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Title: Russia Human Rights Practices, 1995
Author: U.S. Department of State
Date: March 1996
RUSSIA
Russia has been undergoing a profound political, economic, and social
transformation since the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991. Institutions and
democratic practices are evolving but not fully developed. The Constitution
approved by voters in 1993 provides for a democratic government founded on three
branches of power with checks and balances: the Presidency and the Government,
headed by the Prime Minister; a bicameral legislature, or Federal Assembly,
consisting of the State Duma and the Federation Council; and the courts.
Suspended in 1993, the Constitutional Court again heard cases in 1995, among
them a challenge to the constitutionality of the President's decrees regarding
the use of federal military forces in the Republic of Chechnya. For the first
time in Russian history, the second consecutive multiparty democratic
parliamentary elections took place in December.
The Ministry of Internal Affairs (MVD), the Federal Security Service (FSB), and
the Procuracy are responsible for law enforcement; the MVD also oversees the
prison system. A new law gave the FSB broad law enforcement functions,
including fighting crime and corruption, in addition to its previous security
and counterintelligence tasks. The law enhances the FSB's powers; however, its
human rights provisions are unclear, and it provides for only limited oversight
of the FSB. In addition, as part of the Russian Government's effort to fight
organized crime, a new law on operative searches and seizures granted a number
of internal security agencies the right to engage in a variety of clandestine
activities, also with limited oversight. No cases in which this law has been
used against critics have yet been documented, although the potential for misuse
exists. At the same time, however, some Russian human rights and environmental
activists complained of harassment by the FSB and other internal security
agencies. Some members of the security forces continued to commit human rights
abuses.
This was a pivotal year in Russia's difficult transition from a centrally
planned to a stable, market economy. Over 73 percent of enterprises, comprising
75 percent of the industrial work force and producing 85 percent of
manufacturing output, are privatized. After 4 years of large annual declines in
gross domestic product (GDP) and industrial production, the economy is showing
tentative signs of stabilizing. The fall in real GDP has slowed considerably--
down 4 percent in the first half of 1995 over the same period in 1994--and
overall industrial production effectively stopped falling in the summer of 1994.
Inflation has been declining since the beginning of 1995, in line with the
Government's commitment to noninflationary financing of the federal deficit.
Unemployment has remained steady over the same period, with the number of
unemployed and underemployed estimated at 13 percent of the labor force.
However, real wages continue to decline, and roughly 30 percent of the
population now live below the poverty line.
The Government's human rights record continued to be uneven, with reversals and
worsening in some areas, most notably in the conduct of the war in Chechnya.
Domestic and foreign human rights groups documented numerous killings and
serious violations of international humanitarian law and human rights in the
Republic of Chechnya by both Russian military and Chechen separatist forces.
Violations committed by Russian military forces occurred on a much greater scale
than those of the Chechen separatists.
Russian troops invaded the Republic of Chechnya on December 11, 1994, in order
to prevent Chechnya's effort to secede from the Russian Federation. The origins
of the conflict are complex. The immediate roots of this crisis go back to
1991, when Chechnya declared its independence. But relations between Russia and
the people of Chechnya have long been contentious, dating to the period of
Russian expansion in the Caucasus in the 19th Century. The indiscriminate and
disproportionate use of force in Chechnya by Russian troops resulted in
thousands to tens of thousands of civilians killed, and some 500,000 people
displaced. These actions were in conflict with a number of Russia's
international obligations, including those concerning the protection of civilian
noncombatants. In addition, American humanitarian aid expert and outspoken
Chechen War critic Fred Cuny disappeared, and his body had not been recovered by
year's end.
The Chechen conflict sparked a major debate over accountability in government
decisionmaking and the Government's commitment to the rights of its citizens and
international norms. The Constitutional Court found President Yeltsin's
deployment of military forces in Chechnya without parliamentary approval to be
constitutional. However, the Court ruled that international law was binding on
both government and rebel forces, although neither was in compliance with
Protocol II Additional of the Geneva Conventions, specifically with the
provision that every effort must be made to avoid causing damage to civilians
and their property. The Court also ruled that victims of human rights
violations had legal recourse.
As the conflict in Chechnya continued, police and other security forces in
various parts of Russia increased their practice of targeting citizens from the
Caucasus region for arbitrary searches and detention on the pretext of
maintaining public safety.
The media functioned unhindered, with a few notable exceptions, and represented
a wide range of opinion. For the most part, the media operated freely in
reporting on the Chechen conflict despite government pressure and heavy-handed
treatment by Russian troops in the war zone. The Constitutional Court found
the Government's efforts to ban certain journalists from the war zone
unconstitutional. While journalists were permitted back into the war zone,
pressures against them continued. In addition, the prosecutor's office opened
investigations against some journalists, based on their reporting on Chechnya,
on charges of having spread propaganda in the service of terrorists.
With some exceptions, nongovernmental organizations freely documented and
reported on human rights abuses. However, the Parliament's dismissal of Sergey
Kovalev as Parliamentary Ombudsman for Human Rights for his condemnation of the
conduct of the war in Chechnya undermined official human rights monitoring.
Kovalev resigned as Chairman of the Presidential Human Rights Commission in
January 1996, publicly accusing the President of backtracking on human rights.
According to Russian and foreign human rights groups, several prison inmates
died after having been tortured by members of the security forces or as a result
of inferior sanitary conditions and medical care.
In the military, the practice of "dedovshchina," or the violent hazing of
younger soldiers continued. The Mothers' Rights Organization estimated that
approximately 4,000 to 5,000 soldiers died from abuse or commited suicide.
The Constitution outlines an extensive underpinning of legal protections and
institutional support for the observance and enforcement of human rights.
However, several important pieces of legislation designed to provide the
implementing mechanisms for human rights provisions had not yet been approved by
Parliament by year's end. Furthermore, the impetus for legal reform weakened.
Judicial reform did not advance very far, and the judiciary remained subject to
executive and military influence. Jury trials were only available in 9 of 89
regions. A large case backlog, trial delays, and lengthy pretrial detention
remained problems. There are no laws on domestic violence although violence
against women remains a problem.
RESPECT FOR HUMAN RIGHTS
Section 1 Respect for the Integrity of the Person, Including
Freedom from:
a. Political and Other Extrajudicial Killing
There were no known political killings by agents of the Government. However,
some detainees died after beatings by security officials, others died due to
harsh conditions in detention facilities and the lack or inadequacy of medical
care (see Section 1.c.).
Several people died while being detained by police for questioning or while
being held in pretrial detention centers (SIZO's, the Russian acronym for
investigative isolation centers) as investigations were carried out. The
prosecutor's office in Saransk's Leninskiy district instituted criminal
proceedings against a policeman for premeditated murder in the case of the death
of 19-year-old Oleg Igonin while he was being held for questioning. In a July
report to the United Nations, the Moscow Center for Prison Reform (MCPR) called
pretrial detention centers (SIZO's) "places that threaten all of us. SIZO's are
a serious threat to public security."
It is difficult to determine exactly how many citizens who were detained or
incarcerated died in custody. Prison reform organizations and human rights
groups are only now beginning to collect information from the regions. The
Moscow Human Rights Research Center, an umbrella organization for several
Moscow-based human rights groups, reported that in 1994, 417 detainees in
pretrial detention died, 184 of those in facilities in the Moscow area. The
report also notes that "there is serious basis to presume that these reported
numbers are substantially lower than reality." Some died as a result of the
lack or inadequacy of medical care. Others died from injuries suffered as a
result of beatings. The data for 1995 are not yet available.
The MCPR and the President's Human Rights Commission, formerly led by Sergey
Kovalev, charged that prison guards and other security personnel, who are
sometimes brought to prisons to assist with controlling inmates, are seldom
rebuked or reprimanded for excessive use of force. However, charges of abuse
were filed against some correction facility directors and officers.
Sergey Grigoryants, a vocal critic of the Russian security services, charged
that he and his family have been the targets of reprisals, and that the FSB had
a hand in his son's death in January and an attack on Grigoryants himself in
March. Investigative agencies reportedly have not interviewed the only witness
to the murder of Grigoryants' son. The full facts in this case have been
difficult to establish.
There were several high profile murders involving members of Russia's financial
elite and other prominent figures. It is unclear whether any of these killings
was politically motivated, and most appear linked to organized crime or business
disputes. By year's end, no arrests were made in approximately 60 cases of
murder for all of 1995 involving prominent bankers or businessmen, or in the
case of the murder of journalist and television executive Vladislav Listyev.
Members of Parliament and candidates were also murder victims. The motive for
most of these killings is also unclear. In early 1995, Sergei Skorochkin was
murdered, apparently in revenge for having killed an organized crime leader in
1994. During the December Duma election, candidates murdered included Mikhail
Lezhnev (an entrepreneur from Chelyabinsk) and Duma Deputy Sergei Markidonov.
Markidonov, who was killed in November, was the fourth Duma Deputy to be killed
during the 2-year term of the Duma, according to the Moscow Times.
