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Title: Burma Human Rights Practices, 1995
Author: U.S. Department of State
Date: March 1996
BURMA
Burma continued to be ruled by a highly authoritarian military regime
widely condemned for its serious human rights abuses. The military
Government, the State Law and Order Restoration Council (SLORC), headed
by the armed forces commander and composed of top military officers,
seized power in September 1988 after harshly suppressing massive
prodemocracy demonstrations. Retired dictator General Ne Win, whose
idiosyncratic policies had isolated Burma and driven the country into
deep economic decline, is believed by many to continue to wield
considerable influence.
The SLORC permitted a relatively free election in 1990, but it failed to
honor the results--which were an overwhelming rejection of military
rule--or to cede power to the victorious prodemocracy forces. Instead,
the SLORC attacked the coalition of winning parties and their leaders
through intimidation, detention, and house arrest. In April 1992, the
SLORC began taking some steps to lessen its harsh rule. The regime
reopened universities, released some political prisoners, and introduced
modest economic reforms. But in January 1993 the SLORC established the
"National Convention," a body ostensibly tasked with working out a new
constitution and primarily made up of delegates handpicked by the
military. The SLORC has carefully stage-managed the Convention's
proceedings and ignored even limited opposition views. Despite having
no mandate from the people, the SLORC seems determined to draft a
constitution that will guarantee a dominant role for the military in the
country's future political structure.
The Government reinforces its rule via a pervasive security apparatus
led by the Directorate of Defense Services Intelligence (DDSI). Control
is buttressed by selective restrictions on contact with foreigners,
surveillance of government employees and private citizens, harassment of
political activists, intimidation, arrest, detention, and physical
abuse. The Government justifies its security measures as necessary to
maintain order and national unity, although almost all major insurgent
groups have reached accommodations with the SLORC in recent years, and
the others pose little threat to major population centers. Members of
the security forces committed numerous serious human rights abuses.
Burma is a poor country, with an average per capita gross domestic
product of about $200 to $300 a year. Primarily an agricultural
country, Burma also has substantial mineral, fishing, and timber
resources. Since 1988 the Government has slowly opened up the economy
to permit expansion of the private sector and to attract foreign
investment. Some economic improvement has ensued, but major obstacles
to economic reform persist. These include restrictions on private
commerce, constantly changing rules and regulations; overcentralized
decisionmaking, a bloated bureaucracy, a greatly overvalued currency,
poor infrastructure, and grossly disproportionate military spending.
The Government's severe repression of human rights continued essentially
unchanged during 1995, despite a few potentially significant moves on
the political front and the appearance of greater normalcy fostered by
increased economic activity. Out of sight of most visitors, citizens
continued to live subject at any time and without appeal to the
arbitrary and sometimes brutal dictates of the military. There
continued to be credible reports, particularly from ethnic minority
dominated areas, that soldiers committed serious human rights abuses,
including extrajudicial killings and rape. Disappearances continued,
and members of the security forces beat and otherwise abused detainees.
Prison conditions remained harsh, and the judiciary is not independent
of the executive.
The use of porters by the army--with attendant mistreatment, illness,
and even death for those compelled to serve--remained a standard
practice. The military continued to force ordinary Burmese on a massive
scale (including women and children) to "contribute" their labor, often
under harsh working conditions, on construction projects throughout the
country. A midyear directive ordering a halt to certain kinds of forced
labor appeared to have only a limited impact. Although the Government
continued to release some prisoners, it continued arbitrarily to arrest
and detain citizens for the slightest expression of dissenting political
views. Several hundred, if not more, political prisoners remained in
detention, including approximately 20 Members of Parliament elected in
1990. The International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) closed its
office in July as a result of the SLORC's refusal to accept the ICRC's
standard modalities for conducting prison visits.
The SLORC continued to restrict severely basic rights to free speech,
press, assembly, association, and privacy. Worker rights are also
severely limited. Political party activity remained severely
restricted, and citizens do not have the right to change their
government. By year's end, the Government had still not taken up Aung
San Suu Kyi's call for a genuine dialog on political reform. The
Government's rejection of the appeal of the opposition National League
for Democracy (NLD) for a reform of the National Convention's working
procedures led most of the Convention's elected representatives to
withdraw in November. Although more than 196,000 Rohingyas (Burmese
Muslims from Arakan State) who fled to Bangladesh in 1992 had returned
to Burma by year's end, about 50,000 remained in camps across the
border. A few thousand students and dissidents continued in exile in
Thailand. Roughly 90,000 Burmese were residing in ethnic minority camps
in Thailand, among them many thousands of new arrivals driven out by
Burmese army attacks on the Karen and Karenni ethnic minority controlled
areas. Discrimination against ethnic minorities and violence against
women remained problems.
