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TITLE: OCCUPIED TERRITORIES HUMAN RIGHTS PRACTICES, 1994
AUTHOR: U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE
DATE: FEBRUARY 1995
THE OCCUPIED TERRITORIES (INCLUDING AREAS SUBJECT
TO JURISDICTION OF THE PALESTINIAN AUTHORITY)
This report differs from past reports because it reflects the
fundamental changes that have occurred in the West Bank and
Gaza Strip as a consequence of the implementation of the
Declaration of Principles (DOP) signed by the Government of
Israel and the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) on
September 13, 1993.
In May Israel transferred most responsibilities in the Gaza
Strip and Jericho area to an interim Palestinian self-governing
authority, the "Palestinian Authority (PA)," pursuant to
agreements between Israel and the PLO. Additional
responsibilities were transferred to the PA in the West Bank
between August and December. The PA exercises authority over a
large Palestinian population in the Gaza Strip and Jericho
area, and more limited authority in the rest of the West Bank.
Accordingly, this report discusses the policies and practices
of both the Israeli Government and the Palestinian Authority in
the respective areas where they exercise jurisdiction and
control.
The DOP fundamentally altered the relationship between
Palestinians and Israelis. This historic agreement put into
motion a process designed to end their conflict and to guide
negotiations over the future of the territories. The DOP
provides for a 5-year transitional period in which specified
responsibilities are to be transferred to the PA to permit the
Palestinian people of the West Bank and Gaza Strip to govern
themselves.
Implementation of this process began in May, when Israel and
the PLO agreed (the Gaza-Jericho Agreement) on the initial
transfer of powers and responsibilities relating to the Gaza
Strip and the Jericho area in the West Bank. In August the
Government of Israel and the PLO agreed (the Agreement on
Preparatory Transfer of Powers and Responsibilities) on the
further transfer of five areas of responsibility (education and
culture, health, tourism, taxation, and social welfare) in the
rest of the West Bank, excluding Israeli settlements. The
transfer to the PA of responsibility for these areas was
completed in December. Israel continues to be responsible for
external security, internal security and public order in
Israeli settlements, foreign relations, and certain other areas
until an agreement on permanent status is achieved. At year's
end, Israel and the PLO were continuing discussions on the
modalities for elections in the West Bank and Gaza Strip, and
the related redeployment of Israeli security forces away from
populated areas of the West Bank, pursuant to the DOP. In
accordance with the DOP this election will establish a
Palestinian Council to replace the PA.
The situation in the occupied territories remains complex and
subject to change. Israel occupied the lands known as the
"occupied territories" (the West Bank, Gaza Strip, Golan
Heights, and East Jerusalem) as a result of the 1967 war. The
international community does not recognize Israel's sovereignty
over any part of the occupied territories. Israel has,
however, asserted sovereignty over, and annexed, East
Jerusalem. The Israeli Government has also extended its law
and administration to the Golan Heights. Under Israel-PLO
agreements, the permanent status of the West Bank and Gaza
Strip, as well as the issue of Jerusalem, are to be addressed
in subsequent negotiations.
The West Bank and Gaza legal regimes derive from Ottoman,
Jordanian, Egyptian, and British law, Israeli military orders,
Israel-PLO agreements, and decisions by the PA. The United
States considers Israel's authority in the occupied territories
to be subject to the Hague Regulations of 1907 and the 1949
Fourth Geneva Convention relative to the protection of
civilians in time of war. The Israeli Government considers the
Hague Regulations applicable, but not those of the Geneva
Convention, although it states that it observes the Geneva
Convention's humanitarian provisions.
Israel has governed the territories through the Israeli Civil
Administration (CIVAD), a body overseen by the Minister of
Defense. Most West Bank towns are governed by mayors appointed
by the Israeli Government, although there are exceptions, such
as Hebron, Nablus, and Bethlehem. With elections for a
Palestinian Council still under negotiation, the majority of
Palestinians have not yet had the opportunity to participate in
a broad-based electoral process. An exception is in East
Jerusalem, where Palestinian residents are eligible to vote in
Israeli municipal elections. However, most Palestinians
eligible to vote boycott such elections on the grounds that
Israel's annexation of East Jerusalem is illegal. Israeli
settlers in the territories (about 12 percent of the population
there) are subject to Israeli law and are better treated than
Palestinians who are subject to military occupation law. The
Government's economic policies in the occupied territories
favor Israeli settlers and Israeli interests in general. Under
Israel-PLO agreements, Israel retains jurisdiction over
settlements and settlers during the transitional period. The
final status of the settlements will be addressed in future
negotiations.
Israeli security forces in the West Bank consist of the Israel
Defense Forces (IDF); the Shin Bet, or General Security
Services (GSS); the police; and the paramilitary border
police. Military courts try Palestinians accused of security
crimes as defined by the Government of Israel. The Palestinian
Police Force (PPF) was established in May. It is responsible
for security and law enforcement in Gaza and in the Jericho for
Palestinians and other non-Israelis.
The economies of the West Bank and Gaza are small, poorly
developed, and highly dependent on Israel. Both areas rely on
agriculture, services and to a lesser extent light
manufacturing. Many West Bank and Gazan workers are employed
at day jobs in Israel. The West Bank and Gazan economies have
been adversely affected by the occupation, the Palestinian
uprising known as the intifada, the Gulf War and the resulting
cutoff of Arab funding, and tensions caused by continued
terrorist incidents.
There were clear improvements in the human rights situation in
the occupied territories in 1994. With progress on
implementation of the DOP, Palestinians are acquiring more
opportunities to participate in political and economic
decisions that affect them. The withdrawal of Israeli forces
from Gaza and Jericho has reduced the frequency of large-scale
confrontations and unrest. The nighttime curfew that had been
imposed on the Gaza Strip since 1987 is no longer in effect.
In addition, Israel released several thousand Palestinian
prisoners, for much of the year held fewer Palestinians in
administrative detention, eased restrictions on freedom of
expression, relaxed enforcement of restrictions on public
gatherings, and made some improvements to prison conditions.
