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TITLE: PAKISTAN HUMAN RIGHTS PRACTICES, 1994
AUTHOR: U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE
DATE: FEBRUARY 1995
PAKISTAN
Pakistan is an Islamic republic in which power is shared
between the Prime Minister, as the leader of the National
Assembly, and the President. The Chief of Army Staff also
wields considerable influence on many major policy decisions
and is the third member of the unofficial "troika" which
governs the nation. During 1994, Prime Minister Benazir Bhutto
dominated political policymaking, with President Farooq Leghari
playing a complementary role. Chief of Army Staff General
Abdul Waheed consulted closely with the Government but avoided
active involvement in governing.
Responsibility for internal security rests primarily with the
police, although paramilitary forces, such as the Rangers and
Frontier Constabulary, are responsible for maintaining law and
order in frontier areas. On November 30, the Army and
paramilitary forces ended their operation, begun in 1992, to
help restore law and order in Sindh province. Provincial
governments control the police and paramilitary forces when
they are assisting in law and order operations. Both forces
committed abuses in 1994.
Pakistan is a poor country, with great extremes in the
distribution of wealth, an extremely high rate of illiteracy,
and a per capita income of $400. Its economy includes both
state-run and private industries and financial institutions.
The Constitution assures the right to private property and the
right of private businesses to operate freely in most sectors
of the economy. The Government continues to pursue economic
reform, emphasizing the privatization of government-owned
financial institutions, industrial units, and utilities.
Cotton, textiles and apparel, rice, and leather products are
the principal exports.
Although the Government made strong public commitments to
address human rights concerns, particularly those involving
women, child labor, and minority religions, most human rights
abuses are rooted deeply in the social fabric. At year's end,
these efforts had not resulted in a significant change in the
overall human rights situation. Serious problems continue in
many areas. Government forces continued to use arbitrary
arrest and detention, and have tortured or otherwise abused
prisoners and detainees. They are unchecked by any serious
government effort to reform the police or judicial systems or
to prosecute those responsible for abuse. This Government, as
did previous ones, continued to harass political opponents and
to repress the Sindh-based Mohajir Qaumi Movement (MQM)
political party.
Islamic religious zealots continued to discriminate against and
persecute religious minorities, basing their activities in part
on discriminatory legislation against those religious
minorities. The Government proposed changes in the enforcement
of the so-called blasphemy law to limit its abuse, but no
changes were enacted and abuse continued. However, in November
the Lahore High Court overturned the 1992 blasphemy conviction
of a Christian, Gul Masih.
Religious and ethnic-based rivalries resulted in numerous
murders, mosque bombings, and occasional civil disturbances.
Traditional social and legal constraints kept women in a
subordinate position in society. They continued to be
subjected to murder, torture, rape, and other forms of
degradation both by agents of the State and societal elements.
The Government and employers continued to restrict workers'
rights significantly. The use of child and bonded labor
remained widespread in spite of both legislation to restrict
these practices and the signing of a Memorandum of
Understanding (MOU) on child labor with the International Labor
Organization (ILO). Little was done to improve basic
conditions for women and children. Female children continued
to fall behind their male counterparts in such measures as
levels of health care and education.
RESPECT FOR HUMAN RIGHTS
Section 1 Respect for the Integrity of the Person, Including
Freedom from:
a. Political and Other Extrajudicial Killing
Extrajudicial killings, often in the form of staged "police
encounters" in which the police or military shoot and kill the
suspects--many of them unarmed--continued in 1994. Most of
these killings occurred in rural Sindh Province as part of the
Army's law and order program, "Operation Cleanup," which ended
on November 30. A survey conducted in June by the Human Rights
Commission of Pakistan (HRCP) reported that the incidence of
excesses committed by or attributed to the Army and the police
in Sindh had diminished in early 1994. However, the frequency
of extrajudicial killing throughout Pakistan reported in the
press indicates that this continues to be a serious problem.
A typical case occurred on May 3, when police killed five men
in Sukkur, Sindh province. An HRCP investigation determined
that the men were rounded up, brought to a police clerk's
residence, tied up and killed with automatic weapons in a
well-planned operation. The Government denied this allegation,
saying the victims were dangerous criminals who were killed
during a 2-hour "encounter" with police.
The HRCP reported 32 extrajudicial deaths in Sindh between
January and May. Many are believed to have died as a result of
police torture. The Government did not charge or try any law
enforcement personnel for these killings.
The Government used excessive force to control political
demonstrations in Karachi. At least 13 people were killed and
87 injured during police clashes with MQM demonstrators from
April 29 to May 1. The opposition claims that the police
killed two demonstrators in October during an
opposition-organized strike in Punjab.
Ethnic and sectarian tensions rose during 1994. Members of
Shi'a and Sunni Muslim organizations targeting rival groups set
off numerous bombs, especially in Sindh and Punjab provinces,
causing over a dozen deaths. The Government made few arrests.
Some of the bombs were set off following inflammatory sermons
delivered during Friday prayers. Ethnic and religiously
motivated riots continued to occur. In Karachi, people were
killed almost daily in fighting among factions of the MQM, and
between the MQM and Sindhi nationalists. The rate of killings
increased in the second half of the year.
b. Disappearance
There were no reported disappearances.
c. Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading
Treatment or Punishment
There continued to be credible evidence that police tortured
and otherwise mistreated detainees. For example, the HRCP
reported that Bakhshan Khan Bhatti died in jail on July 25.
Prisoners claim that Bhatti was hung upside down and beaten.
However, the authorities maintained that he died from illness
and internal pain.
In other cases, 13 police officers were charged with torturing
to death Pervez Akhtar in a police lockup on June 17 in Gujar
Khan, Punjab. The Government arrested four officers in
connection with Akhtar's death, but released them on bail and
took no further action. According to a May 25 press report, a
Christian boy was tortured to death while in Gojra Sadar police
custody. In one egregious case, security forces arrested a
25-year-old MQM activist in Sindh province on June 21,
reportedly blindfolded and stripped him, and questioned him
about the location of MQM weapons. The activist died in
custody. After family members recovered the man's body, they
reported that his eyes had been gouged out, his neck drilled,
his ears chopped off, and his shoulder and backbone broken.
Police and jailers so routinely use force to elicit confessions
and compel detainees to incriminate others that the practice
has become standard procedure. Torture methods included:
beating, burning with cigarettes, whipping the soles of the
feet, sexual assault, prolonged isolation, electric shock,
denial of food or sleep, hanging upside down, forced spreading
of the legs, and public humiliation including stripping in
public. Some magistrates and doctors helped cover up the abuse
by issuing investigation and medical reports that the victims
died of natural causes.
Police frequently use the threat of abuse to extort money from
prisoners and their families. In some cases, the authorities
have detained whole families to force a relative, the subject
of an arrest warrant, to surrender.
Upon assuming his position, the superintendent of the Karachi
central jail reportedly ordered 450 prisoners stripped, and
many of them beaten, injuring at least 50. During this period
from January 13 to 15, the prisoners were kept in a 24-hour
lockup, with no toilet facilities, no water, and little food.
