| The State Department web site below is a permanent electronic archive of information released prior to January 20, 2001. Please see www.state.gov for material released since President George W. Bush took office on that date. This site is not updated so external links may no longer function. Contact us with any questions about finding information. NOTE: External links to other Internet sites should not be construed as an endorsement of the views contained therein. |
Title: Nigeria Human Rights Practices, 1995
Author: U.S. Department of State
Date: March 1996
NIGERIA
General Sani Abacha, who seized power in a palace coup in November 1993,
remained Nigeria's Head of State throughout 1995. Under Abacha, the
main decisionmaking organ was the exclusively military Provisional
Ruling Council (PRC), which ruled by decree. The PRC oversees the 32-
member Federal Executive Council composed of military officers and
civilians, including several prominent politicians. Pending a new
constitution, some provisions of the 1979 and 1989 constitutions were
observed, although the decree suspending the 1979 constitution was not
repealed, and the 1989 constitution was never implemented. In his
October 1 Independence Day speech Abacha announced a transition
timetable which purports to return Nigeria to democratically elected
civilian government by October 1, 1998. However, by year's end, little
progress had been made in the transition.
The Government continued to enforce its arbitrary authority through the
Federal Security System (the military, the state security service, and
the national police), and through decrees blocking action by the
opposition in the courts. All branches of the security forces committed
numerous serious human rights abuses.
At the end of the year, the economy continued its downward slide. While
the country's elites continued to prosper, unemployment,
underemployment, and inflation increased markedly. Nigeria depends on
oil exports for over 90 percent of its foreign exchange earnings and
over 75 percent of its budget revenues. In order to cope with reduced
oil revenues, the Government implemented a national Structural
Adjustment Program (SAP) from 1986 to 1991. While the SAP was a success
in some respects, economic conditions for the average citizen remained
very difficult, and successive military governments increasingly
abandoned reform by printing money the fueled inflation. Endemic
corruption further hindered the functioning of the economy.
The human rights record worsened in 1995. Throughout the year, the
Government cracked down hard on the opposition. The most prominent
outspoken critics of the regime remained in detention or self-imposed
exile abroad, although four detainees were released on December 31.
General Abacha's Government relied regularly on arbitrary detention and
mass arrest to silence its many critics. The winner of the annulled
June 1993 presidential election, Chief Moshood K. O. Abiola, remained in
detention on charges of treason. Security forces used excessive force
to combat a growing wave of violent crime, killing and wounding a number
of persons, including innocent civilians. Police tortured and beat
detainees, and prison conditions remained life threatening; many
prisoners died in custody. Citizens do not have the right to change
their government. To continue its hold on power, the regime enacted or
extended a series of harsh decrees restricting press freedom and civil
liberties which, like other military decrees, contained clauses
prohibiting judicial review of any government action. Prominent writer,
environmentalist, and minority rights activist Ken Saro-Wiwa and eight
others were executed November 10, following a trial by special tribunal
completely lacking in respect for due process for the murder of four
Ogoni politicians in May 1994. Former Head of State Olusegun Obasanjo,
his erstwhile deputy and outspoken National Constitutional Conference
delegate, Shehu Musa Yar'Adua, and more than 20 others were charged,
convicted, and sentenced by a secret military tribunal for their roles
in alleged March coup plot. Abacha announced in October that the PRC
had confirmed the Tribunal's verdicts, he also announced that the
Government had commuted many of the death sentences. Obassanjo was
sentenced to 15 years' imprisonment instead of life, and Yar'Adua's
death sentence was commuted to 25 years' imprisonment. Four military
officers were given life sentences.
Security services continued routine harassment of human rights and
prodemocracy groups, including labor leaders, journalists, and student
activists. Other human rights problems included violence and
discrimination against women; infringements of freedom of speech, press,
assembly, association, travel, and political and labor affiliation.
RESPECT FOR HUMAN RIGHTS
Section 1 Respect for the Integrity of the Person, Including Freedom
from:
a. Political and Other Extrajudicial Killing
As in previous years, police and security services commonly engaged in
extrajudicial killings and excessive use of force to quell antimilitary
and prodemocracy protests. Credible, although unconfirmed, reports by
Nigerian human rights groups indicate numerous deaths of suspects in
police custody. These reports are generally accepted by the public and
are consistent with other credible reports of police abuse, including
the use of torture to extract criminal confessions. The Government
seldom holds police and security services accountable for their use of
excessive, deadly force or the death of individuals in custody. The
Government's actions have fostered a climate of impunity in which these
abuses flourish.
Minority rights and environmental activist Ken Saro-Wiwa and eight
others were executed on November 10 after their conviction by a tribunal
which, although legally constituted, did not conform to the
internationally accepted norms for a fair trial (see Section 1.e.).
In January 52-year-old Uwanogho Obire died while in detention at Oghara
Police Station (Ethiope West), Delta state. Witnesses testified before
a judicial panel of inquiry that police interrogators tied Obire to a
bar suspended between two wooden frames and whipped him with an electric
cable and iron rods. In February the Government dismissed two Ondo
state policemen for flogging to death two robbery suspects during
interrogations at the Ondo town police station. The Movement for the
Survival of Ogoni People (MOSOP) publicized the case of Clement Tusiima,
an Ogoni who died while in government custody in August. In May 1994,
the Rivers state internal security task force had arrested Tusiima, a
skilled automobile technician, in Port Harcourt in connection with the
killings of four prominent Ogoni politicians. Reportedly tortured by
soldiers for several months at Bori military camp, Tusiima was
transferred to the State Intelligence and Investigation Bureau and
subsequently to Port Harcourt prison. MOSOP alleged that Tusiima was
denied urgently needed medical treatment following his ordeal and died
of brain damage.
Extrajudicial killings remained common. Increasing and widespread
violent crime prompted police to employ roadblocks and checkpoints,
where extortion, violence, and lethal force is reportedly common. On
January 25, Ikeja (Lagos) police shot and killed two university
students, Bola Afilaka and Ayodele Adejuyibe, after Afilaka refused to
stop his car at a checkpoint. Following a pursuit, police reportedly
apprehended the pair, shot them, then detained both at Adeniji Adele
police station. Nineteen-year-old Afilaka was found dead in the cell
the next morning. On February 1, 14-year-old roadside merchant Mabel
Ugwumanu was killed by stray bullets fired by police attempting to stop
a motorist at a checkpoint in Ihiala.
Mobile anticrime police patrols routinely shot people suspected of armed
robbery. According to the Human Rights Monitor (HRM) organization, in
May a police patrol in Kaduna state shot and killed three suspected
armed robbers. The police maintained that they shot the three suspects
to halt their escape while conveying them to Kano. HRM noted that the
police shot all three men in the chest, not in the back as would be
expected of people fleeing. In June Zaria police shot and killed 11
robbery suspects in two separate encounters. Police killed eight
suspects during a highway shootout and three others while attempting to
apprehend them at a Zaria hotel. Police maintain that all were trying
to escape. In August Lagos state police commissioner James Danbaba
claimed that police killed 30 suspected armed robbers during a series of
late July raids on their hideouts scattered throughout the state.
There were credible reports that "Lagos State Environmental Task Force"
(see Section 1.c.) members killed several citizens who refused to stop
at checkpoints or failed to comply with task force orders. In January
task force members pursued and shot two men who refused to stop at a
checkpoint. On April 12, task force members shot and killed a minibus
driver after he refused the use of his vehicle to pursue another
vehicle. On May 9 members shot and killed a 17-year-old boy after he
allegedly tried to flee from the premises of the Lagos state Transport
Corporation office in Oshodi. On March 16 three officials of the Akure
(Ondo state) Local Government Environmental and Sanitation Revenue Task
Force killed merchant Esther Akinbayajo in Akure during a minor argument
in which officials reportedly used excessive force.
b. Disappearance
There were no reports of politically motivated disappearances. However,
government detention practices have the effect of causing many detainees
to be "missing" for extended periods (see Section 1.d.).
c. Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading Treatment or
Punishment
The 1979 constitution (suspended) and the 1989 constitution (never
implemented) prohibit torture and mistreatment of prisoners and provide
criminal sanctions for such excesses. The Evidence Act of 1960
prohibits the introduction of evidence obtained through torture.
