U.S. Department of State
Vol. X, Part 1, FRUS, 1958-60: E. Europe Region; Soviet Union; Cyprus
Office of the Historian
[Section 18 of 19]
FEBRUARY 1959 - JULY 1960: CONSTITUTION OF THE REPUBLIC OF CYPRUS; EFFORTS BY THE UNITED STATES TO SECURE ITS INTERESTS
312. Telegram From the Department of State to the Consulate General in Nicosia
Washington, February 25, 1959, 6:35 p.m.
341. Contel 375./1/ In replying queries regarding future of US communication facilities in Cyprus you should avoid giving Cypriots grounds for belief question will be open for discussion between new Government of Cyprus and USG. You should seek to avoid comment but, if pressed, you may reply to such queries by saying USG expects provision for continuity of US facilities will be worked out in context detailed agreement which will give effect to documents signed in London.
FYI. We propose shortly to follow up on suggestion final para London 4378./2/ End FYI.
//Source: Department of State, Central Files, 511.47C2/2 - 2459. Confidential; Priority. Drafted by Blood. Repeated to London, Athens, and Ankara.
/1/Telegram 375 from Nicosia, February 24, requested guidance concerning a request by a representative of Reuters News Agency for a statement about the future of U.S. communications facilities on Cyprus. (Ibid.)
/2/Telegram 4378 from London, February 20, reported Foreign Office assurances that they had safeguarded U.S. interests in the agreement signed on February 19 and that these rights would extend to all agreements signed prior to the end of British administration in Cyprus. The final paragraph reported that the Foreign Office suggested consultations between the United States and United Kingdom over communications facilities prior to talks with Greece, Cyprus, and Turkey. (Ibid., 747C.00/2 - 2059)
313. Telegram From the Department of State to the Consulate General in Nicosia
Washington, February 25, 1959, 7:05 p.m.
342. Makarios' imminent return to Cyprus, reported in press as scheduled for this weekend, raises question as to how we can best reestablish effective working contact with Archbishop.
With this goal in mind we believe you should call on Makarios as soon after his return as you think appropriate and express deep satisfaction USG at conclusion of mutually acceptable agreement on Cyprus and our appreciation for his contribution to achievement of settlement. You should also express our particular gratification at promised restoration of peace and prosperity to Cyprus and reestablishment of friendly relations between Greek and Turkish Cypriots. You should wish Makarios well in his important task of providing leadership in giving practical effect to the agreements concluded in London, and express willingness and interest in meeting with him from time to time to discuss developing situation in Cyprus. In this connection if you consider it appropriate, you may specifically recall close and friendly relations between Archbishop and your predecessor./1/
You may wish to apprise Cyprus Government in advance of any appointment with Makarios. You should follow call on Archbishop with similar call on Kuchuk.
//Source: Department of State, Central Files, 747C.00/2 - 2559. Confidential. Drafted by Blood. Repeated to London, Paris for USRO, Ankara, and Athens.
/1/Raymond F. Courtney, Consul in Nicosia, June 9, 1954 - September 8, 1957.
314. Memorandum From Director of Central Intelligence Dulles to Acting Secretary of State Herter
Washington, February 26, 1959.
[Source: Department of State, Central Files, 747C.00/2 - 2659. Secret. 1 page of source text not declassified.]
315. Telegram From the Embassy in the United Kingdom to the Department of State
London, February 26, 1959, 7 p.m.
4454. Embtel 4453./1/ Foreign Office passed Embassy copy UK - Greece - Turkey agreed minutes re Cyprus white paper February 19/2/ and informally made following points of interest to Department.
//Source: Department of State, Central Files, 747C.00/2 - 2659. Secret. Repeated to Ankara, Athens, Nicosia, and Paris for USRO.
/1/Telegram 4453 from London, February 26, transmitted the text of a February 19 secret protocol initialed by the Foreign Ministers of Greece, Turkey, and the United Kingdom. (Ibid.)
/2/The minutes have not been identified. The White Paper was The Conference on Cyprus (London, February 1959), Cmd. 680.
1. US facilities. Final clause (IV) paragraph B UK declaration (page 12 white paper) commits Cypriots to assume appropriate obligations. This considered obvious applicable provision US facilities problem. [5 lines of source text not declassified]
2. Committee in London/3/ (paragraph 2 C of agreed measures re new arrangements in Cyprus, page 15 white paper). Foreign Office looking for premises committee, which probably will be organized at ministerial level with officials doing real work. Hopes it will meet within week.
/3/Regarding the three committees established to implement the London accords, see Document 316.
3. Transitional committee on Cyprus (paragraph 2 B above document). Plans begun get it going, but names and details not worked out. While choice rests with Governor, he obviously will accept recommendations, and committee in fact, if not de jure, will become transitional government of island.
4. Date of independence./4/ Now that outside date set, Foot extremely eager get on with task and some hope he may finish ahead of time. At same time, Averoff said at conference and Foreign Office thinks it possible, UK could obtain short extension if date appears impracticable. Obviously too soon decide this question.
/4/The London accords called for the establishment of an independent Cypriot state by February 19, 1960.
5. Definition of military areas (paragraph B UK declaration, page 12 white paper) not even begun, and much work to be done on this.
6. Most immediate problem is to get Makarios in and Grivas out with minimum of difficulties. Harding offer amnesty for EOKA was in effect "turn head other way," but EOKA wants more formal acceptance of amnesty this time. Problem of face and prestige involved both sides. Makarios due on island March 1 or 2, and Foreign Office hopes inevitable celebrations won't get out of hand. It gave Greece approval for few students return for celebrations and now finds group numbers 800 and involves special ship. Foreign Office somewhat fearful Turk reaction and incidents between communities.
7. Foreign Office stressed main preoccupation at this time is maintain spirit genuine cooperation which existed at conference, without which implementation agreement next to impossible.
316. Editorial Note
The Cyprus agreements were approved by the Parliaments of Greece (February 28), Turkey (March 4), and the United Kingdom (March 19). Archbishop Makarios returned to Cyprus after 3 years in exile on March 1. On March 9, EOKA leader George Grivas announced a cease-fire, and on March 17, as part of the settlement, Grivas left Cyprus and returned to Greece.
Three bodies were established to implement the London agreements on Cyprus. A Transition Committee of Greek and Turkish Cypriots was established in Nicosia to confer with British colonial officials and prepare for the transfer of administrative responsibilities on the island. This committee began work on March 3. A Joint Constitutional Committee, also based in Nicosia, was assigned the task of writing a constitution for the new republic. It comprised representatives of Greece and Turkey and of the Greek and Turkish Cypriot communities. This committee met for the first time on March 23. A Joint Commission of Greek, Turkish, British, and Cypriot representatives met in London to prepare final treaties which would put the London agreements into effect. Its first meeting was held on April 4.
317. Memorandum of Conversation
Athens, March 5, 1959, 11:45 a.m.
Cyprus; Yugoslav-Greek Talks at Rhodes
Minister of Foreign Affairs Evangelos Averoff-Tossizza
Mr. Phedon Annino Cavalierato, Chef de Cabinet
Mr. Alexander Matsas, Director, First Political Division, Greek Ministry of Foreign Affairs
Mr. Owen T. Jones, Director, Greek, Turkish and Iranian Affairs, Department of State and Samuel D. Berger, charge d'Affaires ad interim
1. The Foreign Minister asked me to call, as this was the first time I had seen him since the Cyprus agreement. I expressed the great satisfaction of the United States with the settlement and congratulated him on this tremendous achievement, in which he had personally played so great a part.
2. He then spoke as follows about Cyprus:
a. It was, he said, a tremendous achievement, but it was not yet a settlement. It would depend upon whether it worked, and that in turn depended on the Greek and Turkish governments. For his part, he could say that the Greek government was in deadly earnest to maintain the closest cooperation with Turkey. This was an overriding necessity, in view of the dangerous Middle Eastern situation.
b. He himself was not happy about particular details of the settlement, and could not tell whether it was going to prove possible to move toward the concrete realization of self-government. This would depend in the main on Makarios. He thought Makarios was sincere and determined to make the agreement work.
c. It would also depend upon Grivas. He knew Grivas and had recently received communications from him. Grivas was not at all pleased with the settlement. However, in Grivas' last letter he had said that while he was dissatisfied he was, above all, a soldier, and he would remain silent. Mr. Averoff said "That is the best we can expect at the moment, and perhaps it will be possible to bring Grivas around. We plan to give him very high honors,/1/ and the British have proved understanding." Grivas refuses to come out of his mountain hiding place until after all the men who fought with him have been released. The British were very understanding in the matter, and he hoped that all this would be accomplished very soon and that Grivas would be coming to Greece.
//Source: Department of State, Central Files, 747C.00/3 - 659. Secret; Limited Distribution; Noforn. Drafted by Berger. Enclosure to despatch 725 from Athens, March 6. The meeting was held in Averoff's office at the Greek Foreign Ministry.
/1/Grivas was flown by the Greek Air Force to Athens on March 17 for a public reception. He was promoted to the rank of Lieutenant General (Retired) in the Greek Army and granted a pension commensurate with that rank.
d. In an aside, Averoff told the following story: He said that he told Macmillan and Lennox-Boyd/2/ that the wisest thing the British could do when Grivas leaves Cyprus is to send him out with a guard of honor at the airport. He said that Macmillan and Lennox-Boyd were at first taken aback at this suggestion, but when he explained that this single gesture would do a great deal to warm the hearts of the Greek Cypriots and the people of Greece, and restore good will toward the British, they saw the point. However, they said it was impossible to take such a dramatic step because of British public opinion. Mr. Averoff said the British gave indications that they would do something to indicate the respect in which they hold Grivas. Averoff said the British Army in Cyprus has a good deal of admiration for Grivas and from the British Army point of view, Macmillan could have gotten away with this gesture, but that he recognized it was impossible from the domestic British point of view.
/2/Presumably during the London conference on Cyprus February 17 - 19.
e. Mr. Averoff then said in a further aside that one day he will let us have access to some of the secret files on Cyprus. They will show, he said, who shot Mrs. Cundliffe in the back and who shot the American Consul./3/ It was not, he could assure me, a Greek. Mrs. Cundliffe was shot because of a love affair. The Greek government knew this at the time, but could not publish it because once the woman was dead, it would have been regarded with disbelief in the emotional climate of the time. However, we would recall that the court did not find the accused guilty, and the whole thing was covered over. This whole story will be told in time, but the time is not yet. As he began to move on to other subjects, I interrupted him to ask if he could tell us the story of the shooting of the American Vice Consul. He said he was sorry he could not tell me anything more except that it was not a Greek who did it, but it was done by "those who wanted to create antagonism between the Greeks and the Americans." He refused to be drawn out in the matter, merely saying we would be told in due course. I did not feel this was the occasion to engage in a discussion of the necessity for us to know the circumstances surrounding the shooting of one of our officers, but this is a matter on which we should consider pressing at an appropriate time.
/3/Mrs. Cundliffe, the wife of a sergeant in the 29th Field Regiment, Royal Artillery, was shot in the back by a terrorist on October 3, 1958, while leaving a store in Varosha, Cyprus. The attack came shortly after EOKA announced a terror campaign directed against all English persons on the island. John P. Wentworth, Vice Consul in Nicosia, was shot by gunmen on September 18, 1958, during a series of EOKA terrorist attacks in Nicosia.
3. Averoff then said the ability to make the Cyprus settlement work also depended upon other countries. A United States gesture now would be most useful in terms of the Cypriots, and he strongly urged that we issue a statement congratulating the Cypriot people on their achievement and the prospects of independence and self-government, and indicating an American interest in the future of Cyprus, saying that the Americans seek nothing of Cyprus and ask only that they join the family of free nations./4/ When Mr. Matsas interrupted to suggest that the United States should indicate a willingness to offer economic help "without strings", Mr. Averoff said he did not think that this was desirable for the purposes of this first statement. This was more in the nature of extending a hand of friendship to the Cypriot people. There had been in the papers this morning a report that the United States contemplated setting up missile bases in Cyprus. Mr. Averoff paused at that, as if to expect an answer from us, whereupon Mr. Jones and I said we knew nothing of any plans for missile bases in Cyprus, and were sure there was no truth to the report. Averoff implied in that event it would do no harm to deny the report, for there were those who were now seeking to damage the United States in the eyes of the Greeks and the Cypriots.
/4/In telegram 2444 to Athens, March 12, the Department indicated that mention of U.S. satisfaction with the Cyprus settlement would be included in speeches celebrating the 10th anniversary of NATO. (Department of State, Central Files, 747C.00/3 - 659)
4. Averoff then said the following of the Russians. The Russians who usually were so skilled in exploiting any kind of situation had, in their handling of the Cyprus situation, not been very clever. Nor had they given any indication of friendship to the new Cyprus nation. They were plugging the line that the enosis had been betrayed. This was not going over in Cyprus because the people are so enthused with their new freedom that Russia appeared to them at the moment to be unfriendly. The Russian line was, however, creating something of a danger inside Greece and would have some effect on the Greek youth. In the final analysis, the future of Cyprus will depend upon what Makarios and Grivas say and do. If the local Communists come out against the settlement they will be called traitors in Cyprus but the local Communists will in the end do what Moscow tells them to. At the moment Makarios and Grivas were confronted by the large Communist controlled trade union movement. The Communists have done a good job of building the unions, representing them, and fighting for improvements, and in trade union terms are well regarded among the workers. Averoff estimates that about half the trade union members or somewhat less are Communists. The Archbishop has tried to build a new union movement, but so far has not had very much success. On the future handling of the trade unions, the Archbishop and Grivas disagree. The Archbishop is for a moderate policy of trying to wean the workers away from the Communist controlled unions into the new nationalist trade union movement. Grivas, who is vigorously anti- Communist, as everyone knows, is for a tough line and wants to take harsh and punitive measures against the Communist controlled unions and their leaders. Averoff then turned to Grivas again, saying he has indicated in his latest communication that he will return to his military career and will not take an active interest in politics, either in Greece or in Cyprus.
[Here follows discussion of unrelated subjects.]
318. Telegram From the Consulate General in Nicosia to the Department of State
Nicosia, March 6, 1959, 4 p.m.
391. Ankara also for Jones. Deptel 342 repeated all addressees./1/ Carried out instructions reference telegram this morning. Archbishop expressed himself as being extremely grateful this official word from USG.
//Source: Department of State, Central Files, 747C.00/3 - 659. Secret; Limit Distribution. Repeated to London, Ankara, Athens, and Paris for USRO.
