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Title: Croatia Human Rights Practices, 1995
Author: U.S. Department of State
Date: March 1996
CROATIA
The Republic of Croatia is a constitutional parliamentary democracy with
a powerful presidency. President Franjo Tudjman, elected in 1992,
serves as head of state and commander in chief of the armed forces. He
chairs the influential National Defense and Security Council, and
appoints the Prime Minister, who leads the Government. President
Tudjman's party, the Croatian Democratic Union (HDZ), holds the majority
of seats in both houses of Parliament, and the HDZ has ruled Croatia
since independence in 1991. A new Government was named in November
after multiparty elections were held for the lower house of Parliament.
Government influence weakens the nominally independent judiciary. The
enormous constitutional powers of the presidency, the military
occupation of large sections of the country, and the overwhelming
dominance of one political party tend to stifle the expression of
diverse views.
In March the United Nations protective Force (UNPROFOR) mandate was
modified to include monitoring of the international borders of Croatia
and an increased presence of human rights monitors in the U.N. protected
areas. The mission was renamed the United Nations Confidence
Restoration Operation (UNCRO). In May and August, the Government
launched military offensives against three rebel Serb-held zones and
recovered the territory after 4 years of breakaway Serb occupation.
The U.N. High Commissioner for Refugees estimates that approximately
180,000 Serb refugees fled into Serb-controlled territory in Bosnia and
Croatia and Serbia/Montenegro during the two campaigns. Only the
Eastern area of Croatia remains outside effective government control,
although both the Government and local Serb leaders signed an agreement
in mid-November to bring this area under complete government control
after a transitional period of 1 to 2 years. Abuses continued in rebel
Serb-held areas. Tens of thousands of expelled Croat and Muslim
refugees continued to arrive from Serbia and Bosnia.
The Ministry of the Interior oversees the police, while the Ministry of
Defense oversees the armed forces (HV). Civil police have no authority
over military police or over uniformed military personnel. The national
police have primary responsibility for internal security, but in times
of disorder, for example, during and after the May and August
offensives, the Government may call on the army to provide security.
Both the police and army are responsible for external security.
Civilian authorities generally maintain effective control of the
professional security forces. However, official personnel from each
service were responsible for significant abuses committed in the
reclaimed territories. In Serb-controlled areas, well-armed police and
military forces continued their pattern of human rights abuses against
both non-Serbs and Serbs.
Croatia's economy is slowly changing to a market-based free enterprise
system. Industry is largely state owned.
Agriculture is mostly in private hands. Family-owned small enterprises
are multiplying. The stabilization program kept inflation low
throughout the year. The continued occupation of the eastern area by
rebel Serbs, the massive refugee problem, and the two military
offensives all limited economic recovery. The slow transition and the
war economy contributed to polarizing economic disparities.
There were serious human rights problems during the year, the most
flagrant violations being committed during and after the May and August
military operations. Although the Government generally respected the
human rights of ethnic Croats, its human rights record worsened with
respect to minority groups, especially ethnic Serbs. The bulk of
violent abuses occurred in the reclaimed regions, after the military and
police operations. The Government failed to establish adequate civil
authority to control vengeful renegade arsonists, looters, and
murderers who still operated with impunity in the reclaimed areas months
after the offensives had ended. The Government sought to legalize and
institutionalize the population changes resulting from these offensives,
rather than welcome back Serb refugees. After the military actions, it
appeared less than genuinely interested in devising measures to restore
confidence in the Serbian community, or even in maintaining an ethnic
Serb presence in Croatia. The security forces committed, cooperated in,
or ignored many of the abuses in the reclaimed areas. The Government
did not effectively seek out or punish those involved, except in a few
token cases. The Government temporarily suspended key provisions of the
National Minorities law in September and still has not established the
provisional human rights court, as mandated by the 1992 Constitution.
Specific abuses committed included ethnic-based killings, arbitrary
detention and torture, restrictions of movement and repatriation, mass
destruction and confiscation of property, denial of fair and expeditious
trials, and infringements on freedom of speech and the press. Societal
discrimination against women and ethnic minorities and violence against
women are problems.
Rebel Serb authorities committed human rights abuses in the areas they
controlled. The police and military forces continued to use violence,
murder, intimidation, and displacement against Croats and minorities to
settle incoming Serb refugees and achieve their goal of ethnic cleansing
in the areas they controlled. In May, provoked by the Government attack
on Western Slavonia, the self-proclaimed "Republic of Serbian Krajina
(RSK)" President Martic ordered the bombing of Croatian civilian
centers, including Zagreb. At least six civilians died in these
incidents. Residents of the "RSK" were subject to a controlled, quasi-
legal system that operated without freedom of expression, assembly,
press, religion, or movement and which denied citizens the right to
change their government.
RESPECT FOR HUMAN RIGHTS
Section 1 Respect for the Integrity of the Person, Including Freedom
from:
a. Political and other Extrajudicial Killing
UNCRO officials registered 300 to 500 reports of killings in reclaimed
parts of Croatia. Most killings were ethnically motivated and occurred
long after the military offensives were over. Only in the most public
cases were effective government investigations carried out and
perpetrators punished, mostly as a result of pressure from international
authorities and human rights groups. Among those implicated in the
killings were civilians, civil police, and active duty military
personnel, especially members of the nonprofessional "home guard"
brigades.
There were numerous and brutal killings. For example, in late August,
seven elderly civilians were shot, slaughtered, and burned in the
village of Grubori. The oldest victim was 90 years old. Witnesses saw
uniformed special police and HV at the scene. At first, government
officials claimed that the civilians were caught in a clash between HV
and enemy troops. Months later a few Croats were arrested for the
murder of these civilians and were still under investigation at year's
end. On September 28, in the village of Varivode, UNCRO monitors found
the bodies of nine elderly Serbs who had been shot to death. Thirteen
individuals were arrested for these killings. At the end of the year,
the Government claimed that it had investigated 26 murders and resolved
15 cases, charging a total of 20 individuals, including 3 soldiers and 1
policeman.
Serbs in the occupied areas also committed ethnically motivated killings
within the sectors and along the confrontation line, with a
disproportionate number of non-Serb victims. For example, in June
three Croat garbage collectors were kidnapped by East Slavonian Serbs
during a regular run to the Osijek city dump inside the separation zone.
Two individuals were released, but Serb authorities in Erdut eventually
claimed that the third, Franjo Ivos, was killed. No suspects were ever
apprehended, and local authorities insist that the body was lost. In
October Serb snipers from this sector killed two Croats in Belisce.
