U.S. Department of State
Vol. X, Part 1, FRUS, 1958-60: E. Europe Region; Soviet Union; Cyprus
Office of the Historian

[Section 4 of 19]

16. Despatch From the Legation in Hungary to the Department of State

No. 413 Budapest, January 23, 1959.


Recommendations Regarding United States Policy Toward Present Hungarian Regime

In a recent survey of the course of relations between the United States and Hungary in 1958 (Legation despatch No. 383, January 7, 1959),/1/ the Legation came to the conclusion that there had been a worsening of relations in this period. Virtually all the major and minor issues existing between the two countries at the beginning of the year remained unresolved at year's end. With the passage of time, world public interest in the Hungarian question has decreased; other and more pressing problems demand attention. As a result, the present regime in Hungary had been able to improve its international position. If it did not escape unscathed in the recent session of the United Nations General Assembly, it did succeed in avoiding drastic sanctions against it. Internally, also, the regime has further consolidated its position. The Hungarian people have not given up their dislike of the regime and its Soviet masters but, as prospects for outside support have receded, they have tended more and more to an attitude of helpless resignation and decreased resistance to regime pressure.

//Source: Department of State, Central Files, 611.64/1 - 2359. Secret. Drafted by Pratt and Ackerson.

/1/Not printed. (Ibid., 611.64/1 - 759)

Under the circumstances, the Legation feels it imperative to re-examine the outstanding issues in United States-Hungarian relations with a view to determining what actions it should itself take or should recommend to the Department in order to improve the United States position in Hungary.

Before setting forth our observations, we should like to make certain general comments. In the first place, the Department will perceive that our present suggestions closely resemble those put forward when we made a similar survey in the early months of 1958 (Legation despatches No. 471, March 5, and No. 489, March 12, 1958)./2/ This is not surprising, in view of the similarity between the current situation and that prevailing last year. Our proposals last year bore little fruit; in fact, most of them were never translated into action because of political developments in Hungary. There is no guarantee that our initiatives will fare any better this year, but we are convinced that the deteriorating position of the United States in Hungary makes some action on our part more than ever necessary.

/2/In despatch 471, the Legation submitted the following recommendations: "(1) Continued pressure on the regime for the release of the arrested local employees of the Legation. This pressure should be in the form of diplomatic representations; publicity in the Western press should also be considered. (2) Lifting of the ban on the travel of United States citizens in Hungary as a price for easing some of the present staff restrictions on the Legation. (3) Implementation of a common NATO policy on the accreditation of new Ministers to Budapest. (4) Exploration of means of solving the question of Cardinal Mindszenty's future position." (Ibid., 611.64/3 - 558) In despatch 489, the Legation submitted certain recommendations for expanding contacts with the Hungarian people through an increase in trade, informational activities, and cultural exchanges. (Ibid., 611.64/3 - 1258)

In the second place, the overall effect of our recommendations would be to put United States-Hungarian relations on a basis comparable to that existing for United States relations with other Communist bloc countries. We believe that movement toward such a "normalization" of relations with the present Hungarian regime is necessary not because we consider that the regime merits approval and respect, but because we believe some reconciliation with the regime is required before we will be allowed significant opportunities for projecting United States influence on the Hungarian people.

Lastly, it will be noted that our proposed initiatives are neither numerous nor extensive. Any real increase in United States activities in Hungary would require a complete change in the attitude of the regime-- something that does not seem likely in the foreseeable future.

Harassment of the Legation

In the past, the chief harassment of the Legation by the Hungarian authorities has been the arrest of, or punitive action against, local Hungarian employees. At present, two local employees are under "internal deportation" orders and are living a precarious existence in remote villages. Persistent attempts by the Legation to aid them have been rebuffed; however, no new drastic actions have been taken or threatened against other employees in recent months and even cases of minor annoyances, such as revocation of driving licenses, have not recurred. The Legation sees no alternative in the coming months to continuing its efforts on behalf of the two deported employees and standing ready to defend any other employees unfairly treated. It may be that our vigorous protests over the cases that have occurred have helped to some extent to deter the police from more numerous persecutions.

Minor forms of harassment, such as the "guarding" of the Legation by large numbers of uniformed and secret police, the interrogation of Hungarian visitors to the Legation, etc., may be expected to continue. As in the past, the Legation will from time to time voice its dissatisfaction over such practices, without necessarily making a big issue of the matter. Any lasting solution to the harassment issue must, however, depend on a more extensive easing of relations than seems in prospect now.

Contacts with Hungarians

Since the Revolution, there has been a steady decline in Legation contact with both official and unofficial Hungarians. The regime desired to have Americans and other Westerners attend staged propaganda affairs, but hindered meaningful exchanges with citizens. Means used to accomplish this were not only the minor harassments noted above, but also the anti-American propaganda campaign which became so marked during the fall. The clear warning of this campaign was that it is dangerous for any Hungarian to have any contact with American officials. Men holding posts in various ministries who had never hesitated in the past to discuss official business with Legation officers, now expressed preference for having the Foreign Ministry act as intermediary between them and the Legation. Old friends and new acquaintances shied away from even the most innocuous meetings with Americans. The Legation will continue to try to check this trend by the judicious inviting of official or "approved" personalities to social functions, by seeking face-to-face discussions in preference to written communications whenever business matters arise with Hungarians, etc. However, the best method for expanding the Legation's circles of acquaintances, under existing conditions, would seem to be the development of informational and cultural programs approved or tolerated by the regime.

Information Program

The Legation continues to be dissatisfied with its lack of anything that could properly be called an information program. Nevertheless, the reasons that have in the past argued against such a program remain strong today: the presence of Cardinal Mindszenty in the Legation, the police surveillance of the building, and the impossibility of asking local employees to do any kind of informational work. We have been able to dispose of a certain number of American magazines and other publications of a non-political nature. In the future, we hope to increase the number of such presentations to ministries, libraries, museums, and other institutions. A more ambitious program remains contingent on future developments.

Cultural Exchange

The visit of a limited number of top-flight American artists, lecturers, and sportsmen in 1958 was one bright spot in the year's rather gloomy picture of Hungarian-American relations. The Legation strongly urges that the number of such visits be increased this year because they are warmly desired by the Hungarian people and because they enable the Legation to expand its circle of acquaintances in the Hungarian cultural field.

In the past, these tours have been arranged through private channels, largely to avoid the necessity of dealing with the regime and to forestall regime demands for reciprocity. While wishing to expand tours under private sponsorship, the Legation would also like to recommend reconsideration of the United States position on official exchanges with Hungary. Dealing with Hungarian authorities on the matter of cultural exchanges certainly signifies little in the way of approval of the regime. The Hungarians have not yet demanded reciprocal visits, but even if they should do so now, we see little objection to having Hungarian cultural figures come to the United States. So far as we know, the few Hungarian performers appearing there in 1958 (the runner Roszavolgyi and the fencing team) did not encounter hostile receptions. We see definite benefits in having as many Hungarians as possible familiarize themselves with the United States. At the same time, our readiness to admit Hungarians should have some influence in persuading the authorities here to accept a greater number of United States artists.

In this connection, the Legation would like to call attention to the cultural operations conducted by other Western countries here (Legation despatch No. 394, January 9, 1959)./3/ We have learned that the British Legation has recommended to London a major expansion of their cultural program, with the ultimate objective of restoring the British Council in Budapest and that this recommendation has been accepted in principle in London. Coordination of cultural plans with the British and perhaps with other NATO countries would seem desirable at this stage.

/3/Not printed. (Ibid., 550.64/1 - 959)

Commercial Relations

Somewhat akin to our advocacy of expanded cultural relations, is our belief that the United States should liberalize its trade policy toward Hungary. Obviously this question is part of the general problem of East- West trade. Hungary could probably never become an important outlet for American goods, and it is clear that anything the regime buys from America will be used for the benefit of the regime. However, the Hungarians have voiced a great interest in trying to sell to the United States. Since we do not believe they could garner a large stock of dollars by such activities, we believe that the United States could profitably acquiesce in the Hungarian desire to try the American market.

