinator in the Interior Ministry.  Internationally, the  FRG hosted a Dublin Group meeting on Assistance to Eastern Europe and is organizing preparatory work for the development of the Europol drug unit.  

Ghana is a transit point for cocaine from Latin America and heroin from Southeast and Southwest Asia in route to the U.S. and Europe.  These drugs largely are handled by Nigerian trafficking organizations using Ghanaian carriers.  However, some Ghanaian entrepreneurs have begun to smuggle narcotics directly from source countries to western markets or into Ghana.  Ghana ranks second to Nigeria as the source of narcotics couriers in West Africa.  Marijuana remains the most abused drug in Ghana.  Ghana is a party to all the UN antidrug conventions, and is meeting the goals and objectives of the 1988 UN Convention.

Greece continues to be a key transshipment point for illicit narcotics from major drug producing nations in the Middle East and South Asia, destined for Europe and the U.S.  The current turmoil in the former Yugoslavia has forced many traffickers to bypass that region, resulting in increased levels of heroin and hashish leaving Greece by ship.

Grenada.  Illicit narcotics are a growing problem in Grenada.  Enforcement resources are limited, and the open coastline is ideal for smuggling activities.  Grenada is a party to the 1988 UN Convention, and senior officials have committed the government to the fight against narcotics.  The country's active antidrug measures indicate that it is meeting the goals and objectives of the convention.  

Guatemala is a major transit country for cocaine and has been an important potential producer of opium.  Aerial and manual crop control operations destroyed about 470 ha of opium poppy under cultivation in Guatemala.  By the end of 1992, following an active Guatemalan-USG crop control effort, surveys were unable to detect any significant poppy cultivation--although small, scattered plots still exist.  The GOG recognizes the security and health threat posed by illicit drugs and is committed to cocaine interdiction and opium poppy control.  Guatemalan law enforcement agencies have worked closely with the DEA in Operation Cadence, a cocaine interdiction program.  Combined USG-GOG cocaine interdiction operations in 1992 seized 9.5 mt of cocaine.  The Guatemalan Treasury Police are the principal beneficiaries of USG assistance and take the lead in eradication and enforcement actions.  Guatemala and Mexico are cooperating increasingly on narcotics control on their border.  Drug-related corruption continues to be a problem challenging the GOG.

Guyana's heavily forested and sparsely populated interior, with numerous small, remote airfields, provides ready access to traffickers shipping cocaine from Venezuela, Brazil and Suriname through Guyana to the Caribbean and the U.S.  Officials expect the volume transiting Guyana to increase as interdiction efforts in the Caribbean increase.  An undetermined amount of cannabis grows year-round, especially along waterways.  Guyana has stated its intention to ratify the 1988 UN Convention in 1993 after it adopts appropriate implementing legislation.  

Haiti.  Colombian trafficking organizations continue to use Haiti as a base of operations and transit country for cocaine en route to the U.S.  The de facto government of Haiti has not effectively attacked the problem.  We do not have an accurate assessment of the amount of cocaine transiting Haiti.  President Aristide's ouster in the September 1991 coup d'etat halted close bilateral narcotics control cooperation with Haiti, except in certain areas of law enforcement.  Corruption of Haitian officials continues to be a major problem.  Haiti is not a party to the 1988 UN Convention.

Honduras is a transit route for cocaine destined for the U.S. and Europe.  Although the Honduran Air Force deters drug traffickers from using Honduran air space, transit by land and sea remains essentially unhindered.  Hondurans produce marijuana but do not grow or produce other illicit drugs.  Local cocaine consumption has increased markedly in recent years, perhaps as a result of traffickers paying their Honduran accomplices in kind.  The Government of Honduras (GOH) has paid increasing attention to the problem since 1989, adhering to the 1988 UN Convention as well as creating a National Antidrug Council.  Hondurans admit that widespread corruption is a serious impediment to drug control efforts.  U.S.- Honduran cooperation has been good; INM-funded programs have helped equip rapid reaction forces, and established an information clearinghouse.

Hong Kong is an important center for brokering and transshipping heroin from the Golden Triangle to the United States and other destinations.  Drug traffickers also use it to launder their narcotics earnings.  The applicability of the 1988 UN Convention will extend to Hong Kong, through the United Kingdom's ratification, when appropriate local legislation is passed.  At this time, Hong Kong's active counternarcotics effort represents substantial compliance with the goals and objectives of that Convention.

Hungary.  Efforts by drug traffickers to expand their operations  out-paced the government's antidrug activities in 1992.  Drug organizations are now shipping more drugs, mostly heroin but also some cocaine, through Hungary to Western Europe.  Hungarian officials suspect that drug traffickers also are using the antiquated banking industry to launder funds.  The Government of Hungary (GOH) interdiction and demand reduction efforts have been limited by the shortages of trained customs and police personnel, equipment, and other resources.  Political and economic problems in the region have prevented the emergence of a regional coordinated antidrug campaign among East European nations.  

Iceland's drug problems are less severe than those of its European neighbors, primarily because of its small population  and its isolation.  However, the use of cocaine and other drugs is growing.  Government of Iceland (GOI) policy makers and law enforcement officials are committed to combatting the drug problem.  As the drug problem grows, the GOI is showing a willingness to extend international cooperation and to establish legal standards consistent with the 1988 UN Convention.  Iceland cooperates closely with Interpol, other Nordic countries, and the DEA to intercept drug traffickers.

India's importance to the international drug market lies in the transit of heroin and other illegal opium derivatives across its borders from neighboring producing countries.  Other important drug control problems are diversion from its licit opium industry to illicit channels, illegal cultivation, and illicit export of chemicals for processing heroin.  Despite good cooperation with the United States on individual cases of trafficking and an increasingly strong effort to curtail diversion from licit cultivation, the Government of India (GOI) needs to raise the priority of anti-drug programs and take stronger measures to control the transit of drugs and to prevent diversion. India is a party to the 1988 U.N. Convention and is making progress in meeting the Convention's goals and objectives.

Indonesia is not a major narcotics processing country nor money laundering center.  Although marijuana is produced in large quantities, little enters the U.S. market.  Domestic drug abuse is a small but growing problem, and the Government of Indonesia (GOI) views drug abuse and trafficking as a major long-term threat to social stability.  U.S.-Indonesian cooperation is good, with the USG providing funding for training and equipment procurement and the GOI cooperating with the U.S. Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA) in a number of areas.  Indonesia has signed, but is not yet a party to, the 1988 UN Convention.

Iran is a major transshipment point for illegal opiates from Pakistan and Afghanistan destined principally for Europe but also the U.S.  The USG estimates that approximately 3,50O ha of opium poppy were under cultivation in Iran in 1992.  The Government of Iran (GOI) claims success in combatting the illegal drug trade.  However, since the break in U.S.-Iranian diplomatic relations in 1979, the USG cannot verify these assertions.  Iran ratified the 1988 UN Convention in 1992, but the USG does not have sufficient information to indicate whether Iran is meeting the treaty's goals and objectives.

Ireland is increasing in importance as an international narcotics transit country.  Its long, sparsely patrolled coastline makes maritime drug transfers and clandestine landings of drugs relatively easy.  Its proximity to other West European drug markets, such as Great Britain and the Netherlands, make it increasingly attractive as a base.  Irish authorities suspect that the Provisional Irish Republican Army (PIRA) is increasingly involved in racketeering and may be becoming more active in narcotics trafficking.  Ireland's small population limits domestic demand, but drug use is increasing, especially among the affluent young.  Irish authorities do not believe that trade in precursor chemicals is a problem, but fear that money laundering is increasing.  Reliable statistics are scarce.  Ireland is a founding member of the Dublin Group and an active participant in the EC's Trevi Group, and continues to support international narcotics control cooperation.  Ireland has not yet ratified the 1988 UN Convention .    Israel is a transit country for heroin and hashish, which are also the drugs of choice in the modest, but growing, domestic drug abuse populace.  The Government of Israel (GOI) regards the war on drugs as a national priority; the police rank drug control as its third priority after internal security and public order.  The Knesset (Parliament) has enacted stricter laws for drug smuggling and trafficking, and increased the severity of punishment for dealers.  Since Israeli drug-trafficking rings are spread throughout the world, the Israeli National Police strongly support cooperation with foreign police forces, and has stationed drug liaison officers in Turkey, Holland and France.  Israel has signed, but not ratified, the 1988 UN Convention.

Italy is a transshipment point for drugs moving from Southwest Asia to the United States.  Italian anti-drug policy emphasizes demand reduction and treatment, but authorities are also focussing on law enforcement, particularly on Mafia-related activities.  Despite new financial record-keeping requirements, Italy is emerging as a leading money laundering center in Europe.  The Italian authorities have cooperated closely with the USG, as evidenced by the success in 1992 of "Operation Green Ice", a U.S. Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA) international money laundering sting operation.  Italy is active in the Dublin Group, the Chemical Action Task Force, and the Financial Action Task Force, and is a major donor to the United Nations International Drug Control Program (UNDCP).  Italy ratified the 1988 UN Convention in 1990.  

Ivory Coast (Cote D'Ivoire)'s international airport in Abidjan is a transit point in the international narcotics trade, primarily for Asian heroin and some South American cocaine headed toward Europe and North America.  Ivorian production of illicit drugs is limited to small amounts of low-grade cannabis for domestic consumption.  Domestic use of illegal narcotics, particularly heroin and cocaine, increased in 1992.  Cote d'Ivoire has an organized counternarcotics effort coordinated by the National Drug Police (NDP).  The Ivorian Government recognizes that narcotics are a growing problem, but is unable to devote the resources necessary to make a major impact on the problem.  Cote d'Ivoire signed a bilateral agreement with the U.S. in 1992.

Jamaica is favorably situated for transshipment of South American cocaine to the U.S. and is also a marijuana producing country.  In 1992, Jamaican counternarcotics agencies worked with DEA against cocaine and marijuana distribution and trafficking networks, and to target, arrest, and prosecute traffickers.  A U.S. National Guard temporary radar station, established in southwestern Jamaica in August 1991 to monitor suspect aircraft, has increased the country's detection capability.  The Jamaican Joint Information Coordination Center (JICC) increased its output of useful information, including identifications of trafficking aircraft, vessels, and individuals, up by almost a quarter over 1991.  Preliminary estimates indicate that cannabis planting decreased by a third; although crop destruction declined 3 percent, harvestable cultivation in 1992 was less than half of the 1991 amount.  Private sector organizations continued their narcotics education and awareness programs.  Jamaica is not a Caribbean financial center nor an important money laundering site.  It has not ratified the 1988 UN Convention but acts in accord with many of its provisions.  Corruption continues to be a problem impeding the effectiveness of narcotics control efforts in Jamaica.

Japan.  Southeast Asian heroin transits Japan, but not on a large scale by world standards.  Although methamphetamine is the drug of choice, there are signs that a market for cocaine may be developing.  Japan is a party to the 1988 UN Convention and has enacted several laws to conform with the treaty.  As a result of currency control laws, one of the country's most potentially significant narcotics related problems is money laundering. 

Jordan does not produce illicit drugs; problems associated with drug transshipment also have been minor.  The majority of trafficking has been in hashish, although heroin has been seized on rare occasions.  Although domestic consumption of hashish is limited at present, and the level of narcotics addiction is low, some Jordanian expatriate workers returning from abroad may bring acquired drug habits with them.  The primary concern for Jordanian authorities is narcotics traffic from Lebanon, through Jordan, to Egypt and the Gulf states.  Cooperation with Egyptian law enforcement officials remains adequate to address issues of mutual concern.  The Government of Jordan (GOJ) is imposing strict border-control procedures, stepping up customs inspections, tightening regulations on overland transport of goods, and increasing surveillance of suspects, in part as a result of its heightened sanctions enforcement efforts.  Narcotics enforcement coordination has been vested in the Pan-Arab Bureau for Narcotics Affairs.

