U.S. Department of State
Vol. X, Part 1, FRUS, 1958-60: E. Europe Region; Soviet Union; Cyprus
Office of the Historian
[Section 2 of 19]
EASTERN EUROPE REGION
U.S. POLICY TOWARD THE SOVIET-DOMINATED NATIONS IN EASTERN EUROPE; U.S. RESPONSE TO THE RAPACKI PLAN FOR CREATION OF A NUCLEAR-FREE ZONE IN CENTRAL EUROPE; PRESIDENT EISENHOWER'S PROCLAMATION OF CAPTIVE NATIONS WEEK
1. Telegram From the Department of State to the Mission to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization and European Regional Organizations
Washington, January 21, 1958, 5:38 p.m.
Topol 2486. This message contains Department views on Rapacki Plan./1/
//Source: Department of State, Central Files, 640.0012/1 - 2858. Secret. Drafted by Reinstein (EUR/GER) and McBride (EUR/RA) and cleared with various officers in the Department of State and with the Department of Defense. Also sent to London and Ottawa and repeated to Bonn, Moscow, Warsaw, Ankara, Athens, Brussels, Copenhagen, Lisbon, Luxembourg, Oslo, Reykjavik, Rome, and The Hague.
/1/The Rapacki Plan was first proposed by Polish Foreign Minister Adam Rapacki in a speech to the U.N. General Assembly on October 2, 1957. It called for the establishment of a denuclearized zone in Poland, Czechoslovakia, the German Democratic Republic, and the German Federal Republic. For text of Rapacki's address (U.N. doc. A/PV.697), see Documents on Disarmament, 1945 - 1959, vol. II, pp. 889 - 892.
Embassies London and Ottawa should convey Foreign Offices as soon as possible and inform Department and USRO when instructions carried out.
USRO should make presentation to NAC based on following points as soon as NAC schedule permits. You may begin your presentation using numbered points 1 - 4 Polto 2112/2/ as preamble. We leave it to your judgment and Spaak's views whether or not convene special NAC meeting.
/2/Points 1 - 4 of Polto 2112 from Paris, January 18, discussed Western and free world public opinion and the difficulty of leading it in the “right direction." The telegram cautioned that the United States must not appear to be forcing atomic weapons or foreign forces on its European allies, but point 4 concludes that the United States “does not propose to sacrifice real security for agreements that only provide illusion of security." (Department of State, Central Files, 740.00/1 - 858)
1) We indicated in our reply to Bulganin note/3/ which was discussed in NAC that we believed Rapacki Plan should be studied in NATO and with NATO countries directly concerned. In Heads of Government communique/4/ NATO nations stated they would study all proposals designed to reduce international tensions. Accordingly we have carefully considered Rapacki Plan. After careful study our reaction is heavily negative. While it might have some surface attraction, it poses totally unacceptable risks. Therefore we cannot consider this scheme as basis for any serious negotiations for reasons given below.
/3/For text of Premier Bulganin's letter of December 10, 1957, and President Eisenhower's reply of January 12, 1958, both of which dealt with ways to reduce international tension, see Department of State Bulletin, January 27, 1958, pp. 122 - 130.
/4/For text of the communique issued on December 19, 1957, at the conclusion of the meeting of the Heads of Government of the North Atlantic Council in Paris, see ibid., January 6, 1958, pp. 12 - 15.
2) Although other proposals in same field (Kennan ideas, Gaitskell plan, etc.)/5/ are being publicly discussed, we have restricted following to Rapacki Plan because latter was specifically raised in Bulganin note. Furthermore attempt discuss all these things at once would seem confusing.
/5/The proposals of former Ambassador to the Soviet Union George F. Kennan and British Labour leader Hugh Gaitskell, among others, are discussed in Intelligence Report No. 7664, “Public Reaction in Western Europe to Recent Disengagement Proposals," February 13, 1958, prepared by the Bureau of Intelligence and Research in the Department of State. (National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, OSS - INR Reports)
3) For obvious reasons we believe NAC debate on this subject should remain most private and we expect every precaution will be taken against leaks.
4) We believe dangers of plan are self-evident to those with any knowledge of subject. Real problem would seem to be public opinion, in combating what appears to public on surface as reasonable proposal. We believe public statements by Western countries on Rapacki Plan should spell out as simply as possible dangers of plan and stress positive aspects Western proposals in disarmament and security fields.
5) In meeting this unquestioned problem of public opinion, we believe NATO Governments should take lead in presenting forcefully to their peoples considerations which make this plan dangerous, as well as positive aspects of Western proposals.
6) Rapacki Plan was put forward by Poles in UN some months ago. While it attracted relatively little attention initially, degree of interest in Western opinion which it has aroused since endorsement by Bulganin makes essential adoption common line by NATO Governments on proposals and concepts it involves.
7) Rapacki Plan has much in common with other Soviet bloc initiatives in that it proposes formula to reduce tensions in Europe based on existing division of Germany, and designed to exclude nuclear weapons from Germany.
8) Rapacki Plan goes counter agreed NATO strategy existing since 1954 which calls for integrated nuclear capability in NATO shield forces. Furthermore Heads of Government meeting recently decided implement decision extend tactical nuclear weapons (which US forces now have) to forces of other nations (warheads remaining US custody). Without such weapons Soviet superiority becomes overwhelming in light their much greater conventional forces.
9) Barring NATO forces in Germany from having nuclear weapons is unacceptable militarily and it is highly unlikely US opinion would tolerate maintenance significant US forces in Germany without such weapons, which in their tactical form are increasingly becoming conventional, with U.S. forces. Result would be that shield concept would disappear.
10) Rapacki Plan also involves disarmament considerations. If ban proposed is on nuclear warheads alone, we seriously question its enforceability. If it involves delivery systems as well (Rapacki according to Embassy Warsaw includes ban on “nuclear infrastructure" in his plan), it obviously goes deeply into question armament limitations.
11) From disarmament standpoint, Rapacki Plan and Soviet variant thereof appear new limited form of basic Soviet “ban the bomb" proposal. As arms limitation applied to divided Germany, it involves entire European security question which Western policy links to German reunification.
12) Plan has further disadvantage of establishing particular conditions and limitations on one NATO member which do not apply to others. This is contradictory thus not only to basic NATO strategy as outlined but also to NATO political unity.
13) Rapacki Plan is sharply different from NATO-approved disarmament proposals of last August which envisaged inspection for prevention surprise attack in a broad European zone which included portions of USSR./6/
/6/Secretary Dulles made this proposal to the Subcommittee of the U.N. Disarmament Commission on August 2, 1957; for text of his address, see Documents on Disarmament, 1945 - 1959, vol. II, pp. 839 - 845.
14) Rapacki Plan appears designed to appeal to sentiment in West for "disengagement" on basis present line of demarcation between Soviets and West. This sentiment appears to be motivated by two ideas.
a) One is that confrontation of two large groups of potentially hostile forces in Central Europe involves threat to peace and that this threat is increased by adoption of nuclear weapons. This idea, which is fundamentally opposed to NATO shield concept, we do not consider to be sound. Threats to peace since NATO was established and NATO force created have arisen not in Europe but elsewhere. Political directive recognizes need for forces capable of dealing also with hostile local action, as distinct from major armed aggression. We believe NATO forces, organization and command arrangements are well adapted to prevent inadvertent, unauthorized or unnecessary use of nuclear weapons.
b) Second idea is that presumed reduction of tension which would result from military steps would in some way facilitate settlement of German problem. We believe this is not only erroneous but dangerous concept. In the absence of comprehensive understanding with USSR on future of Germany and on detailed military arrangements in broad area of Europe, partial measures would merely be to solidify status quo, which is Soviet aim. This proposal has no features looking to German reunification and indeed seems perpetuate division.
