U.S. Department of State
Vol. X, Part 1, FRUS, 1958-60: E. Europe Region; Soviet Union; Cyprus
Office of the Historian

[Section 11 of 19]

SEPTEMBER - DECEMBER 1959: VISIT TO THE UNITED STATES OF NIKITA S. KHRUSHCHEV

108. Editorial Note

Chairman Nikita S. Khrushchev made an official visit to the United States September 15 - 27, 1959. For documentation on the invitation and Khrushchev's acceptance, see Documents 87 - 89, 91, and 101 - 102.

The President announced the agreement on the exchange of visits at a special press conference on August 3. For text of his announcement and ensuing questions from the press, see Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: Dwight D. Eisenhower, 1959, pages 560 - 564. Throughout August and early September, Murphy and Soviet Ambassador Mikhail A. Menshikov held many conversations to discuss arrangements for Khrushchev's forthcoming trip. Memoranda of these conversations are in Department of State, Central File 033.6111.

The most extensive documentation on the Khrushchev visit is ibid., Conference Files: Lot 64 D 560, CF 1459 - 1475. Background documents are in CF 1459 - 1462; memoranda of conversation are in CF 1463 - 1464. Copies of cables on substantive and administrative matters are in CF 1465 and 1469. Briefing papers are in CF 1466 - 1468. Miscellaneous administrative and substantive matters are in CF 1470; White House memoranda on substantive and administrative matters are in CF 1471. A detailed chronology of Khrushchev's visit for September 15 and 16 is in CF 1472. The chronology for September 17 and 18 is in CF 1473. The chronology for September 19 to 24 is in CF 1474 and for September 24 to 27 is in CF 1475.

Khrushchev arrived at Andrews Air Force Base on Tuesday, September 15 at 1 p.m. Members of his large party included his wife Nina Petrovna Khrushchev, his daughters Julia Nikitichna and Rada Nikitichna Adzhubei, his son Sergei Nikitich Khrushchev, and his son-in-law Alexei Ivanovich Adzhubei, editor of the Soviet newspaper Izvestia. For texts of Eisenhower's welcoming remarks and Khrushchev's arrival statement at the airport, see Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: Dwight D. Eisenhower, 1959, pages 654 - 656. A memorandum of Khrushchev's conversation with Eisenhower at 3:30 p.m. that afternoon is printed as Document 109. For text of their joint statement following this conversation, see Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: Dwight D. Eisenhower, 1959, pages 656 - 657. Also at 3:30 p.m., William S.B. Lacy, Special Assistant to the Secretary of State for East- West Exchange, met with Georgi Zhukov, Chairman of the Soviet State Committee on Cultural Relations with Foreign Countries. A memorandum of their conversation on U.S.-Soviet exchange discussions is in Department of State, Conference Files: Lot 64 D 560, CF 1472.

At 4:30 p.m., John A. McCone, Chairman of the Atomic Energy Commission, met with Vasily Semenovich Yemelyanov, Chairman of the Soviet Chief Administration for Atomic Energy; see Document 110. A memorandum of President Eisenhower's private conversation with Khrushchev at the White House at 5 p.m. is printed as Document 111. Following this conversation, Henry Cabot Lodge, Ambassador to the United Nations, whom Eisenhower had asked to serve as Khrushchev's host during his visit, called on Khrushchev at Blair House where Khrushchev stayed while in Washington. A memorandum of their conversation is in Department of State, Conference Files: Lot 64 D 560, CF 1472. Eisenhower gave a dinner in honor of Chairman and Mrs. Khrushchev that evening. For texts of Eisenhower's toast and Khrushchev's response on this occasion, see the press release in Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: Dwight D. Eisenhower, 1959, pages 657 - 659.

On Wednesday, September 16 at 9:40 a.m., Khrushchev left by car for a visit to the Agricultural Experiment Station in Beltsville, Maryland. A memorandum of his conversation with Lodge in the car on the way to and from Beltsville is printed as Document 112. At 10 a.m., Secretary Herter met with Foreign Minister Andrei A. Gromyko to plan for the meeting between Eisenhower and Khrushchev at Camp David toward the end of Khrushchev's visit. A memorandum of their conversation is in Department of State, Conference Files: Lot 64 D 560, CF 1472. After his return from Beltsville, Khrushchev attended a luncheon at the National Press Club. At 3:30 p.m., he made an automobile tour of points of interest in the Washington area. A memorandum of his conversation with Lodge during this tour is printed as Document 113. Khrushchev ended his tour at the Capitol where he had tea with the Senate Foreign Relations Committee. Notes of this meeting are in Department of State, Conference Files: Lot 64 D 560, CF 1472.

On the next morning, September 17, Khrushchev and his party left by train for New York City. A memorandum of Lodge's conversation with Khrushchev during the train trip is printed as Document 114.

Khrushchev and his party left by car for Hyde Park, New York, the following morning, September 18, where he was met by Eleanor Roosevelt. Khrushchev laid a wreath on President Roosevelt's grave and then had a tour of the Hyde Park Museum. Memoranda of Khrushchev's conversations with Lodge in the car to and from Hyde Park are printed as Documents 115 and 116. At 3 p.m. the same afternoon, Khrushchev addressed the U.N. General Assembly. Following his speech, Nelson A. Rockefeller, Governor of New York, called on Khru-shchev. Khrushchev then took a motor tour of points of interest in New York. Two memoranda of his conversations with Lodge during this tour, in which they discussed trade and the construction of city buildings, are in Department of State, Conference Files: Lot 64 D 560, CF 1473. Khrushchev attended a dinner that evening given by Dag Hammarskjold, U.N. Secretary-General.

At 9:30 a.m. September 19, Khrushchev and his party flew from New York to Los Angeles. A memorandum of his conversation with Lodge on the airplane is printed as Document 117. Following lunch at Twentieth- Century Fox Studios and a visit to a motion picture set there, Khrushchev went to his hotel in Los Angeles. A memorandum of his conversation with Lodge during the car ride to the hotel is printed as Document 118. A message from Lodge to the Department of State, September 19, reporting on his conversation with Gromyko late that evening is printed as Document 119. A memorandum of Acting Secretary of State Dillon's telephone conversation with Lodge, September 20, following up on Lodge's message, is printed as Document 120.

On Sunday morning, September 20, Khrushchev left Los Angeles by train for San Francisco. A memorandum of his conversation with Lodge during the trip is printed as Document 121. A memorandum of their brief conversation on signs protesting Khrushchev's visit in Washington and a summary of a meeting that evening between Khrushchev and International Union presidents are in Department of State, Conference Files: Lot 64 D 560, CF 1474.

The next morning, September 21, Khrushchev toured San Francisco by automobile and boat. A memorandum of his conversation with Lodge during the tour is printed as Document 122. Lodge summarized the events of the previous 2 days in a cable to Herter; see footnote 2, Document 122.

On the morning of September 22, Khrushchev flew from San Francisco to Des Moines, Iowa. A memorandum of his conversation with Lodge and George Christopher, Mayor of San Francisco, en route to the airport is in Department of State, Conference Files: Lot 64 D 560, CF 1474. A memorandum of Khrushchev's conversation with Ambassador Llewellyn Thompson on the airplane in which they discussed the comments of former Ambassador Charles E. Bohlen on Khrushchev's drinking habits is ibid. A memorandum of President Eisenhower's conversation with Acting Secretary Dillon and McCone on the exchange of nuclear energy information with the Soviet Union is printed as Document 123.

On Wednesday morning, September 23, Khrushchev visited farms in the vicinity of Coon Rapids, Iowa. A memorandum of his conversation with Roswell Garst during his tour is printed as Document 124. He flew later that day to Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania, leaving there on September 24 for Washington. A memorandum of his conversation with Lodge on the way to the Pittsburgh airport is printed as Document 125. The President and Herter also met that day in preparation for the Camp David meetings; see Document 126. That evening, Khrushchev met with several American business leaders at a dinner; see Document 127.

For Lodge's report to the President on his tour with Khrushchev, see Document 128. A memorandum of Pat Nixon's conversation with Khrushchev's daughter Julia at a luncheon on September 25 is in Department of State, Conference Files: Lot 64 D 560, CF 1475. Secretary Herter hosted a luncheon for Khrushchev; his toast, released as Department of State press release 675, is ibid. A memorandum of Under Secretary Dillon's conversation with Pavel Alekseevich Satyukov, chief editor of Pravda, during the luncheon is ibid.

On Saturday, September 26, the President and Khrushchev breakfasted together; see Document 129. Later that morning, they discussed Germany and Berlin; that memorandum of conversation is printed in volume IX, Document 13. For other memoranda of their conversations, see Documents 130 and 131. The two then left by helicopter for a visit to the President's farm in Gettysburg, Pennsylvania. Two memoranda of conversation between George Allen and Georgi Zhukov on jamming and the establishment of information centers are in Department of State, Conference Files: Lot 64 D 560, CF 1475. Later that afternoon, Herter and Gromyko discussed bilateral issues; a memorandum of that conversation is in the East-West exchanges compilation in the Supplement. George Allen's memorandum for the files detailing the continuation of these conversations when he and Zhukov joined the meeting between Herter and Gromyko is in Department of State, Conference Files: Lot 64 D 560, CF 1475.

On Sunday, September 27, Dillon met with Khrushchev at 9:35 a.m.; see Document 132. Khrushchev next met with President Eisenhower; see Document 133. The record of the private meeting between the two, at which they discussed the joint communique, and the President's report on this meeting in a conversation with Herter are printed in volume IX, Documents 14 and 15. The discussion at lunch is printed as Document 134. After lunch, the conversation turned again to the joint communique; the memorandum is printed in volume IX, Document 16. For text of their joint statement following these Camp David discussions, see Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: Dwight D. Eisenhower, 1959, pages 692 - 693. An unsigned and undated summary and analysis of the Camp David talks is in Department of State, Conference Files: Lot 64 D 560, CF 1475.

At about 2 p.m., the President and Khrushchev left by car for Washington where Khrushchev held a press conference and gave a speech carried on the NBC television network. He and his party left late that evening for Moscow. For the President's follow-up comments on the visit, see Document 135.

President Eisenhower's recollections of the visit are in Waging Peace, pages 405 - 413 and 432 - 449. John Eisenhower's account is in Strictly Personal, pages 254 - 264. Lodge's impressions are in The Storm Has Many Eyes, pages 157 - 181, and As It Was, pages 111 - 113. Khrushchev's reminiscences on his visit are in Khrushchev Remembers: The Last Testament, pages 368 - 416. The Soviet Union published two books in English on the visit: Face to Face: The Story of N.S. Khrushchev's Visit to the U.S.A., September 15 - 27, 1959 (Moscow: Foreign Languages Publishing House, 1960) and Khrushchev in America (New York: Crosscurrents Press, 1960). The latter publication contains the full texts of all Khrushchev's speeches and press conferences during his visit. Transcripts of his speeches and press conferences are also in Department of State, Conference Files: Lot 64 D 560, CF 1475B. Almost all of his public statements were published in The New York Times.

109. Memorandum of Conversation

Washington, September 15, 1959.

PARTICIPANTS

USSR

Premier Khrushchev Foreign Minister Gromyko Ambassador Menshikov Mr. Soldatov Mr. Troyanovsky

U.S.

The President The Vice President Secretary of State Herter Ambassador Cabot Lodge Ambassador Thompson Mr. Kohler Mr. Akalovsky

Mr. Khrushchev and aides arrived promptly at 3:30 at the President's office. After initial greetings Mr. Khrushchev promptly handed the President a polished wooden box containing a model of the sphere incorporated in the Soviet moon-shot rocket Lunik II and of the pennants contained therein which are presumably now on the moon./1/ Accompanying this was an embossed presentation folder. The President accepted the souvenir with interest and appreciation.

//Source: Department of State, Conference Files: Lot 64 D 560, CF 1472. Secret. Drafted by Kohler and approved by Herter and Goodpaster.

/1/Lunik II, a Soviet space rocket launched on September 12, reached the Moon on September 14.

Following the ceremony the President opened the conversation by saying that in view of the limits of the time available today, it would probably be possible to do little more than to sketch out the general outlines of the discussions. He did not have any intention of curtailing the talks but thought it would be useful to hit on the subjects of discussion on which it was necessary to get a fuller understanding between the Soviets and ourselves. He said it was inevitable that we would have to talk about points of irritation such as Berlin and Laos. However, he felt that if we could get these into some reasonable perspective, then we could proceed to talk about more constructive subjects, such as wider exchange of ideas and people, trade--if there were any real possibilities--reduction of propaganda of mutually irritating nature and the like. As to Camp David, the site of the talks, this was a simple place. There would not be much room except for about four people on each side plus interpreters and of course personal service. He pointed out that Camp David was cooler than Washington, a fact which he thought would please the Chairman. Mr. Khrushchev quickly interjected that this was quite right. The President continued: among the subjects of bilateral nature, trade and especially the development of tourist exchanges were of interest, pointing out that we were sending nearly 15,000 tourists to the Soviet Union and receiving only about 100 Soviet citizens.

The President said that if there were any subject that the Chairman wanted to start on today, he invited Mr. Khrushchev to present his views in any way he might like. He wanted to mention only one other point. Before the conference broke up the press would want photographs and a short statement. The talks were personal in nature but perhaps the Foreign Ministers could figure out something which could be said to satisfy the curiosity of the press.

Mr. Khrushchev commented that the Ministers should be given some work to do. He confirmed to the President that he agreed with the program of discussions as he had stated. He wanted to ask only if the President contemplated discussing the disarmament question.

The President replied in the affirmative, adding that he did not exclude any subject from the talks.

Mr. Khrushchev repeated that he was in general agreement with the subjects the President had mentioned. These were the ones on which we needed to exchange and to bring our views closer. He had been commissioned by the Soviet Government to discuss the widest matters. The Soviet Government would like to bring about normal relationships between the two countries and the improvement in the international climate which would result from this. Of course he said each country has its own views as to the items to be discussed and the terms of the discussion. He saw no reason why we should not find agreement on many things in the discussions. If so, the discussions could then become negotiations, perhaps at some other spot and some other composition of meetings. The people of the world expected such developments. He spoke the view of the Soviet Government in saying that: “We believe that you do not want war; and we assume that you also believe this about us."

The President interjected that he saw no profit in mutual suicide.

Mr. Khrushchev resumed, saying that he agreed with this statement, but that when the Foreign Ministers met they talked otherwise and that the presence of interpreters did not seem to help. When one side gave its interpretation of a position, the other side immediately thought that this was what they were saying but suspected that they were thinking otherwise. The main thing, he said, is to establish trust. Probably we cannot take each other's word at this time but we must try to bring about trust. There is no other way. Of course there are differences in our political systems and the whole basis of our social systems is different. These differences must be recognized. If we approach each other in the expectation that the other's system will be overturned, then there will be no basis for understanding. Let us allow history to be the judge of which system is preferable and meanwhile live in peace as good neighbors.

The President said he did not disagree with Mr. Khrushchev's remarks. The question seemed to be - - how do we start to clear away the underbrush of confusion and mutual distrust and begin then to solve some of the problems between us. He thought the basis of the mistrust was not suspicion of Mr. Khrushchev toward himself or his suspicion of Mr. Khrushchev. It was a problem of national psychology and popular feeling. He said that frankly, our people are aware of Communist ideology and read its doctrine starting all the way back to Marx, on the destruction of our society, even by force. Our people become uneasy and they say things which are irritating. We have in the US a Communist Party which the people think is militant and is supported by Communists in Moscow. People are thus fearful and tense. Sometimes this feeling even becomes excessive and leads to witch hunts, as in the days of McCarthy (Khrushchev interjected that he read about this). The President resumed, saying that he was sure that we wanted to approach these talks in a friendly way and explore what we could do. He said he was making no charges but explaining the situation. He assumed that Mr. Khrushchev would do the same and we would see if we could find ways to increase confidence and improve the situation, perhaps step by step. So, with the Chairman's permission, he would take up one subject right now, that of Berlin. The United States' position is that we assumed reposibilities at the end of World War II. He agreed with Mr. Khru-shchev that the present situation in Berlin is abnormal. However, until the United States can discharge its obligation to the German people, there should be no unilateral action on the part of the Soviets embarrasing to us and making it impossible for us to discharge these responsibilities. We cannot abandon those responsibilities until there is an acceptable settlement.