Russian attacks were responsible for the deaths of thousands to tens of
thousands of civilian residents of Chechnya, and Russian forces were credibly
reported to have summarily executed Chechens. Foreign and Russian journalists
covering the military conflict in Chechnya alleged that Russian forces fired
upon and threatened them. The Glasnost Defense Foundation reported that 14
journalists died in Chechnya. Natalia Aliakina, a journalist for the German
weekly magazine Focus, was killed in Chechnya in June by a Russian soldier. She
and her husband had stopped at a checkpoint when they were fired upon by the
soldier. The soldier has since been detained on murder charges. Chechen rebels
also killed civilians, most notably during the raid on the town of Budennovsk in
southern Russia. Human Rights Watch/Helsinki reported that Chechen forces
admitted to having summarily executed Russian pilots and at least eight other
Russian military detainees (see Section 1.g.).
The case of the 1994 murder of investigative reporter Dmitriy Kholodov remained
open, although no one has yet been arrested (see 1994 report).
The investigation into the murder of Aleksandr Men, a Russian Orthodox priest
murdered 5 years ago, was reopened in August (see 1990 and 1991 reports).
The administration of capital punishment raised some procedural and humanitarian
concerns. Official statistics of the Ministry of Internal Affairs show that 20
people were executed in 1995, but reliable sources suggest that the number was
higher. Human rights organizations claim that cases involving the death penalty
are shrouded in secrecy and are still governed by procedures defined by the
Central Committee of the Communist Party in 1982. The Code of Criminal
Procedures requires that those accused of crimes carrying a possible death
sentence be afforded a jury trial, if they want one. However, jury trials are
available in only 9 of 89 regions. The Constitution also gives those sentenced
to death the right to appeal to the President for clemency. However, with
limited access to legal representation, these appeals often are not made, and
when they do occur, are usually refused. The MCPR has alleged that prisoners
awaiting appeals of death sentences are often denied adequate food and medical
attention.
b. Disappearance
Human Rights Watch and the OSCE have documented several instances in which
Ministry of Internal Affairs forces in Chechnya abducted civilian noncombatants
as well as Chechen separatist soldiers. According to government statistics,
government forces detained 1,308 Chechen noncombatants without arrest warrants
in the period up to June 30. Of that number, the Government admits to still
holding 141. The Government claims that the others have been released, but
documenting these statements has been difficult. Many Chechens have appealed to
the OSCE and human rights groups for help in locating relatives whom federal
authorities claim to have released.
Chechen separatist forces also engaged in hostage-taking, most notably in
Budennovsk. Most of the Russians apparently have been released, although it is
estimated that Chechen forces continue to hold approximately 60 to 70 Russians.
American relief expert and outspoken Chechen War critic Fred Cuny disappeared in
Chechnya in April. It is unclear what actually happened, but many different
sources have reported that at some point he was held by Chechen fighters. An
extensive effort was mounted to locate Cuny. Some Russian officials made
spurious accusations of ties between Cuny and U.S. intelligence or Chechen
leader Dudayev. Cuny's family members finally discontinued the search, based on
their belief that Cuny was dead. Cuny's relatives criticized the governments of
the Republic of Chechnya and especially the Russian Federation for inadequate
cooperation during the search.
Police logged an increasing number of reports about the disappearances of
Russian citizens, particularly young men. Most were attributed to criminal foul
play rather than to any political motivations.
c. Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading Treatment or
Punishment
The Constitution prohibits torture and other cruel, inhuman, or degrading
treatment or punishment. However, Russian prisoners' rights groups have
documented cases in which members of the security forces torture and beat
detainees and prisoners. The law "On the Detention of Those Suspected or
Accused of Committing Crimes" was approved by the Duma on June 21. The law
establishes mechanisms intended to prevent violations of the rights of
individuals in pretrial detention. The law also states that inmates must be
provided with adequate space, food, and medical attention. Nevertheless, the
authorities do not ensure that these provisions are respected.
The Society for Penitentiary Institutions and the MCPR have amassed a large
volume of documentation, through oral interviews with prisoners and suspects'
and prisoners' letters to families, on the use of torture against persons held
in pretrial detention facilities throughout Russia.
The MCPR has documented many cases of torture. One such method is referred to
as the "elephant" torture. A gas mask is put on the suspect. The flow of
oxygen is restricted or cut off until a suspect agrees to confess. The
prosecutor's office in Saransk's Leninskiy district instituted criminal
proceedings for premeditated murder against a police officer in the case of the
death of 19-year old Oleg Igonin, who had a heart attack and died while being
subjected to the elephant torture in July. The MCPR also reports many cases in
which suspects have had the soles of their feet beaten. There are allegations
that sometimes outside guards are brought in to rough-up suspects in pretrial
detention centers in order to "keep them in line."
Two Turkmen dissidents, who were arrested in Russia for activities against the
Government in Turkmenistan, claimed that they were beaten while in pretrial
detention. Their cases were dropped in January due to lack of evidence, and
both are now living in Sweden.
The Society for the Guardianship of Penitentiary Institutions has amassed
considerable evidence of rape in prison by guards and by other inmates.
The systematic abuse of psychiatry as a form of punishment has declined
dramatically from Soviet-era practice. However, the Independent Psychiatric
Association continues to document isolated cases in which sane persons are
committed to psychiatric institutions after running afoul of local authorities.
In February Valeriy Pashin was committed to a mental hospital in Tambov by order
of the Tambov prosecutor; the order followed a reported series of property
disputes between Pashin and the prosecutor. Pashin spent a month in the
psychiatric institution, until a court threw out the decision and ordered Pashin
freed following an outcry from Pashin's family and friends.
Domestic and international human rights organizations have compiled a
substantial number of credible accounts of torture and other cruel and inhuman
or degrading punishment of Chechens by Russian military and internal forces.
These abuses include beatings of combatants as well as of unarmed civilians
suspected of involvement with, or support for, the secessionist Chechen rebels.
Human Rights Watch has also collected testimony from civilians in Chechnya on
cases of the use of rape by Russian military and internal forces as a form of
punishment against residents of villages which are believed to support
separatist forces. There have also been well-founded reports of Chechen
militants engaging in torture or degrading punishment against Russians.
Conditions in detention centers are harsh and, at times, life threatening.
Severe overcrowding, the failure to expand capacity, the Government's lack of
sufficient funds for the care and feeding of inmates, inadequate supervision by
law enforcement and correctional facility personnel, and the lack of individual
or institutional accountability for violations, all contributed to continued
substandard conditions. In a report to the United Nations, the MCPR called the
conditions in pretrial detention centers "torture." The law mandates a space of
2.5 square meters per detainee. However, the average space for persons in
pretrial detention centers dropped to 1.6 square meters, 0.9 square meters in
urban areas. Men and women are separated, but juveniles are routinely detained
with adults charged with serious crimes. In Moscow pretrial detention
facilities with spaces for 88,100 detainees housed over 250,000. In other large
cities, such as Yekaterinburg and Vladivostok, facilities house an average of
twice the number of inmates they are intended to hold.
Human rights groups report that suspects can be detained in such facilities for
up to 18 months while an investigation is being conducted, and then even longer
while they await court sessions.
In comparison, conditions in prisons are better. However, in 1994 the MVD
received only 87 percent of its funds allocated by the federal budget. As a
result, it is estimated that prisons were able in fact to provide only 60 to 70
percent of the daily food rations they envisioned providing and only 15 to 20
percent of needed medications and medical care. Prisoners and detainees must
rely on families to provide them with extra food and routine medicines.
Health and sanitation standards in pretrial detention facilities and prisons
themselves declined in 1995. The overcrowding and unsanitary conditions in
penal facilities are directly linked to insufficient funding of the operations
by the MVD, and present a grave danger to detainees. Tuberculosis is perhaps
the biggest health problem. The MCPR has certified rates of tuberculosis 17
times higher in prison than in the free population, and death rates of those
infected with tuberculosis in prison of 10 times higher than those outside.
The MCPR chronicled the deaths in July of 11 people in a pretrial detention
center in Novokuznetsk who perished when temperatures in crowded cells rose to
over 110 degrees, and inmates were denied water. In August two inmates in Perm
also died in a cramped pretrial detention facility in hot weather without water.
The MCPR has documented many cases of inmates who died because they were not
given adequate medical assistance for grave illnesses, despite complaints about
these illnesses to prison authorities for long periods before their deaths. For
example, Konstantin Vedeneyev was denied medical attention until he was
transferred from Butyrka prison to Matrosskaya Tishina prison (which has better
medical facilities) only 2 days before he died of tuberculosis.
Prison reform has not yet been implemented. Prisons are centrally administered
from Moscow, although reforms envision transferring control to regional
officials. At present, regional prison and detention facilities often receive
only a percentage of the funds allocated to them, and then usually behind
schedule. Guards are frequently not paid for months, and they usually have
little training before coming on duty. Increasingly, employees of detention and
prison facilities are quitting for higher and more regularly paid positions in
the private sector, leaving prison jobs unfilled. This adds to the burden of
those employees left behind, increasing their concerns for personal safety on
the job and contributing to incidents of abuse. However, in 1995 the MVD and
MCPR set up a training program for new officers coming on duty to educate them
on human rights standards and legal norms.
Prisoners involved in national security cases are detained in special prisons.
In cases involving charges of espionage or treason, access is very limited or
completely restricted. Family access to those detained in pretrial facilities
is usually not allowed, while for those in prisons it varies by institution and
depends on the prison administration. Some prisons have accommodations for
overnight visits of family members if they have traveled far to see a prisoner.
Prisoner monitors are allowed access to prisons, provided that they have prior
approval to visit from the Central Directorate for the Execution of Punishment
(GUIN).