Rebel Serbs also targeted U.N. personnel. A Kenyan UNCRO soldier was
shot dead in July in sector south. In January in sector east, one
Russian battalion soldier and three local Serbs were shot under unclear
circumstances, possibly involving black market activity. In September
four Danish U.N. soldiers were killed near Dvor as Bosnian Serbs
deliberately targeted a U.N. observation post across the Una river in
Croatia. HV units had attempted to cross the river, and fire was
exchanged between the two sides. UNCRO officials claim that the
position of a tank's gun indicated that it had targeted U.N., and not
HV, positions.
No progress was made on the excavation of mass grave sites in occupied
areas until Croatian forces obtained control of the territory.
Government sources claim to have located over 250 mass graves in the
former Serb-occupied territories, and the Government began uncovering
some of the sites. After many of the bodies were identified, they were
released into the custody of family members. Based on eyewitness
reports, the Government charged individual rebel Serbs with murder, some
of whom were tried in absentia.
b. Disappearance
Few new cases of disappearances were reported. At year's end, the
Government reported more than 2,800 cases of missing persons still
unresolved from the 1991-92 war. Some progress was made in removing
names from the list of those missing as a result of prisoner and body
exchanges and of identification of corpses exhumed in the reclaimed
areas. An unknown number of cases of missing Serbs remained open at the
end of the year as a result of the two government offensives. The
Government made no public effort to investigate these cases.
c. Torture and other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading Treatment or
Punishment
The Constitution prohibits torture or cruel or degrading punishment, but
government forces continued to commit such abuses in some instances.
Security forces at certain prisons beat and mistreated prisoners during
detention and interrogation. After both offensives, foreign observers
saw the wounds of rebel Serb detainees who complained of such treatment
at detention centers, in Varazdin in May, for example, as well as at
other sites. However, such cases were not routine, and there was no
evidence of systematic torture in Croatian jails. Most Serb detainees
interviewed by international monitors reported good treatment. There
were no reports of abuses or mistreatment of common criminals arrested
and detained in Croatian jails.
Except for the short-term detention facilities used to house civilians
rounded up after the military actions, detention facilities generally
meet minimum international standards of cleanliness, nutrition, and
amenities. Jails are crowded, but not to excess, and family visits and
access to counsel are available. Detained rebel Serbs arrested for
armed rebellion were mainly held in military prisons, as with most
security prisoners. After the August offensive, the Government
increasingly restricted access to these Serb prisoners by UNCRO and
other international observers until late in the year.
There were credible reports of torture and other abuse in Serb-
controlled areas. Harsh treatment of non-Serbs was commonplace, and
Serbian authorities did not punish abusers. In March a British citizen
of Croatian descent was detained for a month in Knin and tortured with
electric implements. Two of the three Ojisek garbage collectors
kidnapped by East Slavonian Serbs (see Section 1.a.) complained that
they were tortured and otherwise mistreated during their detention.
Local police and paramilitary forces reportedly beat and robbed
detainees, as well as subjected them to psychological torture, such as
death threats. Prison conditions in the Serb-controlled areas were
reliably reported to be abysmal.
d. Arbitrary Arrest, Detention, or Exile
The Constitution contains provisions to protect the legal rights of all
accused, but the Government does not always respect these rights in
practice. The Government frequently abuses pretrial and investigative
detention. The most prominent case of arbitrary arrest occurred in late
October when 15 persons, mostly prominent ethnic Serbs, were detained
for espionage. The court eventually charged the suspects after holding
them in detention for 3 months. Army special forces troops arbitrarily
arrested several dozen rebel Bosnian Muslim refugees in the Kupljensko
camp at the end of the year and forcibly repatriated them to Bosnia.
Refugee organizations continued to report similar instances in which
Muslim refugees were detained and threatened with forcible expulsion.
Government police and military forces rounded up the remaining civilian
populations of the formerly occupied areas immediately after both
offensives. The elderly, women, and children were confined in
collection centers outside the war zone, some for several weeks.
Government officials explained that this measure was taken for
detainees' own safety, until their "identification" was verified, and
their homes were demined. Many homes were looted during their absence.
Draft age men were taken to separate centers and held even longer until
a determination was made whether to investigate them either for war
crimes or for armed rebellion. Over 1,500 men were detained after the
attack on Western Slavonia, about 200 of whom were investigated at
length. The Government extended the amnesty for armed rebellion to
cover the period from August 17, 1990, to May 10, 1995.
Police normally seek arrest warrants by presenting evidence of probable
cause to an interrogating magistrate. Police may carry out arrests
without a warrant if they believe the suspect might flee, destroy
evidence, or commit other crimes. Such cases are not uncommon. The
police then have 24 hours in which to justify their decision before the
local interrogating magistrate.
After arrest, the law states that persons must be given access to an
attorney of their choice within 24 hours; if they have no attorney, and
are charged with a crime for which the sentence is over 10 years'
imprisonment, the interrogating magistrate will appoint counsel from a
list of public defenders. If the sentence is under 10 years, detainees
can request court-appointed counsel if they so choose. The court will
appoint counsel after charges are levied for the trial. The
interrogating judge must, within 3 days of the arrest, decide whether
sufficient cause exists to hold the person in custody pending further
investigation. The judge must justify the decision in writing,
including the length of detention ordered. These decisions may be
appealed, either immediately or later in the detention period. The
usual period of investigative detention varies from a few days to a few
weeks but by law may be as long as 2 years. Those persons held under
investigative detention are often denied certain rights, such as visits,
until they are officially charged. Accused persons have the right to
have their attorney present whenever they wish during the investigation
as well as during any appeal of investigative detention.
In practice, detainees are almost always bound over for investigation
unless it is clear that no case exists against them. Once the
investigation is complete, detainees are usually released on their own
recognizance pending trial, unless the crime is a major offense, the
accused are considered public dangers, or the court believes they may
flee. There are provisions for posting bail after charges are brought,
but the practice is not common. Police will sometimes retain the
passports of those released pending trial to prevent them from leaving
the country.
By law, rebel Serbs detained after the two offensives could be held
under investigative detention, pending charges, for 6 months. In many
cases, "RSK" Serbs arrested for armed rebellion did not have adequate
access to legal counsel, nor were they informed in a timely manner by
the courts of their rights. Few were assigned a public defender until
months after their arrest; some saw counsel only once or twice, usually
only during a court hearing. Although they had been in investigative
detention for 6 months, many such Serbs were tried and convicted in 2
days in November and December, having spoken to their lawyers only once.
On December 30, the Government amnestied and released an additional 455
rebel Serbs arrested in August.