The President then said that he did not want to monopolize the conversation. So if Mr. Khrushchev wanted to talk, it was certainly his turn to do so.

Mr. Khrushchev replied that the President as the host had the right to regulate the conversation. He had no complaints.

The President said if we wanted to make progress, we must discuss specific questions. The Berlin Question was a symbolic one, irritating to the Soviets and unpleasant for us. The Soviets' threat to take unilateral action had brought about a serious crisis. Maybe, though, we would have to put this particular question at the back end of the talks. Some of the subjects which the President would like to discuss were perhaps nuclear testing, some disarmament questions and, he would again repeat, questions of a much greater exchange of books, publications and ideas. He felt that it was important to have exchanges between government leaders. He was glad that the Vice President and his brother, Dr. Milton Eisenhower, had visited the Soviet Union. Similarly he had been pleased with the visits of Messrs. Mikoyan and Kozlov over here. It would be even better if there could be much broader interchanges between everyday people--workers, farmers, and the like. He was also interested in exhibits. He had admired the Soviet exhibit in New York and had been glad to have ours in Moscow. Mr. Khrushchev interrupted at this point to say that as concerns exhibits, he could say in a friendly way that the United States exhibit could have been much better than it was. He did not want to discuss this in detail and thought he could do that later. However, he would like to say why he considered that our exhibit was not really American. The President replied that he had heard some criticisms from some of our people which were considerably more bitter than that voiced by the Chairman.

The President resumed, saying that he could assure Mr. Khru-shchev that every word he uttered outside of private meetings such as this would be candidly and accurately reported. He was delighted that the Chairman could tell our people everything he could or wanted to about how he feels as regards the problems that divide us. When Mr. Khrushchev rides with him to Camp David, he will see all the television antennae and will realize that his likeness and every word that he utters is coming into the living rooms of the houses.

The President concluded that there was not much use in trying to discuss these problems in detail this afternoon. We had outlined a number of subjects and the course we would like to follow in approaching them when there was an opportunity for a longer conversation.

Mr. Khrushchev replied that he was quite agreeable to the exchange of views on the subjects mentioned by the President. If he might, he would like to say a few words in general terms about one subject which had been mentioned. He was afraid that American officials, not being Marxists, did not understand Marxism. Coming to the U.S. he had read the Vice President's last speech./2/ The Vice President “was becoming Marxist" and had indicated that he was studying the subject but he was afraid the Vice President was not studying very well. (The Vice President interjected he was complimented that Mr. Khrushchev read his speech.) Mr. Khrushchev continued saying that Mr. Nixon had mentioned toothaches in his speech. The speech was not a toothache to him but it was certainly not calculated to reduce tensions and calm feelings on the eve of his visit. On the contrary it would arouse feelings. Mr. Khrushchev was a bit of a politician himself and so he understood the approach. The President had mentioned the subject of mutual reduction of propaganda. Like a hunter following a fresh trail he wanted to mention the Vice President's speech as not being designed to bring about a better atmosphere for his visit. We must all realize that it is impossible to gain the confidence of a people over the heads of its government. If the Americans had no respect for him and the Soviet Government, they could not hope to win over the Soviet people. In fact, “I represent our people." If he could be excused for being frank and outspoken he would say that if he had made such a speech as the Vice President's on the eve of the Vice President's arrival in the USSR, the Vice President would find the situation difficult and the atmosphere tense. After the Vice President's speech, he, Khrushchev, had been surprised to find the people here tolerant and friendly. However, this was probably because they respect the President and respect him as a guest of the President. He had raised this subject only because propaganda had been mentioned. If the Soviets followed the same course it would be difficult to bring about a better atmosphere. If he had read the Vice President's speech before his departure he would have felt compelled to hit back.

/2/Nixon's speech to the American Dental Association in New York on September 14 was extensively summarized in The New York Times, September 15, 1959.

The President commented that he must read this speech of the Vice President's about which the Chairman was talking. The Vice President suggested that he also read the speech Mr. Khrushchev had made on the day the Vice President arrived in Moscow and the speech he made while the Vice President was there so that the President could get the record straight on both sides./3/

/3/For a condensed text of Khrushchev's speech in the Sports Palace in Moscow on July 23, which focused on Poland, the captive nations week resolution, and Nixon's visit, see Current Digest of the Soviet Press, August 26, 1959, pp. 12 - 13. For the full text of Khrushchev's speech at the opening of the American National Exhibition in Moscow on July 24, see Toward Better Understanding, pp. 4 - 8.

Mr. Khrushchev commented that if they were to talk about the Moscow speeches, he would ask the President to be the referee. If at the opening of the American Exhibit he had not spoken before the Vice President, his speech would have been different in content and in length. Even so his speech had not been published in the American press as had the Vice President's. The President turned to Mr. Kohler who reported that Mr. Khrushchev's speech had been given considerable coverage in the American press but confirmed that it had been published in full textually only on the magazine U.S. News and World Report./4/

/4/”Our Country Will Catch Up With the U.S.," U.S. News and World Report, August 17, 1959.

Mr. Khrushchev commented that this was not the same thing as the daily press--that they had magazines too in the Soviet Union and he knew what they were.

The President said he wanted to assure Mr. Khrushchev that there was no censorship in the U.S. He also wanted to say that he could not influence the American newspapers. He would not try and could not do so if he did try.

Mr. Khrushchev replied he knew some things about conditions in the U.S. and that he had noted the talk about full freedom of press existing here. He had also noted that what the U.S. Government wants to have published is published and what it does not want to have published is not published. If we were to take that approach the Soviets could, too. It was better to take a reasonable view of the matter and not refer to our respective constitutions. The Soviets were proud of their constitution just as the Americans were. However, he was sorry to pursue this subject. He had taken it up only as an example.

The President said he wanted to make two points. One, he thought we should talk about propaganda objectively but that we should not make propaganda among ourselves. Consequently he would not pursue the question of the debates between the Chairman and the Vice President. The second point was that if Mr. Khrushchev would like to investigate the full freedom of our press, he would invite any editors, reporters or journalists the Chairman might want to see to meet with him. Mr. Khrushchev could be quite alone with them and find out what they say about government control. Again, he would assure Mr. Khru-shchev that there was no such control. It would have been very useful to him to have been able to influence the press during the two political campaigns he had waged.

Mr. Khrushchev replied, “I believe you", adding that though this was his first trip to the U.S., he knew something about how things were done here and likewise he read the papers.

The President commented that Mr. Khrushchev would be having a big meeting with the press tomorrow. He had no idea of the questions the Chairman would face but he thought he would find that there was no control over them and practically no limitations to the kind of questions that would be asked. The President himself faced this kind of press questioning once a week.

Mr. Khrushchev commented that he reads the record of the President's press conferences including the questions and answers. He thought he knew what the press was like here. He was prepared to take it as he found it though he would point out that there is a different kind of press in the different kinds of social system which we have. The President had mentioned the exchange of ideas. He wanted to say that if there were an exchange of speeches and the American speech was published by the Soviets and the Soviet reply was not published by the American press, then perhaps the next speech would not be published in the Soviet press. This would result in a “dialogue between deaf persons", with what was published on one side not relating to what was said on the other. He too could say that he did not control the publishers and the press in the Soviet Union--so the conditions were similar.

The President replied that we might consider trading television programs, perhaps one-half hour program on each side every month. An American leader could speak there and a Soviet leader here. While he could not control these things he did know that the American companies would be interested in getting such programs.

Mr. Khrushchev replied that the Soviets have had a bad precedent with the Vice President on the question of television programs, too. During the discussion at the American exhibit which was kinescoped, it had been agreed that there would be a full translation on both sides. However, some American television companies had not translated Mr. Khrushchev's remarks in full. He was not complaining, he was just stating the facts.

The President said that he had seen the pictures and he did not think the Chairman had lost any of his effectiveness.

Mr. Khrushchev again said that though he was not making any great complaints his remarks should have been presented in full.

The President replied that he thought that arrangements could be made in connection with the television programs so that the representatives of each country could check the accuracy of translations and monitor use throughout the other country. Mr. Khrushchev said it was too bad Mr. Georgi Zhukov was not here as he was the Soviet official who knew most about these things. As regards television, he had had Mr. Eric Johnston to his home in the Caucasus./5/ Mr. Johnston had proposed that there be a project for an exchange of filmed speeches of the President and Mr. Khrushchev. The Soviet side had agreed to this but it appeared that the U.S. had dropped the project.

The President said that Mr. Johnston had mentioned this to him only as a proposal but that he had heard no more about it./6/

/5/See Document 56.

/6/See the source note, Document 56.

Mr. Khrushchev said that he had mentioned the proposal as one instance in which the Soviets had accepted but nothing had come of the project.

The President replied that he would look into this matter and follow through on it. However, he wanted to repeat that if the Soviet monitors find any lack of coverage of Mr. Khrushchev's present visit to the U.S., he would like to hear about it personally.

Mr. Khrushchev thanked the President but said that he did not expect any deficiency in this respect and was sure that he would have no complaints.

The President, changing the subject, said that he would be glad to have any suggestions of the Chairman regarding the arrangements at Camp David or as to any other way in which we might help to make his visit here more pleasant.

Mr. Khrushchev expressed his appreciation, adding that perhaps he had not realized the burden he had undertaken and that he might need some relief or some help.

The President asked whether the Chairman meant that he should perhaps make one of Mr. Khrushchev's speeches in his stead.

Mr. Khrushchev replied that it would probably not be possible for them to change places in that way. Each of them had a certain position where they stood but if they tried to change around, things might get very confused. He went on to say that he recalled that when he was in Great Britain, he had been taken from one city to another at a great pace./7/ He had finally said to Mr. Eden/8/ that he had had all he could stand-- he now needed some sleep. Mr. Eden had replied that it would be possible to skip an English city but that they could not fail to keep their itinerary in Scotland or Scotland would leave the Empire.

/7/Reference is to an official visit Khrushchev and Bulganin made to the United Kingdom April 18 - 27, 1956.

/8/Sir Anthony Eden, Prime Minister of the United Kingdom April 1955 - January 1957.

The President resumed, saying that in connection with the arrangements, everything which had been planned had either been suggested or approved by the Soviet representatives. Consequently if Mr. Khru-shchev wanted to get more sleep, he would have to decide for himself what to drop.

Mr. Khrushchev said that if the burden was too great, this was probably a result of his desire to see as much as possible in a very short time. He then reverted to the question of exchanges and said that when we discussed this subject, he would like to have Mr. Zhukov along on the Soviet side.

The President replied that Camp David was only 35 minutes away from Washington by helicopter. Any special aide that Mr. Khrushchev might want could be brought up to Camp David on short notice, in addition to those who would remain there. Consequently he would be delighted to have Mr. Zhukov come up. In fact, he would like to invite the Chairman to take a helicopter ride with him now.

Mr. Khrushchev nodded assent but he said that he would first like to say a few words about the President's reference to Marxism and “your Communist Party". It was not necessary to discuss this in detail now, but during the later talks he would want to rectify the views which the President had expressed. He had read many speeches by members of Congress alleging that Moscow controls the Communist parties throughout the world. Such allegations are certainly in error. However, he would not go into details now.

The President had also mentioned that he wanted to discuss Berlin and he would also like to say a few words on that subject now. He wanted to make clear that the Soviets had not raised the issue of Berlin as such, but rather the question of the conclusion of a peace treaty in order to terminate the state of war with Germany. Thus the status of West Berlin would also be settled. He too wanted to discuss this question. He would give a sincere exposition of Soviet views and would be glad to hear the President's views. It would be desirable if we could work out common language, recognizing the fact of the existence of two German states, and confirming that neither side would try to bring about either a Socialist or a Capitalist solution by force. If we could make that point clear, then we would remove the danger from the situation. If we were to speak of our sympathies, then we both knew where the sympathies of each other lie. American sympathies lie with West Germany and the system existing there. Soviet sympathies are with East Germany and the system prevailing on that side. It would be well to recognize the facts. That doesn't mean that the United States would accord juridical recognition to the GDR, but would accept the state of fact as it exists. “Believe me," he said, “we would like to come to terms on Germany and thereby on Berlin too. We do not contemplate taking unilateral action, though on your side you took unilateral action in Japan in which we were deprived of rights we should have had. We had to accept that." However, he continued that he realized the problems of Germany have been hanging for 14 years. We must find a way out which would not leave an unpleasant residue in our relationship. Rather, we should seek a solution allowing us to revert to the friendly relationship on the subject of Germany we had enjoyed during World War II. The Soviets were prepared to try to find a way out which would not do injury either to United States prestige or to their own. He felt that if we worked hard enough, we could find such a way out. He would repeat to the President a compliment which he had made publicly about him by citing the very high esteem the Soviets had felt for him as an allied leader during the war. Stalin had had the highest opinion of the President's integrity with regard to the USSR during World War II, and the Soviet leadership all share this high regard.

Continuing, Mr. Khrushchev said, “You must recognize that we are Communists, that we and you have different systems. You must recognize that there are these two different worlds. If we ignore these realities, then we cannot come to terms."

The President, changing the subject, suggested then that in preparing for further talks at Camp David, the respective staffs should take papers and our positions on all these subjects would be discussed. These papers could be put down (on the table) and we could see if we could bring them closer together.

Mr. Khrushchev requested clarification. Did the President mean that the Ministers should try to get agreed documents or summaries of positions?

The President replied negatively, saying that this would not be practicable and cited the long attempts made by the Foreign Ministers to reach agreement at Geneva.

Mr. Khrushchev commented that he felt the Ministers would not be agreed.

The President said no, that he had not had agreed papers in mind but, for example, on Berlin there could be an outline of the respective positions.

Secretary Herter suggested that Mr. Gromyko and he might meet tomorrow and take a little time to agree on the subjects to be discussed. Mr. Khrushchev indicated his agreement with this and the President confirmed that the Foreign Ministers would agree only on the subjects for discussion. The Vice President commented that the Foreign Ministers would agree as to what we disagree on. Mr. Khrushchev terminated the conversation by saying that the Foreign Ministers would try to establish where we disagree. It would then be up to the President and himself to try to agree.

The press representatives were then admitted to the President's office for photographs, after which the President and Mr. Khrushchev had a brief private meeting with the interpreters only and then proceeded to the south lawn with the interpreters and security aides to take a helicopter sight-seeing tour of Washington.

110. Memorandum of Conversation

Washington, September 15, 1959, 4:30 - 6:30 p.m.

PARTICIPANTS

V.S. y'Emelyanov, Chairman, Chief Administration for Atomic Energy, USSR John A. McCone, Chairman, Atomic Energy Commission Dwight A. Ink, Special Assistant to the Chairman, AEC John Hall, Assistant General Manager for International Activities, AEC Raymond L. Garthoff, Rapporteur Natalie Kushmir, Interpreter

In reply to questions, Mr. y'Emelyanov indicated that he will accompany Mr. Khrushchev on the latter's trip around the country, and will be in Washington and available for talks on the 24 - 26 of September. y'Emelyanov also stated that he will be in this country for meetings of the International Atomic Energy Agency Scientific Advisory Committee in New York on 27 October. He suggested he will have more free time in October than on the present trip.

McCone referred to the talks held with y'Emelyanov by Hall and Rabi in Vienna last June,/1/ and to the subsequent talks with Admiral Rickover,/2/ and stated that while he had no specific proposals to make he would like to continue exploring the possibilities raised in these talks.

//Source: Department of State, Conference Files: Lot 64 D 560, CF 1472. Confidential. Drafted on September 16 but no further drafting information appears on the source text. The meeting was held at the Atomic Energy Commission headquarters.

/1/Documentation on the talks among Yemelyanov, Hall, and Isidor I. Rabi, member of the Science Advisory Committee of the Office of Defense Mobilization, is scheduled for publication in volume III.