A Duma committee is charged with investigating and monitoring conditions in
prison and pretrial detention facilities. The Commission for Prison Reform to
the President and the Commission for Judicial Reform to the President also
monitor prison conditions and have prepared recommendations and legislation for
reform. However, due to opposition by the Ministry of Internal Affairs, these
efforts have made little progress. Moscow human rights groups make frequent
visits to the prisons in the Moscow area, but they do not have the resources and
do not yet have the network across the country to investigate conditions in all
89 regions.
The practice of dedovshchina, the violent hazing of new recruits in the
military, continued. This practice includes various forms of physical and
mental abuse, including the use of recruits as personal servants of more senior
soldiers. The criminal investigation unit of the Ministry of Defense reported
that 423 soldiers committed suicide in the Russian army in 1994 and that an
additional 2,500 died as a result of "criminal incidents." The Mothers' Rights
Foundation and the Soldiers' Mothers Committee believe that many of those who
committed suicide were driven to do so by violent hazing or, indeed, that they
did not take their own lives but rather died from abuse. Although the Mothers'
Rights Foundation did not have complete figures for 1995, the group estimated
that approximately 4,000 to 5,000 soldiers died from abuse or committed suicide.
These organizations have compiled evidence on individual suicide and hazing
deaths and have tried to help the families of soldiers who died under such
circumstances apply to the Government for compensation. Officers of the armed
forces continue to permit, even encourage, dedovshchina. The national military
leadership apparently made no moves to implement training and education programs
systematically to combat dedovshchina, nor has the concept of a military police
force advanced much past the discussion phase.
Hazing of Jehovah's Witnesses in the military was reported. After being
forcibly inducted into military service, three members of a Jehovah's Witness
congregation from the Murmansk area were beaten severely and denied food and
water. Court martial charges have been brought against some soldiers who
refused to participate in military training; others have simply been dismissed.
Others, after months of beatings and abuse, were declared "medically unfit" and
discharged. The Soldiers' Mothers Committee estimates that 25,000 men annually
dodge the military draft.
There were reports of some instances of forced labor. There have been
documented cases of soldiers being sent to perform work for private citizens or
organizations.
d. Arbitrary Arrest, Detention, or Exile
The Constitution states that the arrest, taking into custody, and detention of
persons suspected of crimes are permitted only by judicial decision. The
Criminal Procedures Code currently in force gives prosecutors, not judges, the
authority to order the arrest of a suspect. Although the Constitution provides
for transferring that power to judicial authorities, the President first
approved and then later vetoed legislation for a new criminal procedures code
implementing this provision.
A criminal suspect can be detained up to 48 hours without a warrant if police
have reason to believe the person has just committed a crime or if he is a
danger to others. The suspect must be arraigned before a judge within 72 hours
of being taken into custody if the crime for which the person is being detained
is punishable by at least 18 months in prison. The draft criminal procedure
code requires that suspects be informed of charges and gives a suspect the
right to a hearing before a judge, at which time he can challenge the grounds of
the arrest. However, the President's 1994 decree on combating organized crime,
which is still in force, allows law enforcement authorities to detain persons
suspected of ties to organized crime for up to 30 days without charge and
without access to a lawyer. Authorities employed this decree extensively during
the year. Bail is provided for in the law but is seldom granted.
Detainees have the right to have an attorney present during questioning
following arrest and throughout proceedings up to and including arraignment.
Detainees have the right to request a court evaluation of the legality of
detention. If the court finds the detention illegal, the judge has the power to
order immediate release. However, most citizens are not aware of their rights
and rarely exercise them.
Police often detain persons without judicial permission beyond the 48-hour time
period, and the constitutional right to judicial review of detention within 48
hours of arrest is frequently ignored. Russian human rights monitors have
documented evidence from interviews with detainees that the few who are aware of
their rights and complain of violations are subjected to beatings.
Nevertheless, about one in six cases of arrest is now appealed to the courts,
and judges release one in six of these on grounds of insufficient evidence or
breach of procedure.
While in pretrial detention, a suspect is under the jurisdiction of the
prosecutor's office and the Ministry of Internal Affairs. The Criminal Code
requires the prosecutor's office to conclude the investigation within 2 months.
However, investigations are seldom completed in that time, and prosecutors can
ask for extensions of up to 18 months. After the investigation has been
completed, the suspect is transferred from MVD to the jurisdiction of the court
system. The law does not stipulate a time frame during which a suspect must be
brought to trial. Given the backlog of cases, suspects often wait a long time
for a case to be brought to trial. Indeed, suspects frequently serve the length
of their sentence while awaiting trial in detention facilities.
The Constitution and the draft criminal procedures code provide for the court to
appoint a lawyer if a suspect cannot afford one. The Society for Guardianship
of Penitentiary Institutions is often called upon by judges to provide legal
assistance for suspects facing charges and trial without any representation.
This Society operates primarily in Moscow, although it uses its connections
throughout Russia to appeal to legal professionals to take on cases of the
indigent. However, in many cases the indigent receive little assistance,
because local governments lack sufficient funds to pay for trial attorneys for
them.
Some human rights activists believe that the authorities have arrested some
people on false pretexts for expressing views critical of the Government, and in
particular, for voicing criticism of the security services. Viktor Orekhov, a
former KGB officer who assisted dissidents under the Soviet regime, was arrested
on charges of illegally possessing a firearm soon after he made unflattering
remarks about his former boss, now the FSB chief of intelligence for the Moscow
region, in an article. Within a matter of weeks Orekhov had been tried,
convicted, and sentenced to 3 years in prison at hard labor. This sentence was
subsequently reduced to 1 year. Noting the speed with which he was tried and
sentenced in the usually slow court system, Orekhov alleged that he was targeted
for retribution by the security services because of his human rights work.
There were a number of procedural flaws and mishandling of evidence marred his
trial. The FSB's influence and interest in the case was extensively reported in
the domestic and foreign press. In addition, former KGB Major Vladimir
Kazantsev was arrested on August 21 after he gave an interview to the Moscow
News newspaper in which he described purchases by the KGB's central directorate
for security of illegal eavesdropping devices from foreign firms. At year's
end, Kazantsev had been released from custody, but the case continued to be
investigated.
Family members often are not informed of charges and sometimes are not permitted
to visit relatives in custody. Hamat Kurbanov, the Moscow representative of the
Chechen government, was arrested in his home at 1:00 a.m. on June 17 by four
plainclothes police officers who had no warrant or legal basis for making the
arrest. Kurbanov was subsequently told that he would be charged with treason
and crimes against the State. Only after he had been in custody for 10 days was
his wife able to find out where and on what charges he was being detained. He
was later released. No charges had been filed by year's end.
The MCPR reported that, as of December 31, 701,400 persons convicted of crimes
were confined to the penal system. As of December 31, the MVD's Central
Directorate for Carrying out Punishment reported that 295,000 people--as
compared with 250,000 in 1994--were being held as suspects in crimes in 168
pretrial detention centers, which were built to hold 88,100 people. Of that
number, 4,750 suspects, who had not yet been tried or awaited appeal of their
convictions, were being held in prisons. Furthermore, of the 295,000, the
Central Directorate reported that 39,500 people were being detained on charges
of violating public order and had been detained for more than 30 days under
President Yeltsin's crime decree. The average period of detention was 9 to 10
months.
The Ministry of Internal Affairs is responsible for 743 correctional labor
institutions, 168 pretrial detention facilities, and 13 prisons. In addition,
the MVD maintains 60 educational labor colonies for juveniles. The Ministry of
Education is attempting to certify that schooling is indeed provided in all of
these institutions in place of the current system of trade and handicraft
production.
The Government does not use forced exile.
e. Denial of Fair Public Trial
The Constitution provides for an independent judiciary. While the judiciary is
far from independent, it is starting to act more like an independent judiciary.
Judges still remain subject to influence from executive or military security
forces. In addition, judges in practice are totally dependent on the Ministry
of Justice for court infrastructure and financial support and on local
authorities for their housing.
The judiciary consists of three branches: the regular court system, with the
Supreme Court at its apex, the arbitration court system, over which the High
Court of Arbitration presides; and the Constitutional Court as a single body
with no courts under it. The Constitutional Court functioned until the fall of
1993, when President Yeltsin suspended it (see 1993 report). The Court then
remained inoperative due to the Government's inability to fill remaining
vacancies. Following the Federation Council's confirmation of all of the
President's nominees, the Court was finally reestablished in early 1995, and it
ruled on politically sensitive issues related to the war in Chechnya (see
Sections 1.g. and 2.a.). It displayed some independence and is beginning to
assume a more active role in the judicial system.
Disputes between business entities are tried in the system of courts of
arbitration, which consists of lower level courts and the High Court of
Arbitration. There are 82 courts of arbitration with over 2,000 judges. These
courts hear over 300,000 cases per year. If a party to a civil suit is a
private citizen, the dispute must be handled by a court of general jurisdiction.
Throughout Russia there are about 14,000 judges in approximately 2,500 courts of
general jurisdiction at various levels. The vast majority of litigation is
heard by these regular courts. Apart from the arbitration courts, there are no
courts of special jurisdiction to handle domestic relations or probate disputes.
Within the regular court system most cases are heard in the peoples' court.