Several positive developments occurred, most notably the release of
Burma's foremost prodemocracy leader, Aung San Suu Kyi, her 2 top
lieutenants, and 103 other political prisoners. Resident
representatives of the office of the United Nations High Commissioner
for Refugees (UNHCR) were permitted to continue their work monitoring
the return of the Rohingyas, and a limited number of international
nongovernmental organizations (NGO's) were allowed to set up operations
or expand existing ones.
Despite these positive moves, by year's end the SLORC had yet to make a
fundamental break with its past behavior and demonstrate a willingness
to cede its hold on absolute power. Most importantly, the generals have
failed thus far to begin negotiating with the country's prodemocracy
forces and ethnic groups on a genuine political settlement to allow a
return to the rule of law and respect for basic human rights.
RESPECT FOR HUMAN RIGHTS
Section 1 Respect for the Integrity of the Person, Including Freedom
from:
a. Political and Other Extrajudicial Killing
There was no evidence of an explicit or systematic government policy
encouraging summary killings. However, there continued to be credible
reports of instances of brutality and killings of civilians by the
military, particularly in minority dominated areas and among those
impressed as porters. The Government's general disregard for human
rights has created a climate clearly conducive to such abuses.
b. Disappearance
As in previous years, private citizens and political activists continued
to "disappear" temporarily for several hours to several weeks. DDSI
officials usually picked up people for questioning without the knowledge
of their family members and in many cases, though not all, released them
soon afterward. At the same time, large numbers of people continued to
be taken away by the military for porterage or other duties, often
without the knowledge of their family members. The whereabouts of those
conscripted, as well as of prisoners transferred for labor or porterage
duties, remained difficult to trace (see Sections 1.g. and 6.c.).
c. Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading Treatment or
Punishment
Again in 1995, political detainees were held incommunicado for long
periods. Detainees were routinely subjected to harsh interrogation
techniques designed to intimidate and disorient. The most common forms
of mistreatment were sleep and food deprivation coupled with round-the-
clock questioning, but some were also kicked and beaten. In recent
years, there have been credible reports of prisoners being forced to
squat or assume unnatural positions for lengthy periods. In the past,
there have also been reports of practices such as electrical shocks to
the genitals, suffocation, and cigarette burns, but there were no known
instances of these techniques being employed in 1995.
There continued to be credible reports that security forces subjected
ordinary citizens to harassment and physical abuse. In rural villages
the military routinely entered villages to confiscate property and food
and used abusive recruitment methods to procure porters. Those forced
into porterage or other duties faced extremely difficult conditions and
mistreatment that sometimes resulted in death. There was a steady
pattern of reports that soldiers raped ethnic minority women (see
Section 1.g.).
The regimen at Insein prison near Rangoon remained extremely harsh,
including widespread use of solitary confinement, little or no exercise,
no mosquito nets or reading or writing materials for virtually all
prisoners, poor nutrition, and inadequate medical care. A handful of
prominent political prisoners were housed in separate bungalow
accommodations on the prison compound. Most prisoners were permitted to
receive medicine as well as supplemental food brought by their families
during the 15-minute visits permitted every 2 weeks. Conditions for
political prisoners were reliably reported to be much worse at some
upcountry locations, particularly Thayet and Thayawaddy prisons.
Unlike in the past, in May the SLORC refused to allow visiting U.S.
Congressman Bill Richardson to meet with political prisoners.
Similarly, the SLORC refused a request by U.N. Special Rapporteur Yozo
Yokota to visit several political prisoners during his October trip.
Credible reports indicate a group of political prisoners at Insein
prison was mistreated after smuggling information to Professor Yokota on
conditions in that facility. The Government continued to bar the ICRC
from visiting detainees or convicted prisoners of any kind. After the
Government officially notified the ICRC that it was not prepared to
accept the ICRC's standard procedures for conducting prison visits, the
ICRC closed its Rangoon office in July, though not before indicating its
willingness to renew discussions again should the SLORC change its mind.
d. Arbitrary Arrest, Detention, or Exile
The SLORC routinely practiced arbitrary arrest and incommunicado
detention. Prior to being charged, detainees do not have access to
legal counsel or their families. There is no provision in the law for
judicial determination of the legality of detention, and political
detainees cannot obtain release on bail.
Because of the high level of intimidation discouraging overt political
activity, detentions for public antigovernment activities remained at a
relatively low level. Nonetheless, the authorities continued to detain
scores of political activists for low-level political activity, such as
handing out opposition flyers or shouting political slogans in public.