The superintendent justified his actions as part of his mandate
to clean up corruption at the jail. Abuse is reported to have
continued in the jail throughout the year.
Despite regulations that prohibit the police from detaining
women overnight, some women continue to be arbitrarily detained
overnight and sexually abused. The police reportedly gang
raped five women in a village in Sindh province on January 18.
Although there is increasing coverage of rape in the
English-language press, rape victims often do not file reports
because of social taboos, police intimidation, and family
pressure. There are few policewomen to perform matron duties,
despite regulations requiring that policewomen must be present
in station houses during the questioning or detention of
females. To address this problem, the Government opened
"women's police stations" in several cities staffed by female
personnel. However, the press has reported that the staff is
poorly trained. The Government is offering these officers
additional training.
Rape, along with other forms of police and military abuse,
takes place in a climate of impunity caused by the failure of
successive Governments to prosecute and punish the abusers.
This failure is the single largest obstacle to ending or even
reducing the incidence of abuse. The authorities transfer or
arrest offending officers, but seldom prosecute or punish
them. There were no known court convictions of abusive police
officers in 1994. In general, investigating officers shield
their colleagues. Persons who attempt to bring charges against
police officers are often threatened by other officers and drop
the charges. However, according to one human rights advocate,
the Government took action in several cases--a move which
reportedly resulted in a decline of such sexual abuse cases in
1994.
The incidence of torture and abuse was not restricted to the
security forces. There were reports that different factions of
the MQM tortured and killed members of rival groups. Three
persons were killed on July 16 in Karachi. According to the
press, two of the victims were members of the MQM's Altaf
group. Their bodies were discovered in a field with marks of
torture, including burn wounds and broken bones. The other
victim, a member of the MQM's Haqiqi group, was gunned down in
the street along with his 5-year-old niece. MQM gunmen are
also suspected of murdering six Karachi policemen on June 28.
The Hadood Ordinances, promulgated by the central Government in
1979, were an attempt to make the Penal Code more Islamic.
These Ordinances provide harsh punishments for violating
Islamic law, or Shari'a, including death by stoning for
unlawful sexual relations and amputation for some other
crimes. In practice, the standards of evidence for imposing
these punishments are exceptionally high, and to date they have
never been carried out.
Nonetheless, these laws apply to Muslims and non-Muslims alike
and weigh most heavily on women. Under these ordinances, a
woman who reports that she has been raped or files for divorce
may find herself charged with adultery. All consensual
extramarital sexual relations are considered violations of the
Hadood Ordinances. However, according to a lawyer from the
HRCP, the Government has brought fewer charges against women
under the Hadood Ordinances than in the past, and the courts
have shown greater leniency toward women in their sentences and
in the granting of bail.
There are three classes of prison facilities: Class "C" cells
generally hold common criminals--convicts and those in pretrial
detention. Such cells often have dirt floors, no furnishings,
and poor food. The use of handcuffs and fetters is common.
Prisoners in these cells reportedly suffer the most abuse, such
as beatings and being forced to kneel for long periods.
Conditions in "B" and "A" cells are markedly better. The
authorities reserve the latter for "prominent" persons.
There were several reports in 1994 that wealthy landlords or
political parties operated private jails. Many such jails are
believed to exist in tribal and feudal areas. Some of the
prisoners have reportedly been held in them for many years.
The police raided several such jails in 1994 and released the
prisoners. In February the police raided a private jail
operated by a local landlord in Umerkot, Sindh province. They
released 13 men, 11 women, 9 girls, and 7 boys. The police
arrested four persons during the raid.
d. Arbitrary Arrest, Detention, or Exile
The law permits a Deputy Commissioner (DC) of a local district
to order detention without charge for 30 days of persons
suspected of threatening public order and safety. The DC may
renew detention in 30-day periods, for a total of 90 days. For
other criminal offenses, the police may hold a suspect for 24
hours without charge. If the police can provide material proof
that detention is necessary for an investigation, a court may
extend detention for a total of 15 days.
In practice, the authorities do not strictly observe the limits
on detention. The police are not required to notify anyone
when an arrest is made, and often hold detainees without charge
until they are challenged by a court. The police sometimes
detain individuals arbitrarily without charge, or on false
charges, in order to extort payment for their release. The law
stipulates that detainees must be brought to trial within 30
days of their arrest. However, in many cases trials do not
start until about 6 months after the filing of charges.
The authorities generally permit family members and lawyers to
visit inmates. However, in some cases the authorities refuse
such visits, even though the detainee has been held for years
awaiting trial. A report published by the HRCP on a visit to a
prison in Sukkur, Sindh province, in July cited 11 detainees
who had been awaiting trial from 1 to 3 years. HRCP officials
speculate that detainees in other areas may have been held for
over 10 years.
The Government uses mass arrests to quell civil unrest. The
army arrested over 800 MQM party workers from May 4 to 7,
following 5 days of violence in Karachi. The arrested included
3 MQM Senators and 11 MQM members of the Sindh Provincial
Assembly. Almost all were released within 1 week. The
authorities established detention facilities near the
Provincial Assembly building to allow jailed assembly members
to attend sessions.
The Federally Administered Tribal Areas have a separate legal
system, the Frontier Crimes Regulation, which recognizes the
doctrine of "collective responsibility." Under this
regulation, the authorities are empowered to detain the fellow
members of a fugitive's tribe, or to blockade the fugitive's
village, pending his surrender or punishment by his own tribe,
as is the local tradition. The Government exercised such
authority in 1994. After the Supreme Court ruled that all
federal laws extend to tribal areas, the tribes in the Malakand
Division of the Northwest Frontier province clashed with
government forces, demanding a return to Islamic law. The
tribes blockaded roads and an airport, killed a member of the
Provincial Assembly, and held numerous officials hostage. In
response, government forces were called in to pacify the area,
and burned several houses belonging to the leaders of the
unrest. In November the provincial government agreed to a
return to Shari'a law in Malakand Division after 30 Islamic
activists and soldiers were killed in the fighting.
In August the Inter-Services Intelligence Agency (ISI), the
Government's military intelligence organization, detained
Shaukat Ali Kashmiri, the Secretary General of the Jammu and
Kashmir People's National Party. In September the ISI released
Mr. Kashmiri from Attock Fort Detention Center, but denied that
it had held him in detention.
The authorities arrested more than 1,100 political opponents of
Prime Minister Bhutto, including 45 members of the provincial
and national assemblies, prior to or during the October 11
general strike. The authorities charged only a few of them and
released most within a month. The Government filed criminal
charges, ranging from murder to possession of illegal weapons,
against five opposition members of the National Assembly who
were arrested on October 11. Three were later released on bail
but two refused to apply for bail and remained in custody at
year's end.
e. Denial of Fair Public Trial
The judicial system involves several different court systems
with overlapping and sometimes competing jurisdictions. There
are civil and criminal systems with special courts for
high-profile cases, as well as the Federal Shari'a appeals
courts for certain Hadood offenses. The appeals process in the
civil system is: civil court, district court, high court, and
Supreme Court. In the criminal system, the progression is:
magistrate, sessions court, high court, and Supreme Court.