/2/No record of talks between Rickover and Yemelyanov has been found. Regarding Rickover's meetings with Kozlov, see footnote 3, Document 93, and Document 98. 1 2

y'Emelyanov stated that he had been surprised with the visit by Admiral Rickover. He had expected McCone to accompany Vice President Nixon, and had prepared a program of activities for McCone. He regretted that Rickover's schedule had not allowed him to see additional things.

y'Emelyanov offered to show McCone everything appropriate that he would like to see during a visit to the Soviet Union, at any appropriate time. McCone replied that he well understood military matters such as plutonium production were not appropriate, and expressed his understanding that other laboratories and reactors were subject to discussion in connection with possible visits, as are ours. y'Emelyanov stated that this was also his understanding. Facilities for the production of U - 235 and Plutonium are connected with the military program and are not open to discussion or collaboration. He indicated that they were ready to show us prototype, experimental, educational, and power reactors. y'Emelyanov further proposed direct collaboration between scientists of the two countries and suggested work on an agreement defining the scope of such collaboration. He stated that, for example, we could collaborate in the field of controlled thermonuclear reactions. He also stated that they are ready to exchange information and visits in the field of uses of nuclear energy for transportation (propulsion), for example, exchange of data on the Lenin for data on the Savannah. McCone replied that this would, indeed, be useful and suggested that such an agreement might be incorporated in the present exchange agreement by negotiators by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Department of State. y'Emelyanov noted that, according to his understanding, talks on the cultural exchange agreement for 1960 - 61 were to begin in Moscow in October or November, and would have a section governing activities in the field of the peaceful uses of atomic energy./3/ This understanding was confirmed by Hall.

/3/Regarding the negotiations leading to a cultural agreement with the Soviet Union, including an additional memorandum on atomic energy cooperation, see Part 2, Documents 1 ff.

Hall commented that two matters were under discussion: 1) an exchange of visits by y'Emelyanov and McCone, and, 2) a formal agreement on further exchanges. y'Emelyanov stated his agreement with this understanding of the points under discussion.

y'Emelyanov proposed that, in connection with the visits by himself and McCone, they first decide on the things they want to see and on this basis the duration of the visits, and when these points are clear it would be easy to determine the most convenient timing of each of their visits. McCone noted that as for the things he would like to see, he was interested in any phases of peaceful uses of atomic energy; for example, research laboratories, experimental reactors, prototype reactors, power reactors, and propulsion reactors, such as on the Lenin. He repeated that exchanges on dual-purpose reactors and U - 235 producers, being under a military classification, were not contemplated. y'Emelyanov noted his general agreement and inquired whether McCone would like to visit a uranium mine. McCone indicated his interest. y'Emelyanov continued by suggesting that McCone might be interested in visiting the Alpha and Ogra facilities working on controlled thermonuclear reactions. McCone replied that he would be interested, and suggested that y'Emelyanov might be interested in seeing ours.

y'Emelyanov stated that he had done much for increasing collaboration, although he had run into many difficulties. He gave an example of preferred treatment which he said he had given to the U.S. The only foreign specialist who had been able to visit the Lenin was Admiral Rickover. Although his good friend Professor Randers (Norway)/4/ had wanted to see the Lenin, he had refused to show it to him. (y'Emelyanov noted parenthetically that he himself had never visited the Lenin.) y'Emelyanov continued, making reference to the visit of Admiral Rickover with the comment that the Admiral had a difficult character. McCone indicated jocularly that this was the view of some people here, too.

/4/Gunnar Randers, Director of the Norwegian Atomic Energy Institute.

y'Emelyanov returned to the question of suitable subjects for exchange. He noted that several prototype and experimental reactors were being built in the Volga region, but that this was proceeding more slowly than he would like. Consequently, in some cases construction had only begun or not even begun, and in those instances he could only show the plans of projects. McCone replied that the same situation prevails here. McCone noted that plans have the advantage of showing the future, whereas existing installations could only reflect the past. y'Emelyanov suggested that Soviet and American scientists might work together building some new reactor. He stated that he could not claim credit for originating this idea, as it had been advanced by Hall and Rabi in Vienna. But, he continued, he had not wasted time and he had discussed the idea in Moscow, and it had been well received by scientists there. Perhaps, he suggested, we could together build a reactor accelerator or controlled thermonuclear reactor.

Hall noted that the International Atomic Energy Agency could gain a good deal from such a Soviet-American project. He noted that y'Emelyanov had often said that the Agency only talks, and that this seemed a good opportunity to permit it to sponsor a useful activity. y'Emelyanov agreed and suggested that the two countries make an agreement and register it with the Agency. He commented that frankly there was at present a strange situation. The Agency talks over no major matters. Life is passing the Agency by. We should work out something on our own. McCone noted that this situation also troubles him, and that he too would like to help the Agency have a more active role. y'Emelyanov adverted to the following example of a difficulty in working with the Agency. He had sought to get accreditation by the Agency for Cern and Dubna, but the Agency did not want to do so for a long time. When it finally agreed, he discovered that the scientists at Dubna were no longer interested because they felt they would only lose time by going there since the work at the Agency was not fruitful. y'Emelyanov stated that he had favored the proposal of Eisenhower of 1953,/5/ that he still favored the proposal, and that he would continue to favor it, but that it would be necessary to do something to revive the Agency. McCone expressed his general agreement, but noted that the work of the Agency was by no means wholly sterile. The Agency, he recalled, had done much in the educational field, if not much in scientific work. y'Emelyanov agreed and remarked that the Agency has done more in the past year than before.

/5/For text of Eisenhower's “Atoms for Peace" speech to the United Nations on December 8, 1953, which among other things called for the creation of an international atomic energy agency under the aegis of the United Nations to provide peaceful power from atomic energy, see Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: Dwight D. Eisenhower, 1953, pp. 813 - 822.

McCone inquired whether y'Emelyanov was going to the meeting of the Agency in Vienna. He mentioned that he himself was going there on the 27th of September for one week. y'Emelyanov said that he was not planning to attend unless his presence should be necessary, and that he would go only if his deputy there should in the next fortnight advise him that his presence would be required.

y'Emelyanov referred to the fact that he was now conducting talks with others. For example, he was in touch with Professor Cockcroft/6/ concerning exchanges on fast neutron reactors, and in this connection they will soon send a group to England in return for a recent visit of British scientists. Also, they are soon sending a group to France in connection with an exchange on thermonuclear controlled reactions.

/6/Sir John Cockcroft, British physicist and master of Churchill College, Cambridge.

y'Emelyanov declared that there was a difficulty peculiar to Soviet contacts with American scientists. The British come, see things, go home--but with the Americans it's a little different. It is true, he said, that we have shortcomings, as do you, but Americans always seem to criticize. They are like guests who after dinner complain that the meat was burned or salted too little or too much. Americans seem to seek out the worst, then exaggerate it, and give it to the press. For example, said y'Emelyanov, Admiral Rickover told him that he had had difficulties in seeing certain things on the icebreaker Lenin, but that he would not want to cause any difficulties in the press on such misunderstandings. But y'Emelyanov learned that the New York Times had carried accounts quoting Admiral Rickover on the run-around he had been given on the Lenin./7/ When I (y'Emelyanov) had visited Shippingport, our press asked me for comments, but I didn't give them anything.

/7/See The New York Times, July 28, 1959.

Garthoff noted that he had been present with Rickover at the Lenin and could perhaps clarify the situation to which y'Emelyanov referred. Initially Rickover had not been permitted to see the reactors or to discuss them in any detail, despite his prior understanding that it would be possible to do so in the same way that y'Emelyanov had been permitted fully to inspect the Savannah and Shippingport./8/ This fact became known to newsmen present at the Lenin. Subsequently, when the misunderstanding was cleared up and the Admiral had been permitted to inspect the Lenin, the Admiral sought out the press directly upon his return to the hotel and informed them that contrary to the impression that all had received at the time, he had finally been allowed to see it. Unfortunately, some press stories had already been filed. And, Garthoff noted, the New York Times did subsequently carry the revised account of the Admiral's visit to the Lenin and his words of praise for it./9/

/8/No evidence has been found that Yemelyanov was part of the tour that visited the Savannah on June 30 and Shippingport on July 11. Reference may be to one of Yemelyanov's numerous visits to the United States from 1955 to 1957.

/9/Not found.

McCone commented that Nixon's reports on his visit were very complimentary, that Admiral Rickover had been most complimentary in his report to Congress, that Mr. Cisler of Edison Electric an Mr. McCune of General Electric had also both been most complimentary./10/ He suggested that what y'Emelyanov was referring to might be something in the past. y'Emelyanov stated that he had not meant to reproach us but that he wanted to mention certain difficulties that he had with Americans, though never with the French and British. For another example, Professor Weisskopf after his visit to Dubna had written a critical article./11/ But, concluded y'Emelyanov, he was in favor of these contacts and merely wanted to note that we must strive to end such problems.

/10/Regarding Nixon's public comments on his visit to the Soviet Union, see The New York Times, July 28, 1959, and the transcript of his news conference, August 2, in Toward Better Understanding, pp. 24 - 31. For Rickover's report to Congress on August 18, see Report on Russia by Vice Admiral Hyman G. Rickover, USN: Hearings before the Committee on Appropriations, House of Representatives, 86th Congress, 1st Session (Washington: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1959). The remarks by Walker Cisler, President of Detroit Edison Co., and Francis K. McCune, vice president of atomic business development in marketing services, General Electric, and President of the Atomic Industrial Forum, have not been further identified.

/11/This article, presumably by Victor F. Weisskopf, professor of physics at Massachusetts Institute of Technology, has not been further identified.

y'Emelyanov declared his surprise that Rickover was at all satisfied with his visit, because he came at a bad time for him so that he (y'Emelyanov) couldn't do anything else for Rickover. McCone took the occasion of this remark to express his own surprise that y'Emelyanov had thought that he, McCone, would be accompanying the Vice President on the latter's recent visit. y'Emelyanov replied that he had merely been thinking in terms of his talks with Hall and Rabi and that when he heard that Rickover was coming he was perplexed, but connected the fact with his talks with Hall. McCone clarified the point that Rickover had accompanied the Vice President at the latter's request, and y'Emelyanov commented that he had merely inferred some connection with the earlier talks.

y'Emelyanov suggested that since both he and McCone were not physicists but engineers, practical men, he would like to conclude the conversation with some concrete practical steps, and he offered two proposals:

1) That we work on a treaty agreement specifying certain areas for collaboration in the nuclear energy field. We can, he suggested, each draft a proposal and then give them to one another, and when we have reached an agreed draft send it to our governments. McCone agreed.

2) Can we decide what you would like to see in the Soviet Union, the duration of your visit, and when you would like it to take place. McCone replied that he would like to think over the specifics of the visit. He noted that y'Emelyanov knows in general from the conversation what he would want to see. He would like to bring several people with him. As for y'Emelyanov's visit here, perhaps it could be made immediately after the meeting in October. y'Emelyanov said probably it could.

y'Emelyanov then sketched a tentative sample program of the sort he envisaged for McCone's visit. The Ural power station (where Rickover had been); the Voronezh power station (where Cisler had been); a good uranium mine; the icebreaker Lenin; experimental thermonuclear reactors at Moscow and Leningrad; a big accelerator (7 million kwts) now building at Moscow; a new nuclear center and reactor at Tashkent; etc. McCone stated that he would do the same in outlining a program of y'Emelyanov's visit. He remarked that he thought that y'Emelyanov had seen Brookhaven several times (y'Emelyanov replied six times) and Shippingport, but not the Argonne laboratory, Dresden, the test reactors in Idaho, the materials laboratories at Ames, Iowa, and the Lawrence Laboratory at Berkeley. (y'Emelyanov indicated that he had not been to any of these places except Berkeley.) McCone noted that we now had two experimental gas-cooled reactors that y'Emelyanov might find of interest. y'Emelyanov noted that the Soviet scientists had long been prejudiced against such gas-cooled reactors but were now starting to show interest; at present their work on such reactors is only in the planning stage. McCone commented that there had been similar prejudices here, and that we used for the most part water reactors. The two new gas-cooled reactors that we are starting to work on are in the 30 - 40 megawatt scale. y'Emelyanov said that they had used mostly pressurized and field tube reactors, and in planning a joint project with the Czechs had offered either, while favoring field tubes, but the Czechs decided in favor of pressurized tank. In response to a question he stated that this joint project was for a reactor producing 70 thousand kwts (electrical).

McCone inquired whether the Soviets had found that electrical power from nuclear stations was expensive. y'Emelyanov strongly indicated that they had. He further stated they have much cheap coal in the Soviet Union. He stated that there remained many complex engineering problems--for example, that they have not yet decided which thermal-producing elements are best. McCone noted that we both seem to have the same problems and y'Emelyanov agreed.

It was agreed that upon y'Emelyanov's return to Washington on the 24th arrangements will be made to continue talks, and that at that time each will present his suggested proposals in connection with the visits. McCone inquired on a tentative basis whether y'Emelyanov thought that early October, following the meeting in Vienna, might be an appropriate time for his visit to the Soviet Union. y'Emelyanov replied that he couldn't say at the present because he was not certain what plans Khrushchev might have for him at that time, but that he would be in a position to say when he returns on the 24th.

A brief press release drafted by the AEC was approved by y'Emelyanov for release at the conclusion of the talks, and was released./12/

/12/Not found.

111. Memorandum of Conversation

Washington, September 15, 1959, 5 p.m.

SUBJECT

President's Private Conversation with Mr. Khrushchev

PARTICIPANTS

U.S. The President Mr. Akalovsky

U.S.S.R. Chairman Khrushchev Mr. Troyanovsky (interpreting)

The President opened the conversation by saying that he wanted to tell Mr. Khrushchev something that he felt very personally and in which he believed very deeply. He added that he did not expect any immediate answer or comment by Mr. Khrushchev.

//Source: Department of State, Conference Files: Lot 64 D 560, CF 1472. Secret; Limit Distribution. Drafted by Akalovsky on September 16 and approved by Goodpaster on September 21. The meeting was held at the White House.

The President then said that he had asked Mr. Khrushchev to come to the United States because of one deep conviction. He said he believed that Mr. Khrushchev had an opportunity to become the greatest political figure in history because he has a tremendous power in a complex of states with great might. The President noted that he also has power but only as far as one nation--the U.S.--is concerned; the states forming the Western Alliance have their own ways of doing things and have their own independent approaches to the problems facing them. Thus, Mr. Khrushchev could do a great deal for peace by exercising the power he possesses in that direction. The President observed that he had sixteen more months to remain in office, after which he would become a private citizen. However, even then he would still love people--all people, including the Russian people--just as he loves all of them now. He would want them to live in peace and prosperity then, just as he wants them to live peacefully and happily now. For this reason, the President said, he believed that Mr. Khrushchev could be the man to do a great deal to secure peace in the world. This matter, the President concluded, is one that is very close to his heart, and this was why he mentioned it to Mr. Khrushchev on such a personal basis.

Mr. Khrushchev replied that the Soviet Union shared the President's desire for peace but stated that this goal could not be attained if only one side were to exert efforts to achieve it. Therefore, it is necessary that both sides approach their problems sensibly and resolve the accumulated issues to their mutual satisfaction. Mr. Khrushchev emphasized that he believed in the President and in his good will and that for that reason there should be will and determination on both sides to do everything possible to resolve their differences. If both sides showed such will and determination, he was confident that all problems existing between them could be settled.

The President concluded the conversation by saying that we should pray that this would come true.

112. Memorandum of Conversation

September 16, 1959.

PARTICIPANTS

Henry Cabot Lodge Mr. Khrushchev Mr. Sukhodrev

SUBJECT

Beltsville Car Trip

Driving out to Beltsville we passed the Jefferson Memorial which I pointed out to Mr. Khrushchev. I said that Jefferson had said that he preferred a press without a government to a government without a press.

Khrushchev nodded and said that was a very good phrase.

Then I said that Jefferson had said that the people had a right to revolution when they felt like it.

Khrushchev said--then why do you complain about our revolution.