For example, in February at least 20 young people were arrested in
connection with a short demonstration at the funeral of former Prime
Minister U Nu; 9 were later sentenced to 7 years in prison. Other small
groups of young people were detained in July for distributing flyers,
and at year's end only a few were known to have been released.
In June the authorities detained former National League for Democracy
(NLD) acting chairman Kyi Maung, who had been released from prison only
3 months earlier. Kyi Maung and two of his four companions picked up at
the same time were subsequently released. The other two were held and
later tried in a summary procedure without benefit of legal counsel and
sentenced to 7 years in prison. This included the former chairman of
the Democracy Party, Thu Wai. At the same time, another former
Democracy Party activist, Htway Myint, was also arrested, tried, and
given a 7-year sentence. All three were convicted for allegedly
violating the country's security laws when in fact they appear to have
merely engaged in political discussions.
In November three supporters of Aung San Suu Kyi were arrested and
within days sentenced to 2 years in prison for objecting to the
placement of traffic-control barriers by police in front of the NLD
leader's residence.
Forced exile is not used as a method of political control.
e. Denial of Fair Public Trial
The judiciary is not independent of the executive. The SLORC names
justices to the Supreme Court, who, in turn, appoint lower court judges
(with the approval of the SLORC).
The court system, as inherited from the British and subsequently
restructured, is comprised of courts at the township, district, state,
and national levels.
Throughout 1995 the Government continued to rule by decree and was not
bound by any constitutional provisions providing for fair public trials
or any other rights. Although remnants of the British-era legal system
were formally in place, the court system and its operation remained
seriously flawed. Many observers believe there has been an improvement
over the last few years in judicial procedures, at least in the handling
of nonpolitical cases. But ongoing unprofessional behavior by some
court officials, pervasive bribe-taking, the misuse of overly broad
laws, and the manipulation of the courts for political ends continued to
deprive citizens of the right to a fair trial and the rule of law.
Some basic due process rights, including the right to a public trial and
the right to be represented by a defense attorney, were generally
respected except in sensitive political cases. Defense attorneys are
permitted to call and cross-examine witnesses, but their primary purpose
is to bargain with the judge to obtain the shortest possible sentence
for their clients. Most court proceedings are open to the public.
However, in political cases, almost all trials are held in courtrooms on
prison compounds and are not open to the public. In these instances,
defense counsel appears to serve no purpose other than to provide moral
support, since reliable reports indicate verdicts are dictated by higher
authorities.
During the first 3 months of the year, 105 persons believed to be
political prisoners were released, including former NLD Member of
Parliament-elect and one-time National Convention delegate Dr. Aung Khin
Sint. This group also included former NLD chairman Tin Oo and former
acting NLD chairman Kyi Maung. On July 10, Aung San Suu Kyi was freed
unconditionally after serving 6 years under house arrest. During the
remainder of the year, 49 other persons believed to have been political
prisoners were released. By year's end, at least several hundred--if
not many more--political prisoners remained incarcerated.
f. Arbitrary Interference with Privacy, Family, Home, and
Correspondence
The military ruled unchecked by any outside authority, and the State
continued to interfere extensively and arbitrarily in the lives of
private citizens. Through its extensive intelligence network, the
Government closely monitored the travel, whereabouts, and activities of
many citizens, particularly those known to be politically active.
Security personnel selectively screened private correspondence and
telephone calls and conducted warrantless searches of private premises.
On occasion the Government attempted to jam foreign radio broadcasts
(see Section 2.a.). Government employees were required to obtain
advance permission before meeting with foreigners.
The SLORC continued to move people out of cities to peripheral new town
settlements, though not on the same scale as in the early 1990's. While
facilities in some of these areas have improved over time, residents
targeted for displacement continued to be given no option but to move,
usually on short notice. The military also continued to relocate
forcibly some rural villages, especially in ethnic minority areas.
Those able to remain in established cities and towns were subject to
arbitrary seizure of their property. In a number of urban areas,
residents were compelled to cede land for road-widening projects decided
upon without any public consultation or endorsement. Other long-term
city residents were required to cede land for commercial redevelopment
and were compensated at only a fraction of the value of their lost
homes. Automobiles and other movable property remained vulnerable to
arbitrary seizure. In rural areas, military personnel at times
confiscated livestock and food supplies.
g. Use of Excessive Force and Violations of Humanitarian Law in
Internal Conflicts
For more than four decades the Burmese Army has battled diverse ethnic
insurgencies. These ethnic minority insurgent groups have sought to
gain greater autonomy from the dominant ethnic Burman majority. In 1989
the SLORC began a policy of seeking cease-fire agreements with most
ethnic insurgent groups. In late 1994, however, the army moved
militarily against the largest remaining ethnic insurgent group, the
Karen National Union (KNU). In late 1994, the KNU broke into two
factions, in part because of government efforts to stir up religious
tension between the Karen Christian and Buddhist communities. The
Buddhist faction, known as the Democratic Karen Buddhist Organization
(DKBO) subsequently allied itself with the Government.