This form of judicial proceeding functions everywhere. As trial courts of
general jurisdiction, the people's courts handle over 90 percent of civil and
criminal cases. Only a limited category of cases involving the most serious
crimes falls directly under the original jurisdiction of the next level of
courts--the oblast (regional) court.
Serious cases, such as those involving murder, can be tried by one of several
different methods: a case can be heard by (1) the judge and a panel of
"people's assessors;" (2) a judge alone; or (3) a jury, but only in those
regions where jury trials have been authorized. A decision of lower courts can
be appealed through intermediate courts up to the Supreme Court. All higher
courts have discretionary trial jurisdiction.
Direct appeal (referred to as cassation) to a higher court is not the only way
for a party to challenge a trial court decision. The law provides citizens with
the right to appeal to higher courts even when the time limits prescribed for
cassation review have expired. This right can be exercised by a person duly
convicted and serving a sentence, as well as by another person who wishes to
proceed on behalf of such an inmate.
Access to government information and evidence in a case depends on the charges
against the defendant. In some cases involving espionage or treason, only those
defense lawyers who have the necessary security clearances are allowed to work
on cases and review evidence against clients. Often this means that the
defendant may not be able to retain the lawyer he wishes, but rather a lawyer
appointed or suggested by the court. Under secrecy law provisions, the lawyer
must forfeit his or her right to travel abroad for up to 5 years and may also be
subject to having mail and telephone monitoring by the FSB.
Prosecutors, like the courts, are organized into offices at the district,
regional, and federation levels. They are ultimately responsible to the
Prosecutor General, who is nominated by the President and confirmed by the
Federation Council. Apart from regions where adversarial jury trials have been
introduced, prosecutors remain very influential in the conduct of court
proceedings. Prosecutors supervise criminal investigations, which are usually
conducted by the MVD. Prosecutors also conduct investigations for serious
crimes, e.g., murder. The Procuracy, unlike in the United States, is an
investigative body.
In the 80 regions where juries have not yet been introduced, criminal procedures
are still weighted heavily in favor of the prosecution. For example, the
constitutionally mandated presumption of innocence is often disregarded, and
defendants are expected to prove their innocence rather than prosecutors proving
guilt. Moreover, rates of conviction remain above 99 percent, as opposed to the
16-percent acquittal rate among juries. Judges--fearing that an outright
acquittal will result in a prosecutorial appeal--frequently send cases back to
the prosecutor for "additional investigation." This greatly increases
defendants' time spent in pretrial detention.
The right to an attorney during pretrial questioning is often overlooked. Many
defendants recant testimony given in pretrial questioning, stating that they
were denied access to an attorney or that they were threatened or beaten and
only said what they thought the authorities wanted to hear (up to a full
confession) so that the abuse would stop. Nevertheless, Russian human rights
monitors have documented cases in which convictions were obtained on the basis
of the original, illegal testimony (after the defendant refuted that testimony
in court), and even in the absence of other proof of guilt.
Criminal defendants, and prosecutors in nonjury trials, have the right of
appeal. In practice, however, superior courts lack the authority to overturn
decisions of a lower court and may only mandate that the case be retried. The
lower court can retry the case on the same evidence, reach the same decision,
and--since there is no legal limit to the number of appeals--the dissatisfied
party can appeal again. The system, however, is heavily weighted against
appeals because (1) the prosecution and the courts have a vested interest in
clearing the backlog of cases, and (2) defendants prefer prisons, where better
conditions prevail, over pretrial detention centers (see Sections 1.c. and
1.d.).
Since 1993 adversarial jury trials have been introduced in 9 out of 89 regions.
In 1995, 376 jury trials were held in the 9 regions in which they are
sanctioned. Verdicts were handed down in 257 of these, which involved 419
people; 338 were found guilty, 81 were found innocent. The 119 cases that were
not decided were remanded back to the prosecutor's office for more
investigation, which is not supposed to happen under the jury trial law.
In the first 6 months of 1995, 529,055 criminal cases were opened; in 410,703 of
these a sentence was handed down. Some 530,027 people were convicted; 2,484
others were acquitted; 47,413 cases were sent back to the prosecutor for further
investigation.
In August the case of Viktor Orekhov (see Section 1.d.) focused attention on the
possibility that agencies outside the judicial system, particularly the security
services, were exerting influence on certain cases.
In a high profile case, Vil Mirzayanov, an employee who exposed information on
the illegal production of chemical weapons in Russia and won a civil case
against the Ministry of Defense in February, faced a Ministry of Defense
countersuit. However, the countersuit was dropped in March, and Mirzayanov left
the country the same month (see 1994 report).
The case of Fridrikh Gilshteyn demonstrated continuing problems with judicial
procedure. In May 1992, officers from the local militia station allegedly
broke into Mr. Gilshteyn's apartment, beat him, and arrested him. In November
1992, Mr. Gilshteyn was charged with an armed attack on a drunken man. He was
arrested in March 1993 and sentenced to 3 years' imprisonment. In August 1993,
he was sent to a labor camp 400 kilometers from Moscow. He was subsequently
freed by the court in February 1995 and emigrated from Russia.
The case of Semyon Livshits, a Jewish naval officer who had applied to emigrate
to Israel, also highlighted problems of judicial procedure. His appeal was
finally heard in late August after months of postponements by the Military
Collegium of the Supreme Court. The military court upheld Livshits' conviction
but reduced his sentence from 10 to 6 years, 5 of which he has already served in
a labor prison near Vladivostok. Livshits' lawyer is working to secure his
release before Livshits serves out the final year of his sentence (see 1994
report).
There are few reports of political prisoners.
f. Arbitrary Interference with Privacy, Family, Home, or
Correspondence
The Constitution states that officials can enter a private residence only in
cases prescribed by federal law or on the basis of a judicial decision. It
permits the Government to monitor correspondence, telephone conversations, and
other means of communication only with court orders. It prohibits the
collection, storage, utilization, and dissemination of information about a
person's private life without his consent. The implementing legislation
necessary to bring these provisions into effect has not yet been passed.
New laws on the Federal Security Service and on operative searches and seizures
significantly strengthened the legal powers of the FSB and other internal
security agencies. The April 3 law on the FSB provides it with broad law
enforcement functions--fighting crime and corruption--in addition to its
previous security and counter-intelligence tasks. The law details the
circumstances under which FSB agents may enter a private residence, office, or
other premises without prior judicial approval. There must be either sufficient
grounds to believe that a crime is in progress or has been committed or a belief
that the welfare of citizens is endangered. In such cases, the FSB must notify
the Prosecutor within 24 hours of the entry.
Despite the expansion of the FSB's powers, the law provides for only limited
oversight and contains unclear human rights provisions. The law vests the
Procurator General with the power to oversee the FSB's activities. However, it
denies such oversight authority in the areas of informants, organization,
tactics, methods, and means of implementation. The role of the Parliament is
limited to that of monitoring the FSB.
The August 12 law on operative searches and seizures granted to seven internal
security agencies, including the FSB, the right to engage in a variety of
clandestine activities, some of which could be carried out in the absence of
prior judicial approval. The law does bring the use of wiretaps and searches
and seizures into conformity with the Constitution by introducing, for the first
time in Russia, a requirement that wiretaps in criminal cases be approved by a
judge rather than a prosecutor. However, although this approval could be given
after the fact in some cases, some human rights experts believe that the
Constitution requires prior judicial approval in certain instances. Government
officials can still conduct wiretaps in criminal investigations without court
review, but evidence obtained in this fashion would not be admissable in court.
The August law permits agents to open mail, tap telephones, monitor other forms
of communication, and enter a private residence without a court order in cases
of emergency that may lead to the commission of a serious crime or if Russia's
political, military, economic, or environmental security is threatened. In
these cases, a judge must be notified within 24 hours of the action. Within 48
hours of the start of such an action, the agency must either receive a court
order permitting it or end it. The law does not define what would constitute
either a case of emergency or the term "security."
As is the case with the FSB law, oversight is weak. Information concerning the
organization, tactics, methods and means of investigations is off limits to the
prosecutor. Similarly, the role of the Parliament is limited.
Human rights groups charge that the FSB is stepping up harassment of domestic
critics and certain other groups. For example, in December FSB agents
confiscated material on human rights abuses in Chechnya from a group of Russian
human rights activists on their way to an international meeting (see Section 4
and the cases of Sergay Grigoryants and Viktor Orekhov described in Sections
1.a. and 1.d.). In addition, the FSB accused the Norwegian environmental
Bellona Foundation of collecting state secrets on Russia's Northern Fleet in
October. The group had been gathering material for a second report on the
Fleet's nuclear waste. The FSB raided the group's Murmansk office, confiscating
all material on the Fleet's nuclear waste sites as well as computers and video
cameras, interrogated researchers working on the study, and searched many of
their homes. Others cooperating with Bellona in Murmansk, St. Petersburg, and
Severodbinsk also were interrogated and subject to apartment searches.
According to the Moscow Times, the Bellona Director asserted that the FSB's
objective seemed to be to intimidate Russians from working with the foundation.
g. Use of Excessive Force and Violations of Humanitarian Law in
Internal Conflicts
Russia continued its brutal military campaign against the secessionist Republic
of Chechnya, which it launched in December 1994. Russian forces used
indiscriminate and disproportionate force during the destruction of most of
Chechnya's main city, Groznyy, and in attacks on other Chechen towns and
villages. According to press reports, there were up to 4,000 detonations an
hour at the height of the winter campaign against Groznyy. After federal forces
captured several major cities and towns in the Chechen Republic, Chechen
fighters employed guerrilla and terrorist tactics against forces of the
Ministries of Defense and Internal Affairs, as well as against Russian civilians
in the town of Budennovsk.
