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Title: Sudan Human Rights Practices, 1995
Author: U.S. Department of State
Date: March 1996
SUDAN
After the 1989 coup that overthrew Sudan's democratically elected
government, the military assumed power under Lt. General Omar Hassan Al-
Bashir and his National Salvation Revolution Command Council (RCC).
Bashir and the RCC suspended the 1985 Constitution, abrogated press
freedoms, and disbanded all political parties and trade unions. In 1993
the RCC dissolved itself and appointed Lt. General Bashir President.
However, since 1989 real power has rested with Hassan Al-Turabi and his
National Islamic Front (NIF). NIF control over government operations
was further solidified with the end of the RCC, and NIF members and
supporters held most key positions in the Government, security forces,
judiciary, academia, and the media. Although legislative authority
theoretically rests with the government-appointed Transitional National
Assembly (TNA), the new Government maintained the RCC's suspension of
the 1985 Constitution and continued to restrict most civil liberties.
In addition to the regular police and the Sudan People's Armed Forces
(SPAF), the Government maintains an external security organ, an internal
security organ, an Islamic militia, known as the Popular Defense Forces
(PDF), and an Islamic police force, the Popular Police, whose mission
includes enforcing proper social behavior, including restrictions on
alcohol and "immodest dress." Members of the security forces committed
numerous human rights abuses.
Civil war, economic mismanagement, over 3 million internally displaced
persons, and a refugee influx from neighboring countries have devastated
Sudan's mostly agricultural economy. Exports of gum arabic, livestock,
and meat accounted for over 50 percent of Sudan's 1995 export earnings.
Reforms aimed at privatizing state-run firms and stimulating private
investment failed to revive a moribund economy saddled with massive
military expenditures.
The civil war in Sudan continued into its 12th year, resulting in the
deaths of more than a million and a half Sudanese. Neither side has the
ability to win the war on the battlefield. The number of human rights
violations decreased in mid-1995 following a limited 4-month cease-fire
in the South brokered by former U.S. President Jimmy Carter and a
reduction in fighting between southern rebel factions prior to the fall
of 1995. However, efforts to seek a peaceful solution to the conflict
by Kenya, Uganda, Ethiopia, and Eritrea under the auspices of the
Intergovernmental Authority on Drought and Development (IGADD), aided by
a newly created Dutch-led Friends of IGADD, remained stalemated.
The dismal human rights situation showed little improvement. Both the
Government and insurgents committed serious human rights abuses.
Government forces carried out massacres, extrajudicial killings,
kidnapings, forced labor, slavery, and forced conscription, on a broader
scale than opposition forces. A myriad of official and secret
government security forces routinely harassed, detained, and tortured
opponents or suspected opponents of the Government with impunity.
Prison conditions are harsh, and the judiciary is largely subservient to
the Government. The Government continued to restrict most human rights,
including the rights to free speech, press, assembly, association,
religion, privacy, and movement. Citizens do not have the right or the
ability peacefully to change their government. In the context of the
Islamization and Arabization drive, pressure--including forced
Islamization--on non-Muslims remained strong. Fears of Arabization and
Islamization and the imposition of Shari'a (Islamic law) fueled support
for the southern insurgency. Discrimination and violence against women
and abuse of children continued, and government restrictions on worker
rights persisted.
Levels of overall cooperation with U.N.-sponsored relief operations
deteriorated during the year. Both the SPAF/PDF and rebel factions
periodically obstructed the flow of humanitarian assistance to affected
populations, and there were problems with relief flights in the south.
The rebels continued to restrict most human rights in the areas under
their control and were responsible for a massacre, extrajudicial
killings, kidnapings, and forced conscription. The Sudanese People's
Liberation Army (SPLA) did not take action to implement its 1994
decision to create civilian control over its military and humanitarian
wings and to institute rule of law in areas it controls.
RESPECT FOR HUMAN RIGHTS
Section 1 Respect for the Integrity of the Person, Including Freedom
from:
a. Political and Other Extrajudicial Killing
Official and unofficial government forces committed an undetermined
number of political killings of persons suspected of belonging to or
collaborating with the insurgent SPLA. In May there were unconfirmed
reports that Government forces in Juba rounded up and summarily executed
approximately 40 soldiers loyal to former SPLA commander William Nyuon,
after Nyuon defected back to the SPLA.
Credible and independent sources indicate that soldiers of the SPLA
participated in a massacre of more than 200 Nuer villagers in the
Ganyliel area of southern Sudan on July 30. In response to pressure
from the international community and nongovernmental organizations
(NGO's), the SPLA announced in August that it would investigate the
incident; at year's end, the SPLA had not yet begun an investigation.
There were no other substantiated reports of extrajudicial or political
killings, possibly due to the limited access to the war zones by outside
observers.
b. Disappearance
The Government was responsible for continued arrests and subsequent
disappearances of persons suspected of supporting the rebels in
government-controlled areas in the south and Nuba Mountains. Awad Al-
Karim Gharbawi, a retired military officer, was arrested in September
trying to cross the Sudanese border, after having been refused an exit
visa to join his wife in Namibia. He remains unaccounted for, along
with two other military officers arrested at about the same time.
