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TITLE:  SUDAN HUMAN RIGHTS PRACTICES, 1994
AUTHOR:  U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE
DATE:  FEBRUARY 1995









                             SUDAN


After the 1989 coup that overthrew Sudan's democratically 
elected government, the military assumed power under Lt. 
General Omar Hassan al-Bashir and his National Salvation 
Revolution Command Council (RCC).  Bashir and the RCC suspended 
the 1985 Constitution, abrogated press freedoms, and banned all 
political parties and trade unions.  In 1993 the RCC dissolved 
itself and appointed Lt. General Bashir President.  However, 
since 1989 real power has rested with Hassan al-Turabi and his 
National Islamic Front (NIF).  NIF control over government 
operations was further solidified with the end of the RCC, and 
NIF members and supporters held most key positions in the 
Government, security forces, judiciary, academia, and the 
media.  The NIF continued to consolidate its power in 1994.  
Although legislative authority theoretically rests with the 
government-appointed Transitional National Assembly (TNA), the 
new Government maintained the RCC's suspension of the 1985 
Constitution and continued to restrict most civil liberties.

The civil war in Sudan continued, despite efforts by Kenya, 
Uganda, Ethiopia, Eritrea, and Sudan, under the auspices of the 
Intergovernmental Authority on Drought and Development (IGADD), 
to seek a peaceful solution to the conflict.  Government forces 
launched a major offensive against the Sudanese People's 
Liberation Army (SPLA), gaining some ground, displacing 
thousands of civilians, and causing new outflows of refugees.

In the second half of the year, however, the SPLA took the 
offensive, overrunning Amadi, besieging Kapoeta, and attacking 
other government-held positions.  By year's end, the Government 
had suffered heavy casualties, its hold on Kapoeta had become 
precarious, and it had been forced, because of SPLA pressure, 
to postpone its planned dry-season offensive.  Despite SPLA 
successes, divisions between the SPLA (mainstream faction), led 
by John Garang, and the South Sudan Independence Movement 
(SSIM), formerly the United faction of the SPLA, led by Riak 
Machar, continued to hamper the insurgency's effectiveness in 
battling the Government.

In addition to the regular police and Sudan People's Armed 
Forces (SPAF), the Government maintains an Islamic militia, the 
Popular Defense Forces (PDF), and an Islamic police force, the 
Popular Police, whose mission includes enforcing proper social 
behavior, including restrictions on alcohol and "immodest 
dress."

Civil war, economic mismanagement, high inflation, over 2.5 
million internally displaced persons, and a refugee influx from 
neighboring countries have devastated Sudan's mostly 
agricultural economy.  Exports of gum arabic, livestock, and 
meat accounted for over 50 percent of Sudan's 1994 export 
earnings.  Reforms aimed at privatizing state-run firms and 
stimulating private investment have failed to revive a moribund 
economy saddled with massive military expenditures.

The dismal human rights situation showed no improvement in 
1994.  Both the Government and insurgents committed serious 
human rights abuses, including massacres and extrajudicial 
killing, kidnaping, and forced conscription.  A myriad of 
official and secret government security forces routinely 
harassed, detained, and tortured opponents or suspected 
opponents of the Government with impunity.  Despite some 
improvement in overall cooperation with U.N.-sponsored relief 
operations, both the SPAF/PDF and SPLA/SSIM periodically 
obstructed the flow of humanitarian assistance to affected 
populations.

The Government and rebels continued to restrict most civil 
rights, including the rights to free speech and association.  
In the context of the Islamization and Arabization drive, 
pressure--including forced Islamization--on non-Muslims 
remained strong.  Fears of Arabization and Islamization and the 
imposition of Shari'a (Islamic law) have fueled support for the 
southern insurgency.  Serious abuses against women and children 
continued.

RESPECT FOR HUMAN RIGHTS

Section 1  Respect for the Integrity of the Person, Including 
           Freedom from:

     a.  Political and Other Extrajudicial Killing

Official and unofficial government forces committed an 
undetermined number of political killings of persons suspected 
of belonging to or collaborating with the insurgent SPLA.  
There were also credible reports that government forces 
executed over 20 Chadian dissidents in western Sudan in January 
and killed at least 3 students while putting down an 
antigovernment riot in El Obeid in February.

There are credible reports that security forces beat and 
tortured to death detainees.  For example, police beat to death 
Mustafa Azraq, a street vendor, who had been in police custody 
in Khartoum for less than 24 hours.  Similarly, in September 
security forces tortured to death opposition activist Abdel 
Meneim Rahma in Wad Medani.  The Government routinely denied 
any wrongdoing and has yet to discipline publicly any official 
guilty of political or extrajudicial killing since it came to 
power in 1989.

In an incident highlighting intra-Islamic divisions, in 
February gunmen linked to al Muslimin, a small extremist 
Islamic sect, murdered 16 worshipers and wounded over 20 more 
at a mosque in Omdurman because they had "betrayed" Islam.  The 
attackers also allegedly planned to kill leading Saudi Islamist 
Bin Laden and NIF leader Hassan al-Turabi.  Police killed two 
of the gunmen following a shoot-out, and captured a third, 
along with an accomplice who did not participate in the 
shootings.  Their trial, conducted by a special court presided 
over by a government-appointed judge linked to the National 
Islamic Front, lasted from July to September.  Credible 
government sources conducting the pretrial investigation 
complained that the Government was suppressing evidence, 
downplaying, in particular, the gunmen's ties to senior members 
of the Government and the NIF.  In September the court 
sentenced the surviving gunman to death and his accomplice to 
10 years in prison.  The death sentence was carried out 
immediately.

There were also credible reports that both the SPLA and SSIM 
carried out egregious political and extrajudicial killings and 
massacred civilians during combat operations.  In October the 
SSIA (the armed wing of the SSIM) was responsible for the 
massacre of more than 100 residents in the town of Akot, many 
of whom were killed in their beds at the Akot hospital.  The 
Akot massacre was part of the endemic fighting between the 
rival southern insurgent movements (SPLA/Mainstream and the 
SSIM).

     b.  Disappearance

The Government was responsible for continued arrests and 
subsequent disappearances of persons suspected of supporting 
the rebels in government-controlled areas in the South and Nuba 
Mountains.  Scores of persons arrested by government forces in 
Juba in 1992, including two local U.S. Agency for International 
Development employees, Dominic Morris and Chaplain Lako, 
remained unaccounted for, and most are believed dead.  However, 
there were reliable reports that at least a few of those 
arrested then were being held in a Khartoum prison; the 
Government has stated it has no knowledge of their whereabouts.

     c.  Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading
         Treatment or Punishment

The Government's official and unofficial security forces 
continued routinely to beat and torture suspected opponents.  
In May security personnel arrested and badly beat elderly 
southern politician Eliaba Surur for having contacts with the 
U.S. Embassy.  He later required brain surgery to remove a 
blood clot, suffered as a result of his beating.  Security 
forces arrested and beat scores of students after antiregime 
demonstrations in El Obeid and Wad Medani in February and 
April.  Eyewitnesses in Wad Medani reported that the police had 
deliberately broken limbs of some of the arrested student 
demonstrators.  During the January trial of a group accused of 
conspiring to commit sabotage (see Section 1.e.), the 
defendants stated that they had been brutally tortured.  Court- 
appointed medical examiners confirmed that at least seven had 
been tortured; some had been badly burned.

Throughout the year the security forces detained government 
opponents incommunicado, often for months, in unofficial 
prisons known as "ghost houses."  Some inmates released in 1994 
commented that conditions had improved compared to previous 
years.  However, inmates in ghost houses were still subject to 
torture, including whipping and clubbing; suspension by the 
wrists; application of electric shocks; burning with hot irons; 
submersion in hot and cold water; deprivation of food, water, 
sleep, and access to toilet facilities; confinement in 
overcrowded and unsanitary quarters; deprivation of medical 
care; and psychological torture.

There were, however, fewer reports of torture in ghost houses 
in 1994 than in previous years.  The Government has never 
publicly disciplined any security official for torture, 
although its use is widely known.

There were credible and recurrent reports that both government 
and insurgent forces in the field periodically raped women and 
that police personnel sometimes raped female detainees.  There 
were also credible reports that SPLA and SSIM forces tortured 
some of their prisoners.

Conditions in official prisons were harsh but generally not 
life-threatening.  Almost all prisons were built before 
independence in 1956 and are poorly maintained.  Many lack 
basic facilities like toilets or showers.  Health care is 
primitive and food inadequate.  Minors are often held with 
adults.  Female prisoners are kept separately from men, and 
rape in prison (as opposed to police stations) does not appear 
to be a major problem.

Sudan's 1991 Criminal Act, based on the Shari'a, mandates 
specific "hudud" punishments, including amputation, stoning, 
and lashing, for some offenses.  The courts handed down several 
sentences involving amputations in 1994, of which at least one 
was carried out.  The Government routinely meted out lashings, 
most often to persons convicted of brewing or consuming 
alcohol, following trials that did not meet internationally 
accepted standards of fairness (see Section 1.e.).  In July the 
authorities lashed Abdoullahi Yusif and his brother Mohanna 
Mohammed of Wad Medani for alleged apostasy; Mohanna had to be 
hospitalized as a result.

     d.  Arbitrary Arrest, Detention, or Exile

The 1991 Criminal Code does not include provisions concerning 
the length of detention of security and other detainees, and 
the Government routinely detained persons without charge and 
without reference to the judiciary.  The state of emergency 
introduced following the 1989 coup authorizes the Government to 
arrest people without using warrants and to detain them 
indefinitely without charge or trial.  Under the National 
Security Act, the Government may detain a suspect for 
interrogation for up to 72 hours.  This is renewable for up to 
1 month with "justification," which is not defined.

Also under the 1992 National Security Act, the President has 
the power to authorize "precautionary detention" for up to 3 
months "to preserve the general security," but in practice this 
authority rests with subordinate officials.  A person detained 
under this provision theoretically must be notified of the 
reasons for detention within these 3 months, and the President 
may extend detention for 3 more months if a magistrate approves 
the extension.  In practice, these legal provisions are 
routinely ignored as the authorities often detain opponents in 
ghost houses indefinitely.

The law allows for bail, except for those accused of crimes 
punishable by death or life imprisonment.  In theory, the 
Government provides legal counsel for indigents in the case of 
crimes punishable by death or life imprisonment.  However, 
courts sometimes fail to inform defendants of this right.  
Moreover, in some cases counsel is only allowed to advise the 
defendant and may not address the court.  Thus, despite some 
legal protections, detainees have few rights and are often 
subject to arbitrary, and in many cases, incommunicado 
detention.

The Government's secrecy and arbitrary detention practices made 
it impossible to know the exact number of political detainees 
and prisoners.  Although the Government continued to pick up 
and detain suspected opponents across the country, the number 
of new arrests decreased compared to previous years.