I said that I hadn't complained about their revolution but that Jefferson thought you ought to have frequent revolutions--that the people ought to have a right to throw everybody out of office at frequent intervals. We throw ours out at frequent intervals.

Khrushchev said--oh, that wouldn't do.

On the way back from Beltsville I said that I had read with great interest the English text of the speech which Mr. Khrushchev had given at Veshenskaya just before leaving to come to the United States/1/ and that I had noticed that he had spoken of the desirability of a “freer life" for the Soviet people and wanted to ask if that was a correct translation. After he had said that it was, I said I would be interested to know what he meant by that phrase.

//Source: Department of State, Conference Files: Lot 64 D 560, CF 1472. Confidential. Drafted by Lodge and initialed by William W. Scranton, Secretary Herter's Special Assistant. A handwritten notation on the source text reads: “CAH saw."

/1/Not further identified.

He had obviously been thinking about our conversation two hours earlier. He said: Going back to Jefferson's phrase about a free press--that may have been all right in Jefferson's time when the world was coming out of feudalism and going into capitalism, but doesn't apply today because you haven't got a free press in this country. He said a poor negro sweeping the roads had nothing to say about the press. The press may be free in the sense that you can buy a printing press, but he couldn't afford to buy a printing press. The press, of course, is free for the rich people like Hearst who own newspapers--not anybody else.

I said that I didn't know how much freedom a road sweeper in the Soviet Union had to get his views printed in Pravda or Izvestia but I said that I can speak with some authority, being a professional newspaper man, that he has been completely misinformed about the United States. We have a commercial press. It is a business. They make their money by selling advertising. The only way they can sell advertising is to have a large amount of readers. If the reader doesn't like the paper the paper doesn't sell advertising and all the Hearsts in the world can't make somebody buy something he doesn't want to read--so the reader is the boss in every real sense as far as journalism is concerned, just as the consumer is the boss in retailing, just as the voter is boss in politics.

Khrushchev said journalism ought to be educational, not a business.

I said the fact that the press is commercial doesn't exclude their publishing things of quality and they publish many things of quality, but we think that no one is wise enough to tell the newspapers what they shall print and to tell the people what they shall read. We believe that wisdom resides in the people and that people must have a free choice between a very free and active opposition and those who are in power.

I pointed out that the New York Times is our leading paper on foreign affairs and they almost always are in opposition to US policy in the United Nations and almost always say so.

Khrushchev then said Rockefeller could be elected President.

I said he could if the people wanted him.

He said: When Rockefeller stopped being President he would have enough to live on. In my country I haven't got money and when I leave I will be taken care of by the country.

I said that Eisenhower was a poor boy.

Khrushchev said he has a farm.

I said that I understand that in Russia a man has a right to own his own home.

Then he shifted and said there wasn't much chance for a man in a poor class.

I said we don't think in terms of classes. Our whole system is geared to the individual and there are so many hundreds of thousands of cases of poor boys starting at the bottom and going to the top that every poor boy feels he has a good chance to get to the top and he is right.

Oh well, Khrushchev said, of course if you want to put it that way all of us started as savages way back.

I said I don't think the boy who gets to the top is a savage. I have even heard that there are poor boys who get to the top in the Soviet Union.

He laughed at that and said he hadn't meant it that way.

The tone of the whole thing had been earnest but not acid. When we were out on the sidewalk at the Blair House I said I had found this conversation very stimulating, that he was a very stimulating man to talk with and thanked him for the opportunity to exchange views. He indicated that he would be glad to do it again.

(He gives you the impression, which Ambassador Thompson has spoken of, of a man who has an open mind on some things. He hasn't got a completely open mind at all, but certainly gives the impression of being a good listener. He not only gives the impression--he is a good listener. He will pick up details in what you have said.)

113. Memorandum of Conversation

Washington, September 16, 1959.

PARTICIPANTS

Henry Cabot Lodge Mr. Khrushchev Mr. Sukhodrev Mr. Akalovsky

SUBJECT

Car Tour of Washington

//Source: Department of State, Conference Files: Lot 64 D 560, CF 1472. Confidential. Drafted by Lodge and initialed by Scranton. A handwritten notation on the source text reads: “CAH saw."

After the Press Club luncheon I took him to the Lincoln Memorial where he gave every indication of being much impressed. He said Lincoln was a great man. He stood in front of the statue and bowed his head.

Then when I read to him the last paragraph of the Second Inaugural-- stressing the part about “firmness" in the right and the part about a “just" peace--which I stressed on purpose--he said, those are “beautiful words". When we drove away he showed great interest in Lincoln and the Civil War.

On Constitution Avenue we went by the statue of the Third Division and he asked what it was.

I said--it is a monument to the Third Infantry Division.

He asked if they had fought against the Germans and I said yes that in both World War I and World War II that outfit had an outstanding record and I said possibly many people would tell him that the First Division, Second Armored and Third Division had had more engagements, casualties and decorations than any other divisions in the army.

He said--that monument is very warlike. In our country there is nothing like that.

I said the money was raised by the veterans and it was decided by them not the government.

(That struck him as very peculiar coming from a country where everything is done by the government.)

114. Memorandum of Conversation

September 17, 1959.

PARTICIPANTS

//Source: Department of State, Conference Files: Lot 64 D 560, CF 1472. Confidential. Drafted by Lodge and initialed by Scranton. A handwritten notation on the source text reads: “CAH saw."

Ambassador Lodge Ambassador Thompson Mr. Pedersen Mr. Akalovsky Mr. Khrushchev Mr. Gromyko Ambassador Menshikov Mr. Sukhodrev

SUBJECT

Train Trip between Washington, D.C. and New York City

During a general conversation with Khrushchev on the train to New York I recalled an incident of my childhood--being taken to see Henry Adams in 1910--and that he had predicted that by the 1950's the two great powers of the world would be the Soviet Union and the United States. That seemed to interest Mr. Khrushchev.

He used it as occasion to bring up the subject of nuclear tests, which he said he hadn't followed. I said I thought the Soviet Union and the United States have the same interest in bringing about an orderly world in view of the fact that the bi-polar world was not a realistic idea even now and that there are five or six countries approaching technological and economic maturity and that the time when we would be the only two great powers was not going to last forever.

He said France could probably make a bomb but it took more than this to be a big power. Sweden could make a bomb, Germany could probably make some, China and India could within the next ten or fifteen years. And I said maybe Brazil much later on, and he said very much later. He agreed wholeheartedly that we have a common interest in getting an orderly world.

On the negotiations on the cessation of nuclear tests he said that we wanted to get intelligence operators into the Soviet Union. I said you could have the same type of people here. He said we don't want them in your country. I said I thought he had no worry about the control posts that would exist in the Soviet Union because with all the resources in the Soviet state they could easily mislead them on any intelligence matters.

Khrushchev said the talks had reached a point where we wanted two-thirds foreigners to be in the control posts and they only want one-third. He thought this was a question that he and the President could work out. Perhaps he has a 50 - 50 split in mind.

Then he got on to missiles and at great length he expressed how helpless bombers were and how much higher and faster missiles are. He said winged missiles were no good. They could be shot right down. He also said the USSR had ICBMs while the US had none. Therefore, the USSR was stronger then the US. I just let him talk and finally said that I could agree that they are ahead of us in rockets. I said when you have two great technological powers like the Soviet Union and the United States one is going to be ahead at various times. We were ahead with the atomic bomb-- you are ahead in rockets at the moment. Those things don't last and I am sure, I said, that you can be in no doubt of our retaliatory power, and that it is quite impossible--if you were to use these missiles--not to expect suicidal results for you. I said you can hit our cities but not our retaliatory military installations. I also said that neither of us seemed to have perfected anti-missile defenses. (He nodded affirmatively on what appeared to be both of these points.) I said our bombers and our Navy and our “other things" would “devastate" the Soviet Union. He agreed that a war would be suicidal for both sides.

He then shifted to military bases. He said there we were with those bases and hydrogen bombs in West Germany. I said you have bases in East Germany and he said they weren't bases. I said why not, and after avoiding a reply a few times he said they didn't have the hydrogen bomb there. I said you could move them in a very short time across a few miles of roads. We have to come across the Atlantic Ocean.

Khrushchev said they did not need to put nuclear weapons in East Germany. They could destroy West Germany from the Soviet Union. How many bombs do you imagine it would require to destroy even the United Kingdom, he asked.

Then he mentioned our bases in Spain and Morocco. I said--Mr. Chairman, I was in the Senate when NATO was created. It was created as a reaction to Stalin. If you had been the head of the Soviet state I daresay things might have been different. He nodded his head at this. You know enough to realize there is no offensive intent in NATO at all. It is a purely defensive organization. The countries asked for it because of fear.

I also said I believed that overseas bases were something that weren't going to last forever. It doesn't need to worry you at all. He said in response to this whole little speech of mine: There is much in what you say; in certain respects you are right and in certain ones you are not.

He then shifted to less serious subjects. We were just outside of Philadelphia. There were a lot of old two-story houses through the right window (next to which he was sitting). He said they had some old houses in the USSR but did not build like that any more. I said I would like for him to look at the ones on the left, where there were new houses, as well as the right. He said this was fair--we have a lot more bad housing than you have. He had not come here to look at bad things, of which they had enough at home. He then said his advisers had told him last night he should watch out for me because I would twist him around my little finger. They told him I would show him only the good things and he should insist on seeing some of the bad ones too. He said he had told them that he did not want to see anything that I did not want to show him. I said I thought if anyone were twisted around a little finger it would not be him around mine and that I wanted him to see anything he wanted, both good and bad.

He then referred to my reputation for arguing with Soviet diplomats in the UN. He said--go in and give the Russian diplomats hell. Beat them up; it is good for them; they will get wiser that way. Gromyko then spoke up for the first time and said he disagreed with this. Khrushchev said--you see, the man speaks up for himself.

Khrushchev then told the old story about two Jewish merchants, each of whom wanted to know where the other was going. One of them asked the other where he was going. The second one, who was going to Cherkasky, figured that if he said he was going to Cherkasky the first one would then think he was not going there. The second Jewish merchant, when he heard the first one say he was going to Cherkasky, reasoned that he said he was going to Cherkasky so he would think he was not and therefore knew he was going to Cherkasky. Khrushchev laughed heartily at this joke and said that although he preferred to talk directly he supposed this was the way diplomats had to talk to each other. He pointed at Gromyko and me and asked which one of us was going to Cherkasky.

After a few more jokes and inconsequential talk I excused myself to allow him to finish his speech (and to find time to write this up).

115. Memorandum of Conversation

September 18, 1959.

PARTICIPANTS

Henry Cabot Lodge Mr. Khrushchev Mr. Troyanovski

SUBJECT

Trip to Hyde Park

Khrushchev was “of two minds" as to his performance in New York on Thursday. He had felt that the questions at the Economic Club had been “provocative" and that the evening there had not been a success./1/ He referred particularly to the question asked by Gardner Cowles about the jamming of radio broadcasts which he thought was especially provocative.

//Source: Department of State, Conference Files: Lot 64 D 560, CF 1473. Confidential. Drafted by Lodge. Another copy of this memorandum bears the President's initials, the only memorandum of Lodge's many conversations with Khrushchev initialed by the President. (Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, International File)

/1/For text of Khrushchev's speech and the following question-and-answer session at the Economic Club dinner on Thursday, September 17, see The New York Times, September 18, 1959.

I said that I had known Cowles all my life and that I was sure he had not meant to be provocative but it was just the kind of question important to Americans and that one of the things that gave this trip value was that it gave Americans the chance to ask things on their minds. Obviously the American way of looking at life and the Soviet way of looking at life are very different and that created difficulties. But if there had been no difficulties there would have been no point in his making the great effort to come here to try to solve the difficulties.

He said that the question of what broadcasts would be heard in the Soviet Union was entirely an internal matter and that it was none of our business. If we persisted in an unreasonable attitude there would be no end of jamming. As a matter of fact he had been ready to reduce jamming on selected items--not merely artistic--but speeches and debates. But he certainly would not authorize outsiders making appeals to people within his borders to turn them against the government. He said you would not like people from outside appealing to people here to overthrow the government.

I said that if such appeals were made on our radio most Americans would simply laugh, but I recognized he had a perfect right to regard this as an internal matter.

I told him that I thought he had been misinformed when he had been told the State Department was in favor of reducing and contracting cultural exchanges. I said the reverse was the case. They wanted to expand them.

He said he had been advised by Mr. Zhukov that the State Department wanted to curtail exchange of students.

I said there is obviously a misunderstanding which should be cleared up, to which he agreed.

He then started probing me on a wide range of subjects. In fact he was definitely trying to tease me.

He brought up the American Communists who had been sent to jail some years ago and said what an unjust thing that had been.

I said that we were very much against violence in this country. We realized that it had been written by some of the leading Communist writers that violence should be used ruthlessly, but we were against it. On the other hand, I said, every American had the right to try to get control of the government by peaceful means. For example, I had been campaign manager of the effort in 1951 - 52 to get the Republican nomination for General Eisenhower--which was in effect an attempt to get control of the government. In this case the attempt was completely successful. There was nothing illegal about this.

But American Communists are committed to overthrow the government by force. No government, including the Soviet, fails to have laws to protect it against being overthrown by force.

He wanted to know what these Communists had done.

I said this had happened nine years ago and I hadn't studied it lately, but it is completely spread out on all records of the court.

He said you can look for nine years and you can never find proof that they have done anything wrong.

Then he turned to me with a grin and gave me a nudge in the ribs and said: You say you don't like violence. Did George Washington have an election in order to win the American Revolution?

Later he was talking about a certain politician in Russia who was out speaking to everybody--people and cows. I interrupted him to say that American politicians wouldn't bother talking to the cows because they don't vote. He laughed heartily, made an “X" mark on my sleeve, and said: That scores one for you.

He went back again to the dreadfulness of our press and our politics. I said he ought to realize that with us the printed word wasn't taken as solemnly as in Russia.

Any man who wanted to start a political party could do so by signatures on a paper. This I believed was inconceivable in the Soviet Union. These are some of the differences that exist.

He said, I understand some people buy papers for advertising.

I said my wife reads the ads every morning and notices such things as shoes, hats, rugs, etc., and then telephones the stores her orders. What is wrong with that?

He boasted over and over again how they were going to surpass us, obviously trying to get a reaction out of me. After about the fifth time I said this: I admire so much what the Soviet Union has accomplished in production of heavy industry, medicine, rockets, nuclear physics and languages. I think it is wonderful. I think it is a good thing for us to compete and only humanity stands to gain if we compete to see who can do the most for everyday people. I would like to go further to compete to see who can give them the most freedom--throw the government out if they don't like it. But, I said, it is just inconceivable to me that you can ever get ahead of us. Our potential for long-range growth is simply fantastic, and some time I would just like to show you some figures I think will astound you. With the best will in the world I don't think you can possibly catch up with our way of doing things.

He kept coming back to the subject of my grandchildren and that in their future there will be no more capitalism. They will all the [be?] Socialists.

And finally I said: You are talking about what my grandchildren will be seeing here. Maybe you would like to know what I think your grandchildren will be seeing in Russia. I don't think the Soviet Union is static. There is a lot of evolution there. He said--yes, lots of evolution. And, I said, what I think we are going to see is a lessening of central bureaucracy and a growth of wider individual freedom, and my grandchildrens' generation and your grandchildrens' generation will be very much alike in essentials although politicians will go on talking a long time in the same old phrases.

He said--may God have pity on you. Then he turned to Mrs. Khrushchev and said: Isn't it a sad thing to see a nice man all stuffed up with foolish notions? Come to the Soviet Union and we will polish you up.

On another occasion he said things like Buddhism, Mohammedanism, etc., were going across national boundaries.

I said--I think you think Communism is a religion.

He said--no, it is science of history.

Approaching Hyde Park I mentioned that I was in the Senate when Franklin D. Roosevelt was President.

He said--he was a Democrat and you are Republican.

I said--yes, but he was kind to me and when I left the Senate to go into the Army he wrote a very nice letter.

He said when Truman came along there was the difference between day and night. If Roosevelt had lived things might have been different.

