U.S. Department of State
96/02/14:  UN Reform Efforts (Amb. Birenbaum)
A Collection of Remarks on UN Reform by Ambassador David Birenbaum, U.S. Representative to the UN for UN Management and Reform



FOR RELEASE ON DELIVERY         USUN PRESS RELEASE
#019-(96)
                               FEBRUARY 14, 1996


STATEMENT BY AMBASSADOR DAVID E. BIRENBAUM, UNITED
STATES REPRESENTATIVE TO THE UNITED NATIONS FOR UN
MANAGEMENT AND REFORM, TO THE UN GENERAL ASSEMBLY
WORKING GROUP ON STRENGTHENING THE UN SYSTEM (GA
REFORM), FEBRUARY 14, 1996
------------------------------------------------------------------

GENERAL ASSEMBLY REFORM:1.  The Working Calendar of the
                            General Assembly

1.A.   Should the GA, like the Security Council, be
available and work on a full year basis with provision
for the Plenary to resume as necessary to consider any
urgent issue?  Or should there be two Plenary
sessions, rather than one:  a spring session
(March/April) and an autumn session
(September/November)?

   THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY IS AVAILABLE TO MEET AS NEEDED
   THROUGHOUT THE YEAR. WE SEE NO NEED TO DEPART FROM
   THE CURRENT PROCEDURES IN THIS RESPECT. AS
   DISCUSSED IN GREATER DETAIL IN RESPONSE TO OTHER
   QUESTIONS, WE BELIEVE THAT THE CALENDAR AND WORKING
   METHODS OF THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY SHOULD BE REFORMED
   SO AS TO MAKE AVAILABLE TIME FOR DEBATE OF
   IMPORTANT ISSUES DURING THE PLENARY SESSION. IN
   THAT EVENT, IT WOULD NOT BE NECESSARY TO HAVE A
   SPRING SESSION, WHICH WOULD BE COSTLY.


1.B.   Should the Plenary continue to be convened for a
general debate in September and should the calendar be
adjusted so it could focus on:

   i)  major political questions
   ii) establishment of financial and management
        priorities and budgetary decisions for the
        coming calendar year
   iii)elections for the coming calendar year
   iv) agenda items from the coming calendar year.

   WE BELIEVE THAT THE GENERAL DEBATE SERVES IMPORTANT
   PURPOSES AND SHOULD BE CONTINUED.THE GENERAL
   ASSEMBLY IS THE ONLY FORUM IN THE WORLD ADDRESSED
   ANNUALLY BY THE HEADS OF STATE OR GOVERNMENT. THIS
   ADDS TO THE PRESTIGE OF THE UNITED NATIONS,
   PROVIDES AN OPPORTUNITY FOR A FOCUSED DISCUSSION OF
   ISSUES OF INTERNATIONAL IMPORTANCE AND FACILITATES
   THE CONDUCT OF DIPLOMATIC BUSINESS AT THE HIGHEST
   LEVEL.

   AS AMBASSADOR ALBRIGHT SAID IN HER STATEMENT OF
   JANUARY 15 TO THIS GROUP,"THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY'S
   AGENDA LONG AGO GOT OUT OF HAND.ASSEMBLY DEBATES
   TEND TO COVER AN ENORMOUS RANGE OF ISSUES,OVER AND
   OVER AGAIN, WITHOUT CREATING ANY GREATER DEGREE OF
   CONSENSUS. THE UNITED STATES FAVORS REFORMS THAT
   WOULD MAKE THE ASSEMBLY'S AGENDA SHORTER, LESS
   REPETITIVE AND MORE RELEVANT TO SPECIFIC DECISIONS
   FACING THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY."IN THAT REGARD,
   WE PROPOSE THAT:

   -   TO ORGANIZE THE WORK OF THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY,
        THE BUREAU SHOULD BE ELECTED THE PREVIOUS
        DECEMBER INSTEAD OF THE WEEK BEFORE THE
        SEPTEMBER GENERAL DEBATE. THIS WOULD ALLOW
        AMPLE TIME FOR PLANNING.  

   -   THE FIRST ORDER OF BUSINESS AT THE PLENARY
        SHOULD BE A DISCUSSION OF THE STATE OF THE UN.
        THAT DISCUSSION WOULD BE INTRODUCED BY THE
        SECRETARY GENERAL WHO WOULD PRESENT HIS REPORT
        ON THE WORK OF THE ORGANIZATION.SUFFICIENT TIME
        SHOULD BE SET ASIDE FOR THIS DISCUSSION, WHICH
        SHOULD PROVIDE GUIDANCE ON POLICY TO THE
        SECRETARY GENERAL AND  THE COMMITTEES OF THE
        GENERAL ASSEMBLY.

   -   THE TRADITIONAL GENERAL DEBATE WOULD FOLLOW THIS
        DISCUSSION, WITH REMARKS REFERRING TO POINTS
        RAISED SHOULD SPEAKERS SO DECIDE.

   -   THEMATIC DEBATES SHOULD BE SCHEDULED
        PERIODICALLY FOR CONSIDERATION OF IMPORTANT
        ISSUES FACING THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY, SUCH
        AS THOSE WHICH HAVE BEEN THE SUBJECT OF RECENT
        INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCES.THE APPROPRIATE MAIN
        COMMITTEE WOULD DO THE PREPARATORY WORK FOR THE
        DEBATE WHICH SHOULD CULMINATE IN THE ISSUANCE
        OF AGREED CONCLUSIONS.APPROPRIATE ARRANGEMENTS
        WOULD HAVE TO BE MADE TO FACILITATE
        PARTICIPATION OF CIVIL SOCIETY.BRINGING SUCH
        ISSUES INTO THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY WOULD ENHANCE
        THE ROLE OF THE ASSEMBLY AT FAR LOWER COST TO
        MEMBER STATES.

   -   BECAUSE OF THE DIFFICULTY OF NEGOTIATING THOSE
        RELATIVELY FEW DRAFTS BROUGHT DIRECTLY TO THE
        PLENARY WITHOUT THE BENEFIT OF A MAIN COMMITTEE
        REPORT, SPECIFIC TIME SHOULD BE SET ASIDE IN
        THE PLENARY'S CALENDAR FOR INFORMAL
        NEGOTIATIONS TO OCCUR UNDER THE CHAIRMANSHIP OF
        A GENERAL ASSEMBLY BUREAU VICE PRESIDENT.  THIS
        PROCESS SHOULD BE RESERVED FOR ONLY THOSE
        DRAFTS WHICH ARE NOT SUBSTANTIVELY UNDER THE
        PURVIEW OF ANY ONE MAIN COMMITTEE AND YET WHICH
        CARRY SPECIAL POLITICAL SIGNIFICANCE.