There is no official figure for civilian deaths, but unofficial estimates range
from the thousands to the tens of thousands. The Government has reported that
2,000 federal soldiers were killed and 6,000 wounded during the military
operation.
Violations of international humanitarian law and human rights by government
forces included: the disproportionate and indiscriminate use of military force;
the inhumane treatment of noncombatants; arbitrary detention; beatings; the
torture or summary execution of Chechens at "filtration" (detention) centers,
the largest of which functioned at a meat processing plant near Groznyy; and
harassment and attacks on journalists in the war zone. Credible sources
reported severe mistreatment of Chechen prisoners by Russian defense and
internal security forces. In April credible sources also reported that many
Chechen prisoners, all of whom Russian authorities allegedly presented as
soldiers but amongst whom it was believed were many civilians, had been beaten
by Russian authorities. Although humanitarian organizations suceeded in
providing relief supplies throughout most of the year, government forces at
times obstructed the delivery of these materials. Government forces also
hindered the provision of medical assistance to injured combatants and
noncombatants alike.
The worst violations of international humanitarian law and human rights were
reportedly committed by the "kontraktniki," nonconscripted Russian citizens paid
by the Russian army. "Kontraktniki" are accused of being the group most likely
responsible for having committed the civilian massacre at Samashki. According
to the Russian human rights group Memorial, Russian forces killed 103 civilians
in Samashki in early April in retaliation for the village's support for Chechen
separatists. The Memorial report indicated that no fewer than 18 persons were
killed in artillery bombardment; 5 were killed as a result of shots fired from
armored vehickles; 6 were shot by Russian snipers; at least 30 were killed
inside their homes, either from gunfire at close range or as a result of
grenades being thrown into homes; at least 2 Samashki residents were reported to
have been executed by Russian officers while in filtration camps; others were
set on fire by Russian forces. The youngest killed was 15 years old; the oldest
103. A Duma commission is investigating the massacre, but the commission head
has rejected allegations that a massacre or gross violations of human rights
took place there.
Chechen violations of international humanitarian law and human rights included
taking civilians hostage, killing civilians, and using civilians as shields to
attain military goals during the June raid on the town of Budennovsk.
Approximately 100 civilians were killed during the hostage-taking and raid.
Human Rights Watch reported that Chechen forces admitted to summarily executing
Russian pilots and at least eight other Russian military detainees (see Section
1.a.)
The Constitutional Court ruled that international law was binding on both
government and rebel forces, although neither was in compliance with Protocol II
Additional of the Geneva Conventions, specifically with the provision that every
effort must be made to avoid causing damage to civilians and their property.
The Court further ruled that victims of human rights violations had legal
recourse, in accordance with the Constitution and the International Covenant on
Civil and Political Rights.
The international community and human rights nongovernmental organizations
(NGO's) repeatedly called upon both parties to respect the rights of both
civilian noncombatants and detainees provided for in international humanitarian
law and the OSCE Code of Conduct and to hold human rights violators accountable.
The OSCE Permanent Council expressed deep concern over the disproportionate use
of force by the Russian Armed Forces; deplored the serious violations of human
rights before and after the outbreak of the current crisis; called for the full
respect of international humanitarian law in the region; for human rights
violators to be brought to justice; and the unhindered delivery of humanitarian
aid to all in need. The OSCE also emphasized the need for an immediate cease-
fire and for the International Committee of the Red Cross to be given unhindered
access to all detainees. In April the OSCE sent a mission to Chechnya to
promote human rights observance and a peaceful settlement to the dispute. NGO's
such as Human Rights Watch, Amnesty International, and Russia's Memorial, issued
reports based on travel to the region detailing human rights violations,
particularly the treatment of Chechens and other local residents, by Russian
soldiers.
Four government agencies are investigating human rights violations in Chechnya:
the State Duma Investigatory Commission on the Causes and Conditions of the
Emergence of the Crisis in the Chechen Republic (the Duma Commission); the
Ministry of Justice's temporary Commission Observing the Implementation of the
Constitutional Rights and Freedoms of Citizens in the Process of the Restoration
of Constitutional Order on the Territory of the Chechen Republic (Ministry of
Justice Commission); the Military Procuracy of the Russian Federation; and the
Interregional Military Procuracy of the Northern Caucasus.
In addition to the massive loss of life, the Russian Federal Migration Service
(FMS) reports that 380,000 people have fled from Chechnya since the conflict
began. International observers have put the number as high as 500,000. The FMS
calculates that from 200,000 to 250,000 displaced people are expected to return.
While the FMS has announced that it will compensate people for destroyed
apartments and most living space, it is unclear whether ethnic Russians will
return to the war-ravaged republic. Many Chechens are living with relatives in
surrounding areas; whether or not they will return is unknown.
International observers report that legal institutions have ceased completely to
function, and there is no authority to ensure the enforcement of Russian law and
the provisions of the Constitution in Chechnya. On July 30, the Government and
forces loyal to Chechen president Dudayev signed a military protocol calling for
a cease-fire, the disarming of rebel formations, the withdrawal of most federal
troops, and the exchange of prisoners. Implementation of the protocol was slow
and came to a halt in the fall, following the assassination attempt on General
Romanov, former commander of the federal forces in Chechnya. Sporadic--and at
times heavy--fighting continues.
In late 1995, the Russian government announced elections to replace the Moscow-
backed government that assumed power after Dudayev was driven from Groznyy.
Prominent human rights organizations called for cancellation of the December 17
elections in Chechnya due to the conditions in the region, which they described
as a virtual state of emergency. They warned that the results of the elections
would lack credibility and predicted that the elections would exacerbate
preexisting tensions and prevent political reconciliation. The OSCE Assistance
Group (AG) temporarily departed Groznyy rather than monitor elections that they
judged could not be "free and fair." Dokur Zavgayev won the elections, but
there were widespread allegations of fraud and manipulation of the results.
Section 2 Respect for Civil Liberties, Including:
a. Freedom of Speech and Press
The Constitution provides for freedom of mass information and the "right of each
person to seek, receive, pass on, produce, and disseminate information freely by
any legal method." Although the Russian Federation Government still retained
various potential levers over the media, including publication licensing, access
to printing presses, access to newsprint, and distribution, the print media--
most of which are independent of the Government and many of which are privately
owned--functioned, with exceptions, relatively unhindered and represented a wide
range of opinions. Also, small, private radio stations continued to
proliferate, and independent and semi-independent television throughout the
country continued to multiply.
Nevertheless, reports of government pressure on selected media increased,
especially in relation to the conflict in Chechnya. In May the Fourth Congress
of the Russian Union of Journalists, representing 60,000 journalists nationwide,
reported that "political, economic, and administrative pressure on media
organizations and individual journalists in Russia has been increasing." The
Union also noted that "one of the most important achievements of the press today
is the fact that the political spectrum is represented" in both the print and
broadcast media. The Glasnost Defense Foundation (GDF), a media watchdog
organization, reported over 450 cases of violations of journalists' rights
during 1995, of which 60 percent were related to the conflict in Chechnya. This
was a 150 percent increase over the same period during the previous year,
although the increase may be due in part to better reporting. In Chechnya the
Glasnost Defense Foundation reported 371 incidents against 267 journalists; 14
journalists died in Chechnya.
The GDF reported some 200 incidents unrelated to Chechnya that included:
murders and other suspicious deaths of journalists (30 percent); restricting
access to sources or news sites by authorities at different levels (18 percent);
financial restraints leading to the cancellation of broadcasts or individual
issues of publications, or even the complete closure of publications (15
percent); prosecutions of journalists because of their reports (14 percent);
robberies and destruction of journalists' equipment, including the firebombing
of newspaper offices in Tomsk (9 percent); and other types of interference by
authorities, including intimidation of sources (8 percent) and outright
censorship (6 percent). During the summer, a criminal case was initiated by the
regional government against Arsenyevskie Vestiye, a newspaper in the Primorskiy
region, for reprinting a 1994 report on human rights violations in the region.
In the Chechen conflict, both Russian and foreign journalists reported that the
Russian army subjected them to detentions, beatings, and sniper attacks. Other
reports of abuses by the Russian army cited destruction of video and audio
equipment and exposed tapes, censorship of completed reports, and interference
in reaching the zones of conflict. The Government established a special
committee to urge the media to project official government war information,
although this effort was generally ineffective.
In addition, the Government attempted to revoke the accreditation of certain
journalists working in the war zone without a court order as required by a 1991
law on mass media. In a case involving government actions in Chechnya, the
Constitutional Court ruled that the Government's efforts to evict critical
journalists from Chechnya without a valid court ruling were illegal. The ruling
reaffirmed the constitutional right to free information and guarantee of court
protection of rights and freedoms. As a result of this ruling, journalists were
permitted back into the area of conflict. However, the pressures against them
continued.