After brief detentions in April 1993 and April 1994 in which he 
was questioned about his opposition activities, Sadiq al Mahdi 
was again arrested and held for 12 days.  The Government 
alleged that al Mahdi and his two supporters, Hamad Bagadi and 
Abdul Rahman Farah, were involved in a conspiracy to overthrow 
the Government that included assassinations and bombings.  
Although both al Mahdi and Bagadi made statements upon their 
release admitting that Bagadi had passed information to a 
foreign intelligence service, the Government never pressed 
formal charges against any of the three. It released Bagadi and 
Farah in early July.  The authorities detained Sid'Ahmed 
Hussein without charge on two occasions in 1994.  In November 
1993, they arrested Hussein and held him in a ghost house until 
February 1994.  In mid-April, they rearrested him and released 
him in late May.

The authorities picked up numerous other lower ranking 
opposition figures and others throughout the year and held some 
for several months.  Reasonable estimates of the number of 
political detainees ranged between several score and a few 
hundred.  The Government also continued its practice of de 
facto arrest of suspected opponents by requiring them to report 
to security offices in the morning and wait all day for several 
days in a row.  Those targeted for such harassment were unable 
to earn a livelihood.

     e.  Denial of Fair Public Trial

The judiciary is not independent and is largely subservient to 
the Government.  The Chief Justice of the Supreme Court, 
formerly elected by sitting judges, is now appointed (as the 
senior judge in the Sudanese judicial service, he also controls 
the judiciary).  Since 1989 the authorities have replaced 
hundreds of judges considered ideologically unsuitable.  Most 
new judges have ties to the NIF and favor strict application of 
Islamic law (the Shari'a); many have little or no legal 
training.  The RCC banned the respected Sudanese Bar 
Association in 1989 and replaced it with a government-appointed 
committee.  Human rights monitors have pointed out that the 
Government continued to harass, detain, and torture members of 
the legal profession it views as political opponents.

Sudan's judicial system includes four types of courts:  regular 
courts, both criminal and civil; special mixed security courts; 
military courts; and tribal courts in rural areas to resolve 
disputes over land and water rights and family matters.  The 
1991 Criminal Act governs criminal cases, whereas the 1983 
Civil Transactions Act still applies to most civil cases.  
Military trials, whose proceedings are secret and brief, do not 
meet international standards.

Trials in the regular courts nominally meet international 
standards of legal protections.  For instance, the accused 
normally have the right to counsel, and the courts should 
provide free legal counsel for indigent defendants accused of 
crimes punishable by death or life imprisonment.  In practice, 
however, these legal protections are unevenly applied.

In 1989 the Special Courts Act created special three-person 
security courts to deal with a wide range of offenses, 
including violations of constitutional decrees, emergency 
regulations, and some sections of the Penal Code, as well as 
drug and currency offenses.  Special courts, on which both 
military and civilian judges sit, handle most security related 
cases.  Attorneys may advise defendants as "friends of the 
court" but normally may not address the court.  Lawyers 
complain that they are sometimes granted access to court 
documents too late to prepare an effective defense.  Sentences 
are usually severe and implemented at once.  Death sentences, 
however, are referred to the Chief Justice and the Head of 
State.  Defendants may file appeal briefs with the Chief 
Justice.

In a case with political undertones, the trial of 2 suspects 
charged with killing 16 persons at Omdurman's Thawara Mosque 
began in July.  The majority of the victims were members of the 
pro-Saudi branch of the Ansar el Sunna sect which is opposed to 
the NIF.  Opposition figures charge that the Government or NIF 
organized the massacre, and their assertions were fueled by the 
appointment of a judge closely linked to the NIF to preside 
over the case.  In September the court sentenced the surviving 
gunman to death and his accomplice to 10 years in prison.  The 
death sentence was carried out immediately.

In April, despite the court's acknowledgment that confessions 
were elicited through the use of torture, the court found 
guilty 21 of 29 defendants accused of plotting bombings and 
sentenced them to prison terms ranging from 2 to 10 years.  The 
court found the confessions admissible evidence because the 
defendants could not prove they were actually being tortured at 
the time they confessed (see Section 1.c.).  The court also 
claimed that Islamic law allows torture, despite the bulk of 
Islamic jurisprudence to dispute this assertion.

In late 1994, the authorities released half a dozen former 
officers who had been sentenced for alleged coup plotting in 
1990 and 1991.

The Government officially exempts the 10 southern states, whose 
population is mostly non-Muslim, from parts of the 1991 
Criminal Act.  But the Act permits the possible future 
application of Shari'a in the south, if the local state 
assemblies, envisioned in Sudan's new political system, so 
decide.  Moreover, in 1993 the Government transferred all 
non-Muslim judges from the south to the north, replacing them 
with Muslim judges.  However, there were no reports that hudud 
punishments, other than lashings, were carried out by the 
courts in government-controlled areas of the south.  Fear of 
the imposition of Shari'a remained a key issue in the rebellion.

Parts of the south and the Nuba mountains fell outside of 
effective judicial procedures and other governmental 
functions.  According to credible reports, government units 
summarily tried and punished those accused of crimes, 
especially offenses against civil order.  In SPLA-held areas, 
there was some reliance on traditional justice by village 
elders.  However, the SPLA ultimately ruled by summary methods, 
including beatings, torture, and arbitrary execution.

     f.  Arbitrary Interference with Privacy, Family, Home, or 
         Correspondence

The Government routinely interferes with its citizens' 
privacy.  Throughout 1994 security forces frequently conducted 
night searches without warrants.  They targeted persons 
suspected of political crimes or also, in northern Sudan, of 
distilling or consuming illegal alcoholic beverages.  For 
example, in March security forces broke up a family ceremony in 
a private home in memory of 28 officers executed in 1991 for 
coup plotting.  They arrested and beat 30 participants at the 
memorial service.

A wide network of government informants conducted pervasive 
surveillance in schools, universities, markets, workplaces, and 
neighborhoods.  The authorities kept key opposition figures 
under frequent surveillance.  The Government also continued its 
practice of summarily dismissing military personnel and other 
government employees whose loyalty it suspected.  Dozens lost 
their jobs throughout the year.  Security personnel routinely 
opened and read mail and tapped telephones.

Government-instituted neighborhood "popular committees," 
ostensibly a mechanism for political mobilization, served as a 
means for monitoring households.  These committees caused many 
Sudanese to be wary of neighbors who could report them for 
"suspicious" activities, including "excessive" contact with 
foreigners.  The committees also furnished or withheld 
documents essential for obtaining an exit visa from Sudan.  In 
high schools, students were sometimes pressured to join 
proregime youth groups.

     g.  Use of Excessive Force and Violations of Humanitarian 
         Law in Internal Conflicts

Since the civil war began in 1983, at least 1.5 million people 
have been killed as the result of fighting between the Islamic 
Government in the north and insurgents in southern Sudan.  The 
civil war continued unabated in 1994, and all sides involved in 
the fighting were responsible for abuses in violation of 
humanitarian norms.  At year's end, the Government controlled 
most of Sudan, except for parts of the south and the Nuba 
Mountains.  All efforts undertaken by Sudan's neighbors (Kenya, 
Uganda, Ethiopia, and Eritrea) to seek a peaceful resolution to 
the civil war under the auspices of IGADD were unsuccessful 
(see Section 3).

Government forces launched a major offensive against the SPLA, 
gaining some ground, displacing thousands of civilians, and 
causing new outflows of refugees.  However, Government forces 
suffered heavy casualties and were put on the defensive late in 
the year when the SPLA took the offensive.  SPAF units bombed 
civilian targets indiscriminately, forcing thousands of 
southern Sudanese to flee to neighboring Uganda and Kenya.  
Government forces were also responsible for the massacre of 
civilians, and throughout the year PDF forces regularly looted 
and burned villages and killed civilians in "pacification" and 
other military operations, particularly around Aweil, Warrap, 
Thiet, and Tonj.

By year's end the International Committee of the Red Cross 
(ICRC) access to war-wounded had improved, but the evacuation 
of wounded from certain localities in the south continued to be 
subject to authorization which was not systematically granted.  
The former Chief of Security in Kordofan Province, Khalid Abd 
El Karim Salih, told the Arabic-language London-based 
periodical Al-Majallah in March that government forces 
systematically targeted civilian populations in the Nuba 
Mountains, killing thousands.

The SPLA and SSIM were also responsible for egregious abuses 
and attacks on civilians, exemplified by the massacre of more 
than 100 residents of the southern town of Akot by SSIA forces 
in October (see Section 1.a.).  Approximately 300 members of 
the armed wing of the SSIM entered Akot on October 24 and 
killed and wounded town residents, including several patients 
at the Akot hospital who were killed in their beds.  Several 
thousand families fled Akot following the incident.

In October police killed at least five people and wounded 
dozens of others at the Khuddeir Squatters Settlement in 
Omdurman when the Government forcibly resettled its residents 
and demolished the slum (see Section 2.d.).

Section 2  Respect for Civil Liberties, Including:

     a.  Freedom of Speech and Press

The Government severely curtails freedom of speech and press.  
Government intimidation and surveillance, fostered in part by 
the informer network, continued to inhibit open, public 
discussion of political issues.  Radio, television, and the 
bulk of the print media are controlled entirely by the 
Government and required to reflect government and NIF 
policies.  Sudan television had a permanent military censor to 
ensure that the news reflected government views.

In mid-1993, the Government adopted a new Press Code that 
called for turning the existing state-owned print media into 
publicly held companies.  The Code also allowed the formation 
of new, private newspapers.  Implementation of the Code has 
been slow.  The few publications that issued shares were 
purchased by government ministries and state-owned 
corporations, thus keeping them under government control.

In 1994 two privately owned dailies began publishing in 
accordance with the new Code.  After several months of 
harassment, in April the Government shut down permanently the 
Sudan al-Duwali, published by NIF supporter Mahjoub Irwa.  
Articles in the Sudan al-Duwali had been critical of government 
actions, including corruption, prompting the Government to 
accuse the paper of circulating false information and serving 
"foreign circles and countries."  Police also arrested and 
briefly detained Majoub Irwa and two key journalists, Ahmad Al 
Bagadi and Mutawakel Abd El Daafich, but did not charge the 
three men with any crime.  The other newly opened, privately 
owned daily, Al Ahbar Al Yaum, has followed a progovernment 
line and has not encountered any problems.