As for trade fairs and exhibitions, we think a well-selected American display would be highly effective here and the Hungarians should be tested on their willingness (by no means certain) to accept such a thing. An obvious price for permission to exhibit here is a reciprocal invitation to have a display in the United States. Whether a Hungarian display would get an embarrassingly hostile reception in the United States is hard to say. It seems to the Legation that the matter at least deserves further study. Hungarian officials have expressed considerable interest in this topic, and a flexible United States attitude might improve our bargaining position on other points.

Aside from agreeing to mutual participation in fairs, easing visa procedures for commercial people, and perhaps raising the inspection ban on the import of Hungarian meat products, there is little we can do to boost Hungarian-American commerce. All that we can expect to do is to put ourselves in a position where we can point out to the Hungarians that they are free to compete with others for a share in American trade.

Visa and Passport Problems

During the past year, a major source of irritation in the Legation's dealing with Hungarian authorities has been the visa policies of the two countries. On several occasions, the Legation has found it necessary to complain about Hungarian delays or failures in issuing visas, particularly to United States officials coming to Budapest on business. In turn, the Hungarians have frequently charged that the United States was too restrictive on visas to journalists, sportsmen, scientists, commercial representatives, etc. In the fall of 1958, they announced a policy of strict reciprocity on visas. The first result of this was the limitation on the exit and entry visas of United States Legation employees (See Legation despatch No. 329, November 28, 1958)./4/ The United States has now more than corrected any inequity that existed on this particular score (Legation despatch No. 362, December 19, 1958);/5/ we are watching to see what remedial steps the Hungarians will take in return. We believe that, at the very minimum, the United States should review all of its visa procedures with regard to Hungarians, to be sure that we are not more restrictive than the Hungarian regime unless such restrictions are clearly demanded by security considerations.

/4/Not printed. (Ibid., Visa Office Files)

/5/Not printed. (Ibid.)

The United States passport regulations limiting travel to Hungary are another irritant--and, the Legation believes, an unnecessary one--in Hungarian-American relations. The regulations do not seem necessary as protection for United States citizens; in recent years, those Americans who have come here have not experienced serious trouble with the police, nor have any of our local employees been arrested since the early part of 1957. We still have two local employees under deportation and, if there were the slightest indication that keeping the passport restrictions would exert pressure on their behalf, the Legation would favor continuing the regulation. It does not appear, however, that their status is negotiable with any means presently available; therefore, the Legation advocates lifting the passport limitation without directly seeking any Hungarian concession in return. There is, of course, no assurance that this will markedly improve the climate of our relations, but there would appear to be no United States interest which is protected by the maintenance of this travel restriction. The Hungarians have made the point that it is the passport restrictions which prevent a great increase in the number of tourists from the United States. We doubt that this is true, but would favor an experiment which might promote contacts between Americans and the Hungarian people.

Legation Staff Ceiling

The United States has never accepted the concept that the Hungarian Government can fix the size or composition of the Legation's staff. Nevertheless we have in practice kept even below the limits stated in the Foreign Ministry's note of May 25, 1957./6/ With the severe curtailment of the Legation's activities, the staff ceiling has worked no particular hardship. This situation could change if an easing of the atmosphere produced such things as the regime's granting of passports to intending emigrants, a regular influx of large numbers of American tourists, a major cultural exchange program, or the re-opening of informational activities. Such developments do not seem likely in the near future and, in any event, the requisite easing of the atmosphere would probably also result in the falling away of the staff limitations without the necessity of direct negotiation on the point.

/6/Presumably reference is to the Foreign Ministry's note dated May 24, the text of which was transmitted to the Department of State in despatch 589 from Budapest, May 24, 1957. (Ibid., Central Files, 611.64/5 - 2457)

The Hungarian Item in the United Nations

While the United Nations has not been able to provide a solution to the Hungarian question, its continued consideration of the question has placed the Hungarian and Soviet regimes at great psychological disadvantage and has damaged Hungary's position domestically and internationally. This has naturally provoked bitter reaction on the part of the regime; as was evidenced in the last United Nations General Assembly, the anger of the authorities has been concentrated more and more on the United States as the recognized leader of the fight against the Hungarian regimen in the United Nations.

The Legation believes that the United States stand in the United Nations has been based on principle, and that we could not in conscience have done less than we did; we see no occasion for apology or retraction of our position. As for the future, it is still some months before the next regular session of the General Assembly and events in the meantime will influence our policy then. Nevertheless, if our arguments in favor of moving toward normalization of relations are valid, they will require that the United States adopt at least a tentative position now that we will let the United Nations record stand but will not take the initiative to force the issue from here on out. In this connection, we should mention that, while our opportunities for sampling public opinion are slight, we have found a discouraging lack of interest among Hungarians in the recent United Nations debate and its outcome. Regime propaganda is not particularly effective, but it may eventually get some popular response to its theme that the United States and other Western powers are "ganging up" on Hungary while trying to conciliate the USSR because of its "proven" technical and military superiority.

Designation of Minister

Up until the middle of 1958, there were frequent indications that the regime strongly desired an exchange of ministers between the two countries as a sign of finally restored relations. In the latter half of the year, hints and statements of regime officials to this effect began to disappear. Nevertheless, it seems certain that the Hungarians would be glad to have a United States minister in Budapest. In view, however, of the United States attitude toward the regime and of the recent history of relations between the two countries, the designation of a minister does not seem likely in the immediate future. When the time is ripe for such a step, it can probably be used as a bargaining point to procure important concessions from the Hungarians.

It should be noted, however, that the bargaining value of a ministerial designation could be reduced if in the meantime other Western countries, particularly the NATO nations, had accredited envoys here. During the past year, the Dutch and Belgian ministers departed, leaving charges d'Affaires to act for their countries. On the other hand, the British Minister, Sir Leslie Fry, left this month and in line with standard British practice is being replaced by another minister, due to arrive shortly. Similarly, a new Israeli minister is slated to arrive in February, replacing Minister Touval. The present charge d'Affaires of Greece has indicated he is hoping for an appointment as minister here this year. Hungary may be expected to urge a "regularization" of the relations upon other countries now represented here by charges; thus, new Hungarian ministers have already been accredited to Brussels and The Hague. While it would probably have been impossible to dissuade the British from sending a new minister, it is believed that the question of accreditation by other NATO countries should be kept under close review in the NATO Council in order to avoid having the United States placed in an embarrassingly isolated position in this matter.

Cardinal Mindszenty

The question of the future of Cardinal Mindszenty remains one of the most difficult problems of United States-Hungarian relations. This matter has been discussed at length in the Legation's despatch No. 471 of March 5, 1958, and in numerous other messages to the Department. We have at the moment little to add to these communications.

In October of last year, the Hungarian authorities flatly refused the request of the Sacred College of Cardinals, conveyed through the Legation, that Cardinal Mindszenty be permitted to attend the Conclave in Rome. This action put an end to speculation that the regime would be interested in a face-saving device for removing the Cardinal from Hungary. At the same time, the Cardinal's manifest reluctance even to consider departing except on the most specific instructions of the Vatican underlined the fact that in considering solutions to the question his attitude, as well as that of the Vatican, must be taken fully into account. Finally, this episode gave the regime a chance to say for the first time that the Hungarian authorities have been officially "notified" of the whereabouts of the Cardinal. The implications of this position are not clear; at the very least, it would seem that the regime now considers itself free to press at any time its charge that the Legation is harboring a fugitive from justice, contrary to international law and practice.

It should not be overlooked that the question of the Cardinal may involve such deep feelings of personal enmity and vengeance on both sides as to be virtually non-negotiable while the present leaders remain in power. The Legation is inclined to believe, however, that a settlement could be arranged, but that the price would be high. We continue to think the whole question of normalization of relations would be involved, including particularly the exchange of ministers between the two countries, and an express or implied understanding about future United States policy in the United Nations.