In rebel Serb-controlled areas, virtually no safeguards existed against
arbitrary detention, and Serb forces continued to use detention as an
intimidation tactic. They commonly arrested civilians in the
"separation zone." The incident involving the Osijek garbage collectors
was the most highly publicized. In January a French journalist was
arrested for illegally crossing into "RSK" territory and was sentenced
by a military court to 2 1/2 years in prison, although he has since been
released. In November two Americans were detained for 3 days by Vukovar
local authorities for taking pictures. In November and December, sector
east authorities arrested a man from Hungary and a Croat from Osijek,
each of whom had "trespassed" onto Serb territory. Until August
residents of the "Bihac pocket" in western Bosnia-Herzegovina were
sometimes arbitrarily detained while transiting Serb-held territory.
The Constitution prohibits the exile of Croatian citizens. Serbs
captured during the offensives who did not originate from Croatian
territory were subject to deportation after they served their sentences
for war crimes.
e. Denial of Fair Public Trial
Government influence weakens the nominally independent judiciary. For
example, during regularly-held judicial elections in 1994, a dispute
arose which raised concerns about the extent of political control over
the judiciary. In February the High Judicial Council, which is
controlled by the Ministry of Justice and the Ministry of
Administration, elected new judges for the Supreme Court. However, the
Constitutional Court ordered that the nominating procedure be redone,
claiming that the Council had not appointed qualified personnel. Chief
Supreme Court Justice Milan Vukovic lost his appointment. Minister of
Justice Ivica Crnic disputed the election procedures and resigned in
March, saying that he did not wish to be involved in an undemocratic and
totalitarian procedure.
The Croatian judicial system consists of municipal and district courts,
a Constitutional Court, a Supreme Court, an Administrative Court and a
High Judicial Council. The High Judicial Council (with a president and
14 members from all parts of the legal community) appoints judges and
public prosecutors. The upper house of Parliament nominates persons for
membership on the High Judicial Council, and the lower house elects
members to 8-year terms. The eleven judges of the Constitutional Court
are elected to 8-year terms in the same manner.
In September the Government repealed certain provisions of the 1992
Constitutional Law on Minorities, which included the establishment of a
Provisional Court of Human Rights, a court which had never been
established (see Section 3). Emergency measures established in 1991 are
still being applied. These orders provide for the suspension of certain
legal remedies in legal proceedings and give the six-court military
legal system jurisdiction over a large number of cases involving
civilians.
Although the Constitution provides for the right to a fair trial and a
variety of due process rights in both civilian and military courts, in
practice the prosecuting attorney has leeway in deciding whether to
bring a case against an individual, and, in cases considered
"political," both the indictment and the conduct of trials are sometimes
subject to outside influence.
Nor is the judicial process free of ethnic bias. The investigative
detention of rebel Serbs was often based on circumstantial evidence and
uncertain testimony. Court authorities, including the detainees' own
court-appointed defense counsel, often displayed a strong bias against
them. A majority of judges took month-long vacations in mid-August,
further postponing investigative hearings. Large numbers of detainees
never received legal counsel. International trial observers claimed
that witnesses often recanted or changed their stories, presumably due
to intimidation on behalf of the accused.
The legal system in the Serb-controlled regions remained a sham, with
its procedures and practices totally subject to interference by those in
power. Specific information is hard to come by, as these proceedings
are closed to monitoring by the UN and other international observers.
The estimated number of political prisoners, including Serbs who
remained in detention, was over 500.
f. Arbitrary Interference with Privacy, Family, Home, or
Correspondence
The Constitution declares the home inviolable. Only a court may issue a
search warrant, stating the justification for the search of a home or
other premises. Police may enter a home without a warrant or the
owner's consent only if necessary to enforce an arrest warrant,
apprehend a suspect, or prevent serious danger to life or important
property. In practice, the authorities often failed to adhere to these
constitutional requirements.
International observers witnessed the mass looting, destruction, and
burning of property in the reclaimed territories by both official
military and civilian personnel and by unhindered civilians allowed to
roam the area. Within days of the start of the May and August
offensives, the first cases of house burnings were reported. Over one-
third of the buildings in the former sectors north and south were burned
within 2 months of the August offensive. Another third was heavily
damaged and uninhabitable. The village of Donji Lapac and many others
with a predominant Serb population were burned to the ground. From
early August until the end of the year, international human rights
monitors reported daily incidents of looting, burning, and threats made
to the remaining local population. Monitors continually reported the
names and automobile license numbers of perpetrators to government
authorities. Most people detained for looting and arson were released
after questioning pending further investigation. Security personnel and
military commanders generally did nothing to stop this destruction, and
local and international observers often witnessed security forces
starting the fires or standing by as they burned. Official
investigations and prosecutions for these acts began only after intense
international and media pressure on the Government and were viewed as
neither serious nor complete. At years end, the Government reported to
the U.N. that it had registered 2,878 cases of arson and brought charges
against 11 persons. It had identified 1,054 cases of looting, of which
770 had been "clarified," and had charged 1,260 individuals. The
Government provided no supporting documentation for these claims.
In August an official decree placed under government administration the
abandoned property of citizens who had fled the country for Serbia or
other Serb-controlled areas since the 1991 war. The Government claimed
that this act was necessary to give Croat refugees decent shelter and to
protect the properties from looting and destruction. The decree was
viewed internationally as a thinly veiled attempt to prevent the return
of Croatian Serbs to their homes. However, it was immediately passed
into law by the HDZ-controlled legislature. Owners were allowed a 90-
day filing period to reclaim their property, but the new law's complex
procedures required a claimant to produce citizenship documents which
could not be obtained outside Croatia, and to file a claim in Croatia.
Both requirements were practical impediments to Croatian Serbs' efforts
to reclaim their property. The time limit for filing a claim was
subsequently lifted in January 1996. Although the Government eventually
set up processing centers in Belgrade and other nearby capitals, the
procedure remained slow.
Military and civil police continued to carry out forced evictions,
involving hundreds of families of all nationalities. In other cases,
Croatian refugees, often with the appearance of official countenance,
forcibly entered the homes of ethnic Serbs and other minorities who had
lived for years in family apartments, but who were themselves not listed
as the official tenant. Although such evictions were often declared
illegal in court, authorities forbade the police to remove the intruders
on the basis of a law which requires that a new home be found for a
displaced or refugee family before it can be removed from any form of
housing, whether it was legally occupying the housing or not.