The Government often charged that the international, and 
particularly Western, media have an anti-Sudan bias, and it 
routinely confiscated issues of foreign publications that were 
judged hostile to the Government.  Although the Government 
periodically granted foreign journalists entry and access to 
war zones and a variety of political leaders, security forces 
closely monitored their activities.  In one instance in 1994, 
police briefly detained a journalist and confiscated his film.  
In June the Government closed the Khartoum office of 
Egyptian-published opposition newspaper Al-Khartoum and 
detained in a ghost house its local correspondent, Abdul Saeed 
for 3 months.  As a result of the Government's hostile 
attitude, many respected journalists who worked in the local 
media before 1989 have quit their jobs and left Sudan.

After the coup, the Government harassed and dismissed many 
academics considered antiregime, and its practice of repressing 
opposition has had a chilling effect on academic debate.  
Government security forces continued to arrest and detain 
academics linked with opposition parties.  The Government 
continued to use political and ideological criteria in 
appointing new faculty.

     b.  Freedom of Peaceful Assembly and Association

The authorities severely restricted these freedoms, permitting 
only government-sponsored gatherings.  The declaration of the 
state of emergency and of martial law on June 30, 1989, 
effectively eliminated the right to assembly.  Security forces 
repeatedly used excessive force in breaking up nongovernment- 
sponsored demonstrations (see Section 1.a.).

Apart from a few indigenous NGO's involved in relief work and 
sports and social clubs, all private associations were  
controlled by the Government or the NIF.

     c.  Freedom of Religion

Although the Government has stated that all religions should be 
respected and freedom of worship guaranteed, in practice the 
Government treats Islam as the de facto state religion and has 
declared that Islam must inspire the country's laws, 
institutions, and policies.  Various restrictions under the 
Missionary Societies Act of 1962 limited the ability of 
non-Muslims to practice their religion freely, and the 1991 
Criminal Act made apostasy by Muslims punishable by death.

There were credible reports that security forces harassed, 
intimidated, and, in at least one confirmed instance, 
physically abused Christian converts in 1994.  In July 
authorities lashed and threatened with death Christian clan 
leader Sheikh Abdoullahi Yusuf and Mohanna Mohammed for 
apostasy.  In April the police arrested and detained without 
charge three Catholic Church volunteers from Egypt and a 
Catholic clergyman for alleged threats to the security of the 
State.  In May the authorities released the Sudanese clergyman 
and expelled the three Egyptians from the country at the same 
time.

Authorities continued to restrict the activities of Christians 
in 1994.  The law forbids proselytizing of Muslims, but Muslims 
are allowed to proselytize freely.  The Government required 
missionary groups to apply for special licenses, and work 
permits for foreign missionaries remained difficult to obtain.  
The Government continued to deny permission to build churches, 
and in the north, no new churches have been built since the 
early 1970's.  There were also reliable reports that in some 
war zones, government forces closed churches and restricted 
movements of Christian clergy.  The Sudan Catholic Bishops' 
Conference (SCCB), the Sudan Council of Churches (SCC), and the 
Coptic Church all faced restrictions on their activities, which 
local officials often interpreted capriciously.  Among these 
restrictions were the repeated difficulties experienced by 
Christian clergymen in obtaining travel permits to attend 
Christian Church conferences abroad.  In October the Government 
announced that the Missionary Act had been abrogated and 
replaced by a new law.  However, the details of the new law had 
not been made public by year's end.

Non-Muslims continued to criticize the Government's favoritism 
of Islam over other religions.  As the basis of Sudan's Arab 
culture, all citizens are exposed to Islamic ideas set forth in 
the Koran.  In the Popular Defense Forces, all trainees, 
including non-Muslims, are indoctrinated in the Islamic faith.  
In prisons, government-supported Islamic NGO's offer 
inducements to, and exert pressure on, non-Muslim inmates to 
convert.  There were also reliable reports that, in some war 
zones, Islamic NGO's withheld food and other key services from 
the needy unless they converted to Islam.

In SPLA/SSIM-controlled areas, Christians and Muslims were 
generally allowed to worship freely.

     d.  Freedom of Movement Within the Country, Foreign 
         Travel, Emigration, and Repatriation

The Government restricted freedom of movement by denying exit 
visas to some categories of persons (such as policemen and 
doctors).  The Government also kept lists of political figures 
and others not permitted to travel abroad.  Because of tensions 
with Egypt, the authorities denied many requests for travel to 
that country.

Women may not travel outside of Sudan without the permission of 
their husbands or male guardians.  Some former political 
detainees were forbidden to travel outside of Khartoum.  
Movement was generally free for other Sudanese outside of the 
war zones, but those who failed to produce an identity card at 
checkpoints risked arrest.  Foreigners needed permits, which 
were hard to obtain and often refused, for domestic travel 
outside of Khartoum.  (Diplomats, however, could travel freely 
to many locations.)  Foreigners had to register with the police 
on entering the country, seek permission to move from one 
location to another, and reregister at each new location within 
3 days of arrival.  Foreign NGO staff sometimes had problems 
obtaining entry visas to Sudan or work or travel permits once 
they were in country.

The SPLA/M and SSIM require NGO personnel to obtain permission 
before they travel to areas they control.  Such permission is 
granted regularly.  However, the SPLA/SSIM would not give such 
permission to most Islamic NGO's (many of which have ties to 
the Government or the NIF).  There were reports of SPLA/SSIM 
abuse and mistreatment of NGO personnel.

Tens of thousands of persons, largely southerners and 
westerners displaced by famine and civil war, continued to live 
in squatter slums in the Khartoum area.  Throughout 1994 the 
Government razed thousands of squatter dwellings in this area.  
As in the case of the destruction of the Khuddeir squatters 
settlement in October (see below), inhabitants of these 
dwellings knew that their homes were slated for destruction, 
but they were not told precisely when it would occur.  
Bulldozers would typically arrive unannounced in a neighborhood 
and carry out the razings the same day.  Tens of thousands were 
made homeless and often forcibly moved to resettlement sites 
outside the city, where conditions were harsh and distances 
from employment opportunities great.

In October the Khartoum state government used excessive force 
in meeting a protest demonstration by squatters from the 
Khuddeir settlement of Omdurman, killing at least five persons 
and wounding dozens (see Section 1.g.).  The protest 
demonstration took place after the Khartoum state government 
had reneged on its promise to resettle them in nearby areas and 
had determined to move them to a distant camp.  The Khuddeir 
residents had filed a legal case against the state government, 
but the latter set its bulldozers in action before the courts 
had a chance to rule on the case.

Sudan accorded refugees relatively good treatment.  At the end 
of the year, the population of officially registered refugees 
(largely composed of Ethiopians and Eritreans) was about 
600,000, about half of whom received assistance from the United 
Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), and UNHCR 
resettlement of refugees to third countries proceeded 
smoothly.  There were no reports of forcible repatriation of 
refugees, regardless of their status, in 1994.  Refugees could 
not become resident aliens or citizens of Sudan, regardless of 
their length of stay.  However, the Government tolerated a 
large number of refugees and allowed them to work, although 
typically in menial occupations in the cities.  Thousands of 
Sudanese refugees fled to Uganda in 1994, as a result of the 
fighting between the Government and the insurgency and 
SPLA/SSIM infighting.  There were also refugee flows from Sudan 
to Ethiopia and Kenya as well.

Section 3  Respect for Political Rights:  The Right of Citizens 
           to Change Their Government

Citizens had neither the right nor the ability to change their 
government peacefully.  Political power remained solely in the 
hands of a small group of unelected military officers and the 
NIF leadership.  The NIF continued to increase its power at the 
provincial and state level.

In 1989 the RCC abolished all political parties and detained 
temporarily the major party leaders, and in 1990 rejected both 
multiparty and one-party systems.  In 1992 the RCC instituted 
the Transitional National Assembly (TNA) based on a 
Libyan-style political structure with ascending levels of 
nonpartisan assemblies.  The Government appointed its members, 
largely progovernment deputies.  Although individual members 
occasionally criticized government policies, the TNA remained a 
rubber-stamp body, whose main function was to ratify 
legislation proposed by the Executive.

In April the General Elections Act, promulgated by provisional 
decree by the President and pending ratification by the TNA, 
specified that an undefined government-appointed body, the 
General Elections Corporation, will select all candidates who 
will be permitted to run in the general elections.  The 
Government plans to hold elections in March 1995 for state 
assemblies.  It will appoint 10 percent of the assembly 
members, each state's popular committees will elect 45 percent 
of the members, and the people will elect the remaining 45 
percent.  The Government plans to have the elections for the 
Transitional National Assembly shortly after the state assembly 
elections.

Although government rhetoric supported ending the civil war, 
the Government launched major military offensives in the south 
throughout the year.  Rival rebel factions continued to fight 
intermittently among themselves.  In a bid to mediate the 
conflict, the Intergovernmental Authority on Drought and 
Development (IGADD), a regional body that comprises Djibouti, 
Eritrea, Ethiopia, Kenya, Uganda, and Sudan, sponsored several 
negotiating rounds between the Government and the rebels.  By 
year's end, the negotiations were stalemated due to the 
intransigence of the various warring parties, whose commitment 
to peace was questionable.  Prospects for a negotiated 
settlement remained slim.

Although there were no women in the highest ranks of 
government, women in lesser positions played a modest role in 
day-to-day government operations.  One of the governors of 
Sudan's 26 states was a woman, and there were a few female TNA 
members.  The NIF did not, however, encourage female 
involvement in politics.

Section 4  Governmental Attitude Regarding International and 
           Nongovernmental Investigation of Alleged Violations 
           of Human Rights

The Government tried to stamp out any domestic criticism on 
human rights issues by frequently and vehemently denying any 
responsibility for human rights abuses.  Since the 1989 coup, 
the Government has banned local, independent human rights 
organizations.  However, the Christian church organizations, 
SCCB and the SCC, continued to seek to monitor and publicize 
human rights abuses, especially religious discrimination.

In 1991 the Government created the Sudan Human Rights 
Organization (SHRO)--not to be confused with the previous SHRO, 
which it dissolved after the 1989 coup--to defend its human 
rights record.  This organization has yet to criticize the 
Government.  In an attempt to demonstrate the regime's concern 
for human rights, the TNA adopted in 1993 the "Sudan Document 
of Human Rights" and created a human rights committee.  After 
the latter began quietly investigating cases of disappearances, 
however, the Government dismissed its members in July and 
appointed new members.  The new members have shown no 
inclination to criticize or investigate the Government's human 
rights record.

The Government was highly defensive about foreign criticism of 
its human rights record.  It bitterly denounced the February 
report on Sudan by the U.N. Special Rapporteur on Human Rights 
in Sudan, Gaspar Biro, and bitterly attacked him personally.  
Much of the Government's response to the detailed and 
documented report consisted of denunciations of the 
rapporteur's age, qualifications, and integrity, and of  
accusations that he was hostile to Islam.  The Government 
declared that because of the rapporteur's alleged bias against 
Islam, he was no longer welcome to visit Sudan.