15) We have received reports indicating that plan was proposed on Polish initiative, although cleared in advance with Soviets. If this is true, it is interesting. It may represent Polish desire to take steps leading to breaking impasse between Soviets and West. It may also reflect Polish concern that continuing build-up of nuclear capability in Western forces in Germany may lead to demand by Soviets for stationing of Soviet nuclear bases in Poland and Czechoslovakia. Such a development could result in restoration of some of Soviet control over Poland weakened during past year.
16) Exploitation of potential differences between Poland and USSR would present West with opportunities. Ability to establish Western military inspection in Poland and Czechoslovakia would also offer possibilities of expanding Western contact and influence in these areas. While these are possibilities to which West must be alert in presenting its own proposals, they do not involve advantages of sufficient importance or certainty to warrant us in incurring risks to our own security.
17) Therefore, we reiterate in conclusion our conviction that in fact Rapacki Plan represents nothing new in the way of progress towards settlement of European problems and is, for the reasons listed above, a highly dangerous proposal./7/
/7/The Rapacki Plan was discussed in the session of the North Atlantic Council on January 22 and also in a special private session later that day attended only by each Permanent Representative and one or two of his advisers. The private session was held at Spaak's suggestion in order to permit a “free and forthright expression of views." Reports on these two sessions are in Polto 2157 and Polto 2158 from Paris, both dated January 22. (Department of State, Central Files, 640.0012/1 - 2258)
2. National Intelligence Estimate
NIE 12 - 58 Washington, February 4, 1958.
//Source: Department of State, INR - NIE Files. Secret. A note on the cover sheet indicates that this estimate superseded NIE 12 - 57 and was concurred in by the Intelligence Advisory Committee on February 4. The Atomic Energy Commission Representative to the IAC and the Assistant Director, Federal Bureau of Investigation, abstained because the subject was outside their jurisdiction. An extract of NIE 12 - 57, “Outlook for Stability in the Eastern European Satellites," dated February 19, 1957, is in Foreign Relations, 1955 - 1957, vol. XXV, pp. 578 - 579.
The cover sheet, dissemination notice, table of contents, and a one-page appendix on Soviet economic aid to the satellites and other intra-bloc credits affecting the satellites are not printed.
OUTLOOK FOR STABILITY IN THE EASTERN EUROPEAN SATELLITES
To assess the prospects for stability in the European Satellites over the next few years.
1. Since the crisis of October 1956, the USSR and the Satellite regimes have had considerable success in reimposing party unity and general submissiveness among the people, at least on the surface. Even in Poland, the Gomulka regime has strengthened its hold despite continuing unrest.
2. For at least the next few years the USSR and the Satellites will probably avoid further political innovation but maintain the general policies--especially in the economic field--followed during 1957. We estimate that by and large such policies will preserve relative stability in the Satellites over the next few years. Popular revolts are unlikely, largely because of the still fresh example of Soviet repression in Hungary; nor do we expect another coup on the Polish model elsewhere in the Satellites.
3. But the USSR and the Satellite regimes have by no means eliminated those forces in Eastern Europe which underlay the unrest of 1956. We foresee a continued atmosphere of change and ferment, more highly charged than under Stalin. Popular dissatisfaction, party factionalism, intellectual dissent, and chronic economic difficulties will continue to stimulate desires for reform and change. A period of political turbulence might again emerge if internal controls are relaxed, or there are economic crises, or uncertainties appear to characterize the policies of the USSR or local regimes. The greatest potentialities for unrest appear to exist in Poland and East Germany.
4. We also continue to believe that Poland's ability to maintain its semi-independence will be a key factor affecting future political developments in Eastern Europe. Barring an acute economic crisis, the Gomulka regime has a better than even chance of surviving the internal threats to its position. We also believe that it will be able to retain its relative freedom from direct Soviet control. In time this development, together with Yugoslavia's continued independence, may tend to encourage nationalist-oriented elements in the other Satellites to seek greater autonomy.
5. For the short term at least the Soviets will almost certainly go slow in liberalizing their policy, but they do not seem to view a return to Stalinist policies as either necessary or feasible. The USSR will probably continue to extend substantial aid to alleviate economic difficulties. Moreover, once reassured that their position is no longer threatened, the Soviet leaders might gradually allow a more independent role to the Satellites, within the limits imposed by Soviet hegemony. On the other hand, should this hegemony again appear to be seriously threatened reversion to a harsher policy would follow.
6. The West's ability to influence the course of European Satellite development through policies and actions directed at the Satellites themselves is limited, particularly by tight Communist controls. Within these limits, however, the post-Stalin trends in Eastern Europe and the likely continuation of stresses and strains within the Satellites have created a situation more open to Western influence than at any time since 1948. Growing trade and East-West contacts offer some opportunities. But probably the only means--short of force--that could have a substantial positive or negative impact on Eastern Europe lie within the field of major East-West agreements which would fundamentally affect the current situation.
[Here follows the “Discussion" section with parts entitled “Situation and Prospects in Individual Satellites," “The Outlook in the Satellites," and “Impact of Western Policies."]
3. National Intelligence Estimate
NIE 10 - 58 Washington, March 4, 1958.
ANTI-COMMUNIST RESISTANCE POTENTIAL IN THE SINO-SOVIET BLOC
To appraise the intensity and scope of dissidence and resistance in the Sino-Soviet Bloc, and to estimate the resistance potential in times of peace and war.
Like its predecessor,/1/ this estimate is a brief appraisal of the causes, nature, and extent of anti-regime dissidence and resistance within the Sino-Soviet Bloc. It is based upon eleven country studies prepared by the inter-agency Resistance Intelligence Committee established by the IAC. These studies, which analyze dissidence and resistance in each country of the Bloc, have been noted but not individually approved by the IAC; they are appended as annexes to the estimate itself./2/
//Source: Department of State, INR - NIE Files. Secret. According to a note on the cover sheet, this estimate was submitted by the Director of Central Intelligence and concurred in by the Intelligence Advisory Committee (IAC) on March 4. The Atomic Energy Representative to the IAC and the Assistant Director, Federal Bureau of Investigation, abstained because the subject was outside their jurisdiction.
/1/NIE 10 - 55, "Anti-Communist Resistance Potential in the Sino-Soviet Bloc," 12 April 1955. [Footnote in the source text. NIE 10 - 55 is not printed.]
In the estimate and the annexes, the following terminology is used:
Dissidence--a state of mind involving discontent or disaffection with the regime.
Resistance--dissidence translated into action.
Organized resistance--resistance which is carried out by a group of individuals who have accepted a common purpose, agreed upon leadership, and worked out a communications system.
Unorganized resistance--resistance carried out by individuals or loosely associated groups which may have been formed spontaneously for certain limited objectives, without over-all plan or strategy.
Passive resistance--resistance, organized or unorganized, which is conducted within the framework of the resister's normal life and duties, and involves deliberate nonperformance or malperformance of acts which would benefit the regime, or deliberate nonconformity with standards of conduct established by the regime.