Scores of persons arrested by government forces in Juba in 1992,
including two local U.S. Agency for International Development Employees,
Dominic Morris and Chaplain Lako, remained unaccounted for, and most are
believed dead. However, reliable reports indicated that at least a few
of those arrested in Juba in 1992 were being held in a Khartoum prison;
the Government has stated it has no knowledge of their whereabouts. The
whereabouts of Sudanese medical personnel Samuel Garang, Mohamed Nowar
Aso, and Mirghani Kafi, last seen in police custody in 1990-91, remained
unknown at year's end.
c. Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading Treatment or
Punishment
The Government's official and unofficial security forces continued
routinely to beat and torture suspected opponents. For example, in one
case, four detainees were made to lift heavy chairs over their heads for
hours on end. They were whipped if their pace slackened. Similarly,
when former Prime Minister Sadiq Al-Mahdi was arrested in May, he was
reportedly forced to sit in the sun in temperatures reaching 110 degrees
Fahrenheit for refusing to answer questions (see Section 1.d.). There
were credible reports that security officials tortured some detainees
following large demonstrations in September in Khartoum (see Section
1.d.).
In mid-September armed security elements raided the home of Mohamed Ali
Hamid Omer and beat a group of former government officials who were
visiting with sticks and water hoses (see Section 1.d.). They were then
taken to security offices where they were beaten again and interrogated.
After being detained for 36 hours, the men were released with an
apology. No reason was given for their detention. In February NIF
security officials beat relatives of executed coup plotters at a
demonstration (see Section 2.b.).
The number of reports and perhaps incidents of torture in "ghost
houses," places where security forces detained government opponents
incommunicado often for months, decreased perhaps because the tightened
hold of the NIF regime meant less need to intimidate opposition groups.
However, reliable sources report that most ghost house inmates have been
transferred to the normal prison system, particularly Khartoum's main
Kober Prison. The Government has removed the west wing of Kober Prison
from the jurisdiction of the Prison Service and placed it under the
supervision of the security services. Persons detained in the west wing
of Kober Prison are held incommunicado. While ordinary prison wardens
are theoretically accountable to courts of law for the abuses they
perpetrate, security forces are not. Despite the widespread use of
torture, the Government has never publicly disciplined any security
official for torture.
Sudan's 1991 Criminal Act, based on Shari'a law, prescribes specific
"hudud" punishments, including amputation, stoning, and lashing, for
some offenses. The courts did not impose sentences involving amputation
in 1995. The Government routinely meted out lashings, most often to
persons convicted of brewing or consuming alcohol, following trials that
did not meet internationally accepted standards of fairness (see Section
l.e.). In August five Nuban young women were sentenced to death for
apostasy, because they had converted to Christianity. At year's end, it
was not clear if the sentences had been carried out.
Credible and recurrent reports state that police personnel sometimes
raped female detainees and that both government and insurgent forces in
the field raped women.
It is widely believed that the SPLA and the Southern Sudan Independence
Movement (SSIM) also tortured prisoners in their custody, although the
lack of access to rebel-controlled areas made it difficult to verify
these allegations.
Conditions in official prisons were harsh but generally not life
threatening. Almost all prisons were built before independence in 1956
and are poorly maintained. Many lack basic facilities like toilets or
showers. Health care is primitive and food inadequate. Minors are
often held with adults. Female prisoners are kept separately from men,
and rape in prison (as opposed to police stations) does not appear to be
a major problem. Prison officials arbitrarily denied visits by family
members.
d. Arbitrary Arrest, Detention, or Exile
The 1991 Criminal Code does not include provisions concerning the length
of detention of security and other detainees, and the Government
routinely detained persons without charge and without reference to the
judiciary. Under the 1992 National Security Act, the Government may
detain a suspect for interrogation for up to 72 hours. This is
renewable for up to 1 month with "justification," a term not further
defined.
Also under the 1992 National Security Act, the President has the power
to authorize "precautionary detention" for up to 3 months "to preserve
the general security," but in practice this authority rests with
subordinate officials. A person detained under this provision
theoretically must be notified of the reasons for detention within these
3 months. The President may extend detention for 3 more months if a
magistrate approves the extension. In practice, these legal provisions
are routinely ignored, and the authorities continued to detain opponents
indefinitely.
The law allows for bail, except for those accused of crimes punishable
by death or life imprisonment. In theory, the Government provides legal
counsel for indigents in the case of crimes punishable by death or life
imprisonment. However, courts sometimes fail to inform defendants of
this right. Moreover, in some cases counsel is only allowed to advise
the defendant and may not address the court. Thus, despite some legal
protections, detainees have few rights and are often subject to
arbitrary, and in many cases, incommunicado detention.
The Government's secrecy and arbitrary detention practices made it
impossible to know the exact number of political detainees and
prisoners. Although the Government continued to pick up and detain
suspected opponents across the country, the number of new arrests
decreased compared to previous years. In May former Prime Minister
Sadiq Al-Mahdi was arrested after giving a speech critical of the
Government and detained incommunicado without charge for 3 months. In
August the Government released Al-Mahdi along with 31 other political
detainees. Other detainees may have been released throughout the year.
The Government claimed that there were no remaining political detainees.
Estimates of the present number of political detainees ranged from
several score to a few hundred.
The authorities picked up numerous other lower ranking opposition
figures and others throughout the year and held some for several months.
For example, in May and June government security forces arrested over
100 members of the Sudanese opposition and a handful of underground
Communist Party leaders. In mid-September, security forces beat men
gathered at the house of Mohamed Ali Hamid Omer, took them to security
offices, beat and interrogated them there, and detained them for 36
hours. They were released with an apology but without an explanation
for their detention (see Section 1.a.). During 3 days of antigovernment
demonstrations in September, which were sparked by the detention of four
students who had heckled the President during a July 29 speech at
Khartoum University, the Government detained and interrogated an
estimated 3,000 persons, including precoup-era labor leaders; most of
the detainees were released after a short time. Credible reports
indicate that torture was used during the interrogations.
