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Title: Afghanistan Human Rights Practices, 1995
Author: U.S. Department of State
Date: March 1996
AFGHANISTAN*
* The American Embassy in Kabul has been closed for security reasons
since January, 1989. Information on the human rights situation is
therefore limited.
Afghanistan in 1995 continued to experience civil war with the military
balance and political control shifting between various factions in
different parts of the country. Nominal President Burhanuddin Rabbani
remained in power in Kabul, the capital, although his mandate expired in
June 1994. His authority was maintained by the military forces of de
facto Defense Minister Ahmed Shah Masood. Only two of the factions that
comprised the original nine-party coalition Government in 1993 remained.
In November Rabbani told the U.N. Special Mission that he was willing to
transfer power to a 28-member interim council, comprised largely of pro-
Rabbani elements. His offer was rejected by the Taliban, an independent
coalition of religious students and former commanders. As of early
December, no agreement on an interim council had been reached. There is
no constitution, no rule of law, and no independent judiciary. Outside
the capital, several provincial administrations maintained limited
functions. Civil institutions were mostly nonexistent. Banditry was
prevalent in much of the country.
Rabbani's forces controlled Kabul and 4 to 5 of Afghanistan's 32
provinces. The rest are controlled by the armed factions, primarily the
Taliban (religious students movement), General Dostam's National Islamic
Movement (NIM), and the Council of the Eastern Provinices. By September
the Taliban had consolidated its hold over half the provinces and almost
two-thirds of the territory. Efforts were under way to foster military
and political cooperation among the opposition factions to oust Rabbani
and Masood from power, however none succeeded. In October the Taliban
began advancing on Kabul. In November and December, air raids and
rocket attacks by proRabbani and Taliban forces resulted in over 100
civilian casualties. By year's end, Masood's forces had failed to
dislodge the Taliban from their forward positions around Kabul.
The Kabul authorities have not established a formal security apparatus;
rather they relied on the forces of Masood. The Rabbani regime has
limited influence even in the few provinces under its control. In most
areas of the country, tribal warlords and armed commanders ruled their
own personal fiefdoms with little reference to any other authority.
Local security units operated independently of any governmental
authority and were responsible for many human rights abuses.
Agriculture, including high levels of opium poppy cultivation, remained
the mainstay of the economy. Afghanistan has become the second largest
opium producer in the world and a substantial hashish producer as well.
Civil war has impeded reconstruction of irrigation systems and repair of
market roads. The presence of an estimated 10 million land mines has
restricted areas for cultivation and slowed the return of refugees who
are needed to rebuild the economy. The laying of new minefields,
primarily by pro-Rabbani forces but also by General Dostam's NIM,
exacerbated an already difficult situation. Formal economic activity
remained marginal; commerce was deterred by the recurrent fighting and
blocked roads. Modest reconstruction took place in Herat, Kandahar,
Jalalabad, Mazar-i-Sharif, and some rural areas where local authorities
had reestablished a degree of order and civil administration, and United
Nations and nongovernmental organizations were able to operate. When
Kabul was united under Rabbani/Masood control in March, reconstruction
efforts began in the capital as well. However, rocket attacks of Kabul
by Taliban forces in November largely halted those reconstruction
efforts.
Large-scale human rights violations continued to occur; citizens were
effectively precluded from changing their government peacefully. The
warring factions not only failed to protect the human rights of
civilians, but often wantonly violated those rights by specifically
targeting noncombatants. The various armed factions were often
responsible for assassinations, indiscriminate lethal shelling of
civilians, torture, rapes, looting, and kidnapings for ransom. Masood's
troops were responsible for looting and rape after they captured the
Karte Seh section of Kabul from the Taliban and Shi'a forces in March.
Dostam's forces systematically looted the northern city of Kunduz after
taking the city in mid-February. While the Taliban were generally
acknowledged to have been more successful than other factions in
restoring peace and order to areas under their control, they also were
reputed to enforce strict Islamic punishments in areas that they
controlled--public executions, amputations of hands and feet for theft,
and restricting women's rights by preventing them from working and girls
from attending schools. Civil war conditions and the unfettered actions
of competing factions effectively limited the freedoms of speech, press,
assembly, association, and religion.