Active resistance--resistance, organized or unorganized, which expresses itself in positive acts against the regime. It may or may not involve violence, and may be conducted openly or clandestinely. It may take such forms as intelligence collection, psychological warfare, sabotage, guerrilla warfare, assistance in escape and evasion, open defiance of authority, or preparatory activity for any of the above.
With the progressive consolidation of Communist control, however, active resistance has in general tended to take less the forms mentioned above, and to be expressed more in such forms as strikes, demonstrations, and open manifestations of intellectual and other dissent. While in many cases these activities are not wholly motivated by anti-regime attitudes, they nevertheless have anti-regime connotations.
Scope and Intensity of Dissidence and Resistance
1. Dissidence continues to be widespread in the Sino-Soviet Bloc. Improvements in living standards and such relaxation of regime controls as took place during the last three years have been, except perhaps in the USSR, insufficient to reduce substantially general discontent. Save in semi-independent Poland, nationalist anti-regime feelings in Eastern Europe are as strong as ever. In addition to common grievances, various population elements harbor special resentments, such as those of peasants towards collectivization, workers towards Communist labor discipline, intellectuals and students towards enforced ideological conformity, believers towards anti-religious measures.
2. The scope and intensity of dissidence, however, varies widely from country to country. One of the most important distinctions in both peacetime and wartime resistance potential is whether or not the regime is viewed as representing the national rather than an alien interest. Except among certain of its own national minorities, the Soviet regime has succeeded in identifying itself among its own population as a legitimate national government. But Communist regimes in the Far East have made somewhat less progress in this respect, and those in Eastern Europe, again excepting Poland, have failed almost completely. In the divided countries, the existence of a functioning alternative government exercises some attraction which operates to increase dissidence, but this appears to be a major factor only in East Germany. Other variations in resistance potential arise from differences in national character, in historical traditions, in economic conditions, and in religious attitudes.
3. In the last few years most Bloc regimes have sought to reduce popular discontent and to narrow the rifts between the regimes and their peoples. The leashing of the Soviet secret police, the decollectivization of Polish agriculture, and efforts to improve living standards are cases in point. These policies have had some success. On the other hand, the very trend toward relaxation of controls and resulting confusion as to regime policies have given greater scope to overt manifestations of discontent. Sharp criticism arose, for example, among Moscow writers and Chinese intellectuals when the regimes experimented with a looser application of controls. In Hungary and Poland, inhibitions upon the use of police terror and serious splits within the Communist parties permitted dissidence to swell into active resistance, in Hungary on a mass scale. In reaction, the Bloc regimes have tightened their controls, and in Hungary after the bloody suppression of the revolt the regime reverted to harsh repression. The Bloc leaders have striven to insure party unity, to circumscribe the range of permissible criticism, and to provide various reminders of their physical power. As a result, organized active resistance is negligible in the Bloc at the present time.
Resistance Potential in Peacetime
4. During the next few years, conditions of life probably will not improve sufficiently to reduce dissidence significantly in most countries of the Sino-Soviet Bloc. This dissidence will probably continue to be expressed primarily in various forms of passive resistance--noncompliance with regime orders, economic malingering, other low-risk ways of expressing individual opposition. So long as the regimes do not revert to all-out repression, there is also likely to be some continuation of those forms of active resistance--strikes, demonstrations, open expressions of intellectual dissent--which have characterized the past few years. In particular, such manifestations are likely in parts of Eastern Europe. In Communist China, some disturbances by peasants and ethnic minorities are also likely.
5. Moreover, many Bloc regimes recognize that the cultivation of popular support and the eliciting of broader initiative would require not only economic betterment but some degree of liberalization of controls. However, they also recognize that such steps increase the difficulty of maintaining party unity and complete control over the populace. Thus they will probably accede to popular pressures only in those cases in which they regard it as relatively safe to do so. But any relaxation of controls will tend to give dissident elements opportunities to press their grievances in indirect ways.
6. Further, each regime's problems may be increased and complicated by developments elsewhere in the Bloc and influences from the Free World. The repercussions of the USSR's de-Stalinization campaign and the events in Hungary and Poland have agitated dissidents throughout the Bloc, in some cases to the point of stimulating various forms of resistance. Intra-Bloc variations in ideology and policy have contributed to dissatisfaction and ferment among intellectuals and students. As contacts with non-Bloc countries increase, unfavorable comparisons will arise. In consequence, campaigns against dissidence, while primarily concerned with its domestic sources, must also contend with unsettling influences from abroad.
7. The difficulties of dealing with dissidence, various forms of resistance, and foreign influences may lead to policy vacillations between “hard" and “soft" lines or to intra-party disputes. These developments might evoke greater resistance activity. This activity, however, would tend to be directed towards the elimination of specific grievances rather than to the overthrow of the existing regimes, since the latter course would seem highly unpromising unless there were a serious prior weakening of party and police.
8. For these reasons we regard major outbreaks of active resistance as unlikely, although these cannot be excluded in certain volatile situations in Eastern Europe. Sporadic local outbreaks will probably recur, but they will almost certainly be within the capabilities of security forces to repress. The regime's counter-weapons--primarily the monopoly of physical force (coupled with an evident willingness to use it) and a near-monopoly of means of communication--will remain formidable. In Poland the regime has shown less reliance on these weapons, but a primary safeguard against violent resistance is the widespread recognition, to which the Catholic Church lends important support, that it would provoke Soviet intervention. Here, as elsewhere in Eastern Europe, Soviet suppression of the Hungarian revolt and the absence of Western assistance have underlined the futility of violent resistance.
9. Emigre organizations of former Bloc nationals have, in general, lost effective contact with their homelands and are little known to Bloc populations. Virtually all of them have suffered from internal bickering, and many have been penetrated by Communist agents. Emigre groups do not significantly contribute to resistance potential, and with rare exceptions their leaders would not be welcomed to positions of power after liberation.
Resistance Potential in Event of General War
10. At the outset of a general war, patriotism would act to diminish sharply the resistance potential in most of the USSR and to some extent in Communist China, though in the latter case this would depend more on the nature of the conflict. In the Far Eastern satellites, any increase in resistance potential probably would be only marginal. But in the satellite states of Eastern Europe, as well as in certain minority areas of the USSR and Communist China (e.g. the Baltic States, Georgia, Western Ukraine, Tibet), the outbreak of war would rekindle hopes of liberation and immediately increase the resistance potential. This potential probably would be highest in Poland, Hungary, and East Germany. We believe, however, that unless the tide of war ran sharply against the Bloc and its military and security forces were significantly weakened, resistance activities of a para-military nature could be prevented or at least confined to manageable proportions.
11. While we conclude that resistance activities probably would not be a major factor so long as the outcome of the main conflict remained dubious, resistance activity probably could be expected, especially in Eastern Europe, in the form of intelligence collection and transmission, aid to Western personnel in escape and evasion operations, and minor sabotage. The level of such activity would vary considerably, because of differences in resistance potential, and also as a result of the amount of outside assistance available and the location of battle lines.
12. Only conjectures can be made concerning the impact on resistance activity of the use of nuclear weapons. Much would depend on such factors as the extent and locale of the attacks, the types of weapons used, the damage caused, the extent to which regime controls were disrupted, etc. Among population groups suffering direct losses, survivors probably would first be stunned, then concentrate their energies exclusively on problems of personal survival. In areas sufficiently distant from attack to be largely unaffected, resistance might increase as dissident elements found that Communist controls had been weakened; on the other hand, they might conclude that nuclear weapons were so decisive that extensive resistance was irrelevant or unnecessary. Groups outside the attack area but sufficiently close to be caught in the resulting chaos would be subject to all these effects. It is possible that, in certain cases, attacks against selected targets might weaken the regime's anti-resistance capabilities more than they impaired resistance potential.