In another incident in September, a group of worshipers in a mosque in a
Khartoum suburb were arrested by security personnel and detained because
the mosque's imam had delivered a sermon critical of NIF leader Hassan
Al-Turabi.
The Government also continued its practice of de facto arrest of
suspected opponents by requiring them to report to security offices in
the morning and wait all day for several days in a row. Those targeted
for such harassment were unable to earn a livelihood. The Government
also detained temporarily international relief workers (see Sections
1.g. and 2.d.).
e. Denial of Fair Public Trial
The judiciary is not independent and is largely subservient to the
Government. The Chief Justice of the Supreme Court, formerly elected by
sitting judges, is now appointed (as the senior judge in the Sudanese
judicial service, he also controls the judiciary). Since 1989 the
authorities have replaced hundreds of judges considered ideologically
unsuitable. Most new judges have ties to the NIF and favor strict
application of Islamic (Shari'a) law; many have little or no legal
training. The RCC banned the respected Sudanese Bar Association in 1989
and replaced it with a government-appointed committee. Human rights
monitors have pointed out that the Government continued to harass,
detain, and torture members of the legal profession it viewed as
political opponents.
Sudan's judicial system includes four types of courts: regular courts,
both criminal and civil; special mixed security courts; military courts;
and tribal courts in rural areas to resolve disputes over land and water
rights and family matters. The 1991 Criminal Act governs criminal
cases, whereas the 1983 Civil Transactions Act still applies to most
civil cases. Military trials, whose proceedings are secret and brief,
do not meet international standards.
Trials in regular courts nominally meet international standards of legal
protections. For instance, the accused normally have the right to
counsel, and the courts should provide free legal counsel for indigent
defendants accused of crimes punishable by death or life imprisonment.
In practice, however, these legal protections are unevenly applied.
In 1989 the Special Courts Act created special three-person security
courts to deal with a wide range of offenses, including violations of
constitutional decrees, emergency regulations, some sections of the
Penal Code, as well as drug and currency offenses. Special courts, on
which both military and civilian judges sit, handle most security
related cases. Attorneys may advise defendants as "friends of the
court" but normally may not address the court. Lawyers complain that
they are sometimes granted access to court documents too late to prepare
an effective defense. Sentences are usually severe and implemented at
once. Death sentences, however, are referred to the Chief Justice and
the Head of State. Defendants may file appellate briefs with the Chief
Justice.
The Government officially exempts the 10 southern states, whose
population is mostly non-Muslim, from parts of the 1991 Criminal Act.
But the Act permits the possible future application of Shari'a law in
the south, if the local state assemblies (see Section 3) so decide.
Moreover, in 1993 the Government transferred all non-Muslim judges from
the south to the north, replacing them with Muslim judges. However,
there were no reports that hudud punishments, other than lashings, were
carried out by the courts in government-controlled areas of the south.
Fear of the imposition of Shari'a law remained a key issue in the
rebellion.
Parts of the south and the Nuba mountains fell outside of effective
judicial procedures and other governmental functions. According to
credible reports, government units summarily tried and punished those
accused of crimes, especially of offenses against civil order. SPLA-
held areas sometimes relied on traditional justice by village elders.
The SPLA proclaimed a civilian structure to eliminate the secret and
basically political trials by military commanders of previous years, but
at year's end there was no evidence to indicate that such civilian
trials had been held.
In August the authorities released 18 former officers who had been
sentenced for alleged coup plotting in 1990 and 1991 and a 1994 bombing.
According to international human rights NGO's, 7 persons were not
included in the amnesty. There was no information available regarding
possible political prisoners in the south.
f. Arbitrary Interference with Privacy, Family, Home, or
Correspondence
The Government routinely interferes with its citizens' privacy.
Security forces frequently conducted night searches without warrants.
They targeted persons suspected of political crimes or, in northern
Sudan, of distilling or consuming illegal alcoholic beverages.
A wide network of government informants conducted pervasive surveillance
in schools, universities, markets, workplaces, and neighborhoods. The
Government disbanded political parties and prevented citizens from
forming new political groupings. The authorities kept key opposition
figures under frequent surveillance. The Government also continued its
practice of summarily dismissing military personnel and other government
employees whose loyalty was suspect. Dozens lost their jobs throughout
the year. In August the Government set up a committee to review the
cases of persons who had been summarily dismissed since the 1989 coup.
However, the review eligibility criteria were such that only 20 percent
of the cases of those summarily dismissed were eligible. At year's end,
little progress had been made in the review process.
Security personnel routinely opened and read mail and monitored
telephones. During the first half of the year, the Government enforced
a ban on unlicensed satellite dishes, but enforcement tapered off later
in the year. On July 16, Ahmed Abdalla Akood, a former government
official, was detained and interrogated for owning a fax machine.
Government-instituted neighborhood "popular committees"--
ostensibly a mechanism for political mobilization--served as a means for
monitoring households. These committees caused many citizens to be wary
of neighbors who could report them for "suspicious" activities,
including "excessive" contact with foreigners. The committees also
furnished or withheld documents essential for obtaining an exit visa
from Sudan. In high schools, students were sometimes pressured to join
pro-regime youth groups.
A Muslim man can marry a non-Muslim, but a Muslim woman cannot marry a
non-Muslim, unless he converts to Islam. Only Muslims are allowed to
adopt children (see Section 2.c.).