It is apparent from the above review that normalization of relations with the present regime in Hungary (even on a purely Curtain basis) is unlikely so long as (1) Cardinal Mindszenty remains a refugee in the Legation, (2) an exchange of ministers is not effected, and (3) the United States continues to spearhead the attacks on the regime in the United Nations. The Legation certainly does not recommend that the United States attempt to resolve all of these problems at the present time, but it does believe that these matters should be kept actively in mind and that all possible preparations should be made and actions taken to ameliorate and eventually to overcome these impediments to improved relations. There are, however, a few things which might be done immediately, in an effort to put ourselves in a better position to establish more intensive contact with government officials and with other Hungarians whose point of view might be affected by closer relations with the West. The Legation, therefore, recommends that the policy of the United States toward the present regime in Hungary be considered in the following sequence, with Phase I to be instituted immediately.


Phase I

1. That the passport restriction on travel of American citizens to Hungary be immediately rescinded, without any attempt to negotiate a quid pro quo therefor. The Legation believes that the small degree of thawing in our relations with Hungarian officials which would result from such action would be sufficient quid pro quo.

2. That our visa procedures with Hungary be carefully reviewed in detail, to be sure that our procedures are at least as liberal as those of the Hungarian regime. The Legation, for its part, contemplates raising with the Foreign Office the question of resuming a more liberal policy toward members of this Legation in return for the recent liberalization of United States visa policy toward members of the Hungarian Legation in Washington. (We shall do this about the middle of March, which will be approximately three months after the notification of our new procedures to the Foreign Office.)

3. That the United States officially facilitate, rather than restrict, the visits of Hungarians to the United States--particularly those engaged in cultural, information, sport, and commercial activities. The Hungarians have already been more liberal in this regard than has the United States, but this situation can hardly be expected to continue indefinitely on a one-sided basis.

Phase II

(The timing of this Phase would depend upon developments not only in Hungary, but in our general relations with the Communist bloc. However, the Legation believes that the matter should now be under active consideration in Washington; that the preliminary steps, which do not require discussion with the Hungarians, should be initiated; and that we should be ready to act if and when the situation appears propitious.)

1. Resolution of the problem of the Cardinal's refuge in the Legation (see, in this connection, the Legation's despatch No. 302, November 20, 1958)./7/

/7/Document 13.

2. The exchange of ministers between the United States and Hungary. (Note: It would seem probable that these two matters should be negotiated simultaneously, in the possibility that the one might be used to offset the other.)

3. That we desist from any further efforts to obtain the refusal of the credentials of the Hungarian delegation to the United Nations or the adoption of new resolutions on the Hungarian Question. This would not mean, however, that we would approve the rescinding of the Resolutions which have been adopted by the General Assembly, until such time as the USSR and Hungary might comply with those Resolutions. We should, on the contrary, continue to remind these two countries and the world in general (as, presumably, would other free countries, members of the United Nations) of the failure of the USSR and of Hungary to meet their obligations in this regard.

Phase III

With the completion of Phases I and II, we would be in normal Curtain relations with the Hungarian regime and would, thereby, be on a footing similar to that already occupied by other Western missions in Budapest. It is probable that, in the process of reaching this position, certain restrictive actions of the Hungarian regime would already have been altered--such, for instance, as the close surveillance of the Chancery (which is probably due, in large part, to the presence of the Cardinal) and the restrictions on the size and composition of the Legation staff. If, in fact, these things had not been done, we should then be in a better position to require that they be immediately carried out.

The United States should then, it is suggested, be prepared to propose to the Hungarian Government the establishment of such understandings or agreements as might be deemed necessary for the implementation of active programs for cultural and informational exchange and for commercial intercourse. The Legation does not feel that grandiose projects, involving large increases in personnel assigned to this Legation, would ever be justified, even under the most favorable circumstances; but it is believed that something quite effective might be done in cultural exchange and in a modest expansion of trade between the two countries. Pending, however, the arrival at this point of Phase III--which it might very well take some considerable time to reach--the Legation suggests that the Department encourage and, where possible, assist the expansion of cultural and commercial exchanges between the Hungarians and other Western countries--in particular, Great Britain, France, and Italy./8/

Garret G. Ackerson, Jr. Charge d'Affaires a.i.

/8/Attached to the source text was a memorandum from Assistant Secretary of State for Security and Consular Affairs John W. Hanes, Jr., to Merchant, dated February 16, in which Hanes wrote that he would oppose any change at this time in U.S. passport policy toward Hungary, and especially those changes recommended in despatch 413 from Budapest. He noted further that he "would certainly oppose it unless there were more compelling reasons for doing it--particularly of a quid pro quo nature-- than are apparent to me from reading this despatch." In another memorandum to Assistant Secretary of State for International Affairs Francis O. Wilcox, also dated February 16, Hanes wrote that he had seen "no actions on the part of the Hungarian regime nor of the USSR to warrant our softening our attitude along any of the lines suggested by Budapest" with regard to U.S. policy on the Hungarian question at the United Nations. (Department of State, UN Files: Lot 61 D 91, Hungary)

17. Report Prepared in the Bureau of Intelligence and Research

IR No. 8005 Washington, April 27, 1959.

//Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, OSS - INR Reports. Official Use Only. The source text bears the following notation: "This is an intelligence report and not a statement of Departmental policy."

/1/In this survey the term "Eastern Europe" includes the Soviet bloc countries of Poland, Hungary, Czechoslovakia, East Germany, Rumania, Bulgaria, and Albania. It also includes Yugoslavia. The term "intellectual" covers those groups included in the "intelligentsia" class of communist jargon, among which are writers, poets, artists, sculptors, composers, and others in the fine arts, as well as journalists, teachers, and students. The term is basically synonymous with "opinion molders." Because writers have been the most influential of Eastern European intellectuals, this survey is built mainly on their activities. [Footnote in the source text.]


The degree of freedom of expression allowed Eastern European intellectuals/1/ as of early 1959 lies somewhere between the rigidly enforced Party line of "socialist realism" that characterized the period before Stalin's death and the "thaw" that reached peak intensity in the period leading up to and just after the Polish and Hungarian upheavals of late 1956. During the two and a half years since the Hungarian revolution, the Eastern European regimes have tried--with varying degrees of success--to refurbish and strengthen their controls over all spheres of cultural life. Economic and other pressures have been used, but so far there has been little recourse to the police and other strong administrative measures of the Stalin era.

At present, Polish intellectuals have considerably greater latitude of expression than their counterparts in any other Eastern European bloc country. At the other extreme is Albania, which has passed through the Stalin and post-Stalin periods with its intellectual life unchanged. Throughout the period under review the regimes have been faced with the same problem they have had since their coming to power: the necessity of securing and maintaining the cooperation of intellectuals (the "opinion makers"), while trying, at the same time to move toward their ideological goal of forcing intellectual life into the mold of "socialist realism." At the end of the period, as at the beginning, press and official complaints about intellectual life make clear that the problem is still far from solution. In Yugoslavia, since the 1948 Tito - Cominform break, intellectuals have been allowed an increasing latitude of expression, with the yardstick of "socialist realism" gradually abandoned.

Polish and Hungarian Efforts to Re-Establish Controls

The eruptions that took place in Poland and Hungary in 1956 saw the virtually complete disintegration of the regime controls over intellectual life. Writers, journalists, and artists led the way in taking over or disrupting government and party apparatuses of control. With the rise of Gomulka to power in Poland and the quelling of the Hungarian revolution, the new governments began to cast about for methods of re-establishing these controls. The Gomulka regime has relied in its efforts largely on persuasion, while the Kadar regime has vacillated between force and inducement. In both cases the resistance of the intellectuals has kept the regimes from achieving more than limited success.