In January the Burmese army offensive led to the fall of Manerplaw, the
longtime headquarters of the KNU and of semiexiled prodemocracy forces.
Less than a month later, the KNU's last major defensive encampment along
the Thai border also fell to army troops. These two incidents unleashed
a flood of as many as 10,000 refugees into Thailand. Throughout the
rest of the year, the DKBO staged cross-border raids resulting in injury
and death, destruction of refugee camps, and the forced repatriation of
some refugees. In June several thousand more fled to Thailand after
troops attempted to move into Karenni-held areas of Kayah State, which
led to the breakdown of the SLORC's cease-fire agreement with the
Karenni National Progressive Party (KNPP).
In connection with the military's campaign against the Karen, Karenni,
and drug trafficker Khun Sa and his Shan United Army, as many as several
thousand civilians were believed to have been coerced into working as
porters in jungle areas in or near combat zones. According to reliable
reports, military sweeps for porters or demands for porter "taxes"
(i.e., cash payment instead of porter duties) reached as far as Rangoon
and other urban areas in central Burma. It was also credibly reported
that some members of the military used sham threats of impressment to
extort money.
Antigoverment insurgent groups were also responsible for violence; mines
laid by insurgents caused both civilian and military deaths. At least
one former insurgent group that concluded a cease-fire agreement with
the SLORC is known to have used forced labor. In addition, the
narcotics-trafficking Shan United Army brutalized and murdered
villagers, conducted forced recruitment of boys, and impressed porters
while fighting against the army and ensuring continued cultivation of
opium by peasant farmers.
Section 2 Respect for Civil Liberties, Including:
a. Freedom of Speech and Press
Severe restrictions on freedom of speech and the press persisted
throughout 1995. The security services continued to clamp down on those
attempting to express opposition political views, such as by handing out
flyers or chanting slogans (see Section 1.d.). Many more refrained from
speaking out for fear of arrest and interrogation. Major exceptions
were Aung San Suu Kyi, and NLD Vice Chairmen Tin Do and Kyi Maung, who
following Aung San Suu Kyi's release in July regularly gave short
speeches in front of her residence to those willing to run the risk of
being seen by military intelligence.
All forms of domestic public media were officially controlled or
censored. This strict control in turn encouraged self-censorship on the
part of writers and publishers. Private citizens were generally unable
to subscribe directly to foreign publications. A limited supply of
secondhand copies of international newsmagazines and a sizable number of
private publications on nonpolitical issues were available to the public
at large, but censors occasionally banned issues or deleted articles
deemed unwelcome by the Government.
The government-monopoly television, radio, and newspaper media remained
propaganda instruments. With the exception of coverage of some limited
aspects of the National Convention, these official media did not report
opposing views but rather attacked those in the democratic opposition
who dared to take issue with government policies. Editors remained
answerable to military authorities. While the English-language daily
New Light of Myanmar continued to include many international wire
service reports on foreign news, domestic news hewed strictly to and
reinforced government policy.
Many foreign journalists, including television crews, were able to visit
and report on developments in the country, although their movements were
sometimes restricted and monitored. However, other journalists were
denied visas or issuance was so delayed as to render a planned visit
impossible.
Foreign radio broadcasts, such as those of the British Broadcasting
Corporation (BBC), Voice of America (VOA), and Norway-based Democratic
Voice of Burma, remained prime sources of uncensored information. The
authorities at times attempted to jam or otherwise interfere with the
reception of these broadcasts. However, the head of the BBC's Burmese
service was officially received in May, and two reporters for VOA's
Burmese service were each allowed to remain in the country for several
months. The Government also allowed some foreign government-sponsored
information programs.
The authorities took new steps to restrict the use of satellite
television. After imposing a September 1993 deadline for registering
satellite dishes, they failed to approve additional licenses or clarify
who in the future would be allowed to have access to foreign television.
In June the Government issued an official warning threatening up to 3
years' imprisonment for operation of an unlicensed satellite television
receiver.