Section 5  Discrimination Based on Race, Sex, Religion, 
           Disability, Language, or Social Status

     Women

Some aspects of Sudanese law and many traditional practices 
discriminate against women.  Gender segregation is 
commonplace.  In keeping with Islamic law, Muslim women are not 
accorded the same property, inheritance, and family rights as 
Muslim men.  Women typically inherit half as much of the estate 
of a man with the same degree of kinship, and only men may 
initiate legal divorce proceedings.  These rules apply only to 
Sudanese Muslims and not to those of other faiths.  Women are 
discriminated against in employment, and only a small number of 
women worked in the professions, the police, and the military.

Government directives require women in government offices and 
female students and teachers to conform to Islamic dress 
codes.  Enforcement of the dress code regulations was uneven, 
but at times severe.  On New Year's Eve of 1993, security 
forces raided many of Khartoum's private clubs and arrested 
several Muslim women for allegedly wearing clothes that did not 
conform with the Government's version of modest dress.  The 
authorities punished several of these women by lashing.

Violence against women appears to be common, especially wife 
beating, although accurate statistics do not exist.  The 
Government has not addressed the issue of violence against 
women; nor was it discussed publicly.  The police do not 
normally intervene in domestic disputes, and there were no 
reports of court cases involving violence against women in 
1994.  For cultural reasons, many women are reluctant to file 
formal complaints against such abuse.  Women refugees from the 
south were particularly vulnerable to harassment and sexual 
abuse.

Among some southern tribes, rape is common.  No blame is 
attached to the practice, although the man involved must pay 
the woman's family if she becomes pregnant.  Among some ethnic 
groups, wives are taken on a trial basis lasting up to 4 
years.  The husband may dissolve the marriage during this 
period by returning the wife to her family, although he must 
pay a price for each child born during this time.  Such wives 
reportedly may contract further marriages and are not 
stigmatized by having been returned.

     Children

Government practice, as opposed to government rhetoric, 
demonstrated no significant concern for the rights and welfare 
of children.  A considerable number of children suffered 
serious abuses, including occasional enslavement, in the war 
zones.  There were recurrent reports that the SPLA held 
thousands of children in camps against their will and used them 
as a reservoir of recruits for its military forces.

There continued to be credible but unconfirmed reports of the 
existence of special camps where people from the north or from 
abroad come to purchase women and children.  In his report to 
the U.N. Commission on Human Rights, the U.N. Special 
Rapporteur noted eyewitness accounts which revealed consistent 
reports of the locations of camps.  Young girls and women are 
reportedly purchased for housekeepers and in some cases wives.  
The boys are reportedly kept as servants (see Section 6.c.).

The Government runs several camps for vagrant children.  Police 
periodically sweep the streets of Khartoum and other major 
cities, taking children whom police personnel deem homeless to 
the camps, where they are detained for indefinite periods.  
These children may not leave the camps and are subjected to 
strict discipline and physical and military training.  Health 
care and schooling at the camps are generally poor; basic 
living conditions are also often primitive.  All the children, 
including non-Muslims, must study the Koran, and there is 
pressure on non-Muslims to convert to Islam.  Children in the 
camps are often incorporated into the PDF.

Female genital mutilation (FGM), although illegal, is 
widespread, especially in northern Sudan.  As many as 90 
percent or more of females in the north have been so mutilated, 
with consequences that sometimes have included severe urinary 
problems, infections, and even death.  Pharaonic mutilation 
(infibulation), the severest of the three types, is the most 
common and is usually performed on girls between 4 and 7.  
Because few physicians will perform the operation, it is most 
often done by paramedical personnel in improvised, unsanitary 
conditions, causing severe pain and trauma to the child.  Women 
displaced from the south to the north reportedly are 
increasingly imposing FGM upon their daughters, even if they 
themselves have not been subjected to it.

     National/Racial/Ethnic Minorities

Sudan's population of 24.9 million is a multiethnic mix of over 
500 Arab and African tribes with scores of languages and 
dialects.  The Arab, Muslim culture in the north and central 
areas and the non-Muslim, black African culture in the south 
are the two dominate cultures.  The west has a smaller 
population of Muslim black Africans.  Northern Muslims, who 
form a majority of about 16 million, have traditionally 
dominated the Government.  In response, the southern ethnic 
groups fighting the civil war want independence, or, at a 
minimum, the right to self-determination.

The Muslim Arab majority and the NIF-dominated Government 
continued to discriminate against ethnic minorities in almost 
every aspect of society.  Residents in Arabic-speaking areas 
who do not themselves speak Arabic are discriminated against in 
education, jobs, and other opportunities.

The Arabization of instruction in higher education 
discriminated against non-Arabs.  To compete for a university 
slot, students completing high school had to pass examinations 
in four subjects--English, mathematics, Arabic, and religious 
studies.  Even at the university level, exams for all subjects 
except English were in Arabic, disadvantaging nonnative Arabic 
speakers.

     Religious Minorities

Although the law recognizes Sudan as a multireligious country, 
in practice, the Government treats Islam, the religion of the 
majority, as the state religion.  Muslims are the majority and 
predominate in the north, but are in the minority in the mostly 
Christian or animist south.  There are also 1 to 2 million 
Christian or animist displaced southerners, and about 500,000 
Copts, in the north.

In government-controlled areas of the south, there was credible 
evidence of a policy of Islamization, as NIF supporters often 
replaced non-Muslim civil servants.  All non-Muslim judges have 
been transferred to the north, where they are relegated to 
low-level tasks such as adjudicating traffic disputes.  In the 
north, some non-Muslims lost their jobs in the civil service, 
the judiciary, and other professions.  Few non-Muslim 
university graduates found government jobs at all.  Frequent 
dismissals in the army and police purged professionals to make 
room for NIF supporters.  Some non-Muslim businessmen 
complained of petty harassment and discrimination in the 
awarding of government contracts and trade licenses.

     People with Disabilities

The Government does not discriminate against handicapped 
persons, but it has not enacted any special legislation or 
taken other steps, such as mandating accessibility to public 
buildings and transportation for the disabled.

Section 6  Worker Rights

     a.  The Right of Association

Although Sudan had a strong labor union movement during the 
government of Sadiq al-Mahdi, the RCC abolished the precoup 
labor unions, closed union offices, froze union assets, forbade 
strikes, and prescribed stiff punishments, including the death 
penalty, for violations of RCC labor decrees.  The Government 
dismissed many labor leaders from their jobs or detained them, 
although most of those arrested were later freed.  In 1994, 
however, the Government detained without charge a number of 
union activists suspected of antiregime activities.  In March 
the International Labor Organization (ILO) Committee on Freedom 
of Association deplored the detention of two trade unionists 
and expressed consternation at the death sentence pronounced 
against a third (even though he was later pardoned) for calling 
a strike.

Prior to the new Labor Law instituted in 1992, the Government 
had established preliminary, government-controlled steering 
committees in 1989 and 1990 to manage union affairs.  Under 
tight control of these committees, the Sudan Workers Trade 
Unions Federation (SWTUF), the leading blue-collar labor 
organization with about 800,000 members, was restored with its 
leadership unchanged and its assets returned.  In 1992 local 
union elections were held, after a delay to permit the steering 
committees to arrange the outcomes.  The elections resulted in 
government-approved slates of candidates voted into office by 
prearranged acclamation.

Although the Government continued to forbid strikes, some 70 
employees of the state-owned telephone company struck in 
August.  In September the company fired the 70, and the 
authorities detained 18 of them for periods as long as 2 weeks.

The U.S. Government in 1991 suspended Sudan's eligibility for 
trade benefits under the Generalized System of Preferences 
because of its violations of worker rights.

Unions remained free to form federations and affiliate with 
international bodies, such as the African Workers' Union and 
the Arab Workers' Union.

     b.  The Right to Organize and Bargain Collectively

An RCC constitutional decree of June 30, 1989, temporarily  
suspended the right to organize and bargain collectively.  
Although these rights were restored to organizing committees in 
September of the same year, government control of the steering 
committees meant in practice that the Government dominates the 
process of setting wages and working conditions.  The continued 
absence of labor legislation allowing for union meetings, 
filing of grievances, and other union activity, greatly reduced 
the value of these formal rights.  Although local union 
officials raised some grievances with employers, few carried 
them to the Government.  Wages are set by a tripartite 
committee comprising representatives of the Government, the 
labor unions, and business.  Specialized labor courts 
adjudicate standard labor disputes.

In 1993 the Government created two export processing zones.  By 
the end of 1994, however, they existed only on paper, and the 
Government had not yet made clear whether or not Sudanese labor 
laws would apply fully in these zones.

     c.  Prohibition of Forced or Compulsory Labor

Although the law prohibits forced or compulsory labor, slavery 
persists.  The taking of slaves, particularly in war zones, and 
their export to parts of central and northern Sudan continued 
in 1994.  Captives were forced to do agricultural and domestic 
work, and some women were forced to serve as concubines.  
Although in some instances local authorities took action to 
stop instances of slavery, in other cases the authorities did 
nothing.  There were also several unconfirmed reports that some 
captives were exported to Libya.  In its 1993 World Labor 
Report, the ILO noted that traditional slavery survived and is 
increasing in modern-day Sudan in the context of the ongoing 
civil war (see Section 5).

The SPLA and SSIM continued to force southern men to work as 
laborers or porters or forcibly conscripted them into their 
fighting forces.

     d.  Minimum Age for Employment of Children

The legal minimum age for workers was 16, but the law was 
loosely enforced by inspectors from the Ministry of Labor in 
the official or wage economy.  Children as young as 11 or 12 
worked in a number of factories, particularly outside of the 
capital, including the oil mills at Um Ruwaba.  In addition, 
gross poverty in Sudan has produced widespread child labor in 
the informal, unregulated economy.  In rural areas, children 
traditionally assist their families with agricultural work from 
a very young age.

     e.  Acceptable Conditions of Work

The legislated minimum wage is enforced by the Ministry of 
Labor, which maintains field offices in most major Sudanese 
cities.  Employers generally respect the minimum wage.  Workers 
who are denied the minimum wage may file a grievance with the 
local Ministry of Labor field office, which is then supposed to 
investigate and take appropriate action if there has been a 
violation of the law.  In July the Government increased the 
minimum wage to $23 (approximately 9,000 Sudanese pounds) per 
month.  Given Sudan's soaring inflation, however, this wage is 
insufficient to support the average Sudanese worker and his 
family.

The workweek is limited by law to 6 days and 48 hours, with a 
day of rest on Friday.  Although Sudanese laws prescribe health 
and safety standards, working conditions were generally poor, 
and enforcement by the Ministry of Labor minimal.  The law does 
not address the right of workers to remove themselves from 
dangerous work situations without loss of employment.