The Government did not launch a serious crackdown against the television
networks for their coverage of the Chechen war. The independent network, NTV,
and, to a lesser extent, the state-owned television and radio (now known as
Russian Public Television), continued to broadcast frank reports on the conduct
of the military campaign, largely without direct interference. However, Russian
State Television head Oleg Poptsov charged that he was nearly fired, and that
government officials attempted to intimidate him due to the station's
independent coverage of the war. The Government did institute a criminal
investigation of an NTV reporter for having interviewed Shamil Basayev, the
Chechen who led the attack on Budennovsk.
In July the General Prosecutor launched criminal proceedings against the satiric
puppet show "Kukly" on NTV, charging the show's producers with "public and
premeditated humiliation" of high state officials, including President Yeltsin,
by depicting them "in an insulting manner." The Kukly case was subsequently
dropped.
Outside the large media markets of Moscow and St. Petersburg, regional media
continued to be subject to varying degrees of pressure from authorities and
dominant industries. Regional officials cited unpaid debts as a pretext for
closing some newspapers that were also critical of regional governments. Many
media organizations were liable to pressure because they occupied city-owned
premises or received subsidies from local and regional governments. In towns
dominated by single industrial enterprises, the leaders of that enterprise had
sufficient power to suppress investigative reporting and discussion of
embarrassing topics, such as environmental pollution or privatization schemes
benefiting management. In these circumstances, some journalists said they
practiced self-censorship. Despite a ruling by the Presidential Judicial
Chamber in favor of the regional newspaper Luberetskaya Pravda, local
authorities took over the paper and hired an entirely new staff. In the far
eastern city of Khabarovsk, local authorities closed the independent television
station TV S.E.T. in August after it broadcast programs critical of the regional
administration.
Perilous finances caused some independent media to accept government and private
subsidies. The sudden withdrawal of financial subsidies at the time of the
breakup of the Soviet Union continued to bedevil the print media. In a replay
of a similar effort in 1994, the Federation Council rejected a law passed by the
Duma on state support for the media, which would have replaced most of the media
subsidies now in the state budget--89 billion rubles in 1995 compared with 237
billion rubles the previous year--with an expanded package of tax breaks.
There are also reports that investigative journalists were subjected to
intimidation and pressure by emerging private business and financial interests.
b. Freedom of Peaceful Assembly and Association
The Constitution provides citizens with the right to assemble freely, and the
Government respects this right in practice. Organizations must obtain permits
in order to hold public meetings. The application process must begin between 5
and 10 days before the scheduled event. Citizens freely and actively protested
government decisions and actions. Permits to demonstrate were readily granted
to opponents and to supporters of the Government.
However, in August police broke up two antinuclear rallies organized by the
Moscow chapter of Greenpeace for lacking appropriate demonstration permits.
Videotapes being made at the scene of a Red Square rally were confiscated and
erased by police. A rally in front of the French Embassy was also dispersed.
Public organizations must register their bylaws and the names of their leaders
with the Ministry of Justice. Political parties must also present 5,000
signatures and pay a fee to register. Organizations registered with the
Ministry of Justice were allowed to present candidates in the December
elections. The law and the Constitution ban the participation in elections of
those organizations which profess anticonstitutional themes or activities.
During the campaign preceding the December elections, the Ministry of Justice
closely monitored the statements and activities of all parties to limit the
propagation of extremist views.
c. Freedom of Religion
The Constitution provides for freedom of religion, and the Government respects
this right in practice. In December 1990, the Soviet Government enacted a law
on religious freedom designed to put all religions on an equal basis. While it
posed some obstacles to complete freedom of religion, it forbade government
interference in religion and enacted simple registration requirements for
religious groups.
The enactment of the 1990 law was followed by a "boom" in religious life, both
in traditional and nontraditional forms. The religious boom that has occurred
since 1990, in part due to the presence of well-financed foreign missionaries,
has disturbed many sectors of Russian society, particularly nationalists and
those in the Russian Orthodox Church, some representatives of which indicated
that they wished to limit the activities of foreign religious groups; however,
President Yeltsin opposes such control. In 1995 a new law on religion was
considered by the Parliament, but it had not been approved by year's end. The
draft emphasizes "regulation" and "control" of religious groups, as opposed to
freedom.
According to the U.S. Helsinki Commission, an increasing number of local and
provincial governments are issuing restrictive laws and decrees that violate the
provisions of the 1990 Law on Religion. Foreign religious groups are usually
the target, and reportedly the measures are surprisingly similar. These decrees
often include provisions that violate the right of an individual to talk and
write freely about his or her religion. These harsh laws are not always
enforced, but the potential exists for them to be used to restrict the
activities of religious minorities.
There were reports that Jehovah's Witnesses were forcibly inducted into the
military and suffered hazing, including beatings and confinement without food or
water.
Although Jews and Muslims continue to encounter prejudice, they have not been
inhibited by the Government in the free practice of their religion. Synagogues,
churches, and mosques have been returned to communities to be used for religious
services. However, for some religious communities the return of property
confiscated by the Communist regime remains an issue. According to the U.S.
Helsinki Commission, several churches continue to encounter problems in the
return of church properties. The Moscow Anglican Church and Moscow's Immaculate
Conception Catholic Church have not been able to occupy fully buildings that
were forcibly taken from their congregations by the Communist government.
Throughout Russia all religious faiths are attempting to regain nationalized
property through legal measures. Most synagogues have been returned; some Roman
Catholic Churches are still in the process of being handed back to
congregations; the Anglican Church in Moscow may soon again become the property
of that community.
d. Freedom of Movement Within the Country, Foreign Travel,
Emigration, and Repatriation
The Constitution provides citizens with the right to freely choose their place
of residence. However, the Government severely restricts this right. Citizens
are generally free to travel within Russia. All adults are issued internal
passports which they must carry while traveling and use to register visits of
more than 10 days with local authorities. Travelers not staying in hotels
usually ignore this requirement.
Citizens must obtain "propiskas" (residence permits) to live and work in a
specific area. Tens of thousands of ethnic Russians, citizens of former Soviet
Republics who have decided to move to Russia, often face great difficulty with
the cost of obtaining these propiskas. The leaders (and citizens) of Moscow and
other big cities staunchly defend retaining these permits as necessary in order
to control crime and keep crowded urban areas from attracting more inhabitants.
The cost of a propiska is often beyond the financial means of most migrants or
refugees, who usually do not register. However, those without propiskas are not
eligible for social or health services, nor can they send their children to
school. Moreover, former Presidential Human Rights Commissioner Sergey Kovalev,
Human Rights Watch/Helsinki, and others charged that law enforcement officials
use the propiska system as a means to discriminate mainly against people from
the Caucusus.
Laws on the propiska system were declared illegal. However, in practice, cities
maintained systems which controlled the movement of people. Since many ethnic
Russians tend to assume that a great deal of crime is committed by darker-
skinned peoples, such peoples are the target of checks and searches more often
than lighter-skinned peoples. Discrimination occurs against darker-skinned
peoples in larger cities throughout Russia, but especially in the biggest cities
where they are concentrated, like Moscow.
On July 17, the Council of Ministers issued a decree entitled "On Ratification
of Rules of Registration" by which local authorities may refuse to register an
individual for temporary or permanent residence based on certain conditions
which include "unsuitable housing conditions, objections from family members,
and other conditions envisioned by Russian law." The decree, which has the
force of law, requires that citizens register if they intend to remain in a
locality more than 10 days on vacation or business. It states that "only in
cases of serious illness of the temporarily registered citizens or their
relatives, or in other circumstances preventing the citizen from leaving the
place of temporary residence, may the period of stay be extended." Former
Russian Human Rights Commissioner Sergey Kovalev and Human Rights Watch
condemned this decree as an infringement upon the freedom of movement which
allows the possibility of arbitrary enforcement by corrupt local authorities.
The Government issues two distinct types of passports, one for foreign travel
and one for foreign emigration. If a citizen has had access to classified
material, police and intelligence service approval is necessary to receive a
passport for foreign travel. It is often difficult for such persons to get a
passport within 5 years of having left their former work. Persons denied
foreign passports can appeal the decision to a commission chaired by the Deputy
Foreign Minister. The commission meets monthly and has been able to resolve a
great many of these cases.
In 1995, 289 passports were issued as a result of reviews of cases by the Ivanov
Commission, and between 200 and 250 persons are awaiting emigration passports.
Between 5,000 and 6,000 are awaiting passports for travel because they at one
point were privy to secret information or worked in the defense or security
sectors. Russian law allows for travel and emmigration passports to be
withheld, but the Ivanov Commission's reviews allow for citizens to appeal
restrictions.
The Constitution provides all citizens with the right to emigrate. It does not
restrict the emigration of citizens to any country and does not prohibit those
who have left Russia from returning. Several "poor relative" cases (i.e.,
situations in which permission to emigrate is refused until they have received
the approval of certain close relatives--an approval which often means a cash
settlement) were resolved during the year. Some refugees who have sought haven
in Russia, such as Kurds, have left the country because of the difficulties they
encountered in securing the propiskas necessary to live in urban areas. Others,
including Tariel Broyev, director of the International Kurdish Cultural Center
in Moscow and his brother Revas, who are of Georgian origin, have alleged that
they were harassed by the police and therefore have left.
Although Russia is a party to the 1951 U.N. Protocol on Refugees and its 1967
Protocol, and does allow refugees the right of first asylum, most refugees do
not want to remain in Russia. Third country nationals apply to the U.N. High
Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) for processing. A large number of workers and
students from Africa and Asia, who came to work in accordance with treaties
between their countries and the former Soviet Union, remain in Russia. The
Government has not deported them but encourages their return home.