Kazakhstan plays a key role in the Central Asian drug trade because of its location, its fields of wild cannabis, and the traditional production of licit opiates.  One-third of all illicit drug seizures in the former USSR took place in Kazakhstan, reflecting its role as a center for drug smuggling.  The lack of effective customs controls, and the increasing transportation links throughout the area, will likely bolster trafficking.  There is little information on local drug smugglers or their operations, though there are some reports of Kazakhstani involvement in drug smuggling in Eastern Europe.   Although drug abuse is not considered a serious threat, health officials believe it is much higher than reflected in the number of registered addicts, 10,697 in 1991.  This number primarily reflects cannabis users in regions where cultivation is high.  In Chimkent, a recent survey indicates one out of every 14 citizens uses cannabis products.  Health officials report note that the use of opium poppy straw and ephedrine may also be on the rise.   The government's nascent drug control efforts largely have continued activities begun under the USSR and have focused on illicit trafficking and cultivation.  

Kenya. Southwest and Southeast Asian heroin transits Kenya en route to Europe and North America.  Indian methaqualone (Mandrax) also is shipped by drug traffickers through Kenya on its way to South Africa.  Kenya acceded to the 1988 UN Convention in 1992, but its Parliament failed to pass implementing legislation.  Kenya is not a major producer of illicit drugs, though cannabis grows and is used extensively within the country.  The stimulant miraa, called khat in the Arab world, is grown legally and exported, primarily to Somalia.  During 1992, the Government of Kenya (GOK) assisted in the successful extradition of one drug suspect to the U.S., but a court allowed a suspect in another case to escape.  Corruption, inefficiency, lack of resources, and an apparent lack of political will to combat drug trafficking plague Kenya's judicial system and law enforcement agencies.   Kyrgyzstan.  The illicit drug industry has already begun to gain a foothold in Kyrgyzstan.  Opium poppy cultivation and trafficking are accelerating throughout the country.  Several Kyrgyz officials have indicated that the drug cultivation and trafficking is destined primarily for markets within the former Soviet Union.  Kyrgyzstan once supplied more than 16 percent of the world's raw licit opium for consumption within the Soviet Union.  Opium cultivation was banned in 1973.  Kyrgyzstan's location makes it attractive to increased transit trade as heroin and hashish traffickers seek new routes from Pakistan and Afghanistan to Russia and the West.  Russian authorities believe Kyrgyzstan is already a conduit for such smuggling.

Korea.  While still modest by world standards, drug abuse is increasing among Koreans;  methamphetamine is the most commonly abused drug.  There is little heroin or cocaine addiction.  The Korean government (ROKG) actively discourages illicit drug production and use.  Korea has begun to implement the United Nation's drug abuse control plan.  The primary USG concern is Korea's role as a trans-shipment point for Asian heroin destined for the U.S. and other world markets.  Korea is not a party to the 1988 UN Convention.

Laos, the world's third largest opium producing country, is the only one of the top three to reduce its potential opium production in each of the past three years.  Estimated opium production declined 13 percent in 1992 from 1991, bringing the total crop reduction since initiation of USG and UNDCP-funded rural development/opium replacement programs in 1989 to 39 percent.

Latvia has emerged as a drug producer.  West European authorities are increasingly concerned about Latvia's growing illicit amphetamine industry.  German authorities seized a record seizure of three mt of amphetamines from Latvia last year, traced to a licit state-run pharmaceutical facility established under the Soviet regime.  The Latvian Government closed the laboratory and confiscated drugs and money.  While Latvia does have a monitoring system that outlaws such production, monitoring efforts have been minimal.  Moreover, law enforcement authorities fear that other such state-run laboratories may also be involved in illicit production.  

Lebanon  remains a major source country for illicit narcotics, despite efforts in the spring of 1992 by the Lebanese and Syrian security forces to eradicate poppy and cannabis cultivation at some sites in the Bekaa Valley.  Harsh winter weather likely destroyed much of the 1992 crop; the eradication campaign destroyed what remained.  Although Lebanon probably did not produce significant quantities of drugs for trafficking, the Bekaa Valley is the site of many hashish and heroin processing laboratories that continued to operate during the year.  Lebanese trafficking families also have forged alliances with South American traffickers, resulting in heroin-cocaine exchanges and a proliferation of cocaine processing laboratories in Lebanon.  Much of the cocaine appears to be destined for Middle East and European markets.  Officials seized heroin, cocaine, and hashish at Beirut International Airport as well as sites in the Bekaa Valley.

Lesotho is a transit country for Mandrax moving from India to South Africa, as well as for small amounts of heroin and cocaine.  Cannabis is grown in some parts of Lesotho and also exported to South Africa.  Lesotho is a party to the 1961, 1971 Conventions and 1972 Protocol, but not to the 1988 Convention.  

Liberia is neither a major drug producing nor transit country.  Nevertheless, to avoid increased security along more established routes, West African traffickers reportedly use the country as an alternate route for illicit drugs, especially heroin, but also cocaine, destined for the U.S. and Western Europe.  War-induced stagnation of the legitimate economy and the perception that Liberians are viewed with less suspicion by U.S. authorities than are other West Africans has made Liberia potentially fertile ground for recruitment of drug couriers.  Drug abuse, while not widespread, is noticeable among urban youth and the various warring factions.  Marijuana is the most commonly used drug, with increases in heroin and cocaine, especially in Monrovia.  Liberia is a party to the 1961 Convention and its 1972 Protocol, but not the 1971 and 1988 Conventions.  

Lithuania.  Political changes and the elimination of enforcement forces of the former communist regime have left Lithuania vulnerable to the drug trade.  While there is little information on the extent of the trafficking through the region, West European law enforcement authorities believe that Turkish and other heroin trafficking networks are expanding their routes through Lithuania.  The open borders and removal of travel restrictions allowed traffickers to expand their smuggling operations by using private vehicles and new routes.  There are now reports that Lithuania is being used by Polish amphetamine networks to move drugs to Sweden.  Health authorities believe that drug abuse is growing, but they have only begun to collect data on the problem.  Most drug abuse appears to be of injectible poppy straw extract.  

Luxembourg has become a major world banking and financial center. GOL officials are working to curb illicit money laundering, which has occurred in the past.  The conviction in Luxembourg of two Cali cartel money launderers in April marked the first time in Europe that drug money launderers have been prosecuted under specific money laundering statutes.  Luxembourg also established an assets forfeiture fund to support drug abuse programs and Luxembourg's participation in multilateral anti-drug efforts.  Luxembourg is neither a drug producer nor a major transit country, but does have a growing abuse problem.  

Malaysia is an important transit point for Golden Triangle heroin, some of which is also processed in the country from imported opium or derivatives.  There is no known cultivation of opium poppy in Malaysia. Heroin No. 3 and marijuana are the primary drugs of abuse domestically.  Marijuana is considered to be a significant problem, but there are seldom significant arrests or seizures.  The Malaysian Government recognizes the seriousness of the narcotics threat both domestically and internationally, and has active law enforcement, public education, and treatment programs.  During 1992, Malaysia arrested at USG request a major Southeast Asian heroin trafficker and pursued extradition proceedings against him.  Although the extradition request was denied, the trafficker was expelled from Malaysia, and is now under arrest in the U.S.

Mali is not a significant drug transit country, although its proximity to West African drug trafficking centers and lack of border and airport controls put it at risk.  Mali is a party to the 1961 UN Convention, but not to its 1972 Protocol or the 1971 or 1988 UN conventions.  The USG has no information about Mali's plans to become a party to the 1988 accord.  

Malta is unlikely to become a significant producer of drugs or precursor chemicals.  Maltese officials have no evidence of active money laundering taking place.  Local court narcotics cases have predominantly involved prosecution for possession.  The Government of Malta (GOM) last received Bureau of International Narcotics Matters (INM) assistance in FY 91, consisting of the donation of two former US National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA) patrol boats for use in coastal surveillance.  Maltese police have participated in two recent DEA training seminars.  Local drug cultivation is insignificant.  The GOM intends to sign and ratify the 1988 UN Convention once domestic legislation is brought into conformity with the Convention.

Martinique and Guadeloupe, and French Guiana on the South American continent, are departements (states) of France, subject to French law, and to the 1988 UN Convention to which France is a party.  With the resources of France behind them, they are meeting the goals and objectives of the convention.  Drug traffickers and money launderers are active, especially on the French half of the island of St. Martin and in Guadeloupe, whose free port status, heavy flow of tourists, offshore banking facilities, and easy access to the relatively less-controlled Dutch half of the island, make it vulnerable to drug-related operations.  

Mauritania is not a drug transit country, but in recent years Mauritanian authorities have uncovered a number of attempts to import narcotics.  Increased trafficking is most likely the result of enhanced enforcement in Morocco, combined with Mauritania's location as a possible way station between Latin America and Europe, as well as the low salaries of local officials and the reputed corruptibility of many of them.  It has no significant domestic drug problem, nor does it hold any attraction for money launderers.  Mauritania is a party to the 1961 and 1971 UN conventions and the 1972 Protocol, and has signed but not ratified the 1988 UN Convention.  

Mauritius is a transit country for methaqualone (Mandrax) from India to South Africa.  Heroin also transits the country, and some is consumed locally.  There is a potential for money laundering in its offshore banking industry.  Mauritius is a party to the 1961 and 1971 Conventions, though not the 1972 Protocol.  Despite being one of the first countries to sign the 1988 Convention, Mauritius has not ratified it, but is expected to do so.  

Mexico continued its vigorous and comprehensive national campaign against the production, trafficking and abuse of illegal drugs, meeting the goals and objectives of the 1988 UN Convention.  In 1992, the Government of Mexico (GOM) seized nearly 40 mt of cocaine and 97 kg of heroin and effectively eradicated 6,860 ha of opium poppy and 12,100 ha of cannabis. 

Mexico is working with the U.S. to build a coordinated hemispheric response to the drug threat, as evident in President Salinas's participation in the February 1992 San Antonio Summit.  The GOM urges its neighbors to take greater responsibility for combatting trafficking in their countries.  In July, Mexico announced that it would set an example by assuming the remaining costs of counternarcotics programs previously supported by U.S. narcotics control funds.  USG support will instead concentrate on specialized training and technical assistance.  Mexico is a party to the 1988 UN Convention.

The USG and the GOM maintained close, effective counternarcotics cooperation in 1992, despite GOM indignation over what it viewed as violations of Mexican sovereignty and international law in the Alvarez Machain case.  These concerns led the GOM to revise the rules under which the DEA operates in Mexico.

Along with its successes, Mexico faces daunting obstacles.  Corruption remains a deep-rooted and persistent threat to GOM antidrug programs, despite efforts by President Salinas to eliminate it.  Illicit drug-crop cultivation has spread to more remote areas, while South American cocaine traffickers have taken evasive measures to avoid detection.  Mexico's revitalized economy and unregulated money exchange houses make it an attractive venue for money laundering.  The GOM needs to enact money laundering legislation, which may be submitted to the Mexican Congress in April 1993.  Mexico also needs better chemical controls, since the size of its chemical industry makes monitoring of precursor and essential chemicals very difficult.  