RESPECT FOR HUMAN RIGHTS
Section 1 Respect for the Integrity of the Person, Including freedom
from:
a. Political and Other Extrajudicial Killing
Combatants sought to assassinate rival commanders and their
sympathizers. The perpetrators of these assassinations and their
motives were difficult to identify, as political motives are often
entwined with family and tribal feuds, battles over the drug trade,
religious zealotry, and personal vendettas.
In February Kabul authorities vowed to investigate the murder of the
wife and children of Dr. Salem Mohammed Zeray, a former Communist
government minister, who were found dead in their Kabul home. All had
had their throats cut. In its 1995 report on Afghanistan, Amnesty
International (AI) stated that official investigators appointed by
President Rabbani reportedly confirmed that there had been no signs of
other injuries or of a robbery. No further information or outcome of
the investigation was known.
In March Abdul Ali Mazari, the leader of an anti-Rabbani Shi'a faction,
was killed while in the custody of the Taliban. The Taliban carried out
public executions of purportedly corrupt officials in certain areas they
controlled. In March a mass grave with 22 bodies was found south of
Kabul; 20 of the deceased were Shi'a Muslims of the Hazara ethnic
minority. They apparently were killed execution style with their hands
tied behind their backs and bullets fired into their heads. It was
unclear who was responsible for the Shi'a deaths.
In October Syed Mohammad Yousaf, a top Rabbani commander, was reportedly
murdered as a result of internal strife within the Kabul coalition.
Also in that month, Mamoor Ghayyur, former governor of northern Baghlan
Province and Hezb-I-Islami member, and 15 others were ambushed and
killed while travelling in Baghlan Province. Local press accounts
suggested that NIM-allied General Jaffar Naderi ordered the
assassination.
In November Abdul Hakim Katawazi, retired Afghan general and Secretary
General of the Council for Understanding and National Unity (CUNUA), was
murdered outside his Peshawar office. Some members of CUNUA, a moderate
political organization, favor a role for the former King of Afghanistan
in a future Afghan government. The next day, Wakil Wazir Mohammad, a
tribal elder and CUNUA supporter was shot and killed at his home in a
Peshawar suburb. No suspects have been apprehended by local authorities
in either case, although some suspect that the Kabul regime or radical
Islamist Hekmatyar's faction was involved.
b. Disappearance
Hostage-taking for ransom or political reasons was common. There were
persistent, credible allegations of hostage taking for ransom in Kabul,
reportedly by troops loyal to de facto Defense Minister Ahmad Shah
Masood. In August the Taliban forced a Russian aircraft enroute to
Kabul to land in Kandahar and found it to be carrying AK-47 ammunition
headed for the Kabul regime. They held the Russian crew of seven in
detention, but allowed ICRC delegates to visit them regularly. The
Russian Government appealed to the Taliban to free the crew on
humanitarian grounds but to no avail. The Taliban demanded an
accounting of 60,000 Afghans who purportedly disappeared between 1978
and 1989; they believed some were still in the former Soviet Union. The
Taliban gave Russian officials a list of 6,700 names about whom the
Russians promised to seek information. As of year's end, the Russian
crew had not been released.
Groups in Russia listed nearly 300 Soviet soldiers who had served in
Afghanistan as missing in action or prisoners of war. Most were thought
to be dead or to have voluntarily assimilated into Afghan society. Some
allegedly continued to be held against their will by their Afghan
captors. The Ukrainian Government maintained that there are Ukrainian
prisoners of war held in Afghan camps.
There were unconfirmed but persistent reports of girls and young women
throughout Afghanistan being kidnapped by local commanders. Some of the
women were then forced to marry their kidnappers. Others simply
remained missing. To avoid this situation, some families sent their
daughters to Pakistan. There were also reports that women have been
killed by their male relatives to prevent forced marriages (see Section
5).
c. Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading Treatment or
Punishment
Armed factions reportedly employed torture frequently to extract
information from prisoners or to break their will. Inmates have been
tortured to death. Various factions maintained prisons in territories
under their control and established torture cells in them. According to
a press report, prisoners in a Panjshir prison in the north, which was
controlled by de facto Defense Minister Ahmad Shah Masood, were
routinely beaten, kept awake at night, and fed insufficient and bad
food.