Poland. When Gomulka returned to power in October 1956, the Polish Party's control over intellectual life was almost nonexistent. Writers were free from censorship; publishing houses were independent of effective state control. The main Party newspaper, Trybuna Ludu, did not necessarily present anything more than the views of its editors. In the early months of 1957, Gomulka's position became strong enough to begin introducing certain measures to control literacy and journalistic activity. Regime spokesmen began to stress the "socialist responsibility" of writers and pointed to the international difficulties (with the USSR) that certain journalists had caused.

The first concrete steps taken were those aimed at increasing the regime's control over the press. Through 1957 the process of weeding out editors and journalists was carried on at a rapid pace. In the wake of an increasing number of appeals and warnings against irresponsible discussion, the student periodical Po Prostu was forced to stop operation in October. The cultural magazine Europa was banned before publishing its first issue.

So far at least, there has been no strong attempt to reintroduce "socialist realism," but the regime has made known its desire to have Polish intellectuals adapt themselves to a minimum degree of "socialist orientation." While economic and other means of pressure have been used to gain some sort of conformity, the Party is clearly unwilling to resort to repressive measures. In the short run, it cannot suppress intellectual freedom for fear of losing the intellectual support it still has.

Nevertheless, certain steps were taken in the closing months of 1958 that indicated the Polish regime's preoccupation with the weakness of its system of controlling intellectual life. A plenum of the Central Committee held in October formulated a "new cultural policy" and enunciated various proposals (still only on paper) directed toward improving the situation. One proposal called for the establishment of a high-level cultural agency to keep closer tabs on the direction and scope of foreign contacts. Another stressed the need for a new "ideological commission" within the Central Committee (to supplement the existing Cultural Commission); still another emphasized the need for more direct contact between the Party and writers, while a further one called for the establishment of a "Central Coordinating Commission" for cultural and educational matters with branches throughout the country.

Polish writers continue to resist pressures on their freedom to write as they wish. At a December 1958 writers' conference in Wroclaw, for example, they firmly and clearly condemned censorship of literary works by the regime. The government sarcastically rejected the writers' complaints and went on to criticize in sharp terms the silence of certain writers and a "coffee house dictatorship" among intellectuals-- the regime's way of describing the professional ostracism that is shown any writer or artist that gives in to regime blandishment or pressure.

The latest incident in the continuing struggle between the regime and writers broke into the open in early April 1959. The point at issue was a directive set forth by the Minister of Culture the beginning of 1959 that all Polish writers must obtain official approval before signing contracts with foreign publishers. The Writer's Union fought the new directive and has apparently won its case. Reportedly the Minister of Culture has revised his original statement to read that the directive was meant to be a suggestion and that the submission of foreign contracts for official approval was to be on a voluntary basis.

Hungary. Polish reluctance to use strong means for the re-establishment of cultural controls was not initially duplicated in Hungary. The Kadar regime began to take a strong stand against dissident writers and other intellectuals soon after Soviet troops had put down the revolution. In April 1957 the Writer's Union was abolished (replaced by a regime- oriented Literary Council) and other literary and artistic groups were reorganized. A Central Committee session of June viciously attacked writers, and throughout the rest of the year numerous intellectuals were arrested. In clamping down on cultural life, the regime made use of the phrase "counterrevolutionary activity" as a convenient peg on which to hang its accusations.

The Party resolution of June 1957 was reinforced by a strong "cultural directive" of August 1958. But despite these pressures, writers have continued to resist the regime's efforts to bring about conformity. Their main weapon has been silence. Kadar has recently admitted that many writers have been "silent" for six months or more. Other complaints have been that they have written only about "atemporal" and "apolitical" subjects, if they have written at all.

The apparent failure of strong-arm methods to achieve regime goals in obtaining the cooperation of the intelligentsia has apparently led the Hungarian regime to decide that a policy built on "comradely criticism" and inducement is more likely to be effective than force in bringing intellectuals into line. This "comradely criticism," however, has become increasingly sharp and the regime has made clear that its patience is not unlimited. The regime intends to revive the Writer's Union to take over or supplement the work of the Literary Council--apparently to increase pressure on writers to write as well as to conform. The press continues to attack "deviationists" of various categories (particularly the populists and folk writers who are criticized for overemphasizing nationalism and for attempting to build a third road to socialism). But for the present at least, there is little use of the police to enforce conformity. Whether this new policy will be long continued or will in fact prove effective is not yet clear.

Orthodox Regimes Seek to Strengthen Control Apparatus

The "thaw" and the 1956 upheavals in Poland and Hungary had only limited effect on the activities of intellectuals in the other and more "orthodox" bloc countries. In Albania no relaxation of the regime attitude was apparent, while Czechoslovakia, East Germany, Rumania, and Bulgaria had short periods of relaxation in the wake of the 1955 Geneva Conference and the 20th CPSU Congress. When writers and other intellectuals have threatened to get out of hand, however, they have been quickly disabused of ideas of intellectual freedom.

The position of intellectuals in these countries falls into one general pattern. Writers, artists, composers, and playwrights have been criticized (and have sometimes been the victims of stronger sanctions) for not staying within the bounds of "socialist realism." But the regimes have not, like the Polish and Hungarian Governments, been compelled since 1956 to re-establish control apparatuses--they have had only to strengthen existing mechanisms. New measures have been introduced for this purpose, but the use of drastic "administrative" measures characteristic of the Stalin era has been notably missing.

The police have not been commonly used to force complete conformity, and criticism of a book that had been published or a play that was already being shown to the public, has made clear that censorship is not absolute. Contacts with the West continue in varying degrees, although the regimes carp from time to time about the excessive influence of such contacts on the population (particularly the youth).

Czechoslovakia. The Czech and Slovak Central Committees used the Polish and Hungarian upheavals to sharpen their attacks on "revisionism" in literature and art and impose tighter supervision over the press and literary journals. Party press organs criticized those writers considered "too liberal" and all through 1957 forced changes in editorial boards to insure greater compliance with the Party line. In December a new commission to censor the press was established.

In spite of this increased pressure for conformity, there were several incidents in 1958 and 1959 that indicated the regime's control apparatus was not absolute. Josef Skvorecky's novel The Cowards, which was applauded immediately after its 1958 publication, was subsequently denounced as "cheap, slanderous, and sensation seeking." The head of the publishing house that put out the book was fired. Czech composers were told that they "were not immune to revisionist tendencies" and must make greater efforts to bring their music into closer touch with "real life under socialism."

In early 1959 regime spokesmen warned writers against such tendencies as "revisionism," "subjectivism," and "apoliticism." Films produced and already shown were condemned for "pessimism" and "bourgeois content" and banned. Theater managers were criticized for putting on plays "that the people want to see" rather than "those that would guide and instruct." They were also criticized for presenting "too few Soviet plays, only occasional Czech or Slovak contemporary plays, and none written by playwrights in other People's Democracies." Comparable regime efforts to insure intellectual conformity are apparent in all other fields of cultural activity. The "cultural conference" scheduled for this July will no doubt see those efforts raised to a still higher pitch.

East Germany. The "thaw" in East Germany, which began shortly after the 20th Congress of the CPSU, was concentrated in a limited number of philosophical and theoretical writers. No doubt with the 1953 uprising still vividly in mind, the regime took quick and forceful action (such as the arrest of "revisionist" Professor Wolfgang Harick in November 1956 and his trial in early 1957) to keep the intelligentsia in line; but it has used persuasion as well as force to attain its goal of conformity with "socialist realism." It has offered intellectuals a number of material and other incentives, including high wages, generous bonuses, and pleasant and paid vacations. The so-called "technical intelligentsia" (e.g., research professors, physicists, engineers) have received special consideration, such as access to Western publications and rather broad freedom of travel. Most significantly they have not been forced to become Party apologists as the price of advancement. The principal limitation placed on their activities has been that they are not publicly to oppose the regime.