Moldova plays a relatively minor role in the drug trade.  There is little information on the extent of drug trafficking, possible production, and/or domestic consumption.  Moldovan authorities believe, however, that increasing amounts of Southwest Asian heroin are transiting Moldova en route to Western Europe.  Drug-related problems may be growing.  In 1991, 109 crimes and 167 misdemeanors linked respectively to the use of drugs and to addiction were recorded in Moldova compared to 63 crimes and 120 misdemeanors in 1991.  Small scale cultivation of opium poppies and cannabis exists, but no statistics are available on the extent of such cultivation.  Moldova, as a successor state to the USSR, continues to be bound by the drug control treaties to which the USSR is a party, including the 1988 UN Convention.  

Morocco is a significant producer of cannabis, the majority of which is consumed in Europe and North Africa as hashish.  Increasing amounts of cocaine and, to a lesser extent, heroin are transiting from the Americas and Asia through Morocco en route to Europe.  During most of 1992, the Government of Morocco (GOM) did not conduct a vigorous  anti-narcotics campaign despite widespread acknowledgement that the drug problem is increasing.  In October, King Hassan II called for a new effort to combat drugs.  As a result, the last three months of the year brought increased enforcement and interdiction, and an expression of will on the part of the GOM to do more.  However, poor interagency coordination, budgetary constraints, and corruption continue to plague Morocco's counternarcotics efforts.  Morocco ratified the  1988 UN Convention following the King's decree, and the Justice and Health Ministries drafted legislation to bring Moroccan laws into compliance with the Convention.  

Mozambique is not a major drug producer or transit country, although it is a transit point for drugs, primarily methaqualone (Mandrax) from India through Kenya and on to South Africa.  Marijuana use has long been common among rural Mozambicans, and is cultivated and used for medicinal purposes.  While domestic narcotics consumption is minimal, use of marijuana and cocaine among urban, upper-class youth is rising.  Mozambique is not a party to any of the UN drug conventions, nor does the USG have any information about Mozambique's actions to meet the goals and objectives of the 1988 UN Convention.

Nepal's open border with India and its proximity to Pakistan and Burma make it an alternate transit route for heroin from the Golden Crescent and Golden Triangle to Europe, other points in Asia and the United States.  Although Nepal produces marijuana for the domestic market, there is no evidence of any significant Nepalese production of illicit drugs entering international markets.  The democratic Government of Nepal (GON) has continued its 18-month-old commitment to narcotics control by forming a dedicated Narcotics Law Enforcement Unit, and signing a Narcotics Master Plan agreement with the United Nations Drug Control Program (UNDCP).  Cooperation with the United States and other countries on enforcement, training, and legal assistance also increased during the past year.  Nepal is a party to the 1988 U.N. Convention.

The Netherlands is becoming an important transit point for cocaine from Suriname and heroin from Southwest Asia.  Government of the Netherlands (GON) officials are also concerned about the role of the Dutch territories of Aruba and the Netherlands Antilles in shipping significant quantities of illicit drugs to the country.  The Netherlands is an important source of amphetamines for other European countries, and a major transit and brokering country for chemical exports.  The Netherlands has long had a domestic policy which tolerates personal use of small amounts of cannabis products, and a generous system of medical and social care for addicts.  This traditional emphasis on treatment rather than criminal enforcement is a matter of ongoing debate within the Netherlands, and an occasional source of controversy with neighboring countries.  The major bilateral accomplishment of 1992 was the signing on November 20 of an agreement with the U.S. on asset-sharing and forfeiture.  The GON expects to ratify the 1988 UN Convention in 1993.

Netherlands Antilles. Aruba, Curacao and the Dutch half of St. Maarten are increasingly important in cocaine trafficking from Suriname, Venezuela, and Colombia to the U.S. and Western Europe.  Aruba and especially St. Maarten are also sites of money laundering.  (The Netherlands Antilles, comprising the Dutch Caribbean islands, except Aruba, and Aruba separately, enjoy autonomous rule as members of the Kingdom of the Netherlands.)  The Government of the Netherlands Antilles (GONA) has pledged its commitment to combat drug trafficking and abuse; an investigation underway by its Attorney General could lead to numerous arrests.  Both the GONA and the Government of Aruba (GOA) actively participate in counternarcotics training programs.  A recent asset sharing and forfeiture agreement between the U.S. and the Netherlands applies to the Netherlands Antilles and Aruba.     New Zealand is not a major narcotics producing or trafficking country;  marijuana remains the dominant illicit drug.  The GNZ toward full compliance with the 1988 UN Convention, which it signed in 1989 but has not yet ratified. 

Nicaragua.  While its drug control problems are still fairly modest, Nicaragua is vulnerable to greater inroads by traffickers, given the weakness of its counternarcotics forces and institutions.  The security apparatus has been drastically reduced since Violeta Chamorro's accession to office in 1990, and its top levels are staffed by individuals appointed by the Sandinista Liberation Front (FSLN).  Despite the Nicaraguan Government's severe economic and political problems, it is aware that narcotics is a growing threat.  Nicaragua is a party to the 1988 UN Convention but has not fully implemented it.  In addition to a bilateral agreement with the U.S., the GON signed narcotics accords with Mexico and Colombia in 1992.  It also signed a regional convention with the other Central American countries, and hosted the meeting of the Central American Permanent Commission on Narcotics in November. 

Niger is not a significant drug transit or producing country.  The main threat is posed by drug smuggling networks in neighboring Nigeria.   Niger occasionally has seized heroin (in amounts under ten kg) moving from Nigeria through Niger to Europe.  Narcotics-related corruption is not tolerated by the Nigerien Government.  Niger acceded to the 1988 UN Convention in November, and has taken strong preliminary steps toward compliance with the convention.  

Nigeria is a major transit country for Asian heroin and the focal point for most West African heroin trafficking organizations.  Nigerian trafficking operations continue to expand, both inside Nigeria and throughout West Africa.  The Nigerian Drug Law Enforcement Agency (NDLEA) made more arrests in 1992, but focused almost exclusively on drug couriers rather than on the leaders of the drug groups.  NDLEA seized more cocaine and marijuana but less heroin in 1992 than 1991.  The USG requested the extradition of four Nigerians wanted on drug charges; one has been extradited and the other three are at large.  Official corruption remains an obstacle to effective counternarcotics efforts.  The government is seriously concerned about increasing domestic drug abuse.  While legal mechanisms are in place to combat what appears to be extensive money laundering, there has been no significant attempt at enforcement.  Nigeria is a party to the 1988 UN Convention, but has not made an effective effort to achieve its goals and objectives.

Norway  is not a significant producer of narcotics or other controlled substances, but Norwegian citizens are expressing growing concern over the effects of illicit drug usage.  Norway's long coastline, and its open borders with Russia (Kola Peninsula) and its Scandinavian neighbors make it difficult for authorities to control smuggling.  With a rise in drug overdose deaths and drug-related crime, Norwegian law enforcement personnel are pressuring the government and the parliament to devote more resources and to pass legislation to counter the drug threat.

The Government of Norway (GON) is active in a number of international anti-drug organizations including the Pompidou Group and the Dublin Group.  It is a contributing member to the United Nations International Drug Control Program (UNDCP) and has provided anti-drug assistance to major drug source countries in the Andean region and the Golden Triangle.  Norway is a signatory to the 1988 UN Convention Against Illicit Traffic in Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances (1988 UN Drug Convention) and hopes to ratify it in the spring of 1993.  

Pakistan  The Government of Pakistan (GOP) had mixed results in its anti-narcotics efforts during 1992.  Cooperation with USG agencies in investigations and enforcement operations remained good and resulted in the arrest of several persons in Pakistan charged with violating U.S. drug laws.  Since 1991, two fugitives have been found extraditable by the courts in Pakistan and one case has been appealed to the Supreme Courts  In all, six persons were arrested at U.S. request and their extradition  proceedings are underway in Pakistan.  Imports of heroin into the U.S. on Pakistan's international airlines continues to be a problem.  During the period January 1987 to June 1992, more than 165 kg of heroin was seized on incoming flights. 

Panama remains a major narcotics money-laundering and illicit drug-transshipment nation; there is no evidence that either of these problems diminished during 1992.  However, the GOP did cooperate closely with the USG and other governments in counternarcotics efforts and enhanced the capabilities of its counternarcotics forces; on July 15, 1992, GOP officials seized 5.2 mt of cocaine in the Colon Free Zone, the largest cocaine seizure ever in Central America and the Caribbean.  Cocaine seizures increased overall for 1992.  The GOP also cooperated on the extradition of several alleged Colombian drug traffickers to the U.S. and took the initiative in implementing nation-wide narcotics demand-reduction programs.  In general, the Panamanian Government continues to support U.S. counternarcotics policy objectives; however, charges of corruption against senior government officials have impeded law enforcement and the development of effective counternarcotics institutions.  Also, despite some indications of intent to attack money laundering, launderers continued to evade GOP law enforcement.

Papua-New Guinea (PNG) is not a significant drug producing, trafficking, money-laundering or essential chemical country.  Like many other countries in the region, however, Papua New Guinea has a small but increasing problem of production and trafficking of high-potency cannabis grown by farmers who find it more profitable than licit crops.  While this cannabis is primarily consumed domestically, the Governments of both PNG and Australia are concerned by reports of cannabis shipments to Australia in exchange for weapons imported into PNG.  PNG has not yet ratified the 1988 UN Vienna Convention.  

Paraguay is a transit route for Andean cocaine shipped to Brazil and Argentina and onward to the U.S. and Europe.  Although marijuana is produced in significant quantities in the northeastern region of the country, little reaches the United States.  A diverse and growing financial sector provides greater potential for money laundering, especially through exchange houses which are already a serious concern.  Paraguay may be a transit route for precursor and essential chemicals.  The Government of Paraguay (GOP) has stated its commitment to combat trafficking, a commitment underscored by the inclusion of an a narcotics control article in the new constitution.  Paraguay ratified the 1988 UN Convention in 1990.  Since then, it has taken important steps to comply with the convention's goals and objectives by strengthening enforcement agencies, and broadening the scope of the government's antidrug activities.  In 1992, Paraguay initialed a draft financial information exchange agreement with the U.S.  Corruption is a serious problem impeding narcotics control efforts.

Peru.  The April 5, 1992, suspension of constitutional democracy by President Fujimori set back USG efforts to support Peruvian narcotics-related law enforcement and alternative development efforts in 1992.  The strafing of a U.S. C-130 by Peruvian fighters (and death of one U.S. crewman) while on a Peruvian-authorized narcotics mission also damaged bilateral relations.  While only small inroads were made against the flow of cocaine base out of Peru, the Government of Peru (GOP) brought significant resources and political will to bear on specific facets of the Peruvian narcotics industry to begin a campaign to disrupt narcotics trafficking operations in the Huallaga Valley.  These efforts also included enhanced civic action and alternative development activities.  Narcotics corruption remained a significant impediment to GOP counter-narcotics efforts in the field.

The Philippines.  Marijuana and, increasingly, hashish, dominate illicit drug production and export in the Philippines, but methamphetamine is the most commonly abused drug domestically.  The country is a transit point for heroin and metamphetamines destined for East Asia, the Pacific and the U.S.  In 1992, the Philippines Government (GOP) cooperated with the USG in demand reduction operations and law enforcement efforts aimed at interrupting the flow of heroin and cocaine through the Philippines.  The Philippines has signed the 1988 UN Convention but is not yet a party to it.