There were no deportations for the second straight year and a
substantial decrease in the number of house sealings.
Moreover, Israel and the PLO have for the first time
established channels and procedures for dealing with a variety
of their differences over political, economic, and security
matters.
At the same time, there were credible reports that during 1994
Israel mistreated, and in some cases tortured, Palestinians
during arrest and interrogation. According to these reports,
Israel also utilized undercover units in possible extrajudicial
killings. Military courts imposed harsh sentences on
Palestinians. Discriminatory policies on land and resources
use and trade, and limits on freedom of movement remained in
place. There were also restrictions imposed on the ability of
Palestinians in the territories to travel to Israel. During
the period covered in this report, Israeli civilians and
military personnel were the targets of repeated lethal
terrorist attacks. Israel also imposed periodic and often
sustained closures, which were designed to meet Israel's
security needs, but which did have a severe impact on the
Palestinian economy in the territories.
The PA assumed authority in Gaza and Jericho only in May. It
is difficult to assess fully the PA's human rights record for
the period under review (May to December). Because of its
recent establishment, the process of institution-building,
especially of the judiciary, has been slow. There have been
credible reports that the Palestinian Police Force (PPF) has
mistreated detainees. The PA stated that it would investigate
incidents of mistreatment. Members of the PPF reportedly
committed at least one extrajudicial killing, that of a
detainee in custody. Although individuals were charged with
misconduct in this case, none has been brought to trial. The
PPF has also used excessive force on occasion, such as in
November, when at least 16 persons were killed and hundreds
wounded in an effort to quell an armed demonstration at Gaza's
Filistin Mosque. There were also limitations on press
freedom. In July the PA banned the distribution in Gaza and
Jericho of An-Nahar, an East Jerusalem daily, purportedly
because the paper took a pro-Jordanian line. In November the
PA temporarily stopped distribution in Gaza of four newspapers
that provided accounts of demonstrations against the PA to
which the Gaza police chief, speaking on behalf of the PA,
objected.
Both Palestinian and Israeli opponents of the DOP have resorted
to violence as a means to derail the agreement. A number of
extremist groups, specifically the Islamic Resistance (Hamas)
and the Palestinian Islamic Jihad (PIJ), made a concerted
effort to undermine Israeli-PLO negotiations by killing
Israelis and discrediting the authority and effectiveness of
the PA. A terrorist bombing in Tel Aviv in October, for
example, killed 22 Israelis. There were also acts of violence
committed by Israeli settlers, including killings and the
destruction of property. In several instances, security forces
took little or no action to halt settler attacks. In February
a settler extremist killed at least 29 Palestinians worshipping
at the Ibrahimi Mosque in Hebron. Following this attack, the
Israeli Government began to implement in March strict measures
to control extremist settler violence against Palestinians.
Israel remained obligated under international occupation law to
ensure, as far as possible, public order and the safety of the
civilian population in the occupied territories. Violence in
the territories also included killings of Palestinians by other
Palestinians because of alleged collaboration with Israel.
RESPECT FOR HUMAN RIGHTS
Section 1 Respect for the Integrity of the Person, Including
Freedom from:
a. Political and Other Extrajudicial Killing
Credible sources report that Israeli undercover units,
disguised as Palestinians, killed at least 13 Palestinians.
This is a decrease from the 27 Palestinians reported killed by
undercover units in 1993. The Government does not publish its
guidelines on the conduct of undercover operations in the
occupied territories.
The mission of these undercover units appears to be to arrest
activists suspected of committing serious crimes. Human rights
organizations charge that undercover units deliberately kill
suspects under circumstances in which the suspects might have
been apprehended alive. Authorities acknowledge that the
undercover units conduct operations among Palestinian
activists, but claim that such units observe the same rules of
engagement as other IDF units. They further claim that the IDF
investigates all killings and allegations of misbehavior.
However, human rights groups state that the investigations are
not conducted efficiently and rarely result in the imposition
of serious punishment. The IDF does not announce the findings
of its investigations.
A Palestinian free-lance journalist recorded on videotape an
apparent incident of extrajudicial killing in September. The
tape depicts an Israeli soldier firing a bullet into the head
of a Palestinian, Nidal Tamimi, who reportedly tried to stab a
soldier in Hebron. Tamimi was lying on the ground with a
gunshot wound in the chest.
In March an Israeli undercover unit reportedly opened fire
without warning on six masked members of the Fatah Hawks
Organization, four of whom were armed, at the Jabalya Refugee
Camp in Gaza, as they reportedly stopped cars and handed out
political pamphlets. In May credible sources reported that an
Israeli undercover unit shot two Palestinians, one a Hamas
fugitive, without warning, after they had disembarked from a
bus in Al-Ram near Jerusalem. Human rights groups demanded an
independent investigation into the Jabalya incident and what
they termed the shoot-to-kill policies of the undercover forces
and the IDF. According to the Judge Advocate General's office,
at year's end the incident was still under investigation.
According to the Government, Palestinians killed 23 Israelis in
the West Bank and Gaza Strip, and 52 within Israel; the 1993
figures were 49 and 14, respectively. The worst incidents were
an October bus bombing in Tel Aviv that killed 22, and bombings
in Afula and Hadera in April that killed 12.
Israeli settlers killed 37 Palestinians in the West Bank and
Gaza in 1994, compared to 14 in 1993. Most of these resulted
from a single incident in February when an Israeli settler
extremist killed at least 29 Palestinian worshippers at the
Ibrahimi Mosque in Hebron, also known as the Tomb of the
Patriarchs. In the other instances, the IDF reportedly took
little or no action to halt attacks. After the Hebron
massacre, Palestinians and many human rights groups questioned
whether the IDF adequately protects Palestinians in the
occupied territories. In the wake of the incident, the Israeli
Army shot and killed over 20 Palestinians and wounded many more
during unrest associated with the massacre. The Government
later appointed an independent commission of inquiry which
found that there was a near total absence of law enforcement
against settler violence in the territories. The commission
called for more stringent on-site security measures and a
clarification of the rules governing the use of deadly force
against Jewish settlers in extreme circumstances.
