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U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE
JAPAN: 1994 COUNTRY REPORT ON ECONOMIC POLICY AND TRADE PRACTICES
BUREAU OF ECONOMIC AND BUSINESS AFFAIRS





                              JAPAN

                     Key Economic Indicators
        (Billions of U.S. dollars unless otherwise noted)


                                     1992      1993      1994

Income, Production and Employment:

Real GDP                          3,322.6   3,786.7   4,110.0 1/
Real GDP Growth (pct.)                1.1      -0.2       1.0 2/
Nominal GDP                       3,662.5   4,214.1   4,595.3 1/
Real GDP by Sector:
  Agriculture/Fisheries              77.6       N/A       N/A
  Mining                              8.5       N/A       N/A
  Manufacturing                   1,034.3       N/A       N/A
  Construction                      291.9       N/A       N/A
  Electricity/Gas                   110.2       N/A       N/A
  Wholesale/Retail                  465.7       N/A       N/A
  Finance/Insurance                 192.3       N/A       N/A
  Real Estate                       327.6       N/A       N/A
  Transportation                    207.7       N/A       N/A
  Services                          470.0       N/A       N/A
Per Capita Income (USD)            22,861       N/A       N/A
Labor Force (millions)               65.8      66.1      66.4 3/
Unemployment Rate (pct.)              2.2       2.9       2.8 3/

Money and Prices:  (annual percentage growth)

Money Supply 
  (M2+CD annual avg./pct.)            0.6       1.1       1.8 3/
Commercial Interest Rates
  (10-yr govt bonds/yr-end)          4.52      3.02      4.56 4/
Savings Rate (pct.) 5/               14.3       N/A       N/A
Investment Rate (pct.) 6/            26.3      25.3      24.1 1/
CPI (1990=100)                      105.0     106.4     107.1 3/
WPI (1985=100)                       97.8      95.0      93.2 7/
Exchange Rate (Yen/USD)            126.65    111.20    102.66 7/

Balance of Trade:

Total Exports (FOB)                 339.6     360.9     288.7 8/
  Exports to U.S. (FAS)              97.2     107.3      86.2 8/
Total Imports (CIF)                 233.0     240.7     198.4 8/
  Imports from U.S. (CIF)            47.8      48.0      46.7 8/
Trade Balance with U.S.              49.6      59.3      39.5 8/

Balance of Payments:

Current Account                     117.6     131.4      89.2 9/
Trade Account                       132.3     141.5      98.1 9/
Services/Transfers                  -14.8     -10.1      -9.0 9/
Long-Term Capital                   -28.5     -78.3    -24.4 10/
Basic Balance                        89.1      53.1     61.9 10/
Short-Term Capital                   -7.0     -14.4     -6.3 10/
Gold & FOREX Reserves (yr-end)       68.7      95.6     117.5 4/

N/A--Not available.

1/ Jan-June, S.A.A.R.
2/ Jan-June, year-over-year.  Estimated 1994 figure.
3/ Jan-August, average S.A.
4/ End of September.
5/ Savings as percent of personal disposable income.
6/ Public and private domestic fixed capital formation
and inventory investment/nominal GNP.
7/ Jan-August average, N.S.A.
8/ Jan-September cumulative, N.S.A.
9/ Jan-August cumulative, S.A.
10/ Jan-August cumulative, N.S.A.



1.  General Policy Framework

    In 1993, the Japanese economy, the world's second largest
at more than $4 trillion, posted its lowest calendar year GDP
growth since 1974, negative 0.2 percent for the year.  Output
declined slightly in 1994, the first time since the early 1970s.

    Japan is now recovering from the second longest economic
slowdown in Japan's postwar history.  Prior to the slowdown
that began in 1991 and lasted through 1993, Japan had never
experienced two consecutive years of less than 3 percent real
growth.  The surge in asset prices and high rates of capital
investment and hiring in the late 1980's gave way, by 1991, to
sharply slower growth, corporate restructuring, and balance
sheet adjustment by businesses and consumers.  Very low levels
of utilization for existing capacity suggest that business
investment will be a lagging factor in the current recovery.