(###)##









                           SUDAN

##
TITLE:  SUDAN HUMAN RIGHTS PRACTICES, 1994
AUTHOR:  U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE
DATE:  FEBRUARY 1995









                             SUDAN


After the 1989 coup that overthrew Sudan's democratically 
elected government, the military assumed power under Lt. 
General Omar Hassan al-Bashir and his National Salvation 
Revolution Command Council (RCC).  Bashir and the RCC suspended 
the 1985 Constitution, abrogated press freedoms, and banned all 
political parties and trade unions.  In 1993 the RCC dissolved 
itself and appointed Lt. General Bashir President.  However, 
since 1989 real power has rested with Hassan al-Turabi and his 
National Islamic Front (NIF).  NIF control over government 
operations was further solidified with the end of the RCC, and 
NIF members and supporters held most key positions in the 
Government, security forces, judiciary, academia, and the 
media.  The NIF continued to consolidate its power in 1994.  
Although legislative authority theoretically rests with the 
government-appointed Transitional National Assembly (TNA), the 
new Government maintained the RCC's suspension of the 1985 
Constitution and continued to restrict most civil liberties.

The civil war in Sudan continued, despite efforts by Kenya, 
Uganda, Ethiopia, Eritrea, and Sudan, under the auspices of the 
Intergovernmental Authority on Drought and Development (IGADD), 
to seek a peaceful solution to the conflict.  Government forces 
launched a major offensive against the Sudanese People's 
Liberation Army (SPLA), gaining some ground, displacing 
thousands of civilians, and causing new outflows of refugees.

In the second half of the year, however, the SPLA took the 
offensive, overrunning Amadi, besieging Kapoeta, and attacking 
other government-held positions.  By year's end, the Government 
had suffered heavy casualties, its hold on Kapoeta had become 
precarious, and it had been forced, because of SPLA pressure, 
to postpone its planned dry-season offensive.  Despite SPLA 
successes, divisions between the SPLA (mainstream faction), led 
by John Garang, and the South Sudan Independence Movement 
(SSIM), formerly the United faction of the SPLA, led by Riak 
Machar, continued to hamper the insurgency's effectiveness in 
battling the Government.

In addition to the regular police and Sudan People's Armed 
Forces (SPAF), the Government maintains an Islamic militia, the 
Popular Defense Forces (PDF), and an Islamic police force, the 
Popular Police, whose mission includes enforcing proper social 
behavior, including restrictions on alcohol and "immodest 
dress."

Civil war, economic mismanagement, high inflation, over 2.5 
million internally displaced persons, and a refugee influx from 
neighboring countries have devastated Sudan's mostly 
agricultural economy.  Exports of gum arabic, livestock, and 
meat accounted for over 50 percent of Sudan's 1994 export 
earnings.  Reforms aimed at privatizing state-run firms and 
stimulating private investment have failed to revive a moribund 
economy saddled with massive military expenditures.

The dismal human rights situation showed no improvement in 
1994.  Both the Government and insurgents committed serious 
human rights abuses, including massacres and extrajudicial 
killing, kidnaping, and forced conscription.  A myriad of 
official and secret government security forces routinely 
harassed, detained, and tortured opponents or suspected 
opponents of the Government with impunity.  Despite some 
improvement in overall cooperation with U.N.-sponsored relief 
operations, both the SPAF/PDF and SPLA/SSIM periodically 
obstructed the flow of humanitarian assistance to affected 
populations.

The Government and rebels continued to restrict most civil 
rights, including the rights to free speech and association.  
In the context of the Islamization and Arabization drive, 
pressure--including forced Islamization--on non-Muslims 
remained strong.  Fears of Arabization and Islamization and the 
imposition of Shari'a (Islamic law) have fueled support for the 
southern insurgency.  Serious abuses against women and children 
continued.

RESPECT FOR HUMAN RIGHTS

Section 1  Respect for the Integrity of the Person, Including 
           Freedom from:

     a.  Political and Other Extrajudicial Killing

Official and unofficial government forces committed an 
undetermined number of political killings of persons suspected 
of belonging to or collaborating with the insurgent SPLA.  
There were also credible reports that government forces 
executed over 20 Chadian dissidents in western Sudan in January 
and killed at least 3 students while putting down an 
antigovernment riot in El Obeid in February.

There are credible reports that security forces beat and 
tortured to death detainees.  For example, police beat to death 
Mustafa Azraq, a street vendor, who had been in police custody 
in Khartoum for less than 24 hours.  Similarly, in September 
security forces tortured to death opposition activist Abdel 
Meneim Rahma in Wad Medani.  The Government routinely denied 
any wrongdoing and has yet to discipline publicly any official 
guilty of political or extrajudicial killing since it came to 
power in 1989.

In an incident highlighting intra-Islamic divisions, in 
February gunmen linked to al Muslimin, a small extremist 
Islamic sect, murdered 16 worshipers and wounded over 20 more 
at a mosque in Omdurman because they had "betrayed" Islam.  The 
attackers also allegedly planned to kill leading Saudi Islamist 
Bin Laden and NIF leader Hassan al-Turabi.  Police killed two 
of the gunmen following a shoot-out, and captured a third, 
along with an accomplice who did not participate in the 
shootings.  Their trial, conducted by a special court presided 
over by a government-appointed judge linked to the National 
Islamic Front, lasted from July to September.  Credible 
government sources conducting the pretrial investigation 
complained that the Government was suppressing evidence, 
downplaying, in particular, the gunmen's ties to senior members 
of the Government and the NIF.  In September the court 
sentenced the surviving gunman to death and his accomplice to 
10 years in prison.  The death sentence was carried out 
immediately.

There were also credible reports that both the SPLA and SSIM 
carried out egregious political and extrajudicial killings and 
massacred civilians during combat operations.  In October the 
SSIA (the armed wing of the SSIM) was responsible for the 
massacre of more than 100 residents in the town of Akot, many 
of whom were killed in their beds at the Akot hospital.  The 
Akot massacre was part of the endemic fighting between the 
rival southern insurgent movements (SPLA/Mainstream and the 
SSIM).

     b.  Disappearance

The Government was responsible for continued arrests and 
subsequent disappearances of persons suspected of supporting 
the rebels in government-controlled areas in the South and Nuba 
Mountains.  Scores of persons arrested by government forces in 
Juba in 1992, including two local U.S. Agency for International 
Development employees, Dominic Morris and Chaplain Lako, 
remained unaccounted for, and most are believed dead.  However, 
there were reliable reports that at least a few of those 
arrested then were being held in a Khartoum prison; the 
Government has stated it has no knowledge of their whereabouts.

     c.  Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading
         Treatment or Punishment

The Government's official and unofficial security forces 
continued routinely to beat and torture suspected opponents.  
In May security personnel arrested and badly beat elderly 
southern politician Eliaba Surur for having contacts with the 
U.S. Embassy.  He later required brain surgery to remove a 
blood clot, suffered as a result of his beating.  Security 
forces arrested and beat scores of students after antiregime 
demonstrations in El Obeid and Wad Medani in February and 
April.  Eyewitnesses in Wad Medani reported that the police had 
deliberately broken limbs of some of the arrested student 
demonstrators.  During the January trial of a group accused of 
conspiring to commit sabotage (see Section 1.e.), the 
defendants stated that they had been brutally tortured.  Court- 
appointed medical examiners confirmed that at least seven had 
been tortured; some had been badly burned.

Throughout the year the security forces detained government 
opponents incommunicado, often for months, in unofficial 
prisons known as "ghost houses."  Some inmates released in 1994 
commented that conditions had improved compared to previous 
years.  However, inmates in ghost houses were still subject to 
torture, including whipping and clubbing; suspension by the 
wrists; application of electric shocks; burning with hot irons; 
submersion in hot and cold water; deprivation of food, water, 
sleep, and access to toilet facilities; confinement in 
overcrowded and unsanitary quarters; deprivation of medical 
care; and psychological torture.

There were, however, fewer reports of torture in ghost houses 
in 1994 than in previous years.  The Government has never 
publicly disciplined any security official for torture, 
although its use is widely known.

There were credible and recurrent reports that both government 
and insurgent forces in the field periodically raped women and 
that police personnel sometimes raped female detainees.  There 
were also credible reports that SPLA and SSIM forces tortured 
some of their prisoners.

Conditions in official prisons were harsh but generally not 
life-threatening.  Almost all prisons were built before 
independence in 1956 and are poorly maintained.  Many lack 
basic facilities like toilets or showers.  Health care is 
primitive and food inadequate.  Minors are often held with 
adults.  Female prisoners are kept separately from men, and 
rape in prison (as opposed to police stations) does not appear 
to be a major problem.

Sudan's 1991 Criminal Act, based on the Shari'a, mandates 
specific "hudud" punishments, including amputation, stoning, 
and lashing, for some offenses.  The courts handed down several 
sentences involving amputations in 1994, of which at least one 
was carried out.  The Government routinely meted out lashings, 
most often to persons convicted of brewing or consuming 
alcohol, following trials that did not meet internationally 
accepted standards of fairness (see Section 1.e.).  In July the 
authorities lashed Abdoullahi Yusif and his brother Mohanna 
Mohammed of Wad Medani for alleged apostasy; Mohanna had to be 
hospitalized as a result.

     d.  Arbitrary Arrest, Detention, or Exile

The 1991 Criminal Code does not include provisions concerning 
the length of detention of security and other detainees, and 
the Government routinely detained persons without charge and 
without reference to the judiciary.  The state of emergency 
introduced following the 1989 coup authorizes the Government to 
arrest people without using warrants and to detain them 
indefinitely without charge or trial.  Under the National 
Security Act, the Government may detain a suspect for 
interrogation for up to 72 hours.  This is renewable for up to 
1 month with "justification," which is not defined.

Also under the 1992 National Security Act, the President has 
the power to authorize "precautionary detention" for up to 3 
months "to preserve the general security," but in practice this 
authority rests with subordinate officials.  A person detained 
under this provision theoretically must be notified of the 
reasons for detention within these 3 months, and the President 
may extend detention for 3 more months if a magistrate approves 
the extension.  In practice, these legal provisions are 
routinely ignored as the authorities often detain opponents in 
ghost houses indefinitely.

The law allows for bail, except for those accused of crimes 
punishable by death or life imprisonment.  In theory, the 
Government provides legal counsel for indigents in the case of 
crimes punishable by death or life imprisonment.  However, 
courts sometimes fail to inform defendants of this right.  
Moreover, in some cases counsel is only allowed to advise the 
defendant and may not address the court.  Thus, despite some 
legal protections, detainees have few rights and are often 
subject to arbitrary, and in many cases, incommunicado 
detention.