During the inquiry, Army officers testified to confusion about
the rules on firing at Israeli citizens during confrontations
between Palestinians and Israelis. They stated that most
soldiers would not fire on settlers, even if they attacked
Palestinians. The inquiry revealed what human rights groups
termed a double standard regarding the treatment of Israeli and
Palestinian residents of the occupied territories.
In a report on settler violence published in March, the Israeli
human rights group B'tselem stated that, since the beginning of
the intifada in 1987, only one Israeli settler had been
convicted of murdering a Palestinian, even though 62
Palestinians have been killed by Israeli civilians. The report
concluded that the settlers appeared to be in mortal danger in
only four cases. Later in the year, another settler was
convicted of murder and sentenced to life imprisonment.
Human rights groups note that Palestinians often fail to report
cases of settler violence because they fear being labeled as
collaborators with Israeli authorities and retribution by
settlers. These groups claim that police investigations of
settler violence are often superficial, delayed, and rarely
lead to arrests or sentencing. In October, the Israeli press
reported that West Bank military commander Major General Ilan
Biran asked the police and the Attorney General's office to
speed up 88 criminal cases pending against settlers. Biran
charged that the police and the courts inefficiently process
army complaints against settlers. For this reason, the IDF
maintains it must restrict the movements of violent settlers by
issuing administrative orders to confine them to their
neighborhoods or villages or to deny them entry to specific
sites, such as the Ibrahimi Mosque/Tomb of the Patriarchs in
Hebron. Approximately 35 Israeli settlers fall into this
category.
Figures compiled from a number of sources indicate that
Palestinians killed 65 Palestinians in 1994, most often because
of alleged collaboration with Israeli security services, but
also in disputes between political factions, or street gangs,
or in personal feuds. The PLO leadership pledged in 1994 that
it would try to halt the killings of "collaborators." The
number of such killings has declined in the past few years:
there were 79 killings in 1993 and 149 in 1992. However, there
were reports that the PA sought to persuade Israeli Arabs to
refuse to allow families of collaborators to resettle in Israel.
The PA police also reportedly committed at least one
extrajudicial killings. Farid Jarbou', a taxi driver, was
arrested by the PA police as a suspected collaborator with the
Israeli security services, and detained at the Gaza Central
Prison where he was reportedly beaten during interrogation.
Jarbou' died in detention on July 5, reportedly from injuries
sustained during interrogation. After an investigation by the
PA Department of Justice, four Palestinian police officials
were arrested in connection with Jarbou's death. They have
been released pending trial.
In August members of the Palestinian preventive security force
(PSF) shot and killed Nidal Al-Khuli, a security officer, in a
confrontation with members of another Palestinian security
service in the West Bank town of Tulkarem. In September PSF
officers killed another PSF officer during a confrontation with
members of Hamas in Gaza. The PA police arrested the security
officers responsible for the killings; at year's end, they were
awaiting trial.
b. Disappearance
There were no confirmed reports of any disappearances
attributed to either Israeli or Palestinian security services
in 1994.
c. Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading
Treatment or Punishment
International, Israeli, and Palestinian human rights groups and
diplomats continue to provide credible reports indicating that
Israeli security forces are responsible for widespread abuse,
and in some cases torture, of Palestinian detainees, including
those who possess U.S. citizenship. According to the reports,
such abuse takes place immediately after arrest and during
interrogation. Common practices reportedly included hooding;
forced standing; tying the detainee in contorted positions;
prolonged exposure to extreme temperatures; blows and beatings
with fists, sticks, and other instruments; confinement in a
small and often filthy space; sleep and food deprivation;
threats against the detainee's family; and threats of death.
The apparent intent of these practices is to disorient and
intimidate prisoners, and to obtain confessions or
information. The International Committee of the Red Cross
(ICRC) declared in 1992 that such practices violate the Geneva
Convention.
Several Israeli settlers, arrested in 1994 for suspected
membership in a new underground terrorist organization, claimed
they were tortured after arrest. An investigator from the
Attorney General's office was unable to substantiate their
assertion that security guards hooded, and "otherwise tortured"
them in "rat-infested cells."
Israel's Criminal Code prohibits torture. Authorities maintain
that torture is not condoned in the occupied territories, but
acknowledge that abuses sometimes occur and are investigated.
However, the Government does not generally make public the
results of such investigations. In June Human Rights Watch
published a report based on courtroom testimonies and on
interviews with 36 Palestinians interrogated since June 1992,
their defense attorneys, Israeli soldiers, and GSS agents. The
report concluded that torture and mistreatment perpetrated by
Israeli security services are "not isolated excesses" but "a
pattern that could persist only with the acquiescence of the
Government of Israel."
After 40 Israelis were killed in several terrorist attacks by
the extremist group Hamas, the GSS decided in November to allow
interrogators "greater flexibility" in applying the guidelines
established by the 1987 Landau Judicial Commission, which
condemned torture but allowed for "moderate physical and
psychological pressure" to secure confessions and obtain
information. The Government has not defined the meaning of
"greater flexibility." The decision will be in effect for 3
months, after which it will be reviewed.
Most convictions in security cases before Israeli courts are
based on confessions. An attorney is not allowed to meet with
a client until after interrogation, a process that may take
days or, in some cases, weeks. The Government does not allow
representatives from the ICRC to have access to detainees until
the 14th day after arrest. Human rights groups point to this
prolonged incommunicado detention as contributing to the
likelihood of abuse. Detainees often claim in court that their
confessions were coerced, but judges rarely exclude such
confessions. Human rights groups assert that Palestinian
detainees often fail to lodge complaints either from fear of
retribution or because they assume their complaints will be
ignored.