Poland is playing an increasingly important role in the drug trade as a transit area and an amphetamine producer for Western Europe.  The political changes in Eastern Europe have prompted Southwest Asian heroin traffickers to expand transit routes into Poland to smuggle heroin to Western Europe.  Cocaine traffickers also have begun to exploit Poland's relaxed border controls.  Economic issues dominated the Government of Poland (GOP)'s domestic agenda during 1992, limiting attention to expanding drug problems.  Moreover, the GOP's antidrug efforts have been limited by manpower and resources shortages.  There has been little progress towards establishing a comprehensive antidrug strategy.  Drug trafficking is illegal in Poland, but possession of drugs for personal use is not. 

Portugal is an increasingly important transit point for illicit drugs, particularly cocaine from South America destined for Western Europe.  Some cocaine has been trans-shipped through Portugal to the United States.  Rising domestic consumption of cocaine concerns Portuguese authorities.  Hashish, traditionally the drug of choice, is readily available and affordable.  The number of heroin addicts, drug seizures and arrests are increasing.  The Judiciary Police (PJ) has been increasingly active in anti-drug enforcement.  New drug control legislation will aid police in their drug investigations.  The Government of Portugal (GOP) traditionally has focused on demand reduction through education and treatment.  However, Portuguese authorities prosecute traffickers vigorously and cooperate fully with European and USG law enforcement agencies.  The GOP is also active in several international anti-drug organizations, including the Dublin Group.  The Prime Minister recently appointed a new domestic drug policy coordinator/commissioner and raised the level of the drug issue on Portugal's national agenda. 

Romania.  Drug trafficking through Romania appears to be accelerating.  The elimination of internal transportation controls, which essentially confined smuggling to bonded (TIR) trucks on main highways, have made it easier for smugglers to operate.  There are indications that the civil war in Yugoslavia has forced heroin traffickers to reroute heroin shipments northward through Romania of Southwest Asian heroin from Turkey through the Balkans into Germany.  An increase in heroin smuggling across the Black Sea on trucks ferried from Istanbul to Constanta, Romania, has also been detected.  Most heroin smuggling appears to be dominated by well-established Turkish drug trafficking organizations, but there has also been an increase in East European networks that include Romanians.  

Russia.  The demise of the Soviet Union, increased political turmoil, the new convertibility of the ruble, and the relaxation of strong border and internal controls have led to escalating drug trafficking and abuse in and through Russia.  According to Russian officials, over 15 mt of hashish, opium, heroin, and cocaine were seized in Russia over the past five years, much of it from Central Asia, Pakistan, Afghanistan and the Ukraine.  Russian authorities believe that the increased transit trade is fueling a growing domestic drug market which they cite as the largest in the Newly Independent States (NIS).  Concern over these problems has prompted Moscow to increase its antidrug efforts and pursue increased counternarcotics cooperation with the West and within the NIS.  

Over the past year, the Russian Government (GOR) has accelerated its antidrug campaign, signaling an increased high-level commitment to targeting the threat.  Recent efforts include the expansion of the antidrug force, increased enforcement efforts, and the drafting of new narcotics control legislation.  There is growing sentiment within the Ministry of Interior (MVD) that recent legislation allowing for possession of drugs for personal use must be repealed.  Further domestic efforts are needed to institute controls to monitor precursor and essential chemicals and financial transactions.  

Russia is a party to the 1988 UN Convention, the 1961 Single Convention on Narcotic Drugs and its 1972 Protocol, and the 1971 Convention on Psychotropic Substances, and is making strides in meeting the goals and objectives of the 1988 UN Convention.  Within the NIS, Moscow is promoting greater regional cooperation to target rising trafficking from Central Asia and elsewhere.

St. Kitts and Nevis.  This twin-island nation is well situated to be a transit point between the producing countries of South America and the consumer markets of North America.  Drug trafficking through the largely unprotected waters of St. Kitts/Nevis was underscored when its small police force and Coast Guard intercepted several drug-laden vessels and traffickers.  Increased seizures and arrests suggest and effort by the traffickers to exploit St. Kitts/Nevis and avoid the well-monitored traditional routes.  From the Kittian waters fast boats can quickly reach the French departments of Guadeloupe and St. Martin,  and Puerto Rico, within U.S. customs territory, and thus evade European and U.S. Customs.  The USG and the Government of St. Kitts/Nevis expect to sign a narcotics control agreement in 1993, and have initiated discussions for a "hot pursuit" agreement to allow the U.S. Coast Guard and other USG agencies to enter territorial waters and assist in tracking and arresting suspected traffickers.  In 1992 the Government also introduced asset-seizure legislation.  It has not ratified the 1988 UN Convention, but its enforcement efforts, counternarcotics cooperation with the USG, and introduction of asset-seizure legislation are all consistent with the Convention's goals and objectives.  

St. Lucia's expanding tourist industry brings in U.S. dollars, daily flights to and from the U.S. and Europe, and thousands of cruise ship passengers.  Authorities discovered cocaine destined for the U.S. on at least one cruise ship, but have made no major seizures.  St. Lucia is willing to work with the UN and the USG on legislation needed to sign the 1988 UN Convention.

St. Vincent and the Grenadines.  St. Vincent is especially vulnerable to narcotics trafficking.  Its rough terrain and twenty-plus tiny islands of the Grenadines are not adequately patrolled.  Cocaine from South America can easily be airdropped or landed by boat.  In July, authorities seized 17 kg of cocaine on a vessel at one of these islands.  More than 900 flag of convenience ships are registered in St. Vincent under a system that makes owners untraceable; several have been the subjects of drug and weapons investigations .  The government expects soon accede to the 1988 UN Convention and has sought UN and USG assistance in drafting implementing legislation.  

Saudi Arabia has begun to face serious drug trafficking and addiction problems.  Saudi Arabia is used as a transit country, primarily for heroin moving from Pakistan and Southeast Asia to Nigeria and elsewhere in Africa, and onward to Europe and the U.S.  Saudi Arabia is increasingly involved in international drug trafficking in part because Muslim pilgrims easily obtain visas to visit the holy cities of Mecca and Medina, and traffickers use pilgrimage visas to mask travel from and through narcotics source countries.  Saudi Customs officials made several hundred drug seizures in 1992.  Saudi Arabia instituted a death penalty for convicted narcotics traffickers in 1988.  Saudi Arabia acceded to the 1988 UN Convention in January 1992 and is reviewing its laws to bring them into conformity.  

Senegal.  Good air and sea connections to Europe and North America make Senegal an attractive transit point for Asian heroin.  Senegalese are increasingly involved in international narcotics activities, including the false document industry.  Most drug-related arrests occur at Dakar-Yoff International Airport.  Local drug abuse among youth is on the rise.  The principal obstacles to effective drug enforcement remain the inadequacy of local resources, corruption, weak border controls, and competing national priorities.  Senegal is a party to all major international conventions dealing with drug production and trafficking, including the 1988 UN Convention.  Although Senegal does take enforcement actions and cooperates with the USG, European, and international organizations on counternarcotics matters, it needs to do more about drug-related corruption to be considered as adequately meeting the goals and objectives of the 1988 Convention.       Seychelles is not a major drug producing or transit country.  In February 1992, it acceded to the 1988 UN Convention.  Given the modest nature of the problem and the scarcity of resources available, Seychelles is adequately meeting the Convention's goals and objectives.  

Sierra Leone is becoming more attractive as a drug transit country to Europe and the U.S., but there are no relevant statistics.  Couriers passing through from other African countries, tourists, and ships calling at Freetown are the means of transshipment.  It is not a drug-producing country.  Sierra Leone signed the 1988 UN Convention in 1989, but has not ratified it and currently has no initiatives to implement it.  Nor is Sierra Leone a party to the other international narcotics conventions.  

Singapore has some of the most stringent anti-drug laws in the world.  It is a significant transit country for narcotics shipments, and an attractive financial center for money laundering.  Since becoming a party to the Financial Action Task Force (FATF) in 1991, Singapore has participated in FATF meetings and will host the next session in April 1993.  The government has passed legislation on asset forfeiture with a provision for money laundering targeted against drug traffickers.  Singapore's domestic drug abuse problem is small.  Singapore is not a party to the 1988 UN Convention.

Spain has become the principal gateway for cocaine shipped to Europe.  The U.S. Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA) estimates that roughly 55% of the cocaine destined for the European market, largely from the Cali and Medellin cartels, flows through the Iberian Peninsula.  Spain also is a transit point for hashish from the Maghreb and heroin from Asia.  Spanish interdiction efforts have stopped some large shipments of cocaine, heroin, and hashish. Heroin is the primary drug of abuse, but cocaine use is on the rise as is public concern about illicit drugs.   Spanish officials traditionally have preferred demand reduction and rehabilitation rather than by law enforcement and criminal prosecution.  Spain ratified the 1988 UN Convention in 1990, and in 1992 passed special legislation on money laundering, asset forfeiture, and precursor chemicals in compliance with European Community (EC) directives.  There were  some notable successes in international interdiction in 1992, including Spanish cooperation and active participation in a transatlantic maritime cocaine smuggling case coordinated under the auspices of Article 17 of the 1988 UN Drug Convention.  USG officials believe that Spanish officials are placing a higher priority on enforcement and more aggressive prosecution of traffickers and money launderers than in the past.  

Sri Lanka has a growing narcotics problem from the flow of Southwest Asian heroin to meet local demand market and for transshipment to other countries.  Illicit marijuana continues to be grown as well. Money laundering could well become a serious problem; a 1989 law permitting numbered currency accounts increased the local banking system's vulnerability, but  there is little awareness of the issue outside law enforcement circles.  Law enforcement agencies combating the illegal drug trade are hindered by a shortage of trained manpower, a serious backlog in the main drug laboratory, and antiquated legislation.  Nonetheless, the number of arrests for narcotics-related offenses increased during the year with USG-trained personnel playing a major role.  Sri Lanka is a party to the 1988 UN Convention.

Sudan's transshipment role in the international drug trade is a consequence of being Africa's largest country, with vast open spaces, a long undeveloped Red Sea coast, and borders with eight countries and Eritrea.  Cannabis is the main drug of abuse.  The Government of Sudan (GOS) only recently began to take a serious interest in narcotics matters, and is addressing eradication, prosecution, and treatment.  Sudan is a party to the 1961 Convention, but not its 1972 Protocol or the 1971 Convention.  It is a signatory but not a party to the 1988 Convention, which it plans to ratify during 1993.  

Suriname is a drug transit country for movement of cocaine from cocaine processing areas in South America to Europe, primarily to the Netherlands.  Precursor chemicals destined for South American processing facilities may also pass through Suriname.  There is little apparent flow of narcotics from Suriname to the United States.  Corruption is widespread. Leading traffickers reportedly enjoy the protection of the country's powerful military establishment.  The civilian government installed in September 1991 has begun to strengthen narcotics laws, increase law enforcement capabilities, and foster cooperation with other governments against narcotics trafficking, but with few practical results as yet.  It did, however, ratify the 1988 UN Convention in October 1992.

Sweden is not a significant drug producer, transit country for US-bound drugs, or money laundering center.  Amphetamines and cannabis are the major drugs of abuse, though heroin is also available.  Recently there has been an increasing flow of drugs to Sweden from transit points in  Eastern Europe and the Balkans.  Cocaine smuggling is on the rise, with cocaine now an established drug in the Swedish market.  Although Government of Sweden (GOS) statistics show that overall drug use has remained stable, with a decline in intravenous heroin use among the younger Swedes, Swedish drug enforcement officials believe the data understate the problem.  Drug treatment facilities and methodology are improving, but have not kept pace with the demand for treatment.  The GOS is assuming more responsibility for demand reduction, as local programs suffer from budget cutbacks needed to trim public sector expenditures.  Sweden remains active in international anti-drug organizations.  Bilateral cooperation in anti-drug activities continues to be excellent between USG and the Government of Sweden (GOS).  Sweden ratified the 1988 UN Nations Convention in 1991.