The Government's secrecy and arbitrary detention practices made 
it impossible to know the exact number of political detainees 
and prisoners.  Although the Government continued to pick up 
and detain suspected opponents across the country, the number 
of new arrests decreased compared to previous years.

After brief detentions in April 1993 and April 1994 in which he 
was questioned about his opposition activities, Sadiq al Mahdi 
was again arrested and held for 12 days.  The Government 
alleged that al Mahdi and his two supporters, Hamad Bagadi and 
Abdul Rahman Farah, were involved in a conspiracy to overthrow 
the Government that included assassinations and bombings.  
Although both al Mahdi and Bagadi made statements upon their 
release admitting that Bagadi had passed information to a 
foreign intelligence service, the Government never pressed 
formal charges against any of the three. It released Bagadi and 
Farah in early July.  The authorities detained Sid'Ahmed 
Hussein without charge on two occasions in 1994.  In November 
1993, they arrested Hussein and held him in a ghost house until 
February 1994.  In mid-April, they rearrested him and released 
him in late May.

The authorities picked up numerous other lower ranking 
opposition figures and others throughout the year and held some 
for several months.  Reasonable estimates of the number of 
political detainees ranged between several score and a few 
hundred.  The Government also continued its practice of de 
facto arrest of suspected opponents by requiring them to report 
to security offices in the morning and wait all day for several 
days in a row.  Those targeted for such harassment were unable 
to earn a livelihood.

     e.  Denial of Fair Public Trial

The judiciary is not independent and is largely subservient to 
the Government.  The Chief Justice of the Supreme Court, 
formerly elected by sitting judges, is now appointed (as the 
senior judge in the Sudanese judicial service, he also controls 
the judiciary).  Since 1989 the authorities have replaced 
hundreds of judges considered ideologically unsuitable.  Most 
new judges have ties to the NIF and favor strict application of 
Islamic law (the Shari'a); many have little or no legal 
training.  The RCC banned the respected Sudanese Bar 
Association in 1989 and replaced it with a government-appointed 
committee.  Human rights monitors have pointed out that the 
Government continued to harass, detain, and torture members of 
the legal profession it views as political opponents.

Sudan's judicial system includes four types of courts:  regular 
courts, both criminal and civil; special mixed security courts; 
military courts; and tribal courts in rural areas to resolve 
disputes over land and water rights and family matters.  The 
1991 Criminal Act governs criminal cases, whereas the 1983 
Civil Transactions Act still applies to most civil cases.  
Military trials, whose proceedings are secret and brief, do not 
meet international standards.

Trials in the regular courts nominally meet international 
standards of legal protections.  For instance, the accused 
normally have the right to counsel, and the courts should 
provide free legal counsel for indigent defendants accused of 
crimes punishable by death or life imprisonment.  In practice, 
however, these legal protections are unevenly applied.

In 1989 the Special Courts Act created special three-person 
security courts to deal with a wide range of offenses, 
including violations of constitutional decrees, emergency 
regulations, and some sections of the Penal Code, as well as 
drug and currency offenses.  Special courts, on which both 
military and civilian judges sit, handle most security related 
cases.  Attorneys may advise defendants as "friends of the 
court" but normally may not address the court.  Lawyers 
complain that they are sometimes granted access to court 
documents too late to prepare an effective defense.  Sentences 
are usually severe and implemented at once.  Death sentences, 
however, are referred to the Chief Justice and the Head of 
State.  Defendants may file appeal briefs with the Chief 
Justice.

In a case with political undertones, the trial of 2 suspects 
charged with killing 16 persons at Omdurman's Thawara Mosque 
began in July.  The majority of the victims were members of the 
pro-Saudi branch of the Ansar el Sunna sect which is opposed to 
the NIF.  Opposition figures charge that the Government or NIF 
organized the massacre, and their assertions were fueled by the 
appointment of a judge closely linked to the NIF to preside 
over the case.  In September the court sentenced the surviving 
gunman to death and his accomplice to 10 years in prison.  The 
death sentence was carried out immediately.

In April, despite the court's acknowledgment that confessions 
were elicited through the use of torture, the court found 
guilty 21 of 29 defendants accused of plotting bombings and 
sentenced them to prison terms ranging from 2 to 10 years.  The 
court found the confessions admissible evidence because the 
defendants could not prove they were actually being tortured at 
the time they confessed (see Section 1.c.).  The court also 
claimed that Islamic law allows torture, despite the bulk of 
Islamic jurisprudence to dispute this assertion.

In late 1994, the authorities released half a dozen former 
officers who had been sentenced for alleged coup plotting in 
1990 and 1991.

The Government officially exempts the 10 southern states, whose 
population is mostly non-Muslim, from parts of the 1991 
Criminal Act.  But the Act permits the possible future 
application of Shari'a in the south, if the local state 
assemblies, envisioned in Sudan's new political system, so 
decide.  Moreover, in 1993 the Government transferred all 
non-Muslim judges from the south to the north, replacing them 
with Muslim judges.  However, there were no reports that hudud 
punishments, other than lashings, were carried out by the 
courts in government-controlled areas of the south.  Fear of 
the imposition of Shari'a remained a key issue in the rebellion.

Parts of the south and the Nuba mountains fell outside of 
effective judicial procedures and other governmental 
functions.  According to credible reports, government units 
summarily tried and punished those accused of crimes, 
especially offenses against civil order.  In SPLA-held areas, 
there was some reliance on traditional justice by village 
elders.  However, the SPLA ultimately ruled by summary methods, 
including beatings, torture, and arbitrary execution.

     f.  Arbitrary Interference with Privacy, Family, Home, or 
         Correspondence

The Government routinely interferes with its citizens' 
privacy.  Throughout 1994 security forces frequently conducted 
night searches without warrants.  They targeted persons 
suspected of political crimes or also, in northern Sudan, of 
distilling or consuming illegal alcoholic beverages.  For 
example, in March security forces broke up a family ceremony in 
a private home in memory of 28 officers executed in 1991 for 
coup plotting.  They arrested and beat 30 participants at the 
memorial service.

A wide network of government informants conducted pervasive 
surveillance in schools, universities, markets, workplaces, and 
neighborhoods.  The authorities kept key opposition figures 
under frequent surveillance.  The Government also continued its 
practice of summarily dismissing military personnel and other 
government employees whose loyalty it suspected.  Dozens lost 
their jobs throughout the year.  Security personnel routinely 
opened and read mail and tapped telephones.

Government-instituted neighborhood "popular committees," 
ostensibly a mechanism for political mobilization, served as a 
means for monitoring households.  These committees caused many 
Sudanese to be wary of neighbors who could report them for 
"suspicious" activities, including "excessive" contact with 
foreigners.  The committees also furnished or withheld 
documents essential for obtaining an exit visa from Sudan.  In 
high schools, students were sometimes pressured to join 
proregime youth groups.

     g.  Use of Excessive Force and Violations of Humanitarian 
         Law in Internal Conflicts

Since the civil war began in 1983, at least 1.5 million people 
have been killed as the result of fighting between the Islamic 
Government in the north and insurgents in southern Sudan.  The 
civil war continued unabated in 1994, and all sides involved in 
the fighting were responsible for abuses in violation of 
humanitarian norms.  At year's end, the Government controlled 
most of Sudan, except for parts of the south and the Nuba 
Mountains.  All efforts undertaken by Sudan's neighbors (Kenya, 
Uganda, Ethiopia, and Eritrea) to seek a peaceful resolution to 
the civil war under the auspices of IGADD were unsuccessful 
(see Section 3).

Government forces launched a major offensive against the SPLA, 
gaining some ground, displacing thousands of civilians, and 
causing new outflows of refugees.  However, Government forces 
suffered heavy casualties and were put on the defensive late in 
the year when the SPLA took the offensive.  SPAF units bombed 
civilian targets indiscriminately, forcing thousands of 
southern Sudanese to flee to neighboring Uganda and Kenya.  
Government forces were also responsible for the massacre of 
civilians, and throughout the year PDF forces regularly looted 
and burned villages and killed civilians in "pacification" and 
other military operations, particularly around Aweil, Warrap, 
Thiet, and Tonj.

By year's end the International Committee of the Red Cross 
(ICRC) access to war-wounded had improved, but the evacuation 
of wounded from certain localities in the south continued to be 
subject to authorization which was not systematically granted.  
The former Chief of Security in Kordofan Province, Khalid Abd 
El Karim Salih, told the Arabic-language London-based 
periodical Al-Majallah in March that government forces 
systematically targeted civilian populations in the Nuba 
Mountains, killing thousands.

The SPLA and SSIM were also responsible for egregious abuses 
and attacks on civilians, exemplified by the massacre of more 
than 100 residents of the southern town of Akot by SSIA forces 
in October (see Section 1.a.).  Approximately 300 members of 
the armed wing of the SSIM entered Akot on October 24 and 
killed and wounded town residents, including several patients 
at the Akot hospital who were killed in their beds.  Several 
thousand families fled Akot following the incident.

In October police killed at least five people and wounded 
dozens of others at the Khuddeir Squatters Settlement in 
Omdurman when the Government forcibly resettled its residents 
and demolished the slum (see Section 2.d.).

Section 2  Respect for Civil Liberties, Including:

     a.  Freedom of Speech and Press

The Government severely curtails freedom of speech and press.  
Government intimidation and surveillance, fostered in part by 
the informer network, continued to inhibit open, public 
discussion of political issues.  Radio, television, and the 
bulk of the print media are controlled entirely by the 
Government and required to reflect government and NIF 
policies.  Sudan television had a permanent military censor to 
ensure that the news reflected government views.

In mid-1993, the Government adopted a new Press Code that 
called for turning the existing state-owned print media into 
publicly held companies.  The Code also allowed the formation 
of new, private newspapers.  Implementation of the Code has 
been slow.  The few publications that issued shares were 
purchased by government ministries and state-owned 
corporations, thus keeping them under government control.

In 1994 two privately owned dailies began publishing in 
accordance with the new Code.  After several months of 
harassment, in April the Government shut down permanently the 
Sudan al-Duwali, published by NIF supporter Mahjoub Irwa.  
Articles in the Sudan al-Duwali had been critical of government 
actions, including corruption, prompting the Government to 
accuse the paper of circulating false information and serving 
"foreign circles and countries."  Police also arrested and 
briefly detained Majoub Irwa and two key journalists, Ahmad Al 
Bagadi and Mutawakel Abd El Daafich, but did not charge the 
three men with any crime.  The other newly opened, privately 
owned daily, Al Ahbar Al Yaum, has followed a progovernment 
line and has not encountered any problems.