In March the home of the family of Umma Party Secretary General Omar Nur
El Dayem was confiscated without prior notice; the eviction may have
been due, in part, to Nur El Dayem's testimony before the U.S. Congress.
g. Use of Excessive Force and Violations of Humanitarian Law in
Internal Conflicts
Since the civil war began in 1983, more than 1.5 million people have
been killed as the result of fighting between the Islamic Government in
the north and insurgents in southern Sudan. The civil war continued
unabated, and all sides involved in the fighting were responsible for
abuses in violation of humanitarian norms. At year's end, the
Government controlled most of Sudan, except for parts of the south and
the Nuba mountains. Efforts to seek a peaceful resolution to the civil
war were unsuccessful. According to the report of the U.N. Special
Rapporteur on Human Rights in Sudan, on June 21, 1995, an Antanov
aircraft of the Sudanese forces dropped 22 bombs on Regifi and
surrounding areas in the Nuba Mountains, killing 6 civilians and
injuring 12. Eyewitnesses reported that the bombardment was
concentrated on a densely populated area, indicating the Government's
intent to terrorize the civilian population and to force the population
to flee the area.
Government forces routinely killed rebel soldiers taken prisoner in the
civil war, and no rebels were reported being held as prisoners of war in
government-controlled areas. The SPLA took prisoners of war. An
international humanitarian organization was able to visit some of them.
Government restrictions on flights into southern Sudan during the second
half of the year, as well as other problems, prevented visits to some
SPLA held prisoners of war.
There were also instances in which the Government arrested or detained
international NGO workers. For example, in May in Pariang a government
military unit detained two doctors working with the Italian NGO,
Comitato Collaborazione Medica. Following several months of
negotiations with the Government and local military leaders the two
doctors were released into U.N. custody. At approximately the same time
the SPLA released three United Nations workers it had held prisoner in
Chukudum during the same period.
Both sides routinely displaced and often killed civilians, and committed
numerous violations of humanitarian law, during their offensive
operations, most of which were carried out by the Government this year.
The Government also commonly and deliberately targeted aerial bombing
and militia raids to disperse civilians in displaced persons camps and
in areas where they had congregated to receive relief supplies. In
September the towns of Bideet and Ombassi were bombed resulting in 15
deaths and 11 wounded. Also in September a military barge fired
indiscriminately on villages in the Yomcir area, displacing additional
people; aerial bombing accompanied the barrage. In November government
bombers attacked several towns in Western Equatoria in what appeared to
be stepped-up efforts to terrorize the populace.
Although government rhetoric supported ending the civil war, the
Government launched military offensives in the south throughout the
year. In March former President Carter negotiated a 2-month cease-fire
to allow guinea worm eradication activities in the south. The cease-
fire was extended for an additional 2 months, but the sides would not
agree to further extensions, and there were violations by both sides
during the cease-fires. Other peace initiatives remained stalemated due
to the intransigence of the various warring parties, whose commitment to
peace was questionable. Prospects for a negotiated settlement remained
slim. The 1995 dry season offensive campaign began with an initial
success by Government forces on the southern border, and by an SPLA
drive in the south toward Juba, the main southern city. Over all,
however, the war remains unwinnable by either side.
The SPLA reportedly detained thousands of children as a reservoir of
recruits (see Sections 5 and 6.c.).
Section 2 Respect for Civil Liberties, Including:
a. Freedom of Speech and Press
The Government severely curtails freedom of speech and press.
Government intimidation and surveillance, fostered in part by an
informer network, continued to inhibit open, public discussion of
political issues. Radio, television, and much of the print media are
controlled directly by the Government and required to reflect government
and NIF policies. However, lively discussions take place in the press
on domestic issues, especially economic failures. All journalists, even
in the privately owned Arabic dailies, practice self-censorship. Sudan
television had a permanent military censor to ensure that the news
reflected official views.
In mid-1993, the Government adopted a new Press Code that called for
turning the existing state-owned print media into publicly held
companies. The Code also allowed the formation of private newspapers.
Implementation of the Code was slow. The few publications that issued
shares were purchased by government ministries and state-owned
corporations, thus keeping them under government control.
Of the two privately owned dailies, Akhbar Al-Youm followed a
progovernment line and did not encounter any problems. The Government
suspended publication of the other, Al-Rai Al-Akher, for 2 weeks in
September after its September 20 edition in which two editorials
questioned government policy and discussed Western Christians' support
for Sudanese southerners. Earlier, Al-Rai Al-Akher had published a
report on police treatment of student protesters during President
Bashir's July 29 speech at Khartoum University. The report prompted the
progovernment Khartoum University Student Union to publicly warn Al-Rai
Al-Akher of the "consequences" of being biased. The day the Government
announced of Al-Rai Al-Akher's suspension, it also announced that two
previously closed newspapers would be allowed to resume publishing.
The Government often charged that the international, and particularly
Western, media have an anti-Sudan and anti-Islam bias, and it routinely
confiscated issues of foreign publications judged hostile to the
Government. Although the Government periodically granted foreign
journalists entry and access to war zones and to a variety of political
leaders, security forces closely monitored their activities. All
journalists, including foreigners, who wish to work in Sudan as
correspondents are required by law to register with the Government. The
Government rejected the applications of some journalists who had
previously worked for newspapers associated with political parties,
claiming that they did not have enough experience. As a result of the
Government's hostile attitude, many respected journalists who worked in
the local media before 1989 have quit their jobs and left Sudan.