The civil judicial system provides for an open trial,
cross-examination, representation by an attorney, and appeal of
sentences. Attorneys are appointed for indigents only in
capital cases. There are no jury trials. Owing to the limited
number of judges, the heavy backlog of cases, and outdated
court procedures, cases routinely drag on for years. In both
the Hadood and standard criminal codes, there are bailable and
nonbailable offenses. According to the Criminal Procedures
Code, the accused in bailable offenses must be granted bail and
the accused in "nonbailable" offenses should be granted bail if
accused of a crime where the sentence is less than 10 years.
Bail is set, often purposely, at unreasonably high levels for
indigent defendants.
The Federal Shari'a Court,and the Shari'a Bench of the Supreme
Court serve as appeals courts for certain convictions in the
criminal court under the Hadood Ordinances. The Federal
Shari'a Court also may overturn legislation judged to be
inconsistent with the tenets of Islam. However, these cases
may be appealed to the Shari'a Bench of the Supreme Court.
The judicial process continued to be impeded by bureaucratic
infighting and inactivity and the overlapping jurisdictions of
the different court systems. Scores of positions in the lower
magistracy remained unfilled. Persons in jail awaiting trial
are sometimes held for periods longer than the sentence they
would receive if convicted.
Cases involving bombings, sabotage, highway robberies,
banditry, or kidnaping may be brought before three types of
special courts. These include the special courts established
by the Suppression of Terrorist Activities Act of 1975 to try
"terrorist" cases and the "speedy trial courts," established by
a 1987 ordinance to circumvent the judicial backlog. The
Government abolished both of these courts in July. A third
type of court, established in 1991 by the Constitution's 12th
amendment, adjudicates heinous crimes. In 1991 the President
promulgated new ordinances which gave the Federal Government
the exclusive authority to refer cases to these courts. In
practice, the Government refers cases involving violent
criminal offenses to these courts.
Many legal experts believe the special courts do not provide
for a fair trial. They maintain that the short time for
investigations and trials detract from the accused's right to
prepare an adequate defense. Some observers maintain that
trial procedures have effectively repudiated the presumption of
innocence. They also cite the encroachment by federal
authorities on the provincial government's constitutional
authority to administer justice and the inherent unfairness of
parallel courts to which cases may be assigned arbitrarily.
Moreover, the special courts may deny bail if the judges decide
that the accused may have reasonably committed an offense.
Government officials and some attorneys maintain that despite
the deficiencies, the special courts are necessary because of
the judicial backlog. They also maintain that the rules of
evidence apply in the courts, defendants have the right to
counsel, and the judges must meet the same standards as those
appointed to a high court. Defendants also have the right to
appeal, but only one appeal is allowed.
In late 1993, the Government announced that it would allow the
speedy trial courts ordinance to lapse in July 1994. After
that date, the Government transferred all pending cases and
investigations before the speedy courts to the regular courts.
The special terrorist courts still exist.
The judiciary is not independent. Through the President's
power to transfer High Court justices and grant tenure to new
appointees, the executive branch is able to influence the
provincial High Courts, and especially the lower levels of the
judicial system. Judges in the special courts are retired
jurists, who are hired on renewable contracts. The desire to
maintain their positions influences many of their decisions.
Despite the Government's promise to strengthen judicial
independence, it took several measures regarded as efforts to
influence the court for political reasons. In February, in a
ruling regarded as politically motivated, the Supreme Court
upheld the right of two members of the Northwest Frontier
Provincial Assembly, who were members of the Muslim League
Nawaz group, to join the Pakistan People's Party (PPP). Their
move allowed the PPP to gain control of the assembly. In other
moves regarded as politically motivated, the PPP government and
the President transferred the well-respected chief justice of
the Sindh High Court to the Federal Shari'a court, replacing
him with a judge considered loyal to the PPP. There was also
criticism of the appointment of 20 new judges to the Lahore
High Court. The Government also refused to confirm six judges
named to the High Court in Sindh province, and several High
Court judges in Punjab, who had been appointed when the
opposition party was in power.
After dissolving the first Bhutto government in 1990, President
Ghulam Ishaq Khan established special "accountability"
tribunals to try members of previous federal and provincial
governments on criminal and corruption charges. However, only
members of the Bhutto government--all of whom belong to the
PPP--were charged with corruption and misconduct. No members
of other political parties were brought to trial. In 1994 the
tribunals acquitted the accused.
In 1994 the Government brought numerous criminal cases against
members of the former Nawaz Sharif government, their
businesses, and their political supporters. The Government
also filed cases to have Nawaz Sharif and other members of his
party disqualified from the National Assembly. The Government
incarcerated several accused persons, including Nawaz Sharif's
75-year-old father, who was arrested in November for tax
evasion and money laundering. The authorities released the
father after 4 days, but at year's end his case and those of
the others were pending.
A 1990 Shari'a court decision resulted in the introduction of
the Islamic concepts of Qisas--roughly an "eye for an eye"--and
Diyat--"blood money"--into the Penal Code. The Qisas and Diyat
Ordinance allows compensation to be paid to a victim's family
in lieu of the accused receiving punishment. As a result,
wealthy or influential persons sometimes escape punishment for
such crimes as murder and assault. The right to seek pardon or
commutation is not available to defendants under the
ordinance. The Hadood and Qisas and Diyat ordinances apply to
both ordinary criminal courts and Shari'a courts.
Appeals of certain Hadood convictions involving penalties in
excess of 2 years' imprisonment are referred exclusively to the
Shari'a courts. Cases referred to the Federal Shari'a court
are heard jointly by Islamic scholars and High Court judges
using ordinary criminal procedures. Cases referred to the
Shari'a bench of the Supreme Court are heard jointly by Islamic
scholars and Supreme Court judges using ordinary criminal
procedures. Judges and attorneys must be Muslim and be
familiar with Islamic law. Within these limits, defendants in
the Shari'a court are entitled to the lawyer of their choice.
There is a system of bail.
Under the Hadood Ordinances, evidence is given different weight
depending on the religion and sex of the witness. A non-Muslim
may not be a witness against a Muslim but may offer testimony
against another non-Muslim. Testimony of females is not
admissible for the harsher punishments (lashing, amputation,
and stoning). In cases involving financial matters, the
testimony of two women is required for it to be admitted as
evidence. The evidentiary laws that apply to lesser
punishments are roughly based on English common law.
There continued to be charges that magistrates and police,
under pressure to achieve high conviction rates, persuade
detainees to plead guilty without informing them of the
consequences. Politically powerful persons also attempt to
influence magistrates' decisions and have used various forms of
pressure on the magistrates, including the threat to transfer
them to other assignments. Magistrates also perform a wide
variety of administrative functions for the provincial
governments, reducing the time devoted to judicial duties.