/1/Telegram 342 to Nicosia, February 25, instructed Belcher to contact Makarios as soon as possible after his return from exile and attempt to re-establish an "effective working contact." (Ibid., 747C.00/2 - 2559)
During ensuing half hour he made following points of interest:
1. Great problems both political and economic lay ahead.
2. Republic of Cyprus would need economic assistance from US and UK. Mentioned figure of 20 million dollars from US and 20 million pounds from UK for purpose of easing island over difficulties of next few years. He mentioned dangers of inflation if money not wisely used and said infusion must take place over reasonable period of time. He covered much same ground as Rossides (Contel 389)/2/ and I replied in precisely same manner.
/2/Telegram 389 from Nicosia, March 5, reported that Rossides, during a March 5 conversation, cited growing unemployment and business recession in Cyprus in seeking U.S. aid. Belcher was "non-committal" about the prospect for aid and stressed the need for increased efforts to attract private investment. (Ibid., 747C.00/3-559)
3. In response my mention of political problems he would face implementing London agreement, he launched on somewhat lengthy discussion his difficulties as spiritual-political leader pointing out that people seem united in support of him but when it came to choice of ministers and legislators the opposite was the case. He recognized great difficulty in arriving at judicious choice of advisers and he expressed himself as being well aware of the degree of criticism leveled at most of his close associates. "God willing," he said, "I will make the right choices."
4. Expressed personal admiration for Foot and his belief that they would be able work effectively together during transition period. I said Foot had told me same thing about him last night.
5. Had heard of forthcoming Jones visit and naturally wishes opportunity present his views in person. I said visit not as pictured in press but that Mr. Jones would naturally appreciate opportunity discuss general situation.
Comment: As with most people meeting Archbishop for first time I was most impressed with magnetic personality and warmth of his manner. His remarks on economic assistance, which amounted to request, follow pattern set earlier by contacts among young lawyers and business people in Greek community. I was surprised that Makarios was even more frank and outspoken in his approach to this problem than Zenon Rossides had been. Believe USG must assume aid expected and our failure to assist new republic will be considered, whether justifiably or not, as mounting to dereliction of what Cypriots consider almost duty.
NSC 5718 Supplement, Paragraph 35/3/ recognizes in principle that USG assistance may be required. Since this is case and in view, our considerable direct interests in island (FBIS monitor station, relay stations, projected VOA, Cyprus Mines Corporation) not to mention our general interest in seeing Cyprus become prosperous symbol of cooperation among Western allies, we should reach decision in principle on aid program at an early date.
Have appointment with Kuchuk Saturday and expect same request from him./4/
/3/Reference should be to NSC 5718/1; for text, see Foreign Relations, 1955 - 1957, vol. XXIV, pp. 585 - 592.
/4/In telegram 394 from Nicosia, March 9, Belcher reported that Kuchuk had appealed for U.S. economic aid and stressed his desire to work in cooperation with the Greek Cypriot leadership. (Department of State, Central Files, 747C.00/3 - 959)
319. Telegram 5347 From the Department of State to the Embassy in the United Kingdom
Washington, March 19, 1959, 6:48 p.m.
[Source: Department of State, Central Files, 511.47C4/3 - 1759. Secret. 1 page of source text not declassified.]
320. Telegram From the Embassy in Greece to the Department of State
Athens, March 26, 1959, 10 p.m.
2193. Embassy telegram 2174./1/ In interview today on aid questions with Prime Minister separately reported,/2/ he touched briefly on Cyprus. Underlining political risks and sacrifices which he had assumed in agreeing to settlement he repeated GOG determination to make settlement work and bespoke our influence to that end. He recalled powers given to Vice President/3/ were most extensive and unless carefully utilized could disrupt possibilities of pacification and general acceptance by Cypriots. He was personally encouraged by attitude of GOT and he hoped to cement this progress in forthcoming visit to Ankara. However, there were some indications of Turkish Cypriot intention to make demands which would not be accepted by predominantly Greek population and he hoped we would use our great influence toward moderation. Prime Minister would not be drawn into giving anything specific but on deduction he might be referring to aid to Turkish Cypriots through GOT, I remarked I was confident US which had taken no decision on aid to Cyprus would certainly consider most carefully all complications of any aid problems before making decisions. I said that I was further confident that both UK and Turkey wanted to see agreements work and that with good will on all sides it could be done. Prime Minister did not mention NATO membership for Cyprus.
//Source: Department of State, Central Files, 747C.00/3 - 2659. Secret; Limit Distribution; Noforn. Repeated to Ankara, Paris for USRO, London, and Nicosia.
/1/In telegram 2174 from Athens, March 24, Riddleberger reported on a March 23 conversation with Averoff in which Averoff expressed optimism over the progress of the Cyprus settlement. (Ibid., 747C.00/3 - 2459)
/2/Riddleberger reported on his discussion with Karamanlis in telegram 2192 from Athens, March 26. (Ibid., 747C.00/3 - 2659)
/3/The powers of the Vice President were outlined in the document on the basic structure of the Republic of Cyprus, signed on February 19; see Document 311.
321. Telegram From the Consulate General in Nicosia to the Department of State
Nicosia, April 14, 1959, 5 p.m.
438. Joint State - USIA. Deptel 405 sent Athens Usito 234 repeated information London Usito 255 Ankara Usito 196./1/ Believe we should seriously consider giving Cypriots "right of first refusal" on VOA installation. We could go to Archbishop (either direct or through British) explaining we had all but signed agreement with British when London agreement reached and everything placed in abeyance; GOG was opposed but now appears possible install in Rhodes. Issue could be put clearly to Makarios pointing out value of investing substantial sum in Paphos area and of continuing annual local expenditures roughly similar to FBIS Karavas of $350,000. If Greek Cypriots agreed to installation this would set pattern and simplify situation with regard existing facilities (Contel 437)/2/ although latter facet need not be raised at same time.
Understand Cyprus better spot technically and several hundred miles closer to target area. "Offer" of additional U.S. investment now would be sign our interest and good will. Archbishop can only say no and we at least would have made offer to regime anxious for new investments./3/
//Source: Department of State, Central Files, 747C.00/4 - 1459. Secret; Priority. Repeated to London, Athens, and Ankara.
/1/This telegram, April 13, informed the Embassy in Athens that the USIA preferred a site on Rhodes rather than Cyprus for new VOA facilities. (Ibid., 511.47C4/4 - 1359)
/2/In telegram 437 from Nicosia, April 14, Belcher reported on discussions with British officials regarding an approach to the Cypriots for discussions on retention of U.S. communications facilities on the island. (Ibid., 116.1/4 - 1459)
/3/On April 15, the Department of State replied that a final choice of Cyprus had been made. (Telegram 409 to Nicosia, April 15; ibid., 511.47C4/4 - 1559)
322. Telegram From the Consulate General in Nicosia to the Department of State
Nicosia, May 4, 1959, 2 p.m.
454. Question military aid to Cyprus Republic raised very informally by Governor just prior my departure for Ankara - Athens consultation. Informed Ambassador Riddleberger that Foot and military advisers favored use British equipment for new 2,000 man army. Much equipment and repair facilities already here. However, in case British equipment required payment they favored US equipment if it could be given free.
//Source: Department of State, Central Files, 747C.56/5 - 459. Secret. Repeated to London, Ankara, Athens, and Paris for USRO.
Situation now changed. Foot now tells me his advisers have reconsidered and are in favor Cyprus Army being equipped with material similar to that to be used by Greek and Turkish contingents. Since Greek and Turkish officers will be responsible for training new Cypriot Army they should be able work with familiar equipment. This would mean primarily US material of kind used by NATO forces.
Appears therefore, that when inevitable planning for new army starts, Cypriots will in all probability turn to USG for assistance in equipping force. It is estimated some 2,000,000 pounds required annually just to clothe, feed, house and pay new force. Additional equipment costs would be too burdensome for new government even if it had viable economy to back it up.
Recommend USG reach early decision in principle regarding willingness supply arms if requested but that at all costs we avoid predominantly military aid program to new nation whose attention focussed on more desirable and needed economic assistance.
323. Telegram From the Consulate General in Nicosia to the Department of State
Nicosia, May 19, 1959, 3 p.m.
483. During course Hart/1/ conversation with Makarios latter described his attitude towards municipalities issue/2/ by reading excerpts from bill which he proposes present to transitional committee this week. In essence it is public position already known through press. It does not provide sine qua non of Turkish position, namely geographic partition of five main towns. Provides only for administrative division allowing Greeks to vote and pay taxes to Greek municipal council and Turks to vote and pay taxes to Turkish municipal council. When questioned regarding British bases Makarios expounded his belief that British should not insist on having populated centers in base areas. He believed they should accept his suggestion of series of enclaves connected by existing roads to which British would have unlimited access. He was fearful that inclusion of number Greek Cypriots, possible varying from 5 to 15,000 within base areas would be source of constant friction annoying both to British and to Cypriots. Such things should be avoided if possible.
//Source: Department of State, Central Files, 747C.00/5 - 1959. Secret. Repeated to London, Ankara, Athens, and Paris for USRO.
/1/Deputy Assistant Secretary of State Parker T. Hart visited Cyprus May 16 - 17 during a five-nation familiarization tour (May 9 - 27).
/2/Article 20 of the London agreement of February 19 provided for the establishment of separate Greek and Turkish municipalities in the five largest towns of Cyprus with the provision that this arrangement would be examined before the end of 4 years to evaluate its effectiveness.
When I questioned Makarios regarding failure of AKEL to join popular front organization, EDMA, and asked him what significance might be he said that when he had suggested EDMA be created shortly after he returned to island he had throught of EDMA as organization which could embrace all those factions on island who were against Communism. He had not anticipated truly united front and was glad that left wing had not joined. He believed way to beat Communists was for right wing to promote program which was as good or better than left wing. He understood that proposed program would be announced during next week or ten days. Archbishop did not mention aid program.
When we saw Kuchuk, who had the Minister of Agriculture and Acting Defense Minister/3/ with him, we spent most of time discussing municipality issue although Kuchuk and Plumer opened meeting with plea for substantial aid program. Turks are adamant insisting on Geographic Division. They indicated they could go along with situation whereby voting and tax payments would be to respective no matter in which area individual lived or owned property. [sic]
/3/Fazil Plumer was Minister of Agriculture; Osman Orek was Minister of Defense.
Significant part of discussion with Turkish leaders was theme of distrust which pervaded their statements. They do not believe in Greek good will toward them and within framework of Zurich they will attempt gain every possible advantage as insurance against future when British no longer here.
Comment: With regard to municipalities issue, believe Archbishop's announced policy is actually negotiation position from which he and Greeks will retreat once they find that it is impossible to sway Turks. Although many Greeks speak in the most adamant terms on supporting idea of administrative versus geographic division, more sensible and realistic leaders, such as Minister of Justice Clerides, have told me that it is impossible to visualize anything but geographic division as implied in London agreement. If they can persuade Turks to give in on question of taxes and voting they will in final analysis accept geographic division. Neither Makarios nor Minister gave indication GOG representation reported Contel 469,/4/ but am certain Christopoulos has made position GOG clear to them.
/4/Telegram 469 from Nicosia, May 13, reported that the Greek Government was pressing Makarios to break the deadlock on the municipalities issue through a compromise. (Department of State, Central Files, 800.0047C/5 - 1359)
324. Telegram From the Department of State to the Consulate General in Nicosia
Washington, June 6, 1959, 3:43 p.m.
477. Contels 454, 507./1/
//Source: Department of State, Central Files, 747.56/6 - 459. Secret. Drafted by Blood; cleared with the Department of Defense, International Cooperation Administration, Ellis, Rehm, McClellan, and Swihart; and approved by Rountree. Repeated to Ankara, Athens, London, Paris for USRO, and pouched to Rome for the Liaison Officer.
/1/Telegram 454 from Nicosia is printed as Document 322. Telegram 507 from Nicosia, June 4, reported that Foot had again pressed for U.S. military aid for Cyprus. Belcher told him that the United States was reluctant to be involved in arms supply. (Department of State, Central Files, 747C.56/6 - 459)
1. We would be most reluctant to become involved in direct US military assistance to Cypriot armed forces. Instead, we think Cypriots should look to Greeks and Turks as source of military equipment for their small army. It seems to us joint Greek-Turk cooperation in the provision of economic aid to Cyprus, as suggested in communique following Karamanlis - Menderes talks in Ankara,/2/ might well be extended to field of military assistance. Tripartite military alliance and tripartite headquarters embracing Greek and Turkish training contingents could provide ready organizational framework through which equipment could be channeled.
/2/May 7 - 9.
2. Moreover, any US military assistance program for Cyprus would inevitably present us with problem of coordinating Cypriot requests with Greeks and Turks, and very probably, mediating among them.
3. We recognize we may be asked by Greeks and Turks to permit them to transfer to the Cypriot armed forces MAP equipment no longer required for purposes for which made available. Such transfers would require USG approval rather than bilateral agreement with Cyprus under Mutual Security Act.
4. If pressed by Foot for US views, Congen authorized reply along lines paras 1 and 2.
325. Airgram G - 02 From the Department of State to the Embassy in the United Kingdom
Washington, July 1, 1959, 5:39 p.m.
[Source: Department of State, Central Files, 747C.00/6 - 1959. Confidential. 2 pages of source text not declassified.]
326. Telegram From the Embassy in Greece to the Department of State
Athens, July 10, 1959, 7 p.m.
106. Reference: Embdes 1106, June 24, 1959./1/ Following telegram prepared by Berger and Horner in process when I arrived:/2/
//Source: Department of State, Central Files, 747C.00/7 - 1059. Secret; Limit Distribution; Noforn. Repeated to Paris for USRO, London, Nicosia, and Ankara.
/1/Despatch 1106 from Athens reported on the possible disruptive effects on Greek politics of the entry into public life of Grivas. (Ibid., 781.13/6 - 2459)
/2/On March 17, the President appointed Ellis O. Briggs as Ambassador to Greece, replacing Riddleberger who became Director of the Mutual Security Agency on March 3. Riddleberger left Athens on May 20 and Briggs arrived on July 7 and presented his credentials to King Paul on July 15.
1. From variety sources evidence accumulating Grivas planning possibly in few days or weeks, almost certainly in next three-six months to enter political arena. This now almost main subject local comment, rumor and gossip. Following are latest developments which have come to Embassy's attention.
2. Averoff told Berger July 8 Makarios and Grivas relations strained since London settlement now rapidly deteriorating. He believes Makarios press interview criticizing Grivas true, despite Makarios denial./3/ Said Makarios this week sent scorching letter to Grivas complaining of his attitude toward Cyprus matters which has infuriated Grivas. Comment: Rumor circulating today Grivas will declare himself publicly against Makarios within few days.
/3/In an interview published in The Washington Star, July 5, Makarios warned that he, not Grivas, would govern Cyprus and that right-wing political organizations must abide by democratic rules.