The U.N. Special Rapporteur for Human Rights in Afghanistan visited a
prison in Jalalabad in August. He described prison conditions as
difficult; the prisoners were given no food. It was the responsibility
of prisoners' relatives to provide food once a week. Those who had no
relatives had to petition the local Shura or rely on other inmates.
Prisoners live in collective cells.
The Taliban ruled strictly in the southern and eastern provinces they
controlled, establishing ad hoc and rudimentary judicial systems. As
there was no functioning national judicial system, the Taliban imposed
their own form of justice based on traditional Islamic laws and
punishments. Murderers were subjected to public executions (see Section
1.a.) and thieves had one hand and one foot severed. In February the
Taliban imposed for the first time in Afghanistan the punishment of
amputation. Three Afghans convicted of highway robbery by an Islamic
court in Lashkargah, Helmand province, each had a hand and a foot
publicly amputated under local anesthesia; the operations were
reportedly performed by doctors. Public amputation under similar
conditions for the crime of theft reportedly was imposed by the Taliban
Shari'a court in Ghazni province after the accused were caught
attempting to rob a truck driver of goods valued at $280. There were
also reports that amputations as punishment for severe crimes were
carried out in other non-Taliban controlled areas.
d. Arbitrary Arrest, Detention, or Exile
With the breakdown of law and order, justice was not administered
according to formal legal codes and procedures in many localities.
Little is known about procedures employed during the year for taking
persons into custody and bringing them to trial. Presumably, practices
varied considerably among the localities.
e. Denial of Fair Public Trial
With the collapse of a nationwide judicial system, many municipal and
provincial authorities relied on some form of Shari'a (Islamic) law and
traditional tribal codes of justice. However, little is known about the
implementation of these precepts. The administration and implementation
of justice varied from area to area, and could depend on the whims of
the local commanders. Reportedly, one northern commander summarily
executed, tortured, and meted out punishments without reference to any
other authority.
According to AI, in the first months of the year, dozens of prisoners
received punishments, including execution and amputation, ordered by
recently established Islamic courts in areas controlled by the Taliban.
These courts reportedly were hearing cases, at times in sessions that
lasted only a few minutes. Reportedly one such court in Kandahar
usually consisted of four judges who gathered in a room or courtyard.
Both witnesses and the accused were brought before the judges to recount
testimony and plead their cases. Prisoners were often brought forward
in shackles. The court reportedly dealt with all complaints, using
traditional Islamic laws and punishments as well as traditional tribal
customs (see Section 1.c.). In cases involving murder, convicted
prisoners were generally ordered executed by relatives of the victim
(see Section 1.a.), who could instead choose to accept blood money.
Decisions of the courts were reportedly final.
In Kandahar the Taliban executed two persons convicted of murder in
early 1995. The sentences were handed down by a four-member Islamic
court headed by Maulawi Sayed Mohammed. The executions were performed
by the victims' next-of-kin using rifles. In May a former army officer
of the Communist regime was executed in Shaikhabad (Wardak Province)
after being convicted by a Taliban Islamic court for murdering two men
several days earlier. A relative of one of the murdered men performed
the public beheading with a sword. Reportedly, northern Pashtun tribes
residing in nominally Dostam-controlled areas punished severe crimes by
amputating hands.
No firm estimate was available on the number of political prisoners, but
a Pakistan-based human rights group estimated that well over 1,000
people were held as political prisoners or hostages by armed factions or
independent commanders. According to an International Committee of the
Red Cross (ICRC) document issued in September, ICRC delegates had access
to 2,829 detainees during the first 7 months of the year, 2,309 of whom
were seen for the first time. Delegates made 83 visits to 43 places of
detention during the same period.
f. Arbitrary Interference with Privacy, Family, Home, or
Correspondence
Intrafactional fighting often resulted in the homes and businesses of
civilians being invaded by the opposing forces--whether victor or loser.