   -   TIME LIMITS ON INTERVENTIONS NEED TO BE SET AND
        MAINTAINED FOR FOCUSED AND EFFICIENT DEBATE,
        E.G., 15 MINUTES DURING THE CEREMONIAL GENERAL
        DEBATE, AND 10 MINUTES FOR OTHER PLENARY
        INTERVENTIONS; SET NUMBER OF SPEAKERS
        DESIGNATED IN ADVANCE OF EACH AGENDA ITEM ON
        DEFINED SIDES OF THE ISSUE (NOT TO APPLY TO
        GENERAL DEBATE).  THE MAIN COMMITTEES ARE
        LIKEWISE ENCOURAGED TO TAKE SIMILAR MEASURES.

   -   ELECTIONS SHOULD BE SCHEDULED AT A SPECIFIED
        PERIOD IN THE SESSION, WHICH WOULD FACILITATE
        PLANNING THE AGENDA.


1.C.   Should the general debate be based on a general
report of the Secretary General setting out the
important issues on the international agenda as a
whole?  Or should a more focussed and shorter report
of the Secretary General on the work of the
Organization provide the basis?

   SEE ABOVE.


1.D.   Should a "Mission Statement" be produced and
what should be the role and relevance of that
statement?

   IN THEORY, THERE IS MUCH TO BE SAID FOR HAVING A
   MISSION STATEMENT. HOWEVER, WE BELIEVE THAT GAINING
   AGREEMENT ON SUCH A STATEMENT WOULD BE A VERY
   DIFFICULT PROCESS AND THAT THE RESULTING DOCUMENT
   IS LIKELY TO BE A POLICY DOCUMENT WHICH FAILS TO
   PROVIDE POLICY GUIDANCE.  A PROPERLY STRUCTURED
   DISCUSSION OF THE WORK OF THE ORGANIZATION AS
   PROPOSED ABOVE WOULD SERVE THE PURPOSE OF SUCH A
   STATEMENT.


1.E.   Should the committees meet only during the
regular sessions of the GA, or should they also be
available to meet round the year as necessary? 
Alternatively, should work in the committees take
place principally when the General Assembly is not in
session so as to prepare effectively for the sessions,
and so as to minimize overlapping?

   AS INDICATED ABOVE WITH RESPECT TO THE GENERAL
   ASSEMBLY, THE COMMITTEES ALSO ARE ABLE TO MEET
   THROUGHOUT THE YEAR AS NEEDED. WE BELIEVE THAT IS
   THE APPROPRIATE PROCEDURE. THE IDEA OF SCHEDULING
   THE WORK OF THE COMMITTEES PRINCIPALLY WHEN THE
   GENERAL ASSEMBLY IS NOT IN SESSION, WHILE APPEALING
   CONCEPTUALLY,PRESENTS PROBLEMS OF COST, CONFLICTS
   WITH THE SCHEDULES OF OTHER UN BODIES AND WOULD
   ENCOURAGE MORE MEETINGS WITHOUT IMPROVING THE WORK
   OF THE COMMITTEES.

1.F.   Should the Bureau of the GA be elected, as it is
now, before the start of the Plenary session, or
should it be elected in November/December and function
for a full calendar year with effect from 1 January?

   ELECTED IN DECEMBER OF PREVIOUS YEAR BUT LIMITED IN
   MANDATE AS A BUREAU-ELECT UNTIL THE FOLLOWING
   SEPTEMBER (SEE ABOVE).(###)

-------------------------------------------------------------------
U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE
96/2/13:  UN Reform #2 - General Assembly (Amb. Birenbaum) 



FOR IMMEDIATE RELEASE           USUN PRESS RELEASE
#018-(96)
                              FEBRUARY 13, 1996


STATEMENT BY AMBASSADOR DAVID E. BIRENBAUM, UNITED
STATES REPRESENTATIVE TO THE UNITED NATIONS FOR UN
MANAGEMENT AND REFORM, TO THE UN GENERAL ASSEMBLY
WORKING GROUP ON STRENGTHENING THE UN SYSTEM (GA
REFORM), FEBRUARY 13, 1996
------------------------------------------------------------------

GENERAL ASSEMBLY REFORM:  2     Structure of Committees
                                      and Subsidiary Bodies


2.A.   Is there a need to continue with the present
practice of voting in both the committees and the
Plenary?  How could this be avoided so as to enhance
the role of the Plenary?

 THERE IS SUCH A NEED, SINCE THE COMMITTEES AND THE
 PLENARY TAKE SEPARATE DECISIONS.THE REAL ISSUE IS
 WHETHER COMMITTEES OF THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY SHOULD BE
 COMMITTEES OF THE WHOLE. SO LONG AS THAT IS THE CASE,
 VOTING IN BOTH BODIES IS A REDUNDANT BUT PROBABLY
 NECESSARY RITUAL.WE WOULD BE OPEN TO CONSIDERATION OF
 PROPOSALS TO ESTABLISH SMALLER COMMITTEES WHICH WOULD
 BE REFLECTIVE OF THE MEMBERSHIP AND COULD FUNCTION
 WITH FAR GREATER EFFECTIVENESS AND EFFICIENCY.IN THAT
 EVENT, DISCUSSION AND DEBATE IN THE PLENARY ON THE
 RECOMMENDATIONS OF THE COMMITTEES WOULD BE
 MEANINGFUL.  CONSISTENT WITH THE NEED TO REVIEW AND
 ELIMINATE IRRELEVANT BODIES, WE FAVOR ADOPTION OF A
 POLICY THAT NO NEW BODIES SHOULD BE CREATED WITHOUT A
 FINDING OF NECESSITY.

2.B.   Could debates be reserved for the Plenary and
the Committee structure utilized mainly for discussing
and finalizing resolutions to be adopted in the
Plenary, including on the basis of reports from
subsidiary bodies?  Could debates in the committees
take place only in the context of discussion on
resolutions and therefore be not in the nature of
formal prepared statements, but informal dialogue in
the context of negotiations?


 WHILE WE FAVOR THE OBJECTIVE OF ENHANCING THE ROLE OF
 THE PLENARY, WE DO NOT BELIEVE THE DEBATE AND
 NEGOTIATION OF RESOLUTIONS ARE FUNCTIONS WHICH CAN BE
 SEPARATED.IF THAT WERE ATTEMPTED,THE RESULT IS LIKELY
 TO BE MORE SPEECHES AT BOTH LEVELS.HOWEVER,THE
 PROCEDURES OF THE COMMITTEES SHOULD BE REVIEWED TO
 SHORTEN THE AMOUNT OF TIME TAKEN BY FORMAL
 INTERVENTIONS.  CONSIDERATION SHOULD BE GIVEN ALSO TO
 SUCH MEASURES AS IMPOSING TIME LIMITS ON SUCH
 INTERVENTIONS AND  LIMITING THE NUMBER OF SPEAKERS IN
 SUPPORT OR OPPOSITION.  THESE PROCEDURES WOULD APPLY
 IN BOTH THE PLENARY AND COMMITTEES.