I said--there are also differences on your side--not just ours.

116. Memorandum of Conversation

September 18, 1959.

PARTICIPANTS/1/

Henry Cabot Lodge Mr. Khrushchev Mr. Gromyko Mr. Troyanovski Mr. Akalovsky

SUBJECT

Trip from Hyde Park

//Source: Department of State, Conference Files: Lot 64 D 560, CF 1473. Confidential. Drafted by Lodge.

/1/Ambassador Menshikov was not listed among the participants, presumably in error.

On the way from the museum to Mrs. Roosevelt's cottage I told Mr. Khrushchev that in accordance with his wishes arrangements had been made for a ride through Harlem upon our return to New York City, to be followed by a ride on the subway. I mentioned that the ride through Harlem would take 20 to 25 minutes.

Ambassador Menshikov then engaged in a conversation with Mr. Khrushchev, whereupon he told me that in view of the short time left before Mr. Khrushchev's appearance at the UNGA, Mr. Khrushchev wanted to go directly back to the hotel after the visit to the cottage.

I replied that this was all right with me but that the Harlem visit had been scheduled to meet his own request.

Menshikov then said that the time scheduled was inconvenient and that therefore the ride had to be canceled. He implied that the time had been selected on purpose so as to make it difficult to have the ride because I did not want Mr. Khrushchev to see Harlem. I objected to his remark very strongly, saying that it had been he who had requested the ride yesterday and that now that his request had been fulfilled, I did not want him to say to Mr. Khrushchev that I prevented him from seeing things he wanted to see. I said this rather sharply in order to let him know that I was aware of his attempts to misrepresent various situations to Mr. Khrushchev.

He asked me not to raise my voice and I apologized for raising my voice.

On the way back to New York City Mr. Khrushchev and I had conversations on a variety of subjects. Touching upon the subject of missiles Mr. Khrushchev spoke very highly of his scientists and engineers and, without mentioning his name, referred to one young scientist in particular who had perfected a rocket that had hit the bull's eye on its first flight. The reason for that was that this particular engineer had developed an engine that had performed excellently during its very first test on the platform, while many other types of rocket engines had exploded during their first tests and had to be perfected in the course of subsequent tests. This achievement, Mr. Khrushchev said, had reduced the period required for the development of that particular rocket by two years.

I said that I was aware of the high level of technological skills in the Soviet Union and expressed my hope that both in our country as well as in the Soviet Union, those skills would be devoted to peaceful ends rather than to the production of means of war. I said that I was looking forward to Mr. Khrushchev's forthcoming speech in the UN where he said he would make new disarmament proposals. I asked him whether the proposals would be something entirely new, rather than based on the Soviet proposals made in the past.

Mr. Khrushchev replied that I should be patient and wait until he made his speech. He indicated, however, that he was going to introduce very broad proposals, which would test the sincerity of the United States' approach to the question of disarmament.

I assured him that the United States was as anxious to achieve real disarmament as any state in the world, provided it was under effective control, so that all parties would be confident that neither side was gaining a unilateral advantage.

I said then that out of the 500 foreign control post personnel envisaged for control over a discontinuance of nuclear tests only 200 would be American or British and that I could not see how the Soviet Union's security could be affected by such a small number of foreign personnel. I also pointed out that these people would be stationed at control posts and would not roam around the country.

Mr. Khrushchev said that he had not followed the last stage of negotiations on nuclear tests very closely and that therefore he did not know what the present respective positions were.

I told him that our proposal was for one-third local control post personnel, one-third US-UK and one-third from other countries. He expressed the belief that agreement could be reached on this subject.

I told him that if he and President Eisenhower during their talks would reach agreement on the subject of nuclear tests, this would be a sign of confidence that would be greatly encouraging.

Mr. Khrushchev then said that he was sorry the Soviet Union had accepted the U.S. proposal for nuclear explosions for so-called peaceful purposes. He said that they would be nothing but a continuation of testing because the only thing to be tested was the device's firing mechanism and that purpose could be achieved through so-called peaceful explosions. In referring to Soviet tests he said that each of the tests they had conducted had brought about a decrease in the cost of production of nuclear weapons by 50%. Therefore Soviet experts on atomic weapons were very anxious to continue testing, but he had given them orders not to do so as long as the other powers did not test. He also stated that the Soviet Union was not interested in the production of so- called tactical nuclear weapons because they were too expensive and also because strategic weapons could be used much more effectively. He observed that the United States was a very rich country and that perhaps for that reason it could waste money on the development of tactical weapons. He also mentioned that the Soviet Union had a number of new atomic devices ready for testing, but repeated again that they would be kept in warehouses and not tested so long as other countries did not test their devices.

117. Memorandum of Conversation

September 19, 1959.

PARTICIPANTS

Mr. Khrushchev Henry Cabot Lodge Mr. Gromyko Ambassador Thompson Mr. Pedersen Mr. Sukhodrev Mr. Akalovsky

SUBJECT

Plane Trip from New York to Los Angeles

I told Khrushchev that I planned to suggest in my speech tonight that we exchange a million copies of books on our own countries. He was most pleased that I told him about this in advance. First he said he would like to choose the U.S. book because he did not want to have any propaganda about the USSR.

//Source: Department of State, Conference Files: Lot 64 D 560, CF 1474. Confidential. Drafted by Richard F. Pedersen, Chief of the Political Section of the Mission to the United Nations.

I said this was not the idea at all; the idea was to give him a book which presented positively information about the United States. What I was interested in now was whether he had any objection to me speaking about this tonight.

He said--no that he liked the idea.

He then told me he would like to get authority to buy some Boeing 707 Jets like we are flying on. He said he would be glad to give us one of their planes for one of ours. He said planes did not have much military value. They were only good for civilian use. They would not use 707's just as we did because their conditions were different. They could adapt what they would learn. He also thought we could learn from some of theirs. He suggested he might give us the plane he flew over in. He said he would take these questions up with the President.

I also told him that he might have some rough going with the Labor Leaders in San Francisco. He told me it was very nice of me to give him this advance notice.

I told him that when I had first gone to the United Nations I was mystified about how the Soviet Union ran its foreign affairs. Russian policies and why and how they were made were a mystery to me. This trip was educational for me. Now I understand at least a few of the reasons for some of their policies. I said facetiously that if you get discouraged about the trials and tribulations of this trip you can at least realize that you have done some education of Lodge.

Khrushchev then referred to his Rabinovich joke. I asked which one of us was which. He said--you can take your choice.

We showed him the President's answer to James Reston in the press conference of September 17 about the fact that their conversations would manifestly have to discuss other countries./1/ He said he agreed with this.

/1/For the transcript of the President's September 17 press conference, see Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: Dwight D. Eisenhower, 1959, pp. 670 - 671.

I talked to him about jamming. He said they would be ready to stop jamming on certain things, not only artistic programs but also debates and such things. But they would not allow appeals to overthrow the government to be broadcast to the Soviet Union. He made it clear to me later that he meant broadcasts to the Soviet Union and not to the satellites.

On his disarmament proposals before the UN yesterday,/2/ I paraphrased the comments that Herter had made in his brief press release./3/ As Herter had suggested I told Khrushchev as my personal idea I thought it might be desirable for the Secretary General to address a request to member states about how many security forces they would need. Khrushchev first said this would not be acceptable. After further conversation when it became clear that the request would be for information purposes only he said that would be all right.

/2/For text of Khrushchev's September 18 speech to the U.N. General Assembly, see The New York Times, September 19, 1959.

/3/Reference is to USUN press release 3224, September 18, in which Herter indicated that the United States would examine carefully Khrushchev's disarmament proposal, and emphasized U.S. interest in “controlled disarmament," which the Soviet Union had so far rejected. (Department of State, IO Files)

I told him I had not had time to study his disarmament declaration but I knew the President was personally interested in control measures.

He said the difficulty was we want to have controls without disarmament. He believed that disarmament and controls should go together. He said our proposals were unfair because we had bases abroad.

I said I saw no theoretical reason why controls could not cover outlying bases of both of us--including those of Eastern Europe and ours elsewhere.

He said that is what we want to get at. That is what I am proposing.

I said we did not want any more paper prohibitions in disarmament.

He said--who suggested such a thing.

I said I had not said anybody had but that this was something we had to watch. I pointed out we had had prohibition of alcoholic beverages in the United States in the 20's and in spite of fine words it had not worked out because it was only on paper.

At one point in the conversation Khrushchev said that rockets were wonderful. You did not have to train people to navigate them. They did not become obsolete or deteriorate. They could be stored simply. We did not have them but he would be willing to destroy his tomorrow in a disarmament agreement.

Khrushchev said that we should leave their internal arrangements alone. We should only deal on international questions. We should not interfere with his system. (He made it clear he meant Eastern Europe as well.)

I said what do you mean. You seem to be shifting your ground. You are also including Poland, Hungary, etc., when you say these are domestic questions in the Soviet Union. There is a difference between Poland, Hungary and the Soviet Union. He became a little annoyed. He said--well you win a prize for geography. You at least know that Poland is different from the Soviet Union. He said that he had been talking to Gomulka recently./4/ Khrushchev said--he is one of those “slaves" you talk about. Why don't you leave him alone.

/4/Khrushchev met with Gomulka during his visit to Poland July 14 - 23.

I said--all we do is pray for them. You don't believe in prayer, so why do you mind?

He said he did not want to see us waste our time.

I said the only thing we prayed for is that these people should have a free choice. Maybe Gomulka would win in an election. I thought you, Mr. Khrushchev, might win in an election in the Soviet Union.

Khrushchev said he had had kidney trouble for a long time. He liked our smooth roads because his bumped him around and bothered him. He said he drank Borzhonie water and that this prevents his kidney stones from forming and dissolves those he has.

Yesterday when I was leaving the Secretary General's dinner at the UN Kuznetsov came up to me and said the greatest thing that had ever happened to Soviet-US relations was that I was taking Khrushchev around the country. I said I was getting a tremendous education because I was getting such an intimate view of the government of the Soviet Union.

He said--this is an education for Khrushchev too and I am glad that he is traveling with someone who vigorously expounds the United States point of view. He said you must come to Moscow with the President.

I said this was out of my range. I only live from day to day. (Khrushchev has also said to me many times that I ought to come to Moscow.)

118. Memorandum of Conversation

Los Angeles, September 19, 1959.

PARTICIPANTS

Mr. Khrushchev Henry Cabot Lodge Ambassador Menshikov Mr. Sukhodrev Mr. Akalovsky

SUBJECT

Car Trip from Twentieth-Century Fox to Hotel

During the ride through Los Angeles from Twentieth-Century Fox studio to the hotel Mr. Khrushchev, after some casual talk, was asked by Mr. Carter, Deputy Mayor of Los Angeles, who was accompanying us, what had impressed him most in the United States so far. Mr. Khrushchev replied that he had seen nothing that had impressed him particularly because he had been familiar with the United States and the conditions prevailing here even before coming to this country. Everything he had seen so far only confirmed what he had learned about the United States previously by watching movies, reading books, and studying reports about the United States. The situation in this respect was the same as with the United States Senators he had met during his meeting in the Capitol/1/--he had known all of them before through reading their speeches, and the only difference now was that he had met them personally.

//Source: Department of State, Conference Files: Lot 64 D 560, CF 1474. Confidential. Drafted by Akalovsky.

/1/Regarding Khrushchev's September 16 meeting with the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, see Document 108.

He then went on to say that he was extremely well informed about the United States and about the internal developments in this country through his intelligence service. The Soviet Union had even got money from the United States for its intelligence work, he remarked jokingly, because some of the agents who had been sent by the United States to the Soviet Union had been caught and the Soviet intelligence service had kept sending reports to Mr. Allen Dulles in their name with occasional requests for additional funds. Those funds had been received and thus the United States had paid the Soviet Union for its own intelligence operations. There had also been agents who defected to the Soviet Union who had been sent back to the United States as Soviet double agents. He continued to boast about the extreme efficiency of his intelligence service and said that they knew everything. For instance he said, they knew about a highly confidential message from the President to Mr. Nehru, which the President had written in connection with the Chinese- Indian border disputes./2/ This message had not been published in the United States and, Mr. Khrushchev continued, I probably didn't know about it but if I wished he could supply me with a copy.

/2/Presumably Eisenhower's September 2 letter to Nehru, printed in vol. XV, pp. 513 - 514.

I replied that I certainly didn't know anything about it and said that I doubted that he would send me a copy. He remarked that he would show me that he was telling the truth by sending me a copy--which he has not done. He then went on to say that the Soviet Union had known everything about the Turk preparation for military action against Syria about a year ago. The Soviet Union had found out not only the exact disposition of Turkish troops, but also the designations and plans for operation. This information had been published by the Soviet Government and the Turkish General Staff had been completely reshuffled because of that.

Mr. Khrushchev said that he also knew of a confidential letter from the Shah of Iran which had been sent to the President before Mr. Khrushchev's arrival in the United States./3/ In that letter the Shah requested the President to exert some influence on Mr. Khrushchev so as to make him relieve the Soviet pressure on Iran. He then said that the Soviet Union had had complete information as to the preparations for the American exhibition in Moscow and the arguments within the United States Government on this subject about a year ago. He said that those arguments had undermined the success of the American exhibition in Moscow, which in effect was a failure. He claimed that the Soviet people didn't like the American exhibit at all and that after the Czech glassware exhibit had opened in Moscow the Soviet people holding tickets for the American exhibit had been trading two tickets to the American exhibit for one ticket to the Czech exhibit. He concluded this conversation by saying that he reads a lot of American intelligence reports and circulars sent out by Mr. Allen Dulles, although he would much rather read good novels. Nevertheless, as a Premier he had to be well versed in what was going on.

/3/Presumably the Shah's August 16 letter to Eisenhower; see vol. XII, Document 274.

119. Telegram From the Representative to the United Nations (Lodge) to the Department of State

Los Angeles, September 20, 1959, 1:03 a.m.

From Lodge.

1. Following is my conversation with Gromyko at his request after Mayor's dinner in Los Angeles tonight in which he complained (a)that we were organizing provocative questions, (b)that police cordons were keeping Khrushchev from ordinary people, (c)that Pittsburgh might be dropped from schedule, and (d)that perhaps he should curtail rest of trip and return to Washington.

2. I will call you at 9:45 Washington time tomorrow (Sunday) morning to discuss this with you.

After the Mayor's dinner in Los Angeles tonight Gromyko called me and said he wanted to see me with his interpreter. On his arrival I said that I was worried that Khrushchev was getting too tired. Gromyko then immediately took floor and said in Russian: I have come to draw your attention in accordance with wishes of Mr. Khrushchev to say following:

It is now becoming obvious that in almost every place questions are being raised which in our conviction should not be raised if you are guided by good intentions. These questions do not seem to be fortuitous but to make complicated the position of the Chairman of Ministers and negatively to affect outcome of visit. A typical example was today at dinner but this was not only one. You saw yourself that Chairman of Council of Ministers had prepared a speech/1/ which had no polemics and would not provide polemics. He had no intention of any aggravation cropping up, but it would have been strange if he had not replied to Mayor's speech./2/ This was characteristic but far from only such occasion.

//Source: Department of State, Central Files, 033.6111/9 - 2059. Confidential; Niact. Transmitted as DTG 200903Z September.

/1/For text of Khrushchev's speech at a dinner given by Mayor of Los Angeles Norris Poulson, see The New York Times, September 21, 1959.

/2/A copy of Poulson's speech, in which he referred to Khrushchev's remark that “we will bury you," is in Department of State, Conference Files: Lot 64 D 560, CF 1474.

Impression is being generated that Prime Minister is being secluded by police cordon so that there are no possibilities of meeting with ordinary citizens. We have no objections to security measures but it is our impression that police cordon is being used to prevent him from any contacts.

Regarding Pittsburgh, it was difficult to understand in what situation Prime Minister would find himself. What is the purpose? If major strike is still going on he doubts whether it is worthwhile to go there at all. Otherwise Chairman of Council of Ministers would find himself in a false position.

Next question is whether trip should not be curtailed entirely and Prime Minister returned to Washington to talk to President.