Nevertheless, detainees frequently die while in custody (see Section
1.a.), and there were credible reports that police seeking to extract
confessions regularly tortured and beat suspects. There were widespread
and credible reports that military interrogators beat and nearly
tortured to death detained coup plot suspects, including colonels Lawan
Gwadabe and R.S. Bello-Fadile. In February Defense Intelligence Service
agents reportedly tortured an Air Force sergeant whom they accused of
spying. Detainees are regularly kept incommunicado for long periods of
time (see Section 1.d.).
In its early months in power, the Abacha regime formed the Lagos State
Environmental Task Force, as part of its "war on indiscipline and
corruption." Under the direct supervision of the Lagos State
Administrator, Colonel Olagunsoye Oyinlola, the task force used brutal
force on individuals in its attempts to rid Lagos of illegal street
traders and copious accumulated garbage. Task force soldiers routinely
beat and arrested anyone they perceived as "undisciplined," usually
unarmed market women and traders, but also including jaywalkers, errant
drivers, children, and young street hawkers. Task force soldiers at a
Lagos bus stop routinely arrested and punished people who failed to use
a nearby pedestrian bridge. Those arrested were fined, public
humiliated for several hours, and subsequently released. On February 25
soldiers brandishing automatic weapons, whips, and billy clubs destroyed
"illegal markets" on Ikoyi and Victoria islands, confiscated goods, and
extorted money from petty traders.
In March Oyo state military administrator Colonel Chinyere Ike Nwosu
ordered motorists and taxi passengers from their vehicles at the Egebda
taxi and lorry motor park in Ibadan for allegedly violating Oyo
"Sanitation Day" exercise. Nwosu's mobile court fined scores of
motorists and forced them to kneel down in the hot sun. On April 25,
Nwosu's military aides attacked and beat a bank manager in Ibadan after
the banker's car narrowly avoided colliding with Nwosu's convoy of
vehicles. According to press reports, armed soldiers battered the man
with rifle butts, rendering him unconscious. The Government neither
acknowledges nor denies that these practices occur, and their
perpetrators go unpunished.
Prison conditions remain life threatening. Lack of potable water,
inadequate sewage facilities, and shortage of medical supplies result in
deplorable sanitary conditions. Disease runs rampant in the cramped,
poorly ventilated facilities. Prison inmates are seldom allowed outside
their cells for recreation, and many inmates must provide their own
food. In those cases, only those with money or whose relatives bring
food regularly have something to eat. Poor inmates rely on handouts
from others to survive. There are credible reports that prison
officials and police deny inmates food and medical treatment as a form
of punishment or to extort money from them. In October the convicted
coup plotters were dispersed to various prisons around the country,
inhibiting access to their families and food. The prisoners reportedly
also are denied adequate medication and medical care. Severe
overcrowding worsens the problem. For example, Ikoyi prison in Lagos,
built to house about 800 inmates, holds over 2,000.
The Government derives considerable savings from the practice of leaving
many children born in prison with their jailed mothers rather than
placing them in foster homes.
d. Arbitrary Arrest, Detention, and Exile
The regime repeatedly engaged in arbitrary arrest and detention. Police
are empowered to make arrests without warrants if they believe there is
reasonable suspicion of an offense; they often abuse this power. The
law requires that the arresting officer inform the accused of charges at
the time of arrest and take that person to a station for processing
within a reasonable time. By law, police must provide suspects with the
opportunity to engage counsel and to post bail. However, police
generally do not adhere to these safeguards. They often hold suspects
incommunicado under harsh conditions for extended periods without
charge; arbitrary detention occurs frequently. Police also commonly
place relatives and friends of wanted suspects in detention without
criminal charge in an effort to induce suspects to surrender to arrest.
The State Security (Detention of Persons) Decree of 1984 (Decree Two)
provides that the Government may detain without charge persons suspected
of acts prejudicial to state security or harmful to the economic well-
being of the country. When invoked by the Vice President, the decree
suspends the detainee's civil liberties and precludes judicial review.
Many citizens consider Decree Two the main threat to their basic
freedoms because the judicial ouster clause encourages arbitrary
detention and fails to define what constitutes acts prejudicial to state
security or national economic well-being. Decree 11 of 1994 authorizes
the PRC vice chairman or the Commissioner of Police to detain persons
for up to 3 months. Decree 14 of 1994 forbids courts to order the
Government to produce prisoners in court, effectively suspending the
right of habeas corpus.
Throughout the year, especially following an abortive March
1 coup plot, the PRC relied heavily on arbitrary arrest and detention.
Government security forces arrested and detained hundreds of military
personnel and scores of civilians. On March 13, security forces
arrested and detained former head of state Olusegun Obassanjo without
charge in Lagos for 10 days, before security agents returned him to his
Ota (Ogun state) farm, where they placed him under house arrest. Police
also arrested Obassanjo's erstwhile deputy and National Constitutional
Conference delegate, Shehu Musa Yar'adua March 9, and detained him in
Abuja before transferring him to Lagos' Kiri Kiri maximum security
prison. On June 5, the Government convened a secret special military
tribunal, chaired by Brigadier General Patrick Aziza, and formally
charged 16 soldiers and 7 civilians with treason and conspiracy (see
Section 1.e.). On July 14, the Government announced that the tribunal
had investigated 51 suspects, of which it had convicted and sentenced
40, including Obassanjo's and Yar'adua, for treason, conspiracy, and
concealment of treason. Three persons were declared "wanted" for their
alleged roles in the coup plot; seven were released; and one was cleared
of some charges, but was kept in detention for unspecified further
investigations (see Section 1.e.).
The Government also arrested and detained without charge several
prominent journalists, prodemocracy activists, and human rights
campaigners for their alleged roles in the coup plot. On March 15,
security agents arrested the publisher and editor-in-chief of The Sunday
Magazine, Chris Anyanwu, in response to her magazine's feature article
entitled "Coup Update: Blood Bath Soon." In May the Government
arrested Tell magazine assistant editor George Mbah, The News magazine
editor Kunle Ajibade, and Weekend Classique editor Ben Charles Obi. It
detained them at Directorate of Military Intelligence headquarters in
Lagos. On July 26 state security service agents arrested Olatunji
Abayomi, one of Obassanjo's attorneys and Human Rights Africa president;
Tell Magazine correspondent Wole Adeyemu; and British Broadcasting
Corporation assistant correspondent, Femi Shibewa. Adeyemu and Shibewa
were detained and interrogated overnight and released. On July 27, the
Government arrested Beko Ransome-Kuti, chairman of the Campaign for
Democracy (CD), after he criticized Abayomi's arrest and questioned the
veracity of the alleged coup plot. The Aziza Tribunal charged,
convicted, and sentenced Anyanwu, Mbah, Ajibade, Obi, and Ransome-Kuti
for treason, conspiracy, concealment of treason, and other alleged
"anti-regime" activities. Ransome-Kuti was sentenced to life
imprisonment, which Abacha reduced to 15 years in October (see Section
1.e.).
In addition to arrests related to the alleged coup plot, the Government
routinely arrested and detained without charge leading human rights and
prodemocracy activists. In January security agents arrested and
detained for 10 days Ransome-Kuti and Femi Falana. Falana is chairman
of the National Association of Democratic Lawyers. On January 17, the
Government arrested Sylvester Odion-Akhaine, secretary general of the
CD, and Shehu Sani, CD's Northern Nigeria organizer. It detained both
without charge and repeatedly ignored court orders to produce and
justify their continued detention. On April 20, security agents in
Abuja arrested and detained without charge Dr. Ore Falomo, the personal
physician of chief Moshood K.O. Abiola. Falomo was detained in Kaduna
prison until his release on April 23. No official reason was given for
his arrest and detention.