Forced evictions of ethnic Serbs, Croats, and others from former
Yugoslav National Army (JNA) apartments continued. The Ministry of
Defense arbitrarily revoked the tenant rights of individuals who had
lived in the apartments for decades. Referring to property laws which
remove tenancy rights as a result of any 6-month absence, or if the
tenant was ruled to have acted against the interests of the Republic of
Croatia, the Ministry granted soldiers tenancy of these occupied flats.
The soldiers frequently took residences by force of arms, either
evicting the current tenants or forcing them to share the quarters. In
November the Government passed a law allowing former JNA apartments to
be privatized. Unlike other privatizations, legal tenants had
restricted rights to purchase their apartments, and the right to
purchase was not guaranteed. Family members of the registered tenant
were not allowed purchase rights, nor were individuals suspected of
armed rebellion or war crimes. Human rights groups plan to sue the
Government concerning the constitutionality of this law.
The Constitution provides for the secrecy and safety of personal data,
but it was unclear if such guarantees were observed in practice.
Leaders in the Serb-held regions showed no compunction about interfering
with the rights of the inhabitants of those areas, particularly non-
Serbs. UNCRO continued to provide 24-hour patrols of several minority
villages to protect the inhabitants from armed bands. The practice of
forcibly moving Serbian refugees or soldiers into the homes of non-Serb
residents continued as well.
g. Use of Excessive Force and Violations of Humanitarian Law in
Internal Conflicts
In the early morning hours of May 1, special police units and government
troops initiated "Operation Flash," an attack to liberate occupied
Western Slavonia. Announced as a "limited police action" to gain
control of the Zagreb-Lipovac highway, government forces gained
effective control of most of the area within 1 day, and a cease-fire was
reached on the afternoon of May 3. HV troops restricted the movement of
UNCRO forces and surrounded most U.N. bases, including a Jordanian base
along the highway and a Nepalese base at Pustara. Although tensions had
been building for many weeks, the direct pretext for the attack was the
murder of three Croats, who were shot on the highway by a sniper from
behind Serb lines.
Rebel Serb forces reacted by shelling several cities, including Zagreb,
Dubrovnik, Karlovac, Kutina, Nova Gradiska, Novska, Pakrac, Osijek,
Sisak, and Zupanja. Zagreb was shelled on two separate occasions with
Orkan anti-personnel cluster bombs. Among the sites hit were a
children's hospital and the national theater. The shelling resulted in
6 dead and more than 130 wounded. "RSK" president Milan Martic publicly
announced that he had personally issued the order for the capital to be
shelled. Days later, he threatened again to "flatten the city" and kill
"100,000 people." In October Martic was indicted with two other "RSK
officials" by the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former
Yugoslavia (ICTY) for this incident.
Over 7,000 Serb refugees fled in front of advancing HV troops over the
only bridge across the Sava river to Serb-held Bosnian territory.
Government forces left this road open to allow the inhabitants to
evacuate. A pocket of Serbs unable to leave the northern part of the
sector was surrounded by HV forces and surrendered.
On August 4, government forces launched the larger scale "Operation
Storm on the former sectors north and south, and gained effective
control of the area within 5 days. The attack began with the shelling
of the Serb stronghold of Knin, a civilian target. Rebel Serb forces
organized a weak counteroffensive and quickly prepared an evacuation of
both military and civilian personnel from the area. Bosnian Serbs
shelled several cities in government-controlled Croatia although Zagreb
was not hit.
Although reportedly ordered to stay away from civilian targets,
government forces were responsible for the indiscriminate deaths of many
civilians and U.N. personnel during both actions. The Government later
claimed that 188 Serbs had been killed during the May action, of which
54 deaths were civilian. After the August attack, the Government
announced that 116 Serbs and 42 Croat civilians had been killed, as well
as 402 "RSK" soldiers and 211 HV troops. UNCRO estimates of these
figures are higher. During "Operation Flash," the U.N. reported 30
civilian corpses near the village of Novi Varos. Eyewitnesses reported
soldiers shooting at fleeing refugees.
On August 8 near Dvor, Croatian air force planes fired on a Serb refugee
column fleeing into Bosnia. The Government claimed that the Serbs were
moving tanks and other heavy equipment in the same column. One woman
died from wounds she received when a refugee column was stoned on August
9 by onlookers in Sisak. That same day, a British journalist was killed
and two other persons were wounded near Vrginmost, mistakenly targeted
as Serbs by HV forces.
Bosnian government army (ABH) forces entered Croatia during the August
offensive with Croatian government consent. While escorting a refugee
column in August, UNCRO personnel witnessed the deliberate shooting of 9
to 11 mentally and physically handicapped Serb refugees by irregular
units of the ABH. ABH forces also shelled a Serb refugee column in
Donji Zirovac on August 8.
During the offensives, the U.N. suffered casualties from both sides. HV
forces threatened and captured U.N. observation posts, holding some
personnel hostage for several hours. These forces looted many abandoned
U.N. compounds. When HV troops entered Knin in August, they prevented
anyone from leaving the U.N. compound to monitor the fighting. A Danish
UNCRO soldier was used by rebel Serbs as a human shield and was killed
by HV fire. The officer responsible for the order to shoot was arrested
and a murder charge is pending against him. HV forces threw a grenade
into a Jordanian battalion bunker, resulting in 4 to 6 deaths (also see
Section 1.a.).
Both police and military forces were responsible for looting and the
destruction of property, including the mining and burning of houses.
This destruction continued many months after the completion of the
action and was later committed by roving civilians as well (see Section
1.f.)
Elsewhere, isolated ceasefire violations caused at least three
fatalities. Occasional shelling occurred throughout the year from
Bosnian Serb positions bordering Croatia, most commonly targeting
Zupanja, Osijek, and the Dubrovnik area. Dubrovnik airport was shelled
in April, May, August, and October. Three young adults were killed in a
suburb of Dubrovnik from indiscriminate shelling in October. These
attacks also caused substantial property damage.
Several deaths occurred throughout the year from mines. The wide extent
of mine-laying during the conflict was increasingly evident after HV
forces gained control of the three sectors. Soldiers and civilians from
both sides, as well as UNCRO personnel, were victims of unmarked and
uncleared minefields. Expulsions of Croats, Hungarians, Slovaks,
Czechs, and other non-Serbs continued in Serb-occupied areas throughout
the year, with the number of incidents increasing in the remaining Serb-
held territories after each of the two government attacks. Condoned by
local RSK officials, these expulsions served the goal of ethnic
cleansing by ridding the region of minorities.