Over the last several months the regime has intensified its efforts to strengthen the leadership of its cultural organizations, particularly those in East Berlin where contact with the West is greatest. Several of the Party's most capable and loyal cultural officials have recently replaced less effective officials there. The regime has also stepped up its efforts to emphasize traditional German values, with the aim of increasing the impact of its propaganda in both East and West Germany. "Socialist realism" remains the touchstone for new literature, but the old works now being reprinted and commented on have made room for such subjects as "Germany's cultural heritage," in which Goethe, Schiller, Bach--even Wagner--are presented as progressives and nationalists who looked eastward for inspiration.

Rumania. Rumania's "thaw" which began in mid-1955, was cut short in May 1956, when Alexandru Jar and several other writers criticized the Party's cultural line and demanded more intellectual freedom. The regime's response was immediate and the press was soon carrying Jar's abject effort at self-criticism, along with those of his fellow "deviationists."

Through 1957 and early 1958 press articles and official spokesmen called attention to the regime's dissatisfaction with the work of Rumanian intellectuals. The latter were accused of "seeking refuge in the past," "loss of contact with the people," and even " bourgeois nationalism." In 1957, for example, a conference of historians was sharply taken to task for dwelling on such subjects as "medieval sewerage and water problems" and the "organization in the middle ages of provincial towns" in the area that is now Rumania. Although authors were criticized for a number of failings that would have meant loss of position or even imprisonment in the Stalin era, no one was singled out for punishment--although the regime talked of "making examples."

Since mid-1958, the regime has taken a number of steps to increase its control over every sphere of intellectual life. Literature, art, music, the social sciences, have been among those to receive increased attention. Several new decrees have been aimed at tightening the regime's control over theatrical repertories and artistic organizations. Also during the last year, the regime has introduced decrees with the goal of improving the social composition of university students (i.e., to increase the percentage of those with worker or peasant parents), and to increase student participation in manual labor.

Bulgaria. Bulgaria experienced little literary ferment in the period leading up to and including the Hungarian revolution. It was only after the revolution had been put down that a number of plays, novels, and short stories were published that showed the disgruntlement and disaffection of writers who demanded the relaxation of literary censorship. The main outlet for these complaints was Plamuk, a literary journal started by the Writer's Union in early 1957. The most popular of these works--later classified as "black" literature by the Party--were Todor Genov's play Fear and Emil Manov's novel An Unauthentic Case, both of which underscored corruption and power-hunger in Party ranks. Manov, one of Plamuk's editors, came forth as the leading spokesman against "socialist realism" and Party domination of artistic creation.

Through the first half of 1957 the regime seemed undecided as to what steps to take in meeting this challenge. It launched a campaign against Polish, Hungarian, and Yugoslav "revisionist" intellectuals in the spring of 1957, but very little was said about the Bulgarian variety. The first sharp debates between Party spokesmen and the dissident writers began in the summer. By October Fear and An Unauthentic Case were among those literary works condemned by the regime as "revisionist." In December six editors of Plamuk were fired, and in January they were followed by the chief editor of the Bulgarian daily Otechestven Front.

In March 1958 the press began to carry a series of recantations--Genov in April, and Manov, the last to be brought into line, in May. The latter's defeat marked the conclusion of the regime's campaign against Bulgaria's dissident writers. Since then the press has carried articles criticizing various features of Bulgaria's cultural life, but to all intents and purposes the orthodoxy of "socialist realism" is now unchallenged.

Albania. The "thaw" and the events of 1956 left Albanian intellectuals untouched. From time to time writers and artists are criticized for not emphasizing "socialist realism" to the extent desired by the regime, but in general Albania's limited number of intellectuals support the regime and its goals--and by so doing they maintain their highly privileged status.

Yugoslavia Allows Wide Latitude of Intellectual Freedom

"Socialist realism" was abandoned by the Yugoslav regime shortly after the 1948 Tito - Cominform break. There has been nothing since then to indicate that it, or any other yardstick of cultural purity, would be introduced. Yugoslav ideologues like to describe their cultural line as "the new socialist humanism," but in fact there has been little regime effort to set limits on or guide intellectual activity. Painters and graphic artists are completely free, as underscored by their wide- ranging choice of subject matter and style. An exhibit of Yugoslav paintings is as diverse (and as extreme) as anything seen in Western Europe or the United States. While there are limits on the content of literary works, those limits are wide--mainly that Tito, or his government, is not to be criticized. Writers are well aware of this "off-limits" area and have steered clear of giving the regime cause for retaliation. They have generally left politics to Party theoreticians.

Contacts with the West run the whole gamut of intellectual life. Western European and American plays, particularly those in the socialist or avant-garde genre, are extremely popular. The same is true of books, magazines, and art.

Although not frequently done, the Yugoslavs enjoy taunting about "socialist-realism" in the bloc, with the sharpest barbs reserved for Bulgaria and other neighboring countries. Over the last several months the Yugoslavs have rebutted bloc criticism of Yugoslav cultural life in broadcasts beamed in Polish to Europe--in perhaps the hope that in this way they can show their support for the Poles in rejecting Soviet cultural dictation.

18. Operations Coordinating Board Report

Washington, July 2, 1959.


I. Introduction

A. Special Operating Guidance

1. Scope of Plan. The countries covered by this Plan are Albania, Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, and Rumania. Poland and Yugoslavia are each the subject of a separate Plan./1/

//Source: Department of State, OCB Files: Lot 61 D 385, USSR & Satellites--Documents--1959 - 60. Secret. According to a covering memorandum by OCB Executive Officer Bromley Smith, this plan was a revision and updating of the plan approved by the Board on January 23, 1958, and was concurred in by the Board Assistants, on behalf of their principals, on July 2. No copy of the January 23 version has been found in Department of State files; in his covering memorandum, Smith instructed recipients to destroy copies of previous drafts of the plan as well as the January 23 version.

/1/Regarding the OCB Operations Plans on Poland and Yugoslavia, see Part 1, footnote 1, Document 80 and Document 145, respectively.

2. Long-Range Objective. Fulfillment of the right of the peoples in the dominated nations to enjoy representative governments resting upon the consent of the governed, exercising full national independence, and participating as members of the Free World community.

3. Short-Range Objectives.

a. Promotion of the peaceful evolution of the dominated nations toward national independence and internal freedom, even though those nations may continue for some time under the close political and military control of the Soviet Union.

b. Reduction of the contribution of the dominated nations to Soviet strength, and weakening of the monolithic front and internal cohesiveness of the Soviet bloc.

4. [13-1/2 lines of source text not declassified]

5. Soviet Policy. Present Soviet policy appears to be one of experimentation in an effort to find a middle course between the alternatives of (a) placing primary reliance on policies of force and repression, and (b) granting increasing autonomy and independence to the Eastern European regimes. The first alternative would deny to these regimes the possibility of broadening their base of popular support. The second alternative would stimulate popular pressures for further concessions and might become extremely difficult to control. The USSR probably will permit the dominated nations to enter into increasing but selectively-controlled contacts with the West, in an attempt, among other things, to enhance the prestige of these regimes and otherwise favorably influence world opinion; to obtain technical data, commodities, and markets in line with overall bloc plans, and to ease economic strains; and to appease the desires of the intelligentsia in the area for wider associations throughout the world.

6. Increased U.S. Opportunities. Although surface stability has been maintained or restored in all the dominated nations, and will probably be preserved over the next few years, an atmosphere of change and ferment more highly charged than under Stalin will probably continue for some time. This atmosphere offers the United States and Western European countries new opportunities, though still limited, to influence the dominated regimes through greater activity, both private and official, in such fields as tourist travel, cultural exchange, and economic relations, including exchanges of technical and commercial visitors. Experience has shown that a U.S. policy designed to ostracize the dominated regimes has had the concurrect effect of inhibiting increased direct U.S. contacts with the people of the dominated nations. It is now apparent that, as a practical matter, substantial expansion of direct U.S. contacts with the peoples of these nations, and the development through such contacts of popular pressures upon the regimes for increased internal freedom and independence from Soviet control, cannot be achieved without more active U.S. relationships with and through these governments. Such relationships would enable the United States to probe, within the party and governmental bureaucracy, for those individuals or groups who show signs of independent thought, nationalist aspirations, or willingness to use their influence to modify their nation's subservient relationship to the Soviet Union. The actual opportunities for carrying out this policy will, of course, vary from time to time and from country to country. At the present time a necessary first step in Albania is resumption of diplomatic relations. In Czechoslovakia, an important preparatory step is the reaching of an economic agreement, which is currently being negotiated. In Hungary it is difficult to establish useful contacts with government officials while the United States continues to take the lead in focusing world attention on the Soviet suppression of Hungarian freedom and the unrepresentative nature of the present Hungarian government. The Rumanian regime has manifested real though cautious interest in expanding trade relations and in limited cultural, technical, and educational exchanges with the United States.