In May and June, the Government expanded its crackdown, arresting scores
of prodemocracy activists in a series of preemptive strikes prior to the
second anniversary of the annulled 1993 presidential election. In mid-
May security agents arrested Olawale Oshun, acting general secretary of
the National Democratic Coalition (NADECO), Josephine Okei, NADECO
assistant secretary, and Femi Falana after NADECO announced plans to
convene a commemorative convention in Lagos in early June. On June 1,
government security forces arrested and detained Ransome-Kuti, Kwara
state NADECO chairman Wole Oke, former Social Democratic Party
presidential aspirant and NADECO activist Olu Falae, and former Kwara
state governor and NADECO national publicity director Cornelius Adebayo.
In addition, Ondo state security forces arrested and detained the
octogenarian NADECO leader, Chief Michael Adekunle Ajasin, and 39
members of his Yoruba political and cultural association known as
Afenifere and charged them with holding an unauthorized political
meeting at Ajasin's house. On June 7, the Government arrested,
interrogated, and released Olisa Agbakoba, president of the Civil
Liberties Organisation (CLO), and two CLO employees, Steve Aluko and
Tunde Akannu. Agbakoba was rearrested on June 9 and detained for 2
weeks. No official reasons were given for their arrests and detention.
On July 3, security agents arrested Gani Fawehinmi, National Conscience
Party (NCP) president, and detained him without charge for 2 weeks.
Although no official reason was given for Fawehinmi's arrest, it
followed his July 2 press conference during which he had boldly
criticized the Abacha regime and denounced the Government's provisional
lifting of the ban on political activity (see Section 2.b.). Also in
July, the Government arrested Chima Ubani, the secretary general of the
Democratic Alternative (DA), Osagie Obayuwana, the Deputy National
President of CD, and CLO executive director Abdul Oroh. No official
reasons were given for their arrests and the Government ignored a Lagos
federal high court order to produce and justify Oroh's detention. In
late July, federal Ministry of Justice attorneys told the Lagos federal
high court that Abayomi and Ubani were being held under provisions of
the State Security (Detention of Persons) Decree of 1984. In September
police again arrested Gani Fawehinmi along with five fellow NCP
activists as Fawehinmi was about to address a party rally in Lagos. All
six were arraigned and released on their personal recognizance 3 days
after their arrest. Misdemeanor charges against Fawehinmi included
unlawful assembly and conduct liable to breach the public peace. Trial
on the misdemeanors was set for January 1996.
Throughout the year, government forces harassed and detained members of
MOSOP, including Ken Saro-Wiwa's brother and sister-in-law Owns and
Kiana Wiwa. Saro-Wiwa, Ledum Mitee, Barionem Kiobel, and 11 others also
remained in detention in Port Harcourt's Bori Military Camp, with
limited access to their lawyers, families or doctors until the end of
the proceedings. A court convicted Saro-Wiwa and eight others, who
received sentences of death by hanging. The other five defendants were
released. The "Ogoni Nine" were executed November 10 (see Section
1.a.). In August the Rivers state internal security task force arrested
four MOSOP activists including Lekue Lah-Loolo, Baton Mitee, Professor
Meshack Karanwi, and a cameraman who filmed several videos subsequently
incorporated into British television documentaries critical of the
Government and multinational oil companies. Following the Ogoni
executions, several clergymen and others were arrested and detained
briefly to preclude any organized mourning or possible demonstrations.
Several leading labor and prodemocracy activists, who were arrested in
1993, remained in detention at year's end, including: M.K.O. Abiola;
Fred Eno, personal aide to Abiola; Olu Akerele, Corporate Affairs
Manager of the Abiola-owned Concord Press; Frank Kokori, General
Secretary of the National Union of Petroleum, Energy, and Gas Workers
(NUPENG); Wariebi Kojo Agamene, President of NUPENG; R. Addo, first
president of the Petroleum and Natural Gas Senior Staff Association
(PENGASSAN); and P. Aidelomon, a PENGASSAN branch chairman.
The above cases were not isolated. The Government routinely detained
human rights monitors, journalists, and political opponents throughout
the year for making or publishing critical statements. Government
security forces frequently harassed, arrested, and detained journalists
for a variety of reasons, including the alleged spreading of false
information and stories that exposed the actions of government officials
(see Section 2.a.).
Most often the authorities did not charge detainees with a crime, held
them for only brief periods, and questioned them about their activities
and statements. Nigeria's total prison population is estimated at
65,000. A precise figure for the number of persons detained without
charge is unavailable. However, CLO estimates that 50,000 prisoners,
nearly 77 percent of the total prison population, are still awaiting
trial.
There are no reliable estimates of the number of political detainees.
At year's end, annulled 1993 presidential election victor M.K.O. Abiola
remained detained in prison, despite a November 1994 ruling by the
Kaduna Federal High Court of Appeals granting him bail on the condition
that he "not disturb the peace." In December 1994 the same court
overruled its earlier decision, and Abiola's attorneys appealed to the
Supreme Court. In May eight Supreme Court justices, including Chief
Justice Mohammed Bello, withdrew from hearing the case because of a
libel suit they had pending against Abiola's Concord Press, effectively
suspending hearings of Abiola's appeal until new justices are named to
the court. Abiola's trial on treason charges remained suspended
indefinitely on orders from the regime. Other long-term political
detainees, such as Olatunji Abayomi, Frank Kokori, and Abdul Oroh,
continued to be held without trial.
There were no known instances of forced exile as a means of political
control, although several NADECO members, including former Third
Republic Senator Bola Tinabu, retired Air Commodore Dan Suleiman, and
Nobel laureate Wole Soyinka were in self-imposed exile.
e. Denial of Fair Public Trial
To suppress opposition to its rule, the regime first bypassed the
regular courts in favor of "tribunals" and then declared itself above
the law by prohibiting court review of any government action. Sentences
are generally severe. The Government's reliance on tribunals, which
operate outside the constitutional court system, seriously undermines
the judiciary's independence and often results in legal proceedings that
deny defendants due process.
The regular court system is composed of both federal and state trial
courts, state appeals courts, the federal Court of Appeal, and the
federal Supreme Court. Under the 1979 constitution, courts of the first
instance include magistrate or district courts, customary or area
courts, Shari'a (Islamic) Courts, and for some specified cases, the
state high courts. The nature of the case usually determines which
court has jurisdiction. In principle, customary and Shari'a courts have
jurisdiction only if both plaintiff and defendant agree to accept it.
In practice, fear of legal costs, delay, and distance to alternative
courts encourage many litigants to choose these courts.
Decree One of 1984, the basic Constitution (modification and suspension)
decree, the first decree promulgated by the military officers who
overthrew the civilian regime of President Shehu Usman Aliyu Shagari in
1983, left the institutional framework of the judiciary relatively
intact. However, it established a parallel system of military tribunals
with sole jurisdiction over certain offenses, such as coup plotting,
corruption, armed robbery, and illegal sale of petroleum. A 1991 decree
amended Decree One by providing that only sitting or retired civilian
judges may preside over tribunals hearing nonmilitary cases.
The PRC retained the tribunal framework. In most cases before the
tribunals, the accused have the right to legal counsel, bail, and
appeal, although some tribunals substitute a presumption of guilt for
the presumption of innocence, and conviction rates in the tribunals
reportedly exceed conviction rates in the regular courts. In practice
tribunal proceedings often deny defendants due process.