Lodge replied: I certainly hold no brief for questions that have been asked on various occasions but I am sure that on reflection you and Mr. Khrushchev will not think they have been instigated by United States Government to make his visit a failure. I can't believe that you or Khrushchev would believe that. You Gromyko know United States too well to think that. President Eisenhower is not as underhanded or so stupid to do that. We have no control over local politicians. I have been trying all day to persuade Mayor not to make such an unsuitable speech. I can understand why with your different system Mr. Khrushchev might think we can control them, but you have been an ambassador here and you know the United States. United States Government has had no hand at all in this. We have been exerting a moderating influence. If you had seen what he was going to say and took out you would realize that I really accomplished something. I want to deny most vigorously that we are instigating this. I want to do this very very strongly. President would not invite him and then want to make him unhappy. He wants his trip to be useful and interesting and successful.

On police cordon, it is not for purpose of keeping him from the people. I told Mr. Khrushchev today he could see a super-market or stop at a shop or get out and shake hands with people. Monday he will lunch in cafeteria of IBM plant with workers. We are very happy to have him meet any workers he wants. Police are for security. There are people in the United States with strong feelings for various reasons and we must protect him. I thought police in New York did a very good job. There is no disposition to wall him off from workers.

I also understand about how you feel about Pittsburgh. It is perfectly agreeable to me to call off whole trip and go back to Washington. There have been too many banquets and they have lasted much too long and there is no reason why a man of Khrushchev's eminence should be subject to so much annoyance. Going back to Washington would be perfectly agreeable.

Gromyko: Impression is taking shape that all these gatherings are marked by one general trend. You can see this better than we. I can repeat words of Prime Minister when he has often said that he had not come to beg for anything but to find a common language between us. I can cite Khrushchev's statement that he believes in the good intentions of President. But there is distinction between what President says and what happens.

Lodge: As President said to Khrushchev at Soviet dinner, when he (President) winks the people only laugh./3/ I know you have control but we do not. I tried to talk Mayor out of this speech. He would not drop it entirely. I spoke to him both at luncheon at Fox Studio and tonight.

/3/In his toast at the dinner at the Soviet Embassy on September 16, Eisenhower remarked that during his visit to the United States Khrushchev would see that the American people “do not react to our (winking?) and that they do not take orders from us." (Department of State, Conference Files: Lot 65 D 81, CF 1475B)

Gromyko: (At this point Gromyko started speaking in ordinary conversational tones. His manner changed. He ceased being so official and became more human.) We thought provocative elements were being used to sharpen situation.

Lodge: Motive for this is not from United States Government. Motive is personal ambitions of a local politician to have his moment in limelight with world figure like Khrushchev and they see this very eminent man coming into their town and want to get into limelight for some personal ambition of their own. This is not some plot out of Washington. I hope you, Mr. Gromyko, will explain this to Mr. Khrushchev. He might not believe me because I am an American. Our ways may seem strange. We are a loosely organized country compared with the Soviet Union. We are not directed closely from central point.

Gromyko: Speaking frankly, you are representative of President and maybe I could make personal suggestion. You could say something in your speech. You could point out that Khrushchev is an official guest and that certain conclusions should be made from this with respect to behavior.

Lodge: I spoke to Mayor about this today.

Gromyko: You could even do this in speeches. You could use your influence.

Lodge: That is a good opinion. I did tell Mayor today. All I said tonight in my speech was what Khrushchev approved of my doing when I mentioned it in plane this morning. We even have a selfish interest in this of our own because President is going to USSR and because of forthcoming talks in Washington. We have every interest in trip being successful. I am glad you came to tell me. I would much rather have you tell me what you think than withhold it from me. Things have happened that I regret but there has been no connivance. We will be delighted to make it possible for him to mingle with working people and will call rest of trip off if he so desires./4/

/4/This telegram bears no signature.

120. Memorandum of Telephone Conversation Between Acting Secretary of State Dillon and the Representative to the United Nations (Lodge)

September 20, 1959, 10:30 a.m.

I called Lodge back in Los Angeles and told him that I had informed the President of his talk with Gromyko./1/ I further said that we saw no reason why Pittsburgh should not be dropped if Khrushchev so desired. Khrushchev could then devote Thursday/2/ to rest and preparation for talks with the President. Lodge said it might be helpful if Khrushchev could see the President on Thursday for an hour or so. I said I was sure this could be arranged if it seemed desirable. I also told Lodge that the President felt that in view of Lodge's comments on certain numbers of Khrushchev's party,/3/ it would be advisable to limit the Camp David talks as much as possible, i.e., to two on a side plus interpreters- Khrushchev and Gromyko and the President and Herter. The President also felt that Lodge should hold himself available for Camp David, the final decision on this to be taken when Lodge gets back to Washington and reports to the President. In closing I told Lodge we all admired the job he was doing under most difficult circumstances. He was most appreciative and pointed out that yesterday had been a 23-hour day.

C. Douglas Dillon/4/

//Source: Department of State, Secretary's Memoranda of Conversation: Lot 64 D 199. Confidential. Drafted by Dillon who was in Washington.

/1/No record of Lodge's telephone call to Dillon has been found. Regarding Lodge's talk with Gromyko, see Document 119.

/2/September 24.

/3/Not further identified.

/4/Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.

121. Memorandum of Conversation

September 20, 1959./1/

//Source: Department of State, Conference Files: Lot 64 D 560, CF 1474. Confidential. Drafted by Akalovsky.

/1/The source text is incorrectly dated September 21.

PARTICIPANTS

Mr. Khrushchev Mr. Gromyko Ambassador Menshikov Mr. Sukhodrev Henry Cabot Lodge Ambassador Thompson Mr. Kohler Mr. Pedersen Mr. Akalovsky

SUBJECT

Train Trip from Los Angeles to San Francisco

On board the train from Los Angeles to San Francisco I first discussed the schedule for Mr. Khrushchev's stay in San Francisco, which he approved, and then mentioned the situation in Pittsburgh. I pointed out that, while it was true that the steel strike was still on, other plants such as Mesta were operating. He said that he had been informed of that and that this changed the situation. He would not have seen any reason for going to Pittsburgh if all of the plants were shut down.

Khrushchev then talked at great length about his stay in Los Angeles. He expressed his annoyance about the treatment he had received there and in particular about the fact that no one from the city had been on hand at the railroad station to say goodbye to him or to ask him to say a few words to the population of Los Angeles, even though microphones had been set up on the platform. I apologized for this and said that I understood how he felt. I said to him that I met with the Mayor during the luncheon yesterday and had urged him to delete many portions of his speech and that as late as just before the dinner last night I had tried to make him delete certain other portions which I thought were inappropriate. However, the Mayor refused to do so./2/ I said I hoped Mr. Khrushchev would understand that we had no centralized power in our country, that our country was rather loosely organized and that even as a personal representative of the President I could not control the actions of local officials.

/2/See footnote 2, Document 119.

Khrushchev said that he was now beginning to understand the problems the President had in trying to establish normal relations with the Soviet Union. He said that the President was surrounded by certain elements who wanted to prevent a normalization of relations with the Soviet Union. I replied that this was not true. I said that both the Secretary of State and myself were very close to the President and that certainly neither the Secretary nor I were trying to prevent the relations between the two countries from improving.

Mr. Khrushchev replied that he understood that, but said that he also realized why certain difficulties arose. For instance, he said, the Deputy Mayor of Los Angeles, Mr. Carter, told him that he had been born in Russia and that his father had been a merchant. Since Jewish people, except the wealthy ones, had not been allowed under the Czarist regime to live in Rostov, where Mr. Carter had been born, this indicated, Mr. Khrushchev said, that his father had been a very wealthy person and that therefore he had been one of those the Red Army had failed to take care of during the Revolution. Mr. Khrushchev said that he himself had participated in the fighting for the city of Rostov and therefore it was only natural that a person like Mr. Carter would feel rather awkward having to make arrangements for his reception. He said that he didn't blame Mr. Carter for that because he understood that all people were human. It was difficult, he said, for such people as Mr. Carter to change their attitude toward the Soviet regime.

Later during one of our conversations I asked Mr. Khrushchev whether the Soviet Union was switching to a larger production of consumer goods. Mr. Khrushchev said that this was true but said that the Soviet Union was in the same position as a hungry person who had just awakened and wanted to eat. Such a person would not wash his hands before eating. He would grab the food and gulp it down. Therefore, the Soviet Union was not trying now to develop the production of any sophisticated consumer goods; it was simply trying to satisfy the basic needs. Moreover, the demand for sophisticated goods had to be developed in the Soviet Union because people in the Soviet Union don't even feel the need for such goods. In this connection Mr. Khrushchev told us a couple of stories demonstrating the low level of civilization in the Soviet Union at the time of the Revolution. He mentioned that at that time very few ordinary people knew how to use a toilet properly or that they should bathe regularly.

I replied that I realized this but that I had read that since Stalin's days there had been a trend in the Soviet Union towards greater production of consumer goods. Mr. Khrushchev confirmed this and said that Stalin regarded this problem from a military point of view. However, when the Seven-Year Plan was being developed he, Khrushchev, had said that five million tons of steel would [not?] make a big difference as far as defense was concerned and suggested that the output be cut by that amount so as to produce more consumer goods. His argument at that time had been that this would not weaken the defense capability of the Soviet Union but would even strengthen the state because the people would support the government. This approach proved to be the correct one just as the freeing of concentration camp inmates had strengthened the Soviet state rather than weakened it. At the time when the question of the freeing of concentration camp inmates had been discussed, some people in the Soviet Government had expressed fears that this might undermine the Soviet state. He, Khrushchev, argued that it would not because the liberated inmates would see that the government was changing its policy and was taking care of them.

In a conversation between Ambassador Thompson and Khru-shchev, Khrushchev expressed the view that the performance he had seen yesterday at the Twentieth-Century Fox studio was something he could not understand./3/ He said that he could not understand how such good and hard working people could indulge in such entertainment. The only reason for that he thought might be the extreme abundance of wealth in the United States which made the people look for such unusual entertainment. He also complained about having noticed a reporter at the studio who had been trying to make a dancer lift her skirt while she was being photographed with Mr. Khrushchev. This, he thought, was in very poor taste.

/3/In the early afternoon of September 19, Khrushchev visited the motion picture set of “Can Can" at Twentieth-Century Fox Studios.

It has been reported to me that after Mr. Khrushchev's stop at San Luis Obispo, where the people had accorded him a very friendly welcome, Mr. Khrushchev had a very brief conversation with Mr. Sholokhov./4/ He told Sholokhov that, as one could see from the warm welcome, the American people had very friendly feelings toward the Soviet Union in spite of efforts by American officials to erect a barrier between him and the American people. Sholokhov replied that this was true and mentioned the fact that he had seen a man at the station waving a hammer and sickle. He said that the American people were really good, friendly people but that he had a feeling that they were oppressed and frightened.

/4/Mikhail Aleksandrovich Sholokhov, a Soviet writer who was a member of the official party accompanying Khrushchev.

122. Memorandum of Conversation

San Francisco, September 21, 1959.

SUBJECT

Conversations in San Francisco

PARTICIPANTS

Mr. Khrushchev Mr. Lodge Mr. Sukhodrev Mr. Akalovsky

//Source: Department of State, Conference Files: Lot 64 D 560, CF 1474. Confidential. Drafted by Akalovsky.

On our way from the hotel to the pier for the boat ride in the San Francisco Bay, Khrushchev at one point observed that many of the ideals written down in the Bible were also the ideals of Communism. The difference was, he said, Christians believed the ideal society would be given them by God, whereas Communists thought it would be developed by man. He said that the optimistic goal of Communism was to abolish the State, since the State suppresses the free will of the people.

I asked whether he meant, in other words, both Christians and Communists were seeking Utopia, but that the means of achieving it were different.

Khrushchev said that this was true, and that, from his point of view, disarmament was one way of making a step in that direction, since the Army is one of the means of suppressing the individual freedom of men. He also said that eventually police, as well as courts, would be abolished. This would be more difficult to do in the U.S. because of the capitalistic philosophy which provides for individual profit, and as long as every person thought that he should have more than his neighbor, there would be excesses by individuals which should be kept under control. The Soviet Union, of course, was different and, as a matter of fact, just before coming to this country, Khrushchev said, he had signed a decree disbanding a regiment of internal security troops. As a matter of fact, since Stalin's death the secret police had been reduced by 75%.

I noted the fact that he was meeting the American people so freely and was talking to them so directly. In Stalin's days, Soviet policy statements had been very cryptic and there had been no information as to the reasons or motives prompting such policy. This veil of secrecy had caused a situation where many people, for lack of information, had started imagining things which might not have been true. This intensified suspicions. This is why I thought that his visit and his encounters with the American people were very revealing and could be very useful.

Khrushchev replied that the secrecy during Stalin's days had been caused by the ill state of Stalin's mind.

During the boat ride Khrushchev admired the beauty of San Francisco and, having noticed an aircraft carrier entering the harbor, stated that he felt sorry for the crew of that vessel. He said that targets as big as that aircraft carrier could be destroyed immediately if war broke out. He felt that the naval weapons of the future were submarines. While in the past submarines had had to approach their targets as close as five kilometers in order to be able effectively to attack them, now they could do it at distances of several hundred kilometers. Such weapons as flying torpedoes enabled them to do so. He also said that the Soviet Union had scrapped several cruisers which had been under construction and 95% completed; the only naval vessels that the Soviet Union was continuing to build were submarines, destroyer boats and guard boats. When one of the newspaper men asked him how many submarines the Soviet Union had at this time, he evaded a direct reply and said that the Soviet Union was catching herring with submarines.

In the course of our subsequent discussion, I asked him whether it was true that the climate in the Soviet Far East had become considerably milder during the past twenty-five years.

He replied that the port of Vladivostok was an all year round port and never froze.

Later on, while driving to the ILU building, Khrushchev again expressed his belief that the Navy, except submarines, had become obsolete. He said that four years ago the Soviet Union had fired Admiral Kuznetsov, the Commander-in-Chief of the Soviet Navy, because he had opposed the reduction of the Navy and wanted to continue its development.

At the Longshoremens Union Khrushchev made a few rather restrained remarks, expressing the hope that the future would not only be peaceful, but also would bring more work and better lives for the working people. His visit there lasted about fifteen minutes.

We then drove to the IBM plant in San Jose. On the way there, he admired the San Francisco Bay Bridge and our highway construction in general. He also said that under our capitalistic system the practice of collecting tolls from these who use bridges and highways was a sound and rational one; yet in the Soviet Union where there was no private property, this was not possible.

I explained to him that the bridges and highways were built by the State and that we felt that it was fair that the users pay for their construction and maintenance. I also asked him whether it was not true that people in the Soviet Union were allowed to own homes and leave them to their children as inheritance. I said that this indicated that even in the Soviet Union there was private property.

Mr. Khrushchev said that there was a difference between private property and personal property. Things like automobiles, homes, clothing, etc. were considered to be personal property. Under the Soviet system, he continued, all means of production belonged to the entire people, and it was the means of production that couldn't be owned by individual citizens.

To this I remarked that in the U.S. millions owned stock in our industry and were therefore owners of parts of our means of production. I also clarified to him that in Massachusetts electric power was a state- controlled monopoly and that no individual was allowed to produce and sell power individually. Speaking of shares of stock, I said it was a wise thing for a retired person to receive dividends to supplement their income or to insure income in their retirement days.

Khrushchev said that under their system, everyone was provided with a pension in his old age, and that this was much better than collecting dividends.

I replied that we also had a very good and broad social security system in which the American people spent 26 billion dollars per year.

When we were passing Moffett Field, I told him that we had a wind tunnel there, to which he said that they also had wind tunnels in the Soviet Union, one in Moscow and one in Siberia.

On our way back from San Jose, Khrushchev commented on the excellent IBM plant, but said that computers were very highly developed in the Soviet Union too; such things as A bombs or the H bomb could have never been developed in the Soviet Union if it hadn't had highly complicated and sophisticated computers. He also said that had he been in charge of the construction of the IBM plant, he would have built it as a two-story structure because, in his view, this was more efficient and economical. He also observed that most of the IBM employees were young people and said that in the Soviet Union they were also bringing more and more young people into industry.