2.C.   Could the work of the First Committee and the
Disarmament Commission be rationalized or even
integrated?  Alternatively, could the Disarmament
Commission meet every alternate year?  Should the
Conference on Disarmament continue as the negotiating
body?  Has the inter-governmental process
significantly benefited from the Advisory Board on
Disarmament Matters?

 THE TWO ARE NOT DUPLICATIVE AND HAVE SEPARATE
 PURPOSES.  THE UNDC'S PURPOSE IS TO PROVIDE A FORUM
 FOR IN-DEPTH DISCUSSION AND ANALYSIS ON SELECTED
 DISARMAMENT ISSUES.  THE UN FIRST COMMITTEE'S
 SCHEDULE DOES NOT PERMIT TIME FOR THIS.  THAT HAVING
 BEEN SAID, WE QUESTION THE EFFECTIVENESS AND UTILITY
 OF THE UN DISARMAMENT COMMISSION.  SESSIONS OF THE
 UNDC, WHERE DISARMAMENT ISSUES ARE DISCUSSED AND
 REPORTS ARE AGREED CONSENSUALLY, HAVE NOT MANAGED TO
 ACCOMPLISH MUCH IN RECENT YEARS.  THE LAST CONCRETE
 RESULTS FROM THE UNDC WERE GUIDELINES ON REGIONAL
 CONVENTIONAL DISARMAMENT, AGREED AT THE 1992 UNDC. 
 AT THE 1995 SESSION, THE UNDC BROUGHT TO A CLOSE FIVE
 YEARS OF WORK ON AN ITEM ON NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT WITH
 NO CONCRETE RESULTS BECAUSE NO AGREEMENT COULD BE
 REACHED ON THE DRAFTING OF CONSENSUS REPORTS.  THE
 UNDC'S CONSIDERATION OF "THE 1990'S AS THE THIRD
 DISARMAMENT DECADE" ALSO CONCLUDED WITHOUT THE
 ISSUANCE OF A CONSENSUS REPORT.

 THE PROPOSAL THAT THE DISARMAMENT COMMISSION MEET
 EVERY ALTERNATE YEAR IS AN EXCELLENT IDEA.  IT WAS
 DIFFICULT LAST YEAR, AND PROBLEMATIC THIS YEAR, TO
 COME UP WITH TWO OR THREE BROADLY-ACCEPTABLE AGENDA
 ITEMS ON MATTERS OF SUFFICIENT CONCERN.

 THE CONFERENCE ON DISARMAMENT SHOULD CONTINUE AS THE
 NEGOTIATING BODY.  THE CD CAN POINT TO CONCRETE
 SUCCESSES, INCLUDING THE CHEMICAL WEAPONS CONVENTION
 AND LAST YEAR'S WORK ON NEGATIVE AND POSITIVE
 SECURITY ASSURANCES (LATER PASSED BY CONSENSUS BY THE
 UN SECURITY COUNCIL).  THE COMPREHENSIVE TEST BAN
 TREATY IS EXPECTED TO BE CONCLUDED THIS YEAR, AND THE
 CD IS ALSO WORKING ON A FISSILE MATERIAL CUT-OFF
 TREATY.

 THE ADVISORY BOARD ON DISARMAMENT MATTERS DOES NOT
 LOOM LARGE IN THE INTER-GOVERNMENTAL PROCESS, AND
 COULD BE TERMINATED.

2.D.   Is there a need for further harmonization of
agendas of the Second and Third Committees? 
Particularly with reference to social development
issues?

 THESE AGENDAS HAVE BEEN CAREFULLY TAILORED, WITH THE
 SECOND COMMITTEE'S NEARLY FULLY BIENNIALIZED AND
 PROGRAMMED IN SYNCH WITH THE ECOSOC'S NEARLY FULLY
 BIENNIALIZED AGENDA.  THE THIRD COMMITTEE HAS BEEN
 AGGRESSIVELY CLUSTERING RELATED ITEMS, WHICH HAS
 WORKED WELL THERE.  THE NUMBER OF THIRD COMMITTEE
 SUB-ITEMS REMAINS UNNECESSARILY LARGE.  HOWEVER, ONE
 NOTABLE ISSUE ADRIFT BETWEEN THE TWO COMMITTEES IS
 NARCOTICS (A THIRD COMMITTEE ISSUE WHICH COULD TAKE
 ON SECOND COMMITTEE ASPECTS (REGARDING CROP
 SUBSTITUTION AND FLOWS OF NARCO-DOLLARS).  NARCOTICS
 SHOULD REMAIN A THIRD COMMITTEE ISSUE.  ALSO, THE
 SECOND COMMITTEE SHOULD TAKE CHARGE OF ALL POVERTY
 RELATED ISSUES, PARTICULARLY THOSE RELATED TO THE
 LEAST DEVELOPED COUNTRIES, AND CONSIDER THEM IN AN
 OMNIBUS TEXT.

2.E.   Should there be a rationalization of the work of
the Third Committee and related bodies, including
ECOSOC, Commission on Human Rights, Commission on the
Status of Women, Commission on Narcotic Drugs,
Commission on Crime Prevention and Criminal Justice? 
Is it possible to eliminate the current three tier
duplication of debates:  at the commission, at ECOSOC,
and at the GA?

 RATIONALIZATION OF THE WORK OF THESE BODIES IS MUCH
 NEEDED.WE PROPOSE THAT THE ROLES OF THESE BODIES IN
 RELATION TO EACH OTHER BE CLARIFIED. IN THAT REGARD,
 ECOSOC SHOULD CONCENTRATE ITS ROLE ON PROVIDING
 POLICY GUIDANCE AND COORDINATION WITH RESPECT TO
 MATTERS AND UN BODIES WITHIN ITS PURVIEW, AND AVOID
 REOPENING DEBATES HELD IN THE SUBSIDIARY ENTITY.  CPC
 COULD THEN DROP ITS FUNCTION AS A COORDINATING BODY,
 WHICH IT CURRENTLY DOES NOT FULFILL, IN ANY EVENT. 
 THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY SHOULD TAKE NOTE OF THESE
 REPORTS AND PROVIDE A FORUM FOR INTERESTED MEMBER
 STATES TO OFFER THEIR VIEWS ON OUTSTANDING,
 UNRESOLVED ISSUE.  THIS SHOULD TAKE PLACE IN THE
 PLENARY, WHICH WOULD FURTHER THE OBJECTIVE OF
 ENHANCING ITS ROLE. 