Armed gunmen acted with impunity given the absence of any legal
protection from the law or a responsive police force. In March after
capturing the Karte Seh district in southwestern Kabul from the Taliban
and anti-Rabbani Shi'a forces, Masood's troops went on a rampage,
systematically looting whole streets and raping women. In one case
reported by Reuters, government troops broke a man's arms with shovels
and beat his wife when he tried to stop them from looting his home. In
February, after General Dostam's forces took the northern city of
Kunduz, they engaged in widespread, systematic looting of the city,
including homes, stores, and offices.
g. Use of Excessive Force and Violations of Humanitarian Law in
Internal Conflicts
Fighting for power in Kabul and the provinces continued among the armed
factions, causing widespread destruction and indiscriminate killing.
Command and control of armed men was often haphazard and informal, a
condition that obscured the relationship between the perpetrators of
human rights violations and the political leaders with whom they were
nominally affiliated.
The civil war intensified in February when the Taliban, a loose movement
of Afghan religious students and former commanders, advanced to the
outskirts of Kabul. They drove former Prime Minister Gulbuddin
Hekmatyar's forces out of southern Kabul and disarmed Shi'a forces
allied with Hekmatyar. Rabbani's forces, however, repulsed the Taliban
advance and the Taliban retreated to positions about 30 miles south of
Kabul. Some of the worst human rights abuses occurred in southwestern
Kabul in the wake of the retreating Taliban and Shi'a fighters--looting,
rape, and detention of citizens. Many of the abuses were committed by
pro-Rabbani forces. In November Taliban aircraft bombed residential
areas of central Kabul, reportedly killing 39 people and wounding 140.
An estimated 1,500 people died in violence in Kabul primarily during the
fighting in March when Masood's forces consolidated power over the
capital. In many cases civilian deaths were incidental to the military
actions of the belligerents, but in some cases combatants deliberately
targeted civilian areas. In March Taliban commanders reportedly
admitted having fired rockets at Kabul during the intense fighting for
the capital's southwestern sector. In August the Karte Seh section of
Kabul, with a largely Hazara Shi'a population, came under rocket fire in
two separate attacks resulting in the deaths of 18 people. The Taliban
subsequently denied responsibility.
In November and December, more than 150 people died in Kabul due to
repeated rocketing, shelling, and high-altitude bombing of the city,
reportedly by Taliban forces. The Taliban denied responsibility for
civilian casualties, stating they were aiming at military targets.
Civilian casualties also resulted from government counterattacks, air
raids, and shelling on Taliban positions, particularly around Charasyab.
At the beginning of the year, the United Nations High Commissioner for
Refugees (UNHCR) reported that there were approximately 300,000
internally displaced persons (IDP's) in camps near Jalalabad and as many
as 200,000 living independently in and around Jalalabad city. By
September the number remaining in the camps had fallen to approximately
164,000. Between 25,000 and 27,000 IDPs were reported to be living in
camps in the north in Pul-i-Khumri, Mazar-i-Sharif, Shibergan, and
Hairaton. A large number of Kabulis were also displaced within the
city, but there were no reliable estimates as to how many.
The Afghan countryside remained plagued by an estimated 10 million land
mines sown during and since the Soviet occupation. With funding from
international donors, the United Nations (U.N.) has organized and
trained mine detection and clearance teams which operated throughout
Afghanistan, and supported mine awareness programs for civilians.
Nevertheless, the mines will pose a threat for years to come. The
laying of new minefields by pro-Rabbani forces of Ismael Khan in Herat,
by Ahmad Shah Masood around Kabul, and to lesser degree by General
Dostam, has compounded the mine problem.
Section 2 Respect for Civil Liberties, Including:
a. Freedom of Speech and Press
There are no laws effectively providing for freedom of speech and press,
and the nominal government lacked the authority to protect these rights.
Senior officials of various warring factions allegedly attempted to
intimidate reporters and influence their reporting. The few newspapers,
all of which were published only sporadically, were largely affiliated
with different factions. There was a pro-Rabbani radio and television
service in Kabul. The various regions had their own radio and
television stations: former Prime Minister Hekmatyar has his own radio
and television service near Kabul, as does General Dostam in the
northern city of Mazar-i-Sharif. The media in Herat came under Taliban
control when they captured the city in September.