7. Need for Flexible Approach. Flexible U.S. courses of action, involving inducements as well as probing actions and pressures, sometimes applied simultaneously, are required to exploit Soviet vulnerabilities in the dominated nations, and to complicate the exercise of Soviet control over them. Actions to exploit vulnerabilities must be taken with due consideration for other U.S. actions aimed at more active relations with the existing regimes for the purpose of strengthening U.S. influence in these countries and their ties with the West.

8. Expanding Direct Contacts with the People. In order to maintain and develop popular pressures on the present regimes and accelerate evolution toward independence from Soviet control, direct contacts with the people of the dominated nations should be expanded. To facilitate this expansion of direct contact with the people, more active relations with the existing regimes should be established, but without creating the impression that the basic U.S. attitude toward these regimes has changed or will change in the absence of some significant modification in their character. The people of the dominated nations should be encouraged to seek their goals gradually. [4 lines of source text not declassified]

9. Exploiting Divisive Forces. To impair and weaken Soviet domination, divisive forces should be exploited by appropriate measures, including:

a. Fostering nationalist pride and aspirations among the people and within the regime leadership.

b. [2 lines of source text not declassified]

c. [1-1/2 lines of source text not declassified]

d. Publicizing evidences of unequal treatment by the USSR.

e. Encouraging comparisons of the lot of the dominated nations with that of the USSR and with each other, utilizing, within the context of existing directives, examples of Yugoslavia and Poland in loosening Soviet control over this area.

10. Clarifying U.S. Policy. On appropriate occasions, the United States view should be emphasized that the people of each nation should be independent and free to choose their form of government; but any action or statement should be avoided which could reasonably be represented in the dominated nations as advocacy of a return to authoritarian systems of government such as existed in some of these countries prior to or during World War II. It should also be reiterated on appropriate occasions in public statements that the United States does not look upon the dominated nations as potential military allies and supports their right to independence, not to encircle the Soviet Union with hostile forces, but so that they may take their rightful place as equal members in a peaceful European community of nations. Official public statements should continue to point out the evils and defects of the Soviet- Communist system; reiterate U.S. refusal to accept the domination of these nations by the USSR as an acceptable status quo; and stress evolutionary change.

11. Encouraging Independent Initiatives. The regimes in the dominated nations should be encouraged to take independent initiatives in foreign relations and domestic affairs. The United States should also take advantage of every appropriate opportunity to demonstrate to these regimes how their national interest may be served by independent actions looking toward more normal relations with the West. Efforts should be made to bring the dominated nations increasingly into the activities of international technical and social organizations in order to contribute to their greater independence from Soviet influence and to the U.S. advantage. The benefits received by Yugoslavia and Poland from their relations with the United States should be used as an inducement to the regimes of the dominated nations to seek closer relations with the West.

12. Negotiating Issues. The United States should be prepared to discuss and negotiate issues between it and the individual regimes. When complete solutions are not possible, partial solutions which do not impair U.S. objectives should be accepted. Efforts should be made to alleviate or settle long-standing economic issues (such as nationalization claims, surplus property and other financial obligations) between the United States and the dominated nations.

13. Support to Emigres. Support of selected emigres or emigre groups capable of making a positive contribution to U.S. objectives should be continued, while support of less useful emigre organizations is gradually phased out. Efforts should be made to restrict, on a more selective basis, the issuance of official press releases and public statements commemorating traditional national holidays and other anniversary events in the dominated countries. The regularity with which such statements have been issued in routine response to the solicitations of various emigre groups and organizations year after year has made this practice increasingly counter-productive and has tended to detract from the value and impact of statements issued by high officials on occasions of real interest and significance.

14. Defectors, Escapees, and Refugees. [3 lines of source text not declassified] Overt publicity and propaganda exploitation of defectors, escapees, and refugees should be restricted to specific cases where a net advantage to the United States can be expected or where some degree of public treatment is required in the interest of maintaining the credibility of U.S. media. Otherwise, U.S. policies on defectors, escapees, and refugees from Communist areas continue to apply to nationals of the dominated nations.

15. Expansion of Trade. Efforts should be made, on a case-by-case basis as approved by the Council on Foreign Economic Policy, to establish more normal trade relations between the United States and the dominated nations with which the United States has diplomatic relations, thereby facilitating a gradual expansion of trade--consistent with U.S. economic and trade control policies--when this would be a means of projecting U.S. influence and lessening the dominated nations' economic ties with, and dependence on, the Soviet Union.

16. Charitable and Relief Efforts. Voluntary relief agencies should be encouraged to undertake appropriate operations in the dominated nations when suitable opportunities arise. U.S. agencies should be prepared to offer food and other relief assistance, through voluntary agencies or otherwise, to the people of the dominated countries when emergency situations occur.

17. Official Information and Cultural Program. The general goal of the official United States information and cultural program in the Soviet- dominated nations is to provide the peoples in this area with informational or cultural material which will (a) give them a sound understanding of United States and Western policy, (b) strengthen their cultural ties with, and foster favorable attitudes toward, the United States and the Free World, and (c) be useful in helping them meet their own problems in ways which will promote the peaceful evolution of the dominated nations toward national independence and internal freedom.

U.S. information and cultural activities within these countries are severely restricted at present. In Albania, where the United States does not now have a diplomatic mission, it is only through the Voice of America that the U.S. Government can reach the local populace. Even in Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, and Rumania, the Voice remains, despite strong jamming, especially in urban areas, the primary means for the U.S. Government to reach the broad masses of the population. In the absence of USIS posts in any of these countries, U.S. information and cultural activities are carried on by the personnel of the U.S. diplomatic mission, and primarily by USIA officers (at present one to each mission) assigned there by arrangement with the State Department. In these countries, police-state conditions hamper in varying degrees informal contacts between United States diplomatic personnel and the local populace, so that distribution and placement of informational materials is kept at a low level at best. For the most part, American cultural attractions, including exhibits, can be scheduled and exchange activities carried on only with regime consent and under stipulations of reciprocity.

Although the amount that USIA can actually do at any given time depends mainly on the attitude of the local regime, USIA should be prepared to take advantage of any change in regime attitudes or other opportunity to increase information and cultural activities. The Department of State, on the other hand, should be prepared to resolve problems of reciprocity that undoubtedly will accompany any proposed increase of such activities. At the same time, it is important to exercise discretion in these efforts so that they do not provoke further regime suppression.

18. Special Role of Private Media. Private information and cultural activities in, or having access to, the dominated nations should be supported, as private media can engage in activities which would promote U.S. objectives but for which the United States Government would not wish to accept responsibility.

19. Motion Picture Films. Continue the practice of giving every proper assistance to American motion picture distributors seeking to market their films in the area.

20. Granting Reciprocity. The United States should be prepared to permit information and cultural activities in this country by the diplomatic missions of the dominated nations on an approximately reciprocal basis.

21. Internal Security. Entries, visits, and activities in the United States of individuals or groups from Soviet-dominated nations are subject to internal security safeguards approved by ICIS (Interdepartmental Committee on Internal Security).

22. Countering Penetration of Less-Developed Areas. The United States and other Free World nations should seek to counter Soviet efforts to use the dominated nations for penetration of the less-developed nations. Czechoslovakia is being given a major role in these efforts; Rumania is also being used in connection with the oil industry.