3. Averoff also told Berger relations between Grivas and Karamanlis worsening, and Averoff saw Grivas July 8 for full discussion situation. Said his personal relations with Grivas excellent and he utilized this to advise Grivas abjure politics at this time and hold himself in reserve as possible replacement for Karamanlis should need arise. (Comment: We have had indication from Rodopolous Speaker of House King has passed same advice to Grivas, and even gone so far as to warn Grivas Karamanlis enjoys King's confidence, and King will be forced oppose Grivas should he enter active politics at this time.)
4. In replying to Averoff Berger said Embassy understands Grivas bitterly anti-Turk and anti-British, is critical of government's "servility and subservience to foreign powers" (i.e. US) and threatens upset Cyprus settlement. Averoff said our information correct and if Grivas held reins of power it would throw Greece into chaos and be an utter disaster. Averoff continued saying if Grivas can be kept from entering politics for another six months, Cyprus would than be on verge of independence and Grivas star would wane. However if there was blow-up in Cyprus, major government scandal, acute worsening economic situation, or should Karamanlis die or be unable carry on, or other external circumstances whole atmosphere here would change, in which circumstances Grivas would have his chance and nothing could stop him coming to power however grave consequences would be for Greece and its relations with main allies.
5. Averoff said Karamanlis concerned over Grivas emergence, but regards Grivas as political babe in arms and confident he can deal with any Grivas threat. Averoff said while he thought there was good chance of containing Grivas he was not as optimistic as Karamanlis.
6. For some considerable period GOG and Karamanlis personally have manifested unmistakable signs uneasiness over Embassy contacts with various and heterogenous opposition elements. Prospective political surfacing of Grivas has accentuated this uneasiness, and within last ten days Averoff has on two occasions spoken to Berger, and this week Rodopolous spoke separately to Berger and Horner on the dangers inherent in these contacts which anti-government elements are misusing to spread rumors that US dissatisfied with Karamanlis and not averse to change. They were assured that US thinks Greece has been well-served by Karamanlis government and that we [will] make this clear whenever the need or occasion for doing so arises.
7. As Department aware there is pronounced Greek propensity to read into words and actions of "American factor", however innocent, portents which simply do not exist. Given this tendency, [1 line of source text not declassified] potential advent of Grivas on political scene has enhanced GOG sensitivity. Embassy proposes as in past to maintain its contacts with opposition for purposes intelligence, but will reduce their frequency. On other hand, we are more than cognizant of dangers to US policy objectives inherent in Grivas ascendancy and will be most cautious in avoiding any implication that we favor him in slightest. Our posture must be one of apparent neutrality and non-intervention. We must bear in mind however that Grivas could reach power, and we must be sufficiently flexible to be able out-step his animus if that rather unpleasant (and, at this reading, not likely) eventuality should occur.
327. Telegram From the Consulate General in Nicosia to the Department of State
Nicosia, July 25, 1959, 7 a.m.
32. Rome for Lister. Now seems apparent that Grivas - Makarios row which highlighted by Grebence article in Express - Washington Star/1/ was brought into open on purpose by Makarios. Reason for so doing was existence of differences and Archbishop's conviction that it best have it out now rather than later. Makarios evidently believed he could establish his political supremacy on local scene in preparation for time when important and controversial decisions (bases, municipalities, etc.) would have to be announced. This belief supported by following facts: Foot given text by Grebence just after seeing me (Consulate telegram 2)./2/ He raised same points I did with same answer from Makarios, observing that it contained political dynamite. Makarios said confidentially he aware of content and was prepared let it be published as written.
//Source: Department of State, Central Files, 747C.00/7 - 2559. Secret. Repeated to London, Ankara, Athens, Paris for USRO, and Rome.
/1/See footnote 3, Document 326.
/2/Telegram 2 from Nicosia, July 1, transmitted the substance of Makarios' interview with Grebence and an assessment by Belcher that Makarios' comments about Grivas could be embarrassing to the Archbishop. (Department of State, Central Files, 747C.00/7 - 159)
In continuation of trend as reported Consulate telegram 24th/3/ there seems little doubt that Archbishop has accomplished his purpose and his position is more firmly established with increased support from Ministers, EDMA and business circles. In marked change since writing my G - 97, June 24,/4/ Georgadjis and Papadopoulos now supporting Archbishop strongly. Makarios has also gained support among usually hyper-critical business community for sensible sterling area decision. Even those among EDMA Central Committee who were critical of Archbishop a month ago have apparently closed ranks behind him--not because of turning away from Grivas but from realization there is no other possible leader and further dissension in ranks would only help the Communists.
/3/Not further identified.
/4/Airgram G - 97 from Athens, June 24, reported on growing divisions in the Greek Cypriot right-wing political movement. (Department of State, Central Files, 747C.00/6 - 2459)
[2 paragraphs (17-1/2 lines of source text) not declassified]
328. Telegram From the Embassy in Greece to the Department of State
Athens, August 13, 1959, 5 p.m.
411. This is Country Team message.
//Source: Department of State, Central Files, 747C.56/8 - 1359. Secret. Repeated to Ankara, Nicosia, and London.
1. Believe Greek plans for 950-man army contingent they are committed to supply Cyprus under agreement probably include furnishing unit with MAP equipment. We believe that such use of MAP equipment clearly in US interests, and that we should raise no objections. However, seems that among possible arrangements under which Greeks might discharge commitment, some might raise fewer problems for US than others. For example, might be desirable that unit chosen be MAP-supported national unit not among forces specifically committed to NATO. This solution would avoid problems of whether MAP equipment being diverted, of whether such diversion created further deficiencies to be filled by MAP, or whether NATO committed forces being diverted from proper tasks. Purpose this message to alert Washington to problem, and to inquire whether these are views which we should communicate to Greeks, before their planning has proceeded too far.
2. Closely allied subject which we believe should begin to receive consideration is problem of equipping native Cypriot force of 2,000 called for by agreement. This subject has not been raised with us by Greeks, and obviously not one on which we should take initiative. We have noted Deptel 3229/1/ that US would be most reluctant to enter into bilateral military assistance agreement with Cyprus, and hope that needs of small Cypriot force could be met by GOG and GOT. This is obviously desirable solution, but complicated to achieve. Only, surplus material Greeks have is British, thus question of GOG supplying surplus MAP equipment to Cyprus does not arise. Adequate quantities of British equipment available in certain categories, such as rifles, bren guns and possibly radio equipment, but vehicles and support weapons not available, and GOG will not be able to supply foreign exchange to purchase them. Moreover, there is problem of integration Greek contribution with that of Turks, who so far as known here, have no disposable British equipment.
/1/Printed as telegram 477 to Nicosia, Document 324.
3. Seems to us here that given above factors possible solution to problems of arming Cypriot native forces might lie in combined Greek, British, Turkish action. Greeks would supply their surplus British equipment, British supply those items Greeks do not have, Ankara may wish comment on nature of possible Turkish contribution.
4. Request advice pt. 1 for early discussion with Greeks and in event Greeks should raise pt. 2. At that time, would appreciate such guidance as Washington able provide./2/
/2/In telegram 601 to Athens, August 28, the Department instructed the Embassy to avoid raising the matter of the Greek contingent with the Greek Government and reaffirmed its reluctance to supply military equipment to Cyprus. (Department of State, Central Files, 747C.56/8 - 1359)
329. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in the United Kingdom
Washington, September 23, 1959, 11:35 a.m.
2380. Rome for Liaison Officer. Paris for USRO and USCINCEUR. Ref (a) Deptel 601 to Athens, rptd London 1965,/1/ (b) London 1221./2/ (c) Nicosia 98./3/ Embassy requested informally raise with Foreign Office question financial and equipment support for Cypriot armed forces and endeavor ascertain British views on how problem can best be resolved.
As point of departure suggest Embassy refer informal Greek sounding re our receptivity to joint Greek-Turk demarche on possibility US support Cypriot forces (Athens 656)./4/ Before answering Greeks we desire compare notes with British.
//Source: Department of State, Central Files, 747C.00/9 - 359. Secret. Drafted by Blood. Repeated to Ankara, Athens, Paris for USRO, Rome, and Nicosia.
/1/See footnote 2, Document 328.
/2/Telegram 1221 from London, September 3, endorsed the suggestion of an approach to the British on the question of arms supply for Cyprus. (Department of State, Central Files, 747C.00/9 - 359)
/3/Telegram 98 from Nicosia, September 9, reported that British officials on Cyprus were operating on the assumption that the Cypriot National Guard would be equipped similarly to the Turkish and Greek contingents on the island. (Ibid., 747C.56/9 - 959)
/4/Telegram 656 from Athens, September 4, reported on discussions with Demetrios Bitsios, a senior official of the Greek Foreign Office. (Ibid., 747C.00/9 - 459)
In explaining preliminary US views Embassy may draw upon reftel (a) less sections pertaining Greek contingent Cyprus, emphasizing our reluctance become involved in direct assistance Cypriot forces and our desire see Greeks and Turks concert their planning in this field. Tentatively we propose in reply Greeks to say (1) we do not want to become involved in matter support Cypriot armed forces, and (2) we believe appropriate course action would be for GOG to work out plans for Cypriot forces with GOT and appropriate Cypriot representatives and then discuss their plans with British.
FYI: We believe principal reason behind provision for Cypriot armed forces in Zurich Agreement was need to effect compromise solution, i.e., tripartite headquarters which would make Turkish military presence on island palatable Greeks. As practical matter, responsibility defense Cyprus will in first instance fall to British garrisons on island and secondarily to Greece and Turkey as military allies Cyprus. Internal security will presumably be job 2000-man gendarmerie and police. We would therefore find it exceedingly difficult endeavor justify military assistance to Cyprus.
While we see merit in idea minimizing problem of supporting Cypriot forces by reduction Cypriot troops (Nicosia 92)/5/ and presumably proportionate reduction Greek and Turkish contingents to be sent Cyprus, we believe we should avoid discussing this idea lest we appear to encourage renegotiation London Agreements. End FYI.
/5/Telegram 92 from Nicosia, September 2, reported on Turkish concern about Greek plans for training Cypriot forces and for labor policy. (Ibid., 741.56347C/9 - 259)
330. National Intelligence Estimate
NIE 32.5 - 59 Washington, October 6, 1959.
//Source: Department of State, INR - NIE Files. Secret. A note on the cover sheet reads in part:
"Submitted by the Director of Central Intelligence. The following intelligence organizations participated in the preparation of this estimate: The Central Intelligence Agency and the intelligence organizations of the Departments of State, the Army, the Navy, the Air Force, and The Joint Staff.
"Concurred in by the United States Intelligence Board on 6 October 1959." The representatives of the AEC and FBI abstained because the subject was outside their jurisdiction.
THE OUTLOOK FOR AN INDEPENDENT CYPRUS
To estimate the outlook for the prospective Republic of Cyprus and the resulting implications for other interested states.
1. Cyprus is slated to become independent by February 1960, according to agreements reached early in 1959 between the UK, Greece, and Turkey, and accepted by Cypriot representatives. These agreements established a most complicated framework for the new state and left many troublesome problems to be worked out before independence is achieved. Moreover, the settlement is under virulent attack by die-hard proponents of enosis (union with Greece). However, we believe that the new republic will emerge about on schedule. (Paras. 7 - 18)
2. Independence will not eradicate serious tensions between the Greek and Turkish Cypriot communities. The settlement is replete with provisions which will tend to perpetuate divisions between them. Though the new constitution will prohibit enosis, sentiment for union with Greece will persist not only on Cyprus but in Greece itself. The island's stability will depend in great part on whether the Greek and Turkish Governments continue to exert moderating influences on the two Cypriot communities. (Paras. 18 - 24, 28 - 29)
3. The Cypriot Communist Party is under able and disciplined leadership and has sufficient strength to create serious problems for the new state. It now controls the largest portion of organized labor and can disrupt government operations, industry, and commerce. Whether or not it is legalized, it will in fact probably control some 20 percent of the national legislature and will continue to play an important role in the municipal governments. (Paras. 25 - 27)
4. Cyprus' political problems are likely to be complicated by unrealistic economic expectations. Prospects for moderate economic growth during the next few years are reasonably good if Cyprus continues to receive substantial income and investment from foreign sources. Nevertheless unemployment will almost certainly increase. Moreover, known reserves of copper, the island's chief export, are limited. Cyprus will expect assistance from Greece, Turkey, the UK, and the US. The Soviet Union and Communist China would almost certainly extend aid if requested. The Bloc has indicated willingness to import substantial quantities of commodities which Cyprus has difficulty selling in world markets. (Paras. 31 - 39)
5. The settlement severely limits the Republic of Cyprus' room for maneuver in international affairs. Cyprus will probably become a member of the UN and will remain in the sterling bloc. It may remain in the Commonwealth, but will probably not join NATO. (Paras. 39 - 42)
6. The British are to retain sovereignty over two base areas, which are likely in time to become the subject of increasing Cypriot opposition. The status of US communications facilities is not under any imminent threat, though the price asked will increase. (Paras. 43 - 44)
[Here follows the "Discussion" section of the estimate.]
331. Telegram From the Consulate General in Nicosia to the Department of State
Nicosia, October 21, 1959, 6 p.m.
169. Called on Makarios Tuesday/1/ afternoon to make oral presentation per instructions and then gave aide-memoire to Archbishop to read./2/ He said there was no question but that US facilities welcome but he questioned me with regard to meaning of "existing arrangements" asking if there were any time limit on agreement with British. When I said no he asked if we paid any rent or royalty. I replied in negative explaining we paid rent for antenna rights but had bought the property on which stations stand. At this point he interjected "well, you know we will be poor and you will have to pay us something." I reiterated that at present time we did not pay any rent and that this of course was not provided for in agreement under which we had been operating. I suggested this was question which could be discussed at later date and that what we were interested in at moment was agreement in principle re recognition of existing arrangements.
//Source: Department of State, Central Files, 747C.00/10 - 2159. Secret. Transmitted in two sections. Repeated to London, Ankara, and Athens.