University teachers and professors remained subject to the same
restrictions on freedom of speech, political activities, and
publications as other government employees. These included warnings
against criticism of the Government; instructions not to discuss
politics while at work; and strictures against joining or supporting
political parties, engaging in political activity, or meeting foreign
officials. Teachers continued to be held responsible for propagating
SLORC political goals among their students and for maintaining
discipline and preventing students from engaging in any unauthorized
political activity.
b. Freedom of Peaceful Assembly and Association
The Government does not respect these rights. The government
prohibition on unauthorized outdoor assemblies of more than five people
remained in effect, although authorities enforced it unevenly. For
example, at times between 2,000 and 3,000 people were able to gather in
front of Aung San Suu Kyi's residence to listen to her weekly talks.
However, legal political parties remained formally required to request
permission from the authorities to hold internal meetings of their own
membership. During one weekly gathering at the home of Aung San Suu
Kyi, three people were arrested for confronting policemen about the
placement of barriers to control the crowd (see Section 1.d.).
Despite these restrictions, the NLD leadership held internal meetings,
traveled upcountry to meet with its supporters, and hosted large public
gatherings. Citizens engaged in these activities, including those
attending Aung San Suu Kyi's addresses, remained subject to arrest at
any time for their activities. Late in the year, the Government's own
mass mobilization organization, the Union Solidarity and Development
Association (USDA), orchestrated a series of rallies as a mass
demonstration of support for the SLORC's political objectives. With few
exceptions, attendance was coerced, with explicit threats of penalities
for those who contemplated staying away. Religious groups, by contrast,
sometimes encountered problems holding outdoor gatherings.
In addition to the USDA, the right of association existed only for
organizations, including trade associations and professional bodies,
permitted by law and duly registered with the Government. Only a
handful continued to exist, and even those were subject to direct
government intervention or took special care to act in line with
government policy. This included such benign groups as the Myanmar Red
Cross and the Myanmar Medical Association. Only 10 political parties
(compared to 75 in 1992) remained legal at year's end
c. Freedom of Religion
Adherents of all religions duly registered with the authorities
generally enjoyed freedom to worship as they chose, although Buddhists
continued to enjoy a privileged position. In recent years, the
Government has made special efforts to link itself with Buddhism as a
means of asserting its own popular legitimacy. For example, during the
year the military arranged the visit of a venerated Buddha tooth relic
from China and after the visit organized construction of two massive new
pagodas to commemorate the event. Consistent reports indicate some
overzealous local officials forced even non-Buddhists to contribute to
Buddhist construction projects. Credible reports continued to surface
of Buddhist missionaries dispatched by the central Government and local
military personnel actively working to expand Buddhism, sometimes
through compulsion, in minority areas.
The Government monitors the activities of members of all religions, in
part because they have in the past been politically active. Security
services demanded that religious groups seek prior authorization to
conduct services out of doors. These regulations were also in effect in
and around Buddhist monasteries and pagodas. Religious publications
remained subject to the same control and censorship imposed on secular
ones. Christian Bibles translated into indigenous languages could not
be imported. It remained extremely difficult for Christian and Muslim
groups to obtain permission to build new churches and mosques.
Religious groups were able to establish links with coreligionists in
other countries, although these activities were reportedly monitored by
the Government. Foreign religious representatives were usually only
allowed visas for short stays, but in some cases were permitted to
preach to Burmese congregations. In August Roman Catholic Cardinal
Josef Tomko was able to visit Rangoon and upcountry locations.
Permanent foreign missionary establishments have not been permitted
since the 1960's, but seven Catholic nuns and four priests working in
Burma since before independence continued to reside upcountry.
Credible reports continued of isolated incidents in which the Government
removed cemeteries in the course of infrastructure projects in urban
areas. These removals targeted adherents of many faiths, including
Buddhists, but were a particularly serious problem for Muslims and
Christians, who--unlike Buddhists--consider such "final resting places"
to be sacred ground.
d. Freedom of Movement Within the Country, Foreign Travel,
Emigration, and Repatriation
Although citizens have the legal right to live anywhere in the country,
both urban and rural residents were subject to arbitrary relocation (see
Section l.f.). Except for limitations in areas of insurgent activity,
citizens could travel freely within the country but had to notify local
authorities of their whereabouts. Those residents unable to meet the
restrictive provisions of the citizenship law, (e.g., Chinese, Arakanese
Muslims, etc.) had to obtain prior permission to travel (see Section 5).
Rural farmers were also not free to leave the land at will.