For example, in late 1994 the Government set up the Ogoni Civil
Disturbances Special Tribunal to try Ken Saro-Wiwa and others for their
alleged roles in the killings of four prominent Ogoni politicians in May
1994 (see Sections 1.d. and 5). On February 6, Saro-Wiwa and four
others pleaded not guilty to charges that they procured and counseled
others to murder the politicians. On March 28, the tribunal charged 10
additional suspects and merged the cases with the ongoing case against
Saro-Wiwa. In June the 18-member defense team led by Gani Fawehinmi
withdrew in protest after the Government refused to comply with a
tribunal order to produce a videotape recorded May 22, 1994 at Port
Harcourt's Government House in which State Administrator Lt. Colonel
Dauda Komo proclaimed that Saro-Wiwa was "guilty of murder."
In July Saro-Wiwa's tribunal-appointed legal aid counsel attorney
resigned from the case, saying that his client refused to cooperate. In
August the tribunal's chairman, Justice Ibrahim Auta, advised Saro-Wiwa
and the others to cooperate with their newly appointed lawyers and
suggested that failure to do so was not in their "best interest" because
it would not stop tribunal proceedings. On October 31, the tribunal
announced guilty verdicts and death sentences for Saro-Wiwa and eight
other Ogoni activists. The PRC "confirmed" this decision November 8 and
executed all nine November 10 (see Section 1.a.).
On June 5, the Government convened a secret special military tribunal,
chaired by Brigadier General Patrick Aziza, and charged 16 soldiers
including 4 colonels (Lawan Gwadabe, R.S. Bello-Fadile, R.A. Emokpae, O.
Oloruntoba), 7 Lt. Colonels (S.E. Oyewole, K. Happy Bulus, M.A. Igwe,
R.D. Obiki, V.O. Bamgbose, O.E. Nyong, C.P. Izuorgu), 3 Captains (M.A.
Ibrahim, A.A. Ogunsuyi, U.S.A. Suleiman), Second Lieutenant Richard
Emonvhe, Staff Sergeant Patrick Usikpeko, and 7 civilians (Ret. Lt.
Colonel M.A. Ajayi, Ret. Major Akinloye Akinyemi, Felix Ndmaigida, Peter
Ijaola, Julius Badejo, Matthew Popoola, Sanusi Mato) with treason,
concealment of treason, and conspiracy. The Government claims the
defendants were tried in accordance with military law and had appointed
military lawyers. There were credible reports that most military
lawyers refused to represent the alleged coup plotters because they saw
it as a "losing proposition." On June 30, the Lagos federal h1gh court
dismissed Akinloye Akinyemi's suit challenging the constitutionality of
the tribunal. Judge Vincent Eigbedion termed Akinyemi's lawsuit
"foolhardy and incomprehensible" and based the court's decision on the
"ouster" clauses contained in the 1990 Special Military Tribunal Act
which prevent the judiciary from interfering with tribunal matters. The
tribunal charged, convicted, and sentenced prominent human rights
activists, journalists, and others, including relatives of the coup
suspects, for their alleged "antiregime" activities throughout July and
August.
In October the Government announced that the PRC and Abacha had approved
final sentences for those convicted of participation in the coup plot.
However, Abacha reduced the original sentences passed by the tribunal
due to the international campaign for clemency for the coup plotters.
The death sentences of Akinyemi, Gwadabe, Oloruntoba and Bello-Fadile
were commuted to life imprisonment. The death sentences for conviction
of conspiracy to commit treason of Yar'adua, Bulus, Oyewole, Emokpae,
Igwe, Lt. Col. Ajayi, and four others were commuted to 25 years. The
life sentences for convictions of concealment of Obaangjo, Ibrahim,
Usikepo, Mato, Ndmaigida, Badejo, Popoola, Obiki and eight others were
reduced to 15 years. Long-term political detainee George Mbah was
convicted along with the coup plotters. Mbah's conviction was reduced
from life imprisonment to 15 years. Prison terms for a variety of other
offenses were similarly reduced. Military personnel who had been
discharged but not tried were to be released and discharged from
service.
The Government's frequent refusal to respect court rulings also
undercuts the independence and integrity of the judiciary. In April and
May, government security agents at Murtala Muhammed International
Airport (MMIA) twice ignored court orders termitting Gani Fawehinmi to
travel abroad (see Section 2.d.). On April 10, security agents told
Fawehinmi that they had been instructed to ignore an April 6 Lagos
federal high court order and to prevent Fawehinmi from boarding a
British Airways flight to London. Fawehinmi alleged that the head of
state personally ordered that he not be allowed to travel abroad for
urgently needed medical treatment because he was seen as a threat to the
Government. In August the Government ignored Lagos federal high court
orders to produce and justify the continued detention of CLO executive
director, Abdul Oroh, and CD Chairman Beko Ransome-Kuti. The state
security service initially ignored court orders to produce and justify
the detention of Olatunji Abayomi and Chima Ubani, then declared that it
held them under Decree Two provisions.
Seriously damaging the shred of credibility the judiciary retained, the
regime in August 1994 declared itself above the law. Decree 12 of 1994
states that "no act of the federal military government may be questioned
henceforth in a court of law," and "divests all courts of jurisdiction
in all matters concerning the authority of the federal Government."
Criminal justice procedures call for trial within 3 months of
arraignment for most categories of crimes. Inefficient administrative
procedures, petty extortion, bureaucratic inertia, poor communication
between police and prison officials, and inadequate transportation
continue to result in considerable delays, often stretching to several
years in bringing suspects to trial.
Trials in the regular court system are public and generally respect
constitutionally protected individual rights, including a presumption of
innocence, the right to be present, to confront witnesses, to present
evidence, and to be represented by legal counsel.
There are no legal provisions barring women or other groups from
testifying in civil court or for giving their testimony less weight.
The testimony of women is, however, accorded less weight in Shari'a
courts. There is a widespread perception that judges are easily bribed,
or "settled," and that the litigants cannot rely on the courts to render
impartial judgment.
The number of political prisoners (as distinct from political detainees)
held by the Government was also unknown.
f. Arbitrary Interference with Privacy, Family, Home, or
Correspondence
Provisions of the 1979 and 1989 constitutions provide for the rights to
privacy in the home, in correspondence, and in oral electronic
communications. However, the military government regularly interfered
in the lives of its citizens, and if the authorities desired to use a
warrant in a particular search case, they often secured it from a
military tribunal rather than a regular court. Human rights and
prodemocracy leaders, including Gani Fawehinmi, Glory Kilanko, and Olisa
Agbakoba, reported that security agents regularly followed them and cut
off or monitored their organizations' telephones. Credible sources
report an increase in harassment and intimidation by police and military
units in Ogoniland following the execution of Ken Saro-Wiwa and the
eight other Ogoni activists. Abuses perpetrated in Ogoniland included
random search of houses and cars without warrants or probable cause and
prevention of any public display of mourning for the Ogoni Nine.
A 1995 money laundering decree allows the National Drug Law Enforcement
Agency to monitor telephone communications, access computer systems, and
obtain bank and financial records of individual and corporate customers.
Section 2 Respect for Civil Liberties, Including:
a. Freedom of Speech and Press
The Abacha regime often publicly declared its support for these
freedoms, but it nevertheless sought to confine public political
dialogue to the constitutional conference. The regime also increased
its systematic intimidation of the press through legal and extralegal
means throughout the year. Constitutional provisions providing for
freedom of speech and the press are not enforceable because of continued
suspension of constitutional rights.
There is a large and vibrant press, which is frequently critical of the
Government. Nonetheless, the Government directly owns or controls many
newspapers and has shut down several others. The Government granted
broadcasting rights to private radio stations for the first time in
1994.
The Government used a variety of methods to repress its many critics.
In January and February it extended its August 1994 decrees proscribing
for 6 months three newspaper publishing houses: the Concord Group; the
Punch Group; and the Guardian Group. These new decrees granted the
Abacha regime and its agents legal immunity from challenges to actions
it took to implement the decrees, even when the action predated the
decree. In July it rescinded the Guardian proscription order reportedly
after that publishing group's owner and former Interior Minister, Alex
Ibru, personally apologized for having offended the Head of State. In
October Abacha announced the removal of the earlier bans on Punch and
the National Concord, expressing the "hope that these media houses will
now operate responsibly within the law and in the national interest."