/2/In telegram 123 to Nicosia, October 9, the Department authorized Consul General Belcher to approach Makarios and Kuchuk at a time he judged best to discuss the future of U.S. communications facilities and gave instructions for presenting the U.S. position. (Department of State, Central Files, 947C.40/10 - 959)
In attempt divert discussion to other sources "financial aid" I emphasized need for economic survey as soon as possible so that when he as head of new government requested assistance requests could be shown to be within framework of plan drawn up by disinterested agency such as Ford Foundation, World Bank, or UN Technical Assist-ance Board. He agreed wholeheartedly and said he and his Ministers were in process of presenting memorandum for transmittal by British to UN requesting assistance in formulating a survey and plan. I also went into details of possibility of economic assistance from a variety of sources as suggested paragraph 7 of Department's 123./3/
/3/Paragraph 7 reads:
"In event Cypriot leaders attempt relate our continued use of facilities with our willingness to provide economic aid to Cyprus, Consulate General may reply along following lines:
"USG following economic developments in Cyprus closely and with sympathetic interest. We recognize Cyprus Republic will face economic problems. At same time it will have available many potential sources of funds to assist in meeting its economic needs upon independence. Besides assistance to be offered by UK, Greece and Turkey, Republic may seek assistance from other European countries and from IBRD and IMF. US would encourage Cyprus application for membership in these organizations. Among American sources, Cyprus would be eligible for loans from Export- Import Bank and Development Loan Fund on same terms available to other countries. Should circumstances warrant, and if Cyprus meets eligibility requirements, consideration could be given to sales to Cyprus for local currency of surplus US agricultural products, in which case some of sales proceeds could be loaned to Cyprus for economic development purposes."
Makarios then suggested that at some time after his government had assumed power we should discuss details of an agreement along lines of present one but which would be formalized by his signature or that of Ministers of new government. Also suggested such agreement should have time limit since his "successors might not have same attitude toward US."
Archbishop then said only additional observation he wished to make was that he did not think this was appropriate subject to be taken up through London committee. He felt it should be settled here in Nicosia between himself, Doctor Kuchuk, Ministers concerned and Consul General. He said that naturally this was matter which the USG would decide for itself but for his part he was of opinion that this was an "internal" affair in which neither Greece, Turkey nor UK had a direct interest. It was a question of agreement between Cypriot leaders and US representatives and should therefore be handled here. I explained that our reasoning was based on feeling that our facilities in Cyprus would be here under an international agreement and that because of international aspects of problem London committee was place to discuss question. He reiterated earlier observations saying that approval by joint committee involved signature by HMG, Greece and Turkey and neither (particularly HMG) was concerned in problem. I said that I would report his views to the Department and would let him know in due course our reaction.
Makarios said he wished discuss subject with his Ministers and he would call me in next few days to discuss matter further. For his part he again said he was more than happy to have radio stations in Cyprus and as far as he concerned he could agree in principle to continuation of existing arrangements with caveat that sometime after new government was formed we would discuss details of these arrangements.
At this point conversation turned to other topics which are reported separately in following telegrams./4/
/4/See Document 332.
Comment: I found Archbishop in jovial and friendly mood but obviously well briefed on possibilities of extracting some quid pro quo for continued operation of our radio stations. While there was no question of break in continuity upon change of sovereignty it was obvious that we would be requested go into some detail as to extent of "existing arrangements" sometime next spring and that we would be expected provide something in return for continued Cypriot "hospitality". When Archbishop mentioned need for us to pay something for right to continue on here, I did not choose to go into any detailed discussion re our inability to pay rent or to discuss any details of how we might respond to this informal request in order avoid any question of negotiating at present time. No mention was made of any details re amount of money which we presently put into economy. It seemed from way conversation was proceeding that best thing to do was obtain agreement in principle while deferring details until later.
When Makarios mentioned question of payment for use present facilities am sure he did not necessarily have in mind payment of rent. However, when we do engage in further discussions am certain that subject will come up again and that it will be made quite clear that some financial quid pro quo is expected. As suggested previously I did not expect we could count on acquiescence in continuation status quo without some adjustment of "terms".
Believe we must follow his advice on venue of further discussions even though by so doing we lose advantage of assistance from Greek, Turkish and British delegates. However, influence of GOG and GOT representatives here is considerable and could be used as result our requests in Athens and Ankara.
Believe during next meeting with Makarios I should mention continuity existing arrangements in context of British declaration (B2 - IV)/5/ in order remind him of obligations new government. We followed Foot's advice in not mentioning this factor in initial presentation, but now it would seem appropriate in view Archbishop's statements to me.
/5/Reference is to paragraph B, section 2, subparagraph 4 of the British declaration of February 17 which was part of the final settlement; see Document 311.
332. Telegram From the Consulate General in Nicosia to the Department of State
Nicosia, October 22, 1959, 8 a.m.
171. During conversation Tuesday with Archbishop Makarios on question our radio facilities,/1/ he said he regretted "troubling me with so unimportant matter" but he had prepared letter to send me on subject of new Cyprus Army. He read letter and showed me list of arms and other equipment required for 2,000 man army. Text letter follows:
//Source: Department of State, Central Files, 747C.5 - MSP/10 - 2259. Secret. Repeated to London, Ankara, and Athens.
/1/See Document 331.
"I have honour to enclose list of armament and equipment required for use of Cyprus Army.
As you are aware Article 14 of Zurich agreement provides Cyprus Republic will have army of 2,000 men. Armament and equipment of this army will be very costly project, and will certainly be entirely beyond limited financial means of Cyprus.
I therefore wish enquire whether these armament and equipment could be provided by USG for use by Cyprus Army".
The extensive enclosures to Archbishop's letter will be pouched this week./2/
/2/Makarios' October 17 letter and an annex outlining Cypriot defense requests were sent to the Department in despatch 69 from Nicosia, October 23. (Department of State, Central Files, 747C.56/10 - 2359)
In handing letter to me Archbishop said with smile "this is first time I have signed request on part of new republic to be for assistance of any kind. It is first but I know it won't be last."
Makarios went on to ask me what my views were on possibility of acceding to his request, I explained I would be happy send his letter as well as enclosures to Department for consideration and inform him of outcome in due course. In saying question had already been mentioned to me by Turkey prior Ministry Defense officials I said they had mentioned possibility that arms of US origin in use in Greece and Turkey be provided by latter governments since they would be standardized with those in use by Greek and Turkish contingents to be stationed in Cyprus and would therefore be more easily used by Greek and Turkish units charged with training of new army. I explained there were legal and financial problems involved in transfer of arms originating from US whether from either Greece or Turkey or direct from the US. I promised inform him as soon as possible of Department's views.
Comment: Archbishop's request should not come as surprise. Details in enclosures to his letter indicate that considerable degree of preparation was involved before presenting request. Since specifications have been presented in such detail it seems obvious someone well trained in military logistics has been involved in work. All specifications are as far as I can determine in US terms and my guess is this list has been prepared for Archbishop by Greek Government. Seems likely assumption process was got underway at time of visit of General Politakos (see Contel 92)./3/ Do not believe request for arms connected with my call re communication facilities. Makarios had no way of knowing I would suggest call when I did, but it was obvious he was happy at opportunity make request in conjunction my approach.
/3/See footnote 5, Document 329.
333. Telegram From the Embassy in Turkey to the Department of State
Ankara, October 27, 1959, 7 a.m.
1026. Rome for Liaison. Zorlu sent for UK Ambassador Burroughs Sunday and recited to him Turkish tale of woe re Cyprus (Embtel 1014)/1/ but with considerably more rancor than Esenbel had revealed to Ambassador on same subject three days earlier. Turks are steamed up and feel particularly incensed at conduct of British and Greeks, with Deniz cited as only last straw in long series of grievances.
//Source: Department of State, Central Files, 747C.00/10 - 2759. Secret; Priority. Repeated to Athens, London, Paris for USRO, Rome, and Nicosia.
/1/Telegram 1014 from Ankara, October 24, reported on Turkish Government reaction to the Deniz incident. (Ibid., 641.826 - Caique Deniz/10 - 2459) On October 18, a British naval patrol stopped the Deniz, a ship of Turkish registry, off Cyprus. The Turkish crew scuttled the ship but the British recovered some of the arms the ship was carrying. In protest over the incident, Makarios suspended negotiations with the Turkish Cypriots.
In discussion with UK representatives today we agreed GOT not likely go beyond Friday statement and we therefore hope it is sufficient to do job (Nicosia 176 to Department)./2/ We also feel there probably not much we can do here at moment beyond expression pleasure with Friday statement, at fact tensions seem to have abated Cyprus and express hope at all levels that constitutional committee will get on with its work.
/2/Telegram 176 from Nicosia, October 24, reported that the Turkish Foreign Office statement on the Deniz incident was satisfactory to Makarios and might lead to a renewal of intercommunal talks. (Ibid., 747C.00/10 - 2459)
Neither Burroughs nor Embassy agree Foot assessment Deniz affair might be good thing (London 2197 to Department)./3/ Seems to us here this merely highlights brittle nature Cyprus relationships and need keep lid on. Important that Turks who have made valient effort keep things calm last two months not be goaded [less than 1 line of source text not declassified]. GOT has been given assurances on their request UK will do everything possible keep Deniz court proceedings quiet but UK Embassy has no idea what can be done.
/3/Telegram 2197 from London, October 23, reported on British Government reaction to the Deniz incident. (Ibid., 747C.00/10 - 2359)
334. Telegram From the Embassy in Greece to the Department of State
Athens, October 27, 1959, 7 p.m.
1114. Rome for Liaison. Conclusion that prevalent Turkish mood respecting Cyprus (Ankara telegram 1014 to Department)/1/ is "resentful, aggrieved, stubborn" and inclined to revert to "Partition or Death" slogan, seems unduly pessimistic, as viewed from here. As indicated Embtel 1073,/2/ Greek Government, although obviously aggrieved party in Deniz case, maintains its determination to see Zurich - London agreements implemented, and we gather from recent telegrams from Embassy London and Consulate General Nicosia that this too is position UK and Cypriot communities. We recognize that once hurdle negotiations are completed and Cypriot republic becomes fact, its chances of survival will be to major degree dependent upon support of Greek and Turkish Governments. I hope therefore that Texel was speaking for himself alone, and would note that Turkish Ambassador Athens Vergin maintains his opinion and I believe sincere belief that his government will faithfully implement Zurich - London agreement.
//Source: Department of State, Central Files, 747C.00/10 - 2759. Secret. Repeated to London, Ankara, Nicosia, Paris for USRO, and Rome.
/1/See footnote 1, Document 333.
/2/Telegram 1073 from Athens, October 22, reported on public and official Greek reaction to the news of the seizure of the Deniz. (Department of State, Central Files, 747C.00/10 - 2259)
335. Telegram From the Department of State to the Consulate General in Nicosia
Washington, October 28, 1959, 4:24 p.m.
150. Rome for Liaison Officer. Contel 171./1/ From earlier indications (Athens 656)/2/ we had expected request for US assistance Cypriot armed forces would come indirectly from Greece and Turkey. Direct request from Makarios gives rise to several delicate questions, quite apart from basic issue of desirability or undesirability of US military assistance to Cyprus. (1) Was Makarios' request made with knowledge and approval Kuchuk and other members Transitional Committee and does it therefore represent coordinated Cypriot request? (2) What is relationship, if any, between Makarios' request and current talks of Cypriot-Greek-Turkish military committee in Athens? (3) If none, are Greek and Turkish Govts privy this request?
//Source: Department of State, Central Files, 747C.56/10 - 2859. Secret. Drafted by Blood and Marcy. Also sent to Nicosia, Athens, Ankara, and London and pouched to Rome.
/2/Telegram 656 from Athens, September 4, reported on Greek soundings regarding possible U.S. military assistance to Cyprus. (Department of State, Central Files, 747C.00/9 - 459)
Foregoing presumably cannot be put directly to Makarios without appearing challenge his competence speak at this time for Cypriot Govt- to-be, or implying he may have been indiscreet or playing Greek community politics. Similarly query Turkish Cypriots would run risk of arousing them if by chance Makarios' request turns out to be purely Greek Cypriot initiative. We have similar concern vis-a-vis Greek and Turkish Govts, though we have noted Congen's guess that Greek Govt already involved.
In light foregoing we contemplate no immediate reply to Makarios' request and are referring to Defense for study lists of requested equipment when they are received. Meanwhile comment action addressees desired as well as any information concerning above questions which they able develop without discussing matter with Cypriots or Greek or Turkish Govts. Nicosia authorized in its discretion discuss with Foot.
Our position on direct military assistance to Cyprus continues as set forth Deptels 477 to Nicosia 601 to Athens and 2380 to London./3/
/3/See footnote 2, Document 328.
336. Editorial Note
Allen W. Dulles, Director of Central Intelligence, reviewed the situation in Cyprus during his briefing on significant world developments affecting U.S. security at the 424th meeting of the National Security Council, November 11:
"Mr. Dulles said he would mention the situation in Cyprus since a policy paper on that subject was a later item on the agenda. He reported that prospects were bright for a peaceful and successful transition to an independent Cyprus by February 19, 1960. The Constitutional Commission was now working smoothly after breaking a deadlock over the powers of the Turkish Vice President. Some clouds remained on the horizon, however. The Cypriots were violent people and the country had a strong , hard-core, Communist element which was for the present biding its time and making no effort to thwart the transition to independence. [3-1/2 lines of source text not declassified]" (Memorandum of discussion; Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, NSC Records)
A draft paper, NSC 5915, "U.S. Policy Toward Cyprus," was scheduled for discussion at the November 11 NSC meeting, but the discussion was postponed. NSC 5915 was subsequently modified and approved by the National Security Council as NSC 6003. NSC 6003 is printed as Document 347.
337. Telegram From the Embassy in the United Kingdom to the Department of State
London, November 30, 1959, 2 p.m.
2801. Rome for Liaison Officer. Deptel 4168./1/ In accordance reference telegram Barbour brought to attention of Hoyer-Millar (Permanent Under Secretary, Foreign Office) US concern over lifting proscription of AKEL. Embassy officer subsequently called on Addis (Head, Southern Department, Foreign Office) and left memorandum setting forth points given reference telegram.
//Source: Department of State, Central Files, 747C.00/11 - 3059. Secret; Niact. Repeated to Ankara, Athens, Paris for USRO, Rome, and Nicosia.
/1/Telegram 4168 to London, November 25, instructed the Ambassador to reiterate to the Foreign Office continued U.S. objections to the legalization of AKEL. (Ibid., 747C.00/11 - 1959)
Addis stated question lifting ban on AKEL had been under constant review at high level HMG since last summer. From [garble] representations made by Embassy, US views well-known and taken into account. Governor Foot strongly supported lifting ban. Decision to raise proscription taken in principle prior to difficulties over arms running. However, was also decided timing not propitious, and implementation delayed.
More recently Foot again recommended lifting ban. Under instructions from Foreign Office Foot consulted Makarios November 28. Makarios stated he in favor of lifting ban "as soon as possible." When asked whether subsequent events might induce him change his mind, Archbishop replied, "No." In reporting to Colonial Office, Foot commented might be thought lift of ban would weaken position of Makarios, but Makarios knew best how to play Cypriot political game.
HMG should accept his assessment. Foot added AKEL making all practical preparations to contest presidential elections in support of Clerides.