After the coup, the Government harassed and dismissed many academics
considered antiregime, and its practice of repressing opposition has had
a chilling effect on academic debate. Government security forces
continued to arrest and detain academics linked with opposition parties.
The Government continued to use political and ideological criteria
whenever possible in appointing new faculty. In the language of a
government press release, there is an educational revolution occurring
aimed at "authenticating" knowledge and Arabizising all educational
institutions. To link educational objectives to Islamic values, all
educational institutions were directed to oblige female students to wear
Islamic dress.
b. Freedom of Peaceful Assembly and Association
The authorities severely restricted these freedoms, permitting only
government-sponsored gatherings. The declaration of the state of
emergency and of martial law on June 30, 1989, effectively eliminated
the right to assembly. During 3 days of largely nonviolent,
antigovernment demonstrations in Khartoum in September at least five
persons were killed by the security forces who indiscriminately opened
fire. The Government arrested approximately 3,000 people, mostly
students, including demonstration leaders or potential leaders (see
Section l.d.). Plainclothes security forces beat students, male and
female, although many of them had taken no part in the demonstration.
The Government let it be known that it would disperse any future
demonstrations by force. The Government backed up its threats by
stationing plainclothes members of the NIF security apparatus with AK-
47's in pickup trucks on the main streets of downtown Khartoum. These
security forces prevented groups of three or more persons from traveling
to the downtown area. Although the Government released most of the
detained demonstrators after a short time, the Minister of Justice
announced on September 18 that "more than 15 persons" suspected of
sabotage operations carried out during the demonstrations would be
criminally prosecuted.
In February NIF security officials broke up a small demonstration in
Khartoum by the Martyr's Association, a group of relatives of 28
officers executed for coup plotting in 1990. Security forces beat,
threatened, and verbally abused the leaders of the group; those taken
into custody were later released.
Northern Muslim opposition groups, which have taken no part in the
fighting, and southern opposition groups formed an umbrella structure in
1995, the National Defense Alliance, to coordinate and improve their
efforts to confront the NIF regime. One major southern faction, the
SSIM, did not participate.
Apart from a few indigenous NGO's involved in relief work and sports and
social clubs, all private associations were controlled by the Government
or the NIF.
c. Freedom of Religion
Although the Government has stated that all religions should be
respected and that freedom of worship is guaranteed, in practice the
Government treats Islam as the de facto state religion and has declared
that Islam must inspire the country's laws, institutions, and policies.
Various restrictions under the Missionary Societies Act of 1962 limited
the ability of non-Muslims to practice their religion freely, and the
1991 Criminal Act made apostasy by Muslims punishable by death. In
August five Nuban young women were sentenced to death for apostasy (see
Section l.c.). At the end of September, the police in Port Sudan
arrested 10 persons, including 2 women, for converting to Christianity.
These persons were still in detention at year's end. On November 30, a
Catholic priest was detained while conducting a pastoral visit. At
least eight uniformed and plainclothes security officers took him to
four police stations for questioning about his activities before he was
released. He was not told why he was detained nor were charges brought
against him.
Authorities continued to restrict the activities of non-Muslims, and
there continued to be reports of harassment and arrest for religious
beliefs and activities. The law forbids proselytizing of Muslims, but
Muslims are allowed to proselytize freely. The Government required
missionary groups to apply for special licenses and continued to deny or
delay work permits for foreign missionaries. In April longtime resident
and Catholic missionary Father Ottorino Sina was denied a reentry visa
to return to Sudan; three other religious leaders were threatened with
expulsion.
The Government continued to deny permission to build churches, and in
the north no new churches have been built since the early 1970's.
Reliable reports stated that in some war zones, government forces closed
or burned churches and mosques and restricted movements of Christian
clergy. At the local level, NIF officials restricted normal activities
of the Sudan Catholic Bishops' Conference, the Sudan Council of
Churches, and the Coptic Church. In October 1994, the Government
replaced the controversial Missionary Act with the Societies
Registration Act. Although this act allows churches to engage in a
wider range of activities than the Missionary Act, churches are subject
to the restrictions placed on nonreligious corporations.
Non-Muslims continued to criticize privately the Government's favoritism
of Islam over other religions. Only Muslims are allowed to adopt
children (see Section 1.f.). As the basis of Sudan's Arab culture, all
citizens are exposed to Islamic ideas set forth in the Koran. All
Popular Defense Force trainees, including non-Muslims, are indoctrinated
in the Islamic faith. In prisons, government supported Islamic NGO's
offer inducements to, and exert pressure on, non-Muslim inmates to
convert. Reliable reports stated that, in some war zones, Islamic NGO's
withheld food and other key services from the needy unless they
converted to Islam.
The U.N. Special Rapporteur in his 1995 Interim Report to the U.N.
General Assembly reported that in rebel-controlled areas, Christians,
Muslims, and followers of traditional African faiths were generally
allowed to worship freely.
d. Freedom of Movement Within the Country, Foreign Travel,
Emigration, and Repatriation
The Government restricted freedom of movement by denying exit visas to
some categories of persons (such as policemen and doctors). The
Government also kept lists of political figures and others not permitted
to travel abroad. Because of tensions with Egypt, the authorities
denied many requests for travel to that country.
Women may not travel abroad without the permission of their husbands or
male guardians. Some former political detainees were forbidden to
travel outside of Khartoum. Movement was generally free for other
citizens outside of the war zones, but those who failed to produce an
identity card at checkpoints risked arrest. Foreigners needed permits,
which were hard to obtain and often refused, for domestic travel outside
of Khartoum. Diplomats, however, could travel freely to many locations.