2.F.  Is it possible for the Decolonization and Special
Political Committee to meet during the January/July
Period and subsume in its work that of some of the
Special Committees such as the Committee on Peaceful
Uses of Outer Space, Ad Hoc Committee on the Indian
Ocean, Committee on Information, etc?  
 WE FAVOR ELIMINATING BODIES WHICH ARE NO LONGER
 RELEVANT OR WHOSE WORK COULD BE MORE EFFECTIVELY AND
 EFFICIENTLY PERFORMED ELSEWHERE.  THE C-24 AND THE AD
 HOC COMMITTEE ON THE INDIAN OCEAN ARE TWO BODIES
 WHICH SHOULD BE INTENSELY SCRUTINIZED WITH A VIEW
 TOWARDS THEIR ELIMINATION.  BY THE SAME TOKEN, THE
 DECOLONIZATION AND SPECIAL POLITICAL COMMITTEE IS
 ITSELF AN ANACHRONISTIC INSTRUMENT, AND ITS MANDATE
 AND PROGRAM OF WORK SHOULD BE THOROUGHLY EXAMINED
 WITH THE VIEW OF DOWNSIZING AND 

  RATIONALIZATION.  THE AIM SHOULD BE TO RESTRUCTURE THE UN SYSTEM
  TO MEET CURRENT AND FUTURE REALITIES, NOT PERPETUATE OUTDATED,
  IRRELEVANT BODIES BY ASSIGNING THEM RESPONSIBILITIES AND DUTIES
  IN WHICH THEY HAVE NO COMPETENCE.  BY THAT STANDARD, THE
  COMMITTEE ON INFORMATION SHOULD BE CONTINUED BECAUSE IT
  PROVIDES IMPORTANT OVERSIGHT FUNCTIONS IN RELATION TO THE
  DEPARTMENT OF PUBLIC INFORMATION.

  IN ADDITION TO THE COMMITTEES IDENTIFIED IN THE QUESTION, THE US
  IS STRONGLY OPPOSED TO TWO PALESTINIAN COMMITTEES:
  - THE SPECIAL COMMITTEE TO INVESTIGATE ISRAELI PRACTICES, AND
  - THE COMMITTEE ON THE EXERCISE OF THE INALIENABLE RIGHTS OF THE
    PALESTINIAN PEOPLE.
  THESE COMMITTEES ARE OUTDATED, IRRELEVANT AND NOT SUPPORTIVE OF
  THE PEACE PROCESS.  IN PARTICULAR, THE SPECIAL COMMITTEE
  PRODUCES NO USEFUL PRODUCT, DUPLICATES THE WORK OF THE UN HUMAN
  RIGHTS COMMISSION AND THE SPECIAL RAPPORTEUR FOR THE OCCUPIED
  TERRITORIES, AND IS AN OUTMODED RELIC OF THE PRE-PEACE PROCESS
  PAST.  THE US FAVORS THE ABOLITION OF THESE TWO COMMITTEES. 
  THE RESOURCES DIRECTED TO THEM WOULD BE PUT TO FAR BETTER USE
  BY SUPPORTING ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT THAT WOULD BENEFIT THE
  PALESTINIAN PEOPLE.

  Bearing in mind the concern for a more dynamic role for the
General Assembly in peace and security issues and the role of
Peacekeeping operations, is it possible to move from the First to
Fourth committees the mandate for "international security"?

  MATTERS RELATING TO INTERNATIONAL SECURITY SHOULD CONTINUE TO BE
  CONSIDERED BY THE FIRST COMMITTEE.  THE SECURITY AGENDA
  REQUIRES SPECIALIZED KNOWLEDGE THAT DELEGATES TO THE FOURTH
  COMMITTEE WOULD NOT HAVE.  NO FIRST COMMITTEE FUNCTIONS OR
  RESPONSIBILITIES SHOULD BE MOVED TO THE FOURTH COMMITTEE.

2.G.     Alternately, could the work of the First Committee and the
Fourth Committee be integrated or merged, with the Plenary taking
greater responsibility for the international security issues?

  THE WORK OF THE FIRST COMMITTEE SHOULD NOT BE TRANSFERRED TO THE
  PLENARY BUT SHOULD CONTINUE TO BE ACCOMPLISHED IN THE FIRST
  COMMITTEE RATHER THAN IN THE PLENARY.  AS MENTIONED ABOVE, THE
  DISCUSSION OF SECURITY ISSUES REQUIRES THE PARTICIPATION OF
  EXPERTS.  WERE SECURITY ISSUES TO BE CONSIDERED ONLY IN THE
  PLENARY, THERE WOULD HAVE TO BE SEVERAL MORE WEEKS BUILT INTO
  THE PLENARY IN ORDER TO ACCOMMODATE DEBATE AND DELIBERATIONS
  WHICH NOW OCCUR IN THE FIRST COMMITTEE.  IT IS DIFFICULT TO SEE
  SIGNIFICANT SAVINGS OR IMPROVED EFFICIENCY COMING ABOUT UNDER
  THIS SUGGESTION.

2.H.     Are the current composition/mandates/working methods of
the ACABQ, Committee on Contributions, Committee on Conferences,
Committee on Program Coordination, Joint Inspection Unit,
Investments committee, and Joint Pension fund board satisfactory
in their advisory capacities or is reorganization necessary? 
What kind of reform is necessary?  Should these committees be
"inter-governmental" in nature or remain as they presently are,
namely experts serving in their "individual capacities"?  Could
their work be subsumed in the fifth committee with representation
from specialists as necessary?

  RECOGNIZING THE NEED FOR BETTER COORDINATION AMONG THE OVERSIGHT
  BODIES, THE GA ADOPTED RESOLUTION 47/454.  DURING A RESUMED
  SESSION OF THE GA (APRIL), THE FIFTH COMMITTEE WILL REVIEW THE
  FUNCTIONING OF THE SUBSIDIARY BODIES RESPONSIBLE FOR
  COORDINATION, ADMINISTRATIVE QUESTIONS AND BUDGETARY MATTERS,
  INCLUDING THE ADVISORY COMMITTEE ON ADMINISTRATIVE AND
  BUDGETARY QUESTIONS, THE BOARD OF AUDITORS, THE JOINT
  INSPECTION UNIT AND THE COMMITTEE FOR PROGRAM AND COORDINATION,
  WITH A VIEW TO IMPROVING THE EFFECTIVENESS OF THEIR OVERSIGHT
  AND COORDINATION MECHANISMS.