    Japan's 1993 external accounts posted record global trade
and current account surpluses of $141 billion (BOP basis) and
$131 billion, respectively.  Sluggish domestic demand slowed
growth in import volume, while exports, especially to other
Asian markets, continued to grow steadily.  Yen appreciation
helped swell dollar-denominated surpluses in the short run
through the so-called "J-curve effect."  Over the longer run,
yen appreciation since 1990, plus eventual recovery in domestic
demand, is widely expected to contribute some downward
adjustment in Japan's external imbalance.

    In recent years, the Japanese government has used public
spending to counter the overall negative contribution of
private demand to domestic demand growth.  Four fiscal stimulus
packages between August 1992 and February 1994 injected a
substantial amount of public works spending into the economy,
some of which is still being disbursed in 1994.

    In 1994 the Diet passed tax reform legislation that will
extend FY 1994 income tax cuts totalling yen 5.5 trillion
($55 billion) through FY 1995.  A "permanent" portion of the
income tax cut (yen 3.5 trillion/$35 billion) will continue
thereafter.  The remaining "temporary" portion (yen 2
trillion/$20 billion) of the tax cut is currently scheduled to
be dropped after 1996, but may be dropped at the end of 1995. 
To offset the tax cut, beginning in April 1997, the consumption
tax (a value-added tax) is to be raised from the current rate
of three percent to five percent.  In addition, the government
announced a new public works investment program totaling yen
630 trillion ($6.3 trillion) that will run from FY 1995 through
FY 2004.

    In order to ease credit conditions, the Bank of Japan
lowered the Official Discount Rate (ODR) seven times between
mid-1991 and September 1993, from 6.0 percent/year to 1.75
percent, a record low.  Nominal interest rates set new record
lows during 1994; yet demand for funds, particularly for
investment purposes, remained relatively weak, as shown by
year-on-year declines in bank lending from mid-1994.  The Bank
of Japan continues to focus on the ODR as its primary policy
adjustment tool, and, through its daily operations, on
provision of funds in the money market for "fine tuning."


2.  Exchange Rate Policy

    The yen has appreciated against the dollar over the past
year, moving above the 100/1 dollar level for the first time in
the summer of 1994.  On paper, Japan ended most foreign
exchange controls in 1980.  In practice, numerous controls
remain on foreign exchange-related transactions and impede the
provision of financial services by competitive foreign firms.


3.  Structural Policies

    The Japanese economy remains in transition.  Structural
change has been a market-driven response to domestic economic
conditions and the changing global competitive environment.  In
the past decade, efforts at economic deregulation also
contributed to change.

    The Japanese government, which formerly directed
considerable public and private resources to priority areas,
has been gradually moving away from such industrial policy
measures, partly in response to criticism of export-oriented
policies.  The government still has a direct role in promoting
and organizing cooperation among Japanese high technology
firms, using off-budget resources and small amounts of
appropriated funds to contribute to investment projects and
government-private sector efforts. 

    From 1989 to 1992, United States-Japan structural economic
issues were handled under the Structural Impediments Initiative
(SII).  SII targeted structural problems in both countries that
impeded reduction of foreign payments imbalances.  Under SII
Japan agreed to liberalize elements of its distribution system,
liberalize its foreign direct investment regime, improve
disclosure rules governing transactions among related companies
(in order to help make business practices more transparent),
and strengthen anti-monopoly enforcement.  Moreover, under SII,
the U.S. and Japan conducted two joint price surveys to
demonstrate that Japan's structural impediments contribute to
unusually high price differentials between Japan and other
overseas markets.  The issues taken up in SII talks are now
addressed as appropriate under U.S.-Japan Framework discussions.

    Japan's economy remains heavily regulated, which reinforces
business practices that restrict competition and keep prices
high.  Price controls remain on certain agricultural products. 
Bureaucratic obstacles to new firms' entry into businesses such
as trucking, retail sales and telecommunications slow
structural adjustment.  The Government of Japan has made
deregulation a key theme, issuing its "Policy for Promoting
Deregulation" on June 28, 1994.  In this connection, the Prime
Minister's Office is leading a government-wide effort to draft
a five-year deregulation action plan that is expected to set
the policy tone and scope of deregulation in Japan until 2000. 
Implementation of the action plan will begin April 1, 1995.