Foreigners had to register with the police on entering the country, seek
permission to move from one location to another, and reregister at each
new location within 3 days of arrival. Foreign NGO staff sometimes had
problems obtaining entry visas to Sudan or work or travel permits once
they were in the country. The SPLA and SSIM also required NGO personnel
to obtain permission before traveling to areas they control, although
such permission was granted regularly. Rebel factions also abused and
mistreated NGO personnel.
Tens of thousands of persons, largely southerners and westerners
displaced by famine and civil war, continued to live in squatter slums
in the Khartoum area. Throughout 1995 the Government razed thousands of
squatter dwellings in this area: inhabitants knew that their homes were
slated for destruction but not when it would occur. Bulldozers would
typically arrive unannounced in a neighborhood and carry out the razings
the same day. Although the Government promised to sell the inhabitants
a plot of land for approximately $145 (100,000 Sudanese pounds), tens of
thousands were made homeless temporarily. Usually, the inhabitants
established temporary shelters on the site of their razed dwellings
until they could gain title to a plot of land. Muslims who did not have
sufficient money to purchase the land and construct a dwelling could
obtain assistance from Islamic charities. Others could not.
Sudan accorded refugees relatively good treatment. At year's end, the
population of officially registered refugees (largely composed of
Ethiopians and Eritreans) was about 353,765, with an estimated 240,000
additional unregistered refugees not in camps. In November, however,
the Government detained up to 300 Ethiopian and Eritrean refugees in
camps in eastern Sudan for alleged crimes committed in the camps. Those
detained included three employees of a U.S.-based NGO which provides
medical services. The arrests prompted the United Nations High
Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) to postpone a long-awaited camp
census. About half the refugee population receives assistance from the
UNHCR. There were no reports of forcible repatriation of refugees,
regardless of their status. Refugees could not become resident aliens
or citizens, regardless of their length of stay. However, the
Government tolerated a large number of refugees and allowed them to
work, although typically in menial occupations in the cities. An
estimated 330,000 Sudanese refugees remained in Uganda, as a result of
the fighting between the Government and the insurgents and rebel
factional infighting. Refugees flowed from Sudan to Ethiopia and Kenya
as well.
Section 3 Respect for Political Rights: The Right of Citizens to
Change Their Government
Citizens had neither the right nor the ability to change their
government peacefully. Political power remained solely in the hands of
a small group of unelected military officers and the NIF leadership.
The NIF continued to increase its control at the provincial and state
levels and removed or retired half of the armed forces officers.
In 1989 the RCC abolished all political parties and detained temporarily
the major party leaders, and in 1990 rejected both multiparty and one-
party systems. In 1992 the RCC instituted the Transitional National
Assembly (TNA) based on a Libyan-style political structure with
ascending levels of nonpartisan assemblies. The membership, largely
progovernment, is entirely government appointed. Although individual
members occasionally criticized government policies, the TNA remained a
rubberstamp body, whose main function was to ratify legislation proposed
by the executive.
In August the Government instituted a federal system of government,
which it claimed would involve local people in decisionmaking. In
reality there is little popular participation in government. A General
Elections Commission selects all candidates permitted to run in general
elections. In the March elections for state assemblies, each state's
popular committees elected 45 percent of the members, and the Government
appointed 10 percent. The remaining 45 percent were chosen in elections
in which, by the Government's own admission, less than 10 percent of the
electorate voted. However, in August the Government announced "open,
free, and fair" presidential and parliamentary elections would be held
in 1996.
Few women were in the highest ranks of government. However, these women
and women in lesser positions played a significant role in government
operations. A deputy Minister for Social Planning, one of the governors
of Sudan's 26 states, and 10 percent of the TNA members are women.
Section 4 Governmental Attitude Regarding International and
Nongovernmental Investigation of Alleged Violations of Human Rights
The Government tried to stamp out any domestic criticism on human rights
issues by frequently and vehemently denying any responsibility for human
rights abuses. Since the 1989 coup, the Government has banned local,
independent human rights organizations. However, the Christian church
organizations, Sudan Catholic Bishops' Conference, and the Sudan Council
of Churches, continued to seek to monitor and publicize human rights
abuses, especially religious discrimination.
In 1991 the Government created the Sudan Human Rights Organization
(SHRO)--not to be confused with the previous SHRO, which it dissolved
after the 1989 coup--to defend its human rights record. This
organization has yet to criticize the Government. This year, the
Popular Arab and Islamic Conference (PAIC), led by Hassan Turabi,
established the International Islamic Human Rights Organization (IIHRO).
The IIHRO is designed to be the Islamic answer to Western human rights
organizations, which the PAIC deems prejudiced against Islam. The
IIHRO issued a statement praising the Government's August release of
political detainees but has yet to criticize the Government.
In an attempt to demonstrate the regime's concern for human rights, the
TNA adopted in 1993 the "Sudan Document of Human Rights" and created a
Human Rights Committee. After the latter began quietly investigating
cases of disappearances, however, the Government dismissed its members
in July and appointed new members. The new members have shown no
inclination to criticize or investigate the Government's human rights
record.
The Government remained hostile toward investigation of its human rights
record and was highly defensive about foreign criticism. It bitterly
denounced the 1994 report on Sudan by the U.N. Special Rapporteur,
Gaspar Biro, and again denied permission for Biro to visit Sudan. Biro
wrote his 1995 Report, which the Government also condemned, and his 1995
Interim Report to the U.N. General Assembly based on sources outside
Sudan. In February the Government revoked the permission it had granted
to Amnesty International to send observers to Sudan. However, the
Government allowed two other international human rights NGO's, Human
Rights Watch and the Lawyers Committee for Human Rights to visit.