B. Selected U.S. Agreements With or Pertaining to the Soviet-Dominated Nations

23. U.S. Involvements Which May Imply Military Security Guarantees. None.

24. U.S. Commitments for Funds, Goods, and Services. None.

25. Other Agreements. Peace Treaty with Bulgaria. Peace Treaty with Hungary. Peace Treaty with Rumania./2/ Surplus Property Agreement with Czechoslovakia./3/ Surplus Property Agreement with Hungary./3/ For additional agreements, see Treaties in Force.

/2/For texts of the treaties of peace signed by the Allied nations with Bulgaria, Hungary, and Romania at Paris, February 10, 1947, see 4 Bevans 403.

/3/Not further identified.

II. Current and Projected Programs and Courses of Action

Note: Individual action items when extracted from this Plan may be downgraded to the appropriate security classification. Unless otherwise stated, target dates for the following courses of action are all "Continuing".


26. In order to promote expanded contacts and to revive and revitalize traditional bonds between the dominated nations and the United States, give encouragement, as circumstances in a particular nation may warrant, and consistent with U.S. economic and trade control policies, to:

a. Contacts between U.S. individuals and individuals in dominated nations in religious, cultural, technical, business, and social fields.

b. Contacts between U.S. business and other organizations and organizations in the dominated nations in comparable fields, including the exchange of delegations of technical experts.

c. Participation, where feasible and appropriate, in internal trade fairs, film festivals, etc., organized by the dominated nations, inviting on a basis of general reciprocity their participation in such activities in the United States.

d. An expanding exchange program of students and teachers and increasing numbers of leaders' and specialists' visits.

e. An expanding program of cultural presentations and athletic events designed to increase U.S. prestige and show U.S. interest in strengthening contacts with the peoples of the dominated countries.

Assigned to: State, USIA

Supporting: Other interested agencies

27. Encourage Western European nations to adopt policies toward the dominated countries parallel to those of the United States, and in particular to concert together through established institutions such as NATO, OEEC, and the Council of Europe for the purposes of (a) taking all practicable steps to extend Western European influence among the dominated nations of Eastern Europe, and (b) exploiting the concept of an integrated, prosperous, and stable European community.

Assigned to: State

28. [3 lines of source text not declassified]

Assigned to: Defense

29. To the extent possible, provide appropriate informational and public relations support for the political and economic policies and programs set forth elsewhere in this Operations Plan. Through VOA broadcasts in the language of each country and in other major languages beamed to Eastern Europe, continue to present accurate information on news events and aspects of life in America and the Free World, as well as on significant developments in the Communist World which are either ignored or distorted by Communist media, in order to further the goals listed in paragraph 17. U.S. diplomatic personnel should establish contacts to carry on, to the extent possible at any given time, the following USIS- type program activities:

a. Distribute a daily press bulletin to local government officials, members of the diplomatic corps, and local press services and newspapers, based on stories and texts carried in the Special European File transmitted by radio-teletype to each post.

b. Furnish other press material to local editors where there is any likelihood of its use for publication or for background, particularly in such non-political fields as sports, music, science and technology, and art.

c. Arrange for the non-commercial circulation or invitational playing of American films, records, tapes, etc.

d. As opportunities arise, provide films and kinescopes for local TV placement.

e. Conduct a presentation program among selected individuals and groups, featuring books, magazines, brochures, art reproductions, and other suitable materials.

f. Encourage and facilitate the performance of representative American musical and theatrical works by local artistic groups.

g. Arrange for the showing of American cultural and scientific exhibits (in a number of cities in addition to the capital, if possible), accompanied as appropriate by the presentation of books, magazines, and local-language brochures and other material.

h. Utilize Legation or Embassy premises for display purposes, through small exhibits in the windows where these are suitably located and adapted, through picture stories on bulletin boards facing the street, and through suitable displays which can be viewed by visitors to mission offices.

i. Maintain in each mission a small reading room accessible to members of the public who have occasion to visit the mission, making sure that adequate supplies of suitable magazines, pamphlets, etc., are on hand for presentation to visitors or replacement of materials taken by visitors.

j. Provide whatever encouragement and material assistance can be given to the teaching of English locally.

k. Utilize the visits of American tourists, businessmen, cultural and sports groups, etc., on a discretionary basis, to widen the dissemination of American informational and cultural materials among the local populace.

Assigned to: USIA and State


A. Political

30. When appropriate, recognize and establish diplomatic relations with Albania, subject to certain conditions, including a guarantee of correct treatment of U.S. diplomatic personnel and satisfactory settlement of the question of the validity of pre-war treaties between Albania and the United States.

Assigned to: State

31. On a selective basis, where our opinion is sought, encourage Western and pro-Western governments to establish diplomatic missions in Albania.

Assigned to: State

32. Continue to maintain informal contact with representatives of the Free Albania Committee in New York. This relationship should be reexamined at such time as United States recognition may be extended to an Albanian government.

Assigned to: State

Supporting: All interested agencies

B. Information and Cultural

33. Through VOA broadcasts, which are virtually our only means of contact with Albania, endeavor to sustain the interest of the Albanian people in the United States and the Free World. By means of these broadcasts seek to inform the Albanian people of U.S. policies, particularly toward Eastern Europe, and of developments in the United States, the Free World, and the Soviet bloc.

Assigned to: USIA

Supporting: State

34. In the event of United States recognition, permit United States tourist travel to Albania. In the meantime, continue to maintain the procedures under which passports may be individually endorsed for travel to Albania for legitimate business, professional, or compassionate reasons.

Assigned to: State


A. Political

35. On March 24, 1959, following negotiations in which the Bulgarian Government withdrew charges of espionage made against former U.S. Minister Heath (which had occasioned the suspension of diplomatic relations in 1950)/4/ and provided assurances that a U.S. Mission in Sofia would be permitted to carry on normal diplomatic functions, agreement was reached for the resumption of U.S.-Bulgarian diplomatic relations./5/ Preparations are now underway to establish a U.S. Legation in Sofia. The target date is August 1959./6/ Passport restrictions on the travel of U.S. citizens to Bulgaria have been removed.

/4/Diplomatic relations between the United States and Bulgaria were suspended on February 21, 1950.

/5/The United States and Bulgaria agreed to resume relations on March 24, 1959; see the Supplement.

/6/Edward Page, Jr., presented his credentials as Minister to Bulgaria on March 14, 1960.

Assigned to: State

36. Upon the establishment of a U.S. Mission in Sofia, the United States should seek to establish and maintain as active and continuous contact as circumstances may permit with Bulgarian officials and leading personalities in other important fields in order to assess the situation there with a view toward determining the courses of action which will best contribute to the attainment of U.S. objectives in that country.

Assigned to: State

B. Information and Cultural

37. Upon the establishment of a U.S. Mission, explore the possibilities for exchanges in the cultural, technical and educational fields as well as opportunities for United States cultural presentations in Bulgaria. Should such opportunities be found to exist, appropriate proposals should be made to the Bulgarians for such exchanges and presentations.

Assigned to: State

Supporting: USIA and other interested agencies

38. Upon its establishment, the United States Mission in Sofia should seek to institute such informational activities as a Legation bulletin board and the dissemination of appropriate United States publications.

Assigned to: State

Supporting: USIA

39. Continue in VOA Bulgarian broadcasts to present accurate information on news events and aspects of life in the American and the non-Communist world, as well as on significant developments in the Communist world which are either ignored or distorted by Communist news media.

Assigned to: USIA

Supporting: State

C. Economic

40. Advise and, when appropriate, assist U.S. businessmen who show interest in exploring Bulgarian trade opportunities when such trade will not contravene strategic trade controls.

Assigned to: State

Supporting: Commerce

41. Facilitate visits of Bulgarian commercial missions to the United States, consistent with U.S. economic and trade control policies and provided adequate security safeguards can be maintained.