In January the Knesset (Parliament) ruled that the Ministry of
Justice, instead of the GSS, would investigate complaints
against GSS interrogators. Complaints against Israeli soldiers
are investigated by the IDF. According to the Israeli
Government, in the period between January and September, 14
soldiers were indicted on allegations of improper behavior, 4
of which were counts of negligent manslaughter. In those
cases, eight convictions have so far been obtained. The
remainder of cases are awaiting trial. Of the aforementioned
convictions, penalties handed down have ranged from demotions
in rank to imprisonment.
The Israeli Central Prisons Authority closed the Nitsan
Isolation Section of Al-Ramleh Prison in 1994 because of its
poor conditions and moved the prisoners to other prisons. The
prisoner population at Ketziot Military Detention Camp, the
object of a 1993 legal petition due to its poor conditions, has
fallen to about 820 in 1994 from 4,900 in 1993. Some problems
concerning prison conditions, however, remain unresolved from
1993. The Israeli Supreme Court has yet to rule on a petition
filed in 1993 by prisoners of Hebron Prison protesting the lack
of water for toilet and bathing facilities.
In May Israeli security forces relinquished the administration
of detention facilities in Gaza and Jericho to the PA. The
physical conditions at these facilities do not meet minimum
international standards. Food and clothing for prisoners are
inadequate and must be supplemented by donations from families
and humanitarian groups. The PA has not allocated its Ministry
of Justice adequate funds to make improvements. Credible
sources have reported that Palestinian security officials have
abused prisoners at the Gaza Central Prison. PA officials
acknowledge such abuse.
In July the Palestinian Independent Commission for Citizen's
Rights (PICCR) recommended that PA prison administrators
implement the basic international standards for the treatment
of prisoners, including ensuring that prisoners have the rights
to legal counsel and humane treatment. In August the PICCR
observed that prison authorities had implemented most of the
recommendations for changes in procedures and that the
treatment of prisoners had improved (see Section 1.a. on the
death of Farid Jarbou'). Other Palestinian human rights groups
have reported that abuse of Palestinian detainees continues in
Jericho and Gaza prisons and that several irregularities have
been reported in courtroom proceedings there.
d. Arbitrary Arrest, Detention, or Exile
Any Israeli soldier may arrest without warrant a person who has
committed, or is suspected of having committed, a criminal or
security offense in the territories, except for the Gaza Strip
and Jericho area. The vast majority of arrests are for alleged
security offenses. Persons arrested for common crimes are
usually provided with a statement of charges and access to an
attorney, and they may apply for bail. However, these
procedures are sometimes delayed. Authorities reportedly issue
special summonses for security offenses. Israeli military
order 1369 stipulates a 7-year prison term for any person who
does not respond to a special summons delivered by a family
member or posted in the civil administration office nearest his
home address. Bail is rarely available to those arrested for
security offenses. The courts treat persons over age 12 as
adults.
Persons may be held in custody without a warrant for 96 hours
and then released unless a warrant is issued. Military orders
were amended in 1994 to shorten the period of prearraignment
detention to 11 days for Palestinians arrested in the occupied
territories. The previous maximum prearraignment detention was
18 days. A ruling in 1992 shortened this period for minors and
those accused of less serious offenses, such as stone throwing,
to 8 days. Authorities must obtain a court order for longer
detentions--up to 6 months from the date of arrest. Detainees
are entitled to be represented by counsel at their detention
hearings. They must be released at the end of the
court-ordered detention if they are not indicted. If there is
an indictment, a judge may order indefinite detention until the
end of the trial. Detainees have the right to appeal continued
detention.
Although a detainee generally has the right to consult with a
lawyer as soon as possible, authorities may delay access to
counsel for up to 15 days in security cases. Higher ranking
officials or judges may extend this period an additional 75
days for the same reasons. Authorities must inform detainees
of their right to an attorney and whether there are any orders
prohibiting such contact. Human rights groups charge that
authorities sometimes schedule appointments between attorneys
and their detained clients, only to move the clients to another
prison prior to the meeting. Authorities reportedly use such
tactics to delay lawyer-client meetings for as long as 90
days. Israeli regulations also permit detainees to be held in
isolation from family and other detainees during interrogation.
Israeli authorities claim that they attempt to post
notification of arrest within 48 hours. However, Palestinian
suspects are sometimes kept incommunicado for several days
after their arrest by Israeli authorities who do not inform the
family of the detainees' whereabouts. Palestinians assert that
they generally locate the detainee through their own efforts.
Notification to the U.S. Embassy or Consulate General of
detained American citizens of Palestinian origin has almost
always been by the detainee's family. The ICRC attempts to
help by telephoning families with information received from
prison officials. A senior officer may delay for up to 12 days
notification of arrest to immediate family members, attorneys,
and consular officials. A military commander may appeal to a
judge to extend this period in security cases for an unlimited
time.
Israeli district military commanders may order administrative
detention without formal charges. The use of administrative
detention continued in 1994, but at a lower level than in
previous years. An estimated 220 Palestinians were in
administrative detention at year's end, compared to 277 at the
end of 1993. Detention periods range up to 6 months and are
renewable. Israeli officials state that administrative
detention is used only when IDF legal advisors determine that
there is sufficient evidence to detain a person and that the
evidence has been corroborated by two sources.
Evidence used at hearings for administrative detention is
secret and unavailable to the detainee or his attorney.
Authorities maintain that they are unable to present evidence
in open court because to do so would compromise the method of
acquiring the evidence, which is often provided by informers
whose lives would be jeopardized if their identities were
known. However, human rights monitors contend that
administrative detention is often used when evidence against a
suspect would not stand up in court.
Detainees may appeal detention orders, or the renewal of a
detention order, before a military judge. At the hearing,
defense attorneys may question security service witnesses
concerning the general nature of the evidence. The Supreme
Court may review rulings by military judges and examine secret
evidence.
There were no deportations in 1994.
Since the signing of the DOP in September 1993, the Government
has released 5,477 Palestinian prisoners, according to
statistics from the Mandela Institute for Prisoners. Of these,
4,500 were released over a period of several months after
Israel and the PLO signed the Gaza-Jericho Agreement in May.