    In 1993, the Clinton Administration announced the
U.S.-Japan Framework for a New Economic Partnership.  A goal of
the Framework is to make our economic ties with Japan more
balanced and mutually beneficial, as well as to promote global
growth, open markets, and a vital world trading system.  The
Framework addresses the wide range of U.S.-Japan economic and
trade issues through negotiations on macroeconomic, structural
and sectoral matters.  The structural and sectoral issues are
divided into five "baskets" for discussion:  government
procurement, regulatory reform and competitiveness, economic
harmonization, implementation of existing agreements and other
major sectors (including autos and auto parts).

    Structural negotiations are ongoing under Framework areas
such as deregulation and competition policy, foreign direct
investment, buyer-supplier relationships, and access to
technology.  In the deregulation and competition policy
discussions, the U.S. has provided detailed suggestions, on
areas ranging from telecommunications to retail policy, for
reforms to be included in Japan's five-year deregulation plan. 
The goal of the Framework's foreign direct investment and
buyer-supplier talks is to increase the market presence in
Japan of U.S. and other foreign firms by encouraging a more
open and flexible investment regime.  The United States has
made many specific recommendations to the Japanese government.


4.  Debt Management Policies

    Japan is the world's largest net creditor.  It is an active
participant together with the United States in international
discussions of the developing country indebtedness issue in a
variety of fora.


5.  Significant Barriers to U.S. Exports

    The Japanese government has removed many formal barriers to
imports of goods and services.  Import licenses, still
technically required for all goods, are granted on a pro forma
basis, with limited exceptions (fish, leather goods and some
agricultural products).  Japan's average industrial tariff rate
(about two percent) is one of the lowest in the world, and
Japan has agreed to further tariff reductions in the Uruguay
Round.  The Uruguay Round Agreement will reduce but not
eliminate trade barriers in agriculture, manufactured goods,
and services.

    Traditional trade policy measures, however, are not the
greatest obstacles to penetrating Japanese markets.  Instead of
tariffs and official discrimination against imports, U.S.
exporters must deal with numerous factors that raise costs and
inhibit access in areas ranging from glass to auto parts. 
These obstacles include archaic and multi-tiered distribution
systems, "keiretsu" (networks between manufacturers and
distributors linked by long-time business relationships and
often by cross-holding of shares) relationships, excessive
government regulation and the use of administrative guidance,
public procurement practices, and the high cost of land (which
inhibits new market entrants).

    In October 1994, the United States and Japan signed
important market-opening agreements under the Framework;
agreements were signed in insurance and government procurement
of medical technology and telecommunications goods and services
(including procurement by Japan's massive phone company, Nippon
Telegraph and Telephone (NTT)).  In December 1994, the United
States and Japan finalized an agreement to open Japan's flat
glass sector to foreign suppliers.  In addition, U.S. and
Japanese negotiators reached agreements in 1994 in a number of
other areas, including opening Japan's huge public works
construction sector to foreign firms; improving access to
Japan's cellular telephone market; eliminating barriers to
imports of apples; and streamlining and improving intellectual
property procedures.

    In the last few years, Japan also agreed to relax rules on
value-added telecommunications services, to strengthen
copyright protection for U.S. music recordings, and to resolve
a dispute involving amorphous metals, for which market entry
has been facilitated.  The United States continues to closely
monitor U.S.-Japan agreements including those in the areas of
commercial satellites, government procurement of
supercomputers, semiconductors, construction, wood products,
paper, medical products and pharmaceuticals, and computer
procurement.  In 1994, the United States announced that
impediments to U.S. market access for paper and wood products
in Japan may warrant future identification of these sectors for
action under the "Super 301" Executive Order.  In 1994, the
United States also initiated a Section 301 investigation of
regulatory barriers in Japan's market for replacement (after
market) auto parts.  Framework negotiations on autos and auto
parts continue.

    The governments of the United States and Japan announced on
January 10, 1995, a comprehensive financial services agreement
under the U.S.-Japan Framework Agreement that will further open
Japan's financial markets to foreign competition.  The
agreement will ensure that U.S. financial institutions have the
opportunity to compete more effectively in the Japanese
financial market.  Inter alia, the agreement opens the
$1 trillion Japanese pension market to effective participation
by foreign fund managers.  The agreement also creates greater
opportunities for foreign financial firms to participate in the
$500 billion Japanese corporate securities market by permitting
greater scope for the introduction of new financial
instruments.  Finally, the agreement will promote further
integration of Japan's capital market with the global capital
markets, and will create significant opportunities for 
competitive financial institutions to help Japanese invest
abroad and Japanese firms to offer securities in offshore
markets.