Section 2 Respect for Civil Liberties, Including:
a. Freedom of Speech and Press
The Constitution provides for freedom of thought and expression,
specifically including freedom of the press and other media of
communication, speech, and public expression, and free establishment of
institutions of public communication. In practice, government influence
on the media through state ownership of most print and broadcast outlets
limits these freedoms. In addition, government intimidation induces
self-censorship. Journalists are sometimes reluctant to criticize the
Government in public forums for fear of harassment, job loss,
intimidation, or being labeled as disloyal to Croatia.
The national television broadcasting and radio broadcasting system (HRT)
is government controlled. The Government also retains a controlling
interest in two of four news dailies and some weekly newspapers.
Although these state-controlled or heavily state-influenced media
frequently carry reportage critical of the Government, they maintain an
overall editorial slant favorable to the Government and the governing
party, the HDZ. Both the broadcast and print media also often exclude
news reports that put Croatia or its government in an unfavorable light.
HRT has several times not broadcast statements by foreign diplomats made
in highly public forums on the need to observe human and minority
rights. Each of the opposition parties is allocated 4 minutes of
television time per week. Access by the parties to the print media is
minimal, with occasional coverage of press conferences and interviews.
During October's parliamentary elections, 1 hour of free broadcast time
on national television was made available to each of the registered
political parties for the pre-election campaign. Time slots were drawn
by lot. Paid advertising on national television was, in theory,
available, but HRT refused to run advertising spots from one of the
major opposition parties on the grounds that some (unspecified)
information in the ad was inaccurate and that the ad did not make clear
which party was placing it. The HDZ advertising budget dwarfed that of
its rivals, and it made heavy use of this budget to buy broadcast time
on the national, state-controlled television network during the election
campaign.
A few newspapers continue to guard their independence, including the
daily Novi List in Rijeka, the weekly Globus, the intellectual bimonthly
journal Erasmus, and the weekly Arkzin, published by the Antiwar
Campaign.
Some extremist publications, with a virulently antigovernment slant, can
be purchased at newsstands, although they have a very small circulation.
The highly popular and often critical weekly Feral Tribune was subjected
to a 50 percent turnover tax in 1994, though in March, under pressure
from the European Union, the tax was lifted by the Constitutional Court.
Government influence over the recently privatized distribution network,
coupled with stiff value added taxes levied at several points during the
production process, also has an impact on press freedom. It is
claimed, though difficult to prove, that the few companies able to print
newspapers do not charge the pro-government media for their services; it
is also widely believed that Tisak, the national distributor for all
newspapers and magazines, removes independent journals very quickly from
its newsstands while at the same time charging them a high percentage of
the cover price for its services. Certain independent newspapers and
magazines claim that they must pay out more than 50 percent of their
gross revenues for taxes and distribution costs alone. On the other
hand, the high circulation of some popular independent periodicals,
Globus being the most visible example, has given them enough financial
independence to thrive despite these high taxes and high costs.
International papers and journals remained available throughout
government-controlled areas, including Serbian periodicals which
subscribers continued to receive by mail.
Croatia has three national television channels and a local television
station in Zagreb which reaches a quarter of the population. Zagreb-
based Channels One, Two, and Three are part of HRT, the official
Croatian Radio and Television Enterprise, headed by a well-known HDZ
member. Regional stations operate in Zadar, Split, Vinkovci, and
Osijek.
In August Parliament announced the first allocations of frequencies for
regional private radio and television stations under the July 1994
Broadcast Law. (No frequencies for nationwide private broadcasters have
been assigned for either radio or television.) Two of 4 planned
frequencies for television and 4 of 20 planned frequencies for radio at
the county (zupanija) level were assigned. Nine of 15 planned
frequencies for municipal-level private television were assigned and 88
of 111 planned frequencies for municipal radio broadcasters were
assigned.
The Broadcast Law mandates that one parliamentary member of the Council
for Croatian Television be an ethnic minority representative, but this
person has not yet been appointed. Among the first acts the Government
undertook after its forces retook the Krajina was to begin broadcasting
programming from the HRT regional station in Knin.
In Serb-controlled regions, freedom of speech and the press virtually
did not exist. With martial law still in effect, there were no
guarantees of a free press and other freedoms, and the authorities
controlled the tone and content of the media. One television station
broadcasts from studios in Beli Manastir and Vukovar in the one
remaining Serb-occupied area at year's end. A few low-powered local
radio stations broadcast from Baranja and Eastern Slavonia. Government
radio and television broadcasts are received in these areas as well.
Academic freedom is generally respected.
b. Freedom of Peaceful Assembly and Association
The Constitution provides that all citizens have the right to peaceful
assembly and association for the protection of citizens' interests or
the promotion of social, economic, political, national, cultural, and
other convictions and objectives, and the Government respects these
provisions in practice.
In early December, over 2,000 Croat refugees gathered in Zagreb for the
largest antigovernment demonstration since independence to protest the
Dayton peace agreement and the loss of their homes in Bosnian Posavina
to Bosnian Serbs. The demonstration was mostly peaceful with a few
isolated incidents of police harassment of protesters.
In Serb-controlled areas, no antigovernment demonstrations were held
throughout the year, and individuals who publicly voiced opposition
views were regularly jailed.
c. Freedom of Religion
The Constitution provides for freedom of conscience and religion and
free public profession of religious and other convictions, and the
Government respects these rights in practice. There is no state
religion. All religious communities are free to conduct public services
and to open and run social and charitable institutions. Roman
Catholicism, Eastern Orthodox Christianity, and Islam are the major
faiths in Croatia, and there is also an active Jewish community. The
majority of practicing Croats are Roman Catholic, and the Government
provides optional Catholic religious education in schools.
There are no formal restrictions on religious groups. The main mosque
in Croatia is in Zagreb, where it serves not only as a religious center
but also as a social aid office for the large Bosnian Muslim refugee
population. Croatian Protestants from a number of denominations, as
well as foreign clergy, actively practice and proselytize, as do
representatives of eastern-based religions. Some foreign religious
organizations seeking to provide social services reported bureaucratic
obstacles to their establishment in Croatia, but it was unclear if this
had any connection with their religious character.
The close identification of religion with ethnicity had earlier caused
religious institutions to be targets of violence. The Serbian Orthodox
cathedral in downtown Zagreb is open, and several other Orthodox
churches and monasteries operate freely in government-controlled
Croatia. International human rights monitors said that the few Orthodox
priests and nuns who remained in Croatia after the 1991 war reported
generally good relations with their Catholic neighbors. After the
military offensives in Western Slavonia and the Krajina region, military
and police forces guarded most of the Orthodox churches to prevent them
from being looted or destroyed. Nonetheless, some were reported to be
looted or damaged.