International journalists in Kabul report that they were routinely
pressured by the authorities to slant their coverage in favor of the
Rabbani regime. In September the Taliban expelled from Herat a British
Broadcasting Corporation (BBC) journalist because they believed his
reporting had a pro-Rabbani tilt.
b. Freedom of Peaceful Assembly and Association
Civil war conditions in Kabul and the tenuous security situation in much
of the country effectively limited Afghans' freedom of assembly and
association. The prohibition against non-Islamic political parties was
reinforced by President Rabbani's call for Jihad, or holy war, against
General Dostam and his followers. The President's backers do not view
Dostam's movement as Islamic.
c. Freedom of Religion
Afghanistan's official name, the Islamic State of Afghanistan, reflects
the country's adherence to Islam as the state religion. Some 85 percent
of the population is Sunni Muslim, with Shi'a Muslims comprising most of
the remainder. The Shi'a minority number among the most economically
disadvantaged people in Afghanistan. Some armed groups have been
particularly brutal in fighting the Shi'a factions. In October Sunni
Taliban forces reportedly seized the possessions of Shi'a families in
the Nimroz capital of Zaranj and forced them to leave the city.
The small number of non-Muslim residents in Afghanistan may practice
their faith, but may not proselytize, according to an official source.
The country's small Hindu and Sikh population, which once numbered about
50,000, continued to shrink as its members emigrated or took refuge
abroad.
d. Freedom of Movement Within the Country, Foreign Travel,
Emigration, and Repatriation
Although in principle citizens have the right to travel freely both
inside and outside the country, their ability to travel within the
country was hampered by warfare, brigandage, millions of undetected land
mines, a road network in a state of disrepair, and limited domestic air
service (complicated by factional threats to air traffic). Despite
these obstacles many people continued to travel relatively freely with
buses plying routes in most parts of the country. However, due to
intermittent fighting in various areas, international aid agencies often
found that their ability to travel, work and distribute assistance was
hampered. International travel continued to be difficult as both
General Dostam and the Taliban threatened to shoot down any planes that
overflew the areas of Afghanistan they controlled without their
permission.
Afghans continued to form one of the world's largest refugee
populations. According to the UNHCR, about 2.25 million Afghans remain
abroad. Of these, 1.3 million are in Iran, 865,000 are in Pakistan, and
28,000 are in Russia. Approximately 19,000 Afghans reside in parts of
the former Soviet Union other than Russia. Pakistan claimed an
additional 500,000 unregistered Afghan refugees in its territory. Over
3.8 million Afghan refugees have been repatriated since 1988, with over
1.5 million returning to Afghanistan in the peak year of 1992.
According to the UNHCR, more than 391,000 Afghans repatriated in 1995,
153,000 from Pakistan and 238,000 from Iran. In November the UNHCR
border facility at Islam Qaleh reopened after a month's closure as the
border with Iran was sealed due to hostilities in the area.
According to the UNHCR, of the 100,000 to 120,000 Tajik refugees who
fled to northern Afghanistan, only 18,000 remained in January; most were
repatriated in 1994. From January to October, an additional 523 were
repatriated. Tajiks repatriating from Sakhi camp, in areas under the
control of General Dostam, were able to repatriate freely. Those in and
around Kunduz, in areas controlled by pro-Rabbani forces, were more
restricted by local authorities and less accessible to the UNHCR.
Pressures from the Tajik opposition limited repatriation as well.
Section 3 Respect for Political Rights: The Right of Citizens to
Change Their Government
The continuing violent struggle for political power among the three
major armed factions (including the nominal Government) precluded
citizens from changing their government or form of government peacefully
and democratically. The authorities in Kabul, nominally a coalition
headed by President Burhanuddin Rabbani, remained in power with the
military backing of de facto Defense Minister Ahmad Shah Masood. In
March Nabi Mohammadi's Movement of the Islamic Revolution, one of the
small coalition parties, resigned from the Government, leaving only 2 of
the 9 original political parties of the coalition government which was
established in 1993. The Kabul regime controlled only the capital and 4
or 5 of Afghanistan's 32 provinces. General Dostam's forces controlled
several northern provinces, and the Taliban movement held sway in at
least 16 provinces in southern, central, and western Afghanistan. Three
eastern provinces were ruled by a neutral governor. In most areas, the
local Shura or Council was the most influential governing body.