There are reports that UNHCR officers have been barred from entering the transit
area of Sheremetyevo II airport in Moscow. Only the UNHCR Office Representative
and his deputy have diplomatic credentials; other UNHCR officials, including
protection officers, do not. Airport officials have said that they can allow
access to the transit area only to accredited diplomats, even though until the
fall of 1995 protection officers did have access. Denial of access to UNHCR
officials to the airport areas contradicts the agreement between UNHCR and the
Russian Federation. UNHCR officers reportedly witnessed the deportations of
dozens of asylum seekers, some to the countries from which they had fled and
where upon return they faced a well-founded fear of persecution. This may have
prompted the Russian government to deny access to UNHCR officials.
Significant numbers of ethnic Russians continue to arrive from parts of the
former Soviet Union. The Federal Migration Service reported that 1,146,000
ethnic Russians moved to Russia in 1994, primarily from central Asian and Baltic
states. FMS does have a small program in place to assist these people, but they
are basically on their own. The International Organization for Migration (IOM)
has a substantial program in place to aid Russians who leave parts of the former
Soviet Union and come to Russia. A presidential decree offering Russian
citizenship to citizens of the former Soviet Union who return to Russia was
scheduled to expire on February 6. However, it was extended until December 31,
2000. The decree allows people to apply either abroad or in Russia. However,
in order to apply within Russia, one must present a propiska.
Section 3 Respect for Political Rights: The Right of Citizens to Change
Their Government
The Constitution provides citizens with the right to change their government at
both the federation and regional levels. They have exercised this right in
practice over the past 4 years. Several regional elections were held during the
year. Citizens voted on December 17 in parliamentary elections, which domestic
and international observers declared to be free and fair. However, no
international observers monitored the elections in Chechnya, due to concerns
about the preelection conditions (see Section 1.g.) Throughout the campaign,
access to the mass media was inhibited only by parties' ability to pay.
The Federal Assembly consists of two chambers. The lower chamber, or the Duma,
consists of 450 deputies, half elected in single mandate constituencies, half by
party lists. In the December parliamentary elections, 43 political blocs
appeared on the ballot.
The upper chamber, the Federation Council, was elected in December 1993. In
September President Yeltsin issued a decree stating that the Council would be
composed of the heads of administration and legislative leaders of each of
Russia's 89 regions. A law delineating this composition was passed by the Duma
in December. The decree entered into full force at the end of the term of the
Council elected in December 1993.
President Yeltsin was elected to a 5-year term in 1991. The Constitution
provides the President and the Prime Minister with substantial powers, which
they used in the absence of effective opposition from the Parliament and courts.
Presidential elections are scheduled to be held in June 1996, for a 4-year term.
Most regional leaders have been appointed by President Yeltsin rather than being
chosen in popular elections. The heads of 21 ethnic republics have been
elected, as well as the mayors of Moscow and St. Petersburg and 20 other
subjects of the Russian Federation. Thus, by year's end 43 of 89 heads of
subjects of the Russian Federation had been elected.
The Constitution does not limit the political activity of any societal group,
including women. The political bloc "Women of Russia" holds 8 percent of the
seats in the Duma. A total of 39 of the Duma's 450 deputies are women. Some
members of religious and national minorities hold positions of leadership at the
local, regional, and national level, including as deputies in the Duma.
Section 4 Governmental Attitude Regarding International and Nongovernmental
Investigation of Alleged Violations of Human Rights
Many Russian human rights groups operate relatively freely. Most are
headquartered in Moscow and have branches throughout the country. Some of the
more prominent domestic human rights organizations are the Moscow Center for
Prison Reform, the Society for the Guardianship of Penitentiary Institutions,
the Glasnost Fund Memorial, the Moscow Research Center for Human Rights, the
Soldiers' Mothers' Committee, and the Mothers' Rights Foundation. Most groups
investigated and publicly commented on human rights issues generally without
government interference or restrictions. However, the Glasnost fund, and others
monitoring internal security agencies have encountered problems, such as
beatings as well as other abuses (see Sections 1.a. and 1.d.).
In addition, government authorities confiscated documents on human rights
violations committed during the Chechen conflict from a Russian nongovernmental
delegation in December. According to the Director of Customs at the airport,
the officials were FSB agents. The participants eventually got through airport
security and attended the meeting in Stockholm. They were prohibited from
taking with them certain materials. However, those materials had already been
sent abroad.
International human rights organizations function generally unrestricted.
However, Human Rights Watch reported that Russian forces denied it access to the
northern Caucusus region three times and that Russian soldiers detained two of
the organization's representatives in Groznyy and confiscated tapes of
interviews with witnesses to human rights abuses. In addition, Russian forces
at times denied international organizations access to towns, including Samashki
and Gudermes, immediately after capturing them. The Russian Government agreed
to permit the OSCE to investigate human rights abuses in Chechnya in keeping
with the Assistance Group's mandate. OSCE observers have investigated some human
rights violations and brought the information to the attention of OSCE
authorities in Vienna. However, there has been little follow up on this
information.
The President's Commission on Human Rights, formerly chaired by Sergey Kovalev,
focused its attention on human rights questions in Chechnya. A Member of
Parliament, Sergey Kovalev also served as Russia's Human Rights Ombudsman. He
was dismissed from that post in March by deputies who were angered by his
critical comments about the conduct of the war in Chechnya. In August aides to
the President reportedly prepared a decree dismissing Kovalev as Chairman of the
presidential Human Rights Commission and transforming the unit into a "complaint
letter department." Kovalev had been criticized for referring to the President
as a "constitutional criminal" during testimony before the Constitutional Court
on Chechnya. President Yeltsin did not sign the decree. In January 1996,
Kovalev resigned from the Commission, publicly releasing a critical letter
accusing President Yeltsin of backtracking on human rights. Shortly thereafter,
the President's Human Rights Commission issued a critical report on the status
of human rights in Russia for 1994 and 1995.
Section 5 Discrimination Based on Race, Sex, Religion, Disability, Language,
or Social Status
The Constitution prohibits discrimination based on race, sex, religion,
language, social status, or other circumstances. However, both official and
societal discrimination still exist.
Some nongovernmental groups attempted to incite violence against other political
or societal groups. Self-proclaimed Fascist Aleksey Vedenkin was arrested in
February after threatening to shoot Human Rights Commission Chairman Sergey
Kovalev and others opposed to the war in Chechnya. Vedenkin was to be tried on
the basis of the anti-Fascist decree approved by President Yeltsin in 1994, but
he was released when the President, in honor of the 50th anniversary of the end
of World War II, granted amnesty to those charged with certain categories of
crime. Some groups attempted to stir up hatred against Jews, peoples from the
Caucasus, and Roma (Gypsies), who were most frequently singled out for verbal or
physical abuse by fellow citizens.
Russian and foreign human rights organizations have recorded information on
attacks against, and maltreatment of, homosexual prisoners throughout Russia in
violation of international norms. Homosexual prisoners are segregated from
heterosexual prisoners and, regardless of the charges or crimes on which they
have been detained or convicted, are housed with persons accused of sex crimes.
In such an environment, human rights organizations assert, they are ostracized
by the rest of the prison population and subject to further abuse.
Women
According to government statistics, 15,000 women were killed by their husbands
in 1994. The Ministry of Internal Affairs recorded 54,000 cases of spousal
abuse in 1994, a figure which most nongovernmental observers, such as the Center
for Gender Studies, regard as conservative. Figures for 1995 were not yet
available. According to a report by Human Rights Watch, violence against women
in Russia is on the rise. Domestic violence is widespread and largely
unreported. According to most observers, police are reluctant to intervene in
such cases, which they reportedly view as internal family matters.
There are no laws on domestic violence, and there are no official statistics
concerning rape or physical abuse of women. Women often do not report such
crimes.
Hospitals and members of the medical profession readily provide assistance to
women who have been assaulted. However, some doctors are reluctant to become
involved in trying to ascertain the details of a sexual assault, fearing that
they will be required to spend long periods of time in court.
There is credible evidence that women encounter considerable discrimination in
employment, and that they are often the last hired and the first to be fired.
According to Human Rights Watch, women account for 90 percent of worker layoffs.
Human Rights Watch accused the Government of participating in discriminatory
actions against women, contending that, as the direct employer or contractor of
companies doing the direct hiring, the Government must enforce employment laws
on women; however, the Government seldom enforces these laws. Employers prefer
to hire men and save on maternity and child care costs and avoid the perceived
unreliability that accompanies the hiring of women with small children. On the
other hand, women comprise the majority of teachers and librarians and appear to
be strongly represented within city administrations.
Children
The Constitution assigns the Government some responsibility for safeguarding the
rights of children. The Kovalev commission has drawn up a comprehensive program
in defense of children's rights which it intends to present to the Parliament.
However, for the most part abuse of children and the situation of such groups as
orphans and children and juveniles in pretrial detention facilities received
little societal attention. The Russian Association of Orphanages reported that
the condition of orphans in post-Soviet era Russia worsened due to financial
constraints on the federal budget and the lack of a charitable tradition in
Russia.
There is no pattern of societal abuse directed at children. The State endeavors
to provide, within its reduced means, for the welfare of children.