Switzerland does not produce narcotics but continued to have a significant narcotics consumption problem in some of the major cities during 1992.  The supply of narcotics is abundant with distribution is largely controlled by non-Swiss.  Drug-related deaths are growing.  Within Switzerland's federal structure, cantonal governments have autonomy on various aspects of narcotics policy.  French-speaking cantons tend to take a tougher line against addicts; some officials in German-speaking cantons urge a more liberal policy.  International narcotics traffickers sometimes use Switzerland as a transit point for shipments to third countries.  Switzerland, a major international financial center, has been used by traffickers for money laundering.  The government has taken significant legal and enforcement actions which should make Switzerland a much less attractive money laundering site.  Switzerland has signed but has not ratified the 1988 UN Convention.

Syria.  Heroin and hashish produced in Lebanon transit Syria in small quantities destined for Europe and the U.S.  Morphine base and opium from Southwest Asia enter Syria via Turkey en route principally to processing labs in the Beka'a valley of Lebanon, although small amounts also may be processed into heroin in Syria.  Heroin, hashish, and psychotropic substances also cross Syria for other markets in the Middle East, including the Persian Gulf states.  Syria is not a major producer of narcotics, nor is it a site for international money laundering. 

In 1992, President Bush did not certify Syria as cooperating with the USG in narcotics matters because of Syria's continued failure to take effective actions on its own in 1991 to curb the involvement of Syrian military and security officials in the Lebanese drug trade, and its failure to formulate a comprehensive narcotics eradication and interdiction effort in conjunction with Lebanon.  The Syrian Government did little to meet U.S. concerns about the involvement of its personnel in the Lebanese drug trade in 1992.  There were, however, signs of greater Lebanese and Syrian cooperation to control drug production and trafficking in the first half of 1992, in which unfavorable weather  destroyed substantial areas of opium cultivation in the Beka'a Valley and Syria.  Lebanese forces eradicated much of the rest.  In both Syria and Lebanon, Syrian security forces reportedly staged or participated in operations that resulted in sizeable drug seizures of heroin and hashish in 1992.  The U.S. Government in 1992 continued its discussions with the Syrian Government on narcotics cooperation,  but the standing contradiction between Syria's claimed counternarcotics policy and the involvement of its military and security personnel in aspects of the Lebanese drug trade remains, however, an obstacle to greater cooperation.  In December 1992, Syria deposited its instrument of ratification for the 1988 UN Convention with the United Nations. 

Taiwan is not a major heroin producer, but is increasingly used by international narcotics traffickers as a transshipment point, a safe haven for fugitives, and a production center for amphetamines.  It also plays a role in money laundering.  Taiwan authorities are becoming more involved in combating narcotics abuse in Taiwan.  Taiwan's law enforcement system has also begun to organize itself to facilitate enforcement of Taiwan drug laws, and to work more closely with the international community to investigate and prosecute narcotics traffickers. 

Tajikistan.  Political upheaval, open borders, and a rise in Afghan opium production across its border, have left Tajikistan open to the drug industry.  Trafficking organizations have already exploited the country's location between Afghanistan and the West to move hashish and opium to Russia and the European NIS.  Limited information suggests that much of the activity is on the Afghan borders in the Northern Kunduz area and the mountainous region of Gorno-Badakhshan.  Several accounts, including from the Government of Tajikistan (GOT), note that weapons and opium from Afghanistan are exchanged for food and medicine.  There also are unconfirmed reports that members of the Islamic/opposition may be involved in the trade.  Tajik authorities have noted several opium seizures in the Pamir region linking Pamir tribal leaders to cultivation and production operations.  In 1992, the GOT began efforts to draft a new penal code; authorities indicated their intention to take into account the provisions of the UN drug conventions.  In the interim the GOT continues to rely on the USSR's Penal Code of 1961.  

Thailand.  While no longer a major source country for opiates (its production potential was estimated as 24 MT of opium in 1992), Thailand remains the primary conduit for heroin from the Golden Triangle sold in the United States.  Thailand began to address some of its problems with the August 1991 passage of narcotics conspiracy and forfeiture laws; in 1992 the first arrests were made under these statutes.  In 1992, the Police Narcotics Suppression Bureau was made a separate organization within the National Police and grew to over 500 officers.  Thai authorities arrested 52 major traffickers, compared to 32 in 1991.  A new extradition treaty with the United States came into effect in May 1991, and the exchange of instruments of ratification of a mutual legal assistance treaty is expected early in 1993.  Widespread police corruption, expanding cross-border trade with Burma, and the involvement of influential Thai and Sino-Thai tycoons in the narcotics trade with the connivance of some Thai officials are serious impediments to more effective counternarcotics action.

Togo is not a major producer of illicit narcotics, but it is a transit country for heroin, cocaine and marijuana to Europe and possibly to the U.S.  Its proximity to Nigeria makes it attractive to Nigerian trafficking networks, which appear responsible for most of the trafficking.  Togo ratified the 1988 UN Convention in 1990, and appears to be meeting the Convention's goals and objectives.  

Trinidad and Tobago is a transit country for South American drugs bound for Europe and the U.S., although the volume of trafficking is difficult to quantify.  It also produces marijuana.  Counternarcotics coordination is directed by the Office of Strategic Services (OSS), established in early 1992.  The Government of Trinidad and Tobago (GOTT) has received USG counternarcotics assistance but has been slow to utilize it.  Anti-drug efforts have been hampered by allegations of major corruption in the police -- some substantiated -- and Customs Service, legislative deficiencies, including failure to ratify the 1988 UN Convention and a dearth of laws pertaining to such matters as money laundering.  There is a general lack of coordination in narcotics matters within the government, notwithstanding the formation of the OSS.  The government is moving to remedy these legislative deficiencies.

Tunisia.  Moroccan hashish transits Tunisia en route to Libya or Europe, although the Health Ministry estimates about ten percent of this hashish is consumed in Tunisia.  There is evidence of small quantities of heroin and cocaine transiting Tunisia on its way to Europe.  Tunisian authorities believe that increased airlinks with other Middle Eastern countries offers opportunities to smuggle heroin through Tunisia to European consumers.  In a well-publicized February 1992 case, authorities seized 6.4 kgs of cocaine at the Tunis-Carthage Airport.  The Italian Embassy in Tunis raised concerns in 1991 about use of Tunisian waters by fishing and pleasure boats smuggling drugs into Italy.  Tunisia recognizes that it has a problem in this regard and is stepping up interdiction efforts. 

Turkey.  A land bridge for Southwest Asian heroin destined for Western Europe and the United States, Turkey has become an important narcotics trafficking route.  Heroin laboratories also have begun to appear in isolated areas of the country.  The Government of Turkey (GOT) is working to diminish both the heroin passing through the country and that which is processed in it.  During 1992, cooperative investigations coordinated by DEA in Ankara and Istanbul helped to hinder the flow of heroin across Turkey and of essential chemicals into the country.  As a result, authorities made record seizures in December 1992 and January 1993 of 7.5 mt of morphine base.  The GOT has achieved near complete success in controlling licit opium poppy cultivation; virtually none leaks into illicit channels.  Turkey was one of the first countries to sign the 1988 UN Convention, but it still has not ratified it.

Turkmenistan.  Traditional cultivation and use of opium poppy and open borders make Turkmenistan increasingly vulnerable to the drug industry.  Turkmenistan appears to have a sizable opium addict population.   Local health authorities note that such traditional use may be declining, but that injectible poppy straw extract use may be on the rise among urban youth.  Some domestic processing and use of heroin may also occur.  Marijuana use is prevalent.  To the extent possible, police forces under the Ministry of Internal Affairs continue to uphold Soviet-era laws against drug possession, use, and opium poppy cultivation.  Semiannual campaigns using helicopters to locate and destroy illegal poppy and cannabis fields continued in 1991-92.  In 1992, the government  participated in several international antidrug conferences;and early in 1993, signed an antidrug law enforcement protocol with Iran. 

Uganda is not a major drug producing or transit country, but cannabis grows wild throughout the country where it is used for medicinal purposes.  It also is becoming an increasingly lucrative export crop, transported by road into bordering countries, and by water via Lake Victoria into Kenya.  Some heroin and hashish are transshipped from South Asia and Europe through Kampala's Entebbe Airport for South Africa.  Enforcement at Entebbe is focused on internal security issues, not narcotics interdiction.  Uganda ratified the 1988 UN Convention but has done little to address the increasing use of, and trade in, illegal narcotics.  Thus, it is not fully meeting its obligations under the convention.  

Ukraine is playing an increasingly important role in the drug trade both as a transit country and as a producer of illicit opium poppy straw.  Recent political changes and newly opened borders have given rise to increased trafficking operations from Central Asia and the Transcaucasus through Ukraine.  Most smuggling operations involve the shipment of heroin, hashish, and/or opium from Afghanistan and Pakistan by rail.  Health authorities believe that this smuggling is fueling an already extensive domestic drug market.  There is limited recognition of the escalating drug threat by the Government of Ukraine (GOU).  As a successor state to the USSR, Ukraine is a party to the major international drug conventions, including the 1988 UN Convention.  Efforts are underway to change domestic legislation to promote implementation of the 1988 UN Convention.  

The United Kingdom actively participates in international anti-drug efforts and has bilateral narcotics control agreements with the USG and a number of other governments.  In 1992 Her Majesty's Government (HMG) chaired several multilateral organizations and participated in a number of important drug control related initiatives.  Law enforcement officials believe South American cocaine traffickers  are attempting to expand their market in the UK, as indicated by a significant increase in cocaine seizures in recent years, especially crack cocaine.  UK anti-drug strategy is designed to reduce the supply of drugs through improved international cooperation, enhance border customs control and domestic police enforcement, raise the quality of drug abuse education, and promote more effective rehabilitation and treatment programs.  By the time the government ratified the 1988 UN Convention in 1991, it had met most of the goals and objectives of the Convention. 

Uruguay's banking stability, respect for customer confidentiality, and unrestricted currency exchange, creates the potential for large-scale money laundering.  So far, however, USG law enforcement agencies have identified only a few money laundering cases.  While production of drugs or precursor or essential chemicals are not major problems, its location makes Uruguay an attractive transit point for drugs flowing through the region.  The Government of Uruguay (GOU) has cooperated with the USG on a number of narcotics investigations and drug control programs and has cooperated on money laundering by tightening banking controls.  However, combatting the narcotics problem is not seen as critically important in  Uruguay.  The lack of political will to confront what appears to be a growing problem, coupled with continuing domestic controversies over economic policy and political reforms, limit the government's support for drug control.  Uruguay has signed but not ratified the 1988 UN Convention, but the GOU is expected to work toward ratification in 1993.  Uruguay has moved toward meeting the convention's goals through its actions to tighten controls on banks and implementation of controls on precursor and essential chemicals. 