13. The question of responsibility for the initiation of general war probably would not substantially affect the will to resist the regimes in the Bloc countries. Nor would the nationality of attacking forces be likely, in the majority of cases, to have great bearing upon the cooperation offered by resistance elements. Exceptions would be cases in which long-standing national antipathies might conflict to an important degree with anti-regime feelings, e.g. (a) German forces in Czechoslovakia, Poland, and the USSR; (b) Yugoslav, Greek, and Turkish forces in Bulgaria; (c) Greek, Italian, and Yugoslav forces in Albania; and (d) Japanese forces in North Korea and Communist China. On the other hand, in the divided countries anti-regime resistance might increase if military forces of the non-Communist government were used.
4. Memorandum From the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (Twining) to Secretary of Defense McElroy
Washington, May 20, 1958.
[Source: Department of State, S/S - NSC Files: Lot 63 D 351, NSC 5811 Series. Secret. 3 pages of source text not declassified.]
5. Memorandum of Discussion at the 366th Meeting of the National Security Council
Washington, May 22, 1958.
[Here follow a paragraph listing the participants at the meeting and agenda items 1 and 2.]
3. U.S. Policy Toward the Soviet-Dominated Nations in Eastern Europe (NSC 5608/1; Appendix to NSC 5608/1; NSC 5808/1; NSC 5505/1; NSC 5607; NSC 5616/2; NSC 5704/3; NSC 5706/2; NSC 5726/1; NSC 5803; NIE 12 - 58; NIE 10 - 58; NSC Action No. 1896; NSC 5811; Memos for NSC from Executive Secretary, same subject, dated May 13 and 21, 1958)/1/
//Source: Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, NSC Records. Top Secret; Eyes Only. Prepared by Gleason on May 23.
/1/The following are printed in Foreign Relations, 1955 - 1957, vol. XXV: NSC 5608/1, "U.S. Policy Toward the Soviet Satellites in Eastern Europe" (without the appendix), July 18, 1956, pp. 216 - 221; NSC 5706/2, "U.S. Policy on Defectors, Escapees, and Refugees From Communist Areas," February 26, 1957, pp. 584 - 588; and NSC 5616/2, "Interim U.S. Policy on Developments in Poland and Hungary," November 19, 1956, pp. 463 - 469. NSC 5607, "East-West Exchanges," June 29, 1956, is printed ibid., vol. XXIV, pp. 243 - 246. NSC 5704/3, "U.S. Economic Defense Policy," September 16, 1957, is printed ibid., vol. X, pp. 495 - 498. NSC 5803, "U.S. Policy Toward Germany," February 7, 1958, is printed in vol. IX, Document 243. NIE 12 - 58 and NIE 10 - 58 are printed as Documents 2 and 3. NSC 5808/1, “U.S. Policy Toward Poland," April 16, 1958, is in Part 2, Document 46. Regarding NSC Action No. 1896, see the memorandum of NSC discussion, April 14, ibid. NSC 5726/1, "U.S. Civil Aviation Policy Toward the Sino-Soviet Bloc," December 9, 1957, is in Department of State, S/S - NSC Files: Lot 63 D 351, NSC 5726 Series. Lay's May 13 memorandum transmitting a memorandum from the Chairman of the Council of Economic Advisers on portions of NSC 5811 is ibid., NSC 5811 Series. NSC 5811 and Lay's May 21 memorandum are not printed. (Ibid.)
General Cutler briefed the National Security Council at considerable length, stressing in particular the differences of view in subparagraphs 28 - c and 28 - d of NSC 5811, reading as follows:
"c. Encourage the dominated peoples to seek their goals gradually [and without resort to premature violent actions].*/2/ [5-1/2 lines of source text not declassified]
"d. Discreetly foster dissident and non-cooperative attitudes; and [do not discourage]**/2/ non-cooperative activities, including passive resistance.
"* JCS proposal.
"** State-Treasury-Budget proposal."
/2/Brackets in the source text.
(A copy of General Cutler's briefing note is filed in the minutes of the meeting, and another is attached to this memorandum.)/3/
/3/Not printed. The minutes of all National Security Council meetings held during the Eisenhower administration are in National Archives and Records Administration, RG 273, Records of the National Security Council, Official Meeting Minutes File.
When General Cutler had finished explaining that the main issue in this paper focused on these two subparagraphs, he stated that the Joint Chiefs of Staff proposals for rewriting subparagraphs 28 - c and - d really constituted a fundamental difference with the view set forth by the pres-ent text of these subparagraphs.
The President said that he was unable to understand the difference, and the matter seemed to him essentially an exercise in semantics. Secretary Dulles noted his agreement with the President's view. General Cutler, however, insisted that if the President and others could not grasp that there was a concrete and substantive difference of viewpoint between the Joint Chiefs' proposals for subparagraphs 28 - c and - d and those of the Planning Board, he had failed to explain adequately the essential differences. The Planning Board had unanimously agreed that the dominated peoples should seek their goals of greater independence from Moscow gradually and generally without resort to violence. The Joint Chiefs, on the other hand, believed that there was no chance of achieving independence in these countries without some fighting. They believed that we should discreetly encourage passive resistance and that violent uprisings, rioting, and guerrilla operations should be encouraged, though only “on a calculated basis when we are ready to cope with the Russian reaction." Moreover, the Chiefs believe that in the event that a satellite gained some measure of freedom, the United States should be prepared to make unmistakably clear to the Soviets that we will not tolerate any efforts toward reprisal or resubjugation.
After thus summarizing what he conceived to be the differences between the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the Planning Board on this issue, General Cutler called first on General Twining.
General Twining said that the Joint Chiefs of Staff were aware that they were getting somewhat out of their military sphere in their comments on subparagraphs 28 - c and - d, but that they felt that as these subparagraphs were written in NSC 5811 they were much too weak. It was for this reason that they had recommended their changes.
Secretary Dulles said that he could not quite agree with General Twining's view and that of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, that there was no chance of a satellite securing its independence of Moscow without some fighting. This was a pretty sweeping statement, and while it might be likely, it was not so certain as the Chiefs seemed to think.
Broadly speaking, continued Secretary Dulles, we in the State Department believe that the best hope of bringing about an acceptable evolution toward greater freedom for the satellites is the exertion by the satellites of constant pressure on the Soviet Union and on their own regimes, in the hope of effecting a change in the thinking of the Soviet rulers. Thus the Soviet rulers may ultimately come to realize that it is in their own best interests to be surrounded by free and relatively friendly countries, rather than, as at present, by a series of bitterly hostile satellite states. How to exert this pressure was a very delicate matter, but it seemed reasonably well covered by the limited- distribution Appendix to NSC 5608/1. While it remained true that no enslaved country could ever achieve its freedom if the people of that country were not willing to die for freedom, the example of Hungary showed that the elements that we most depended upon had been liquidated by the resort to violence.
Secretary Dulles stated that he particularly disliked the bracketed phrase in the first sentence of subparagraph 28 - c, dealing with premature violence. He felt that the proposed course of action was dangerous, and that the bracketed phrase should be omitted from the final text of the subparagraph.