    The ability of foreign architectural and construction firms
to access Japan's public works market continues to be closely
scrutinized by the U.S. government.  For many years, Japan has
engaged in exclusionary practices which have prevented foreign
firms from competing successfully on contracts for major
Japanese construction projects.  To remedy this situation, the
U.S. government negotiated the 1988 Major Projects Arrangements
(revised in 1991) which gave foreign firms improved access to
thirty-four major construction projects with the understanding
that experience gained on these would assist foreign firms in
winning contracts on other construction projects.  Despite
these agreements, U.S. architectural, engineering, and
construction firms continued to face difficulties in doing
business in Japan.  As a result, Japan was designated under
Title VII of the 1988 Omnibus Trade and Competitiveness Act for
discriminatory procurement practices.  Following months of
intensive negotiations with the United States, in January 1994
Japan adopted a new Action Plan to overhaul its current public
works procurement system.  The Action Plan replaces the
designated bidding system (under which only specified companies
could offer bids) with an open and competitive system, allows
foreign firms' international experiences to be considered when
determining a firm's qualifications, and applies to all
procurement above a certain threshold, not just the thirty-four
major projects.  A formal review of the implementation of this
Action Plan will occur during the spring of 1995.

    In addition to progress in the public works area, Framework
agreements in October 1994 improved access for foreign firms to
government procurement of medical technology and
telecommunications goods and services.  The United States
continues to monitor Japanese government procurement practices
to assure that U.S. firms are given an opportunity to compete
fairly and openly.

    Legal services remain on the U.S./Japan trade agenda. 
Despite partial liberalization in 1987 which allowed U.S. law
firms to open offices in Japan, the Government of Japan
continues to maintain severe restrictions on the way in which
foreign firms can provide legal services.  For example, foreign
firms are prohibited from employing or entering into
partnership with Japanese attorneys, and lawyers who are not
qualified Japanese lawyers may not advise clients on points of
Japanese law.

    In December 1993, U.S. negotiators included legal services
in the U.S. package submitted to the GATT.  This decision
effectively froze the current practice regarding legal services
performed by foreign lawyers in GATT signatory countries which
had agreed to include legal services in the final agreement.

    Although the Japanese government has simplified, harmonized
and, in some cases, eliminated restrictive product standards to
follow international practices in a number of areas, many
problems remain.  The 1985-1987 Market-Oriented Sector
Selective (MOSS) Talks resolved many standards problems and set
in motion a continuing dialogue through MOSS follow-up meetings
of experts.

    In general, advances in technology make some current
Japanese standards outdated and restrictive.  In addition,
Japanese industry supports unique safety standards that limit
competition.  Lastly, bureaucratic inertia inhibits further
standards simplification.  Standards problems continue to
hamper market access in Japan.

    Japan's Office of the Trade Ombudsman (OTO) traditionally
only responded when an aggrieved party, such as a foreign
company or domestic importer, complained about Japanese
standards, certifications, and testing procedures.  Since 1993,
the OTO has brought its own cases to the attention of the
Japanese government bureaucracy.  Although the U.S. government
had hoped the new process would lead to greater pressure on the
bureaucrats to change, thus far, the OTO has accomplished very
little.  Of the twenty-one requests brought before the OTO in
1993, regulations in only seven areas were revised
satisfactorily (only two of which involved issues raised by the
United States).  The OTO seems to have made the most progress
in technical areas where the complainant made a good case and
where Japanese government bureaucratic resistance to changes
was light.  The OTO process has not been useful in pursuing
policy issues or politicized market access problems, e.g.
removal of the tariff on feedgrains.  In February 1994, the OTO
was upgraded when it was moved to the Office of the Prime
Minister, but it was still not granted any enforcement
authority.  While Government of Japan effort to strengthen the
OTO may have boosted the office's profile, it is unlikely to
significantly improve the OTO's effectiveness.

    Foreign investment into Japan in most sectors is now
subject to only ex post notification to the Ministry of Finance
(MOF), thanks to MOF commitments made under SII.  Previously,
all foreign investors were required to notify the MOF of their
intent to invest 30 days before any investment occurred.  Japan
still requires prior approval in certain sectors:  air and
maritime transport, space development, atomic energy, oil and
gas production and distribution, agriculture, fisheries,
forestry, leather and leather products manufacturing, and
tobacco manufacturing.