Uzbekistan.  Expanded smuggling activity and opium poppy cultivation underscore Uzbekistan's attractiveness to the drug trade.  As evidenced by a record seizure of over 14 mt of Afghan hashish destined for the Netherlands in February of 1993, and another of 13 mt in 1992, Uzbekistan is a conduit for drugs to Russia and the West.  Moreover, Uzbekistan's borders with the other four Central Asian States and Afghanistan, and its relatively modern transportation system through Tashkent, make it attractive as a brokering center for drug operations.  Uzbek authorities indicate that Azeri, Georgian and other criminal groups appear to make use of Tashkent for their connections to Russia and the West.  Authorities are concerned about a rise in opium poppy cultivation, traditionally grown in Uzbekistan.  There is little information on the extent of such cultivation, although Uzbek authorities believe that most entails small individual plots for domestic consumption.  Cannabis also grows wild in Uzbekistan.  Most information on the extent of drug use is anecdotal, but the Ministry of Health reports 11,000 registered drug addicts.  Marijuana is the most widely used drug, but opium poppy straw and ephedrine are becoming increasingly popular.  Plans are underway to draft a new penal code; authorities indicate their intention to take into account the provisions of the UN drug conventions.  In the interim, the GOU relies on the USSR's Penal Code of 1961.  

Venezuela is a transit country for drugs coming from Colombia and for the precursor chemicals diverted to Colombia to process cocaine.  Venezuela's location, its ties to Italian crime organizations, and its active financial sector have fostered drug money laundering, although there are no reliable data on its magnitude or trends.  The Government of Venezuela (GOV) entered into several anti-drug agreements with the USG in 1992, including two additional bilateral assistance agreements with the Ministries of Justice and Interior to support investigative activities.  Several drug investigations by the Judicial Technical Police (PTJ) and the Directorate of Intelligence and Prevention Services (DISIP) led to significant seizures of drugs and documents inside and outside Venezuela.  Corruption remains a significant problem impeding effective narcotics control programs in Venezuela.

Vietnam.  Vietnamese officials have publicly stated that their country faces a drug addiction problem and that opium production and use are growing.  While most opium seems to be consumed domestically, there is growing evidence that Vietnam is being used as a transit country for Golden Triangle opiates destined for Western markets.  Increasing international travel and trade to and with Vietnam will increase the potential for narcotics trafficking.  The Government of Vietnam (SRV) has become increasingly concerned with domestic narcotics production, trafficking and consumption in recent years.  Opium poppy, grown primarily by ethnic minority groups in the northern highlands, is the principal concern;  cannabis is cultivated in southern provinces, where its abuse is concentrated.  There are no reliable estimates for opium poppy production or use, but SRV officials publicly acknowledge that at least 2,000 ha are cultivated with a potential yield of 15-20 mt of opium annually.  Given the uncertainty of these figures, the USG plans to undertake its own estimate of Vietnamese cultivation.  Vietnam is not a party to the UN drug conventions of 1961, 1971 or 1988, but existing legislation covers some aspects of each of the conventions   Western Samoa is not a significant producer, user or trafficker in narcotics.  An April 1992 U.S. Army aerial survey of the entire country identified only a few small plots of marijuana which is consumed by local youth.  Western Samoa is not yet a signatory to either the 1961 Single Convention or the or 1988 UN Convention.

Yugoslavia.  The political, economic and social turmoil, and the outright warfare which have occurred within the borders of the former Yugoslavia, have dismembered or preoccupied the official organizations which previously had responsibility for narcotics interdiction efforts and analysis.  These organizations have splintered along republic and even ethnic intra-republic lines in the case of Bosnia-Hercegovina.  Cooperation among the former Yugoslav republics has deteriorated significantly, ceasing entirely in some cases, thereby further reducing drug interdiction capabilities in the Balkan area. The same turmoil has led to a reduction of drug trafficking through Yugoslavia.  Yugoslavia was once a key transit country for traffickers smuggling heroin from Southwest Asia to Western Europe.  Most traffickers who once moved heroin in bonded (TIR) trucks are now diverting their operations through other parts of Eastern Europe.  There are some unconfirmed reports, however, that paramilitary, separatist, and possibly even government groups have been involved in drug smuggling to finance the purchase of weapons and other military equipment. There are no longer any accurate statistics on the volume of narcotics passing through the former Yugoslavia.  Yugoslavia was a party to the 1988 UN Convention the 1961 Single Convention on Narcotic Drugs, its 1972 Protocol, and the 1971 U.N. Convention on Psychotropic Substances.  Slovenia became a party by depositing its instruments of accession for all three conventions with the UN.  None of the other republics of the former Yugoslavia have taken steps to do so.  There are no indications that any of these states have adopted new antidrug legislation.  

Zambia's geographic location has long made it a transit point for illicit narcotics shipments, principally mandrax (methaqualone), from the Asian subcontinent to South Africa.  Transshipment of southwest Asian heroin and South American cocaine to markets in Europe and North America is a growing concern.  Except for marijuana, some of which is exported to neighboring countries, Zambia is not a producing country.  There is no significant money laundering activity.  Zambia has signed but not ratified the Vienna narcotics convention. 

Zimbabwe is not a major drug producing or transit country.  Excellent airline connections, however, make Zimbabwe a natural choice as a transshipment point for drugs from Asia and the Middle East.  The increased presence of Nigerians in the country and a recent spate of U.S. visa applications by Pakistanis and Sri Lankans, all of whom had transited the Middle East and Nairobi en route to Harare, lend some credence to claims that drugs move through Harare airport regularly.  There also is some cannabis cultivated in Zimbabwe. 

[EDITOR'S NOTE:  Chart - FY1994 International Narcotics Control Program Fiscal Summary ($ in thousands); FY1994 International Narcotics Control Program by Functional Activity ($ in thousands) is available in hard copy only.]

LEGISLATIVE BASIS FOR THE INCSR

The Department of State's International Narcotics Control Strategy Report (INCSR) has been prepared in accordance with Section 489 of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, as amended (FAA).

The 1992 INCSR is the seventh annual report prepared pursuant to the FAA.  Section 489, added by the International Narcotics Control Act of 1992 (P.L. 102-583) (INCA 1992), applies during fiscal years 1993 and 1994.  FAA Section 490, also added by the INCA 1992, establishes special requirements for the presidential narcotics certification process for those years.  Certification (or a national interest waiver) is a prerequisite for provision of most kinds of U.S. non-narcotics assistance to major illicit drug producing and major drug transit countries.  The INCSR, as in past years, provides the factual basis for the President's certifications, which for fiscal years 1993 and 1994 are made by April 1. 

The statute asks, with respect to each country which received INM assistance in the past two fiscal years, for a report on the extent to which the country has "met the goals and objectives of the United Nations Convention Against Illicit Traffic in Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances."  FAA Section 489(a) (1) (A).  Similarly, the President's certification determination for Fiscal Years 1993 and 1994 depends on whether a country has cooperated fully with the United States, or has taken adequate steps on its own, to achieve full compliance with the goals and objectives established by that Convention (the 1988 UN Convention).  FAA Section 490(b).  

Although the Convention does not contain a list of goals and objectives, it does set forth a number of obligations which the parties agree to undertake.  Generally speaking, it requires the parties to take legal measures to outlaw and punish all forms of illicit drug production, trafficking, and drug money laundering, to control chemicals which can used to process illicit drugs, and to cooperate in international efforts to these ends.  The statute lists action by foreign countries on the following issues as relevant to this evaluating performance under the 1988 UN Convention:  illicit cultivation, production, distribution, sale, transport, and financing, and money laundering, asset seizure, extradition, mutual legal assistance, law enforcement and transit cooperation, precursor chemical control, and demand reduction.

In attempting to evaluate whether countries are meeting the goals and objectives of the Convention, the Department has used the best information it has available.  The expanded 1993 INCSR covers countries which range from major drug-producing and drug-transit countries, where drug control is a critical element of national policy, to mini-states, where drug issues and/or the capacity to deal with them are minimal.  The reports vary in the extent of their coverage.  For key drug-control countries, where considerable information is available, we have provided comprehensive reports.  For many of the smaller countries where only sketchy information is available, we have included whatever data the responsible post could provide.

The country chapters report on actions, including plans, programs, and where applicable, timetables towards fulfillment of Convention obligations.  Because the Convention's subject matter is so broad, and availability of information on elements related to performance under the Convention varies widely within and between countries, the Department's views on the extent to which a given country is meeting the goals and objectives of the Convention is based on the overall response of the country to those goals and objectives.  

Some countries are not yet parties to the Convention.  For such countries, we have nonetheless considered actions taken by those countries in areas covered by the Convention, and plans (if any) for becoming parties and for bringing their legislation into conformity with the Convention's requirements.  For some of the very smallest countries, the Department has insufficient information to make a judgment as to whether the goals and objectives of the Convention are being met.  In those instances, available information on counternarcotics activities has been provided.  

Except as noted in the relevant country chapters, INM considers all countries with which the USG has bilateral narcotics agreements to be meeting the goals and objectives of those agreements.

As in the past, this year's INCSR, provides the factual basis for the President's 1992 certification.  It contains information in accordance with Section 489 of the FAA and the following legislative requirements:

-- Public Law 99-570 [Anti-drug Abuse Act of 1986]:  Section 2015 (b) (3) (country chapters); 

--Public Law 100-690 [Anti-drug Abuse Act of 1988]:  Section 4309 (Laos country chapter); 

Statement on Certification 

Section 490 of the FAA requires that the President certify whether major drug producing and drug transit countries have cooperated with the United States, or taken adequate steps on their own, to achieve full compliance with the goals and objectives established by the 1988 UN Convention.  In making this determination the President must consider 

-- action by these countries on such issues as illicit cultivation, production, distribution, sale, transport and financing, and money laundering, asset seizure, extradition, mutual legal assistance, law enforcement and transit cooperation, precursor chemical control, and demand reduction;

-- whether these countries have accomplished the goals described in an applicable bilateral narcotics agreement with the United States, or a multilateral agreement; and

-- whether they have taken legal and law enforcement measures to prevent and punish public corruption, especially by senior government officials, that facilitates the production, processing , or shipment of narcotic and psychotropic drugs and other controlled substances, or that discourages the investigation or prosecution or such acts.

The statute provides, alternatively, that the President may, by making a national interest certification, authorize provision of aid to a country despite the fact that it would not otherwise qualify for certification as fully cooperating with the USG in narcotics matters.  

Major Drug Producing, Drug Transit, Significant Source, Precursor Chemical and Money Laundering Countries.

Section 489(a) (3) requires the USG during FY 1993 and FY 1994 to identify those countries which are:  (1) major illicit drug-producing and major drug-transit countries, (2) significant direct or indirect sources of narcotics and psychotropic drugs and other controlled substances significantly affecting the United States, (3) major sources of precursor chemicals used in the production of illicit narcotics, and (4) major money laundering countries.  These countries are identified below.

Major Drug-Producing and Drug-Transit countries:  A major drug-producing country is one that cultivates 1,000 hectares or more of illicit opium poppy, 1,000 hectares or more of illicit coca, or which cultivates 5,000 hectares or more of illicit cannabis significantly affecting the United States.  

A major drug-transit country is one (A) that is a significant direct source of illicit narcotic or psychotropic drugs or other controlled substances significantly affecting the United States;  or (B) through which are transported such drugs or substances.  

The following are major drug-producing and/or drug-transit countries:  The Bahamas, Belize, Bolivia, Brazil, Colombia, Ecuador, Guatemala, Jamaica, Mexico, Panama, Paraguay, Peru, Venezuela;  Afghanistan, India, Iran, Lebanon, Morocco, Nigeria, Pakistan, Syria;  Burma, China, Hong Kong, Laos, Malaysia, Thailand.