Most Catholic churches in the Serb-occupied areas have been destroyed.
In Eastern Slavonia, only one active Croatian Catholic priest remains.
A Slovak Catholic priest travels regularly from Serbia to hold masses.
The Government discriminates against Muslims in the issuance of
citizenship papers. The Interior Ministry uses Article 26 of the Law on
Citizenship to deny citizenship papers to persons otherwise qualified to
be citizens of Croatia (see Section 5).
Most requests for conscientious objector exemption from military service
were granted. There is no provision for conscientious objector status
in the Serb-occupied areas.
d. Freedom of Movement Within the Country, Foreign Travel,
Emigration, and Repatriation
The Constitution generally provides for these rights, with certain
restrictions. All persons legally in the country must register their
residence with the local authorities. Under exceptional circumstances,
the Government may legally restrict the right to enter or leave the
country if necessary to protect the "legal order, health, rights, or
freedoms of others."
The Government refused to allow the almost 200,000 refugees who fled the
fighting to return to their homes in the former sectors north, south,
and west. Between 10,000 and 15,000 Serbs filed applications to return
based on humanitarian considerations, but only 400 were approved by mid-
November. Approval was granted only if the individual had immediate
family in Croatia who would sponsor his return and could prove legal
residence in Croatia before independence. Approved returnees did not
return to their homes in the former occupied areas, but were housed by
their family sponsor.
There are restrictions on freedom of movement for all journalists and
all male citizens age 18 through 55 in the cities and in areas close to
the confrontation lines. Journalists, as well as almost all others,
must request permission to enter the conflict zones.
The Government imposed no significant legal restrictions on the movement
of refugees, displaced persons, or national minorities resident in
Croatia. Many refugees were housed in remote locations with little or
no means of public transport. There were several confirmed cases of
forced return of refugees to Bosnia-Herzegovina, especially from among
the rebel Muslim refugees from the Bihac canton of Bosnia-Herzegovina.
The Government tried to enforce strictly a policy of admitting no new
refugee unless transit to a third country was assured. However, in
mid-summer large numbers of Croat and Muslim refugees, forced from Serb-
held northern Bosnia by ethnic cleansing campaigns, entered Croatia via
a crossing over the Sava river at Davor. Ethnic Croats were registered
as refugees, as well as a few Muslims, but most Muslim refugees were
immediately repatriated to government-controlled areas of western
Bosnia.
The Government also continued to relocate refugees from coastal tourist
facilities to inland areas and to recovered territories. Often this
policy met resistance from refugee groups who did not want to move to
buildings with few modern living facilities or to be uprooted and
separated from the people with whom they had spent the last 4 years.
The forces of Bosnian Muslim rebel leader Fikret Abdic were defeated by
the Bosnian army in September, and over 20,000 people left the
municipality of Velika Kladusa in northern Bosnia and entered Croatia.
The Government refused to provide hardened shelter and the refugees set
up a make-shift camp in the village of Kupljensko. Although UNHCR and
the international community determined them to be legitimate refugees
from Bosnia, the Government refused to grant them this status and sought
ways to repatriate them. Severe weather conditions and the lack of
proper shelter combined to force many of the refugees to return to
Bosnia on their own at the end of the year.
The authorities in Serb-controlled areas continued to enforce a coercive
regime, including curfews and strict travel limitations near the front
lines. Threats against the non-Serbs in protected villages effectively
confined them to their homes. Serbs who crossed over from government-
controlled Croatia were eagerly welcomed for propaganda purposes.
Section 3 Respect for Political Rights: The Right of Citizens to Change
their Government
Croatia is a multiparty democracy in which all citizens 18 years of age
and older have the right to vote by secret ballot. The President,
elected for 5 years, exercises substantial power, authority, and
influence but is constitutionally limited to two terms. Parliament is
comprised of the House of Representatives and the House of Zupanije or
Counties, and the Croatian democratic union (HDZ) holds a majority in
both houses. Its leader, President Franjo Tudjman, was reelected in
1992.
In elections for the House of Representatives, held in October, the HDZ
again won a majority of the seats, and 11 other parties also won seats.
International observers faulted the election campaign on a number of
points: the electoral law was hastily presented to Parliament and passed
after only a few hours of debate; a special franchise for Croats living
permanently outside the country was created to include almost 10 percent
of the seats in Parliament; ethnic Serb representation--based on
percentage of population--was dropped from 13 seats to 3 without a
census; changes in constituency boundaries appeared to be arbitrary and
non-transparent; the state-run media restricted criticism of government
policies and activities; and the election administration was flawed
(voter lists were often inaccurate and outdated). The franchise for the
diaspora included ethnic Croats born and resident in Bosnia-Herzegovina,
but excluded ethnic Serbs born in Croatia, who were living as refugees
in Serb-controlled areas. Rules for access to the state-owned media
restricted the ability of opposition parties to criticize government
policies and activities.
During the election, established polling procedures were generally
observed. Poll workers and officials demonstrated a genuine commitment
to conducting their work freely and fairly and usually welcomed the
presence of foreign observers. There were, however, inconsistencies
among polling places, most of which probably resulted from a lack of
training for election officials. Problems during voting appear to have
curtailed the rights of some minority voters. For example, there were
reports that some Serbs were not allowed to vote for the state-wide
party list if they exercised their right to vote on the special list for
ethnic Serb candidates as allowed under the law. Cases of passive
intimidation of Serb voters were also reported by election observers.
Representatives of most minority groups (including Serbs) complained
that voters had been left off the rolls or had been misclassified as
Croats, an error which applied to an estimated 10 percent of minority
voters in some areas, according to a number of election observers.
In September the Government temporarily rescinded Articles 21 and 22
(and all other relevant articles) of the 1992 Constitutional Law on
Human Rights and Freedoms. These laws had established self-governing
special status districts in areas where minorities made up more than 50
percent of the population, namely, municipalities in the Knin and Glina
regions. The provisions remain suspended indefinitely, and at a minimum
until the results of an April 1996 census are known. This repeal of the
special districts law, officially justified by the change in the
demographics of the territory, as well as the law confiscating abandoned
property, and the refusal to allow the mass return of Serb refugees,
contributed to charges that the Government sought to legalize and
institutionalize the population changes after the offensives to create a
homogeneous country with no significant minorities.