Assigned to: State

Supporting: Commerce, Justice


A. Political

42. Seek the permission of Czechoslovakia for the reopening of a consulate in Bratislava at an appropriate time and be prepared to permit Czechoslovakia to open a consulate in the United States on a reciprocal basis.

Assigned to: State

Target Date: As stated

43. Be prepared to consider any appropriate opportunity offered by the Czechoslovak Government to expand the staff of Embassy Prague from the limitation of 18 presently imposed by the Czechoslovak Government.

Assigned to: State

Supporting: Other interested agencies

Target Date: As opportunity presents

B. Information and Cultural

44. Continue in VOA broadcasts to Czechoslovakia to present accurate information on news events and aspects of life in America and the non- Communist world, as well as significant developments in the Communist world which are either ignored or distorted by Communist news media.

Assigned to: USIA

45. Consider at the appropriate time official participation in any international trade fair to be held in Brno.

Assigned to: Commerce, State

Supporting: USIA

C. Economic

46. If an economic settlement is reached, consider means of stimulating an expansion of peaceful trade between the United States and Czechoslovakia.

Assigned to: Commerce

Supporting: State

47. Continue negotiations with Czechoslovakia in an effort to resolve outstanding economic issues between the two countries.

Assigned to: State

Target Date: August 1959


A. Political

48. Continue efforts to focus world opinion on the Hungarian issue by all appropriate means, including diplomatic action, debate within the UN, and the use of official and non-official U.S. media.

Assigned to: State

Supporting: USIA and other interested agencies

49. Continue to consult with Free World nations--and especially with the NATO powers--with a view to coordinating policies toward Hungary.

Assigned to: State

50. Continue efforts to establish and broaden contacts with officials at all levels of the Hungarian administration with a view to identifying and encouraging those tendencies and elements which may be disposed toward greater national independence.

Assigned to: State

51. When and as conditions permit, seek to develop more active relations with the Budapest regime, being prepared in appropriate circumstances to consider an exchange of Ministers.

Assigned to: State

52. At an appropriate time, remove the current restrictions against tourist travel to Hungary by U.S. citizens.

Assigned to: State

B. Information and Cultural

53. Encourage exchanges of athletes, musicians, educators, scientists, technicians, and professional people on a case-by-case basis but do not permit the sending of the Hungarian Folk Ensemble or similar large prestige attractions to this country until the campaign of repression and reprisals in Hungary has ceased.

Assigned to: State

Supporting: USIA and other interested agencies

54. In VOA broadcasts to Hungary, continue to present accurate information on news events and aspects of life in America and the non- Communist world, as well as significant developments in the Communist world which are either ignored or distorted by Communist news media.

Assigned to: USIA

55. When circumstances permit, initiate some informational activities on the Legation's premises, such as the use of window displays on a modest scale and the dissemination of popular U.S. publications to Legation visitors.

Assigned to: USIA

Supporting: State

56. As conditions permit, consider participation in the Budapest Industrial Fair and/or the Budapest Agricultural Fair to the extent possible in view of other commitments under the U.S. trade fair program. On a reciprocal basis, permit Hungarian participation at the New York Trade Fair or similar events in the United States.

Assigned to: State, Commerce, Agriculture, USIA

C. Economic

57. Continue to permit Hungarians to visit the United States for business purposes on a case-by-case basis provided adequate security safeguards can be maintained and provided such visits are consistent with U.S. economic and trade control policies.

Assigned to: State

Supporting: Justice, Commerce

58. In working towards the satisfactory integration of Hungarian refugees in the Free World and in order to minimize redefections to Hungary:

a. Complete the processing of Hungarian refugees as part of the special immigration program under Public Law 85 - 316 and, pursuant to Public Law 85 - 559, continue to admit into this country for permanent residence Hungarian refugees paroled into the United States.

Assigned to: State, Justice

Target Date: September 1, 1960

b. Continue to employ the U.S. Escapee Program to care for and to assist in the resettlement of refugees in other countries, or, if resettlement is not possible, to arrange for their satisfactory local integration.

Assigned to: State


A. Political

59. Make every effort to maintain close and continuous contact with the Rumanian Government on as high a level as possible. Even when the situation is such that there is little or no immediate bilateral business to be discussed, United States representatives should utilize every appropriate occasion to make clear to the Rumanian authorities United States views on important international issues and to encourage them to take these views into careful consideration.

Assigned to: State

60. Seek to establish and maintain contacts with Rumanians not directly connected with Government but influential in artistic, professional and technical fields.

Assigned to: State

Supporting: USIA and other interested agencies

61. Continue on every appropriate occasion to point out to the Rumanians that United States restrictions on Rumanian diplomatic travel are purely retaliatory and will be eliminated whenever the Rumanians are willing to do likewise.

Assigned to: State

62. With regard to restrictions placed by the Rumanian authorities on the staff and functions of the American Mission in Bucharest, maintain a policy of strict reciprocity wherever feasible with respect to the staff and functions of the Rumanian Mission in the United States.

Assigned to: State

B. Information and Cultural

63. Encourage cultural, technical and educational exchanges between the United States and Rumania and be prepared to consider favorably such proposals as the Rumanians may make in this field which are not of a nature disadvantageous to the United States.

Assigned to: State

Supporting: USIA and other interested agencies

64. In VOA broadcasts to Rumania, continue to present accurate information on news events and aspects of life in America and the non- Communist world, as well as significant developments in the Communist world which are either ignored or distorted by Communist news media.

Assigned to: USIA

65. Propose U.S. cultural exhibits and presentations in Rumania whenever the nature of available exhibits warrants and appropriate opportunity exists.

Assigned to: State

Supporting: USIA and other interested agencies

66. In order to assure favorable treatment of U.S. presentations in Rumania, use the influence of the U.S. Government with exhibitors and impresarios in the United States to promote acceptance of reciprocal or equivalent Rumanian presentations in the United States.

Assigned to: State

Supporting: USIA and other interested agencies

67. Assist, encourage and maintain close liaison with private groups and organizations such as universities and foundations which seek to develop exchanges of persons, materials and information with Rumania, where such proposed exchanges are clearly consistent with United States objectives.

Assigned to: State

Supporting: USIA and other interested agencies

68. Although prospects for the establishment of a U.S. information library in Bucharest do not appear favorable at the present time, such a proposal should be renewed whenever circumstances may indicate possible Rumanian receptivity.

Assigned to: State

Supporting: USIA

69. Continue such informational activities as are now undertaken, such as the Legation bulletin board and the dissemination of technical and popular U.S. publications.

Assigned to: State

Supporting: USIA

C. Economic

70. Advise and, when appropriate, assist U.S. businessmen who show interest in exploring Rumanian trade opportunities when such trade will not contravene strategic trade controls.

Assigned to: State

Supporting: Commerce

71. Facilitate visits of Rumanian commercial missions to the United States, consistent with U.S. economic and trade control policies, and provided adequate security safeguards can be maintained.

Assigned to: State

Supporting: Commerce, Justice

72. Be receptive to Rumanian proposals looking toward a solution of war damage and nationalization issues, and be prepared to discuss these issues with them, but maintain our position against joint examination of each individual claim as set out in the Rumanian - U.S. discussions of October - November 1956.

Assigned to: State

Supporting: Foreign Claims Settlement Commission

Note: The following National Intelligence Estimates are applicable:

NIE 12 - 58--Outlook for Stability in the Eastern European Satellites--4 February 1958./7/

NIE 10 - 58--Anti-Communist Resistance Potential in the Sino-Soviet Bloc--4 March 1958./8/

NIE 11 - 4 - 58--Main Trends in Soviet Capabilities and Policies, 1958 - 1963--23 December 1958./9/

NIE 12 - 59--Outlook in the Eastern European Satellites (tentatively scheduled for consideration in July, 1959). Document 2. Document 3. Scheduled for publication in volume III. Document 22.


[End of Section 4]

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