At the end of 1994, an estimated 6,050 Palestinian prisoners
were incarcerated in Israeli administered prisons, military
detention centers, and holding centers, a significant drop from
the 1993 figure of 9,573. Of these, 2,450 were in military
detention centers and the others were in facilities
administered by the Israeli Central Prisons Authority. Since
the beginning of the intifada in 1987, the Government has
routinely transferred Palestinian detainees from the occupied
territories to facilities in Israel, especially to the Ketziot
detention camp in the Negev Desert and Megiddo Prison near
Afula, notwithstanding Article 76 of the Fourth Geneva
Convention. As of September 1, nearly half (2,912) of the
Palestinian prisoners were being detained in Israel.
The Palestinian police in Gaza conducted several mass arrests
in response to acts or threats of violence against Palestinians
and Israelis. These arrests were conducted without warrants
against groups whose members have engaged in violence. In most
cases, Palestinian authorities released detainees without
charge within the 48-hour limit stipulated by Gaza law,
although some suspects remained in custody longer. The PA's
Ministry of Justice requires that all detainees held beyond the
48-hour limit must be formally charged, but acknowledges that
some detainees are held longer without change. Gazan law
allows the Attorney General to extend the detention period to a
maximum of 90 days during investigations. According to the
PA's Ministry of Justice, 20 opposition members were in
detention as of September 1. Authorities generally permit
prisoners to receive visits from family members and attorneys,
except for prisoners held in the Gaza Central Prison security
wing. In principle, detainees may notify their families of
their arrest.
e. Denial of Fair Public Trial
Palestinians accused of non-security offenses are tried
publicly in local courts by Palestinian judges appointed by
Israeli officials, except where jurisdiction has been
transferred by military order. At the beginning of the
intifada in December 1987, the intifada leadership ordered
Palestinian police and judges to resign. This weakened the
ability of the courts to enforce decisions. Since then,
Palestinian courts in the West Bank have functioned
sporadically.
Palestinians accused by Israel of security offenses are tried
in Israeli military courts. Security offenses are broadly
defined and may include charges of political activity, such as
suspected membership in outlawed organizations. Charges are
brought by military prosecutors. Serious charges are tried
before three-judge panels; lesser offenses are tried before one
judge. Defendants have the right to counsel and to appeal
verdicts to the Court of Military Appeals, which may accept
appeals based on the law applied in the case, the sentence, or
both. The right of appeal does not apply in all cases and
sometimes requires court permission. Israeli military courts
rarely acquit Palestinians of security offenses, but sentences
are sometimes reduced on appeal.
Trials are delayed for several reasons: witnesses, including
Israeli military or police officers, do not appear; the
defendant is not brought to court; files are lost; or attorneys
fail to appear, in some cases reportedly because they have not
been informed of the trial date. These delays add pressure on
defendants to plead guilty to avoid serving a period of
pretrial detention that could exceed the sentence. In cases
involving minor offenses, an "expedited" trial may be held, in
which a charge sheet is drawn up within 48 hours and a court
hearing scheduled within days.
By law, most Israeli military trials are public, although
access is limited. Consular officers are allowed to attend
military court proceedings involving foreign citizens, but
there have been delays in gaining admission.
Most convictions in military courts are based on confessions.
There is practically no testimony provided by Palestinian
witnesses because, Israeli authorities maintain, Palestinians
refuse to cooperate with the authorities. Physical and
psychological pressures and reduced sentences for those who
confess contribute to the likelihood that security detainees
will sign confessions. Confessions are usually spoken in
Arabic, but recorded in Hebrew because, authorities maintain,
while many Israeli court personnel speak Arabic, few are able
to write it.
Crowded facilities and poor arrangements for attorney-client
consultations in prisons hinder legal defense efforts.
Palestinian attorneys report that appointments to see clients
are difficult to arrange, and that prison authorities often
fail to produce clients for scheduled appointments.
Israeli settlers in the West Bank and Gaza Strip accused of
security and ordinary criminal offenses are tried under Israeli
law in the nearest Israeli district court. Civilian judges
preside and the standards of due process and admissibility of
evidence are not governed by military occupation law. Settlers
convicted in Israeli courts of crimes against Palestinians
regularly receive lighter punishment than Palestinians
convicted of crimes against either Israelis or other
Palestinians.
The PA inherited a court system based on structures and legal
codes predating the 1967 Israeli occupation. The Gaza Legal
Code derives from British mandate, Egyptian, and some locally
generated law. Jordanian law applies in Jericho. However,
this body of law has been substantially modified by Israeli
military orders. According to the DOP and the Gaza-Jericho
Agreement, Israeli military decrees issued during the
occupation theoretically remain valid in both areas and are
subject to review pursuant to a specific procedure. The PA is
undertaking efforts to unify the Gaza and West Bank Legal
Codes. Until that is completed, the PA will keep in place
existing civilian court structures in Gaza and Jericho. There
is also a military court with about 600 cases pending from
Israeli arrests and prosecutions.
The PA's Ministry of Justice supervises the eight judges in the
Shari'a religious courts in Gaza. They adjudicate divorce
cases almost exclusively. Jericho's court system was separated
from the Ramallah District in September. Appeals from the
Jericho courts are referred to the Gaza Court of Appeals. At
the end of 1994, no controversial cases--including those of
opposition members detained during roundups--had been brought
to trial.
The PA Ministry of Justice appoints all judges for 10-year
terms. The Attorney General, an appointed official, reports to
the Minister of Justice and supervises judicial operations in
both Gaza and Jericho. The Chief Justice dismissed a woman
judge in Gaza shortly after assuming office, reportedly on the
grounds that such positions were not appropriate for women.
She was subsequently reinstated.