When we were passing Moffett Field, he said that he was not interested in military aircraft because they were an obsolete means of war, having been completely displaced by missiles. He said that, as he had mentioned to the Vice President in Moscow,/1/ the Soviet rocketry was so highly developed that just recently one of their ICBM's with a range of 7,000 kilometers and capable of carrying a five megaton war head, had hit a target with a deviation of only 1.4 kilometers to the right. Only 50% of the bombers would possibly reach the target, whereas all rockets would reach the target.

/1/See Document 99.

To this I remarked that it was necessary to know where the targets were.

Khrushchev replied that this was not of great importance because of the highly destructive power of nuclear weapons.

Khrushchev commented favorably on certain types of housing near Twin Peaks but didn't like that on the road to San Jose because the houses were too crowded and constructed in such a way as would not permit them to last longer than 20 or 30 years.

I replied that, while it may be true that some houses were built too close to one another, the climate in this area didn't require more solid construction. I also said that our dynamic society involved constant changes and that all products were replaced with newer and better models even before the end of their useful life. I added that the American people preferred to have individual homes with their privacy rather than to live in big apartment houses or “with their mother-in-law."

Khrushchev also seemed to be very impressed with the large number of cars he had seen and said that the Soviet Union, while producing newer and better models of cars, was not trying to emulate the American pattern but was rather going to set up big rent-a-car garages where people could rent a car whenever they needed one. This, he said, was a much more sensible approach than to have people having their cars standing idle when they didn't need them.

I replied that we also had nationwide rent-a-car systems and also said that the automobile was a very important item in our economy because of the jobs it provided in various industries and services.

After our visit to a supermarket in San Francisco, Mr. Khrushchev said that he didn't know whether there were many stores of this type in the Soviet Union and that if there were any, there were very few of them. He said that upon his return to Moscow, he would take up the subject of developing a system of such stores in the Soviet Union.

At one point in our conversation, he admired our high standard of living and said that it was in the United States that capitalism was at its best. He said that the Soviet Union had never denied that the United States had the highest standard of life and the most efficient methods of production in the world, and that this was the reason why it had chosen the United States as its partner for competition.

I pointed out to him that there was a great deal of difference between capitalism in its American form and the old European type of capitalism.

Khrushchev said that he didn't think that the Soviet Union could catch up with the United States by 1970; while it might be able to catch up with the United States in the total volume of production, he didn't think it would be able to catch up as far as per capita production was concerned. He added that as far as clothing was concerned, the Soviet Union seemed to be now on the same level as the United States.

I then asked him about livestock and whether the number of livestock had increased considerably in the Soviet Union in recent years. He said the increase had been tremendous and that as a result the production of meat, as compared to the same period last year, was now 60% higher. This was a tremendous increase which he himself had found difficult to believe.

During our stop at a housing development Khrushchev, while declining to visit any of the homes there, talked to several people--mostly women.

On our way to the hotel I told him that the people he had talked to were typical representatives of ordinary Americans and that now he could see what the wishes and aspirations of the American people were.

He said, “This city of San Francisco has charmed me."/2/

/2/In a message to Secretary Herter, transmitted as an unnumbered telegram from San Francisco, September 21, Lodge repeated much of the information in the memorandum printed here and added:

“The Mayor and chief of police have cooperated magnificently.

“Khrushchev said that the labor dinner didn't disturb him a bit.

“He has been in excellent humor for two days and has come to make a joke of our mishaps in Los Angeles (having at the time been furious). My personal standing with him is really excellent as of this writing.

“There is no doubt in my mind that as of this moment the gains on this trip definitely outweigh the losses and I can document this in many different ways.

“I can only pray this will continue." (Department of State, Central Files, 033.6111/9 - 2259)

The reference to the labor dinner is to a meeting Khrushchev attended with international union presidents in San Francisco the previous evening, September 20. A summary of this meeting is ibid., Conference Files: Lot 64 D 560, CF 1474.

123. Memorandum of Conference With President Eisenhower

Washington, September 22, 1959.

OTHERS PRESENT

Secretary Dillon, Mr. Farley, Mr. Allen Dulles, Secretary Gates, Admiral Burke, Mr. McCone, Dr. Kistiakowsky, Mr. Gordon Gray, General Persons, General Goodpaster

[Here follows discussion of nuclear testing and atomic cooperation, scheduled for publication in volume III.]

Finally, Mr. Dillon said he wanted to mention the matter of the proposal for exchange of atomic reactor information with the Soviets. The President asked whether this type of exchange is not what the IAEA was created for. Mr. McCone said there was need for guidance for himself and others participating in the discussions, both as to the exchange of information and as to exchange of visits. Yemel'yanov has asked Mr. McCone to visit the Soviet Union, and Yemel'yanov would then want to return the visit, inspecting our “peaceful use" reactors and our fusion experiments./1/ Mr. McCone agreed that the exchanges should be under the aegis of the IAEA and said that he thought Mr. Yemel'yanov shared this view. Mr. Yemel'yanov has stressed how expensive the Soviets are finding the use of atomic energy for power, and has also stated that neither country can afford wasteful duplication of the other's efforts in this field. Mr. Yemel'yanov also apparently proposed to Dr. Teller the building of a joint scientific facility--probably a nuclear laboratory- in Vienna./2/ With regard to thermonuclear fusion experiments, Yemel'yanov's suggestion was that the Russians put twenty to thirty scientists in our laboratories and we put twenty to thirty in theirs. The whole area of high energy physics is a promising one for such joint inquiry.

//Source: Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, DDE Diaries. Top Secret. Drafted by Goodpaster on September 24.

/1/See Document 110.

/2/No further record of Yemelyanov's conversation with nuclear physicist Edward Teller has been found.

The President asked if we had this kind of cooperation with the British. Mr. McCone said we have a complete exchange of information with them in these fields. The President suggested that our participants in these discussions should chiefly do a lot of listening. Mr. Dillon asked that the discussions be kept within the framework of the IAEA or the Lacy - Zarubin agreement./3/ The President said he saw no reason why this cannot be done through the IAEA. At the same time he thought we should take a close look at what information we make available. The Russian scientist wants to see our plants, and have us see his. The President wondered whether the Russians could hold out their more advanced activities. Mr. McCone said that they could, in contrast to us, since our program is public knowledge. He had no doubt they would hold out anything that we have not achieved. Mr. McCone stated that we of course would give them only unclassified information, although they would see some advances in materials which they have not yet achieved.

/3/Reference is to the agreement between the United States and the Soviet Union on exchanges in the cultural, technical, and educational fields, which Zaroubin, then Soviet Ambassador to the United States, and Lacy negotiated on January 27, 1958. For text of this agreement, see Department of State Bulletin, February 17, 1958, pp. 243 - 247.

The President asked whether the people in the AEC think this type of exchange is a good thing. Mr. McCone said that they did, more so in fact than he did. Mr. Dillon commented that whatever we see is a gain.

Mr. Allen Dulles said that the Soviets have shown some embarrassment over their program, since it has been cut back so drastically from their earlier, unrealistic goals. Admiral Burke/4/ commented that we should not fraternize too closely with them. Our allies will think we are weakening with regard to the Communist threat.

/4/Admiral Arleigh A. Burke, Chief of Naval Operations.

Summing up, the President said he saw no objection to our talking with the Russians and getting a clearer idea of just what they have in mind. He was not sure Khrushchev would want to talk about this question at Camp David. The President said he is afraid that Khrushchev will occupy the time at Camp David in unproductive haranguing. He is more likely to do so in a large group. The President would like to limit the group to Khrushchev and Gromyko in addition to Herter and himself, but supposed this would not be possible. He would like to exclude Menshikov, who seems to be “bad news" and is untrustworthy. He thought we must bring out that the Russian itinerary, and schedule of events, were worked up strictly by the Russians, and they have the responsibility for what was on or not on the schedule during his travels around the country.

G.

Brigadier General, USA

124. Memorandum of Conversation

September 23, 1959.

SUBJECT

Car Trip to Garst Farm

PARTICIPANTS/1/

Ambassador Henry Cabot Lodge Soviet Premier Nikita Khrushchev Mr. Sukhodrev Mr. Akalovsky

//Source: Department of State, Conference Files: Lot 64 D 560, CF 1474. Confidential. Drafted and initialed by Akalovsky.

/1/Roswell Garst is not listed among the participants, presumably in error.

On our way to Mr. Garst's farm, Mr. Garst took up two “political" questions with Mr. Khrushchev. He expressed his hope that the Soviet Union would accept the idea of adequate inspection over disarmament measures and stated that he was sure that the President would insist on such inspection. He said that he thought that disarmament would offer particular advantage to the Soviet Union because, while the armaments burden was depriving the American people of just a few luxuries, it was depriving the Soviet people of many essential commodities.

Mr. Khrushchev said that the Soviet Union was in favor of full and adequate inspection and that such inspection was provided for in the latest Soviet disarmament proposals.

Mr. Garst then said that another problem which he was going to ask Mr. Khrushchev to consider was the so-called cases of compassion, of which there were about two or three hundred. He said that he personally knew of approximately thirty such cases, one of which, for example, was that of a Soviet-born girl who had been deported by the Germans to Germany and had later married an American soldier. At present this girl was living with her husband and children in South Carolina and wanted very much for her elderly parents, who are still in the Soviet Union, to come to this country and join her.

Mr. Khrushchev replied that this woman should write a letter explaining her case and recalling his promise to a Latvian couple he had met this morning at the hotel, said that he was sure that the parents would be granted an exit visa. In general, he said, he had nothing against letting people out of the country because “then the capitalists would feed them", thus relieving the Soviet Union of that burden.

On our way back from Mr. Garst's farm to the airport, at some point Mr. Khrushchev mentioned that the Soviet Union had developed a turbo-jet aircraft with a maximum speed of 640 kilometers and a payload of 14 metric tons, which was capable of landing on dirt fields and did not require any concrete runways. The plane was now being used for transporting cargo, but if converted for passenger service it could carry approximately 100 persons.

(It was interesting to observe that upon our landing at Des Moines Airport on September 22, and while we were taxiing to the ramp, Mr. Khrushchev's son, Sergei, took several movie shots of our military jets standing on the field.)

125. Memorandum of Conversation

Pittsburgh, September 24, 1959.

SUBJECT

Car Trip to Airport from Pittsburgh

PARTICIPANTS

Ambassador H.C. Lodge--US Chairman N.S. Khrushchev--USSR

//Source: Department of State, Conference Files: Lot 64 D 560, CF 1474. Confidential. Drafted and initialed by Lodge.

As we were driving to the airport in Pittsburgh on Thursday, September 24th, I said to Chairman Khrushchev that a number of people in Pittsburgh had telephoned me and had come to see me requesting that I make appointments for them to see him concerning so-called compassionate cases--families who were separated and who could not be reunited because of the failure of the Soviet Government to approve.

I had told these individuals that of course I could make no appointments for Mr. Khrushchev to see anyone, but I did feel that Mr. Khrushchev ought to know that this had happened to me in Pittsburgh in addition to the many letters I had received before Chairman Khrushchev's arrival.

He said to me: “I want to settle these matters. Please tell all these people to take them up with Ambassador Menshikov." In this conversation and in the previous one with Mr. Garst he made it clear that he wanted to clean up these cases./1/

I recommend therefore that the State Department, having in mind what he said to Mr. Garst in Coon Rapids, what I understand he said to Mr. Stevenson in the same place/2/ and what he said to me in Pittsburgh, get up their list of cases and take them up with the Soviet Government. The Department should carefully consider doing it through Mr. Thompson instead of through Mr. Menshikov because Mr. Menshikov can apparently always be counted upon to put any American request in its very worst light.

/1/See Document 124.

/2/Adlai E. Stevenson attended a reception given for Khrushchev in Des Moines in the late afternoon of September 22, but no record of their conversation has been found.

126. Memorandum of Conference With President Eisenhower

Washington, September 24, 1959.

OTHERS PRESENT

Secretaries Herter, Dillon, Murphy, Merchant, Mr. Davis, Mr. Hagerty, General Goodpaster

//Source: Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, DDE Diaries. Secret. Drafted by Goodpaster on September 26.

The group came in to discuss with the President matters expected to come up during his meeting with Mr. Khrushchev. The President commented that it will be very difficult to adhere to an agenda. He added that some say that Khrushchev is a master debater. In fact, he seems to be a skillful evader of tough questions.

Mr. Herter thought that the first evening at Camp David might be devoted to having Khrushchev talk about some of our misconceptions regarding communism. Perhaps he could “talk himself out" to a certain extent in this way. The first substantive questions would be Berlin and Germany, to be taken up the following day. Mr. Herter thought that the U.S. should take the offensive on these questions, bringing out that Khrushchev started the crisis, for which there was no need, and carried it forward by threats and pressure. He anticipated the Russians will stress the need for a peace treaty with the separate Germanies, and claim that their conclusion of a peace treaty will void our rights. Our first aim is to maintain our rights until reunification has been achieved. We expect to liquidate our rights in time, but not by their fiat.

The President said he wanted to find some standpoint from which to approach the whole discussion that would put Khrushchev “in a box." He could do this by asking Khrushchev how we might compete with respect to the values that people cherish other than the mere increase in industrial production. Suppose, for example, we call on them to accept the principle of peaceful resolution of differences. In Berlin they are operating with veiled threats of “or else." He did not think there was any point in wasting time listening to Khrushchev respond on the subject of freedom. Mr. Murphy suggested probing Khrushchev as to why he had adopted the ultimatum method of dealing with the German problem at this particular time. Mr. Herter thought that a moratorium could be a period of transition to a new status for the city of Berlin, but noted that the Germans would not agree until after their election late in 1960. Mr. Dillon said he had noted in the report of Gaitskell's talk with Khrushchev/1/ that the latter might agree to such a moratorium without implication that our rights would lapse at its end. The President thought the key point is that Khrushchev precipitated a crisis when he should have called for negotiations.

/1/The report of Hugh Gaitskell, leader of the British Labour Party, of his interview with Khrushchev on September 4 was summarized in The New York Times, September 10, 1959.

Mr. Herter next raised the question of the President's return trip to Russia. The President said that if the American people feel this meeting has been completely futile, and that Khrushchev recognized only his own arbitrary viewpoint, he did not see how he could go. Mr. Herter thought that the current meetings are more likely than not to end somewhat inconclusively. Mr. Dillon added that Khrushchev may save out some “give" for the President's return trip. Mr. Herter did not think the President should condition his return trip on Soviet agreement to a moratorium over Berlin, but did think that a summit meeting should be conditioned on that.

The President asked what State's evaluation was of Khrushchev's disarmament speech./2/ Mr. Herter said it has obviously had substantial impact around the world. The small nations fear that the big powers might start a war, drawing them in. They were also attracted by his suggestion to use the funds freed from armaments for economic development around the world. He recalled that the President had put forward this suggestion six weeks ago./3/ Mr. Khrushchev called for a step by step approach, extending controls as disarmament is extended.

/2/See footnote 2, Document 117.

/3/Not further identified.

Mr. Dillon suggested that the President consider making a speech on disarmament in the United Nations within the next few weeks./4/ The President thought this might be a pretty good idea, providing him an opportunity to set out our plan.

/4/On September 21, Eisenhower wrote Dillon about the prospect of making an address on the subject of disarmament to the U.N. General Assembly. (Department of State, Central Files, 711.11 - EI/9 - 2159) After discussing the idea with Secretary Herter, Dillon responded on September 23 that the usefulness of such a speech would depend on the results of the Khrushchev talks and that no decision should be made until after the talks. (Ibid., 711.11 - EI/9 - 2359)

The President thought that really the most promising line suggested so far is to try to get Khrushchev committed to negotiation as a principle in the conduct of our relations. If he does this, we should be ready to tell him what we are prepared to do. Secretary Herter brought out that Khrushchev had omitted any consideration of any central or UN military force once national forces were reduced. The President said he has been trying to think of concrete examples for a possible step by step approach. We might for example abolish naval units having more than a certain operating range. Mr. Herter said that the Soviets had offered to reduce their conventional forces initially, cutting down to 1.7 million, but offer no way to verify these reductions. One idea his people have been examining is for the United Nations Disarmament Commission to send out a questionnaire for information to every nation asking what forces they require for their own internal security and what armament. Mr. Murphy commented that the existing forces are testimony to our lack of confidence in Soviet behavior, that we increased our forces greatly as the cold war became more severe. The President asked me to find out what was the strength of our armed forces at the end of December 1949. (I did so. The total was approximately 1.5 million.)

