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U.S. REPORT UNDER THE INTERNATIONAL COVENANT ON
CIVIL AND POLITICAL RIGHTS
JULY 1994
Article 4 - States of Emergency
Unlike many countries, the United States does not
have a constitutional or legal regime either for
declaring "states of emergency" or otherwise for
imposing emergency rule by the executive branch.
The U.S. military does not exercise criminal
jurisdiction over civilian persons within the United
States.
Federal Level. The U.S. Constitution and
implementing federal statutes do authorize the
President in limited and clearly defined
circumstances to use federal troops to control
domestic violence, suppress insurrections and
enforce federal law. These laws do not, however,
authorize the executive branch to suspend or
interfere with the normal operations of the other
branches of the national government (the Congress
and the judiciary) or to permit derogations from
fundamental rights. Indeed, with only one limited
exception (the right of habeas corpus, which
Congress may temporarily suspend when public safety
so requires), constitutional rights remain in effect
at all times.
Article IV, Section 4 of the Constitution imposes on
the federal government the obligation to protect a
state "on Application of the [State] Legislature, or
of the [State] Executive (when the Legislature
cannot be convened) against domestic Violence."
Article I, Section 8 authorizes the Congress "[t]o
provide for calling forth the Militia to execute the
Laws of the Union, suppress Insurrections and repel
Invasion." This is the basis for intervention by
federal troops or marshals in civil disorders
occurring within the States.
The Constitution also provides, in Article II,
Section 3, that the President "shall take Care that
the Laws be faithfully executed." This provision
has been interpreted to grant the President
authority to enforce federal laws through
extraordinary means if the President determines that
unlawful obstructions or rebellion make it
impracticable to enforce the laws of the United
States by the ordinary course of judicial
proceedings. Chapter 15 of Title 10, U.S.
Code, defines the scope of the constitutional
grants of emergency powers. Pursuant to the
President s authority under Article IV, Section 4 of
the Constitution, section 331 of Title 10 provides
authority to the President to dispatch troops on
request of the state s governor or legislature. The
sending of troops is not, however, automatically
triggered by the request of a state pursuant to this
section. The President must use his own judgment as
to whether the situation warrants the use of armed
forces. Traditionally, three conditions have
existed before troops have been sent: (1) the actual
existence of domestic violence, (2) a statement that
the violence is beyond the control of the state
authorities, and (3) a proper request from the state
governor or legislature.
Sections 332 and 333 of Title 10 provide authority
for the President to dispatch troops without State
request in order to enforce federal law, prevent
obstruction of the execution of federal law, carry
out federal court orders or protect civil rights.
These provisions overlap to some extent, but both
are aimed at violence or insurrection obstructing or
interfering with the enforcement of federal laws
within a state. Section 332 is aimed generally at
resistance to the carrying out of federal laws;
Section 333 is concerned with the forcible
interference with the civil rights of individuals
and with violence aimed at preventing the
enforcement of court orders. These provisions were
invoked by the President to enforce racial
desegregation orders in certain states during the
1950 s and 1960 s.
Section 334 of Title 10 requires that, in all cases
in which the President deems it necessary to use
armed forces pursuant to his authority under Title
10, the President must issue a proclamation ordering
the insurgents to disperse. Such proclamations are
followed by an Executive Order directing the
appropriate use of the armed forces to suppress the
violence. They are also subject to Congressional
oversight.
In addition to the President s Title 10 authority,
there are further statutory grants of emergency
powers to the President. The National Emergencies
Act, 50 U.S.C. 1601 et seq., confers upon the
President the authority to declare national
emergencies and establishes procedures to be
followed by the President in exercising emergency
power. 50 U.S.C. 1601 et seq. Most importantly,
the Act requires the President to report to Congress
on actions taken and funds expended pursuant to a
declaration of national emergency. The Act further
allows Congress to terminate such states of
emergency by enacting into law a joint resolution.
This Act has typically been used in conjunction with
the International Emergency Economic Powers Act
(IEEPA, described in the next paragraph) to impose
economic sanctions against other nations, rather
than to deal with domestic or national security
emergencies.
IEEPA, 50 U.S.C. 1701 et seq., allows the
President, upon determination that an unusual and
extraordinary threat exists, to issue executive
orders investigating, regulating or prohibiting
certain international transactions. In addition,
the President may issue executive orders
investigating, regulating, and otherwise affecting a
wide variety of transactions in which foreign
interests are implicated. In practice, the use of
IEEPA has been primarily limited to the
implementation of economic sanctions (often mandated
by the United Nations) on the territory of the
United States. IEEPA also imposes Congressional
reporting requirements upon the President. The
Congress may terminate an IEEPA emergency power
granted to the President by passing a joint
resolution pursuant to certain provisions of the
National Emergencies Act.
Most of the President s other congressionally-
mandated emergency powers, particularly in the case
of natural disasters, are delegated to the Federal
Emergency Management Agency (FEMA). These powers
include, among others, his authority under the
Disaster Relief and Emergency Assistance Act, 42
U.S.C. 5121 et seq.; the Fire Prevention and
Control Act, 15 U.S.C. 2201 et seq.; the Flood
Disaster Protection Act, 50 U.S.C. 4001 et seq.;
the Federal Civil Defense Act, 50 U.S.C. 2251 et
seq.; and the Earthquake Hazards Reduction Act, 42
U.S.C. 7701 et seq. FEMA acts as the focal point
for all planning, preparedness, mitigation, response
and recovery actions for such catastrophic domestic
emergencies. FEMA has no authority to suspend or
infringe constitutional rights in the exercise of
its duties. The Agency s purpose is to coordinate
emergency activities at the national, state, and
local levels, fund emergency programs and provide
technical guidance and training.