  THE ADVISORY COMMITTEE ON ADMINISTRATIVE AND BUDGETARY QUESTIONS
  (ACABQ) SHOULD BE REFORMED.  TO INCREASE ITS TRANSPARENCY,
  ACABQ MEETINGS SHOULD GENERALLY BE OPEN TO ALL UN MEMBER STATES
  TO OBSERVE, EXCEPT FOR NECESSARY EXECUTIVE SESSIONS AND
  INFORMAL EXCHANGES WITH SECRETARIAT OFFICIALS.  ACABQ REPORTS
  SHOULD BE STRUCTURED IN 3 PARTS: BACKGROUND, DISCUSSION AND
  RECOMMENDATIONS, WITH RELEVANT DATA PRESENTED AS AN ANNEX. 
  WHEN NECESSARY, DISSENTING VIEWS SHOULD BE STATED.  THE
  PROFESSIONALISM OF THE STAFF SECRETARIAT SHOULD BE
  STRENGTHENED, TO PROVIDE ENHANCED TECHNICAL SUPPORT FOR ITS
  MEMBERS.  THE ACABQ SHOULD REMAIN AN EXPERT BODY, BUT ITS
  MEMBERS SHOULD BE ACCOUNTABLE TO THEIR GOVERNMENTS.

  THE WORK OF THE FIFTH COMMITTEE HAS BECOME TOO COMPLEX AND
  SUBSTANTIAL TO BE HANDLED BY THE FULL COMMITTEE ALONE.  THE
  JOINT INSPECTION UNIT HAS PROPOSED THE ESTABLISHMENT OF
  SUBCOMMITTEES, REPRESENTATIVE OF THE MEMBERSHIP, FOCUSING OF
  PEACEKEEPING MANAGEMENT, STRATEGIC PLANNING AND OVERSIGHT.  THE
  WORK OF THE COMMITTEE WOULD BE IMPROVED BY THE CREATION OF SUCH
  SMALLER SUBCOMMITTEES WITH FOCUSED MISSIONS.

  THERE IS OVERLAP BETWEEN THE ECOSOC'S COORDINATION SEGMENT AND
  THE WORK OF THE COMMITTEE ON PROGRAM COORDINATION, WHICH IN
  RECENT YEARS, AT THE JOINT MEETING OF COMMITTEE ON PROGRAM
  COORDINATION (CPC) AND THE ADMINISTRATIVE COMMITTEE ON
  COORDINATION (ACC), HAS BEEN REPEATING MUCH OF THE WORK DONE AT
  ECOSOC'S SUBSTANTIVE SESSION.  ECOSOC'S COORDINATION ROLE WOULD
  BE IMPROVED AND STRENGTHENED, AND MUCH UNNECESSARY, DUPLICATIVE 


  DISCUSSION WOULD BE ELIMINATED, BY HAVING ECOSOC ABSORB THE
  ECONOMIC/SOCIAL PROGRAM FUNCTIONS NOW PERFORMED BY THE CPC. 
  THIS MEASURE WOULD FURTHER ENHANCE ECOSOC'S ROLE BY GIVING
  ECOSOC THE FUNCTION OF REVIEWING THE BUDGET AND PROGRAM
  RELATION IN REGARD TO ECONOMIC/SOCIAL ACTIVITIES THAT THE CPC
  WAS INTENDED TO PERFORM.  UNDER THIS CONCEPT, THE ACC WOULD
  REPORT DIRECTLY TO ECOSOC IN A REGULAR FORMAT THAT FOSTERS
  CONSIDERATION OF COORDINATION ISSUES AMONG UN DEVELOPMENT
  ENTITIES AND SPECIALIZED AGENCIES.  THE CPC'S REMAINING
  BUDGETARY AND RELATED FUNCTIONS COULD BE ALLOCATED TO THE FIFTH
  COMMITTEE, ELIMINATING THE NEED FOR THE CPC.  THIS WOULD RESULT
  IN SIGNIFICANT COST SAVINGS.

  THE INDEPENDENT JOINT INSPECTION UNIT HAS A SYSTEM-WIDE MANDATE
  TO INSURE EFFICIENCY AND OPTIMUM USE OF FUNDS.  UNFORTUNATELY,
  ITS METHOD OF OPERATION HAS BEEN UNSTRUCTURED, FREQUENTLY
  DRIVEN BY THE INTEREST OF THE INSPECTORS AS OPPOSED TO A
  SYSTEMATIC REVIEW OF UN SYSTEM OPERATIONS.  COMPOSITION AND
  METHOD OF APPOINTMENT NEED TO BE REVIEWED.  WE PREFER A FEWER
  NUMBER OF INSPECTORS IN FAVOR OF AN INCREASE IN THE NUMBER OF
  TECHNICAL SUPPORT STAFF.  DISSATISFACTION WITH THEIR
  PERFORMANCE HAS LED TO POINTED GA RESOLUTIONS IN RECENT YEARS,
  CALLING UPON THE UNIT TO CONDUCT MORE RIGOROUS, RELEVANT AND
  VALUE ORIENTED INSPECTIONS, WITH FOCUSED AND ACHIEVABLE
  RECOMMENDATIONS.

  THE UN JOINT STAFF PENSION BOARD SHOULD REMAIN A TRIPARTITE BODY
  (GOVERNING BODY, ADMINISTRATION, STAFF), MEETING BIENNIALLY.

  THE HIGHLY REGARDED INVESTMENTS COMMITTEE, CONSISTENTLY PRODUCING
  GOOD RETURNS, SHOULD REMAIN A BODY OF EXPERTS.

  THE COMMITTEE ON CONFERENCES DEALS WITH HIGHLY POLITICIZED
  RESOURCE ISSUES, WHICH ARE REOPENED AND DISCUSSED DE NOVO BY
  THE FIFTH COMMITTEE.  IN ORDER TO AVOID THIS KIND OF
  REPETITION, IT MIGHT BE ADVISABLE TO ABOLISH THE COMMITTEE AND
  BRING THE ISSUES DIRECTLY TO THE FIFTH COMMITTEE, WHICH COULD
  BE ASSISTED BY A SUB-COMMITTEE AS INDICATED ABOVE.  THIS WOULD
  ALLOW ALL INTERESTED DELEGATIONS TO PARTICIPATE AND
  ADMINISTRATIVE DECISIONS TO BE MADE THEN AND THERE WITHOUT
  FURTHER DELIBERATIONS DURING THE REGULAR SESSION.