While the Government relaxed restrictions on passport issuance, it
carefully scrutinized all prospective travel abroad. Many applicants
were also forced to pay bribes to obtain passports to which they were
entitled. The official board that reviews passport applications denied
passports in some cases apparently on political grounds. All college
graduates obtaining a passport (except for certain government employees)
were required to pay a special education clearance fee to reimburse the
Government. Citizens who emigrated legally were generally allowed to
return to visit relatives, and even some who had lived abroad illegally
and acquired foreign citizenship were able to return to visit. In
January the authorities extended until the end of the year special
procedures allowing former citizens residing abroad to reacquire
citizenship.
In anticipation of the Government's planned "Visit Myanmar Year 1996,"
restrictions were further eased on foreign travelers. As of September
1, Burmese embassies began issuing tourist visas within 24 hours and
lowered visa fees. However, select categories of applicants, such as
human rights advocates, certain journalists, and political figures,
continued to be denied entry visas unless traveling under the aegis of a
sponsor acceptable to the Government. Although some areas of the
country remained off-limits to foreigners for security reasons, the
authorities officially opened up a substantial number of new domestic
destinations.
In 1995 over 60,000 of the Rohingya Muslims who fled to Bangladesh in
1992 returned to Burma, bringing the total number of returnees to over
196,000. As the year progressed, however, the pace of repatriation
slowed greatly, with over 50,000 still in camps across the border at
year's end. The UNHCR reported that authorities cooperated in
investigating the isolated incidents of renewed abuse which surfaced.
However, the Government continued to refuse some independent observers
access to repatriation areas. During the year, the Government appeared
to have halted the practice of forcibly removing Muslims from elsewhere
in Arakan State to the border townships.
The Government was reportedly reluctant to allow the UNHCR to play a
similar role along the Thai border in connection with the expected
repatriation of large numbers of Mon returnees.
The Government does not allow refugees or displaced persons from abroad
to resettle or seek safe haven.
Section 3 Respect for Political Rights: The Right of Citizens to
Change Their Government
Despite the overwhelming desire citizens demonstrated in the 1990
elections for a return to democracy, they continued to be denied the
right to change their government. Since 1988 active duty military
officers have occupied an increasing number of important positions
throughout the bureaucracy, particularly at the policymaking level.
Despite the appointment of several civilians to the Cabinet in 1992, the
process of placing military or recently retired military officers in
most key senior level positions once held by technocrats in the economic
ministries continued.
Following the NLD's victory in the 1990 elections, the SLORC set aside
the election results and disqualified, detained, arrested, or drove into
exile many successful candidates. Since then 201 of the 485 Deputies
elected have either been disqualified, resigned under pressure, gone
into exile, been detained, or died. Approximately 20 successful
candidates from the election remain in prison.
Rather than accept the will of the citizenry, the SLORC convened a
National Convention in January 1993 to draw up principles for a new
constitution. The SLORC handpicked delegates, and proceedings have been
carefully stage-managed; even limited opposition views have been
ignored. Despite having no mandate from the people, the SLORC tasked
the Convention with drafting principles for a new constitution ensuring
a dominant role for the military in the country's future political
structure. The SLORC leadership met with prodemocracy leader Aung San
Suu Kyi on two occasions in late 1994, but throughout the following year
they failed to heed her call for genuine dialog on the country's
political future and instead proceeded with their own controlled
"consultations" on a new constitution. In late November, the NLD
delegates withdrew from the Convention pending agreement by the
authorities to discuss revising the convention working procedures. Two
days later they were formally expelled. This left the Convention
exercise almost solely in the hands of government appointees and
definitively removed whatever semblance of claim it might once have had
to represent the Burmese people.
Minorities and women are underrepresented in the top ranks of government
service and largely excluded from military leadership. Members of
certain minority groups continued to be denied full citizenship (see
Section 5).
Section 4 Governmental Attitude Regarding International and
Nongovernmental Investigation of Alleged Violations of Human Rights
The Government does not allow domestic human rights organizations to
exist, and it remained generally hostile to outside scrutiny of its
human rights record. However, the authorities continued formally to
receive the U.N. Secretary General's Special Representative. In
February Assistant Secretary General for Political Affairs Alvaro de
Soto held talks with government officials, and during a visit in August
he was also able to meet with Aung San Suu Kyi. Still, the SLORC
remained unwilling to engage the U.N. in a substantive dialog about
Burma's political future.
After considering the January report of its Special Rapporteur for
Burma, Professor Yozo Yokota, the U.N. Human Rights Commission adopted a
resolution in March severely criticizing the authorities for their human
rights abuses. The Burmese representative at the Commission in turn
rejected the criticism as "inaccurate, instrusive and politically
motivated." In keeping with the Special Rapporteur's mandate, in
October the Government permitted Professor Yokota to undertake another
survey trip to Burma, after which he delivered a highly critical review
of Burma's human rights situation to the U.N. General Assembly's Third
Committee. In December the U.N. General Assembly adopted another
consensus resolution deploring continued violation of human rights in
Burma.