Administration of justice in the Federally Administered Tribal
Areas is normally the responsibility of tribal elders and
maliks, or leaders. They may conduct hearings according to
Islamic law and tribal custom. In such proceedings, the
accused have no right to legal representation, bail, or
appeal. The usual penalties consist of fines, even for
murder. However, the Government's political agents, who are
federal civil servants assigned to local governments, oversee
such proceedings and may impose prison terms of up to 14 years.
In remote areas outside the jurisdiction of the Political
Agents, tribal councils occasionally levy harsher, unsanctioned
punishments, including flogging or death by shooting or
stoning. Paramilitary forces under the direction of the
political agents frequently perform punitive actions during
enforcement operations. For example, in raids on criminal
activities the authorities have been known to damage
surrounding homes as extrajudicial punishment of residents for
having tolerated nearby criminal activity.
There are fewer than 10 known political prisoners. Several are
serving sentences under the laws concerning the Ahmadi
religious sect. One person is appealing the death sentence for
blasphemy (see Section 2.c.).
f. Arbitrary Interference with Privacy, Family, Home, or
Correspondence
By law the police must obtain a warrant to search a house but
do not need a warrant to search a person. However, the police
often enter homes without a warrant. In the absence of a
warrant, a policeman is subject to charges of criminal
trespass. However, policemen are seldom punished for illegal
entry.
The Government maintains several domestic intelligence services
which monitor politicians, political activists, suspected
terrorists, and suspected foreign intelligence agents.
Credible reports indicate that the authorities commonly resort
to wiretapping and occasionally intercept and open mail.
Section 2 Respect for Civil Liberties, Including:
a. Freedom of Speech and Press
The Constitution provides for freedom of speech and the press,
and citizens are generally free to discuss public issues.
However, the Constitution stipulates the death penalty for
anyone who damages the Constitution by any act, including the
publication of statements against the spirit of the
Constitution. The Constitution prohibits the ridicule of
Islam, the armed forces, or the judiciary. Moreover, the Penal
Code mandates the death sentence for anyone convicted of
blaspheming the Prophet Muhammad (see Section 2.c.).
Journalists censor themselves on such subjects.
A Print, Press, and Publications Ordinance requires the
registration of printing presses and newspapers and allows the
Government to confiscate newspapers or magazines deemed
objectionable. Foreign books must pass government censors
before being reprinted, although the importation of books is
freely allowed. Government censors occasionally ban
publications, usually for objectionable religious content, but
for other reasons as well. In 1994 the Government banned a
book entitled "The Political Role of Intelligence Agencies in
Pakistan" because it contained a critical view of intelligence
agencies.
A government-owned press trust controls two newspapers--an
English-language and an Urdu daily. The Ministry of
Information controls one of the two main wire services; the
other is privately owned. The numerous privately owned
newspapers have a circulation that far exceeds that of the
government-owned newspapers. The government newspapers and
wire services are circumspect in their coverage of the news and
generally follow the government line.
Nevertheless, the press has enjoyed an increasing level of
freedom since 1989. Privately owned newspapers freely discuss
public policy and criticize the Government. They report
remarks made by opposition politicians and their editorials
reflect a spectrum of views.
The Government attempts to influence editorial policy at
privately owned newspapers by its power to allocate duty-free
newsprint and its placement of government advertising--an
important source of newspaper revenue. In the first half of
1994, the Ministry of Information stopped placing advertising
for several months with two leading Urdu dailies, Khabrain and
Nawa-e-Waqt, claiming they had engaged in irresponsible
journalism. There were also widespread reports that
journalists took bribes from government or opposition political
parties.
Various political parties and the police harassed journalists
and newspaper companies. The police arrested Farooq Aqdas,
senior political correspondent of an Urdu daily, Jang, during
the summer and detained him for several hours on charges filed
against him a year and a half earlier by another journalist.
On December 4, unidentified gunmen assassinated Muhammad
Salahuddin, the editor of the weekly Takbeer in Karachi.
Salahuddin was known for his criticism of the MQM and PPP and
he had been the victim of previous attacks on his home and
office in 1990 and 1991. On December 6, unidentified
assailants shot dead the General Manager of an Urdu daily,
Parcham, in his Karachi office.
The Government owns and operates all radio stations, and all
but one semiprivate television station. It strictly controls
their news broadcasts. However, the Shalimar Television
Network (STN), a semiprivate television station, provides
programs including Cable News Network (CNN) and British
Broadcasting Corporation (BBC) programs, with considerable
independence from government oversight. The Government censors
segments of CNN and BBC considered socially offensive. The
Ministry of Information monitors the advertisements on STN,
editing or removing those deemed objectionable.
Conservative religious and political groups have been active in
promoting their own code of social morality. The Shari'a Law
has bolstered such efforts by placing greater pressure on
individuals to conform to Islamic sensibilities. In 1994 there
were occasional reports of campaigns to remove obscene
materials from video stores, but book and video stores
generally operated without hindrance.
Literary and creative works remain generally free of
censorship. Obscene literature, a category broadly defined by
the Government, is subject to seizure. Dramas and
documentaries on previously taboo subjects, including
corruption, social privilege, narcotics, violence against
women, and female inequality, are now broadcast on television.
The Government and universities generally respect academic
freedom. However, the atmosphere of violence and intolerance
fostered by student organizations, typically tied to political
parties, is a threat to academic freedom. On some campuses,
well-armed groups of students of varying political persuasions
clash with and intimidate other students, instructors, and
administrators on matters of language, syllabus, examination
policies, doctrine, and dress.
Human rights groups remain concerned about the implementation
of a 1992 Supreme Court ruling that prohibits student political
organizations on campuses. While they acknowledge the ruling
led to a reduction of campus violence, they question the
legality of school officials expelling students they find
guilty of membership in a political organization.
b. Freedom of Peaceful Assembly and Association
The Government generally permits peaceful assembly. District
magistrates occasionally exercised their power under the
Criminal Procedures Code to ban meetings of more than four
people when demonstrations seemed likely to result in
violence. This provision was invoked frequently in June during
the Islamic month of Muharram, when tensions between Sunni and
Shi'a Muslims traditionally peak. Many observers attributed
the relatively peaceful month of Muharram to these measures.
The Government usually did not interfere with large political
rallies, although in an attempt to prevent a strike, it
arrested over 1,000 opposition members in October.
Opposition leader Nawaz Sharif and a large number of supporters
traveled unhindered across the country in September, holding
large rallies critical of the Government. However, the
authorities sometimes prevented leaders of politico-religious
parties to travel to certain areas if they believed their
presence would increase sectarian tensions.
The Constitution provides for freedom of association subject to
restrictions by government ordinance and law. There have been
no recent cases of banned groups or parties.
c. Freedom of Religion
Pakistan is an Islamic republic in which 97 percent of the
people are Muslim. The Constitution requires that laws must be
consistent with Islam. The Government permits Muslims to
convert to other faiths but prohibits proselytizing among
Muslims.