  THE COMMITTEE ON CONTRIBUTIONS, FORMED AS A BODY OF TECHNICAL
  EXPERTS, IS OF LIMITED UTILITY.  THE COC'S WORK DOES NOT
  ELIMINATE WORK FOR THE FIFTH COMMITTEE--EVEN WITH COC REPORTS
  AVAILABLE TO THEM, THE FIFTH COMMITTEE TRADITIONALLY DEBATES
  THE VARIOUS ELEMENTS OF THE SCALE METHODOLOGY IN GREAT DETAIL. 
  THERE ARE POLITICAL DECISIONS THAT AFFECT THE SCALE WHICH THE
  COC IS NOT MANDATED TO MAKE AND HAS AVOIDED, BUT WHICH BECOME
  KEY ELEMENTS OF THE SCALE DECISIONS MADE IN THE FIFTH.  THE COC
  CONTAINS FEW REAL EXPERTS; RATHER, MEMBERS TEND TO BE FIFTH
  COMMITTEE DELEGATES OR OTHER GOVERNMENT EMPLOYEES WITH
  EXPERIENCE IN UN SCALE ISSUES.  POLITICAL CONSIDERATIONS 

  INEVITABLY SEEP INTO COC DELIBERATIONS.  AND NOW THE COC WILL BE
  ASKED TO CONSIDER IN A MORE SYSTEMATIC MANNER REQUESTS FROM
  MEMBER STATES FOR EXEMPTION FROM ARTICLE 19 OF THE CHARTER,
  WHICH INVOLVES ISSUES THAT GO BEYOND PURELY TECHNICAL MATTERS. 
  A BETTER APPROACH WOULD BE NO COMMITTEE OR, PERHAPS, A SMALLER,
  INTER-GOVERNMENTAL COMMITTEE (10-15 MEMBERS) THAT COULD
  ORGANIZE REQUESTS FOR DATA AND PROCESS ANALYSES FROM THE
  SECRETARIAT AND OTHERS ON METHODOLOGY QUESTIONS.  THE BULK OF
  THE DEBATE WOULD BE DONE IN THE FIFTH COMMITTEE.  FOR THOSE
  OCCASIONS WHEN TRUE TECHNICAL ADVICE IS WARRANTED, IT COULD BE
  OBTAINED ON AN AD HOC BASIS FROM OTHER SOURCES, SUCH AS THE
  MANY SOURCES OF ECONOMICS EXPERTISE WITHIN THE UN SYSTEM OR BY
  SPECIAL, ONE-TIME ARRANGEMENTS, AS WAS DONE SUCCESSFULLY WITH
  THE SPECIAL GROUP OF EXPERTS ON CAPACITY TO PAY.

2.I.     Should fiscal discipline become an overriding factor in
determining mandates?  Can the Administrative and Budgetary Main
Committee (Fifth Committee) recommend that a particular mandate
be reconsidered by a substantive Committee because of a lack of
resources?

  YES.  CLEARLY FISCAL DISCIPLINE MUST BE AN OVERRIDING FACTOR IN
  DETERMINING THE MANDATES OF THE ORGANIZATION.  THE OTHER MAIN
  COMMITTEES NEED TO SET PRIORITIES WITHIN THE CONSTRAINTS OF
  AVAILABLE RESOURCES.  INDEED, THE FIFTH COMMITTEE SHOULD
  RECOMMEND THE RECONSIDERATION OF MANDATES AS NECESSARY TO
  CONFORM WITH RESOURCES REQUIREMENTS.

2.J.     Should resolution 41/213 which mandated that budget
related resolutions be adopted by broadest possible agreement
(i.e. consensus) be reviewed?  Are the circumstances under which
this procedure was adopted still valid?

  CONSENSUS DECISION MAKING ON BUDGET-RELATED ISSUES IS OF CRUCIAL
  IMPORTANCE.THE POLICY WAS ADOPTED TO RESOLVE A CRISIS OVER
  VOTING RIGHTS ON FINANCIAL MATTERS, WHEN AGREEMENT COULD NOT BE
  REACHED ON PROPOSALS FOR WEIGHTED VOTING.RE-OPENING THAT POLICY
  WOULD PROVOKE A NEW CRISIS OVER THE SAME ISSUE AND INVOKE THE
  WITHHOLDING PROVISIONS OF US LAW. RATHER THAN RECONSIDERING
  THIS ISSUE, WE SHOULD REAFFIRM AND STRENGTHEN THE COMMITMENT TO
  CONSENSUS ON FINANCIAL ISSUES.

2.K.     In the international legal sphere, is it possible to
consolidate (utilizing different segments as appropriate) the
work of the Sixth Committee, the International Law Commission,
the Commission on Crime Prevention and Criminal Justice and 
UNCITRAL?  Should these limited membership bodies be made
open-ended?  Should the work of Special Committee on the
Charter be subsumed in the Sixth Committee?  Could the work of
the ILC be substituted by a high-level segment of Sixth
Committee with participation of eminent experts in
international law?

      THE SIXTH COMMITTEE IS A SUITABLE BODY FOR COMMENTING ON
      THE DRAFTS PREPARED BY UNCITRAL AND THE ILC AND FOR
      ADOPTING THEM AND OPENING THEM FOR SIGNATURE.  THE SIXTH
      COMMITTEE NOT ONLY LACKS THE PARTICULAR EXPERTISE AND THE
      TIME TO DO THE CONVENTION DRAFTING THAT IS INVOLVED, BUT
      ALSO, AS A BODY OF THE WHOLE, WOULD BE TOTALLY UNWIELDY
      AS A DRAFTING BODY.  THE ANNUAL POLITICO-LEGAL INPUT,
      INCLUDING THE SETTING OF PRIORITIES BY THE SIXTH
      COMMITTEE, IS A PROPER AND NECESSARY FUNCTION BEST
      PERFORMED BY A COMMITTEE OF THE WHOLE.  THE ACTUAL
      PREPARATION OF DRAFTS IS BEST CARRIED OUT BY A BODY OF
      LIMITED MEMBERSHIP AND PARTICULAR EXPERTISE; UNCITRAL AND
      THE ILC ARE SUCH BODIES.  IT WOULD BE POSSIBLE TO ACHIEVE
      SAVINGS BY HAVING THE ILC MEET IN NEW YORK RATHER THAN IN
      GENEVA.  THE CRIME COMMISSION FOCUSES ON TECHNICAL
      COOPERATION IN THE FIELD OF CRIME PREVENTION TECHNIQUES,
      IN THE CONTEXT OF HUMAN RIGHTS STANDARDS, INCLUDING
      ISSUES RELATING TO VIOLENCE AGAINST WOMEN AND
      EXPLOITATION OF CHILDREN. THESE ISSUES BELONG MORE
      APPROPRIATELY IN THE THIRD COMMITTEE.  THE REST OF THE
      ISSUES ARE BEST CARRIED OUT BY THE COMMISSION AS A BODY
      OF LIMITED MEMBERSHIP AND PARTICULAR EXPERTISE.  THE
      SPECIAL COMMITTEE ON THE CHARTER, A COMMITTEE OF THE
      WHOLE, ADDRESSES A SUBJECT WHICH THE SIXTH COMMITTEE IS
      WELL-PLACED TO HANDLE.  ITS WORK COULD BE SUBSUMED BY
      THAT COMMITTEE.  (###)
------------------------------------------------------------------------
U.S. Department of State
96/02/13:  UN Reform--The Adgenda #3(Amb. Birenbaum)