Significant Direct or Indirect Source Countries: These countries are identical to those which are significant direct or indirect sources of narcotics and psychotropic drugs and other controlled substances significantly affecting the United States

Major Precursor Chemical Source Countries:   The following countries are major sources of precursor or essential chemicals used in the production of illicit narcotics:  Argentina, Australia, Bahamas, Belgium, Bolivia, Brazil, Canada, Chile, China, Colombia, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, France, Germany, Hong Kong, India, Italy, Jamaica, Japan, Malaysia, Mexico, The Netherlands, Pakistan, Panama, Peru , Singapore, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Thailand, Turkey, United Kingdom, Venezuela.

Major Money Laundering Countries.  A major money laundering country is one whose financial institutions engage in currency transactions involving significant amounts of proceeds from international narcotics trafficking.  The following countries fall into this category:  Bolivia, Brazil, Canada, Cayman Islands, Colombia, Cote d'Ivoire, Ecuador, Germany, Hong Kong, India, Italy, Japan, Liechtenstein, Luxembourg, Mexico, Netherlands, Nigeria, Pakistan, Panama, Paraguay, Singapore, Spain, Switzerland, Thailand, Turkey, UAE, UK, Uruguay, Venezuela. 


INTERNATIONAL TRAINING

More than 4,700 persons participated in the U.S. Government's international narcotics control training program in FY 1992.  Despite a slight decrease in funding for training, there was a significant increase in the number of program participants as compared to FY 1991.  This trend reflects the broadened appeal of INM courses, and the increased size of the audiences for some activities, especially in such areas as money laundering and other more sophisticated programs designed to deal with changing narcotics trafficking trends.  International anti-narcotics training is managed and funded by INM, and carried out by DEA, the U.S. Customs Service, and the U.S. Coast Guard.  Three major objectives guide the performance of this training: (1) to improve the technical and investigative skills of law enforcement and customs personnel, thereby upgrading drug law enforcement capabilities in key narcotics countries; (2) to promote increased cooperation and coordination between U.S. and foreign law enforcement officials, and (3) to underscore the U.S. commitment to strengthening cooperation in international narcotics control.

During FY 1992, INM discontinued its joint effort with the British Foreign and Commonwealth Office for narcotics detector dog training at the Lancashire Constabulary in the United Kingdom.  Since most detector dog programs supported by INM are in Central and South America, it has become more cost-effective to carry out training at the U.S. Customs Canine Enforcement Center at Front Royal, Virginia.  An important element of the training at Front Royal was a course held last September for administrators of canine programs.  This new initiative contributes to INM's overall training strategy of focusing on infrastructure development, and increasing the self-sufficiency of counternarcotics organizations overseas.

Consistent with this training strategy is a general emphasis on replacing basic instruction programs with more sophisticated forms of assistance.  Because of the continuing demand, especially in countries just beginning to come to grips with the threat of illicit narcotics, many programs still address basic law enforcement techniques; examples of these are the Maritime Law Enforcement Course (U.S. Coast Guard), Basic Drug Enforcement Seminar (DEA), and Overseas Enforcement Training (U.S. Customs).  In the countries having greater experience with anti-narcotics programs, there is a trend toward more specialized training, which provides the host nations with the ability to better manage their own efforts.  Some of these more sophisticated courses cover financial investigations and asset forfeiture, use of contraband enforcement teams, anti-narcotics security for common carriers, forensic chemistry, clandestine laboratories, methods of instruction, and management techniques.

In principle, operational level officers attend training courses in host countries, while senior, managerial level officers attend training courses in the United States.  Whenever possible, officers who previously received training are subsequently trained as instructors.

The Executive Observation Program is another important component of International Narcotics Control Training.  While INM manages and funds the Executive Observation Program, it is administered by the Customs Service and the Drug Enforcement Administration.  In addition to allowing a limited number of carefully selected policy-level officials from key narcotics trafficking and transit countries to consult with their U.S. counterparts, this program also provides first-hand exposure to U.S. narcotics control programs and institutions.

             * * * 

                            TRAINING STATISTICS

                                                                Number of           Number of
                                                                Participants       Programs 

Drug Enforcement Administration 

Training in U.S.:
      Executive Observation Programs                    15             4
      International Visitors Program                    665            63
      Forensic Chemist Seminar                              17             1
      International Narcotics Management. Seminar 30            1

Training in Host Countries:
      Basic Drug Enforcement Schools                     470           12
      Advanced Enforcement Schools                       252             8
      Other                                                               706           12

Subtotal:                                                             2,155          101

U.S. Customs Service

Training in U.S.:
      Executive Observation Programs                          4             2
      International Visitor Program                          259            91
      Mid-Management Seminar                                    17             1

Training in Host Countries:
      Overseas Enforcement Training                         618            19
      Contraband Enforcement Team                             62             2
      Train-the-Trainer Workshop                                66             6
      Money Laundering                                               234             4
      Carrier Initiative Training                                 635             9

Subtotal                                                                1,949         134

U.S. Coast Guard    

     Maritime Law Enforcement                                 598            21

Subtotal                                                                   598            21

Other INM-Sponsored Training

     Narcotic Detector Dog Training                              41             6

 TOTAL INM TRAINING FY 92                                    4,743         262



DEMAND REDUCTION

Demand reduction continued to be an area of heightened attention by the United States and the international community in FY 1992.  INM's international demand reduction program provides policy guidance, training and technical assistance that strengthens the ability of other countries to conduct their own demand reduction activity.  Despite a slight decrease in funding for training, there was a significant increase in the number of program participants as compared to FY 1991.  This was accomplished by developing cooperative training agreements with other regional and international organizations.  The cost savings resulting from these agreements enabled INM to provide demand reduction training and technical assistance to over 3000 private and public officials in 33 countries.  Emphasis was placed on specialized courses such as education, prevention, treatment, epidemiology, public awareness, and community organizing and mobilization techniques.  

In addition to this bilateral training, INM pursued joint training initiatives with other international and regional organizations, including host governments.

Significant multilateral training and program initiatives, much of which was funded by non-USG entities, include the following:

--  INM and OAS-CICAD have developed a Latin American regional training center for drug prevention and treatment in Argentina.  OAS-CICAD and the UNDCP provided funds for participants from Central America, the Caribbean, and South America to attend training at this center.

--  Thailand is building a large-scale therapeutic community treatment program (9 buildings on 32 acres of land) and a regional demand reduction training center for Southeast Asia.  The center will become operational in FY 94.  The Colombo Plan Bureau and the Thai Government are partners with INM in this initiative.  FY 92 regional training was conducted in Malaysia.

--  INM initiated a tri-lateral training initiative (U.S., Canada, Mexico) on school-based drug prevention for Central America, in collaboration with OAS-CICAD.

The EC made a substantial contribution to the same organization (APOT) which administers INM's pilot drug prevention program for "street kids" in Brazil, expanding the program's scope of services and number of children involved in the project.  Additionally, UNICEF trained the APOT staff on providing other critical services (general health, education, etc.) to this high risk population.  This project was initiated as part of the U.S. Plan of Action developed in response to the UN World Summit for Children.

OTHER US ASSISTANCE PROVIDED

Section 489 (b)(2)(B) requires the INCSR submission to include a report specifying the assistance provided by the United States to support international narcotics control efforts.  In addition to the budget for INM, which is provided in the Executive Summary, the report is also to include information on assistance provided or to be provided by the Drug Enforcement Administration, the U.S. Customs Service, and the U.S. Coast Guard to various countries, and information on any assistance provided or to be provided by such governments to those agencies.  This information has been prepared by the three agencies and is provided in this section.

DRUG ENFORCEMENT ADMINISTRATION

Assistance provided by DEA to various countries falls into six categories, while assistance received generally takes two forms:

Assistance Provided

DEA representatives helped identify training needs for foreign drug enforcement officials.  Training was provided by the DEA International Training Section to 1,428 foreign nationals in schools and seminars conducted abroad in Basic and Advanced Drug Enforcement Schools, Clandestine Laboratory Seminars, Intelligence and Analytical Methods Schools, Financial Investigative Methods Schools, and Judicial Seminars.  Another 816 foreign nationals were trained by DEA in the U.S. through numerous Executive Observation Programs, Forensic Chemist Seminars, Caribbean Regional School, and International Narcotic Enforcement Seminars. 

DEA representatives

--helped identify the needs of drug control agencies for technical equipment and assistance necessary for the development of the needed drug control capability;

--assisted in developing sources of information;

--provided to the extent possible appropriate information which enabled host government officials to carry out investigations of or operations against international illicit drug traffickers;

--participated with host country officials in pursuing investigative leads; and

--collected, analyzed and provided drug intelligence to host country narcotics enforcement officials in order to integrate the data with enforcement activities in the host country and the United States.

SNOWCAP, CADENCE, and GHOSTZONE.  Highly successful examples of DEA operational support to foreign governments are Operations SNOWCAP and CADENCE.  In Peru, under Operation SNOWCAP, a team of DEA Special Agents works with Peru's Guardia Civil Counternarcotics Police conducting air mobile interdiction efforts throughout the Upper Huallaga Valley (UHV). The SNOWCAP Team lives and works with its counterpart police officers at the Forward Operating Base at Santa Lucia.  This base, which is centrally located in the UHV, enables us to target processing laboratories anywhere in the UHV where a high threat exists to counternarcotics operations because of ongoing guerrilla insurgency.  In 1992, in 103 combined operation with the Peruvian National Police, hundreds of kilos of cocaine base and large quantities of chemicals were seized during the destruction of numerous cocaine base laboratories.

In Bolivia, SNOWCAP was instrumental in the conduct of Operation GHOSTZONE, in which a Bolivian Government force of over 750 police and military personnel disrupted cocaine production and trafficking in the Chapare region.  GHOSTZONE resulted in the destruction of numerous cocaine base laboratories and cocaine HCl processing centers.  Ranches, residences, vehicles, aircraft hangers, and several aircraft were seized.  

In Guatemala, under Operation Cadence, some 17 metric tons of cocaine HCl were seized.  DEA Special Agents, working directly with the Guatemalan Guardia de Hacienda (Treasury Police) also confiscated 18 aircraft and other drug-related assets.  The SNOWCAP approach in which U.S. law enforcement personnel work directly with host country participants is supported by continuing dialogue among the participants in the International Drug Enforcement Conference (IDEC).  It contributes directly to the successful implementation of the USG's Andean Strategy.

Other Activities.  DEA's financial operation section continues to work closely with several foreign governments endeavoring to facilitate the confiscation of funds, conveyances, property, and other assets owned by international narcotics traffickers.  Extraterritorial prosecutions, extraditions, and fugitive apprehensions continue to be developed and facilitated through DEA's cooperation with foreign law enforcement agencies.  Likewise, DEA encourages foreign countries to develop drug detection and crop eradication programs.

Formal training in drug law enforcement techniques is provided to foreign counterparts by DEA both in the U.S. and abroad.  DEA maintains teams of agents who travel throughout the world conducting training sessions for foreign police officers in such areas as investigative procedures, intelligence gathering, and use of technical equipment. 

Assistance Received includes:

--intelligence data of an operational nature regarding narcotics violators, organizations, trafficking routes, laboratory suppression, etc., for use by DEA in its efforts to prevent illicit drugs from entering the United States; and

--intelligence data of a strategic nature regarding production, consumption and seizures of illicit drugs, trends, etc., for use by DEA in effective policy development, resource deployment, and operational planning.