Throughout the year, government security agents frequently harassed,
arrested, and detained journalists. In January security agents arrested
Sani Abdullahi and Yusuf Dingyadi, Hausa Service reporters for the Voice
of America (VOA) and British Broadcasting Corporation (BBC)
respectively, and detained them without charge. The Government accused
the pair of spreading false information, inciting religious hatred, and
broadcasting inaccurate reports about religious clashes in Sokoto (see
Section 5). In March security agents arrested Bayo Onanuga, editor-in-
chief of The News, Tempo, and P.M. News, after The News reported on
meningitis and cholera epidemics in Enugu, Ibadan, and Kaduna, three of
four proposed host cities for the 1995 Junior Soccer World Cup. In May
the Government arrested and detained an A.M. News reporter after he
published a story alleging that the chief of general staff, General
Oladipo Diya, had been a victim of advance fee fraud, commonly known as
"419." In July security operatives arrested Babafemi Ojudu, A.M. News
Editor, and Olusesan Ekinsola, the general manager of Ray Power 100.5,
the only private radio station in Nigeria. Although no official reasons
were given for their arrests, it was widely believed to be in response
to a broadcast that soldiers had laid siege to an Ikeja police station.
In August Enugu state police arrested and detained Louis Onyia,
correspondent for The Week magazine, who refused to disclose his source
of information regarding an article that the state police commissioner
had consulted "oracles" to assist police investigations.
Government repression of journalists continued through the summer with
the August 7 arrest of Fred Ohwahwa, Third Eye on Sunday editor, and the
August 31 arrest of Osa Director, Tell Magazine's Kano bureau chief. No
official reasons were given for their arrest and detention. In
September security agents arrested the managing director of Sub-Saharan
Press Limited (publishers of The Week magazine), Chris Mamah, and The
Week editor, Godwin Agbroko. No reasons were given for their arrest;
however, it was most likely in response to the magazine's September 11
feature entitled "Abacha's Illness: Top Aides Struggle to Take Over."
The Government increased harassment of the independent press in
December. Information Minister Walter Ofonagoro led a high profile
campaign warning journalists not to publish articles against the
interests of the Government. Security agents increased their overall
efforts to intimidate, harass, and arrest prodemocracy journalists.
On December 16, the headquarters of The Guardian was set on fire. Press
accounts said that the fire "was set by men reportedly dressed in
military uniform." On December 17, the Government detained staff of
Tell Magazine, then seized that publication's entire print run, which
featured a headline article, "Abiola Freedom." On December 23, the
State Security Service (SSS) confiscated approximately 32,000 copies of
the January 1 edition of Tell Magazine at the Academy Printing Press in
Ilupeju and ransacked Tell offices in Ikeja. Several hours later, the
SSS arrested Nosa Igiebor, editor-in-chief of Tell. On December 31,
arsonists set fire to the offices of the Independent Communcations
Network Limited, publishers of The News and Tempo. There were credible
reports that the fire was set by the SSS.
The Government also denied entry to and deported foreign journalists,
including two South Africa-based journalists, Henrick Thomsen and Ric
Miller, of a leading Danish daily newspaper. In May it seized thousands
of copies of the May 22 international edition of Newsweek magazine which
contained an article critical of the Head of State.
The military government used a number of other means to intimidate the
press. These included a decree banning government offices from
advertising in nongovernment media, periodic directives to government
offices forbidding the purchase of certain publications, personal
attacks in government-controlled media against journalists and others
who challenged government policies, and threats of harassment of
potential advertisers and investors in antigovernment publications. In
August the regime dismissed both Tunji Oseni, chief executive of the
government-controlled Daily Times newspaper, and its board of directors.
It appointed a sole administrator, Innocent Oparadike, in their place.
Television, both Nigerian and foreign, is widely available. Access is
limited more by substandard cable installation, electrical power surges
and outages, and technical broadcasting difficulties than by government
intervention.
Academic freedom is generally respected, although the head of Ahmadu
Bello University's Political Science Department claimed that faculty
cannot in fact conduct research. There were credible reports that the
Government secretly tape recorded conversations among faculty at the
University of Ibadan and the University of Lagos. Security agents
subsequently confronted faculty members with the recordings and
interrogated them concerning their alleged political activities. Some
student groups believe university authorities follow government
directives to suspend or expel activist students.
b. Freedom of Peaceful Assembly and Association
The two constitutions provide citizens with the right to assemble freely
and associate with other persons in political parties, trade unions, or
other special interest associations. However, the Government proscribed
all political activity 1 day after coming into power in 1993. In August
1994, General Abacha announced that "individuals or groups may
henceforth canvass political ideas, but they cannot form political
parties for now." On March 3, Ibadan police stopped a rally marking the
end of Ramadan at Oke Ado market after an announcement that prominent
Ibadan politician Lamidi Adedibu was scheduled to speak. In May the Edo
and Oyo state military administrators issued orders indefinitely banning
all political and tribal meetings. In June the Government arrested 39
supporters of Afenifere, and charged them with holding an unauthorized
political meeting (see Section 1.d.).
On June 27, Abacha announced a partial lifting of the month-old ban on
political activity. Enthusiasm over the lifting of the ban was muted,
however, by Abacha's announcement that no political activities would be
allowed until the moribund National Electoral Commission (NEC) was
reconstituted. The only immediate effect of Abacha's announcement was
that political and cultural associations, such as Afenifere, NADECO, and
Gani Fawehinmi's NCP, theoretically could establish themselves as
political parties. Only 1 week after Abacha's announcement, Fawehinmi
was arrested for holding an illegal political rally in Lagos.
Permits are not normally required for public meetings indoors, and
permit requirements for outdoor public functions are often ignored by
both Government and those assembling. However, the Abacha government
retained the authority of Decree Five of the Babangida government, which
had banned gatherings whose political, ethnic, or religious content it
believed might lead to unrest.
Although Abacha announced the lifting of restrictions on political
activities in his October 1 Independence Day address, he issued no
enabling decree. The Lagos police chief refused to grant the NADECO a
permit for a mid-December rally, disbursing the 10,000 people in
attendance with clubs and tear gas. Police also aborted a mid-December
rally in Abeokuta in support of the release of Abiola, Ransome-Kiti, and
Obasanjo. CD Acting Chair Frederick Fasehun and others arrested at the
stillborn rally have been charged with sedition, disturbance of the
peace, and unlawful assembly. On December 27, the Government issued a
directive that all universities be closed, reportedly to prevent the use
of students for illegal rallies by prodemocracy groups. At year's end,
the Government continued to repress the political activities of
opposition groups.
Open-air religious services away from places of worship remain
prohibited in most states due to religious tensions in various parts of
the country.
Religious, professional, and other organizations need not register with
the Government and are generally permitted freely to associate with
other national and foreign bodies. The PRC retained its ban on several
political organizations which it contended were founded primarily along
ethnic, tribal, religious, or other parochial lines for the purpose of
sponsoring various political candidates.
c. Freedom of Religion
The Government generally respects freedom of belief, practice, and
religious education which had been provided for by the suspended 1979
and 1989 constitutions. Decree One (suspending most of the 1979
constitution) and the stillborn 1989 constitution also prohibited
federal and state governments from adopting a state religion, and the
PRC reaffirmed the secular nature of the state in its instructions to
the constitutional conference. The Government instituted a ban in 1987
(which is still in effect) on religious organizations on campuses of
primary schools, although individual students retain the right to
practice their religion in recognized places of worship.