FOR IMMEDIATE RELEASE           USUN PRESS RELEASE
#017-(96)
                              FEBRUARY 13, 1996


STATEMENT BY AMBASSADOR DAVID E. BIRENBAUM, UNITED
STATES REPRESENTATIVE TO THE UNITED NATIONS FOR UN
MANAGEMENT AND REFORM, TO THE UN GENERAL ASSEMBLY
WORKING GROUP ON STRENGTHENING THE UN SYSTEM (GA
REFORM), FEBRUARY 13, 1996
------------------------------------------------------------------

GENERAL ASSEMBLY REFORM:  3     THE AGENDA


3.A.   Without in any way seeking to limit the right of
member states to propose new items, is it practical to
introduce a "sunset rule" that would require any
operative paragraph of a draft resolution which
decides to re-include an item on the next year's
agenda to be subject of a separate decision or vote? 
Alternately, should the General Committee exercise
greater selectivity in deciding on the agenda of the
General Assembly?

 THE PROPOSAL AS FORMULATED WOULD LEAD TO MANY
 ADDITIONAL PROCEDURAL VOTES.  A BETTER APPROACH WOULD
 BE TO TASK THE BUREAU-ELECT  WITH PLANNING THE
 SESSION AND STREAMLINING THE AGENDA, TAKING INTO
 ACCOUNT A VARIETY OF FACTORS SUCH AS THOSE
 CONTEMPLATED BY THE PROPOSED SUNSET RULE.

 WE DO FAVOR A DIFFERENT SUNSET REGIME WHICH WOULD CALL
 FOR PROGRAMS TO END AFTER A SPECIFIED PERIOD (SAY TWO
 BIENNIA) UNLESS RENEWED BASED ON A DEMONSTRATION OF
 CONTINUING RELEVANCE AND VALUE ACCORDING TO
 ESTABLISHED CRITERIA.

3.B.   Would another approach be to establish a rule
that each year for a period of five years the number
of agenda item and the number of resolutions should
drop by 5% thus creating a strong incentive on the
General Committee to focus work on high priority
issues;

 YES.  THIS WOULD CREATE A POWERFUL INCENTIVE TO
RATIONALIZE AND STREAMLINE THE AGENDA.

3.C.   Is it possible to cluster some agenda items
dealing with similar issues?

 IT IS POSSIBLE AND DESIRABLE TO CLUSTER AGENDA ITEMS. 
  SEPARATE ANNUAL RESOLUTIONS ON THE PROGRAM OF ACTION
 FOR LEAST DEVELOPED COUNTRIES, DEBT, COMMODITIES,
 AFRICAN DEVELOPMENT, AFRICAN INDUSTRIAL DEVELOPMENT,
 SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY IN AFRICA, NET TRANSFER OF
 RESOURCES AND OTHER CLOSELY RELATED ISSUES SUCH AS
 THE PARTNERSHIP DIALOGUE COULD BE CONSOLIDATED INTO A
 SINGLE RESOLUTION ON THE CONCERNS OF THE LEAST
 DEVELOPED COUNTRIES.  A SIMILAR APPROACH COULD BE
 PURSUED WITH REGARD TO THE MULTIPLE RESOLUTIONS THAT
 DEAL GENERICALLY WITH TRADE AND ENVIRONMENTAL ISSUES.
  MOREOVER, BECAUSE THE CONCERNS ADDRESSED BY THESE
 RESOLUTIONS VARY LITTLE FROM YEAR TO YEAR, THE
 OMNIBUS RESOLUTION ADDRESSING THEM COULD BE TAKEN UP
 BIENNIALLY OR EVEN TRIENNIALLY.  WHERE NEW
 DEVELOPMENTS WARRANT, CHANGING CONDITIONS OR EMERGING
 ISSUES COULD BE TAKEN UP IN ANY YEAR THAT THEY OCCUR.
  CLUSTERING HAS BEEN USED MORE FREQUENTLY IN RECENT
 YEARS, AND DELEGATIONS HAVE TAKEN TO ITS USEFULNESS. 
 ITS CONTINUED APPLICATION COULD BE ENCOURAGED.

3.D.   Could more agenda items be biennialized and
triennialized?

 YES, FOR EXAMPLE THE POLICY REVIEW OF OPERATIONAL
 ACTIVITIES FOR DEVELOPMENT IS HELD TRIENNIALLY.  THE
 TREND TOWARD BIENNIAL AND TRIENNIAL CONSIDERATION
 EVIDENT IN RECENT YEARS SHOULD BE STRONGLY ENCOURAGED.

(###)
------------------------------------------------------------------------
U.S. Department of State
96/03/11:  UN Reform -- Secretariat #4 (Amb. Birenbaum)


FOR IMMEDIATE RELEASE                  USUN PR Revised #29-(96)
                                       MARCH 11, 1996

STATEMENT BY AMBASSADOR DAVID E. BIRENBAUM, UNITED STATES
REPRESENTATIVE TO THE UNITED NATIONS FOR UN MANAGEMENT AND REFORM,
TO THE UN GENERAL ASSEMBLY WORKING GROUP ON STRENGTHENING THE UN
SYSTEM (TO ESSY GROUP ON CLUSTER #1), MARCH 11, 1996
-----------------------------------------------------------------

  As many have observed, reform is a means, not an end.  So, in
working for the reform of the Secretariat, we need to be clear about
the goal.  What is it that we are seeking to achieve?  What do we
want from a reformed UN?

  A UN, reformed for the 21st Century, would be clear as to its
priorities, structured so as better to focus on them and managed to
achieve results.  Such a UN would regenerate the political will to
support our Organization materially and morally.