Minority groups fear that the Shari'a Law and its goal of
"Islamizing" government and society may further restrict the
freedom to practice their religion. Many reportedly live in
terror because the religious legislation has encouraged an
atmosphere of religious intolerance which has led to acts of
violence directed at Ahmadis, Christians, Hindus, Zikris, and
others. Several incidents in 1994 heightened the sense of
insecurity and fear among the religious minorities.
In April men riding a motorcycle shot and killed Manzoor Masih,
a Christian, as he departed a courthouse in Lahore where he was
being tried for blasphemy. The authorities had arrested Masih
and two other Christians, including a 13-year-old boy, in 1993
for allegedly writing blasphemous remarks about the Prophet
Muhammad on a wall--even though two of the three were
illiterate. Two other persons with Manzoor were injured in the
attack. The police arrested three suspects, among them the
complainants who brought the blasphemy case against Masih. At
year's end, the suspects were free on bail. While government
officials condemned the incident, Christian leaders and human
rights groups maintain that the Government reacted weakly and
has done little to discourage extremists or offer increased
protection to religious minorities. In at least two other
instances, the inhabitants of two villages of Christians,
including Masih's village, were forced to move after receiving
threats from Muslim extremists.
A 1974 constitutional amendment declared Ahmadis to be a
non-Muslim minority because they do not accept Muhammad as the
last prophet of Islam. However, Ahmadis regard themselves as
Muslims and observe many Islamic practices. In 1984 the
Government inserted Section 298(c) into the Penal Code which
prohibited an Ahmadi from calling himself a Muslim and banned
Ahmadis from using Islamic terminology. The punishment is up
to 3 years' imprisonment and a fine. Since 1984, the
Government has used Section 298(c) to harass Ahmadis.
In 1993 the Supreme Court ruled against the Ahmadis in a case
on the constitutionality of Section 298(c). The Court upheld
that section of the law, rejecting the argument that it
violated the right of freedom of speech and religion. The
judge writing for the majority found that Islamic phrases are
in essence a copyrighted trademark of the Islamic religion. He
reasoned that the use of Islamic phrases by Ahmadis was
equivalent to copyright infringement and violated the Trademark
Act of 1940. The majority also found that the use of certain
Islamic phrases by Ahmadis was equivalent to blasphemy.
The judgment has emboldened anti-Ahmadi groups and resulted in
more court cases against Ahmadis. In 1994 the Government
promised that it would defend Section 298(c) from an appeal on
other grounds. In the first 9 months of 1994, 17 cases under
Section 298(c) were filed against Ahmadis resulting in 1
conviction. Rashood Ahmad of Sangahr was sentenced to 2 years
in prison and fined $166 for displaying a verse from the Koran
on his wall.
In January the authorities arrested five journalists, including
the septuagenarian editor of Al Fazal, the Ahmadi daily, under
Section 298(c). The arrests were made because of general
complaints that the writers in Al Fazal had propagated their
faith and passed themselves off as Muslims, thus injuring the
feelings of Muslims. The five were released on bail on March
7. At year's end, their case was pending in the courts.
In another incident, the Rawalpindi Development Authority
demolished an Ahmadi center in Rawalpindi on September 15. The
Government claimed that the land was illegally converted to a
place of worship--despite the fact that the land had been used
for worship for 40 years. On the building plans submitted to
the city, the Ahmadi community did not describe the building on
the land as a mosque, because that would have violated Section
298(c). In other incidents, several prominent Ahmadis,
including a university professor, were killed during the year
in what some regard as sectarian murders. Investigations of
the cases are continuing.
The Government classifies Ahmadis as "non-Muslims" on their
passports. This has led the authorities in Saudi Arabia to
prevent Ahmadis from performing the religious pilgrimage to
Mecca. In 1992 the Government ordered national identity cards
to convey the bearer's religion, but so far the Government has
not submitted implementing legislation.
In 1986 the Government inserted Section 295(c) into the Penal
Code which stipulates the death penalty for blaspheming the
Prophet Muhammad. This provision has been used by litigants
against Ahmadis, Christians, and even Muslims. In 1992 the
Senate unanimously adopted a bill to amend the Blasphemy Law so
that the death penalty is mandatory upon conviction.
According to Ahmadi sources, 5 blasphemy cases, involving 15
persons, were registered against Ahmadis in the first 9 months
of 1994. Since 1986 over 100 blasphemy cases have been
registered against Ahmadis with no convictions. In the same
period, at least nine blasphemy cases have been brought against
Christians and seven against Muslims.
Two persons were convicted of blasphemy and sentenced to
death: Mohammad Arshad Javaid of Bahawalpur, a 37-year-old
Muslim who is reportedly mentally unsound and remains in
prison, and Gul Masih, a Christian of Sargodha. However, Gul
Masih was acquitted of blasphemy by the Lahore High Court on
November 27 and released from prison.
The Blasphemy Law has also been used to justify extrajudicial
killings. In Gujranwala, Punjab, a mob lynched a Muslim in
April in front of the police station after falsely accusing him
of burning a copy of the Koran. In May a judge sentenced a
Muslim accused of killing a Christian school teacher to 14
years in prison. Nevertheless, some observers criticized the
ruling because the judge took into account the defendant's
claim that he committed the offense because the teacher had
blasphemed the Prophet Muhammad. The judge reportedly stated
that blaspheming the Prophet would be conducive to a total loss
of control by every Muslim.
When such religious cases are brought to court, extremists
often pack the courtroom and make public threats against an
acquittal. As a result, judges and magistrates often continue
trials indefinitely, and the accused is burdened with further
legal costs and repeated court appearances.
A Sunni Muslim group, the Anjuman Sipah-i-Sahaba,
unsuccessfully sought to introduce legislation in 1994 that
would have declared the Zikri sect in Balochistan as a
non-Muslim sect. There were also continued reports in the year
of attacks by extremists on Hindus.
The security of religious minorities was a major issue of
discussion in the Government and the press in 1994. The
Government promised to introduce measures to reduce the abusive
litigation under the blasphemy laws, but defended the laws
themselves. At year's end, the Government had not taken any
remedial action.
d. Freedom of Movement Within the Country, Foreign
Travel, Emigration, and Repatriation
Most citizens enjoy freedom of movement within the country and
to travel abroad, but the Government occasionally prohibits
movement of persons within Pakistan through "externment orders"
when it believes their presence will lead to a threat to public
order. Travel to Israel is legally prohibited. Government
employees must obtain "no objection certificates" before
traveling abroad. Students are also required to have these
certificates from their institutions. Pakistanis have and
regularly exercise the right to emigrate. Exit control lists
are used to prevent the departure of wanted criminals.
The resumption of civil war in Afghanistan in early 1994
created a new wave of refugees. In response to this new
influx, the Government closed its borders with Afghanistan and
officially admitted only those Afghans who were properly
documented or in need of humanitarian assistance. Despite
these restrictions over 66,000 new refugees arrived in the
first 9 months of 1994.