British Embassy Ankara consulted Zorlu November 28 who expressed no objection provided ban lifted from AKEL only and not from Cypriot Communist Party. (Addis explained HMG did not intend to lift proscription from Communist Party which banned by earlier ordinance enacted in 1931 or 1932. In response to question he admitted there was in fact little distinction between AKEL and Communist Party.)
Upon receipt of reports of discussions with Makarios and Zorlu, Foreign Office instructed British Embassy Athens to inform (not consult) Greeks. At same time Foot was authorized to announce lifting of ban immediately when he received word from Athens that Greek Government informed.
Comment: Announcement of lifting of proscription of AKEL may be made at any time. We do not believe HMG could be induced at this stage to reverse decision. In considering this matter HMG all along has been aware of strong US views against lifting ban. Apparently there were wide differences of opinion within HMG, and decision was hard one take "on balance"./2/
Addis states he will provide Embassy detailed statement rationale British decision.
/2/AKEL was legalized on December 4.
338. Memorandum of Discussion at the 426th Meeting of the National Security Council
Washington, December 1, 1959.
[Here follow a paragraph listing the participants at the meeting and agenda items 1 - 2.]
3. U.S Policy Toward Cyprus (Supplement to NSC 5718; NSC Action No. 1763; Memos for NSC from Executive Secretary, same subject, dated March 9 and November 6, 1959; NIE 32.5 - 59; NSC 5915)/1/
//Source: Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, NSC Records. Top Secret. Prepared by Boggs on January 26, 1960.
/1/The Supplement to NSC 5718 is printed in Foreign Relations, 1955 - 1957, vol. XXIV, pp. 493 - 494. Regarding NSC Action No. 1763, see ibid., p. 489, footnote 3. The March 9 memorandum instructed the NSC Planning Board to prepare a draft statement of U.S. policy regarding Cyprus. (Department of State, OCB Files: Lot 61 D 385, Cyprus) The November 6 memorandum transmitted to the NSC the views of the Joint Chiefs of Staff on the draft of NSC 5915. (Ibid., S/S - NSC Files: Lot 63 D 351, Cyprus) NIE 32.5 - 59 is printed as Document 330. NSC 5915 is in Department of State, S/S - NSC Files: Lot 63 D 351. The revised text (NSC 6003) is printed as Document 347.
Mr. Gray said that in view of the shortage of time he would address himself primarily to the divergence of views in NSC 5915. After reading Paragraph 5 of his Briefing Note (a copy of which is filed in the Minutes of the Meeting and another copy of which is attached to this Memorandum),/2/ Mr. Gray called the Council's attention to Paragraph 43 of NSC 5915 which dealt with possible U.S. military assistance to Cyprus. The majority version of this paragraph provided that the U.S. would not accede to a Cypriot request for direct U.S. military assistance; the minority version, while recognizing the undesirability of U.S. involvement in such direct U.S. military assistance, provided that the U.S. should be prepared to consider such assistance if measures provided for in Paragraphs 41 and 42--that is, encouraging the Cypriots to look to Greece, Turkey, and the U.K.--failed and if such assistance is believed absolutely essential for the achievement of U.S. objectives. Mr. Gray reported that the majority view was supported by Defense, Treasury, Budget and the JCS, while the minority views was supported by the State Department and OCDM. The majority anticipate requests for military assist-ance from other newly-emerging independent countries and believe that the U.S. at some point will have to draw the line or to accede to other requests of a similar nature. It appears to the majority that Cyprus is the place where the line should be drawn. The minority on the other hand thinks it is too early to say that the U.S. will provide no military assist-ance to Cyprus and believes that we should not tie our hands in the event preservation of U.S. interests on the island, including communications and intelligence facilities, might hinge on this type of aid.
/2/Not printed. The minutes of all meetings of the National Security Council held during the Eisenhower administration are in National Archives and Records Administration, RG 273, Records of the National Security Council, Official Meeting Minutes File.
The President said he was confused. Had Cyprus asked for U.S. military assistance? Mr. Gray reported that Archbishop Makarios had requested military assistance of $2-1/2 million. However, this initial cost was only the beginning of the total cost of providing military assist-ance to Cyprus. The President said he would like to postpone further consideration of the paragraphs on military assistance in the Cyprus paper until he had had an opportunity to consult the Secretary of State.
The National Security Council:/3/
/3/Paragraphs a and b constitute NSC Action No. 2154, approved on December 3. (Department of State, S/S - NSC (Miscellaneous) Files: Lot 66 D 95, Records of Action by the National Security Council)
a. Noted the draft statement of policy on the subject contained in NSC 5915 and the views of the Joint Chiefs of Staff thereon (transmitted by the reference memorandum of November 6, 1959).
b. Tentatively adopted the statement of policy in NSC 5915 with the exception of paragraphs 41, 42, and 43, on which action was deferred pending consideration by the President in consultation with the Secretary of State.
[Here follow the remaining agenda items.]
Marion W. Boggs
339. Editorial Note
On December 13, elections for the offices of President and Vice President were held by the Greek and Turkish communities. Archbishop Makarios was elected President of the new republic and Dr. Fazil Kuchuk, running unopposed, was elected Vice President. Belcher commented on the issues involved in the elections in telegram 224 from Nicosia, November 27. (Department of State, Central Files, 747C.00/11 - 2759) He analyzed the results of the elections in telegram 256 from Nicosia, December 16. (Ibid., 747C.00/12 - 1659)
340. Telegram 296 From the Consulate General in Nicosia to the Department of State
Nicosia, January 12, 1960, 1 p.m.
[Source: Department of State, Central Files, 947C.40/1 - 1260. Secret. 1 page of source text not declassified.]
341. Telegram From the Embassy in the United Kingdom to the Department of State
London, January 13, 1960, 5 p.m.
3468. Nicosia's 296./1/ Embassy told Foreign Office (Wade-Gary, Cyprus Desk Officer) January 13 Makarios signed letter regarding United States communications facilities.
//Source: Department of State, Central Files, 947C.40/1 - 1360. Secret. Repeated to Ankara, Athens, and Nicosia.
Wade-Gary said Assistant Under-Secretary Ross had asked him to inform Embassy that after considering advisability depositing copy of Makarios letter with London cmte (Embassy telegram 3434),/2/ Foreign Office concluded is immaterial whether or not United States prompts Cypriots to deposit copy. As alternative United States might wish formally to transmit copies to British, Greek and Turkish Governments which would accomplish same purpose as depositing copy with London cmte.
/2/Dated January 11. (Department of State, Central Files, 947C.40/1 - 1160)
In response to question Wade-Gary said "obligations" covered by para B - 2 (IV) treated in Article 8 of draft treaty of establishment. United Kingdom draft, which not yet approved by other parties, reads: "All international obligations and responsibilities of government of United Kingdoms hall henceforth, insofar as they may be held to have application to Republic of Cyprus, be assumed by the Government of the Republic of Cyprus. The international rights and benefits heretofore enjoyed by the Government of the United Kingdom in virtue of their application to the territory of the Republic of Cyprus shall henceforth be enjoyed by the Government of Cyprus".
Wade-Gary stated is general practice not to list obligations in treaty. One reason is danger list subsequently may be found incomplete. However, United Kingdom has circulated to London cmte for its information list of obligations which United Kingdom believes are involved. List does not mention United States communications facilities because of problems involved in documenting agreements.
342. Airgram From the Department of State to the Embassy in the United Kingdom
Washington, January 14, 1960, 7:33 p.m.
CG - 438. Re London 2894, Ankara 1386, Athens 1576, Nicosia 245./1/ Useful exchange of views in reftels highlights problem of future role US might be called upon to play on Cyprus and degree of influence we should attempt to exert. We agree with general proposition that UK should take lead on Cypriot matters; that ours should be supplementary role; that we should, whenever appropriate, coordinate our approach with that of UK. Insofar as economic and military aid matters are concerned, this is consistent with current efforts to get European countries to carry greater burden.
//Source: Department of State, Central Files, 747C.00/1 - 1460. Secret. Drafted by Blood, Owen T. Jones, and G. Lewis Jones. Repeated to Athens, Ankara, Paris for USRO, and Nicosia.
/1/Telegram 2894 from London, December 3, recommended strategies available to the United States for ensuring a pro-Western orientation for Cyprus. (Ibid., 747C.00/12 - 359) Telegram 1386 from Ankara, December 15, reported that the Turkish Government favored a multilateral approach to economic and military aid for Cyprus. (Ibid., 747C.00/12 - 1559) Telegram 1576 from Athens, December 7, warned that Cyprus would probably adopt a neutralist policy. (Ibid., 847C.00/12 - 759) Telegram 245 from Nicosia, December 10, recommended a large and active U.S. role in providing aid to Cyprus. (Ibid., 847C.00/ 12 - 1059)
Because of importance of our facilities on Cyprus and importance of Cyprus in Greek-Turkish relations and Eastern Mediterranean generally, it is desirable that US and UK keep in step re their assessments Cypriot problems and we hope that, consistent with our own interests on Island, UK will be willing and able assume main burden.
Embassy London therefore requested to seek early opportunity to discuss Cyprus problem with Foreign Office along following lines. Approach at Hoyer-Millar level suggested.
You might say we recognize British interests on Cyprus exceed those of any other power. We have kept HMG informed of significant approaches made to us by Cypriots and have assiduously avoided raising Cypriot hopes re US assistance in order, inter alia, not to jeopardize possibility Cypriots joining Commonwealth or to complicate work of implementing Cyprus Agreements. We also have refrained from positive response to various Cypriot approaches before obtaining British views. Our present approach promoted by desire to concert again with UK on assessment in several key areas and to assure in conjunction with UK our common objective--maintenance free world orientation of Cyprus.
We believe UK as former sovereign power and principal user of strategic Cyprus real estate patently should take primary responsibility in helping young Republic meet economic problems and in stimulating other interested countries of Western Europe, including Greece and Turkey, to assist Cyprus. We would be interested in British estimate of Cypriot requirements for external assistance. In this connection we have noted one study by private US economist which, assuming UK military base transfers of $28 million yearly (about half of present level), copper tax-royalties of $7 million and emigrant remittances of $9 million, estimates foreign aid on order of $5 to $7 million annually will be required over next several years to preserve present levels of national income and assure minimum levels of economic growth required for political stability.
What are British intentions with regard level UK military expenditures in bases to be retained in Cyprus after independence, technical assistance, and development loans and grants in addition to those mentioned June 25 parliamentary statement? We were pleased to learn (London 3372)/2/ that UK has sent note to Greek and Turkish Governments on desirability of coordinating their contributions to Cypriot development. We hope UK will maintain this initiative. What are UK views on adequacy of Cypriot foreign exchange resources now and over next several years to meet minimum needs? What does UK think international agencies might do on Cyprus? Are British pressing IBRD to undertake economic survey of Cyprus? FYI. We understand from IBRD British inquired informally whether Bank would make survey, and Bank replied it was reluctant to do so since Cyprus not IBRD member, Cypriots themselves had not requested survey, and Cypriots had asked UNTAB for survey. According IBRD British have not raised matter again. End FYI.
/2/Telegram 3372 from London, January 6, 1960, summarized the contents of a British note which outlined the economic requirements of post- independence Cyprus. (Ibid., 847C.00/1 - 660)
It is clear Cypriots entertain exaggerated ideas concerning possible US aid. Aid we will be able to proffer will be modest; from point of view strictly UK interests, probably more modest the better. Does UK agree? Ex-Im Bank and DLF would be prepared consider applications for economic development credits, if justified, and appropriate US agencies would consider PL 480/3/ assistance, again if justified.
/3/For text of P.L. 480, the Agricultural Trade Development and Assistance Act of 1954, see 68 Stat. 454.
We have already informed UK we have no desire become involved in direct military assistance to Cyprus. We plan tell Makarios this and at same time suggest he turn to UK, Greece and Turkey as more logical suppliers. In this connection we welcome British willingness consider request for equipment of Cypriot army (London tel 2655)./4/ We inclined doubt ability Greeks, Turks and Cypriots to solve by themselves problems involved in establishment and equipment Cypriot army and believe some coordination and monitoring by British may be necessary. Have British yet consulted with Greeks, Turks or Cypriots on these problems? If not, do they plan to do so? When? How?
/4/Telegram 2655 from London, November 19, reported that the Foreign Office preferred to act on a combined and coordinated Greek-Turkish- Cypriot request for military assistance and hoped that the United States would encourage the three nations to coordinate their request. (Department of State, Central Files, 747C.56/11 - 1959)
Relations with Soviet and Neutralist Blocs
These could be conditioned significantly by developments during period prior to establishment of Cypriot Republic. While we assume UK, like US, would prefer see completely pro-Western Cyprus, cannot assume this will automatically come about since it would seem inevitable that some neutralist sentiment will manifest itself, strength of which will in all probability depend in great measure on developments in larger East-West framework. We would seem well advised to do nothing, either by omission or commission, which would tend to facilitate Cypriot Government to move in direction Soviet Bloc or neutralism. This was, inter alia, one of considerations US had in mind in endeavoring persuade UK not prejudge issue of legalization of AKEL. While it may be unrealistic to expect that Cypriot Government will refuse to permit any Soviet Bloc representation at all, in view important military and communication facilities as well as broader political implications, we hope representation can be held to minimum. In any event, we believe situation should not be prejudged by British in favor of broader Bloc contacts and/or representation prior to Cypriot independence. Has HMG received any feelers this connection? What are HMG intentions in event Soviet softening-up gestures such as proposals for high level visits during transitional period should eventuate?
343. Telegram 222 From the Department of State to the Consulate General in Nicosia
Washington, January 15, 1960, 6:47 p.m.
[Source: Department of State, Central Files, 847C.062/1 - 1360. Secret; Priority. 1 page of source text not declassified.]
344. Message From Foreign Secretary Lloyd to Secretary of State Herter
London, January 19, 1960.
DEAR CHRIS: You will have heard of the decision to postpone the date of independence for Cyprus until March 19. We gave your Embassy a pretty full account of the meetings on Saturday and Sunday./1/ I want to tell you something of the background of yesterday's announcement.
//Source: Eisenhower Library, Project Clean Up, Cyprus. Secret and Personal. Enclosure to a letter from Caccia to Herter, January 19.