    Foreign investment in the banking and securities industries
is subject to a reciprocity requirement.  Japan gives foreign
investors national treatment after entry, with the Organization
for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) notified of
limited exceptions.  The Japanese government does not employ
local equity requirements, export performance requirements or
local content requirements.  The Japanese government has not
forced foreign individuals or companies to divest themselves of
investments.  Japanese law allows foreign landholding, and
foreign investors may repatriate capital and profits readily.

    At the same time, inward foreign direct investment in Japan
is much lower than that in its major G-7 trading partners. 
There are a number of factors underlying the low level of
inward investment, including the legacy of many years of active
Japanese government discouragement of foreign investment.  A
major problem today, however, is the high cost of doing
business in Japan, particularly for new market entrants, that
makes the rate of return on investments far lower than other
alternatives.  In addition, foreign acquisition of existing
Japanese companies is difficult, due in part to crossholding of
shares among allied companies, leading to the limited
availability of publicly traded common stock.  This practice
complicates efforts of foreign firms to acquire existing
distribution/service networks through mergers and
acquisitions.  The Japanese government has taken some initial
steps to provide incentives to foreign investors.  This issue
is under discussion in Foreign Direct Investment sub-basket of
the Framework.


6.  Export Subsidies Policies

    Japan is a signatory to the OECD Export Credit Arrangement,
including the agreement on the use of tied-aid credit.  The
Japanese government subsidizes exports as permitted by the
Arrangement, which allows softer terms for export financing to
developing nations.  Of the $11.5 billion of official
development assistance that Japan disbursed in 1993, slightly
less than half of the bilateral assistance portion (excluding
Central Europe assistance) was in the form of concessional
loans.  In this area, Japan has virtually eliminated its
tied-aid credits and now extends over 95 percent of its new
loan aid under untied terms.  But U.S. exporters continue to
face difficulties in competing due to the use of (1) Less
Developed Country (LDC) untied aid, where bidding is only open
to Japanese and LDC firms, and (2) tied or partially tied
feasibility studies (provided by grant aid) for untied (loan
aid) projects which result in project specifications more
suited to Japanese than U.S. bidders.  These programs are the
subject of continued discussions within the OECD.  Japan
exempts exports from the three percent VAT-like consumption tax
initiated in April 1989.  This provision does not appear to
have any significant impact on a manufacturer's decision to
sell domestically or export.


7.  Protection of U.S. Intellectual Property Rights

    Japan is a party to the Berne, Paris and Universal
Copyright conventions and the Patent Cooperation Treaty. 
Japan's Intellectual Property Rights (IPR) regime affords
national treatment to U.S. entities.  The United States and
Japan agree that uniform IPR standards and better enforcement
are needed.  To that end, U.S., Japanese, and European
negotiators are engaged in trilateral patent harmonization
talks.  Discussions, including the protection of semiconductor
mask works, are also taking place in the World Intellectual
Property Organization and the GATT.

    Many Japanese firms use the patent filing system as a tool
of corporate strategy, filing many applications to cover slight
variations in technology.  Public access to applications and
compulsory licensing provisions for dependent patents
facilitate this practice.  The rights of U.S. filers in Japan
are often circumscribed by prior filings of applications for
similar inventions or processes.  The need to respond
individually to multiple oppositions slows the process and
makes it more costly.  Japanese patent examiners and courts 
interpret patent applications narrowly and adjudicate cases
slowly.  Japanese patent law lacks a doctrine of equivalence
and civil procedure lacks a discovery procedure to seek
evidence of infringement.

    Average patent pendency in Japan is one of the longest
among developed countries, averaging over five years from
application to grant.  The long pendency period, coupled with a
practice of opening all applications to public inspection
18 months after filing, exposes patent applications to lengthy
public scrutiny without effective legal protection.  Bilateral
talks on Japan's slow patent processing led to a reduction in
the average patent examination portion of the pendency period,
from about 37 months to 30 months.  Efforts to reduce this
period continue.