Section 5 Discrimination Based on Race, Sex, Religion, Disability,
Language, or Social Status
Women
Violence against women appears to be common, especially wife beating,
although accurate statistics do not exist. The Government did not
address the issue of violence against women; nor was it discussed
publicly. The police do not normally intervene in domestic disputes,
and no court cases involved violence against women. Many women are
reluctant to file formal complaints against such abuse. Displaced women
from the south were particularly vulnerable to harassment, rape and
sexual abuse. Among some southern ethnic groups rape is common. No
blame is attached to the practice, although the man involved must pay
the woman's family if she becomes pregnant.
Some aspects of Sudanese law and many traditional practices discriminate
against women. Gender segregation is commonplace. In keeping with
Islamic law, Muslim women are not accorded the same property,
inheritance, and family rights as Muslim men. Women typically inherit
half as much of the estate as a man with the same degree of kinship, and
it is much easier for men to initiate legal divorce proceedings. Women
are also discriminated against in their ability to marry. Although a
Muslim man can marry a non-Muslim, a Muslim woman cannot marry a non-
Muslim unless he converts to Islam. These rules apply only to Muslims
and not to those of other faiths, for whom religious or tribal law
applies. Among some ethnic groups, wives are taken on a trial basis
lasting up to 4 years. The husband may dissolve the marriage during
this period by returning the wife to her family, although he must pay a
price for each child born during this time. In most cases, the husband
gets custody of the children. The wife reportedly may contract further
marriages.
Government directives required women in government offices and female
students and teachers to conform to what it deemed an Islamic dress
code, which, at the least, entailed wearing a head covering. For
example, the Passport Office would not issue passports to women, Muslim
or Christian, who did not have their heads covered in their passport
pictures, and government employees often would not wait on women who did
not have their heads covered. However, enforcement of the dress code
regulations was uneven.
Children
The Government demonstrated no significant concern for the rights and
welfare of children. A considerable number of children suffered serious
abuse, including enslavement and forced conscription in the war zones.
There continued to be credible but unconfirmed reports of the existence
of special camps in the south in which people from the north or from
abroad came to purchase women and children to work as domestics (see
Section 6.c.). Recurrent reports stated that the SPLA held thousands of
children in camps against their will and used them as a reservoir of
recruits for its military forces (see Sections 1.g. and 6.c.).
The Government runs several camps for vagrant children. Police
periodically sweep the streets of Khartoum and other major cities,
taking children whom police personnel deem homeless to the camps, where
they are detained for indefinite periods. These children may not leave
the camps and are subjected to strict discipline and physical and
military training. Health care and schooling at the camps are generally
poor; basic living conditions are also often primitive. All the
children, including non-Muslims, must study the Koran, and there is
pressure on non-Muslims to convert to Islam. Children in the camps are
often incorporated into the PDF.
Female genital mutilation (FGM) is widely condemned by international
health experts as damaging to both physical and psychological health.
Although illegal, FGM is widespread, especially in northern Sudan. As
many as 90 percent or more of females in the north have been mutilated
by FGM, with consequences that sometimes have included severe urinary
problems, infections, and even death. Pharaonic mutilation
(infibulation), the severest of the three types, is the most common and
is usually performed on girls between ages 4 and 7. Because few
physicians will perform the operation, it is most often done by
paramedical personnel in improvised, unsanitary conditions, causing
severe pain and trauma to the child. Women displaced from the south to
the north reportedly are increasingly imposing FGM upon their daughters,
even if they themselves have not been subjected to it.
People with Disabilities
The Government does not discriminate against handicapped persons but has
not enacted any special legislation or taken other steps, such as
mandating accessibility to public buildings and transportation for the
disabled.
Religious Minorities
Although the law recognizes Sudan as a multireligious country, in
practice, the Government treats Islam, the religion of the majority, as
the state religion. Muslims are the majority and predominate in the
north, but are in the minority in the south where most of the people
practice Christianity or traditional African religions. One to two
million displaced southerners, who practice Christianity or traditional
African religions, and about 500,000 Coptic Christians live in the
north.
In government-controlled areas of the south, there continued to be
credible evidence of a policy of Islamization. For example, NIF
supporters often replaced non-Muslim civil servants, and all non-Muslim
judges have been transferred to the north where they are relegated to
low-level tasks such as adjudicating traffic disputes. In the north,
some non-Muslims lost their jobs in the civil service, the judiciary,
and other professions. Few non-Muslim university graduates found
government jobs at all. Frequent dismissals in the army and police
purged professionals to make room for NIF supporters. Some non-Muslim
businessmen complained of petty harassment and discrimination in the
awarding of government contracts and trade licenses. There were also
credible reports that Muslims receive preferential treatment for the
limited services provided by the Government, including access to medical
care.
National/Racial/Ethnic Minorities
Sudan's population of 27.5 million is a multiethnic mix of over 500 Arab
and African tribes with scores of languages and dialects. The Arab,
Muslim culture in the north and central areas and the non-Muslim,
African culture in the south are the two dominant cultures. Northern
Muslims, who form a majority of about 16 million, have traditionally
dominated the Government. The southern ethnic groups fighting the civil
war (largely followers of traditional African religions or Christians)
want some form of regional self-determination or even independence from
the North.