In Jericho, in addition to the civilian court system governed
by pre-1967 Jordanian law, the PA maintains a security court
which is constituted under the PLO's 1979 revolutionary conduct
code. Jericho's security court is presided over by a senior
officer of the Palestinian police. The prosecutor, also a
Palestinian police officer, investigates disciplinary
complaints involving all branches of the Palestinian Police
Forces in Jericho. He has also conducted investigations of
security-related incidents in Jericho, although the suspects
implicated in those incidents were civilians. Normal limits on
the amount of time individuals may be detained before being
brought before a court do not appear to apply to suspects held
by the security prosecutor. In the case of three youths
accused of throwing a Molotov cocktail at a tourist bus, the
security prosecutor reportedly held the suspects in detention
for approximately 2 months while the incident was investigated
by the local Palestinian intelligence branch. The suspects,
who had confessed to the charges at the time they were first
detained, were ultimately turned over to the civilian court for
sentencing.
f. Arbitrary Interference with Privacy, Family, Home, or
Correspondence
Israeli military authorities in the West Bank may enter private
Palestinian homes and institutions without a warrant on
security grounds when authorized by an officer of the rank of
lieutenant colonel. In conducting searches, the IDF has used
forced entries, and has sometimes beaten occupants and
destroyed property. Undercover units have also engaged in
destructive and violent behavior during searches, as well as
harassment of families of wanted Palestinians. Israeli
authorities claim that forced entry may lawfully occur only
when incident to an arrest and when entry is resisted. They
maintain that beatings and arbitrary destruction of property
during searches are punishable violations of military
regulations, and that compensation is due to victims in such
cases. The Government does not provide information regarding
such compensation.
Authorities sealed 5 houses in 1994 for security reasons, a
sharp decline from 27 houses sealed in 1993. Security forces
may demolish or seal the home of a suspect, whether he is the
owner or tenant, without any trial. The decision to seal or
demolish a house is made by several high-level Israeli
officials, including the coordinator of the Civil
Administration and the Defense Minister. Owners of houses
ordered demolished have 48 hours to appeal to the area
commander; a final appeal may be made to the High Court. A
successful appeal generally results in the conversion of a
demolition order to sealing. After a house is demolished,
military authorities confiscate the land and prohibit the owner
from rebuilding or removing the rubble.
In November part of a house was demolished by military order
for security reasons after an appeal to the Israeli High Court
was rejected. This was the first house demolition, albeit
partial, since 1992. The home was the residence of the
Palestinian responsible for the October bus bombing in Tel Aviv
and belonged to his parents. Many human rights groups maintain
that the sealing or demolishing of homes is a form of
collective punishment because such acts target families and
children.
Owners may apply to regional military commanders for permits to
rebuild or unseal their homes. In 1994 the Government
processed 94 requests to open sealed rooms and houses; 61
applications were approved. In June the Palestinian Center for
the Study of Nonviolence began a campaign to reopen many homes
sealed during the occupation. At the Center's urging,
activists and family members opened 130 of more than 350 sealed
houses before they were arrested. Authorities resealed several
of the homes. In December the Israeli Government decided to
allow the opening or rebuilding of homes sealed or demolished
as a result of security offenses committed by a family member
who had been released from prison. Each former prisoner must
apply for a rebuilding or unsealing permit after which the
Government will approve or reject the application.
Israeli security services sometimes monitor mail and telephone
conversations. The authorities sometimes interrupt telephone
service and electricity to specific areas.
In Gaza and Jericho, the existing law requires that a chief
prosecutor issue warrants for entry and searches of private
property. These requirements were ignored in October, when the
Palestinian police conducted a sweep of several districts in
the Gaza Strip to search for a kidnaped Israeli soldier. Homes
were searched without the consent of their owners; in some
cases, the police forcibly entered premises, destroying doors
and windows. Palestinian human rights groups and political
leaders protested the police's conduct, but the PA did not
officially respond.
g. Use of Excessive Force and Violations of Humanitarian
Law in Internal Conflicts
Section 1.a. provides information on Palestinians killed by
Israeli forces and settlers, and Israelis killed by
Palestinians. Many of these victims were deliberately
targeted; however, others were killed, or injured, by the
excessive use of force. Extremists associated with Hamas and
Islamic Jihad were responsible for most of the lethal attacks
on Israelis.
Estimates vary on the number of casualties caused by use of
excessive force in the occupied territories. Figures compiled
from a number of sources indicate that 108 Palestinians were
killed by Israeli security forces, a decrease from the 184
killings in 1993. Killings continued at rates in the West Bank
similar to the frequency in the previous year. Estimates of
the number of Palestinians wounded also vary; IDF figures
report that 925 Palestinians were wounded in 1994, as of
December 26, as compared to the IDF estimate of 890 wounded
between January and September 1993. Human rights groups
estimated that 2,487 Palestinians were wounded by Israeli
security forces in 1994, a decrease from the 1993 estimate of
4,120. Palestinians killed 23 Israeli soldiers and civilians
in the occupied territories, a decrease from the 49 killed in
those areas in 1993. The number of deaths within Israel,
however, increased from 14 in 1993 to 52 in 1994. Estimates of
Israeli wounded were about 427. Extremists associated with
Hamas and Palestinian Islamic Jihad were responsible for most
of the lethal attacks on Israelis.
Israeli security forces killed 15 Palestinians under the age of
16 in 1994. Information on the results of the investigations
of these incidents was not available. Human rights groups
report that the IDF killed 19 people--including at least one
Israeli--at military checkpoints since the closure of the West
Bank and Gaza Strip in March 1993. These individuals were
killed for fleeing, or failing to halt, at the checkpoints.
Human rights groups maintain that incidents could have been
avoided and called for an investigation into military practices
at the checkpoints. After the killing of a Palestinian at a
checkpoint in September, the IDF said it would revise the open
fire orders at checkpoints.