Although there are no legal restrictions on participation by women or
minorities in the political process, they are represented in only small
numbers in Parliament, the executive branch, and courts. Fifteen women
hold seats in the 206-member Parliament; one is the President of the
House of Counties. Election law requires representation for minorities
in Parliament, with proportional representation for any minority that
makes up more than 8 percent of the population. Parliament's October
reduction in the number of Serbian representatives was based on
estimates of the number of Serbs who fled Croatia and the assumption
that they would not return, disregarding the fact that they remained
Croatian citizens. Two of the three remaining seats were won by the
Serbian People's Party and one seat went to the Social Democratic Action
Party.
The "RSK" held elections in December 1993 which no international body
recognized as either legitimate or fair. The "presidential" candidate
sponsored by Belgrade, Milan Martic, "won" only after official
manipulation of the vote. After the fall of the "RSK," the long-serving
leaders of Eastern Slavonia appointed themselves as the "regional
governing council" and "politically" reorganized themselves as a
"district," no longer a "republic." No minorities were represented in
either the "parliament" or the "government" of the "RSK," nor are any on
the council.
Section 4 Governmental Attitude Regarding International and
Nongovernmental Investigation of Alleged Violations of Human Rights
Human rights groups in Zagreb, Split, Rijeka, and Osijek worked to
prevent human rights abuses in their respective localities and brought
their concerns to the attention of local and national authorities as
well as domestic and international media. Most of these groups focused
on legal advocacy programs and social services support for the remaining
populations in the recovered territories. A coalition of groups was
created in May to support and monitor the human rights situation in
Western Slavonia. Elements of this coalition were later extended to
Knin. Human rights groups remained highly critical of the Government's
human rights record.
Major local human rights groups include the Croatian Helsinki
Commission, the Antiwar Campaign, the Dalmatian Solidarity Committee,
the Dalmatian Committee for Human Rights, and the Center for Peace and
Human Rights. The Serbian Peoples' Party and the Social Democratic
Union have human rights committees. The Serbian Democratic Forum,
another local human rights group, focused primarily on the concerns of
the Serbian community. All of these groups have publicly criticized the
Government's human rights policy. International human rights
organizations are also active in Croatia.
The Government cooperated with international investigations of war
crimes carried out by the U.N. Commission of Experts, permitting free
access to refugees for gathering eyewitness testimony, even in cases in
which Croats were the likely perpetrators of the witnessed atrocities.
The Government pledged its cooperation with the International Tribunal
for the Prosecution of War Crimes in the Former Yugoslavia in the Hague.
However, in November President Tudjman named the commander of Bosnian
Croat forces, Major General Tihomir Blaskic, to a new post in the
Inspector General Directorate of the HV, a day after Blaskic had been
indicted by the tribunal. This appointment raised questions about the
Government's pledge.
Serbian forces did not permit the formation or functioning of local
human rights groups and impeded the work of international human rights
groups. An organization called the Danube Peace Bridge, based in
southern Hungary, was active in Eastern Slavonia, supported by activists
from both Croatia and Serbia. However, local "officials" prevented
Croatian human rights monitors from government-controlled Croatia from
entering the region. Only U.N. personnel and the European Union
Monitoring Mission have limited freedom to observe human rights
practices in these areas.
Section 5 Discrimination Based on Race, Sex, Religion, Disability,
Language, or Social Status
The Constitution specifies that all citizens shall enjoy all rights and
freedoms, regardless of race, color, sex, language, religion, political
or other opinion, national or social origin, property, birth, education,
social status, or other attributes. It adds that members of all nations
and minorities shall have equal rights in Croatia. With the exceptions
noted below, these rights are observed in practice. One article
provides for special "wartime measures" but states that restrictions
shall be appropriate to the nature of the danger and may not result in
the inequality of citizenship with respect to race, color, sex,
language, religion, or national or social origin. Under these measures,
these rights have been observed in practice.
Women
Although the Government does not collect statistics, informed observers
state that violence against women, including spousal abuse, is common
and that the number of incidents has increased in the last few years.
Alcohol abuse is commonly cited as a contributing factor. Centers for
the psychological and medical care of abused women are open in several
cities, and there is a 24-hour hot line in a Zagreb medical center. A
number of local institutions and voluntary agencies offer social,
medical, and other assistance to abused women and to those traumatized
by war experiences. Family crisis associations are also active.
The law does not discriminate by gender. In practice, however, women
generally hold lower paying positions in the work force. Although no
statistics are available, the majority of high school and elementary
teachers, nurses, and clerical workers are believed to be female.
Although the number of female-led organizations has increased since the
war, most are devoted to antiwar or humanitarian causes and are poorly
organized and poorly funded. There is no national organization of women
devoted to the protection of women's rights.
Children
The Government strongly committed to the welfare of children. Education
is compulsory up to age 14. Schools provide free meals for children,
day nurseries are available in most communities even for infants, and
medical care for children is free.
There is no documented pattern of societal abuse or discrimination
against children.
People with Disabilities
There is no specific legislation mandating access to buildings or
government services for people with disabilities; access to such
facilities is often difficult. The Government began a new program to
provide several disabled war veterans with publicly financed homes
designed especially to accommodate their particular disability. People
with disabilities face no discriminatory measures, and education and job
opportunities generally are available.
Religious Minorities
The Muslim community in Croatia suffered from discrimination, and
Croatian Muslims and Bosnian refugees continue to report widespread
discrimination in many areas such as citizenship (see Section 2.c.) and
employment rights. The U.N. Special Rapporteur on Human Rights noted
that Muslims (along with Serbs) "are always the first to be dismissed"
from jobs (see Section 5).
National/Racial/Ethnic Minorities
Constitutionally, Croatian Serbs and other minority groups enjoy the
same protection as other self-identified ethnic and religious groups in
the country. In practice, however, there continues to be ever-present,
subtle, and sometimes open discrimination against Orthodox Serbs in such
areas as the administration of justice, employment, housing, and the
free exercise of cultural rights. Serbs continue to be particularly
vulnerable to attack because of the Government's reluctance rigorously
to protect their rights. Attacks against property owned by Serbs, or
even Croats with Serb-sounding names, continued, although at a lesser
rate than in previous years. Serbs in Croatia also continued to receive
anonymous threats by mail, telephone, and facsimile, but in fewer
numbers than in previous years. Many Serbs left government-controlled
Croatia during the year as a result of the combination of economic
discrimination and physical threats and the lack of interest shown by
the Government in devising measures to restore confidence among Serbs
remaining in the formerly occupied areas.