/1/On January 16 - 17, representatives of the United Kingdom, Greece, and Turkey met Archbishop Makarios and Dr. Kuchuk in London in an effort to resolve outstanding differences and permit the Cypriot Republic to come into existence on February 19. The British and Cypriots were unable to resolve their differences over the issue of the territory and rights to be granted for British bases and the date of Cypriot independence was put back to March 19. Telegram 3598 from London, January 20, reported the Foreign Office's account of the January 16 and 17 meetings. (Department of State, Central Files, 747C.00/1 - 2060)
My meetings with the Foreign Ministers of Greece and Turkey and with Archbishop Makarios and Dr. Kutchuk had reached no decisions up to yesterday, and virtually the whole time had been taken up in stating our military requirements, particularly as regards the size of the two sovereign areas. Makarios of course had no conception of what a base means in this modern age. We had complete support from Averoff and Zorlu. Makarios, however, remained obstinately on his old position that we were entitled to no more than the actual area of our present military installations. By yesterday it seemed to me that, short of applying intolerable pressure, we would not have the necessary measure of agreement to justify our presenting the Independence Bill for its second reading in Parliament in time for independence on February 19. Weighing up the risks of presenting Makarios with a 48 hour ultimatum against those of a postponement, we decided that provided Makarios gave real evidence of a will to allow serious progress on the various aspects of the agreement during the remainder of this week, the right course was to agree to postponement. Averoff and Zorlu were in complete agreement. Of course, if we have not the makings of a satisfactory settlement of differences by the end of this week a very serious situation will arise, and I have reserved the right to reconvene the full meeting and consider radical measures in Cyprus itself. I think this has sunk in.
As to the various matters at issue, my impression and that of Averoff, who should be able to judge, is that in his heart Makarios realises that he cannot push us further on the base areas. His main concern is therefore to secure concessions from us in the matter of their administration. He has to justify to his people the claim that we cannot be allowed to maintain little colonies which might be a threat to the economy of the republic. We can do a lot to help him in this, provided that he does not expect us to impair our sovereignty. I am working on this with him and Kutchuk this morning. I shall be discussing our military requirements in the territory of the republic with them this afternoon. There is also the question of economics and finance. The latter is likely to prove quite important.
Some papers give the impression of a breakdown, but this is quite unjustified. I will let you know how things look at the end of this week. As you know, Makarios is not an easy customer, but I hope that the combination of firmness on our military requirements, extension of the time limit and face-saving in the matter of administration within our base areas may bring him round./2/
All good wishes,
/2/In a January 20 reply, Herter praised Lloyd for his efforts to carry the talks over Cyprus to a successful conclusion. (Ibid., 747C.00/1 - 2160)
/3/Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.
345. Telegram From the Embassy in the United Kingdom to the Department of State
London, January 29, 1960, 8 p.m.
3795. Rome for Liaison Officer. Embtel 3598./1/ I had opportunity today to speak separately with Harold Watkinson, Minister of Defense, and Selwyn Lloyd about Cyprus negotiations. Political Counselor discussed problem with Foreign Office Assistant Under-Secretary Ross.
//Source: Department of State, Central Files, 747C.00/1 - 2960. Secret; Priority; Noforn. Transmitted in two sections. Repeated to Ankara, Athens, Nicosia, Paris for USRO, and Rome.
/1/See footnote 1, Document 344.
Watkinson expressed himself as quite optimistic. He said meetings had discussed and decided "everything" except extent of sovereign areas. UK intended stand firm on this point; from standpoint of defense requirements HMG could make no further concessions. On other matters Makarios' principal concern appeared to be to avoid agreements about British facilities outside sovereign areas which would appear to give away Cypriot sovereignty. Watkinson believes Makarios can sell arrangements as they now stand.
I found Selwyn Lloyd optimistic but a little less confident than Watkinson. He believes next ten days are pretty crucial. In Lloyd's opinion time is running against both British and Makarios but more strongly against Makarios. It is hard to see where Makarios can go if agreement not reached. Lloyd stressed that HMG has made considerable concessions. Re sovereign areas agreement has been reached on jurisdiction, administration of Cypriots residing there, taxation and so forth. HMG has offered to give Greek Cypriots sterling pounds 7.5 million over next five years and additional sterling pounds 0.5 million to Turkish Cypriots (although Lloyd was not specific funds are presumably for development purposes). HMG has undertaken reexamine possibility further aid at end of five years.
Lloyd found Makarios much more reasonable than his advisers whom he described as "small-town lawyers." These advisers, especially Rossides, were unable to take broad view, concentrating instead on minuscule points. For example, Lloyd believes things are pretty well agreed to except for extent of sovereign areas. UK plans keep 20,000 troops on Cyprus. He thinks Makarios wants to sell agreement back home and that he can do so. Makarios can count on support from Turkish Cypriots and Greek and Turkish Governments in putting agreement over. Some of Makarios' advisors apparently think there remains some more give in British position. Lloyd hopes he has convinced Archbishop this is not so. Governor Foot is convinced Makarios calls the shots on Cyprus and can put agreement over.
Lloyd said he had been turning over in his mind whether we could be of any help. I commented that I had felt we should stay out of the matter; that it was his business. Lloyd said he appreciated this attitude and agreed it had been the best tactic. However, next week it might be desirable for us to make clear to Greek Cypriots that we think HMG has gone as far as possible. In response to my inquiry he said he was not putting this to us as a request at present. He would let me know if after thinking it over he concluded it would be a good idea. Lloyd expressed himself as convinced Greek Governor could not do much more with Cypriots. Averoff already has exerted considerable pressure on Makarios and further efforts on his part would be counter-productive. Perhaps Karamanlis could have some useful effect. Also Turks might still have some influence they could bring into play. Greek Cypriots are afraid of Turks.
On timing, Lloyd referred to Parliamentary problem, saying agreement must be concluded in ten days if March 19 independence date to be met. He said he had not realized at beginning of present phase of talks how much paperwork remained to be done.
Lloyd commented press has been giving unduly pessimistic account. This line apparently fed by Greek Cypriots. To contrary, Lloyd believes talks have made a lot of progress and impasse not reached. Kutchuk has departed for Ankara and Makarios may be leaving today for Cyprus via Lausanne, apparently to see where draft of constitution stands.
Ross, who less optimistic than Minister, confirmed that this morning Times account (Embtel 3793)/2/ of discussions virtually correct (except as noted below). Ross was rather tired and discouraged following two weeks almost uninterrupted and thus far inconclusive negotiations, and admitted going had been difficult. Rossides had been particularly trying, requiring British repeatedly to go over ground already covered.
/2/Dated January 29. (Department of State, Central Files, 747C.00/1 - 2960)
Main problem still extent and administration of British sovereign areas. British had now offered to delegate virtually all normal civil administrative functions to Cypriots, but could only offer to delegate, i.e. rather than transfer, since latter would mean British no longer sovereign in these areas. So far Makarios had refused this proposal, and also still holding out for reduction in size sovereign areas. Commenting on Times story, Ross said British had not in fact offered to reduce areas by "some three square miles"; Lloyd had remarked that whoever started use of term "so and so many square miles" had certainly not been helpful to negotiations.
Ross said another outstanding difference related to demand by Greek Cypriots for annual payment in nature of "rent" (of sterling pounds three million) for British presence. British object in principle, i.e. not just to amount demanded, though quite prepared to pay for any actual services required.
In contrast, Ross said agreement virtually reached on British military facilities outside sovereign areas.
In reply to queries, Ross said Turkish Cypriots had been most cooperative and clearly anxious bring negotiations to prompt and successful conclusion. Greek and Turkish Governments had made clear their attitudes similar, and also seemed rather fed up with tactics of Greek Cypriots. Greek Government had indicated it felt British requirements as now stated entirely reasonable, and was even willing to indicate this publicly.
While discouraged, Ross said he believed there was still good chance negotiations may be successfully completed shortly. However, if not wound up by February 7, delay of at least two additional months in independence date almost certain. Ross admitted impossible tell what Makarios will do next; not clear whether his continued opposition based on political considerations in Cyprus, his conviction time working for him, or just what.
Meanwhile, London joint committee will resume work on various unfinished details, with hope that, once remaining major problems settled, agreements can be finalized promptly.
346. Memorandum of Discussion at the 434th Meeting of the National Security Council
Washington, February 4, 1960.
[Here follow a paragraph listing the participants at the meeting and agenda item 1.]
2. U.S. Policy Toward Cyprus (Supplement to NSC 5718; NSC Action No. 1763; Memos for NSC from Executive Secretary, same subject, dated March 9 and November 6, 1959; NIE 32.5 - 59; NSC 5915; Memo for All Holders of NSC 5915, dated January 11, 1960)/1/
//Source: Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, NSC Records. Top Secret; Eyes Only. Prepared by Boggs on February 4.
/1/The January 11 memorandum transmitted to the NSC revised pages of NSC 5915. (Department of State, S/S - NSC Files: Lot 63 D 351) Regarding the other documents, see footnote 1, Document 338.
Mr. Dulles presented this subject to the Council. (A copy of Mr. Gray's Briefing Note is filed in the Minutes of the Meeting and another copy is attached to this Memorandum.)/2/ In the course of his briefing Mr. Gray asked whether Secretary Herter would care to comment on recent developments with respect to Cyprus.
Secretary Herter said he had within the last ten days had two letters from Selwyn Lloyd/3/ giving details on the British negotiations with Archbishop Makarios on the acreage the UK was to be allowed to retain for its bases and other installations on Cyprus. Apparently the UK had already made considerable concessions regarding sovereignty in the base areas, but Makarios was still not satisfied. The Turks and the Greeks had supported the UK in the London talks. Makarios had now gone back to Cyprus as a result of the breakdown of the London negotiations. The UK was insisting that Makarios must provide an answer to the problem of the base areas by February 7 if the independence of Cyprus is to be achieved on the scheduled date (March 19), because the British Parliament will require time to pass the necessary legislation. Secretary Herter said he had been disturbed to learn recently that the Greeks and Turks are now about to support Makarios in insisting on a further reduction in the base areas sought by the UK. He estimated that the February 7 deadline set by the UK would pass without an agreement. The UK had not asked the US for any assistance on this problem; indeed, we could not properly intervene in the matter except to say we hoped a settlement could be achieved. The President said a settlement might be reached if the Turks and the Greeks would continue to support the UK. Secretary Herter said Makarios stubbornly refused to understand the needs of the UK for large base areas. [3 lines of source text not declassified] The President asked how much acreage was in dispute. Secretary Herter said the UK wanted 120 square miles for its base areas, while Makarios offered 36 square miles. [3-1/2 lines of source text not declassified]
/3/Lloyd's January 19 letter is printed as Document 344. In his letter of January 29, Lloyd repeated for Herter the text of a telegram to Averoff in which Lloyd reviewed the British position on bases and appealed for Greek help in breaking the impasse with Makarios. (Department of State, Presidential Correspondence: Lot 66 D 204)
Mr. Gray then called attention to Paragraphs 41, 42 and 43 of NSC 5915. He read Paragraphs 41 and 42 and asked Secretary Herter to comment on the split in Paragraph 42, from which the Department of State wished to delete a sentence providing that it should be pointed out to Greece and Turkey that transference of Greek and Turkish MAP equipment to the Cypriot armed forces would not be the basis for additional requirements for military equipment for the Greek and Turkish armed forces. Secretary Herter said the Department of State wished to leave the question of military assistance to Cyprus open, especially in Paragraph 43./4/ He believed a caveat against giving military assistance to Cyprus would not be desirable; he was interested in keeping the situation flexible. Mr. Gray pointed out that the split in Paragraph 42 which he had just alluded to was different from the issue in Paragraph 43. Secretary Herter said Paragraph 42 was really concerned with how much military assistance overall we wished to provide to Greece and Turkey. The President said he was somewhat frightened at the idea of having two of our allies give arms to Cyprus when there was a possibility that those arms might be used against a third ally. He thought it would be undesirable to arm any forces in Cyprus except the gendarmerie. Mr. Scribner believed that Paragraph 42 depended on Paragraph 43. If it is the policy in Paragraph 43 not to provide direct US military assistance to Cyprus, then assistance should not be provided indirectly through a provision in Paragraph 43 that Greece and Turkey can turn over MAP equipment to Cyprus. Mr. Gray said it seemed to him the essential issue was whether, if military assistance to Cyprus became essential to the achievement of US objectives, the question of giving such direct US assistance should be brought back to the Council for a Presidential decision or whether the responsible departments should be authorized to decide whether to give the aid. The President wondered whether we were not trying to solve a problem, the elements of which had not yet been clarified. We might be a bit premature in trying to establish a fixed policy at this time. Secretary Herter said he was willing to go on record in recognizing the undesirability of direct US military assistance to Cyprus, but he did not want to have the policy completely tie the hands of this government. The President felt that the question of whether Cyprus should be given direct US military assistance in the future should be referred back to the Council for a decision. He noted that for the present Britain retains sovereignty over Cyprus and added that when Cyprus had sought independence we had adopted a position of neutrality and had not been willing to take responsibility. He felt that the assumption on which the paper had been written, namely, that Cyprus would become independent, had not yet been realized. He would be inclined to give no direct US military assistance to Cyprus. Mr. Scribner said he would be pleased to have the question of whether to provide direct US military assistance to Cyprus come back to the Council for decision provided the actions of this government had not in the meantime foreclosed the possibility of deciding against such assistance.
/4/See Document 338.
The National Security Council:/5/
/5/Paragraphs a and b and the Note that follows constitute NSC Action No. 2184. (Department of State, S/S - NSC (Miscellaneous) Files: Lot 66 D 95, Records of Action by the National Security Council)
a. Discussed the draft statement of policy on the subject contained in NSC 5915, as amended by the enclosure to the reference memorandum of January 11, 1960; in the light of the views of the Joint Chiefs of Staff transmitted by the reference memorandum of November 5, 1959.
b. Adopted the statement of policy contained in NSC 5915, subject to the following amendments:
(1) Page 17, paragraph 42: Delete the bracketed sentence and the footnote thereto, and substitute therefor the following:
"If Greece or Turkey use such transfers as the basis for requesting the U.S. to provide additional military equipment, any such request should be referred to the National Security Council for consideration in the light of the circumstances then existing."
(2) Page 17, paragraph 43: Delete the alternatives and substitute the following:
"43. Do not provide direct U.S. military assistance to Cyprus unless the other measures in paragraphs 41 and 42 fail. If these measures fail and if it is believed absolutely essential for the achievement of U.S. objectives, consider in the National Security Council the question of direct military assistance to Cyprus under the circumstances then existing."
Note: NSC 5915, as amended by the action in b above, subsequently approved by the President; circulated as NSC 6003 for implementation by all appropriate Executive departments and agencies of the U.S. Government; and referred to the Operations Coordinating Board as the coordinating agency.
[Here follow the remaining agenda items.]
Marion W. Boggs
347. National Security Council Report
NSC 6003 Washington, February 9, 1960.
//Source: Department of State, S/S - NSC Files: Lot 63 D 351, NSC 6003 Series. Secret. In a February 9 memorandum attached to the source text, Marion W. Boggs noted that this statement of policy was adopted by the NSC on February 4 and approved by the President on February 9. NSC 6003 superseded NSC 5718.