Distribution of religious publications is generally unrestricted. There
is a lightly enforced ban on published religious advertisements, and
religious programming on television and radio remains closely controlled
by the Government. Both Christian and Muslim organizations allege that
the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Immigration Department continue
to restrict the entry into the country of certain religious
practitioners, particularly persons suspected of proselytizing. While
it has not outlawed the practice, the Government discourages
proselytizing in the belief that it stirs up religious tensions,
particularly in the predominantly Islamic north.
d. Freedom of Movement Within the Country, Foreign Travel,
Emigration, and Repatriation
The two constitutions entitle citizens to move freely throughout the
country and reside where they wish. However, increasing violent crime
in many parts of the country prompted police to set up roadblocks and
checkpoints, where officials commonly engaged in extortion, violence,
and excessive use of force.
Those constitutions also prohibited expulsion or the denial of exit or
entry to any citizen. In practice, however, women must often obtain
permission from a male family member before being granted a passport,
and the Government, like its predecessors, occasionally prevented travel
for political reasons.
For example, in August the Government prevented Gani Fawehinmi from
exiting Port Harcourt Airport and "deported" him back to Lagos.
Government security agents told Fawehinmi that they had "orders from
above" that he not be allowed to enter Port Harcourt; not to talk to
anyone or address any gathering; and that he be returned to Lagos
"immediately." In April and May, government security agents at MMIA
twice prevented Fawehinmi from boarding an international flight.
Fawehinmi subsequently managed to travel abroad, but government security
agents immediately seized his passport upon his return to Lagos.
Throughout the year the Government routinely seized the passports of its
critics. On June 7, government security agents at MMIA seized the
passport and plane ticket of Abiola's attorney, Godwin Ajayi, prior to
his planned departure to attend an international Bar Association
conference. On June 30, the Government confiscated the passport of
prominent feminist, Glory Kilanko, who, 1 week before, criticized the
Government's human rights record at a British Commonwealth NGO forum in
Wellington, New Zealand. In August the Government seized the passports
of Nigerian Bar Association President Priscilla Kuye, Women in Nigeria
representative Nyoko Toyo, Citizen magazine editor Bilikisu Yusufu, and
Mero Mandara and prevented them from traveling to the Fourth United
Nations Conference on Women in Beijing. In March government security
agents seized former head of state Olusegun Obasanjo's passport after he
returned from the United Nations World Summit on Social Development.
Journalists reported harassment at the nation's airports by security
officials throughout the year, including having to fill out a special
exit and entry form detailing their movements abroad, reasons for making
their trip, and friends and associates overseas. Security officials
harassed or temporarily confiscated the passports of journalists who
refused to complete the form. There were credible reports that the
Government had assigned military security personnel to MMIA to screen
departing passengers to apprehend prodemocracy supporters. Government
security agents were instructed to question extensively citizens who had
been issued United States visas. If the agents were not satisfied with
the responses, they had orders to seize passports and turn the suspects
over to military intelligence and state security service personnel for
additional questioning.
Nigerian law and practice permit temporary refuge and asylum for
political refugees from other countries. The Government cooperates with
the Lagos office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees in
dealing with an estimated 4,300
Liberian, 1,400 Chadian, 580 Cameroonian, 140 Ghanaian, and an
undetermined number of Togolese, Somalian, Sudanese, and Ethiopian
refugees. There were no reports that refugees were expelled from
Nigeria in 1995.
Section 3 Respect for Political Rights: The Right of Citizens to
Change Their Government
Citizens could not exercise this right in 1995 and there was little
indication that General Abacha's military regime was willing to permit
them to do so on any basis other than a process tightly controlled by
the regime. Throughout the year, the regime committed numerous,
repeated, and egregious human rights abuses in its effort to prevent
citizens from opposing it by peaceful political means.
After coming to power, the Provisional Ruling Council headed by General
Abacha promised a return to civilian, democratic rule but did not
provide a timetable. The regime instead convened a constitutional
conference which prepared a draft constitution, but did not set a
definitive date for the termination of military rule. In his October 1
Independence Day address, Abacha announced a transition timetable
leading to inauguration of a civilian president on October 1, 1998. The
process was to begin with the adoption of a new constitution, lifting of
all restrictions on political activities, establishment of an electoral
commission, creation of committees on transition implementation,
national reconciliation, and federal character, and appointment of a
panel on creation of new state and local governments, all within the
final 3 months of 1995. The transition program further provides for a
series of local, state and federal elections over a period of 3 years.
It does not provide for any meaningful civilian participation, other
than in elections, and Abacha has not indicated any intention to
relinquish control during the transition process.
So far, Abacha has made no meaningful progress in the 3-year transition
program. The new constitution proposed by the National Constitutional
Conference in June was never adopted. Only in early December did Abacha
take the first step when he approved the composition of three of the
transition committees. On December 22, Abacha announced the
establishment of the last three committees. However, Abacha never
issued enabling decrees for any of the new bodies, without which they
are powerless. By year's end, no positive action in the direction of
civilian rule had emerged from any of the bodies.
Nigerian politics remains dominated by men. However, there are no legal
impediments to political participation or voting by women or members of
any other minority group. There are three women in the PRC's Federal
Executive Council.
Section 4 Governmental Attitude Regarding International and
Nongovernmental Investigation of Alleged Violations of Human Rights
The Government permitted local human rights groups to operate but often
interfered with their activities, detaining their members and preventing
them from criticizing the Government's human rights record (see Sections
1.d. and 2.a). High-level government officials regularly denounced the
activities of Nigeria's human rights community, often accusing its
members and the independent press of participating in foreign-inspired
plots to destabilize the country.
Notwithstanding the Government's hostile attitude, national and
international human rights groups engaged in a vocal and public campaign
for the promotion of human rights. Among the most active organizations
are: the CLO; the Committee for the Defense of Human Rights (CDHR); the
CD; the Constitutional Rights Project (CRP); the National Association of
Democratic Lawyers; Human Rights Africa (HRA); the HRM; the NCP; the
Institute of Human Rights and Humanitarian Law; the Legal Research and
Resource Development Center; the National Association of University
Women; the International Federation of Women Lawyers; Women in Nigeria;
and the Human Rights Committee of the Nigerian Bar Association. A
number of prominent authors, including Nobel laureate Wole Soyinka,
artists, educators, and jurists, in addition to professional and labor
organizations, spoke out frequently on human rights issues as well.
Amnesty International is active in Nigeria, and the International
Committee of the Red Cross has a regional office based in Lagos.
The Government sometimes prevented foreign human rights monitoring
groups and individuals from visiting Nigeria. In August government
security agents detained and deported two South African-based
journalists for a Danish newspaper (see Section 2.a.). The pair had
planned to meet with leading human rights and prodemocracy activists, as
well as MOSOP representatives, during their 2-week visit. In July the
Government refused the United Nations Human Rights Commission's (UNHRC)
Working Group on Arbitrary Detention permission to visit, citing the
UNHRC's failure to respond to a joint CLO, CRP, MOSOP, CD, CDHR, and HRA
request on July 24 to send a country mission to assess the human rights
situation. The Government admitted British Commonwealth Human Rights
Initiative delegation representatives to the country in July but denied
them access to detainees.
Section 5 Discrimination Based on Race, Sex, Religion, Language,
Social Status, or Disability
Both the 1979 and 1989 constitutions provide citizens with the right to
freedom from discrimination based on "community, place of origin, ethnic
group, sex, religion, or political opinion." However, customary and
religious discrimination against women persists, while tension between
the Government and disaffected minority ethnic groups is on the rise.
Women
Reports of spousal abuse are common, especially wife-beating in
polygynous families. Police do not normally intervene in domestic
disputes, which are seldom discussed publicly. In more traditional
areas, it is questionable whether the courts and police actively
intervene to protect women who formally accuse their husbands if the
level of alleged abuse does not exceed customary norms in the area.
Purdah, the Islamic practice of keeping girls and women in seclusion
from men outside the family, is prevalent in parts of Nigeria's far
north. Women also bear the brunt of attacks for social and religious
reasons, particularly for "immodest" or "inappropriate" behavior.