Approximately 1.4 million Afghan refugees remain in Pakistan.
They have limited access to legal protection and depend on the
ability of the leaders of their groups to resolve disputes
among themselves and with Pakistani society. Women and girls
have obtained better education and health care as group leaders
gradually secured such services. Many refugees have found
employment but are not covered by the labor laws.
Traffickers in women bought or lured hundreds of women from
Bangladesh with promises of a better life. They transported
the women across India and placed them with families as
domestic servants or as prostitutes in brothels. The
authorities detained some of the women for prostitution under
the Hadood Ordinances. Few are able or willing to return to
Bangladesh. Many are released into the custody of their
exploiters, who set them to work as prostitutes again. Efforts
to repatriate Bangladeshis in 1994 were mostly unsuccessful.
The "repatriation" of Biharis continued to be a contentious
issue. The Biharis are Urdu-speaking people from the Indian
state of Bihar who went to East Pakistan, now Bangladesh, at
the time of partition in 1947. Since 1971, after Bangladesh
gained its independence, approximately 250,000 Biharis have
been in refugee camps in Bangladesh. The repatriation of these
people is tied to Pakistan's various ethnic problems. While
the Mohajir community, made up of Pakistanis who emigrated from
India during partition, supports the repatriation, the Sindhi
community opposes the move. In 1993 the Government flew 342
Biharis to Pakistan and placed them in temporary housing in
central Punjab. No further repatriation has occurred.
Section 3 Respect for Political Rights: The Right of Citizens
to Change Their Government
Citizens have the right and the ability to change their
government peacefully. With certain exceptions, citizens aged
21 and over have the right to vote. However, several million
bonded laborers and nomads may not vote because the National
Election Commission has ruled that they do not "ordinarily
reside in an electoral area, nor do they own/possess a dwelling
or immovable property in that area." Political parties have
been allowed to operate freely since the lifting of martial law
in 1985 and 1986. In 1988 the Supreme Court struck down a law
banning unregistered political parties from participating in
elections.
The Senate is elected by the members of the four provincial
assemblies. Senators serve for 6 years. The President is
indirectly elected by an electoral college consisting of the
members of the national and provincial assemblies and the
Senate. The President serves for 5 years. Members of the
national and provincial assemblies serve 5 years, unless the
President dissolves the Assembly. The Senate may not be
dissolved by the President. The President has the
constitutional authority to dismiss the Government arbitrarily,
but a 1993 Supreme Court ruling significantly limited that
ability.
The Constitution requires that the President and Prime Minister
be Muslims. Members of minority religious groups may not vote
in Muslim constituencies. They cast their ballots for
candidates running for special at-large seats reserved for them
in the national and provincial assemblies. Most Ahmadis,
disputing their designation as non-Muslims, have refused to
vote for such representatives. Christians and Hindus note that
this system marginalizes religious minorities, by allowing the
Muslim candidates to ignore them as a voting block. As a
result, areas where minorities predominate receive
significantly less government development and assistance funds.
Local governments and the provincial and national assemblies
are directly elected. However, local government bodies were
dissolved in 1993 as the result of a political compromise
between the ruling party and the opposition. New elections
have not been held. In the meantime, provincial and federal
officials are responsible for governance.
The more than 2 million Pushtun people living in the Federally
Administered Tribal Areas do not vote for their National
Assembly representatives and have no representation in the
assembly of the Northwest Frontier province. In keeping with
local traditions, FATA's National Assembly members are elected
by tribal leaders, or maliks, who are appointed in the
Governor's name by the central Government's political agents.
Many people living in this area have expressed dissatisfaction
at having no vote. However, the majority of Pushtun people
live outside the FATA and, while retaining their tribal
identity, are fully integrated into politics and society.
Because of a longstanding territorial dispute with India, the
political status of the Northern Areas--Hunza, Gilgit, and
Baltistan--is not resolved. As a result, more than 1 million
inhabitants of the Northern Areas are not covered under any
constitution and have no representation in the federal
legislature. The area is administered by an appointed civil
servant. While there is an elected Northern Areas Council,
this body serves in an advisory capacity to the Federal
Government and has no legislative authority. In 1994 in
response to concerns of lack of representation, the Federal
Cabinet decided that residents of the Northern Areas would vote
in elections for representatives to serve on an expanded
Council. However, the expanded Council does not have the
authority to change laws or raise and spend revenue.
In 1993 the High Court of Azad Jammu and Kashmir (AJK) ruled
that the Northern Areas should be incorporated into the
semiautonomous state of Azad Jammu and Kashmir and its
inhabitants given a right to be represented in the AJK
legislative assembly. In August the High Court ruled that the
Federal Government has authority over the Northern Areas until
final status of Jammu and Kashmir is resolved.
Although women participate in government, they are
underrepresented in political life at all levels. Only 4 women
hold seats in the 217-member National Assembly. However, for
the first time, the Government appointed at least five women to
the previously all-male high court benches. While women
participate in large numbers in elections, some women are
dissuaded from voting in elections by family, and religious and
social customs in rural areas.
Section 4 Governmental Attitude Regarding International and
Nongovernmental Investigation of Alleged Violations
of Human Rights
There are several domestic human rights organizations, and new
human rights and legal aid groups continue to form and are
generally free to operate without government restriction.
Senior members of the Bhutto government, including the former
Minister of Law and Justice, have been active members of
respected human rights organizations and participate in human
rights organization functions.
Religious extremists distributed material that accused several
human rights activists of blasphemy and called for them to be
killed. Various international human rights organizations have
been permitted to visit Pakistan and travel freely.
In 1994 the Government formed a human rights unit in the
Ministry of Interior as a sort of ombudsman for human rights.
The unit brought attention to the problem of spouse abuse by
arranging visits by the Prime Minister to hospitalized abuse
victims. A human rights committee was also established in the
National Assembly; a similar committee was formed in the Senate
in 1993. These committees have taken little action to date.
Section 5 Discrimination Based on Race, Sex, Religion,
Disability, Language, or Social Status
Women
There are significant barriers to the advancement of women,
beginning at birth. In general, female children are less
valued and cared for than male children. According to a United
Nations study, girls receive less nourishment, health care, and
education than their brothers. According to the Government,
only 23.5 percent of the females over 10 years old are
literate, compared with 48.9 percent for males. Only 12
percent of women use family planning methods. As a result, the
fertility rate is six children per woman. In rural areas,
women in small farm families generally work alongside men in
the fields. However, they remain subordinate to men and suffer
discrimination in education, employment, and legal rights.
Human rights monitors and women's groups fear that the Shari'a
Law would have a harmful effect on the rights of women and
minorities. However, the Law states that women's and minority
rights protected under the Constitution would not be affected.
The Law's impact on these groups has been limited because the
Government has not passed enabling legislation. Nonetheless,
the Law reinforces popular attitudes and perceptions, and
contributes to an atmosphere in which discriminatory treatment
of women and non-Muslims is more readily accepted.