The Government often charged that the international, and 
particularly Western, media have an anti-Sudan bias, and it 
routinely confiscated issues of foreign publications that were 
judged hostile to the Government.  Although the Government 
periodically granted foreign journalists entry and access to 
war zones and a variety of political leaders, security forces 
closely monitored their activities.  In one instance in 1994, 
police briefly detained a journalist and confiscated his film.  
In June the Government closed the Khartoum office of 
Egyptian-published opposition newspaper Al-Khartoum and 
detained in a ghost house its local correspondent, Abdul Saeed 
for 3 months.  As a result of the Government's hostile 
attitude, many respected journalists who worked in the local 
media before 1989 have quit their jobs and left Sudan.

After the coup, the Government harassed and dismissed many 
academics considered antiregime, and its practice of repressing 
opposition has had a chilling effect on academic debate.  
Government security forces continued to arrest and detain 
academics linked with opposition parties.  The Government 
continued to use political and ideological criteria in 
appointing new faculty.

     b.  Freedom of Peaceful Assembly and Association

The authorities severely restricted these freedoms, permitting 
only government-sponsored gatherings.  The declaration of the 
state of emergency and of martial law on June 30, 1989, 
effectively eliminated the right to assembly.  Security forces 
repeatedly used excessive force in breaking up nongovernment- 
sponsored demonstrations (see Section 1.a.).

Apart from a few indigenous NGO's involved in relief work and 
sports and social clubs, all private associations were  
controlled by the Government or the NIF.

     c.  Freedom of Religion

Although the Government has stated that all religions should be 
respected and freedom of worship guaranteed, in practice the 
Government treats Islam as the de facto state religion and has 
declared that Islam must inspire the country's laws, 
institutions, and policies.  Various restrictions under the 
Missionary Societies Act of 1962 limited the ability of 
non-Muslims to practice their religion freely, and the 1991 
Criminal Act made apostasy by Muslims punishable by death.

There were credible reports that security forces harassed, 
intimidated, and, in at least one confirmed instance, 
physically abused Christian converts in 1994.  In July 
authorities lashed and threatened with death Christian clan 
leader Sheikh Abdoullahi Yusuf and Mohanna Mohammed for 
apostasy.  In April the police arrested and detained without 
charge three Catholic Church volunteers from Egypt and a 
Catholic clergyman for alleged threats to the security of the 
State.  In May the authorities released the Sudanese clergyman 
and expelled the three Egyptians from the country at the same 
time.

Authorities continued to restrict the activities of Christians 
in 1994.  The law forbids proselytizing of Muslims, but Muslims 
are allowed to proselytize freely.  The Government required 
missionary groups to apply for special licenses, and work 
permits for foreign missionaries remained difficult to obtain.  
The Government continued to deny permission to build churches, 
and in the north, no new churches have been built since the 
early 1970's.  There were also reliable reports that in some 
war zones, government forces closed churches and restricted 
movements of Christian clergy.  The Sudan Catholic Bishops' 
Conference (SCCB), the Sudan Council of Churches (SCC), and the 
Coptic Church all faced restrictions on their activities, which 
local officials often interpreted capriciously.  Among these 
restrictions were the repeated difficulties experienced by 
Christian clergymen in obtaining travel permits to attend 
Christian Church conferences abroad.  In October the Government 
announced that the Missionary Act had been abrogated and 
replaced by a new law.  However, the details of the new law had 
not been made public by year's end.

Non-Muslims continued to criticize the Government's favoritism 
of Islam over other religions.  As the basis of Sudan's Arab 
culture, all citizens are exposed to Islamic ideas set forth in 
the Koran.  In the Popular Defense Forces, all trainees, 
including non-Muslims, are indoctrinated in the Islamic faith.  
In prisons, government-supported Islamic NGO's offer 
inducements to, and exert pressure on, non-Muslim inmates to 
convert.  There were also reliable reports that, in some war 
zones, Islamic NGO's withheld food and other key services from 
the needy unless they converted to Islam.

In SPLA/SSIM-controlled areas, Christians and Muslims were 
generally allowed to worship freely.

     d.  Freedom of Movement Within the Country, Foreign 
         Travel, Emigration, and Repatriation

The Government restricted freedom of movement by denying exit 
visas to some categories of persons (such as policemen and 
doctors).  The Government also kept lists of political figures 
and others not permitted to travel abroad.  Because of tensions 
with Egypt, the authorities denied many requests for travel to 
that country.

Women may not travel outside of Sudan without the permission of 
their husbands or male guardians.  Some former political 
detainees were forbidden to travel outside of Khartoum.  
Movement was generally free for other Sudanese outside of the 
war zones, but those who failed to produce an identity card at 
checkpoints risked arrest.  Foreigners needed permits, which 
were hard to obtain and often refused, for domestic travel 
outside of Khartoum.  (Diplomats, however, could travel freely 
to many locations.)  Foreigners had to register with the police 
on entering the country, seek permission to move from one 
location to another, and reregister at each new location within 
3 days of arrival.  Foreign NGO staff sometimes had problems 
obtaining entry visas to Sudan or work or travel permits once 
they were in country.

The SPLA/M and SSIM require NGO personnel to obtain permission 
before they travel to areas they control.  Such permission is 
granted regularly.  However, the SPLA/SSIM would not give such 
permission to most Islamic NGO's (many of which have ties to 
the Government or the NIF).  There were reports of SPLA/SSIM 
abuse and mistreatment of NGO personnel.

Tens of thousands of persons, largely southerners and 
westerners displaced by famine and civil war, continued to live 
in squatter slums in the Khartoum area.  Throughout 1994 the 
Government razed thousands of squatter dwellings in this area.  
As in the case of the destruction of the Khuddeir squatters 
settlement in October (see below), inhabitants of these 
dwellings knew that their homes were slated for destruction, 
but they were not told precisely when it would occur.  
Bulldozers would typically arrive unannounced in a neighborhood 
and carry out the razings the same day.  Tens of thousands were 
made homeless and often forcibly moved to resettlement sites 
outside the city, where conditions were harsh and distances 
from employment opportunities great.

In October the Khartoum state government used excessive force 
in meeting a protest demonstration by squatters from the 
Khuddeir settlement of Omdurman, killing at least five persons 
and wounding dozens (see Section 1.g.).  The protest 
demonstration took place after the Khartoum state government 
had reneged on its promise to resettle them in nearby areas and 
had determined to move them to a distant camp.  The Khuddeir 
residents had filed a legal case against the state government, 
but the latter set its bulldozers in action before the courts 
had a chance to rule on the case.

Sudan accorded refugees relatively good treatment.  At the end 
of the year, the population of officially registered refugees 
(largely composed of Ethiopians and Eritreans) was about 
600,000, about half of whom received assistance from the United 
Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), and UNHCR 
resettlement of refugees to third countries proceeded 
smoothly.  There were no reports of forcible repatriation of 
refugees, regardless of their status, in 1994.  Refugees could 
not become resident aliens or citizens of Sudan, regardless of 
their length of stay.  However, the Government tolerated a 
large number of refugees and allowed them to work, although 
typically in menial occupations in the cities.  Thousands of 
Sudanese refugees fled to Uganda in 1994, as a result of the 
fighting between the Government and the insurgency and 
SPLA/SSIM infighting.  There were also refugee flows from Sudan 
to Ethiopia and Kenya as well.

Section 3  Respect for Political Rights:  The Right of Citizens 
           to Change Their Government

Citizens had neither the right nor the ability to change their 
government peacefully.  Political power remained solely in the 
hands of a small group of unelected military officers and the 
NIF leadership.  The NIF continued to increase its power at the 
provincial and state level.

In 1989 the RCC abolished all political parties and detained 
temporarily the major party leaders, and in 1990 rejected both 
multiparty and one-party systems.  In 1992 the RCC instituted 
the Transitional National Assembly (TNA) based on a 
Libyan-style political structure with ascending levels of 
nonpartisan assemblies.  The Government appointed its members, 
largely progovernment deputies.  Although individual members 
occasionally criticized government policies, the TNA remained a 
rubber-stamp body, whose main function was to ratify 
legislation proposed by the Executive.

In April the General Elections Act, promulgated by provisional 
decree by the President and pending ratification by the TNA, 
specified that an undefined government-appointed body, the 
General Elections Corporation, will select all candidates who 
will be permitted to run in the general elections.  The 
Government plans to hold elections in March 1995 for state 
assemblies.  It will appoint 10 percent of the assembly 
members, each state's popular committees will elect 45 percent 
of the members, and the people will elect the remaining 45 
percent.  The Government plans to have the elections for the 
Transitional National Assembly shortly after the state assembly 
elections.

Although government rhetoric supported ending the civil war, 
the Government launched major military offensives in the south 
throughout the year.  Rival rebel factions continued to fight 
intermittently among themselves.  In a bid to mediate the 
conflict, the Intergovernmental Authority on Drought and 
Development (IGADD), a regional body that comprises Djibouti, 
Eritrea, Ethiopia, Kenya, Uganda, and Sudan, sponsored several 
negotiating rounds between the Government and the rebels.  By 
year's end, the negotiations were stalemated due to the 
intransigence of the various warring parties, whose commitment 
to peace was questionable.  Prospects for a negotiated 
settlement remained slim.

Although there were no women in the highest ranks of 
government, women in lesser positions played a modest role in 
day-to-day government operations.  One of the governors of 
Sudan's 26 states was a woman, and there were a few female TNA 
members.  The NIF did not, however, encourage female 
involvement in politics.

Section 4  Governmental Attitude Regarding International and 
           Nongovernmental Investigation of Alleged Violations 
           of Human Rights

The Government tried to stamp out any domestic criticism on 
human rights issues by frequently and vehemently denying any 
responsibility for human rights abuses.  Since the 1989 coup, 
the Government has banned local, independent human rights 
organizations.  However, the Christian church organizations, 
SCCB and the SCC, continued to seek to monitor and publicize 
human rights abuses, especially religious discrimination.

In 1991 the Government created the Sudan Human Rights 
Organization (SHRO)--not to be confused with the previous SHRO, 
which it dissolved after the 1989 coup--to defend its human 
rights record.  This organization has yet to criticize the 
Government.  In an attempt to demonstrate the regime's concern 
for human rights, the TNA adopted in 1993 the "Sudan Document 
of Human Rights" and created a human rights committee.  After 
the latter began quietly investigating cases of disappearances, 
however, the Government dismissed its members in July and 
appointed new members.  The new members have shown no 
inclination to criticize or investigate the Government's human 
rights record.

The Government was highly defensive about foreign criticism of 
its human rights record.  It bitterly denounced the February 
report on Sudan by the U.N. Special Rapporteur on Human Rights 
in Sudan, Gaspar Biro, and bitterly attacked him personally.  
Much of the Government's response to the detailed and 
documented report consisted of denunciations of the 
rapporteur's age, qualifications, and integrity, and of  
accusations that he was hostile to Islam.  The Government 
declared that because of the rapporteur's alleged bias against 
Islam, he was no longer welcome to visit Sudan.