STATEMENT OF U.S. POLICY TOWARD CYPRUS
1. The agreements to establish an independent Cypriot republic in February 1960, which were reached at Zurich and London in early 1959, brought an unexpected end to four years of violence on Cyprus and justified hopes that a satisfactory solution might be achieved. It is likely that current efforts to implement these agreements will in fact culminate in Cypriot independence though difficult problems remain to be overcome, but there is at least a possibility that the settlement might collapse.
Importance of Cyprus to the United States
2. Cyprus has been important to the United States primarily because the controversy over the future status of Cyprus caused a dangerous deterioration of Greek-Turkish and Greek-British relations and disrupted NATO cooperation in the Eastern Mediterranean. Now it is important that, when Cyprus gains its independence under the provisions of the London Agreements of February 1959, the new Republic become a stable and unifying, rather than disruptive, force in relations among Greece, Turkey, and the United Kingdom. Collapse of the Cyprus settlement could have disastrous consequences for the present pro-Western Government of Greece, could have serious implications for the Turkish Government and could impair Greek-Turkish relations. It could also throw the island into a new period of violence and confused drift, reawakening Greek Cypriot demands for union with Greece and Turkish Cypriot demands for partition.
3. The chief strategic importance of Cyprus to the West will continue to lie in the British bases and their role in the United Kingdom's planning and posture for military operations in the Middle East and Mediterranean. Since the loss of British bases in Egypt, the strategic importance of Cyprus has increased. Cyprus is located within striking range of the USSR and its airfields are capable of handling medium jet bombers. The British currently maintain approximately one wing of light bombers on the island which they may be expected to contribute in support of CENTO plans. The British airfields on Cyprus are useful to the United States as a possible staging base for Middle East operations and as a possible back-up installation for the U.S. facilities located at Adana, Turkey.
4. The United States has other important interests on Cyprus. U.S. governmental facilities include a radio communications relay station which is vital to official U.S. communications throughout the Middle East and foreign broadcast monitoring stations which are important to our collection of foreign intelligence. On the whole, no serious troubles are anticipated in connection with U.S. installations, although Cypriot leaders have indicated that they will seek some form of quid pro quo for continued availability of these facilities. Any effort to relocate these facilities would be costly in terms of both time and money, and there is no other location in the area at which the assigned mission could be accomplished satisfactorily. The American-owned Cyprus Mines Corporation is the largest single business enterprise in Cyprus and its tax payments account for approximately one-sixth of the total governmental revenues of Cyprus. Other U.S. companies, particularly the Cyprus Chrome Company and the Forest Oil Company, have investments in Cyprus.
International Political Orientation
5. The London Agreements provide that an independent Cyprus will be tied closely to Greece, Turkey, and the United Kingdom. These three countries will guarantee the independence, territorial integrity and security of Cyprus, all three will have armed forces stationed in Cyprus, and they will have the right to intervene singly or jointly to restore the situation established by the settlement. Cyprus will be linked with Greece and Turkey in a treaty of alliance, in accordance with which a tripartite military headquarters embracing command and training functions will be established in Cyprus. The forthcoming Cypriot Republic will probably elect to join the British Commonwealth.
6. Cyprus' many formal and natural bonds with Greece, Turkey, and the United Kingdom notwithstanding, a number of Greek Cypriots are drawn toward the Afro-Asian community. Remembrance of support from within the Afro-Asian group for Cypriot self-determination in the United Nations and the temptation to form a bridge between the Afro-Asians and NATO will fortify Cypriot inclinations to fashion an independent foreign policy. Any sentiment for an independent policy will most probably be encouraged by the Cypriot Communists. Under the presently foreseen constitutional set-up, the veto power, which will be exercised by both the Greek President and the Turkish Vice President of Cyprus over foreign affairs decisions, is likely, however, to circumscribe the new Government's room for diplomatic maneuver. The Soviet Bloc will probably try to establish diplomatic representation in Cyprus in order to have observers in such an important military and communications complex, and to take full advantage of the problems facing the new state.
Cypriot Relations with the United States
7. The Cypriot population has no special basis in past history for close relations with the United States. In fact the Greek portion of the population has recently been resentful of the unwillingness of the United States to support their aspirations for self-determination. This resentment is now receding and it is expected that the Cypriot government will seek cordial relations with the United States--and U.S. assist-ance--in order to offset the predominant U.K. position in Cypriot affairs. The Greek and Turkish Cypriot communities will each be sensitive to any U.S. action which appears to show partiality to the other.
Internal Strengths and Weaknesses
8. The Zurich - London Agreements institutionalize the historic separateness of the four-fifths Greek majority and the one-fifth Turkish minority in Cyprus in an intricate and delicately balanced governmental framework. Essentially a federation along ethnic lines, the arrangements can only work successfully with the good will of the Greek and Turkish Cypriot communities and the continued cooperation of the Greek and Turkish Governments. There are no indications that the establishment of an independent Cyprus will give rise to a specifically Cypriot nationalism. Recent years of emergency have subordinated moderate Cypriots, both Greek and Turkish, to extremist leaders who did not hesitate to use force and intimidation to ensure absolute adherence to the national program of their separate communities. Not since 1931 have the Cypriots had an island-wide legislative body, and their training in self-government has been limited to municipal administration and subordinate positions in the civil service. It will be difficult to find sufficient qualified personnel among the Turkish Cypriots to staff the executive levels of the civil service in the 70 - 30 ratio prescribed by the Constitution, and even among the Greek Cypriots there will be a dearth of qualified administrators.
9. The Turkish community in Cyprus, politically more homogeneous and disciplined than the Greek, can be expected to follow the general lead of the Turkish Government. The Greek community is more faction-ridden, and Archbishop Makarios is the only leader prospectively capable of uniting it for the cooperative action needed to get the Republic of Cyprus underway. However, he will be hard put to maintain himself as a unifying and stabilizing force in the face of the subtle opposition of the Cypriot Communists and the tendency toward factionalism on the part of the Greek Cypriot community. Makarios' strength and prestige derive from his unique position as Archbishop and Ethnarch (which makes him both the religious and dominant political leader of the Greek community); his demonstrated abilities at compromise and conciliation; and the support accorded him by the Greek Government. Although at present willing to accept Communist support to avoid an initial electoral struggle, the Archbishop apparently hopes to fashion a reliable non-Communist political party from the former members of EOKA (the Greek Cypriot terrorist organization) and the Nationalist Greek Cypriot youth, labor and agricultural organizations.
10. The political ambitions of General Grivas, the former Chief of EOKA, appear to lie primarily in Greece. Nonetheless, he remains a potential disruptive element in Cypriot politics. Grivas' past attempts to undermine the Archbishop and the settlement itself have not seriously endangered Makarios' leadership, and open political support for Grivas in Cyprus seems limited to a small clique surrounding the Bishop of Kyrenia. Grivas can, however, play upon the admiration accorded him as the almost legendary hero of the liberation struggle and upon the continuing dedication to enosis of the majority of the Greek Cypriots, most of whom appear to hope that Cypriot independence is but a step toward eventual union with Greece.
11. Greek Premier Karamanlis is closely associated with the present settlement and is committed to its success. The cooperation between Makarios and Karamanlis, and the latter's thus far effective opposition to Grivas in the Greek political arena, have done much to lessen Grivas' ability to undermine Makarios on Cyprus and sabotage the settlement. If the Karamanlis government should be replaced by elements which are either not identified with the Cyprus settlement or actually opposed to it, the chances for stability on the island would worsen, and the situation could deteriorate rapidly.
12. In the longer run, the most serious threat to Makarios' political dominance and the future of an independent Cyprus is posed by the Communists. The only well organized party in Cyprus at this time is the no longer proscribed Communist Party of Cyprus (AKEL) with a membership estimated at 6 - 12,000 Greek Cypriots. AKEL strength derives from its skilled mature leadership and its control of the 35,000-member Pan- Cypriot Federation of Labor (PEO) which enables it to dominate organized Cypriot labor. In general the Cypriot Communists have sought to maintain the appearance of unity with other Greek Cypriots. Capable of controlling today perhaps 30 per cent of the Greek Cypriot votes, they can be expected to cause serious problems for the new state, particularly in the event of serious unemployment or financial and political mistakes by the inexperienced nationalists. The large Communist role in municipal governments will probably continue, but is expected to be of less significance in the future because of the anticipated reduction in the importance of these governments following independence. Breaking the grip of the Communists over the labor movement through re-invigoration of the non-Communist labor movement (SEK) is difficult because of the ineffectivness of present SEK leaders.
13. The autonomous Orthodox Church of Cyprus plays a very important role in the lives of Greek Cypriots by virtue of its restrictive control over the Greek Cypriot educational system, its considerable economic power derived from large-scale land holdings, and the political guidance given the villagers by their priests. Increased Cypriot participation with government which will come with independence will undoubtedly force some secularization of Greek Cypriot education and politics when the Republic is established. Church and Government will necessarily be intertwined, however, as long as Archbishop Makarios remains the political leader of the Greek Cypriots. This involvement of the Church in politics is likely, sooner or later, to provide an irresistible issue for exploitation by the Communists.
14. Cyprus is a country of 563,000 people with a per capita income which surpasses that of all other states in the area except Israel. It is, however, a fragile economy marked by great disparities in the distribution of national income and a heavy reliance on foreign exchange from two sources; i.e., income from British bases and exports of copper by the American-owned mining company.
15. Cyprus is predominantly an agricultural country, with more than half of the labor force engaged in farming. Agricultural productivity suffers from an insufficient water supply, excessive land fragmentation and antiquated methods of farming. Minerals, particularly copper and iron pyrites, constitute an important economic resource. Production of minerals now accounts for approximately 13 per cent of GNP and 60 per cent of total exports. However, it is estimated that the largest and richest of the copper deposits will be depleted within about five to six years, and it is unlikely that output of lower grade ores will be increased enough to maintain the present level of copper exports. Capital invested in mining operations is almost entirely of foreign origin, the principal mining enterprise being the American-owned Cyprus Mines Corporation. Industry is small-scale and primarily restricted to the processing of local products such as fruits, tobacco, beverages, olive oil, and building materials. Population increase is approximately two per cent even with a high rate of emigration. While the current unemployment rate of between two per cent and four per cent does not appear serious in itself, it is a matter of real and continuing concern because it is concentrated among higher skilled and better paid workers.
16. In recent years, despite its meager resources, Cyprus has enjoyed a high level of economic activity as a result of British expenditures on the island in connection with the bases there. If, as anticipated, these British military expenditures decline, the Cypriots will be faced with the need to expand both agriculture and industry in order to maintain income and employment, even though revival of the pre-emergency tourist trade should be of material assistance in meeting the problem. Quite apart from the trends in British military expenditures, however, general economic development and more equitable distribution of income will undoubtedly be among the major goals of the new Cypriot government.
17. Both Greek and Turkish Cypriot leaders have indicated their intention to remain in the sterling area for at least ten years. If Cyprus ultimately joins the British Commonwealth, it will presumably do so in recognition of the economic benefits to be derived therefrom. The Greek and Turkish Governments have indicated an intention to provide some economic assistance to Cyprus. Their contributions are likely to be small and channelled so as to benefit primarily their respective ethnic communities in Cyprus. The British have announced their willingness to construct an airport terminal as a gift to Cyprus and to loan Cyprus funds for port improvement and the expansion of electrical distribution facilities, but they have apparently not yet decided on the future level of their economic and military expenditures in Cyprus. At present about three per cent of Cyprus' trade is with the Soviet Bloc. However, both the Soviet Union and Communist China have offered economic aid to Cyprus, and the Soviet Bloc is offering through a Cypriot Communist trading organization to barter Bloc goods for surplus Cypriot agricultural products, an intriguing proposal to the Cypriots in view of restricted markets in the West. The Cypriot leaders have publicly expressed their intention of asking the United States for economic aid and have already privately requested U.S. technical assistance.
18. The British desire to retain sovereignty over two enclaves in Cyprus and the use of other facilities outside the enclaves will be a continuing source of Cypriot-British friction. Under the terms of the Cyprus settlement, Cyprus would have a 2000-man armed force, 60 per cent Greek Cypriot and 40 per cent Turkish Cypriot. The Cypriot armed force, together with a Greek contingent of 950 men and a Turkish contingent of 650, would come under the command of a tripartite headquarters. In addition Cyprus would have a 2000-man gendarm[rie and police force. Makarios has expressed concern over the cost of establishing and maintaining a Cypriot armed force and has asked the United States to provide the arms and equipment required for the Cypriot armed forces. While the Greeks might welcome a smaller armed force, the Turks are apparently opposed to any reduction. The 2000-man armed force would not add significantly to the security of Cyprus against external attack, and would be costly in terms of available resources on Cyprus. If these forces were to be equipped as a constabulary or mobile guard they would be less expensive to maintain and could play a valuable role in coping with any Communist threats to stability.
19. Cyprus is not at present included in the NATO area. [3 lines of source text not declassified] The Cypriots are not likely, at least in the initial years of their independence, to seek membership in NATO.
20. The Greek and Turkish Governments are likely to want to send some of their MAP equipment to Cyprus with their contingents. They may also request us to help support the Cypriot forces with MAP equipment, preferring that the Cypriot forces be equipped with U.S. materiel, as are their own national forces, rather than with British materiel. The British have indicated that they will gladly consider requests for equipment for Cyprus, although they are not anxious to provide such equipment. They also expressed the hope that the United States would take a similar position.
21. A politically stable Cyprus, linking Greece, Turkey, and the United Kingdom in a cooperative relationship, and willing and able to resist Communist subversion.
22. The continued availability to the West of the British military facilities on Cyprus.
23. The continued, unhampered use of U.S. communications facilities on Cyprus.
24. Cypriot economic development conducive to the development and maintenance of political stability, a pro-Western orientation and free democratic institutions.
Major Policy Guidance
25. Support an independent Cypriot state as the only feasible way of achieving under present circumstances a settlement of the Cyprus problem acceptable to all parties.
26. Endeavor, in collaboration with the United Kingdom, Greece and Turkey, to seek to maintain a pro-Western outlook on Cyprus as a means of preserving present Free World interests on the island.
27. Endeavor, within the limits of feasibility, to maintain U.S. communications facilities on Cyprus for as long as they are required, being prepared to this end to offer reasonable quid pro quos, if necessary.
28. Avoid any U.S. action that might suggest partiality between the Greek and Turkish communities.
29. Support the admission of Cyprus to the U.N. and, subject to financial policy considerations, to Free World international financial institutions. Consider supporting admission to other intergovernmental organizations on a case-by-case basis, taking into consideration the role which the Republic of Cyprus could be expected to play in such organizations.