Women experience considerable discrimination as well as physical abuse.
There are no laws barring women from particular fields of employment,
but women often experience discrimination because the Government
tolerates customary and religious practices which adversely affect them.
While the number of women in the formal sector increases every year,
women do not receive equal pay for equal work and often find it
extremely difficult to acquire commercial credit or obtain tax
deductions or rebates as the heads of households.
While some women have made considerable individual progress, both in the
academic and business world, most are underprivileged. Though women are
not legally barred from owning land, under some customary land tenure
systems only men can own land, and women gain access to land through
marriage or family. In addition, many customary practices do not
recognize a woman's right to inherit her husband's property, and many
widows are rendered destitute when their in-laws take virtually all of
the deceased husband's property. In other areas, a widow herself is
considered part of the property, and she too may be "inherited" by the
husband's eldest male relative. Polygyny is widely practiced among all
ethnic groups in both Christian and Islamic communities. Women often
must provide permission from a male family member to obtain a passport
(see Section 2.d.).
Children
The Government only occasionally condemns child abuse and neglect and
makes little effort to stop customary practices, such as the sale of
children into marriage. It remains only sporadically committed to
children's welfare. Public schools continue to deteriorate, and limited
facilities precluded access to education for some children. While the
Government increased spending on children's health in recent years, it
seldom enforced even the inadequate laws designed to protect the rights
of children. Although the law stipulates that "no child shall be
ordered to be imprisoned," juvenile offenders are routinely denied bail
and incarcerated along with hardened criminals.
There are credible reports that poor families often sell their daughters
into marriage as a means of supplementing their incomes. There are also
reports that many young girls are forced into marriage as soon as they
reach puberty, regardless of age, to prevent "indecency" associated with
premarital sex.
The Government publicly opposes female genital mutilation (FGM), which
is widely condemned by international health experts as damaging to both
physical and psychological health. Nigeria cosponsored a resolution at
the Fourth World Health Assembly calling for the elimination of harmful
health practices, including FGM. However, the Government has taken no
action to abolish the procedure, and nearly all ethnic groups subject
young females to it. Nigerian experts estimate that as many as 50
percent of Nigerian women, primarily in the Christian south but less in
the Muslim north, may have undergone FGM, which varies from simple
removal of the clitoral hood or labia minora to excision of the clitoris
and the most dangerous form, infibulation.
The age at which females are subjected to FGM varies from the first week
of life to after a woman delivers her first child. The Ministry of
Health and NGO's sponsor public awareness and education projects to
inform communities of the health hazards of FGM. The press openly
condemned the practice on a number of occasions.
People with Disabilities
While the Government called for private businesses to institute policies
ensuring fair treatment of the 2 percent of the work force that it
claims is disabled, it has not enacted any laws fostering greater
accessibility to buildings and public transportation, nor has it
formulated any policy which specifically ensures the right of the
disabled to work.
National/Racial/Ethnic Minorities
The Government has promulgated no official policy concerning
discrimination against any of Nigeria's 250 ethnic groups, and laws do
not favor one group over another. However, Nigeria has a long history
of tension among its diverse ethnic groups.
Clashes continued between rival ethnic groups in Delta, Rivers, Benue,
Cross River, Plateau, and Taraba states, often resulting in casualties.
Tradition continues to impose considerable pressure on individual
government officials to favor their own ethnic group, and ethnic
favoritism persists. The Ogoni, an ethnic group indigenous to Rivers
state in eastern Nigeria (Nigeria's oil producing region), maintain that
the Government continues to engage in a systematic campaign to deprive
them of their land and its wealth.
Members of the Ogoni group claim that the Government seizes Ogoni
property without fair compensation, ignores the environmental impact of
oil production on Ogoni land, and fails to provide adequate public
services, such as water and electricity. MOSOP, which campaigns for
greater Ogoni autonomy, often describes government policy towards the
Ogoni as genocide. The confrontation between the Government and the
Ogoni has increasingly turned violent, and Ogoni concerns about
environmental degradation and the quality of social services in the oil
producing region have merit. Despite this, accusations that the
Government is engaged in a genocidal campaign against the Ogoni are
unfounded. Other ethnic minorities, particularly in Delta, Rivers, and
Akwa Ibom states, have echoed Ogoni claims of environmental degradation
and government indifference to their development. Groups such as the
Ijaw, Itsekiri, and Urhobo have grown increasingly vocal in expressing
their unhappiness, while the prevalence of ethnic conflict and
confrontation with government forces increased in these areas.
Religious Minorities
The law prohibits religious discrimination. Nonetheless, it is commonly
reported that government officials often discriminate against persons
practicing a religion different from their own. Religious tensions
often lead to violence, as in January, May, and June when clashes
between Muslims and Christians in the northern cities of Kano and Sokoto
resulted in scores of deaths and the partial destruction of each city's
central market. In response, the Christian Association of Nigeria
condemned the killings, and alleged official indifference to the
incidents. To date the Government has not prosecuted anyone for the
killings.
Section 6 Worker Rights
a. The Right of Association
Although basic labor legislation dating to 1974 remains in place,
decrees enacted in 1994 that dissolved elected national executive
councils of the Nigeria Labor Congress (NLC) and two key oil sector
unions and placed them under the authority of government-appointed sole
administrators have effectively emasculated the labor movement. Nigeria
has signed and ratified the International Labor Organization's (ILO)
Convention on Freedom of Association, but there are no safeguards
preventing the Government from interfering in the administration of
labor unions. The Government's exercise of absolute power over the
affairs of the NLC, NUPENG, and (PENGASSAN) fly in the face of
international obligations and demands by numerous international bodies.
Although the International Confederation of Free Trade Unions (ICFTU),
the World Confederation of Labor and the Organization of African Trade
Union Unity (OATUU) filed a complaint with the ILO committee on freedom
of association following the 1994 dismissal of the three National
Executive Councils, the Government had not responded positively by
year's end. Instead, it kept NUPENG General Secretary Frank Kokori and
President Waribi Agamene and two officials of PENGASSAN in custody
without charge since August 1994, and used threats and investigations to
intimidate union officials and undermine union members' resolve to
resist government domination.
The Government's promises to allow elections of new executive councils
in advance of the June ILO conference were never fulfilled, nor was the
labor movement allowed to choose its own representatives to the ILO.
Instead, the Government attempted unsuccessfully to seat workers'
delegates of its choosing. In the ensuing debate on Nigeria in the
ILO's committee on the application of conventions and recommendations,
delegates adopted a "special paragraph" that took the Government to task
for denying trade unions the right to elect their leaders freely. The
1995 action supplemented the 1994 finding of the ILO committee on
freedom of association that the Government's interference in the
administration of labor unions and its restriction of workers rights is
in direct contravention of ratified conventions. The committee then
recommended that the Government remove appointed administrators from
labor bodies, restore suspended union executives and allow them access
to the premises of union headquarters, and restore dues checkoff. By
year's end, none of these demands had been met.
The Government proceeded with plans to impose its own restructuring plan
on the 41 unions of the NLC and was considering a draft constitution for
the labor central. Elections of union executives at local and branch
levels were occurring, but the Government continued to balk at holding
elections for national executives, apparently fearing that the election
would put in office trade unionists who would challenge government
involvement in union affairs.
At the end of the year, the Government had failed to respond to a
request by the ILO to send a delegation to Nigeria aimed at securing the
release of trade unionists and was again cited in a December 1
resolution of the ICFTU executive board that appealed to all affiliates
and international trade secretariats to support measures to seek the
release of the jailed trade unionists and the elimination of government
interference in trade union affairs.
Workers, except members of the armed forces and employees designated
essential by the Government, may join trade unions. Essential employees
include firefighters, police, employees of the central bank, the
security printers (printers of currency, passports, and government
forms), and customs and excise staff. In May 1993, the Government
promulgated the Teaching Essential Services Decree, declaring education
an essential service. The decree did not, however, proscribe education
sector unions.