  We have made clear in our comprehensive submission to this Working
Group that we identify four core missions:

  - maintaining peace and security by Charter-authorized military
    actions to maintain peace, projecting the rule of international
    law and assuring the peaceful use of nuclear energy;

  - supporting international development by promoting environmentally
    sound, socially equitable, economically viable growth;

  - establishing norms, and supporting their implementation,
    especially in the areas of human rights, worker rights, health
    and environment; similarly, defining and monitoring technical
    standards used in areas like civil aviation, postal services,
    telecommunications and intellectual property;

  - preparing for, mobilizing and coordinating humanitarian relief to
    meet emergencies caused by natural disasters and man-made
    catastrophes.


  Successful pursuit of these missions requires important changes in
the way the Secretariat is organized and the role of the Member
States in relation to the work of the Organization.  In particular,
the Secretariat must be given clear guidance on what the member
states want it to accomplish, it must have the authority and the
resources to do the job and it must be held strictly accountable for
performance.  This will require that the Secretariat be restructured
to eliminate departments and other bodies of marginal utility and
consolidate those with functionally similar responsibilities, define
with particularity the missions of the departments which remain and
develop a rigorous performance evaluation system for programs and
manage for results.

  My government envisions a restructured and reformed Secretariat in
which:

  - there is a Deputy Secretary General, appointed by the Secretary
    General, confirmed by the GA and serving at the pleasure of the
    Secretary General, with responsibility for management and system
    coordination.  The Deputy would function as second in command.

  - five departments, each headed by an Under Secretary General, in
    lieu of eight as at present.  These departments would have
    responsibility for political affairs, peacekeeping, sustainable
    development, humanitarian affairs and administration and
    conference services.

  - a strategic planning focus, whereby each department would be
    required to prepare a statement setting forth its mission, goals
    for the current biennium and means of evaluating performance.

  - an intensified commitment to the new personnel management
    philosophy which empowers managers to make decisions, trains
    personnel to manage and holds them accountable for performance.

  - a new determination by the member states to avoid micro-management.

  These reforms hinge on an essential trade off -- greater authority
to manage in exchange for real accountability for performance. 
Required also is clear guidance as to what is expected in terms of
results.  None of these elements will suffice without all of them. 
But together, this package will go far to make the Secretariat a far
more effective instrument for carrying out the UN' core missions.

  Turning to the specific questions in Conference Room Paper 6 to be
discussed today, let us offer the following comments.

1.  With respect to question 1, the U.S. position is that, since we
will be electing a Secretary-General this year, we should defer
consideration regarding terms of office and process of selection
until after that point.


2.  As to the questions concerning the structure of the Secretariat
and its senior management:

The time has come for lines of authority to be consolidated throughout
the Secretariat and departments should be merged, to make the
Secretariat a more effective and accountable instrument for
management of UN activities.  This should be accompanied by real
reductions in senior-level positions, a manageable span of senior
officials reporting directly to the Secretary General and a new
focus on strategic management for performance.

As indicated, the U.S. strongly supports the creation fo the post of
Deputy Secretary General.  The Deputy Secretary General would serve
as acting Secretary General in the absence of the Secretary General.
 Routine responsibilities would include administering the whole
Organization on a day-to-day basis, and handling all management
responsibilities, supported by a new strategic planning competence
to be established in the office of the Deputy Secretary General. 
The Deputy would be nominated by the Secretary General, ratified by
the General Assembly and serve at the pleasure of the Secretary
General.  We would expect that the Secretary General would consult
widely in nominating the Deputy and that, in view of the latter's
system wide responsibilities, would solicit the views of the ACC.

The Secretariat should be organized into a smaller number of
departments with clearly defined missions.  The number of Under
Secretary General and Assistant Secretary General positions should
be reduced significantly.  We would propose five such departments,
each headed by an Under Secretary General, dealing with: political
affairs, peacekeeping, international economic cooperation and
sustainable development, humanitarian affairs, and administration
and conference services.  This will entail consolidating a number of
departments.

An early candidate for re-structuring has already received a great
deal of attention.  The Department of Development Support and
Management Services (DDSMS) is largely redundant in its functions
and responsibilities.  It should be phased out as soon as possible,
consistent with administrative efficiency, and its functions -- but
not necessarily its personnel positions -- transferred for the most
part to the semi- autonomous Office of Project Services (OPS) and
other appropriate elements of the UN system.  Personnel positions in
DDSMS should be eliminated as they are vacated by attrition and
reassignment.

The Department of Economic and Social Information and Policy Analysis
(DESIPA) has statistical compilation and analysis as its most
important function.  DESIPA maintains an excellent statistical
capability.  But its activities in national income accounting and
its work on social statistics could more efficiently and effectively
by carried out if consolidated or better integrated with similar
efforts of UNCTAD and the appropriate specialized agencies such as
WHO, FAO, ILO, the World Bank, and the IMF.



The Department of Policy Coordination and Sustainable Development
(DPCSD) has established an innovative record in stimulating and
relying upon the work of other elements of the UN system, rather
than creating its own capabilities across the full range of its
responsibilities.  In connection with certain consolidations of
ECOSOC subsidiaries which we are recommending, however, many of its
functions could be transferred to Geneva and administratively
supported by the UNCTAD secretariat.  This is particularly true in
connection with the recommended transfer of the Commission on
Sustainable Development to Geneva.

The functions remaining at UN headquarters after restructuring DDSMS,
DESIPA and DPCSD should be collected under a single Under Secretary
General in a single department focused on sustainable development. 
This department would strengthen the work of the UN in carrying out
this vital, core mission in accordance with the mandates of the
General Assembly.

3.  To provide accountability and improved performance, it should
become the standing practice throughout the UN system for programs
to end after a specified period of time unless they have
conclusively demonstrated their continuing relevance and value
according to established criteria.  The Secretary General's existing
authority to require program managers to conduct evaluations should
be exercised to initiate this process.

  The Office of Internal Oversight Services (OIOS) should be tasked
with developing a standardized evaluation methodology, including
specified criteria for relevance and effectiveness, in accordance
with strategic management principals with an emphasis on outputs. 
The use of this methodology should be required as a routine
responsibility of program managers throughout the UN.  The OIOS
should monitor compliance with the evaluation process as part of its
inspection function.

  The information generated by the evaluation process should be used
to establish priorities among those programs administered or
supported by the UN Secretariat, terminating those programs and
activities that have fallen to a lower priority or have lost their
relevance to changing circumstances, and increasing support for
those with a demonstrated need based on performance.  Review of
program evaluations should be part of the functions performed at
present by the Committee on Program Coordination and, in the future,
by a reformed ECOSOC.  Finally, evaluations should be tied to the
UN's budgetary process, thus assuring compliance with the "sunset"
policy and providing a base of information to help establish funding
requirements.

  Along the same lines, budgeting should be zero-based, not limited to
the incremental review of proposed new spending.  This would ensure
that programs and activities are examined regularly and extended
only where justified in terms of their performance. (###)