A limited number of nonpolitical international NGO's continued project
work in Burma, while a few more established a provisional presence while
undertaking the protracted negotiations necessary to set up permanent
operations in the country.
The ICRC closed its office after failing to gain access to Burmese
prisons.
Section 5 Discrimination Based on Race, Sex, Religion, Disability,
Language, or Social Status
The Government continued to rule by decree and was not bound by any
constitutional provisions concerning discrimination.
Women
In part because of the strong role of religion, violence against women,
including spousal abuse, is not considered socially acceptable and
occurs relatively infrequently.
The trafficking of women and girls to Thailand for the purposes of
prostitution remained a serious problem. In border areas, where the
Government's control is limited, there were numerous reports of women
being forced or lured into working as prostitutes in Thailand. While
the number of young women tricked or forced into prostitution is
unknown, a common practice is to lure young women to Thailand with
promises of employment as a waitress or domestic (see Thailand report).
Also, the military continued to impress women for military porterage
duties, and reports of soldiers raping ethnic minority women remained
widespread (see Sections 1.c. and 1.g.).
In general, women in Burma have traditionally enjoyed a high status,
exercising most of the same basic rights as men and taking an active
role in business. Consistent with traditional culture, they keep their
own names after marriage and often control family finances. However,
women remained underrepresented in most traditional male occupations,
and a few professions continued to be entirely barred to women. As
elsewhere, the burden of poverty, which is particularly widespread in
Burma's rural areas, fell disproportionately on women.
Women did not consistently receive equal pay for equal work. There were
no independent women's rights organizations, and no government ministry
specifically targeted the safeguarding of women's interests. A
government-controlled agency, the Myanmar Maternal and Child Welfare
Association (MMCWA), provided some assistance to mothers, and a new
professional society for businesswomen, the Myanmar Women Entrepreneurs'
Association, was formed in 1995.
Children
Despite the establishment of various child welfare programs, the
Government allocated few resources for programs relevant to children,
and once again cut the share of the national budget for education (to 13
percent), with a mere 0.5 percent allocated to social welfare services
(versus an official 33 percent for the military).
There is no pattern of societal abuse of children, although poverty and
alcoholism sometimes lead to instances of abuse. Many families allowed
their young daughters to travel to Thailand to work as prostitutes. The
rising incidence of HIV infection has increased demand for younger
prostitutes.
People with Disabilities
Official assistance to persons with disabilities is extremely limited.
There is no law mandating accessibility to government facilities. While
there are several small-scale organizations to assist the disabled, most
disabled persons must rely on traditional family structures to provide
for their welfare. Funding from the South Korean Red Cross allowed a
prosthesis program begun by the ICRC to continue. Because of land mines
and train accidents, Burma has one of the highest rates of amputee
injuries in the world.
National/Racial/Ethnic Minorities
Burma's myriad ethnic minorities have long resented the dominance of the
country's Burman majority. Over the last few years and continuing in
1995, the SLORC, in the name of national solidarity, has sought to
pacify these ethnic groups by means of negotiated cease-fires, grants of
limited autonomy, and promises of development assistance. By year's
end, the Government had negotiated cease-fire agreements with 15 of 16
recognized ethnic insurgent groups, and talks with a final ethnic group,
the Karen National Knion (KNU), were believed to be underway. However,
the Government's settlement with the Karenni National Progressive Party
(KNPP) broke down after the Burmese army forcibly entered areas under
KNPP control.
The Government included a large number of ethnic minority
representatives in the National Convention and permitted extended debate
on the issue of minority autonomy. However, the ethnic minority
populations complain that their concerns have not been addressed
adequately by the Government, and none is satisfied with the provisions
on limited "self-administration" which the authorities plan to accord a
few groups under the new constitution.
Government investment in the border areas in road, hospital, and school
construction has been modest at best, and economic development of ethnic
minority areas continued to lag, leaving many living at barely
subsistence levels. Since the focus of the hostilities against armed
insurgencies has been in the border areas where most minorities are
concentrated, those populations have been disproportionately victimized
by the general brutalization associated with the military's activities.
Since only people who can prove long familial links to Burma are
accorded full citizenship, ethnic populations, such as Muslims, Indians,
and Chinese, continued to be denied full citizenship. Those without
full citizenship are not free to travel domestically and are barred from
certain advanced university programs in medicine and technological
fields. Anti-Chinese sentiment remained pervasive.