Some Islamic leaders continue to stress a conservative
interpretation of Islamic injunctions to justify discrimination
against women. Many citizens interpret the Koran's injunctions
on modesty to mean that women should remain either at home or
veiled. It remains accepted practice to assign women
subordinate roles in the civil, political, and managerial
hierarchies.
Both civil and religious laws protect women's rights in cases
of divorce, but, as in the case of inheritance laws, many women
are unaware of them, and often the laws are not observed. In
such cases women generally do not receive--or are pressed to
surrender--their due share of the inheritance. In rural areas,
the practice of a woman "marrying the Koran" is still widely
accepted if her family cannot arrange a suitable marriage or
wants to keep the family wealth intact. A woman married to the
Koran is forbidden to have any contact with males over 14 years
of age, including her immediate family members.
In 1992 the Supreme Court invalidated the requirement that a
husband must give written notice of a divorce to a local union
council. The husband's statement, with or without witnesses,
is the defining legal step. The woman, lacking written proof
of divorce, remains legally and socially vulnerable. Human
rights organizations expressed concern that a woman could be
charged with adultery if her former spouse were to deny having
divorced her.
Although a small number of women study and teach in
universities, postgraduate employment opportunities remain
largely limited to teaching, medical services, and the law.
Nevertheless, an increasing number of women are entering the
commercial and public sectors. Karachi lawyers estimate that
the number of female judges in civil courts there has increased
to about 30 percent of the total. There are reports that women
who apply to professional colleges face discrimination. Women
may now participate in international athletic competition,
although few do.
There is no reliable information on the extent of domestic
violence, primarily because it is viewed as a private matter
and many women do not acknowledge that it is a serious
problem. A survey of burn victims at two hospitals in
Rawalpindi and Islamabad conducted by the Progressive Women's
Association from March to October reported 35 cases of burned
women, only 4 of whom survived. So far the Government has
taken legal action against the perpetrators in seven cases and
obtained two convictions.
While abusive spouses may be charged for assault, cases are
rarely filed. Police usually return battered wives to their
abusive husbands. A notable exception occurred in 1994 when a
man convicted of mutilating his wife was sentenced to 30 years
in prison and required to pay $4,000 in compensation. That
case had received extensive media coverage and the attention of
the Prime Minister.
Rape is a widespread problem, although there was a slight
decline in the reported incidence of rape during 1994 compared
to 1993. There were about 800 cases of rape reported in the
press during the year. It is estimated that less than
one-third of all rapes are reported to the police. Marital
rape is not a crime. The rape of another man's wife is a
common method for revenge in rural and tribal areas.
The HRCP reports that there were 92 cases of public humiliation
of women during 1994, including stripping in public, dragging
them by the hair through the streets, throwing acid in their
face, or public sexual harassment. There is little evidence of
efforts by police to stop such activities.
In 1994 the press continued to draw attention to the problem of
so-called dowry deaths in which married women may be killed by
relatives in a dowry dispute. Most of the victims are burned
to death, allegedly in kitchen stove accidents. It is
difficult to differentiate criminal conduct from stove
accidents which are common because of the use of unsafe wood or
gas stoves and because women wear garments of highly flammable
material.
There are an increasing number of reports of women killed or
mutilated by male relatives who suspect them of adultery. Few
such cases are investigated seriously. An article in the
magazine Newsline alleged that hundreds of men and women from
Balochistan and rural areas of Sindh and Punjab provinces are
killed annually for illicit sexual relations. While the
tradition of such killing applies equally to offending men and
women, women are more likely to be killed than men.
Women's organizations operate primarily in urban centers. Many
concentrate on educating women about existing legal rights.
Other groups concentrate on providing legal aid to poor women
in prison who may not be able to afford an attorney.
The Government began implementation of an internationally
funded program to train and deploy 33,000 female health care
workers in rural areas. By December, it had hired 1,760
workers. The Government also produced television documentaries
on women in development and family planning, and promoted
population services in advertisements and by enlisting the
support of religious leaders. The Prime Minister spoke at the
September 1994 Cairo International Conference on Population and
Development. All these efforts were seen as important for the
reversal of Pakistan's poor record in this area.
Children
Legal rights for children are theoretically protected by
numerous laws which incorporate elements of the U.N. Convention
on the Rights of the Child. However, the Government frequently
fails to enforce these laws. Federal law allows, but does not
require, offenders under the age of 14 to be placed in reform
schools; however, no such facilities exist. There is only one
jail in each province for convicted prisoners under age 21. A
United Nations report estimates that there are 250 children
under the age of 14 in Pakistani prisons at any time. Although
Punjab and Sindh provinces have laws mandating special judicial
procedures for child offenders, in practice, children and
adults are essentially treated equally. Very young children
accompany their convicted mothers to jail.
Many children begin working at a very early age. At the age of
five or six, female children are often responsible for younger
siblings. Children are sometimes kidnaped to be used as forced
labor, for ransom, or to seek revenge against an enemy. The
HRCP reported an average of 400 kidnapings of children per
month in Punjab province alone in 1993. The HRCP also reported
that half of the 4,000 rapes that were registered in Pakistan
in 1993 were of minors or teenagers.
Child prostitution involving boys and girls is widely known to
exist but is rarely discussed. The Government does little to
deter it. In Lahore, there are reported to be 2,900 full-time
prostitutes in over 1,200 brothels. It is estimated that 20
percent of the prostitutes are minors.
In July human rights groups and the press reported that 27 boys
were being kept in chains in an Islamic school in the Punjab.
The boys, who had been turned over to the school by their
parents, often for disciplinary reasons, had been shackled in
groups to wooden blocks. Some had been chained for several
years. The school's existence and the chaining was known to
the parents and the community where it had operated for 20
years. Police raided the facility and cut the chains but no
further action was taken to arrest the school's owner or remove
the children. There were unconfirmed reports of the existence
of other such institutions.
Religious Minorities
In addition to the violence and harassment noted in previous
sections of this report, religious minority groups experience
much discrimination in employment and education; Pakistani laws
facilitate discrimination in employment based on religion. In
Pakistan's early years, minorities were able to rise to the
senior ranks of the military and civil service. Today, many
are unable to rise above midlevel ranks. Because of the lack
of educational opportunities for some religious minority
groups, discrimination in employment is believed to be
increasingly prevalent. Christians, in particular, have
difficulty finding jobs above those of menial labor. Ahmadis
find that they are prevented from entering management levels in
government service. Even the rumor that someone may be an
Ahmadi or have Ahmadi relatives can stifle opportunities for
employment or promotion.
Officially designated as non-Muslims, Ahmadis in particular,
suffer from harassment and discrimination and have limited
chances for advancement in the public sector. Young Ahmadis
and their parents complain of increasing difficulty in gaining
admittance to good colleges, forcing many children to go
overseas for higher education. Among religious minorities,
there is a well-founded belief that the authorities afford them
less legal protection than they afford Muslim citizens.