Regarding the exchange of atomic reactor information, the President said he viewed the project favorably so long as the whole thing was done through the IAEA./5/

/5/See Document 123.

The President next asked how the Chinese problem could be taken into consideration. If we are talking about disarmament and such subjects, he wondered how we could negotiate on controls in light of our rigid policy against any recognition of Red China. Mr. Herter said we do not wish to change our stand on Red China. They will not renounce the use of force in Taiwan nor will they release our prisoners. The President said he realized this but wondered how we can talk about general disarmament with them. Mr. Merchant said we have the same problem regarding the Federal Republic of Germany. It is realized, however, that such countries must come under the purview of a disarmament agreement even though they are not UN members. The President repeated that he wished we had a really fine first step in disarmament to offer--one not involving our allies. Mr. Herter said that each type of weapon is so interwoven with others that it is hard to visualize what the President is seeking. Nuclear weapons now are so intimately mixed in with others that they could no longer be banned as a class.

The President said that there were reasons not to single out the nuclear weapon back in 1948, when we had a monopoly, but times have changed and if we could now really eliminate all atomic weapons we would not be too badly off. However, we can not do this without the most extreme and comprehensive inspection system. There is one possibility, however. Bombers and large missiles are discoverable because they are of substantial size.

The President thought Mr. Herter should talk to our Defense people. Where we once said our great strength advantage is nuclear, this is no longer true. If we could put down the sequence of steps we favor, some pattern might emerge. Mr. Murphy thought we could dust off the main lines of our 1957 proposals./6/

/6/Reference is to Western working papers submitted to the Subcommittee of the U.N. Disarmament Commission on August 2 and 29, 1957.

The President next noted that the Russians seemed to want a nonaggression pact. Mr. Herter referred to this as a political treaty. The President thought it was undesirable since it would cover the same ground as our UN commitment and thus detract from it. Also, it would imply some kind of special relationship between the United States and the USSR, and thus alarm our allies. The President noted the point concerning requests that the Russians cease to detain children and other relatives of people now in this country. He also thought we should press to obtain the additional space needed for our Embassy, and should be as tough on the Russians in this country as they are on us.

Regarding trade questions, the President asked whether it was agreed that we have no objection to selling any strategic goods for gold or other hard currency. The group indicated that we do not. Mr. Dillon said he would prepare an additional paragraph regarding trade for consideration for the communique.

Reverting to the question of his visit to Russia, the President said he would be agreeable if Mr. Khrushchev would make a statement that there would be no unilateral interference with our status in Berlin. This would then give us an opportunity to pursue other questions without a pistol at our head, in peaceful negotiation. He could then say he would go to Russia. It was thought the statement should take the form that there would be no unilateral action attempting to prejudice our rights.

The President thought it might be desirable for him to go on TV for fifteen minutes or so just following Mr. Khrushchev's departure on Sunday, either to follow up on anything promising that came up in the talks or to correct any fallacious impression given by Mr. Khrushchev. Mr. Hagerty was confident we could get as much time as we might wish.

The President asked the State Department people to give some thought to the general line we want to follow in the discussions--for example, do both nations really commit themselves to peaceful coexist-ence in the sense he had discussed.

The President mentioned that he was seeing Ambassador Lodge the following day,/7/ and indicated he would like to have Mr. Lodge at Camp David, in order not to waste the experience he had gained through his trip with Khrushchev.

/7/See Document 128.

Finally, the President discussed arrangements for Camp David, and attendance at the luncheon and dinner that he is planning.

G.

Brigadier General, USA

127. Memorandum of Conversation

New York, September 24, 1959.

SUBJECT

Journal of Commerce Dinner for Khrushchev

PARTICIPANTS

Chairman Nikita S. Khrushchev Ambassador Menshikov Ambassador Lodge Acting Assistant Secretary Foy D. Kohler Mr. Eric Ridder, Publisher, Journal of Commerce

(See attached for Others)/1/

//Source: Department of State, Central Files, 033.6111/9 - 2459. Official Use Only. Drafted by Kohler on September 26 and approved by John A. Calhoun on October 2.

/1/Not printed.

This was a dinner given at the Sheraton Carlton Hotel by Mr. Eric Ridder, Publisher, New York Journal of Commerce, arranged by Soviet Ambassador Menshikov directly with Mr. Ridder.

After the dinner was well underway, Mr. Ridder opened the discussion with a short speech in which he expressed the hope for some friendly discussion with the Chairman with free give and take on both sides. He thought this might clarify many questions and cited an example which bothers American businessmen: namely, that the Soviets are reported to be mining gold at the cost of $166 an ounce when the world price is $35 an ounce. Summarizing, he said he would focus on a question to Mr. Khrushchev as to whether the chances of improving trade relations between the USSR and US have been improved by his visit to this country? Mr. Khrushchev said he would like to reverse that question. What did the American businessmen think? Mr. Cortney of Coty/2/ stated that they had not been improved, that such a visit was not a factor in the process. Mr. Ridder disagreed. Mr. White, of Republic Steel,/3/ then took the floor to explain his concept of the difficulties in the Soviet-American relationship. He said that he had started out as a worker and had worked in the USSR, in Greece and other countries. He was now in management. One thing he had found in his present capacity was that in connection with any labor difficulties, there was always some communist hell- raising involved. In almost any situation Soviet influence was found and it was anti-American. There was some applause after this (in which, apparently by inadvertence, Mr. Khrushchev joined).

/2/Philip Cortney, President of Coty, Inc.

/3/C.M. White, Chairman of the Board of Republic Steel Corporation.

After a few remarks from Mr. Fleming and Mr. Strauss, Mr. Moore of Moore - McCormack/4/ sketched his company's improving business behind the Iron Curtain, citing that their shipment of hams for Poland had tripled in three years and shipments to Czechoslovakia of Christmas tree ornaments had considerably increased. They would be interested in carrying more Soviet products.

/4/Lamar Fleming, Chairman of the Board of Anderson, Clayton & Co.; Jack Strauss, Chairman of the Board of Macy's; and William T. Moore, President of Moore - McCormack Lines, Inc.

Mr. Cortney then referred to the question of the price of gold. He said that Soviet secrecy on their gold holdings and production created a lack of confidence in business circles. Mr. Khrushchev did not understand why this worried American business, saying that the question of trade was simply a question of: “You buy what you need from us, we sell you what we can." Mr. Cortney took him up on this remark saying this was not the basis of international trade, which resulted rather from mutual advantage. He repeated again that he could not understand why the USSR kept its gold stock figure a secret. Mr. Khrushchev in turn repeated that he did not understand why Mr. Cortney should want to know this kind of thing. Mr. Khrushchev then continued and referred to Mr. Strauss' earlier suggestion that the goods of Iron Curtain origin encountered sales resistance in the US. In this connection he cited Soviet trade with West Germany despite political differences and said he didn't see what difference the origin made, if the goods were right. Mr. Strauss pointed out that goods had to be marked as to origin under American law, and that there was in fact sales resistance to Soviet goods. Mr. Khrushchev then went on to talk about “discriminatory" American tariffs. In developing his thesis, he said the USSR in fact had nothing to sell, that their warehouses are almost empty. He went on to say, however, there was good trade with the Soviet Union and other western countries.

Mr. Reed of American Express/5/ then referred at some length to the recent exchanges of managerial, industrial and technical exchanges and asked whether Mr. Khrushchev did not find them useful. Mr. Khru-shchev agreed, then went on to say he did not understand why they were able to have trade relations with such a firm as Krupp in West Germany and not with the US. Mr. Cortney again intervened to put the picture in perspective, pointing out that the entire trade of the USSR with the outer world was only two billion dollars out of a total world trade of 220 billion dollars. Mr. Khrushchev then said the questions Mr. Cortney were raising were political, not economic. If the US did not want to trade, then it should not trade. The USSR does not need our goods, though he would point out that in earlier days trade was rather extensive and that Ford, for example, had found it profitable to deal with the USSR. Mr. Cortney said that what was good for Ford was not necessarily good for the US. Khrushchev retorted the United States is made up of Fords.

Mr. McCabe of Scott Paper/6/ then changed the subject by asking Khrushchev to give his impressions of the trip.

/5/Ralph T. Reed, President of American Express.

/6/Thomas B. McCabe, President of Scott Paper Co.

Mr. Khrushchev took the floor, agreeing to try to give his impressions. He had found that the American people were essentially peace-loving. Business people seemed to him particularly interested in good US-USSR relations, except perhaps for the few who depended directly on government arms contracts. However, among US politicians he found there were some who feared the end of the cold war. Maybe they had made too many speeches to permit it. This was the horse they rode into Congress and they couldn't get off. Overall, however, his principal impression was that the US wants to come to an agreement with USSR and to live in peace. As to trade, he would repeat that the USSR does not need this but still believes it would be a good thing. He could agree with Mr. Cortney that national specialization was a factor in international trade. However, since the US did not agree to exports which the USSR needed, the USSR had been obliged to produce its own industrial equipment. For example, he had visited the Mesta plant and found that their largest press was 50,000 tons in capacity./7/ The largest press produced by Soviet industries now is 70,000 tons. He then cited Soviet development of an advanced oil drill. However, the USSR could buy from the US, for example, chemical equipment in which the US is ahead; maybe also some equipment for the oil industry. The Soviet Union had once traded on a considerable scale with the DuPont Company but not in recent years. It could do some business again if the State Department permitted, but since this was not permitted the USSR was buying more goods of this type from West Germany and the UK. Orders to the UK had in fact mounted so rapidly that he had had recently to counsel restraint on his industrial people, so they would not exceed payment possibilities. The USSR was also buying synthetic fibers and production machinery from Italy and France. It was a question of pay and take. If the US found it profitable to trade with the USSR, good. If we did not find it profitable, then we wouldn't trade. This was the law of trade. The USSR could wait while the US took its time to come around to an understanding of these facts.

/7/Khrushchev visited the Mesta Machinery Company at West Homestead, Pennsylvania, on the morning of September 24.

Mr. White turned his attention again to economic systems, charging that the USSR had adopted the Western incentive system, the production methods and many other features. He said that was fine. Mr. Khru-shchev quickly interjected that the Soviets are not stupid. What they found that was good in the Western system they took. The original and greatest contribution in modern production was Henry Ford's invention of mass production which was a high point in economic history. However, he concluded: “If you don't want our caviar, don't buy it. It is very good. We will eat it ourselves."

Mr. Hewitt of Deere Co./8/ then referred to the fact that they had made sales to the Soviet Union over a period of years but always just one or two tractors or combines. He wanted to ask why the Soviets just buy samples of Western production. To this, Mr. Khrushchev said he wanted to give a frank and honest reply. Why should the USSR buy US industrial output in any quantity? They were able to produce everything they needed themselves. Consequently, they buy Western models only to compare and borrow what they consider best. He said the average customer of Deere Co., the US farmer, certainly buys only one or two machines. The Soviet Union buys as much as any farmer or even more. Why should the Deere Co. complain; presumably the company profited equally from both transactions. Maybe Mr. Hewitt should try to get Mr. Garst to buy more of his products. Mr. Hewitt said that he was not talking about individual and private customers but about trade between nations which he understood was the subject of the discussion. Mr. Khrushchev replied that the Soviets were not interested in tractors or combines or planes. At the moment they were only interested in equipment for the chemical industry.

/8/William A. Hewitt, President of Deere & Co.

Mr. Pace/9/ then asked about the question of payment. Mr. Khru-shchev replied that the USSR needed credit, not government credit, but private credit of the kind given them by the UK. They were prepared to pay reasonable rates of interest. In reply to a question from the floor, he said he did not have his technicians available and could not say at exactly what rate. However, he indicated it would probably be the going world rate. He then went on to say that the Soviets were already making vast savings over their calculations in the 7-year plan, being now 5% ahead, which resulted in a significant accumulation of ruble availabilities. (The inference was that increased foreign purchases would increase the savings over the plan and improve Soviet payment possibilities.)

/9/Frank Pace Jr., President of General Dynamics Corporation.

Mr. Percy of Bell and Howell/10/ brought up the question of what assurances the USSR was prepared to give as respects patents, licensing rates, etc. In this connection he cited correspondence he had had on this subject with Sergei Mikoyan, son of Anastas, in connection with Sergei's interest in the high quality of a West German camera he had. Mr. Khru-shchev replied that if the Soviet Union bought patent or license rights, it would pay in accordance with world practice. However, he went on to turn the question aside by saying that young Mikoyan was speaking of a gift given him by the Germans which was in fact no better than Soviet cameras. He said his own son, Sergei, had received five such gifts, including a Japanese camera. The Soviet product was better.

/10/Charles H. Percy, President of Bell & Howell Co.

Mr. White then turned to the question of the general relationship between the two countries, pointing out that Mr. Khrushchev must realize that the US has all elements in its population with very strong feelings, for example, Hungarian, Pole and Czech. Khrushchev questioned him as to his own background to which Mr. White replied that he was German, French, English, Irish and “100% American".

Mr. Khrushchev then went on to say that Mr. White was ignorant of socialism and could not understand the Soviet system. There was then some discussion of communist activities in the US at the end of which Mr. Khrushchev asked Mr. White whether he meant that he wanted him, Khrushchev, to call off the American communists. When Mr. White replied flatly, “Yes", Mr. Khrushchev rolled his head in his hands and said, “there was nothing to do with such people".

Mr. Pace then referred to Mr. Khrushchev's remark that he had found the American people to be peace-loving and asked whether this was a result of his trip. Mr. Khrushchev replied that it was not a result of the trip but that the trip had confirmed this estimation to him. Mr. Pace then asked as to Mr. Khrushchev's feeling on the U.S. Government attitude. Mr. Khrushchev said the reply to this question depended on the concrete situation; for example, if the Soviet disarmament proposals were rejected, then this would cast doubt on U.S. Government intentions. Mr. Pace said we had hoped that Mr. Khrushchev would get the impression that the US was peace-loving but that it was ready to support its “moral principles by power”. Some discussion then ensued as to Mr. Pace's meaning, which Mr. Khrushchev concluded by saying that surrounding the USSR by military bases was not “moral”. Mr. Pace pointed out that we had the same bases when we had an atomic monopoly which we did not use. Mr. Khrushchev replied that the USSR could not depend upon the caprice of a foreign government. The US atomic monopoly was like knowing that the other fellow had a loaded pistol in his pocket and said that: “He who believes in a word is fooled in the end.” More interchange ensued to the effect that the discussion had strayed far away from the subject of trade.

Mr. Khrushchev then said that he would like to make some concluding remarks and be excused. The time was then approaching 10:30 p.m. He said that the Soviet Union wanted to trade with the United States. They considered that trade was the litmus paper indicating whether we had peaceful intentions and wanted to live in peace with the Soviet Union. Evidently we were not yet reconciled to the existence of the Soviet Union, so the Soviets had to be on their guard. He could not return to the Soviet Union and tell the Soviet people of the peaceful words we had spoken if we were not willing to trade. Willingness to trade would be a test of our peaceful intentions. We should not interfere in their Socialist affairs and they would not interfere in our Capitalist affairs. Again he repeated that the removal of trade discriminations would be a test of our intentions. Similarly, if we signed a peace treaty with Germany, this would mean that we wanted peace. If we refused to sign a peace treaty with Germany, it would mean that we want war. The same could be said with respect to disarmament. However, if the arms race should continue, then the Soviets can compete. Their Seven Year Plan provides amply both for armaments and for their domestic requirements.

(###)

[End of Section 11]

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