Section 5  Discrimination Based on Race, Sex, Religion, 
           Disability, Language, or Social Status

     Women

Some aspects of Sudanese law and many traditional practices 
discriminate against women.  Gender segregation is 
commonplace.  In keeping with Islamic law, Muslim women are not 
accorded the same property, inheritance, and family rights as 
Muslim men.  Women typically inherit half as much of the estate 
of a man with the same degree of kinship, and only men may 
initiate legal divorce proceedings.  These rules apply only to 
Sudanese Muslims and not to those of other faiths.  Women are 
discriminated against in employment, and only a small number of 
women worked in the professions, the police, and the military.

Government directives require women in government offices and 
female students and teachers to conform to Islamic dress 
codes.  Enforcement of the dress code regulations was uneven, 
but at times severe.  On New Year's Eve of 1993, security 
forces raided many of Khartoum's private clubs and arrested 
several Muslim women for allegedly wearing clothes that did not 
conform with the Government's version of modest dress.  The 
authorities punished several of these women by lashing.

Violence against women appears to be common, especially wife 
beating, although accurate statistics do not exist.  The 
Government has not addressed the issue of violence against 
women; nor was it discussed publicly.  The police do not 
normally intervene in domestic disputes, and there were no 
reports of court cases involving violence against women in 
1994.  For cultural reasons, many women are reluctant to file 
formal complaints against such abuse.  Women refugees from the 
south were particularly vulnerable to harassment and sexual 
abuse.

Among some southern tribes, rape is common.  No blame is 
attached to the practice, although the man involved must pay 
the woman's family if she becomes pregnant.  Among some ethnic 
groups, wives are taken on a trial basis lasting up to 4 
years.  The husband may dissolve the marriage during this 
period by returning the wife to her family, although he must 
pay a price for each child born during this time.  Such wives 
reportedly may contract further marriages and are not 
stigmatized by having been returned.

     Children

Government practice, as opposed to government rhetoric, 
demonstrated no significant concern for the rights and welfare 
of children.  A considerable number of children suffered 
serious abuses, including occasional enslavement, in the war 
zones.  There were recurrent reports that the SPLA held 
thousands of children in camps against their will and used them 
as a reservoir of recruits for its military forces.

There continued to be credible but unconfirmed reports of the 
existence of special camps where people from the north or from 
abroad come to purchase women and children.  In his report to 
the U.N. Commission on Human Rights, the U.N. Special 
Rapporteur noted eyewitness accounts which revealed consistent 
reports of the locations of camps.  Young girls and women are 
reportedly purchased for housekeepers and in some cases wives.  
The boys are reportedly kept as servants (see Section 6.c.).

The Government runs several camps for vagrant children.  Police 
periodically sweep the streets of Khartoum and other major 
cities, taking children whom police personnel deem homeless to 
the camps, where they are detained for indefinite periods.  
These children may not leave the camps and are subjected to 
strict discipline and physical and military training.  Health 
care and schooling at the camps are generally poor; basic 
living conditions are also often primitive.  All the children, 
including non-Muslims, must study the Koran, and there is 
pressure on non-Muslims to convert to Islam.  Children in the 
camps are often incorporated into the PDF.

Female genital mutilation (FGM), although illegal, is 
widespread, especially in northern Sudan.  As many as 90 
percent or more of females in the north have been so mutilated, 
with consequences that sometimes have included severe urinary 
problems, infections, and even death.  Pharaonic mutilation 
(infibulation), the severest of the three types, is the most 
common and is usually performed on girls between 4 and 7.  
Because few physicians will perform the operation, it is most 
often done by paramedical personnel in improvised, unsanitary 
conditions, causing severe pain and trauma to the child.  Women 
displaced from the south to the north reportedly are 
increasingly imposing FGM upon their daughters, even if they 
themselves have not been subjected to it.

     National/Racial/Ethnic Minorities

Sudan's population of 24.9 million is a multiethnic mix of over 
500 Arab and African tribes with scores of languages and 
dialects.  The Arab, Muslim culture in the north and central 
areas and the non-Muslim, black African culture in the south 
are the two dominate cultures.  The west has a smaller 
population of Muslim black Africans.  Northern Muslims, who 
form a majority of about 16 million, have traditionally 
dominated the Government.  In response, the southern ethnic 
groups fighting the civil war want independence, or, at a 
minimum, the right to self-determination.

The Muslim Arab majority and the NIF-dominated Government 
continued to discriminate against ethnic minorities in almost 
every aspect of society.  Residents in Arabic-speaking areas 
who do not themselves speak Arabic are discriminated against in 
education, jobs, and other opportunities.

The Arabization of instruction in higher education 
discriminated against non-Arabs.  To compete for a university 
slot, students completing high school had to pass examinations 
in four subjects--English, mathematics, Arabic, and religious 
studies.  Even at the university level, exams for all subjects 
except English were in Arabic, disadvantaging nonnative Arabic 
speakers.

     Religious Minorities

Although the law recognizes Sudan as a multireligious country, 
in practice, the Government treats Islam, the religion of the 
majority, as the state religion.  Muslims are the majority and 
predominate in the north, but are in the minority in the mostly 
Christian or animist south.  There are also 1 to 2 million 
Christian or animist displaced southerners, and about 500,000 
Copts, in the north.

In government-controlled areas of the south, there was credible 
evidence of a policy of Islamization, as NIF supporters often 
replaced non-Muslim civil servants.  All non-Muslim judges have 
been transferred to the north, where they are relegated to 
low-level tasks such as adjudicating traffic disputes.  In the 
north, some non-Muslims lost their jobs in the civil service, 
the judiciary, and other professions.  Few non-Muslim 
university graduates found government jobs at all.  Frequent 
dismissals in the army and police purged professionals to make 
room for NIF supporters.  Some non-Muslim businessmen 
complained of petty harassment and discrimination in the 
awarding of government contracts and trade licenses.

     People with Disabilities

The Government does not discriminate against handicapped 
persons, but it has not enacted any special legislation or 
taken other steps, such as mandating accessibility to public 
buildings and transportation for the disabled.

Section 6  Worker Rights

     a.  The Right of Association

Although Sudan had a strong labor union movement during the 
government of Sadiq al-Mahdi, the RCC abolished the precoup 
labor unions, closed union offices, froze union assets, forbade 
strikes, and prescribed stiff punishments, including the death 
penalty, for violations of RCC labor decrees.  The Government 
dismissed many labor leaders from their jobs or detained them, 
although most of those arrested were later freed.  In 1994, 
however, the Government detained without charge a number of 
union activists suspected of antiregime activities.  In March 
the International Labor Organization (ILO) Committee on Freedom 
of Association deplored the detention of two trade unionists 
and expressed consternation at the death sentence pronounced 
against a third (even though he was later pardoned) for calling 
a strike.

Prior to the new Labor Law instituted in 1992, the Government 
had established preliminary, government-controlled steering 
committees in 1989 and 1990 to manage union affairs.  Under 
tight control of these committees, the Sudan Workers Trade 
Unions Federation (SWTUF), the leading blue-collar labor 
organization with about 800,000 members, was restored with its 
leadership unchanged and its assets returned.  In 1992 local 
union elections were held, after a delay to permit the steering 
committees to arrange the outcomes.  The elections resulted in 
government-approved slates of candidates voted into office by 
prearranged acclamation.

Although the Government continued to forbid strikes, some 70 
employees of the state-owned telephone company struck in 
August.  In September the company fired the 70, and the 
authorities detained 18 of them for periods as long as 2 weeks.

The U.S. Government in 1991 suspended Sudan's eligibility for 
trade benefits under the Generalized System of Preferences 
because of its violations of worker rights.

Unions remained free to form federations and affiliate with 
international bodies, such as the African Workers' Union and 
the Arab Workers' Union.

     b.  The Right to Organize and Bargain Collectively

An RCC constitutional decree of June 30, 1989, temporarily  
suspended the right to organize and bargain collectively.  
Although these rights were restored to organizing committees in 
September of the same year, government control of the steering 
committees meant in practice that the Government dominates the 
process of setting wages and working conditions.  The continued 
absence of labor legislation allowing for union meetings, 
filing of grievances, and other union activity, greatly reduced 
the value of these formal rights.  Although local union 
officials raised some grievances with employers, few carried 
them to the Government.  Wages are set by a tripartite 
committee comprising representatives of the Government, the 
labor unions, and business.  Specialized labor courts 
adjudicate standard labor disputes.

In 1993 the Government created two export processing zones.  By 
the end of 1994, however, they existed only on paper, and the 
Government had not yet made clear whether or not Sudanese labor 
laws would apply fully in these zones.

     c.  Prohibition of Forced or Compulsory Labor

Although the law prohibits forced or compulsory labor, slavery 
persists.  The taking of slaves, particularly in war zones, and 
their export to parts of central and northern Sudan continued 
in 1994.  Captives were forced to do agricultural and domestic 
work, and some women were forced to serve as concubines.  
Although in some instances local authorities took action to 
stop instances of slavery, in other cases the authorities did 
nothing.  There were also several unconfirmed reports that some 
captives were exported to Libya.  In its 1993 World Labor 
Report, the ILO noted that traditional slavery survived and is 
increasing in modern-day Sudan in the context of the ongoing 
civil war (see Section 5).

The SPLA and SSIM continued to force southern men to work as 
laborers or porters or forcibly conscripted them into their 
fighting forces.

     d.  Minimum Age for Employment of Children

The legal minimum age for workers was 16, but the law was 
loosely enforced by inspectors from the Ministry of Labor in 
the official or wage economy.  Children as young as 11 or 12 
worked in a number of factories, particularly outside of the 
capital, including the oil mills at Um Ruwaba.  In addition, 
gross poverty in Sudan has produced widespread child labor in 
the informal, unregulated economy.  In rural areas, children 
traditionally assist their families with agricultural work from 
a very young age.

     e.  Acceptable Conditions of Work

The legislated minimum wage is enforced by the Ministry of 
Labor, which maintains field offices in most major Sudanese 
cities.  Employers generally respect the minimum wage.  Workers 
who are denied the minimum wage may file a grievance with the 
local Ministry of Labor field office, which is then supposed to 
investigate and take appropriate action if there has been a 
violation of the law.  In July the Government increased the 
minimum wage to $23 (approximately 9,000 Sudanese pounds) per 
month.  Given Sudan's soaring inflation, however, this wage is 
insufficient to support the average Sudanese worker and his 
family.

The workweek is limited by law to 6 days and 48 hours, with a 
day of rest on Friday.  Although Sudanese laws prescribe health 
and safety standards, working conditions were generally poor, 
and enforcement by the Ministry of Labor minimal.  The law does 
not address the right of workers to remove themselves from 
dangerous work situations without loss of employment.


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