Section 6 Worker Rights
a. The Right of Association
There were no functioning trade unions; even former government-
controlled ones were dormant. Workers continued to be unable to strike,
and there were no reported instances of attempts to do so.
In July 1989, the United States suspended Burma's eligibility for trade
concessions under the Generalized System of Preferences Program, pending
steps to afford its labor force internationally recognized worker
rights.
Because of Burma's longstanding violation of International Labor
Organization (ILO ) Convention 87 on Freedom of Association, in June the
ILO Conference Committee on the Application of Standards devoted a
Special Paragraph to Burma in its general report. Following February
meetings between ILO officials and government representatives in
Rangoon, the lack of a constructive government response prompted the ILO
to cancel plans for a followup visit.
b. The Right to Organize and Bargain Collectively
Workers do not have the right to organize and bargain collectively to
set wages and benefits. The Government's Central Arbitration Board,
which theoretically provides a means for settling major labor disputes,
continued to exist on paper but in practice was dormant. Township-level
labor supervisory committees remained in place to address various low-
level labor concerns.
The Government unilaterally sets wages in the public sector. In the
private sector, wages are set by market forces. The Government
pressures joint ventures not to pay salaries greater than those of
ministers or other high-level employees. Joint ventures circumvent this
with supplemental pay, including remuneration paid in foreign exchange
certificates, as well as through incentive and overtime pay and other
fringe benefits. Foreign firms generally set wages near those of the
domestic private sector but follow the example of joint ventures in
awarding supplemental wages and benefits.
No special export processing zones exist.
c. Prohibition of Forced or Compulsory Labor
Despite government promises to alter the Village and Town Acts to
withdraw the claimed statutory basis for forced labor in the country, at
year's end the legislation was not changed. As the military continued
its program of road, rail, dam, and other infrastructure projects, its
recourse to forced labor remained at a high level. Hundreds of
thousands--if not more--of ordinary citizens were compelled to
contribute labor to these public works. In preparation for the "Visit
Myanmar Year- 1996," in 1995 the Mandalay Moat Project was completed by
using a combination of prison, military, and paid labor, and the Ye-
Tavoy railroad in southern Burma continued to employ large-scale forced
labor, including child labor, according to credible reports .
In June the ILO Conference Committee on the Application of Standards
cited Burma in a second Special Paragraph for its violation of ILO
Convention 29 on forced labor.
Although the Government refused to acknowledge its use of forced labor
publicly, in June it issued an internal order instructing officials to
use paid labor on large-scale infrastructure projects. By year's end,
many instances of forced labor (or forced monetary contributions in lieu
of labor) nevertheless continued to be reported.
d. Minimum Age for Employment of Children
Although the law sets a minimum age for the employment of children, in
practice the law is not enforced. Working children are highly visible
in cities, mostly working for small or family enterprises. Children are
hired at lower pay rates than adults for the same kind of work, and
economic pressure forces them to work not only for their survival but
also to support their families. Arts and crafts is the only sector
producing for the export market which employs a significant number of
children. Despite a compulsory education law, almost 40 percent of
children never enroll in school, and only 27 percent complete the 5-year
primary school course.
e. Acceptable Conditions of Work
Surplus labor conditions and lack of protection by government
authorities continue to dictate substandard conditions for workers,
despite recent annual economic growth of at least 5 percent. The Law on
Fundamental Workers Rights of 1964 and the Factories Act of 1951
regulate working conditions. There is a legally prescribed 5-day, 35-
hour workweek for employees in the public sector and a 6-day, 44-hour
workweek for private and public sector employees, with overtime paid for
additional work. The law also allows for a 24-hour rest period per week
and workers have 21 paid holidays a year. Such provisions actually
affect only a small portion of the country's labor force.
Only government employees and employees of a few traditional industries
are covered by minimum wage provisions. The minimum monthly wage for
salaried public employees (based on the market exchange rate of 120
kyats = $1.00) is $5.00 (600 kyats), but this sum is supplemented by
various subsidies and allowances. The minimum wage is insufficient to
provide a decent standard of living for a worker and family. In
particular, the low level of remuneration of public employment fostered
widespread corruption. The government minimum wage for day labor is
$0.16 daily (20 kyats). Workers in the private sector are much better
paid. The actual average wage rate for casual laborers in Rangoon in
1995 was almost four times the official minimum, but still well below
subsistence levels. Wage increases continued to lag far behind
inflation.
Numerous health and safety regulations exist on the books, but the
Government has not made the necessary resources available to those
charged with their enforcement. Although workers may in principle
remove themselves from hazardous conditions, in practice workers cannot
expect to retain their jobs.
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