    A United States-Japan IPR agreement, signed in August 1994
under the Framework, will provide some relief to problems posed
by the lengthy pendency period and the practice of multiple
opposition filing.  The Japan Patent Office will introduce
legislation to revise the current system by April 1, 1995.  The
agreement is to be fully operational by January 1, 1996.  The
revised system will allow opposition filings only after a
patent is granted.  Multiple opposition filings will be
consolidated and addressed in a single proceeding, minimizing
time and costs.  There will also be a revised, accelerated
examination system, the major elements of which are:  (a)
patents already filed with accredited foreign patent
authorities will be eligible for accelerated examination in
Japan; (b) accelerated examination applications will be granted
or abandoned within 36 months of the request date; and (c)
there are limits on accelerated examination fees.

    Trademark applications are also processed slowly, averaging
two years and three months and sometimes taking three to four
years.  Infringement carries no penalty until an application is
approved.  In April 1992, Japan amended the trademark law to
protect service marks explicitly.

    Japanese copyright protection for programming languages and
algorithms is ambiguous.  Pirated video sales remain a problem,
although the Japanese police cooperate with the Motion Picture
Association of America in targeting video pirates, under 1988
Japanese IPR legislation that facilitates prosecution.  Japan
has committed to enforce vigorously national treatment rights. 
A revised copyright law, which was passed in 1991 and took
effect in January 1992, extends copyright protection to 30
years.  Pre-1978 foreign recordings are now protected back to
1969; foreign recordings are provided with exclusive rights by
cabinet order.  Discussions by an advisory panel to the
Japanese government on a proposal to relax legal restrictions
against reverse engineering of software and decompilation of
computer programs took place in 1994, but the panel ultimately
took no action on the matter and instead recommended further
study.  The U.S. government and U.S. software companies
registered their strong objection to any change.

    Although Japan's 1990 Trade Protection Law is an
improvement over protection by ordinary contract, it is still
very difficult to get an injunction against a third party
transferee of purloined trade secrets.


8.  Worker Rights

    a.  The Right of Association

    This right as defined by the International Labor
Organization (ILO) is protected in Japan.

    b.  The Right to Organize, Bargain and Act Collectively

    This right is assured by the Japanese constitution. 
Approximately 25 percent of the active work force belongs to
labor unions.  Unions are free of government control and
influence.  The right to strike is implicitly assumed by the
constitution, and it is exercised frequently.  Public
employees, however, do not have the right to strike, although
they do have recourse to mediation and arbitration in order to
resolve disputes.  In exchange for a ban on their right to
strike, government employee pay raises are determined by the
government, based on a recommendation by the Independent
National Personnel Authority.

    c.  Prohibition of Forced or Compulsory Labor

    The Labor Standards Law prohibits the use of forced labor,
and the law is vigorously enforced.

    d.  Minimum Age of Employment of Children

    Under the Revised Labor Standards Law of 1987, minors under
15 years of age may not be employed as workers, and those under
the age of 18 may not be employed in dangerous or harmful
work.  Child labor laws are rigorously enforced by the Labor
Inspection Division of the Ministry of Labor.

    e.  Acceptable Conditions of Work

    Minimum wages are set regionally, not nationally.  The
Ministry of Labor effectively administers various laws and
regulations governing occupational health and safety, principal
among which is the Industrial Safety and Health law of 1972.

    f.  Rights in Sectors with U.S. Investment

    Internationally recognized worker rights standards, as
defined by the ILO, are protected under Japanese law and cover
all workers in Japan.  U.S. capital is invested in all major
sectors of the Japanese economy, including petroleum, food and
related products, primary and fabricated metals, machinery,
electric and electronic equipment, other manufacturing and
wholesale trade.




  Extent of U.S. Investment in Selected Industries.--U.S. Direct
Investment Position Abroad on an Historical Cost Basis--1993

                    (Millions of U.S. dollars)
                                                                
              Category                          Amount          

Petroleum                                              5,429
Total Manufacturing                                   13,610
  Food & Kindred Products                     806
  Chemicals and Allied Products             3,189
  Metals, Primary & Fabricated                260
  Machinery, except Electrical              3,800
  Electric & Electronic Equipment           1,614
  Transportation Equipment                  1,824
  Other Manufacturing                       2,118
Wholesale Trade                                        5,859
Banking                                                  309
Finance/Insurance/Real Estate                          4,780
Services                                                 740
Other Industries                                         666
TOTAL ALL INDUSTRIES                                  31,393   

Source: U.S. Department of Commerce, Bureau of Economic Analysis
  
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