In November President Rabbani told Mahmoud Mestiri, the U.N. Special
Envoy for Afghanistan, that he was willing to transfer power to a 28-
member interim council, comprised largely of pro-Rabbani elements--an
offer rejected by the Taliban. Despite the determined efforts of the
U.N. Special Mission to get the factions to agree to a cease-fire and an
interim governing mechanism, no such agreement has emerged. The
Organization of Islamic Conference (OIC) also tried to bring the Afghan
factions together. After the fall of Herat to the Taliban in early
September, the U.N. and the OIC renewed their separate efforts to unite
the factions. Efforts were under way at year's end to promote greater
cooperation--both military and political--among all the opposition
factions to oust Rabbani from power, but these were not successful.
Public response to Taliban rule in Herat was reserved. In other areas,
the populace long-wearied by the disorder caused by unrelenting
fighting, welcomed the Taliban, who disarmed the warlords, restored some
law and order, and halted the practice of frequent road tolls. Some
Afghans expressed support for the return of the former king, Zahir Shah
in some transitional arrangement. Although women in Afghanistan tended
to be denied significant roles in public life, greater freedom in Kabul
and in northern and western Afghanistan provided some limited respite
from these traditional strictures. For example, a few women served as
desk officers in the Kabul regime's Foreign Ministry, in the Protocol
Department, as doctors at hospitals, and as administrators at Kabul
University. The U.N. Special Rapporteur for Human Rights in Afghanistan
noted a high level of female involvement, especially in areas of medical
care and education.
Section 4 Governmental Attitude Regarding International and
Nongovernmental Investigation of Alleged Violations of Human Rights
The Afghan League of Human Rights operated outside of the country in
Pakistan; it produced its annual report there. The Cooperation Center
for Afghanistan is an Afghan nongovernmental organization (NGO) which
operated in both Pakistan and Afghanistan. It produced in Peshawar a
monthly newsletter on the Afghan human rights situation. The civil war
and lack of security made it difficult for human rights organizations to
monitor the situation inside the country. In November two
representatives from Human Rights Watch visited 4 Tajik refugee camps, 3
in Masood-controlled Takhar and Kunduz provinces and one near Mazar-I-
Sharif in Dostam-controlled Balkh province.
In May a new U.N. Special Rapporteur for Human Rights in Afghanistan was
appointed following the death of the previous rapporteur. In August Dr.
Choong-Hyun Paik visited Kabul, Jalalabad, Mazur-I-Sharif, and Islamabad
and Peshawar in Pakistan to discuss the human rights situation with
officials, political leaders, NGO's, refugees, ordinary families, and
others. In October he submitted his report to the U.N. Dr. Paik
concluded that "human suffering of considerable gravity persists in the
form of murder, disappearances, and infliction of conditions that cause
physical destruction, thus depriving people of fundamental human rights
such as the right to life, the right to be free from torture, and the
right to be free from cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment."
Section 5 Discrimination Based on Race, Sex, Religion, Disability,
Language, or Social Status
There are no Constitutional provisions which prohibit discrimination
based on race, sex, religion, disability, language, or social status.
It is not known whether specific laws prohibit discrimination; local
custom and practices generally prevail. Discrimination against women
varies from area to area, depending on the local leadership's attitude
towards work and education for women. Traditionally, the minority Shi'a
faced discrimination from the majority Sunni population. There was more
acceptance of the disabled as the number of people maimed by landmines
increased.
Women
As lawlessness and inter-factional fighting continued, beatings, rapes,
and the killing of women continued to occur. In January 13 armed gunmen
said to be affiliated with Hekmatyar's faction, reportedly attacked a
Tajik refugee camp near the town of Kunduz in the north. They raped 13
Tajik women before killing them. In March when Masood's troops captured
the Karte Seh district of Kabul, they reportedly engaged in widespread
rape. Medical workers said that they knew of at least 6 rapes and 2
attempted rapes. Social taboos against revealing rapes are so strong
that it is impossible to know how many rape victims there actually were.
Afghan custom and tradition imposes limits on women's activities beyond
the home. Under the Communist regime of the 1980's, a growing number of
women, particularly in urban areas, worked outside the home in
nontraditional roles. This trend was reversed when the Communists were
ousted in 1992, and in 1995 women were increasingly precluded from
public service, although some women continued to work as teachers and
nurses in some areas. In conservative areas, many women appeared in
public only if dressed in a burkha (an all-encompassing head-to-toe
garment with a mesh veil for the face).