The President said that he didn't clearly understand the difference between the bracketed phrase and the first part of the sentence, but he was willing to agree with Secretary Dulles that the bracketed phrase should be deleted.
Turning to subparagraph 28 - d, Secretary Dulles commented that he couldn't get very excited about whether the bracketed phrase, “do not discourage", was deleted or remained in the final form of the subparagraph. After all, said Secretary Dulles, the difference between “non-cooperative attitudes" and “non-cooperative activities" would have to be drawn by a pretty fine line. He accordingly would not object to the deletion of the bracketed phrase in subparagraph 28 - d.
Mr. Allen warned the Council that if subparagraph 28 - d remained as written, it would constitute guidance to his Voice of America operations. In this circumstance, and if there were another Hungary, the script-writers could only defend themselves against accusations such as had occurred at the time of the Hungarian revolt, by stating in effect that their discreet encouragement of dissident and non-cooperative attitudes was national security policy. On the whole, Mr. Allen felt that the bracketed phrase had better stay in subparagraph 28 - d.
Both the President and Secretary Anderson expressed anxiety about leaving the phrase "discreetly encourage" in subparagraph 28 - d. The President thought that what was really meant by this phrase was "to look on with a benevolent eye".
[2 paragraphs (11 lines of source text) not declassified]
General Cutler then went on to speak of paragraph 40, reading as follows:
"40. Seek to establish between the United States and the dominated nations with which the United States has diplomatic relations, more normal economic relations, thereby facilitating a gradual expansion of trade--consistent with `Basic National Security Policy' (NSC 5810/1)/4/ and 'U.S. Economic Defense Policy' (NSC 5704/3)*--as a means of projecting U.S. influence and lessening the dominated nations' economic ties with and dependence on the Soviet Union.
/4/NSC 5810/1, "Basic National Security Policy," May 5, 1958, is scheduled for publication in volume III.
"* NSC Action 1865 - c directed the review of this policy; cf. NSC 5810/1, paragraph 37. For the Department of Commerce suggestions for expanding par. 40, see Annex C."
General Cutler also noted that the Secretary of Commerce had suggested, in Annex C to NSC 5811, more detailed guidance with respect to the course of action set forth in paragraph 40. General Cutler suggested that if the details of paragraph 40 were adopted by the Council, they should be removed from the Annex and placed in the policy paper.
The President said that it was his understanding that the proposed expanded trade between the United States and the Soviet-dominated nations was designed to achieve U.S. political objectives and had little or nothing to do with any purely economic advantage which might accrue to the United States. If he were right in this assumption, he believed that the initiative in carrying out the course of action in paragraph 40 should come straight from the State Department.
In turn, Secretary Dulles said he felt that the implementation of paragraph 40 would have to be handled with very great care. As the Vice President had just recently pointed out, the Latin American countries were now under very heavy pressure of an economic sort to increase their trade with the Soviet satellite states. If we, the United States, open the door to greater trade with the satellite states, it may well prove to be the Latin American countries which rush through the door. This could have very serious effects on the political orientation of our Latin American neighbors. The President agreed, and said that that was precisely why he felt that State should take the initiative in determining what should be done to carry out the policy in paragraph 40.
Secretary Dulles said that he would be very reluctant to see the National Security Council agree to any sweeping public statements by U.S. officials regarding increased trade with the Soviet-dominated nations, as appeared to be suggested by the Department of Commerce proposals in Annex C. This could have a very serious effect in Latin America. The Vice President agreed with Secretary Dulles' viewpoint, and said that the leaders of the Latin American countries would on the whole much prefer to trade with the United States, first of all because the machinery we sold them was better than the machinery they got from the Soviet Bloc, and secondly because they did not want a lot of Communist technicians coming into their countries to show them how to operate the machines they had imported from a Soviet Bloc country. The Vice President accordingly agreed that this matter should be handled entirely by the State Department.
Called upon for his views, Secretary Weeks agreed that this was essentially a State Department matter, and that the objective sought, in calling for more normal trade relations with the Soviet-dominated nations, was a political objective and not a commercial one. The paragraphs suggested by the Department of Commerce in Annex C were merely designed to spell out in greater detail what Commerce had supposed to be the State Department's position in favoring more non- strategic trade, as set forth in paragraph 40; and, moreover, Commerce would of course have to implement the actual commercial operations under paragraph 40.
General Cutler then suggested to the Council that Annex C be omitted. The President, however, thought that the whole matter, both paragraph 40 and Annex C, should not be acted upon at this time by the Council, but should be further studied in the State Department prior to final Council action. The subject matter of paragraph 40 was, in the President's opinion, the most important matter which had been discussed this morning at the meeting. As he had so often said, the President reminded the Council again that trade was the chief weapon of the diplomat.
General Cutler then suggested approval of all of NSC 5811 as amended, including paragraph 40, but suggested the omission of Annex C. The details of the implementation of paragraph 40 could safely be left to the Operations Coordinating Board, where the State Department could take the lead. The President said he could not agree with General Cutler's suggestion, and felt that the State Department would have to make up its own mind as to how it wished to make use of increased trade with the Soviet-dominated nations in order to achieve our political objectives. Secretary Dulles agreed, and stated that in its present form paragraph 40 seemed too sweeping, and he would like an opportunity to look at the problem at greater length. General Cutler asked the President if he was agreeable to Council adoption of all of NSC 5811 as amended, except for paragraph 40 and Annex C. Council action on paragraph 40 and Annex C would be suspended until the Secretary of State had had an opportunity to study further the implications of this paragraph. This proposal was approved.
The National Security Council:/5/
/5/Paragraphs a - c and the Note that follows constitute NSC Action No. 1914. (Department of State, S/S - NSC (Miscellaneous) Files: Lot 66 D 95, Records of Action by the National Security Council)
a. Discussed the draft statement of policy on the subject contained in NSC 5811, including a supplementary draft statement of U.S. Policy Toward Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania (Annex B to NSC 5811), in the light of:
(1) The views of the Chairman, Council on Foreign Economic Policy, with particular reference to paragraph 40 and Annex C of NSC 5811, transmitted by the reference memorandum of May 13, 1958; and
(2) The views of the Joint Chiefs of Staff thereon, transmitted by the reference memorandum of May 21, 1958.
b. Adopted the statement of U.S. Policy Toward the Soviet-Dominated Nations in Eastern Europe, and the supplementary statement of U.S. Policy Toward Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania, subject to:
(1) On page 16, deletion of the bracketed words in the first sentence of subparagraph 28 - c, and the footnote thereto.
(2) On page 17, deletion of subparagraph 28 - d and the footnote thereto.
(3) On page 20, deferral of action on paragraph 40 and (on pages 31 and 32) on Annex C, pending further study by the Secretary of State of the foreign policy implications of expanding non-strategic trade with the Soviet-dominated nations for primarily political purposes, and a report on the results of such study for Council consideration at the June 19 meeting.
c. Agreed that the provisions of the special limited-distribution Appendix to NSC 5608/1, as amended at this meeting, should apply to Albania, Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, Hungary and Rumania.
Note: NSC 5811, as adopted by the action in b above, subsequently approved by the President; circulated as NSC 5811/1 for implementation by all appropriate Executive departments and agencies of the U.S. Government; and referred to the Operations Coordinating Board as the coordinating agency designated by the President.