The Muslim majority and the NIF-dominated Government continued to
discriminate against ethnic minorities in almost every aspect of
society. Residents in Arabic-speaking areas who do not themselves speak
Arabic were discriminated against in education, jobs, and other
opportunities.
The Arabization of instruction in higher education discriminated against
non-Arabs. To compete for a university slot, students completing high
school had to pass examinations in four subjects--English, mathematics,
Arabic, and religious studies. Even at the university level, exams for
all subjects except English were in Arabic, placing nonnative Arabic
speakers at a disadvantage.
Section 6 Worker Rights
a. The Right of Association
Although Sudan had a strong labor union movement during the Government
of Sadiq Al-Mahdi, the RCC abolished the precoup labor unions, closed
union offices, froze union assets, forbade strikes, and prescribed stiff
punishments, including the death penalty, for violations of RCC labor
decrees. The Government dismissed many labor leaders from their jobs or
detained them, although most of those arrested were later freed.
During the 3 days of antigovernment demonstrations in September, the
Government preemptively detained precoup labor union officials. Most
were released when the demonstrations ended (see Section 1.d.).
The Sudan Workers Trade Unions Federation (SWTUF) is the leading blue-
collar labor organization with about 800,000 members. In 1992 local
union elections were held, after a delay to permit the government-
controlled steering committees to arrange the outcomes. The elections
resulted in government-approved slates of candidates voted into office
by prearranged acclamation.
The U.S. Government in 1991 suspended Sudan's eligibility for trade
benefits under the Generalized System of Preferences because of its
violations of worker rights.
Unions remained free to form federations and affiliate with
international bodies, such as the African Workers' Union and the Arab
Workers' Union.
b. The Right to Organize and Bargain Collectively
An RCC constitutional decree of June 30, 1989, temporarily suspended the
right to organize and bargain collectively. Although these rights were
restored to organizing committees in September of the same year,
government control of the steering committees meant in practice that the
Government dominates the process of setting wages and working
conditions. The continued absence of labor legislation allowing for
union meetings, filing of grievances, and other union activity, greatly
reduced the value of these formal rights. Although local union
officials raised some grievances with employers, few carried them to the
Government. Wages are set by a tripartite committee comprising
representatives of the Government, labor unions, and business.
Specialized labor courts adjudicate standard labor disputes.
In 1993 the Government created two export processing zones (EPZ's); it
later established a third at Khartoum International Airport. At year's
end, only the EPZ at Khartoum International Airport was open. Sudanese
labor laws do not apply in these EPZ's.
c. Prohibition of Forced or Compulsory Labor
Although the law prohibits forced or compulsory labor, slavery persists.
According to the report by the U.N. Special Rapporteur, reports and
information from a variety of sources after February 1994 indicate that
the number of cases of slavery, servitude, slave trade, and forced labor
have increased alarmingly. The taking of slaves, particularly in war
zones, and their export to parts of central and northern Sudan
continued. There also continued to be credible, but unconfirmed reports
that women and children were sold and sent abroad to work as domestics,
agricultural laborers, or sometimes concubines. In some instances,
local authorities took action to stop instances of slavery, in other
cases the authorities did nothing to stop the practice.
Both the Government and rebel factions continued to forcibly conscript
young men and boys into the military or rebel militias. For example, in
February a group of national service trainees were unexpectedly taken to
Khartoum and flown to Juba, where they were expected to serve in combat.
Young men and boys faced significant hardship and abuse once conscripted
for military service. The SPLA reportedly held thousands of children in
camps against their will as a reservoir of recruits (see Sections 1.g.
and 5). The rebel factions continued to force southern men to work as
laborers or porters or forcibly conscripted them into their fighting
forces.
The Special Rapporteur received testimony on regular abductions which
took place in Gogrial during joint incursions by the army, the PDF, and
the armed militias. In addition, during April and May of 1995 it is
reported that a train proceeding from Babanusa to Wau was used to
transport civilians abducted during raids in the area carried out by
government forces. According to testimony, PDF troops took thousands of
cattle and abducted some 500 women and 150 children.
All the reports and information received indicate the direct and general
involvement of the SPAF, the PDF, armed militias, and mujahidin groups
backed by the Government in the abduction and deportation of civilians
from the conflict zones to the north. All these practices have a
pronounced racial aspect, as the victims are exclusively Southerners and
people belonging to the indigenous tribes of the Nuba Mountains.
d. Minimum Age for Employment of Children
The legal minimum age for workers is 16 years, but the law is loosely
enforced by inspectors from the Ministry of Labor in the official or
wage economy. Children as young as 11 or 12 years worked in a number of
factories, particularly outside the capital, including the edible oil
factories at Um Ruwaba. In addition, gross poverty in Sudan has
produced widespread child labor in the informal, unregulated economy.
In rural areas, children traditionally assist their families with
agricultural work from a very young age.
e. Acceptable Conditions of Work
The legislated minimum wage is enforced by the Ministry of Labor, which
maintains field offices in most major cities. Employers generally
respect the minimum wage. Workers who are denied the minimum wage may
file a grievance with the local Ministry of Labor field office, which is
then supposed to investigate and take appropriate action if there has
been a violation of the law. At year's end, the minimum wage was
approximately $10 (7,000 Sudanese pounds) per month. This wage is
insufficient to support an average worker and family.
The workweek is limited by law to six 8-hour days, with a day of rest on
Friday. Although the laws prescribe health and safety standards,
working conditions were generally poor, and enforcement by the Ministry
of Labor minimal. The law does not address the right of workers to
remove themselves from dangerous work situations without loss of
employment.
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