In late 1994, when the Taliban movement began to take control of
provinces in the southwest, they banned the employment of women and
prohibited girls from attending school. A strict dress code for women
was also enforced. In September, when the Taliban captured Herat, a key
provincial capital in the west, the movement again banned female
employment and female school attendance. UNICEF publicly called on the
Taliban to rescind these decisions. A UNICEF spokesperson said that
local authorities did not allow women to work in public positions,
except for health care workers. Schools were reopened, but female
teachers and girls were not allowed to enter the schools. An Afghan
woman in Herat employed by UNICEF was not allowed to return to her job.
UN programs for women and girls were also suspended. However, Taliban
authorities in Kandahar assured a high ranking U.N. visitor that
education for girls would be permitted within an (undefined) Islamic
framework. The World Health Organization (WHO) was given permission to
open a nursing school for women in Kandahar and was actively recruiting
students.
In April the U.N. Office for Coordination of Humanitarian Assistance to
Afghanistan (UNOCHA) canceled a donor visit to Kandahar province because
the Taliban-controlled Shura (Governing Council) refused to meet with
female diplomats and insisted that they wear a burkha to visit project
sites. This was the first time that female diplomats encountered
difficulties visiting Afghanistan based on their gender. Several weeks
later, female diplomats were permitted to visit Kandahar, as long as
their heads were covered, and they did meet with local authorities.
In June the Nangarhar Shura reinforced its ban on women working in
Jalalabad City, and ordered all female employees except girls' teachers
and female health professionals sent home. Female employees of the
provincial government, except teachers, have been at home since October
1994.
A national women's conference was held in Kabul in July which discussed
women's issues and planned for the Beijing Conference on Women. In
August the Rabbani government canceled at the last minute its
delegation's participation at the conference on the grounds that its
agenda was anti-Islamic and a threat to Afghan religious and cultural
traditions. However, about 10 Afghan women from Europe and elsewhere
attended the NGO forum held concurrently with the Beijing conference.
Children
Local administrative bodies and international assistance organizations
undertook to look out for children's welfare to the extent possible. A
nutritional survey by aid agencies showed that 40 percent of the
children of Kabul suffered from malnutrition. The general disruption of
health services countrywide due to the civil war put many young people
at grave risk. Local authorities in all parts of Afghanistan have
supported UNICEF/WHO mass vaccination campaigns. The disruption of
education due to the fighting throughout Afghanistan has caused a
generation of school children to miss all of their schooling, reportedly
raising illiteracy levels above 75 percent.
People with Disabilities
It was not known whether the nominal Government took any measures to
protect the rights of the mentally and physically disabled or to mandate
accessibility for them. Victims of land mines were a major focus of
international humanitarian relief organizations, which devoted resources
to providing prostheses, medical treatment, and rehabilitation therapy
to amputees. There was more public acceptance of people with
disabilities because of the prevalence of the maimed due to landmines.
The U.N. Development Program conducted a million dollar project to
strengthen comprehensive community-based rehabilitation services for
disabled Afghans. The ICRC and some NGO's were actively involved in
programs for people with disabilities throughout Afghanistan.
Section 6 Worker Rights
a. The Right of Association
Little was known about labor laws and practices in Afghanistan. There
were no reports of labor rallies or strikes. Labor rights were not
defined, in the context of the breakdown of governmental authority, and
there was no effective central authority to enforce them. Many of
Kabul's industrial workers were unemployed due to the destruction or
abandonment of the city's minuscule manufacturing base.
b. The Right to Organize and Bargain Collectively
Afghanistan lacks a tradition of genuine labor-management bargaining.
There were no known labor courts or other mechanisms for resolving labor
disputes.
c. Prohibition of Forced or Compulsory Labor
No information was available on government edicts regarding forced or
compulsory labor. There were no confirmed reports of alleged forced-
work road projects.
d. Minimum Age or Employment of Children
There was no evidence that the Government was able to enforce labor
laws, if they existed, relating to the employment of children.
e. Acceptable Conditions of Work
There was no available information regarding a statutory minimum wage or
the enforcement of safe labor practices. Many workers were apparently
allotted time off regularly for prayers and observance of religious
holidays.
(###)
[end of document]
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