The Posse Comitatus Act, 18 U.S.C. 1385, forbids
the President to use the armed forces to "execute"
the laws except where authorized by the Constitution
or by another act of Congress. 18 U.S.C. 1385.
Under the Act, prohibited actions include
interdiction of vehicles, vessels, and aircraft;
searches and seizures; arrests and "stop and frisk"
actions; surveillance or pursuit of individuals;
investigation; and interrogation. Thus, in a
disaster relief situation, absent any other
legislation, federal troops must avoid a direct law
enforcement role. They may, however, render
humanitarian assistance, including the provision of
emergency medical care to civilians and the
destruction of explosives found in civilian
communities.
State and Local Levels. At the state and local
levels, a wide variety of emergency authorities
permit the state executive branches (state
governors, city mayors, county executives) to take
emergency actions. These authorities are based on
the general police power that is reserved to the
states under the U.S. Constitution. In an emergency
situation, a state may take reasonable actions
necessary to preserve public health, safety and
welfare, even if those actions incidentally infringe
on otherwise protected rights. For example, states
may impose curfews in situations of civil unrest or
to prevent sabotage and espionage in times of war,
establish quarantines during an epidemic, restrict
water usage during a severe drought, and even
regulate interest rates during times of economic
emergency. These various state-imposed regimes may
not, however, limit constitutional rights or
infringe on the nonderogable rights specified in
Article 4 of the Covenant.
Judicial Review. The federal courts have the power
to review the exercise of emergency powers by the
federal or state authorities, and have exercised
considerable judicial scrutiny in this area.
Judicial review has included examination of both
substantive authority and procedural issues. As a
general rule, cases in which the exercise of
emergency power has resulted in the restriction of
individual rights have been subjected to careful
judicial review. See, e.g., Ex parte Milligan, 71
U.S. (4 Wall.) 2 (1886) (voiding a presidential
order suspending habeas corpus); Youngstown Sheet &
Tube v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579 (1952) (invalidating
the seizure of steel mills pursuant to Presidential
order during the Korean War); Dames & Moore v.
Regan, 453 U.S. 654 (1981) (judicial review of
constitutionality of President's orders regarding
disposition of blocked Iranian assets under IEEPA).
Emergency Powers in Practice. Two recent examples
of the use of federal emergency powers include the
1992 Los Angeles riots and the aftermath of
Hurricane Andrew in 1992. In response to the riots
and after receiving a request from the Governor of
California, the President, pursuant to the authority
vested in him by the Constitution and laws of the
United States, including 10 U.S.C., Chapter 15,
issued a proclamation ordering all persons engaged
in acts of violence to cease and desist.
Immediately following the proclamation, the
President issued an executive order directing
federal law enforcement officers and the armed
forces, including elements of the National Guard, to
suppress the violence.
Throughout the emergency, the Department of Justice
remained the lead federal agency, coordinating the
response of all other federal agencies involved,
including the Department of Defense (DOD). Although
military forces had the authority to engage in
direct law enforcement activities, for the most part
they did not do so. Because the worst rioting had
ended prior to the arrival of federal troops and
because military commanders preferred not to involve
soldiers in searches, arrests, pursuits, and other
direct law enforcement activities, the military's
principal role was to increase the security of the
area, thereby deterring further rioting. Civilian
agencies continued to perform the majority of law
enforcement activities.
In response to the devastation of Hurricane Andrew
in August 1992, the President declared a major
disaster under the Stafford Disaster Relief Act (42
U.S.C. 5121-5203) for certain counties in
southern Florida. When it became apparent that
significant federal assistance would be needed in
the disaster area and following a request from the
Governor of Florida, the President authorized DOD to
deploy a significant force to the disaster area to
provide humanitarian relief.
Pursuant to the Stafford Act and the Federal
Response Plan, the Federal Emergency Management
Agency (FEMA) was the lead federal agency and had
the authority to coordinate the activities of all
federal agencies, including DOD. FEMA tasked DOD to
provide assistance requested by state officials, and
the joint task force had no authority to engage in
relief activities other than as directed by FEMA.
Unlike the Los Angeles deployment, the federal
troops in Florida were not authorized to engage in
law enforcement activities. U.S. Understanding.
In keeping with its general understanding of the
requirements of equal protection, as discussed in
connection with Article 2, the United States
submitted the following understanding with respect
to paragraph 1 of Article 4 of the Covenant:
The United States further understands the
prohibition in paragraph 1 of Article 4 upon
discrimination, in time of public emergency, based
"solely" on the status of race, color, sex,
language, religion or social origin not to bar
distinctions that may have a disproportionate effect
upon persons of a particular status.
In other words, distinctions having a
"disproportionate effect" upon persons of a
particular status, but not in fact based on that
status at all, are not necessarily prohibited.
Thus, for example, a curfew could be imposed as
appropriate in view of safety requirements even if,
due to patterns of residence, this affected certain
groups more than others.
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