[EDITOR'S NOTE:  Chart - DEA Summary of International Asset Sharing, February 1993 is available in hard copy only.]

UNITED STATES COAST GUARD

The U.S. Coast Guard (USCG) is currently developing a new international strategy which will more efficiently and effectively fulfill the growing international demand for USCG maritime law enforcement (LE) training.  Foreign countries are becoming increasingly concerned about stopping illegal narcotics trafficking while maintaining individual human rights.  They recognize that the USCG is the world's leading provider for this type of training in the maritime environment.  The USCG focuses its international anti-drug efforts mainly into two areas:  training and combined operations.

Training.  Subject to State Department approval and funding, and in response to foreign government requests for assistance, the USCG deploys mobile training teams (MTTs) to source and transshipment countries to improve law enforcement (LE) skills of indigenous maritime police forces.  As indicated by enclosure (1), last year USCG MTTs trained 593 students in 16 countries.

Most of the LE MTTs are made up of members from the International Maritime Law Enforcement Training Team (IMLETT).  The IMLETT usually deploys three or four of its nine members to perform class room and practical exercise maritime LE instruction to international maritime LE authorities (world wide) for one or two weeks at a time.  The IMLETT is located at the Maritime Law Enforcement School at the U.S. Coast Guard Reserve Training Center in Yorktown, VA.  They feature basic maritime LE training, and train-the-trainer courses.

When longer-term presence is warranted, the Coast Guard's International Maritime Law Enforcement Team (IMLET) deploys personnel for several months at a time to train international LE authorities (mostly in Latin America) in coastal and riverine counter-drug (CD) interdiction.  The team continues to support the Waterways Law Enforcement (WLE) program, a U.S. Government initiative to disrupt the cocaine supply at its source.  Throughout FY-92, IMLET maintained a continuous presence of six members in Bolivia and two in Ecuador.  When deployed, IMLET personnel are at the disposal of the U.S. Ambassador.  In Bolivia, IMLET operations are funded by the Drug Enforcement Administration, and in Ecuador, the Department of State funds IMLET operations.  Since the training objectives have been met, IMLET's continuous presence in Ecuador will be reduced to periodic visits in FY-93/94.  IMLET is a 30 billet unit that can deploy up to 3 teams.  IN FY-93, the USCG is evaluating, with Department of State approval, deploying IMLET personnel to Panama and Colombia in addition to the ongoing Bolivian commitment.

The USCG participates in the U.S. Navy sponsored UNITAS program (South/Central America) and WATC program (West Africa) which provided training and operational assistance to 14 countries last year.  The USCG provides a four man team that deploys on USN vessels for six months to support these programs.  Much of the training the USCG provides is basic maritime LE training.

For about a month every spring the Coast Guard deploys a medium endurance cutter (WMEC) equipped with a helicopter and accompanied by a patrol boat to conduct LE training in several Caribbean nations.  This is called Operation Tradewinds.  Countries such as St. Kitts have greatly benefited from this training and as a result, increased their CD efforts.

The Marine Safety Training and Assist Team (MSTAT) is similar to the IMLETT except that it specializes in marine safety law enforcement.  A large part of their job will be assisting countries in setting up a port safety and security program to control the flow of precursor chemicals, safely and securely through ports of entry.  This team will be established in FY-93.

Finally, the USCG participates in foreign shiprider and classroom exchanges, extended foreign port visits, and in hosting foreign maritime LE personnel at USCG facilities to train and familiarize foreign officials in maritime CD tactics.

Combined Operations.  Subject to approval of the State Department and in response to foreign government requests for assistance, the USCG deploys resources (ships, aircraft etc.) to operate with the maritime police forces of various source and transshipment countries.

The purpose of these "combined" operations is to motivate and further develop indigenous interdiction forces.  Conducting combined operations with foreign maritime interdiction forces results in on-the-job-training for both the foreign forces and USCG personnel.  Countries must have competent forces in order to be considered for combined operations with the USCG.

However, countries desiring combined operations whose forces are insufficiently developed for such operations may receive USCG training.  The Coast Guard is continuing to improve its international training scheduling to coordinate it with combined operations.

Combined operations have a successful history, and help foster relations with allies and neighbors.  Combine operations have led to short term bilateral agreements which facilitate the operations.  Types of agreements include overflight authority for USCG surveillance aircraft, permission to enter foreign territorial waters to carry out enforcement actions, shiprider agreements to facilitate coordination between forces, and shipboarding agreements to streamline the diplomatic communication necessary to board foreign flagged vessels.  One of these agreements , the USCG/Venezuelan bilateral shipboarding agreement, which was signed in FY-92, led directly to the seizure of 18,299 lbs of cocaine.

Continued combined operations have led to permanent bilateral and trilateral agreements such as Operation Bahamas and Turks and Caicos (OPBAT).  This unit provides airborne transport of Bahamian and Turks and Caicos law enforcement officials, as well as DEA agents.  In FY-92, OPBAT interdicted over 15,000 lbs of illegal narcotics.  The USCG, along with the DEA are considering expanding this type of operation in the Dominican Republic and Jamaica in FY-93.  This USCG will upgrade their OPBAT helicopters to H-60's in FY-94.

Other routine combined CN operations in which USCG cutters, aircraft, UNITAS, and IMLET participate in are Operations SNOWCAP/GHOST ZONE in Bolivia, VENUA in Venezuela, and OCEAN TRACKER and OCEAN GARDEN in Belize.  Emphasis on conducting combined operations with foreign interdiction forces should continue and could eventually result in the ultimate force multiplier (i.e., foreign source and transshipment country forces conduction totally independent drug interdiction operations.

In addition to bona fide combined operations, the USCG conducts "coincidental" operations with the Mexican Navy in the Pacific and the Gulf of Mexico.  During these operations, USCG assets do not deploy to other countries to assist their interdiction forces; instead, coincidental operations have USCG and Mexican Naval assets operating simultaneously and exchanging on-the-scene information which may assist in the interdiction of drug traffickers.  Pre- and post-operation planning meetings are held between the USCG and Mexican Naval officials for each coincidental operation.  Communication between the USCG and the Mexican Navy has significantly improved in FY-92, and is expected to continue in FY93/94.  Other Activities

The USCG conducts other activities abroad which, although not directly funded by the Department of State, directly or indirectly benefit international narcotics control efforts.  USCG personnel are permanently stationed in several American Embassies in source and transshipment countries,  including Antigua, The Bahamas, Panama, Costa Rica, Barbados, Haiti, Jamaica, Mexico, Colombia, Bolivia, and Venezuela. These USCG positions are sponsored by various USG programs.

The USG transferred two decommissioned USCG 82-foot patrol boats to Venezuela in FY-92, with an estimated value of $410,000 per craft.  The Venezuelan Coast Guard uses these boats to conduct CN interdiction operations in their coastal waters.  Also in FY-92, the USCG transferred 2 diesel engines to replace  those of the USCG 82-foot Patrol Boat given to Panama in FY-91, at an estimated value of $140,000.  Over the next few years, the USCG will decommission several more of this type of vessel, which will be considered for transfer to transshipment and source country maritime interdiction forces on a case-by-case priority-of-need basis. 

[EDITOR'S NOTE:  Chart - United States Coast Guard Counter Drug International Assistance is avaiable in hard copy only.]

UNITED STATES CUSTOMS SERVICE

International drug interdiction training is a vital segment of the activities, interests, and mission of the U.S. Customs Service.  Training is funded and approved by the Department of State and provided to drug control agencies with an interdiction responsibility in countries considered significant to U.S. drug control enforcement efforts.

In FY 1992, a total of 37 programs were conducted or coordinated involving over 1050 participants in more than 49 countries.  This annual schedule included the following regularly scheduled INC programs:  one Executive Observation Program (EOP), 17 Overseas Enforcement Training (OET) Programs, for individual countries;  two Regional OET's for two or more countries; two Contraband Enforcement Team (CET) programs;  six Train-the Trainer Workshops (T3W) conducted independently or linked to OET programs:  one Mid-Management (MM) Seminar targeted for training administrators; one Short Term Advisory (STA) project; and one Regional Seminar for the Americas and Caribbean areas.

In addition to the regularly scheduled programs, U.S. Customs carried out a number of other narcotics control projects which were in response to high priority concerns.  Among these undertakings were the following:

--A narcotics threat survey of Dominica, St. Lucia, St. Vincent and the Grenadines, funded by INM through the US Embassy in Barbados.

--An assessment of the Latvian Customs Department, funded by the U.S. Treasury Department.

--An Enforcement Training program for India, funded by INM.

--Two consecutive Port Security Programs for Jamaica, funded by INM through the U.S. Embassy in Jamaica.

FY 1992 was the second year in which INM funded certain aspects of the narcotics security techniques training provided by U.S. Customs to managers and employees of private carrier companies under the Carrier Initiative Agreements Program.  Agreements have been signed with over 2,000 carriers.  During 1992, training was provided to over 600 employees/managers of 140 carriers.  These programs were offered in 9 countries: Brazil, Costa Rica, El Salvador, Nicaragua, Honduras, Thailand, Trinidad and Tobago, the United Kingdom, and Uruguay.

Particularly noteworthy in assessing the past year's programs are the significant seizures that were reported by the American Embassy officers to be directly attributable to U.S. Customs training programs.  In January 1992, a 200 kg seizure of cocaine was made by members of the El Salvador Executive Anti-Narcotics Unit during a practical exercise in the Contraband Enforcement Team Program.  The Embassy's cable related that " a 1990 special organization/enforcement survey and a 1991 training course were instrumental in the creation of the UAE.  These teams...have been credited with the seizure of more than 4 metric tons of cocaine in the past 15 months... the ship, aircraft, and truck search methods taught by U.S. Customs personnel have been integral to these successes."

Another significant activity not funded by INN was a co-conducted UNDCP-funded Caribbean Train-the-trainer Workshop for the Caribbean Customs Law Enforcement Council (CCLEC) in Martinique.

In Calendar Year 1991, U.S. Customs transferred $28,000 in seized and forfeited property to the Department of State for use abroad in anti-narcotics activities as follows:

Quantity        Commodity             Recipient                        $ Value
1                   Motor Vehicle         Colombia                            8,000 
1                   Motor Vehicle         The Bahamas                     20,000


In calendar year 1992, the U.S. Customs Service shared financial assets on four occasions:

Coordinated Law Enforcement (Canada)                          6,000.00 RCMP (two occasions)                                                180,176.60 
Trinidad and Tobago Police                                           40,329.60 
TOTAL                                                                         226,506.20

Bilateral Customs Agreements:  In 1992, U.S. Customs concluded bilateral Customs Mutual Assistance Agreements with the Governments of Australia and Honduras.  Each agreement lays the foundation for cooperation on a wide range of customs issues and contains provisions for information and asset sharing.  Customs Mutual Assistance Agreements greatly assist in the gathering of evidence for all violations of U.S. law enforced by Customs, including financial crimes.

U.S. Customs also entered into a maritime narcotics interdiction agreement (commonly known as "Shiprider Agreement"), with the Government of the British Virgin Islands.  This is expected to lead to increased efficiency and better utilization of resources in narcotics interdiction efforts in that area of the Caribbean.
(###)

[EDITOR'S NOTE:  Charts referenced to in brackets [ ] are available only in hard copy of report.]

Contents of this publication are not copyrighted unless indicated.  If not copyrighted, the material may be reproduced without consent; citation of the publication as the source is appreciated.  Permission to reproduce any copyrighted material (including graphics) must be obtained from the original source.
(###)
To the top of this page