The most vulnerable group of children in society are orphans and the mentally
retarded, who are often given up by their parents to state-run institutions.
The plight of these children received considerable media attention in 1995.
Abuses of children in such institutions have been well documented. Human rights
groups strongly believe that the treatment of children in detention facilities
appears to violate international norms. The well-being of children in
institutions for the disabled also suffered due to government budget
constraints.
People with Disabilities
The Constitution does not directly address the issue of discrimination against
disabled persons. The Society for the Defense of Invalids is working to broaden
public awareness and understanding of issues concerning people with
disabilities. Although laws exist which prohibit discrimination, the Government
has not enforced them. The meager resources the Government devotes to assisting
disabled persons is provided to veterans of World War II and other military
conflicts. Special institutions exist for children with various disabilities.
However, as the Society for the Defense of Invalids has observed, "Russian
society, like Soviet society before it, places value only on what a person can
do, build, or earn, which excludes the disabled." The Government does not
mandate access to buildings for the disabled anywhere in the Russian Federation.
Indigenous People
The State Committee for the Development of the North, based in Moscow, is tasked
with representing and advocating the interests of indigenous people. With only
a small staff, its influence is limited. Local communities have been formed in
some areas to study and make recommendations regarding the preservation of the
culture of indigenous people. People such as the Buryats in Siberia, the Tatar
and Bashkiri in the Urals, the peoples of the north, including the Enver,
Tafarli, and Chukchi, and others have worked actively to preserve and develop
their cultures, as well as the economic resources of their regions. Most
believe that they are treated equally with ethnic Russians within the Russian
Federation. Roma (Gypsies) and peoples from the Caucasus, especially Chechnya,
however, face particular problems and discrimination and have been subjected to
verbal and physical abuse (see Section 1.g. for discussion of the war in
Chechnya).
Since 1993 discrimination against people from the Caucasus and Central Asia
increased concurrently with new measures at both the federal and local levels to
combat crime. With wide public support, law enforcement authorities targeted
people with dark complexions for harassment, arrest, and deportations from urban
centers during periods of domestic crisis. This trend continued in 1995. Human
Rights Watch reported that law enforcement agents in Moscow "routinely detained,
intimidated and extorted money from and beat people of color, mainly people from
the Caucasus and Central Asia..." Following the beginning of the military
conflict in Chechnya, noted the group, "detention and harassment of ethnic
Chechens in Moscow became more frequent and more brutal." Former Human Rights
Commissioner Sergey Kovalev Human Rights Watch and charged that the propiska
system disproportionately discriminated against people from the Caucasus area.
Religious Minorities
Muslims, who comprise approximately 10 percent of Russia's population, continue
to encounter societal prejudices and antagonism.
Jews in Russia continue to encounter some forms of societal discrimination.
There have been no reports that Jews were hindered in the practice of their
religion. However, anti-Semitic themes continued to figure prominently in
extremist publications and some Russian politicians made anti-Semitic remarks.
President Yeltsin's anti-Fascist decree of July and his commitment to prosecute
political extremists whose activities violated the Constitution were viewed
initially by some members of Jewish communities as positive developments.
However, this decree apparently has not been used or enforced.
American representatives of Jehovah's Witnesses congregations in Russia reported
that the Channel 5 television station in St. Petersburg aired libelous stories
about their religion and its practices in Russia. They charged that such
stories about "foreign" religions were encouraged by local leaders of the
Orthodox Church.
Members of the Russian branch of the Japanese Aum Shinri Kyo cult reported
societal harassment after the cult was implicated in a Tokyo subway gas attack.
In April a Moscow court froze the cult's assets. The cult's Moscow organization
was sued by the Youth Defense Committee, a public organization which has taken
on the case, for torture, extortion and abuse of civil rights. The case was
pending at year's end.
In certain areas of the country other religions, including Buddhism, various
Christian faiths, and shamanism are practiced in accord with minority
traditions.
Section 6 Worker Rights
a. The Right of Association
The law provides workers with the rights to join or form trade unions, and some
50 to 55 million workers (over 70 percent of the work force) are nominally
organized. However, this number includes members of the successor organization
to the official Communist unions, which are themselves organized as the
Federation of Independent Trade Unions of Russia (FNPR). The numerical
dominance of FNPR, its continued control over the extensive property and real
estate of its predecessor, and its still substantial role in the distribution of
social benefits, function as practical constraints to the right to freedom of
association. Moreover, almost all of the official unions include management as
part of the bargaining unit.
In practice, the leaders of FNPR unions tend to remain dependent on enterprise
managers or local political elites. FNPR uses the leverage it has as the
guardian of social benefits, including health care and vacation facilities, to
dissuade workers from joining independent unions. Labor market analysts cite
polls showing that the majority of workers either do not know that they belong
to a union at all, or belong solely because they believe that they would not be
covered by social insurance or receive other benefits if they did not pay dues
to the official union.
On the national level, trade unions exist independently of the Government,
political parties, and other political forces. The independent, or "free,"
labor unions supported a wide variety of political blocs in the December
parliamentary elections. Political parties do not control or interfere in the
function of any of the trade unions. At the national level, even the FNPR plays
a very independent political role. On the regional and local levels, FNPR
unions are often closely associated with lower-level political bosses.
Unions may freely form federations--two new national groupings of independent
trade unions came into existence during the year--and affiliate with
international labor bodies.
b. The Right to Organize and Bargain Collectively
While collective bargaining is protected under the law, its practice is limited
by the frequent refusal of enterprise management to negotiate with independent
labor unions. For example, the general director of a provincial aerospace
factory told labor unionists that he would not bargain with an independent union
even though it had met all registration requirements. Significant antiunion
discrimination by management exists, although labor law theoretically prohibits
such discrimination. Government policy and an economy rapidly adapting to the
free market have forced enormous reductions in workers employed in large
industrial enterprises (which were staffed according to Soviet precepts). In
this environment, enterprise managers (with the encouragement of FNPR unionists)
easily find ways to ensure that independent union activists are among the first
affected by large-scale layoffs and the last included in retraining programs or
rehired, according to analysts who follow organized labor. In some instances,
factory management has tried to pressure the Government to declare industrial
action illegal or has simply fired strike leaders.
The judicial system has reversed a number of such decisions over the past year
and has generally improved its record in defending worker rights. For example,
in January, a Samara oblast court ordered the reinstatement of some 40 workers
fired from the VAZ auto works in November 1994 for participating in a strike
sponsored by a small independent trade union. Factory management claimed that
the job action was not a strike but an illegal work stoppage. Union leaders
reported that the court later went a step further, ordering that an activist who
had been given an unfavorable work assignment after the strike be returned to
his original duties.
There have been no reports of constraints on worker rights in Russia's several
export processing zones (EPZ's).
c. Prohibition of Forced or Compulsory Labor
The Labor Code prohibits forced or compulsory labor. However, some observers
believe that government enforcement of this provision is ineffective. There
were limited reports of army recruits being forced to serve as personal servants
of more senior soldiers (see Section 1.c.).
d. Minimum Age for Employment of Children
The Labor Code bans regular employment for children under the age of 16. In
certain cases, children 14 or 15 years of age may work in internship or
apprenticeship programs. The Labor Code regulates the working conditions of
children under the age of 18, including prohibiting dangerous work and nighttime
and overtime work. However, growth in entrepreneurial manufacturing and
trading, and in the informal economy, has led to the employment of more children
under the age of 14 in recent years. These child workers usually sell consumer
goods, such as magazines and cigarettes, on the streets or in kiosks. Their
entrance into the labor force reflects the straitened economic conditions in
which many families live. This pressure and the deterioration of the
educational system create a gap between child labor legislation and reality.
e. Acceptable Conditions of Work
The monthly minimum wage at the end of 1995 was roughly $12.87 (60,500 rubles).
While this figure clearly does not constitute a living wage under prevailing
conditions, very few people receive the official minimum. At the same time,
much of the population continues to reside in low-rent or subsidized housing,
and receive various social services from enterprises or municipalities. The
official minimum wage is primarily a benchmark figure for calculating university
stipends, old age pensions, civil service wages, and a host of other social
benefits.
Nonpayment of wages is the primary reason for the vast majority of strikes.
Wage arrears are a potential cause of social unrest over the next few years and
a matter of concern for the Government. For example, the settlement of coal
strikes in Rostov Oblast (in February) and Primorskiy Kray (in May) over wages
owed to miners in the state-supported coal sector required the attention of then
First Deputy Prime Minister Anatoliy Chubays. Russian labor experts believe
that wage arrears amount to a violation of International Labor Organization
standards on acceptable conditions of work.
The Labor Code provides for a standard workweek of 40 hours, with at least one
24-hour rest period. The law requires premium pay for overtime work or work on
holidays.
The law establishes minimum conditions of workplace safety and worker health,
but these standards are not effectively enforced. In factories, workers wear
little protective equipment, enterprises store hazardous materials in open
areas, and smoking is permitted near containers of flammable substances. The
Labor Code does establish workers' right to remove themselves from hazardous or
life-threatening work situations without endangering their continued employment.
Coal miners in the northern settlement, Vorkuta, won reinstatement to their jobs
through the local court system after one such refusal. Nevertheless, the right
to a safe and healthy work environment remains under pressure in an economic
environment where industry is shrinking and unemployment is a constant fear.
??
-7-
RUSSIA
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