30. Look with favor on Cypriot membership in the British Commonwealth as a means of strengthening Cyprus' ties with the United Kingdom and the Free World and of providing economic advantages to Cyprus.
31. Take no initiative to secure the admission of Cyprus into NATO but be prepared to consider such admission if the question is raised.
32. Encourage the Cypriot Government to establish sound economic policies and to maintain an investment climate which would promote both domestic and foreign private investment.
33. Discourage the Cypriot Government from establishing excessive economic ties with the Sino-Soviet bloc.
34. Encourage Cyprus to look to the United Kingdom, to Western Europe, including Greece and Turkey, to the Free World international financial institutions, and to private investment to meet its needs for external capital.
35. Urge the United Kingdom to exercise the major role in supporting Cypriot economic development efforts and in providing economic and technical assistance.
36. Encourage Greece, Turkey, and other Western European countries to take an active interest in promoting the economic welfare of Cyprus and to provide technical and economic assistance within their capabilities.
37. Be prepared to provide technical assistance on a small scale and to negotiate surplus commodity sales under P.L. 480 as an aid in accomplishing U.S. objectives with respect to Cyprus. Consider providing economic development assistance to Cyprus in the event it does not prove feasible or desirable to rely wholly on the United Kingdom, Western Europe, and the Free World international financial institutions. Coordinate any U.S. aid with the assistance being provided by allied nations in order to minimize the possibility of misunderstandings and to prevent competition over particular aid projects.
38. As feasible help strengthen non-Communist labor organizations in Cyprus.
39. Be prepared, as appropriate and feasible, to encourage the reimposition of the ban on the Communist Party of Cyprus.
40. Discreetly encourage the new Cyprus Government to develop, maintain, and train its internal police and security services to combat Communist subversion.
41. Encourage the Cypriots to look to Greece, Turkey, and the United Kingdom and encourage these countries to take cooperative action to equip the Cypriot forces, preferably along the lines of a lightly armed, mobile constabulary with an internal security mission.
42. Be prepared, depending on amounts and types of equipment involved and without commitment to make up resulting deficiencies, to give sympathetic consideration to possible request from Greece and Turkey that their contingents destined for Cyprus be allowed to utilize MAP equipment and, in the event the provisions of paragraph 41 above prove inadequate, that Greece and Turkey be allowed to transfer to the Cypriot armed forces MAP equipment excess to over-all U.S. requirements. If Greece or Turkey use such transfers as the basis for requesting the United States to provide additional military equipment, any such request should be referred to the National Security Council for consideration in the light of the circumstances then existing.
43. Do not provide direct U.S. military assistance to Cyprus unless the other measures in paragraphs 41 and 42 fail. If these measures fail and if it is believed absolutely essential for the achievement of U.S. objectives, consider in the National Security Council the question of direct military assistance to Cyprus under the circumstances then existing.
44. Continue to consult with the United Kingdom, Greece and Turkey, and, if appropriate, with the Government of Cyprus, with respect to the Communist threat on Cyprus, and, particularly if the Communists should move to gain control of the government, support counteraction.
1. A preliminary review has been made by the Department of Defense of the list of equipment requested by Archbishop Makarios on October 17, 1959./1/ The rough order-of-magnitude estimate of the cost to MAP for the provision of the entire list of equipment is approximately $2.5 million. The preliminary estimate of the cost of providing the strictly military items is approximately $2.0 million.
/1/Makarios' request was delivered on October 20, 1959; see Document 331.
2. The purely military items in the list include small arms, ammunition, general purpose vehicles, communications equipment, and individual equipment. The list also includes many items which are not normally provided under grant military assistance, such as barber's tool kits, mantles and flat wicks for hurricane lamps, typewriters, miscellaneous furniture, cooking utensils, and office supplies. The criteria used in MAP programming normally screen out items which are available on the commercial market, on the basis that such items should be furnished by the country from indigenous resources.
3. In the event that a military assistance program for Cyprus is established and subsequently evolves in the normal pattern for less- developed countries, the initial equipment would represent only a small portion of the total MAP costs. In addition, there would be expenses for training, construction of storage and maintenance facilities, spare parts, overhaul of equipment, consumable items such as POL and ammunition, and other expenses. These additional expenses, under normal circumstances, would ultimately involve MAP costs greatly in excess of the initial equipment costs.
4. U.S. Government expenditures under this policy are expected to be relatively small. Technical assistance, if extended, is likely to be in the range of $50,000 to $100,000 per year. There is also a possibility of small agricultural commodity sales under P.L. 480.
5. The United States would not expect to provide economic development loans unless the contingency situation covered by paragraph 37 should arise. Even in that event, the United Kingdom, other Western European countries and the international lending institutions would be expected to provide the bulk of the total external development assist-ance rendered. Unofficial studies have estimated the ability of Cyprus to use foreign development assistance at $5 - 7 million annually over the next few years.
Educational Exchange and Information Programs
6. A small educational exchange program now getting underway might cost as much as $50,000 a year. The U.S. information program, which was initiated in July 1959, is not expected to cost more than about $50,000 a year.
348. Editorial Note
On February 5, Julian Amery, Under Secretary for Colonial Affairs, flew to Nicosia to represent the British Government in a new series of discussions with Archbishop Makarios over the issue of British bases on Cyprus. Amery and Makarios failed to reach an agreement and on February 8, the Governor of Cyprus announced that the date for the island's independence was further (and indefinitely) postponed. Amery returned to London on February 11 after further unsuccessful discussions. On February 23, Amery returned to Nicosia to resume discussions with Archbishop Makarios over the future of British bases on Cyprus.
349. Telegram From the Department of State to the Consulate General in Nicosia
Washington, March 19, 1960, 3:57 p.m.
282. Rome for Liaison. Contel 394./1/ We are not convinced negotiations on base issue have as yet reached point when mediation either necessary or desirable. Of interested parties only Greek Cypriots have suggested mediation. In our view future British-Cypriot relations, as well as our own relations with all concerned, would be on healthier basis if two sides can resolve current issues without recourse mediation.
//Source: Department of State, Central Files, 747C.56341/3 - 1760. Secret. Drafted by Blood and cleared by G. Lewis Jones. Repeated to Athens, Ankara, and London and pouched to Paris for USRO and Rome.
/1/Telegram 394 from Nicosia, March 17, reported on a March 16 conversation between Belcher and Clerides, the Cypriot Justice Minister, in which Clerides appealed for U.S. intervention to settle the bases dispute with the British. (Ibid., 747C.00/3 - 1760)
Greek Government is aware of Greek Cypriot interest in mediation but apparently does not believe time ripe for it (Athens 2210)./2/ If Greeks or Turks or both should subsequently ask us to support idea of mediation with British, we would consider such request in light situation then prevailing. We do not wish ourselves to be mediating power.
/2/Telegram 2210 from Athens, February 9, reported that Averoff opposed U.S. mediation of the bases impasse. (Ibid., 747C.00/2 - 960)
If Clerides pursues matter, ConGen should reply Department believes Cypriots and British should continue endeavor reconcile their differences and in present circumstances believes any action on our part in encouragement of mediation would be inappropriate.
350. Telegram 409 From the Consulate General in Nicosia to the Department of State
Nicosia, March 29, 1960, 6 p.m.
[Source: Department of State, Central Files, 747C.00/3 - 2960. Secret; Limit Distribution; Noforn. 3 pages of source text not declassified.]
351. Telegram From the Consulate General in Nicosia to the Department of State
Nicosia, April 5, 1960, 5 p.m.
420. Foot called me to Government House last night to discuss situation in light of weekend statements by Archbishop and 100 square mile compromise proposal of Kutchuk, which Makarios has described as "unacceptable"./1/ Governor told me that after seeing Makarios and obtaining his approval he called meeting Sunday/2/ of all Greek Cypriot ministers and leading constitutional lawyer.
//Source: Department of State, Central Files, 747C.00/4 - 560. Secret; Noforn. Repeated to Ankara, Athens, and London.
/1/In an April 1 speech commemorating the EOKA uprising of 1954, Makarios threatened a return to civil disobedience and unilateral implementation of the London agreements. On April 2, Kuchuk appealed for a compromise on the issue of British bases and suggested that the Cypriots and British settle on the figure of 100 square miles.
Foot said meeting was "last effort" make Cypriot leaders see the light; he claimed present situation was "high water mark" for Cypriot cause and to fail to close the bargain now would be grave mistake. Governor believed present precarious situation was brinksmanship with a vengeance, but there was no sign whatever that Makarios was willing meet British offer of flexibility with similar move. Governor told Cypriot leaders that if Amery left with no solution it would be very difficult to get talks started again. Contrary to press reports he did not espouse Turkish compromise at meeting. Said he had impression Greeks thought they could drag matter out indefinitely; this was not so. He was most disheartened after meeting with Ministers and others saying he now convinced Makarios has no intention of meeting British even half way. He said there would be no solution unless Greek Cypriots willing do so since UK would never concede to Archbishop's demand for 80 square miles. In explanation he said in strictest confidence such substantial concession would split government and involve resignations of ministers. When I spoke of cost of alternatives, saying that perhaps Greeks counting on British people being unwilling pay bill in money, et cetera, for another round here, Foot said he was sure government quite willing endure considerable trials and expenses (he mentioned "millions") rather than give in.
Greek Cypriot contacts present at meeting, claim Governor asked them persuade Makarios to compromise but would not give indication of extent HMG willing to go. They say Governor kept saying he would not talk about extent in numbers but only wished impress on them that compromise solution must be found at this week's meeting (scheduled for Wednesday). Cypriots went on to say Governor would not commit himself on two questions they consider as vital as area--disposition of bases if UK leaves and method of formalizing agreements on administration. Cypriots were not optimistic. They did not like Foot's approach and suspect motives as result refusal to mention specific figures or reassure them on other two matters. I tried explain difficulties, pointing out that British were afraid give specific proposal until Makarios at least indicated flexibility on his part.
If talks break down Foot expects rapid split between Greek and Turk Cypriots. Says next step would be to call meeting of Foreign Ministers to discuss future possibilities. Governor asked me to do what I could to impress on Greeks fact that situation urgent and further delay impossible.
Comment: In discussing UK position with Governor I still have impression he disagreed in principle, but recognizes political imperatives that influencing his decisions whether inherently right or not. British patience is obviously running short; these moves are probably not merely pressure play. Believe most we can do here at this time is informally express conviction that British will not meet Archbishop's demands. Picture is not conducive to optimism./3/
/3/Formal talks between Amery and Makarios broke down on May 6.
352. Telegram 458 From the Consulate General in Nicosia to the Department of State
Nicosia, May 3, 1960, 1 p.m.
[Source: Department of State, Central Files, 747C.5 - MSP/5 - 360. Secret. 2 pages of source text not declassified.]
353. Telegram From the Consulate General in Nicosia to the Department of State
Nicosia, June 25, 1960, 11 a.m.
365. Rome for Liaison. Reports from London on talks between Defense Secretary Gates and British Defense Minister Watkinson re alleged plan for dispersal British and American H-bombers with Cyprus to be used as one of bases has blown up storm of growing proportions here. Report apparently first appeared in London Observer (we did not see it) and was followed by discussion House of Commons. Timing particularly unfortunate. Past two weeks all Greek papers here have published articles protesting reported plan, editors have wired Macmillan and Makarios, trade unions have issued statements, and Communists planning protest rallies. Makarios has made statement expressing hope "reports unfounded," and has so far resisted increasing pressure to introduce question in talks with Amery. While Communists clearly fanning flames they have struck responsive chord with Greek Cypriots. Turkish Cypriot papers, of course, have said nothing.
While we have not yet been approached directly for clarification on reported Gates - Watkinson talks, would appreciate any information on matter which Department and London can make available./1/
//Source: Department of State, Central Files, 747C.56311/6 - 2560. Confidential. Repeated to London, Athens, Ankara, Paris for USRO, and Rome.
/1/In telegram 385 to Nicosia, June 28, the Department replied that Gates had denied that plans for the dispersal of strategic bombers were discussed during his meeting with Watkinson and that Watkinson made a similar denial in the House of Commons. (Ibid., 747C.56311/6 - 2860)
354. Editorial Note
The draft text of a Cypriot constitution was initialed by representatives of Greece, Turkey, and Cyprus on April 4 and presented to the British Government. On July 1, British and Cypriot representatives announced agreement on the terms of a settlement of the British bases issue by which the United Kingdom retained two bases on the island covering a total of 99 square miles. On July 6, Makarios and Kutchuk initialed agreements setting the division of offices and responsibilities in the new national government of Cyprus between Greek and Turkish Cypriots. The following day the text of a bill granting independence to Cyprus was presented in the House of Commons. For text of the British-Cypriot agreement, see Cyprus, Cmd. 1093 (London, 1960).
355. Telegram From the Consulate General in Nicosia to the Department of State
Nicosia, July 8, 1960, 1 p.m.
16. Rome for Liaison. Now that agreement reached, Cypriots beginning tackle internal problems including establishment Cyprus Army. Believe we should no longer postpone informing Archbishop United States not providing military equipment he requested. As reported Contel 458/1/ Archbishop certain to inquire about other possible U.S. assist-ance. This issue receiving increasing attention locally with nearly daily press commentaries and reminders of aid expected from United States. Example, English and Greek papers July 7 quick to quote New York Times editorial/2/ suggesting "material aid" might be forthcoming from U.S. on proclamation independence.
//Source: Department of State, Central Files, 747C.5 - MSP/7 - 860. Secret. Repeated to London, Ankara, Athens, Paris for USRO, and Rome.
/2/The New York Times, July 6, 1960.
If Archbishop raises question, propose take line that U.S. of course interested in economic well-being and viability of Republic. However we believe premature discuss possible U.S. aid program until Republic has had opportunity 1) canvass all aid possibilities from U.K., Greek and Turk Governments which directly concerned, 2) program spending of 12 million pounds British assistance during first 5 years, 3) study effects on economy of estimated 15 million pounds annual British military spending, 4) assess its own resources and needs which better judged after completion U.N. economic survey scheduled this fall. Meanwhile we prepared continue and possibly increase scope of exchange of persons program as well as consider PL 480 and Eximbank and DLF loans as outlined Deptel 271./3/
Before seeing Archbishop, would be helpful have report from Department on status our recommendations for modest TC program (Contel 458). Since meeting with Archbishop cannot be deferred much longer, appreciate Department's reply soonest./4/
/3/Dated March 10. (Department of State, Central Files, 747C.56/3 - 1060)
/4/In telegram 13 to Nicosia, July 13, the Department approved Heck's proposed reply to Makarios except the phrase "premature discuss possible U.S. aid program." The Department instructed Heck to state that the United States was prepared to provide a "modest" technical assistance program. (Ibid., 747C.5 - MSP/7 - 860)
[End of Section 18]