The action in b - (3) above, as approved by the President, subsequently transmitted to the Secretary of State for appropriate action.
In accordance with the action in c above, as approved by the President, the special limited-distribution Appendix to NSC 5608/1, as amended at this meeting, subsequently issued as a special limited-distribution Appendix to NSC 5811/1.
In accordance with NSC Action No. 1896 - c, the special limited- distribution Appendix to NSC 5608/1, without the amendment adopted at this meeting, issued as a special limited-distribution Appendix to NSC 5808/1 (Poland).
[Here follows agenda item 4.]
S. Everett Gleason
6. National Security Council Report
NSC 5811/1 Washington, May 24, 1958.
STATEMENT OF U.S. POLICY TOWARD THE SOVIET-DOMINATED NATIONS IN EASTERN EUROPE
1. Soviet control over Albania, Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, East Germany,/1/ Hungary and Rumania (referred to hereafter as the dominated nations)/2/ is a basic cause of international friction and, therefore, a threat to peace and to the security of the United States and Western Europe. Soviet determination to maintain control of these nations is also an obstacle to an over-all European settlement and to a significant relaxation of international tensions, including a comprehensive disarmament agreement.
//Source: National Archives and Records Administration, JCS Records, 092 (9 - 14 - 49) IN 15 RB. Secret. A title page, a table of contents, and a May 24 covering note by Lay are not printed. In the covering note, Lay noted that paragraph 40 of NSC 5811 and Annex C of that paper were being referred to the Secretary of State for additional study and would be reconsidered by the NSC at its meeting on June 19. See Document 8.
/1/While many of the considerations set forth in this paper with respect to the Soviet-dominated nations of Eastern Europe also apply to East Germany, there are a number of respects in which special considerations are applicable to East Germany, owing to the fact that the United States regards it as under Soviet military occupation and not as a separate "nation". The specific problems of East Germany and Berlin are treated in the Supplements to NSC 5803. [Footnote in the source text. NSC 5803, "U.S. Policy Toward Germany," February 7, 1958, is printed in vol. IX, Document 243.]
/2/U.S. Policy Toward Poland is treated separately in NSC 5808/1. [Footnote in the source text. NSC 5808/1, dated April 16, 1958, is in Part 2, Document 46.]
2. The principal impediment to Soviet efforts to impose an effective Communist political, economic and social system on the peoples of the dominated nations is the anti-Communist and anti-Russian attitude of the great majority of the population in each such nation. This attitude is intensified particularly by severe restriction of personal and religious freedom, a continued low standard of living, and strong nationalist sentiment among the people, especially the youth, and even among certain elements within the Communist parties. An additional impediment is the continued refusal of the West, particularly the United States and its principal NATO allies, to accept the permanence of Soviet-imposed regimes as compatible with the principles of human freedom and self- determination of nations.
3. Although Moscow has not incorporated the dominated nations into the state structure of the USSR as it did the Baltic Republics of Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania (see Annex B), Soviet physical control over these nations remains firm. The USSR maintains Soviet troops in much of the area (see Annex A)/3/ and the Warsaw Pact formalized Soviet measures for coordination and control over the military forces of these nations. Political control is exerted both on a governmental level and through the Communist Party apparatus. Moscow also exercises control over the area's economy through such means as the Council of Economic Mutual Assistance (CEMA) and through bilateral trade and aid agreements. There are no known anti-regime groups capable of successfully organizing coordinated and sustained resistance to the Communist regimes in any of the dominated nations. The United States has not been prepared to resort to force or threat of force either to eliminate Soviet domination or to support revolutionary movements.
/3/Annex A, a table on military forces in the Soviet-dominated nations of Eastern Europe and Poland, is not printed.
4. After Stalin's death in 1953, the stability of the Soviet political system in Eastern Europe was shaken by a succession of important developments, including: the elimination of a single source of ideological authority and the attacks on the cult of personality (denigration of Stalin); the re-establishment of Party primacy over the police; the growth of the concept of “different roads to socialism"; and, in the campaign to increase labor productivity, an increased use of economic incentives and a decreased reliance on arbitrary police and administrative methods. These developments, which gave rise to policy and doctrinal conflicts within the Soviet leadership, were reflected in the decisions of the 20th Congress of the CPSU in 1956; and their impact spread throughout the Bloc. These developments added to growing uncertainty and confusion in the Communist parties and strengthened the hand of party dissidents seeking democratization and greater national independence. Party and popular unrest reached the greatest heights in Poland and Hungary, where in October 1956 Soviet authority was seriously challenged for the first time since the Yugoslav break in 1948.
5. Although surface stability has been restored and will probably be preserved over the next few years, an atmosphere of change and ferment more highly charged than under Stalin will probably continue for some time. The forces of unrest which underlay the troubles of 1956 are manifest in discontent over current policies within the Communist parties, particularly at middle and lower levels; in intellectual and student ferment; in popular hostility to the regimes, stimulated by party and intellectual dissidents; and in economic discontent, common to all who do not enjoy privileged rank.
6. Additional factors adversely affecting Soviet control in Eastern Europe are:
a. The effects of the Hungarian revolt, which was a serious moral and ideological defeat for the USSR, will persist for some time. The revolt engendered an enduring hatred of the USSR. Future Soviet actions will be tempered by this demonstration of the risk of relying on indigenous armed forces and of failing to gain popular support for Communism.
b. Poland's ability to maintain the limited independence gained in October 1956 will be a key factor affecting future political developments in Eastern Europe. A Polish-type coup in the area is not likely soon, but if the Polish experiment is successful and Moscow's acquiescence in it continues, nationalist elements in the dominated nations may be encouraged to seek greater autonomy.
c. Similarly, the continued existence of Yugoslavia as a Communist nation independent of Moscow will tend to encourage nationalist elements in the area to seek greater autonomy.
7. In these circumstances, present Soviet policy appears to be one of experimentation in an effort to find a middle course between the alternatives of (a) placing primary reliance on policies of force and repression, and (b) granting increasing autonomy and independence to the Eastern European regimes. The first alternative would deny to these regimes the possibility of broadening their base of popular support. The second alternative would stimulate popular pressures for further concessions and might become extremely difficult to limit or control.
8. In this situation, Moscow may experience a diminished ability to exercise unilateral authority in the Communist world. The necessity for maintaining at least outward unity in the Sino-Soviet Bloc and the international Communist movement will, as in the past, lead the Soviets to compromise on some issues and at least to consider the opinions of other Communist parties on others. However, while the memories of Hungary and Poland remain fresh, the security of the USSR's position will remain uppermost in Soviet minds and measures to insure it will be given first priority. This does not mean that Soviet leaders consider a return to Stalinist policies as either necessary or desirable. Rather, so long as Soviet hegemony and basic Communist tenets are not called into question, the USSR will continue to place major reliance on indirect methods of control, preferring to let the dominated regimes deal with their own internal problems unless these get out of hand.