Approximately 70 percent of the work force is employed in agriculture.
Agricultural workers, except for small numbers in the food processing
sector, are not unionized. Most of the informal sector and practically
all small industries and businesses remain nonunionized. Approximately
11.5 percent of the total work force belong to unions.
In contravention of the ILO Convention on Freedom of Association, the
Government has decreed that the NLC is the single central labor body.
Although state executive councils of the NLC continue to function,
government interference makes it difficult for the NLC to represent
workers effectively. The NLC has claimed to represent 3 million workers
of a total work force of 30 million. This figure is difficult to verify
and may have dropped in light of a depressed manufacturing sector and
significant public sector reductions in force. The Government continued
to resist attempts by higher graded workers and middle management to
form and register an independent labor central. However, the Senior
Staff Consultative Association of Nigeria continues to serve as an
unregistered central for the senior staff associations. Because it is
unrecognized by the Government, its leaders have also been more
outspoken on political issues than the NLC.
The right to strike is recognized by law except for those performing
essential services. However, workers are required to give 21 days'
notice prior to commencing a strike. There are no laws prohibiting
retribution against strikers and strike leaders, but strikers who feel
they are facing unfair retribution may submit their cases to the
industrial arbitration panel whose decisions are binding on all parties.
In April the Government fired 3,000 striking Kwara state civil servants
who were demanding promised government relief packages, including 100
percent increases in transportation and housing allowances. The
Government subsequently reinstated the workers, except for union
officials, and dissolved the union.
On May 18 after negotiations broke down, security agents and riot
police, backed by an armored personnel carrier, broke up a demonstration
and arrested scores of striking Nigerian Security Minting and Printing
Company workers who were protesting poor working conditions and the
Government's failure to implement promised relief packages. They had
gathered in front of the Lagos Mint to press their demands. Citing the
Essential Services Decree, the Government dismissed 2,500 workers. Many
of these workers were subsequently rehired as new employees, thereby
forfeiting seniority rights and benefits.
In September teachers struck for 2 weeks over demands that included
payment of allowances and salary arrears that had previously been agreed
to in negotiations. They returned to work when the Government paid half
of the arrears, gave a date certain for payment of the remainder, and
agreed to continue work on stalled consideration of a new teachers'
salary schedule and a teachers' registration procedure. Strikes in the
public sector occurred in many of the 30 states, typically when
underfunded state and local governments failed to fulfill previously
negotiated contract provisions relating to salaries and allowances. The
National Association of Resident Doctors struck for a week in November
on wage-related issues, returning to work when Government conceded two
demands and promised to study two others. At Ahmadu Bello University
Teaching Hospital (ABUTH) in Zaria, the strike by doctors coincided with
the gruesome murder of the medical director of the hospital by service
workers who mobbed his office to protest failure of the hospital to pay
allowances. The doctors at ABUTH, in addition to wage demands, pressed
the authorities to find and arrest suspects and to improve hospital
security.
Nonagricultural enterprises which employ more than 50 employees are
obliged by law to recognize trade unions and to pay or deduct a dues
checkoff for employees who are members. The NLC has complained that
some employers deliberately organize their industries into multiple
units employing less than 50 workers to avoid unionization. The
Government threatened to withdraw the dues checkoff provision and make
the payment of union dues completely voluntary if unions pursue strikes.
This was the case in August 1993 when the NLC called a general strike,
and in September 1994 at the conclusion of the petroleum strike.
In August 1991, the Government revoked a policy in effect since 1975
that permitted international labor affiliation only with the OATUU and
affiliated Pan-African labor federations. Under Decree 32, affiliation
with non-African international labor organizations was allowed.
Negotiations commenced with the ICFTU seeking formal affiliation, but
the removal of the NLC executive and the protracted political
confrontation have precluded further progress on these applications. In
December the ICFTU adopted a resolution critical of the Government's
labor policies and actions.
b. The Right to Organize and Bargain Collectively
The labor laws provide for both the right to organize and the right to
bargain collectively between management and trade unions. Collective
bargaining is, in fact, common in many sectors of the economy. Laws
further protect workers against retaliation by employers for labor
activity through an independent arm of the judiciary, the Nigerian
Industrial Court (NIC), which handles complaints of antiunion
discrimination. Before cases can be brought to the NIC, parties are
required to seek mediation and conciliation through the Ministry of
Labor. Unresolved disputes can subsequently be taken to the Industrial
Arbitration Panel and the NIC. Union officials have, however,
questioned the independence of the NIC in light of its refusal to
resolve various disputes stremming from Government's failure to fulfill
contract provisions for public employees.
There have been no significant reforms in labor practice since January
1991, when the Government abolished the uniform wage structure for all
government entities. This allowed each tier of government--federal,
state, local, and parastatals--freedom to negotiate its own level of
wages, benefits, and conditions of employment. As a result,
negotiations previously conducted on a nationwide basis under the direct
supervision of the Labor Ministry are now conducted on a local, often
plant-wide, basis with less government involvement.
One export processing zone is in development in Calabar, Cross River
state. Workers in such zones are subject to same national labor laws.
c. Prohibition of Forced or Compulsory Labor
The 1974 Labor Decree and the 1989 constitution prohibit forced or
compulsory labor. However, the ILO noted that with no constitution in
force, the Government may be unable to enforce the ILO convention
against forced labor.
d. Minimum Age of Employment of Children
The 1974 Labor Decree prohibits employment of children under
18 years of age in commerce and industry and restricts other child labor
to home-based agricultural or domestic work. The law further stipulates
that children may not be employed in agricultural or domestic work for
more than 8 hours per day. The Decree allows the apprenticeship of
youths aged 13 under specific conditions.
Primary education is compulsory, although this is rarely enforced, and
recent studies show declining enrollment due mainly to the continuing
deterioration of public schools. This lack of sufficient primary school
infrastructure has ended some families' access to education, forcing
them to place their children in the labor market. The ILO and the
United Nations Children's Fund, in consultation with the NLC, have
concluded that child labor, while not yet endemic, is increasing and
could become a serious problem.
e. Acceptable Conditions of Work
The 1974 Labor Decree sets a minimum wage, which is reviewed on an ad
hoc basis. The last review in 1991 was undertaken by a tripartite group
consisting of representatives of the NLC, the Nigeria Employers'
Consultative Association, and the Ministry of Labor. With the
considerable decline in the naira, the Group raised the minimum wage
from $2.90 (250 naira) to $5.00 (450 naira) per month, a level which
does not provide a decent living for a worker and family.
The Labor Decree also established a 40-hour workweek, prescribes 2 to 4
weeks of annual leave, and stipulated that workers must be paid extra
for hours worked over the legal limit. The decree also stated that
workers who work on Sundays and statutory public holidays must be paid a
full day's pay in addition to their normal wages. There is no law
prohibiting excessive compulsory overtime.
The decree contains general health and safety provisions, some aimed
specifically at young or female workers. While it requires that the
Factory Inspectorate of the Ministry of Labor and Employment inspect
factories for their compliance with health and safety standards, this
agency neglects safety oversight of construction sites and other
nonfactory work. The decree also requires employers to compensate
injured workers and dependent survivors of those killed in industrial
accidents. The Labor Decree does not provide workers the right to
excuse themselves from dangerous work situations without loss of
employment. The Labor Ministry, which is charged with enforcement of
these laws, has experienced large staff turnover and has been largely
ineffective in identifying violations. The Government has failed to act
on various ILO recommendations since 1991 to update its moribund
Inspection and Accident Reporting Program.
(###)
[end of document]
Return
to 1995 Human Rights Practices report home page.
Return to DOSFAN
home page.
This is an official U.S. Government source
for information on the WWW. Inclusion of non-U.S. Government links
does not imply endorsement of contents.