IDF regulations permit the use of live ammunition only when
soldiers' lives are in immediate danger, to halt fleeing
suspects, to disperse a violent demonstration, or to fire on an
"individual unlawfully carrying firearms." According to
policy, soldiers should direct fire at the legs only and may
fire at a fleeing suspect only if they believe a serious felony
has occurred and they have exhausted other means to apprehend
the suspect. It is forbidden to open fire in the direction of
children and women, even in cases of severe public disorder,
unless there is an immediate and obvious danger to a soldier's
life.
In practice, soldiers, police, and undercover units used live
ammunition in situations other than when their lives were in
danger (see Section l.a.) and often shot suspects in the upper
body and head. Soldiers, police, and undercover units also
injured many bystanders, including children, by live fire,
rubber bullets, or beating while pursuing suspects.
In 1994 a reserve soldier testified to B'tselem, an Israeli
human rights organization, that as part of his military
training, he was taught to shoot at a hypothetical suspect, in
this case someone who had thrown a Molotov cocktail, without
giving any warning, and to fire additional shots in the
suspect's head as he lay on the ground.
The IDF continued using heavy weapons to destroy houses
believed to be the hiding place of security suspects. An
estimated 12 houses were destroyed by antitank missiles during
such operations. There are no statistics on the number of
damaged homes. The IDF apologized and offered compensation to
an UNRWA senior staff member whose house was demolished by
antitank missiles in April 1994.
In July an IDF unit raided the Augusta Victoria Hospital in
Jerusalem, apparently searching for a group of armed men
distributing Islamic Jihad leaflets on the hospital premises.
The IDF unit reportedly interrupted medical procedures,
intimidated staff, patients, and visitors, reportedly beating
some of them and damaged property. The Government of Israel
expressed regret for any damage or harm raised by the search.
The incident remains under investigation. Human rights groups
claimed that on two instances in 1994, Israeli soldiers used
children as shields to protect themselves from stonethrowers.
The Palestinian Police Force used excessive force to quell a
demonstration at Gaza's Filistin Mosque on November 18.
According to Gaza-based human rights organizations, the
demonstration's sponsors did not request a permit. The
confrontation resulted in the deaths of at least 16 persons and
left hundreds wounded. The PPF arrested hundreds of
demonstrators in the wake of rioting that followed the clash.
Most were released without charges within a few weeks. The PA
established a commission, which at year's end, was still
investigating the incident.
Section 2 Respect for Civil Liberties, Including:
a. Freedom of Speech and Press
The Israeli Government generally respects freedom of speech in
East Jerusalem and the West Bank, but prohibits public
expressions of support for Islamic extremist groups, such as
Hamas, and other groups avowedly dedicated to the destruction
of the State of Israel. The Government eased other
restrictions during the year. It did not enforce the
prohibition on the display of Palestinian political symbols,
such as flags, national colors, and graffiti, acts which are
punishable by fines or imprisonment.
Overall, censorship of specific press pieces decreased during
the year. However, citing security reasons, Israeli
authorities continue to restrict the Arabic press. Military
censors review all Arabic publications in East Jerusalem for
material related to the public order and security of Israel and
the occupied territories. Israeli authorities prohibited the
distribution of the PLO-affiliated Al-Awdah publication for
several months in 1994. In August the Ministry of the Interior
ordered the closure of the Hamas-affiliated East Jerusalem
weekly Al-Bayan. In addition, an Arab press in Hebron was
closed in November by the Israeli authorities for 1 year on
charges of printing inflammatory material against the peace
process. Reports by foreign journalists are also subject to
review by Israeli military censors for security reasons, and
the satellite feed used by many foreign journalists is
monitored. Some journalists have reported that their stories
arrived at their filed destination with a blank segment in the
text.
Some areas continue to be closed to journalists, usually in
conjunction with a curfew or security incident. After the
Hebron massacre in February, the IDF temporarily denied entry
permits to Palestinian journalists, preventing them from
attending their places of work in East Jerusalem.
The IDF requires a permit for publications imported into the
occupied territories. Imported materials may be censored or
banned for anti-Semitic or anti-Israeli content. According to
the IDF, publications supporting Palestinian nationalism are
not censored or banned unless they advocate violence.
Possession of banned materials is punishable by a fine and
imprisonment. Most Palestinians punished by this order in 1994
were members of Hamas. Security forces closed several mosques
after Hamas pamphlets were found inside.
Citing security problems, authorities continued to close
individual secondary and elementary schools for short periods.
The frequency of such closures greatly declined from previous
years. Palestinian universities generally operated normally,
also in sharp contrast to previous years.
Palestinians living in areas under the jurisdiction of the PA
generally enjoy freedom of speech and criticize PA performance
and policies and the peace process. The PA has granted
licenses to publish to a variety of periodicals, including some
operated by groups opposed to the peace process and critical of
the PA. Two new papers, Al-Watan and Al-Istiqlal, affiliated
with Hamas and Islamic Jihad, respectively, appeared late in
the year. Both take a critical line against the PA and PLO
Chairman Yasir Arafat.
However, PA officials and those acting in the name of the PA,
imposed restrictions on the press in several instances. In
July the PA prohibited the distribution of the East Jerusalem
daily An-Nahar in Gaza and Jericho, purportedly because the
newspaper expressed a pro-Jordanian line. There were also
warnings not to distribute in the West Bank, and as a result,
the newspaper stopped publishing. After a series of protests,
the PA allowed An-Nahar to resume distribution in Gaza and
Jericho. After it resumed publication, the paper adopted a
more pro-PA editorial line.
Palestinian police authorities also blocked the distribution of
several Arabic and one Israeli newspaper for several hours
November 28 in reaction to press coverage on a Hamas/Islamic
Jihad demonstration that reported the crowd size to be much
larger than the "official" estimate. Over the next two days,
newspaper distribution was blocked, including the pro-PLO daily
Al-Quds, apparently in reaction to the newspaper's strong
editorial against the PA's distribution blockage. There were
also credible reports that senior PA leaders have intimidated
editors into practicing self-censorship, and that they have
been pressured not to publish certain writers who are out of
favor with the PA or Fatah officials. These actions have had a
chilling effect on the willingness of reporters to criticize PA
officials.