9. In attempting to cope through flexible and pragmatic means with the complex problem of maintaining its position in the area, the USSR probably will:
a. Attempt to obtain some form of East-West ratification of the status quo in Eastern Europe in the hope of undermining the dominated peoples' hope of future U.S. support and thus reducing the likelihood of deviation and unrest.
b. Continue to maintain sizeable armed forces in the area, particularly in East Germany, not only for military reasons but as an essential element in maintaining control over the dominated nations.
c. Be prepared to use armed force to thwart any serious threat to its control in the area, although Soviet reaction to a Gomulka-type coup would depend on the circumstances of the moment; i.e., whether the threat to the Soviet position was sufficient to outweigh the disadvantages of military intervention.
d. Continue to provide economic aid to the dominated nations in order to reduce unrest by improving living standards, to maintain the area's dependence on the USSR, and to counter the appeal of increased trade between Eastern Europe and the West.
e. Permit the dominated nations to enter into increasing but selectively-controlled contacts with the West, in an attempt, among other things, to influence world opinion, to obtain technological data and ease economic strains, and to appease the desires of the intelligentsia in the area for wider associations throughout the world.
10. The current ferment in Eastern Europe offers new opportunities, though still limited, to influence the dominated regimes through greater U.S. activity, both private and official, in such fields as tourist travel, cultural exchange and economic relations, including exchanges of technical and commercial visitors. Experience has shown that a U.S. policy designed to ostracize the dominated regimes has had the concurrent effect of inhibiting increased direct U.S. contacts with the people of the dominated nations. It is now apparent that, as a practical matter, substantial expansion of direct U.S. contacts with the peoples of these nations, and the development through such contacts of popular pressures upon the regimes for increased internal freedom and independence from Soviet control, cannot be achieved without more active U.S. relationships with and through these governments. Such relationships would enable the United States to probe, within the party and governmental bureaucracy, for those individuals or groups who show signs of independent thought, nationalist aspirations, or willingness to use their influence to modify their nation's subservient relationship to the Soviet Union.
11. The West could have the greatest impact on Eastern Europe, and would run the greatest risk, through major East-West agreements which would fundamentally affect the European situation. The very fact of negotiations on any such issues as mutual troop withdrawals, German reunification, or the status quo in Europe, would have some impact on Eastern Europe. To the extent that the West seemed to be confirming Soviet hegemony over Eastern Europe, morale among the peoples and potential party deviants would tend to be depressed. On the other hand, negotiations which appeared to offer hopes of a Soviet troop withdrawal, particularly if coupled with convincing guarantees against their return, would have an opposite effect. An East-West agreement on German reunification which was interpreted in Eastern Europe as an abandonment by the USSR of East Germany would almost certainly have major repercussions throughout the area. Unless countered by positive and vigorous Soviet action, these repercussions--in the form of increasing dissidence, ferment, Party factionalism, riots and strikes--might lead to upheavals or radical policy shifts toward greater external or internal freedom in Eastern Europe, especially in Poland.
12. With the passage of years during which Soviet domination of the Eastern European nations has continued, emigre national committees have proved less productive. This situation has been aggravated by internal factional strife and lack of unified purpose. There is no evidence that emigre politicians have any significant following in their homelands or that in the foreseeable future they will be able to return there to assume a role of political leadership.
13. Flexible U.S. courses of action, involving inducements as well as probing actions and pressures, are required to exploit the Soviet dilemma and sensitivities in the dominated nations and to complicate the exercise of Soviet control over them. In order to take full advantage of existing opportunities in this area, U.S. courses of action toward the dominated nations must appropriately exploit their individual historical and cultural characteristics and the significant differences of their respective present situations.
14. Albania is unique among the dominated nations for its political, economic and cultural backwardness. Despite post-Stalin trends toward liberalization elsewhere in the Soviet Bloc, the Albanian regime has shown few signs of deviating from the Stalinist pattern. Albania presents special problems to U.S. policy because it has traditionally been subject to rival claims and ambitions by Greece, Italy and Yugoslavia. The Albanian Communists have posed as the indispensable champions of Albanian independence and territorial integrity.
15. Albania has never been a nation of primary importance to the United States. Immediately after World War II, U.S.-Albanian discussions on the establishment of diplomatic relations broke down as a result of Albanian refusal to affirm the validity of pre-war treaties and agreements between Albania and the United States. There have been some indications recently that the Albanian regime may desire to establish diplomatic relations with the United States.
16. The Bulgarian regime, despite occasional top-level purges and discontent among intellectuals, appears relatively stable and able to maintain control of the nation. Communist efforts to make Bulgaria an industrial nation without the necessary resources base have produced serious economic problems. Large-scale unemployment has caused the Bulgarian regime to seek extensive economic aid from the Soviet Union and to adopt a new economic plan under which Bulgaria would specialize in light industry and truck-farming. The United States suspended diplomatic relations with Bulgaria in February 1950 after a series of har-assments which culminated in Bulgarian action against the U.S. Minister as persona non grata on charges of subversion and espionage. Bulgarian leaders have several times indicated publicly and through diplomatic channels their desire for a resumption of relations.
17. Except for a brief period of ferment in the spring of 1956 following the disclosures at the 20th Party Congress in Moscow, Czechoslovakia has been a submissive satellite. The Czech people, although traditionally Western-oriented and anti-Communist, have remained largely apathetic under Soviet domination. Specific grievances are probably allayed to some extent by the Czech standard of living, which is appreciably higher now than it was during the Stalin era and is the highest in Eastern Europe. Anti-Soviet sentiment exists within the Party, and there are certainly some in the Party who favor greater independence; but the Party leadership, so far as can be determined, is steadfast in its adherence to the Moscow line. The regime has failed to eliminate the thorny minority problem. The Communist Party continues to have less influence in Slovakia than in Bohemia-Moravia, and the Slovak potential for active resistance is higher.
18. The present Communist regime in Hungary, in consolidating its physical control of the nation, has followed a policy of terror and intimidation clearly intended to wipe out all resistance. Although the Hungarian people continue to despise this regime, a surface calm prevails and the normal pattern of life under Soviet Communism has resumed.
19. A certain degree of moderation has been evident in the economic policy of the Hungarian regime. Collectivization of agriculture remains the ultimate goal, but Kadar has asserted that this will be achieved by “Leninist" persuasion rather than “Stalinist" coercion. A degree of private enterprise among artisans and small tradesmen has been tolerated though not encouraged, and there has been an effort to keep the market reasonably well supplied with consumer goods. With the aid of extensive grants and loans from the Soviet Union and the other Communist nations, the Hungarian economy has recovered from the effects of the revolution more rapidly than had been anticipated, though grave economic problems remain.
20. The Hungarian regime has not granted any appreciable internal political concessions in order to improve its international standing. It has, however, made continuing efforts to overcome its isolation by other means. It has been energetic in negotiating trade agreements with the West, has shown interest in cultural exchanges, and appears to be prepared to permit a degree of contact between Hungarians and the West. The regime has continued publicly to condemn the excesses of Rakosi even while following a basically repressive policy. For public consumption, at least, it has pictured itself as determined to steer a “middle" course between the extremes of Nagy-ism and Rakosi-ism.
21. Because Hungary has become an important psychological factor in the world-wide struggle of the free nations against expansionist Soviet Communism, U.S. policy must maintain a delicate balance; it must seek to encourage the same evolutionary developments as in the other nations of Eastern Europe, without compromising the symbol which Hungary has become. More restraint will be required in dealing directly with regime officials than in certain other nations of the area, and the timing of U.S. moves will be of great importance.
22. The physical hold of the Communist regime on Rumania remains firm. Such personnel changes as have occurred in the Rumanian Communist Government and Party since the Polish and Hungarian events appear to have been connected with internal Party differences, and have not been caused by overt public pressures for change.