Many Christians continue to express the fear of forced
marriages between Muslim males and Christian women, although
the practice is relatively rare. Christians are also subject
to harassment by the authorities, notably including the
blasphemy laws and difficulty in obtaining permission to build
churches.
People with Disabilities
Pakistan has no laws requiring equal accessibility to public
buildings for disabled persons.
Section 6 Worker Rights
a. The Right of Association
The Industrial Relations Ordinance of 1969 (IRO) enunciates the
right of industrial workers to form trade unions but is subject
to major restrictions in some employment areas. In practice,
labor laws place significant constraints on the formation of
industrial unions and their ability to function effectively.
For example, the law prohibits workers in export processing
zones (EPZ's) from forming trade unions. Under the Essential
Services Maintenance Act of 1952 (ESA), workers in sectors
associated with "the administration of the State," which covers
a wide range of government services and state enterprises, such
as education, health care, oil and gas production, and
transport, are allowed to form unions. However, the ESA
sharply restricts normal union activities, usually prohibiting,
for example, the right to strike in affected industries.
Union members make up only about 13 percent of the industrial
labor force and 10 percent of the total estimated work force.
Contract labor continues to flourish, undercutting the power of
the unions and exploiting workers willing to work on temporary
contracts. These workers receive fewer benefits and have no
job security. There is no provision in the law granting the
right of association to agricultural workers.
Legally required conciliation proceedings and cooling-off
periods constrain the right to strike, as does the Government's
authority to ban any strike that may cause "serious hardship to
the community" or prejudice to the national interest. The
Government may also ban a strike that has continued for 30 days.
Strikes are rare. When they occur, they are usually illegal
and short. The Government regards as illegal any strike
conducted by workers who are not members of a legally
registered union. Police do not hesitate to crack down on
worker demonstrations. The law prohibits employers from
seeking retribution against leaders of a legal strike and
stipulates criminal penalties for offenders. The courts may
imprison employers for violating this prohibition but they are
more likely to fine them. The law does not protect leaders of
illegal strikes.
Unions may belong to federations. There are seven major
federations which are free to affiliate with international
federations and confederations. The Government permits trade
unions of all political orientations. While many unions remain
aloof from party politics, the most powerful are those
associated with political parties. After the PPP came to power
in 1988, it successfully organized trade unions under the
banner of the People's Labor Bureau (PLB). The PLB's main
competitors are the Jamaat-i-Islami's National Labor Federation
and the MQM-backed labor unions.
The International Labor Organization (ILO) encourages the
Government to lift prohibitions against union activity in EPZ's
and with respect to radio, television, and hospital employees,
as well as to rescind the existing ban on strikes. The
Government was also asked to amend any provisions of the
Industrial Relations Ordinance, the Press and Publications
Ordinance, and the Political Parties Act which impose
compulsory prison labor in a manner inconsistent with ILO
Convention 105. In response to a government request, the ILO
agreed to provide technical assistance to bring the country's
labor laws into conformity with the world body's conventions.
In 1994 a government task force on labor prepared a report
recommending improvements on worker rights problems.
b. The Right to Organize and Bargain Collectively
The right of industrial workers to organize and freely elect
representatives to act as collective bargaining agents is
established in law. The IRO prohibits antiunion discrimination
by employers. If found guilty of antiunion discrimination,
employers are required to reinstate workers fired for union
activities.
In general, legally constituted unions have the right to
bargain collectively. However, the many restrictions on
forming unions discussed above preclude collective bargaining
by large sections of the labor force, e.g., agricultural
workers, who are not guaranteed the right to strike, bargain
collectively, or make demands on employers.
The Essential Services Act also restricts collective
bargaining. For each industry subject to the ESA, the
Government must make a finding, renewable every 6 months, on
the limits of union activity. In cases in which the Government
prohibits collective bargaining, special wage boards decide
wage levels.
These boards are established at the provincial level and are
comprised of representatives from industry, labor, and the
provincial labor ministry, which provides the chairman. The
chairman may name additional industry and labor representatives
to the board. Despite the presence of the labor
representatives, unions are generally dissatisfied with the
boards' findings. Disputes are adjudicated before the National
Industrial Relations Commission (NIRC). A worker's right to
quit may also be curtailed under the Essential Services Act.
Dismissed workers have no recourse to the labor courts. Most
unions call for the abolition of the ESA.
c. Prohibition of Forced or Compulsory Labor
The Constitution and the law prohibit forced labor. However,
critics argue that the ESA's limitation on some worker rights
constitutes a form of compulsory labor. The Government
informed the ILO's Committee on the Application of Standards in
1990 that amendments were under consideration to rectify the
problem. However, the Government has taken no further action.
Illegal bonded labor is widespread. Bonded labor is common in
the brick, glass, and fishing industries and is found among
agricultural and construction workers in rural areas.
Conservative estimates put the figure of bonded workers at
several million.
The Bonded Labor System (Abolition) Act, adopted in 1992,
outlawed bonded labor, canceled all existing bonded debts, and
forbade lawsuits for the recovery of existing debts. However,
the provincial governments, which are responsible for enforcing
the law, have failed to establish enforcement mechanisms.
Hence, the law is largely ineffective. Lacking employment
alternatives, many workers have voluntarily returned to bonded
labor.
d. Minimum Age for Employment of Children
Child labor is common and results from a combination of severe
poverty, weak laws, and inadequate enforcement of those that do
exist. A key factor is the absence of any compulsory primary
education. The Government acknowledges that violations of
existing laws are common.
Unofficial estimates indicate that workers under 18 years old
make up one-third of the total labor force. While much child
labor is in the traditional framework of family farming or
small business, the employment of children in larger industries
and, according to labor activists, in state-sponsored training
programs, is also widespread. Child labor is widely employed
in the carpet industry, much of which is family-run. This
appears to be the only export industry in which child labor is
employed on a significant scale.
In June the Government signed a Memorandum of Understanding
with the ILO on cooperation toward elimination of child labor.
The two sides will conduct a nationwide survey to develop an
accurate assessment of the scale of child labor.
e. Acceptable Conditions of Work
Labor regulations are governed by federal statutes applicable
throughout the country. The monthly minimum wage is
approximately $50 (1,500 rupees). Although this wage provides
a meager subsistence living for a small family, minimum wage
benefits affects only a small part of the work force.
The law, applicable nationally, provides for a maximum workweek
of 54 hours, rest periods during the workday, and paid annual
holidays. These regulations do not apply to agricultural
workers, workers in factories with fewer than 10 employees, and
to the small "contract groups," which are subdivisions within
factories of 10 or fewer workers. Many workers are unaware of
the regulations protecting their rights because of their lack
of education.
The provinces have been ineffective in enforcing labor
regulations, because of limited resources, corruption, and
inadequate regulatory structures. In general, health and
safety standards are poor. Although organized labor presses
for improvements, the Government has done little and weakly
enforces existing legal protections.
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