The makeup of the police force, which consists almost exclusively of
ethnic Croats--some with little experience or training in police work--
contributed to the problem. As in previous years, the vast majority of
cases of societal violence against Serbs went unpunished. The
Government's practice of discriminating against ethnic and religious
minorities, particularly Serbs and Muslims, in the issuance of
citizenship papers, drew harsh criticism. Human rights groups report
numerous documented cases in which the Interior Ministry denied
citizenship papers to long-term residents of Croatia (that is, resident
in Croatia long before the country declared its independence). Human
rights groups complain that the Interior Ministry almost always based
its denials on Article 26 of the Law on Citizenship, which permits it to
deny citizenship papers to persons otherwise qualified to be citizens of
Croatia for reasons of national interest. The law does not require the
reasons to be explained, and human rights organizations reported that
the police continued to refuse citizenship applications without full
explanation.
The law on citizenship distinguishes between those with a claim to
Croatian ethnicity and those without. The "Croatian people" are
eligible to become citizens of Croatia even if they did not have
previous citizenship of the former Socialist Republic of Croatia, as
long as they submit a written statement that they consider themselves
Croatian citizens. Others must satisfy more stringent requirements
through naturalization in order to obtain citizenship, even if they were
previously lawful residents of Croatia as citizens of the former
Yugoslavia. While an application for citizenship is pending, the
applicant is considered an alien and is denied rights such as social
allowances, including medical care, pensions, free education, and
employment in the civil service.
Serbs and other ethnic minorities also suffered from economic
discrimination. The U.N. Special Rapporteur on Human Rights previously
noted in his report that "it appears that Serbs and Muslims are always
the first to be dismissed." While the difficult economic situation
continued to cause high unemployment for all sectors of society, the
Special Rapporteur's concern was amplified by a large number of credible
reports that Serbs bore a disproportionate burden in layoffs by a broad
variety of employers. Throughout the year, human rights organizations
continued to receive inquiries from Serbs who had been fired from their
jobs as far back as 1992. While in many cases it was impossible to
determine the proximate cause for the firing of an employee, there were
cases where the employee's ethnicity was the stated reason. In one
case, the only doctor to remain in the Knin hospital following
"Operation Storm" was dismissed. In some cases, despite court orders
which confirmed the employee's right to employment or reinstatement to a
previous position, the employer still refused to rehire workers who had
been out of work since 1992.
Roma continued to face societal discrimination and official inaction
when complaints were filed. The 1991 census shows a total of under
7,000 Roma in the country but community leaders number the group in the
tens of thousands.
Other minority groups--Slovaks, Czechs, Italians, Hungarians--did not
report significant discrimination to the same extent as the Serb
community. At the start of the autumn school year, ethnic Hungarian
parents complained that only children whose parents were both registered
to be of Hungarian ethnicity could register in Hungarian schools,
preventing many children of mixed background from attending. The
Italian minority in Istria and other ethnic communities alleged
disproportionate numbers of mobilizations prior to both military
offensives, as a test of their loyalty to Croatia.
In general, non-Serb minorities in the Serb-occupied areas were treated
in abysmal fashion. Most had already been "ethnically cleansed", but
those Croats, Hungarians and other remaining non-Serbs were subject to
summary detention, harassment, and physical intimidation.
Section 6 Worker Rights
a. The Right of Association
All workers, except military and police personnel, are entitled to form
or join unions of their own choosing without prior authorization. There
is an active labor movement with three national labor federations and
independent associations of both blue-collar and white-collar members.
In general, unions are independent of the Government and political
parties.
The right to strike is provided for in the Constitution and is limited
only for the armed forces, police, government administration, and public
services. Strikes have been infrequent since the end of 1994, with two
notable exceptions in the transportation sector. Railway workers went
on strike in December 1994 to protest poor safety conditions and late
payment of wages. Airline pilots went on strike for a few days in the
fall due to a wage dispute. Although there was relatively little labor
unrest, workers continue to complain about the inability of government-
owned or government-run institutions or industries to pay wages on time.
For example, teachers who struck at the beginning of the 1994-95
academic year continued to protest government wage policy and on more
than one occasion threatened to resume strike activity. Despite strikes
and protests, the Government hewed closely to the austerity program it
implemented in October 1993 as part of its economic stabilization
program. The railway strike, however, succeeded in gaining greater
union representation within management.
Unions may freely affiliate internationally.
b. The Right to Organize and Bargain Collectively
Collective bargaining is protected by law and practiced freely. In the
spring, Parliament passed a new Labor Code, with union support, which
revised the statutes governing collective bargaining contracts,
protection for striking workers, and legal limitations on the ability of
employers to conduct "lockouts during labor disputes. Many enterprises
which were "socially owned" have been "transformed" or nationalized as a
first step towards privatization. In the current transition to
privatization and a free market economy, unions are under pressure due
to job losses, general unemployment in a weakened economy, and their own
struggle to become genuine free trade unions.
The new Labor Code deals directly with antiunion discrimination issues.
It allows unions to challenge firings in court, and eliminates
provisions under which illness had been a valid reason for employers to
fire workers. It also erases provisions which, under the old code,
required union shop stewards to remain on the job while serving full
time on workers' councils, and grants them the right of reinstatement
when service is completed. Nevertheless, the trade union federations
have alleged that the Government employs strong-arm tactics against
employees involved in labor disputes and strikes to force them back to
work. Some threats are alleged to include mobilization, or "work
obligations," whereby outside workers are drafted to fill positions.
There are no export processing zones.
c. Prohibition of Forced or Compulsory Labor
Forced or compulsory work is constitutionally forbidden, and there
were no documented instances of it. The Ministry of Labor and Social
Welfare is the agency charged with enforcing the ban on coerced or
forced labor.
d. Minimum Age for Employment of Children
The minimum age for youth employment is 15, and it is enforced by the
Ministry of Labor and Social Welfare. Under the Constitution, children
may not be employed before reaching the legally determined age, nor may
they be forced or allowed to do work that is harmful to their health or
morality. Workers under age 18 are entitled to special protection at
work and are prohibited from heavy manual labor. Education is mandatory
up to age 14.
e. Acceptable Conditions of Work
There are national minimum wage standards. Public service unions are
pacesetters for the rest of the work force, and they were in the
forefront of continued efforts to encourage the Government to honor its
commitments. As of October, the minimum gross monthly wage was roughly
$200 (1024 kuna). National regulations provide for a 42-hour workweek,
overtime pay, a half-hour daily break, and a minimum of 18 days of paid
vacation annually. It is standard practice to provide a 24-hour rest
period during the workweek.
Health and safety standards are set by the Government and are enforced
by the Ministry of Health. In practice, industries are not diligent in
meeting standards for worker protection.
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