23. One of the distinguishing marks of Rumanian Communist rule is an unwillingness to deviate too far from a moderate position in response to sudden changes of attitude in Moscow. The Rumanian Communists have consistently failed to attack Tito with the extreme fervor of some of the other Communist Parties while, on the other hand, they have never gone as far in the direction of liberalization as did the Hungarians prior to the 1956 uprising. Attempts both to pursue standard Communist goals and to allay the economic causes of popular discontent, have caused considerable economic strain.
24. Although unwilling to grant substantial political concessions to the population, the Rumanian leadership during the past year has sought an easing of relations and increased contacts with the United States in order to secure benefits in trade and technology and give substance to its claims of legitimacy and permanence in the eyes of its own people. The Rumanian regime is therefore exceptionally receptive to increased contacts with the West.
25. Short-range: Promotion of the peaceful evolution of the dominated nations toward national independence and internal freedom, even though these nations may continue for some time under the close political and military control of the Soviet Union.
26. Reduction of the contribution of the dominated nations to Soviet strength, and weakening of the monolithic front and internal cohesiveness of the Soviet Bloc.
27. Long-range: Fulfillment of the right of the peoples in the dominated nations to enjoy representative governments resting upon the consent of the governed, exercising full national independence, and participating as peaceful members of the Free World community.
Regional Policy Guidance/4/
/4/NSC policies on the Soviet Bloc (including NSC 5726/1, “U.S. Civil Aviation Policy Toward the Sino-Soviet Bloc", December 9, 1957, and NSC 5607, “East-West Exchanges", June 29, 1956) will continue to apply except as modified by this policy or by exceptions in the policies concerned. [Footnote in the source text. See footnote 1, Document 5.]
Political and Diplomatic
28. In order to maintain and develop popular pressures on the pres-ent regimes and accelerate evolution toward independence from Soviet control:
a. Expand direct contacts with the dominated peoples to exploit their anti-Communist and anti-Russian attitudes.
b. As a means toward accomplishing a above, establish more active relations with the existing regimes, without creating the impression that the basic U.S. attitude toward those regimes has changed or will change in the absence of some significant modification in their character.
c. Encourage the dominated peoples to seek their goals gradually. [5 lines of source text not declassified]
[1 paragraph (5 lines of source text) not declassified]
30. To impair and weaken Soviet domination, exploit divisive forces by appropriate measures including:
a. Fostering nationalist pride and aspirations among the people and within the regime leadership.
b. [2 lines of source text not declassified]
c. [1-1/2 lines of source text not declassified]
d. Publicizing evidences of unequal treatment by the USSR.
e. Encouraging comparisons of the lot of the dominated nations with that of the USSR and with each other.
31. Emphasize on appropriate occasions the U.S. view that the people of each nation should be independent and free to choose their form of government; and avoid any action or statement which could reasonably be represented in the dominated nations as advocacy of a return to the authoritarian systems of government which existed prior to or during World War II.
32. Reiterate on appropriate occasions in public statements that the United States does not look upon the dominated nations as potential military allies and supports their right to independence, not to encircle the Soviet Union with hostile forces, but so that they may take their rightful place as equal members in a peaceful European community of nations.
33. Continue in official public statements:
a. To point out the evils and defects of the Soviet-Communist system.
b. To reiterate U.S. refusal to accept the domination of these nations by the USSR as an acceptable status quo.
c. To stress evolutionary change.
34. a. Encourage the regimes in the dominated nations to take independent initiatives in foreign relations and domestic affairs.
b. Take advantage of every appropriate opportunity to demonstrate to these regimes how their national interest may be served by independent actions looking toward more normal relations with the West.
35. Be prepared to discuss and negotiate issues between the United States and the individual regimes. When complete solutions are not possible, be prepared to accept partial solutions which do not impair U.S. objectives.
36. Endeavor to bring the dominated nations increasingly into the activities of international technical and social organizations in order to contribute to their greater independence from Soviet influence and be to U.S. advantage.
37. Continue as appropriate to support selected emigres or emigre groups capable of making a positive contribution to U.S. objectives, while gradually phasing out support of less useful emigre organizations.
38. Exploit the benefits received by Yugoslavia and Poland from their relations with the United States as an inducement to the regimes of the dominated nations to seek closer relations with the West.
39. Continue application of “U.S. Policy on Defectors, Escapees and Refugees from Communist Areas" (NSC 5706/2)/5/ to nationals of the dominated nations, except that:
/5/See footnote 1, Document 5.
a. [5 lines of source text not declassified]
b. Avoid publicity concerning defectors, escapees and refugees unless such publicity would produce a net advantage to the United States.
/6/By NSC Action No. 1914 - b - (3), action on paragraph 40 and Annex C of NSC 5811 was deferred, pending further study by the Secretary of State of the foreign policy implications of expanding non-strategic trade with the Soviet-dominated nations for primarily political purposes, and a report on the results of such study for Council consideration at the June 19 meeting. [Footnote in the source text. In a June 23 memorandum to the NSC, Lay quoted the text of paragraph 40 as agreed to at the June 19 meeting (see Document 8) and subsequently approved by the President and requested that it be inserted in the text of NSC 5811/1. (Department of State, S/S - NSC Files: Lot 63 D 351, NSC 5811 Series)]
41. Encourage voluntary relief agencies to undertake appropriate operations in the dominated nations if opportunities arise. Be prepared to offer food and other relief assistance, through voluntary agencies or otherwise, to the peoples of the dominated countries when emergency situations occur.
42. Seek the alleviation or settlement of long-standing economic issues (nationalization claims, surplus property and other financial obligations) between the dominated nations and the United States.
Information and Exchange Activities
43. a. In dominated nations with which the United States maintains diplomatic relations, conduct as many information and cultural activities as are considered desirable and feasible.
b. Continue radio broadcasting activities to all the dominated nations.
c. Encourage private information and cultural activities in the dominated nations, recognizing that private media can engage in activities which would promote U.S. objectives but for which the United States would not wish to accept responsibility.
d. Be prepared when necessary to permit information and cultural activities in the United States by the diplomatic missions of the dominated nations on an approximately reciprocal basis.
44. To promote expanded contacts and to revive and revitalize traditional bonds between the dominated nations and the United States, encourage, as circumstances in a particular nation may warrant:
a. Contacts between U.S. individuals and individuals in dominated nations in religious, cultural, technical, business, and social fields.
b. Contacts between U.S. business and other organizations and organizations in the dominated nations in comparable fields, including the exchange of delegations of technical experts.
c. Participation, where feasible and appropriate, in international trade fairs, film festivals, etc., organized by the dominated nations, inviting on a basis of general reciprocity their participation in such activities in the United States.
d. An expanding exchange program of students and teachers and increasing numbers of leaders' and specialists' visits.
e. Tourism, on an approximately reciprocal basis, particularly visits between relatives and friends.
45. Entries, visits, and activities in the United States of individuals or groups from Soviet-dominated nations shall take place under ICIS- approved internal security safeguards.
Policies of Other Free World Nations
46. Encourage Western European nations to adopt policies toward the dominated nations parallel to those of the United States, and in particular to concert together through established institutions such as NATO, OEEC and the Council of Europe for the purposes of (a) taking all practicable steps to extend Western European influence among the dominated nations of Eastern Europe, and (b) exploiting the concept of an integrated, prosperous and stable European community.
47. Seek to counter Soviet efforts to use the dominated nations for penetration of the less-developed nations.
[End of Section 2]