Prior to 1994, no broadcast media originated from the occupied
territories. However, after the signing of the Gaza-Jericho
Agreement, the PA established the Palestine Broadcasting
Company (PBC) with a television station in Gaza and a radio
station in Jericho. The PBC's broadcast news almost
exclusively reflects the PA's views on issues.
Under the August Agreement on Preparatory Transfer of Powers
and Responsibilities (the "early empowerment agreement")
reached with the Government of Israel, the PA assumed
responsibility for all levels of education in the West Bank, in
addition to its jurisdiction in Gaza and Jericho.
There were no reports of interference with academic freedoms.
b. Freedom of Peaceful Assembly and Association
Although Israeli military orders ban public gatherings of 10 or
more people without a permit, authorities relaxed enforcement
after the signing of the Declaration of Principles (DOP) in
September 1993. In 1994 Israeli authorities permitted
large-scale rallies in several towns in support of, and in
opposition to, the peace agreement. Private organizations are
required to register with the authorities, though some operate
without licenses. Authorities permit Palestinian charitable,
community, professional, and self-help organizations to operate
unless their activities are viewed as overtly political or
opposed to the DOP.
PA officials maintain that there are no restraints on freedom
of assembly, although they require permits for rallies and
demonstrations. These have been denied on occasion. In
September Gaza Police Commander Ghazi Jabali issued an order
prohibiting specifically "political" meetings at Al-Azhar
University, the Rashad Shawwa Cultural Center, the YMCA, and
the Gala Cinema without police approval. Later that month,
Jabali issued a second order prohibiting buses from
transporting passengers to attend political meetings without
written permission from the Gaza police commander. The
November confrontation at the Filistin Mosque in Gaza occurred
after Islamists tried to demonstrate without a permit. In
Jericho, the PA requires permits for outdoor rallies and
demonstrations. Other restrictions prohibit calls for
violence, a display of arms, and racist slogans. After the
October signing of the Jordanian-Israeli Peace Treaty,
authorities prohibited a planned anti-Jordanian rally in
Jericho.
c. Freedom of Religion
The Israeli Government respects freedom of religion and does
not ban any group or sect on strictly religious grounds. The
Government permits all faiths to operate schools and
institutions. Religious publications are subject to the
publications laws described in Section 2.a.
The PA also does not restrict the freedom of religion.
d. Freedom of Movement Within the Occupied Territories,
Foreign Travel, Emigration, and Repatriation
Israeli authorities continued to issue some Palestinians green
identity cards which signify that the bearer is a security risk
and prohibit the bearer's travel in or through Jerusalem and
abroad. As of October 1, the Government had issued 1,823 such
cards which are generally valid for 6 months and renewable
indefinitely. Issuance of the cards is a form of punishment
without formal charge or trial. According to Arabic press
reports, Palestinians with blue identity cards, signifying they
are residents of the Jerusalem area, must obtain permits from
Israeli authorities to enter the Palestinian Authority areas.
Closure of the West Bank and Gaza, originally instituted in
March 1993 as a means of reducing the number of attacks on
Israelis, continued at intervals in 1994. Most Palestinians in
the West Bank and Gaza Strip encountered difficulty in
obtaining permits to visit, work, study, or attend religious
services outside their areas of residence. During the periodic
closures of the occupied territories, Christians and Muslims in
the West Bank and Gaza Strip have encountered difficulties in
obtaining permits to visit the holy sites in East Jerusalem.
As a security precaution, authorities also banned West Bankers
and Gazans from entering Jerusalem during major Jewish holidays.
Serious security incidents generally prompt the Government to
tighten or close entry from the territories and the Palestinian
Authority areas for extended periods. Israeli officials
acknowledged that no Palestinian holder of a legal work permit
has committed an act of terrorism in Israel: terrorists have
been either legal residents of East Jerusalem or entered
Israeli territory clandestinely.
Curfews were more frequently imposed in villages and refugee
camps than in urban areas. A serious exception was the
repeated and prolonged curfews on the Hebron area following the
February massacre. The curfew was imposed to ensure the safety
of 450 settlers in the heart of Hebron. Like all curfews, it
inhibited Palestinian residents from going to work, shopping,
receiving visits or assistance from family members, pursuing
their education, and observing religious holidays.
Following the Hebron massacre, the Government briefly
restricted the travel of local Israeli settlers, but they were
not subject to the curfew. Even after the curfew was lifted in
the surrounding area, it remained in effect for shops and
offices in the Hebron business district. Authorities required
residents to obtain permits to gain access to their shops and
homes in the business area. A vegetable market adjacent to a
small Israeli settlement remains closed and several roads to
Palestinian neighborhoods that branch off of a main road were
closed in order to create a safer passage for Israeli settlers
in the Hebron area.
The Government requires all Palestinians to obtain permits for
foreign travel and has restricted the travel of some political
activists. However, thousands of Palestinians in the occupied
territories travel abroad each year.
Bridge-crossing permits to Jordan may be obtained at post
offices without a screening process. Palestinian males between
the ages of 16 and 25 who cross the bridge into Jordan must
remain outside the territories for 9 months. Expedited entry
for Palestinian travelers crossing into Gaza at Rafah, and into
the West Bank from the Allenby Bridge, went into effect in
November. Travel documents and identification cards for the
residents of Gaza and Jericho are issued by the Palestinian
Authority; residents in the rest of the West Bank continue to
be issued documents by Israeli authorities.
Obstacles to emigration include the inability to obtain a
travel permit and the fear of losing one's residency.
Restrictions on residence, tourist visas, reentry, and family
reunification apply only to Palestinian residents of the
occupied territories. Israel sometimes refuses to renew the
laissez-passers of Palestinians from the occupied territories
who live or work abroad, on the grounds that they have
abandoned their residences.
The Government ordinarily does not permit Palestinians who
obtain foreign citizenship to resume residence in the occupied
territories; nor does it permit those who acquire legal
residency abroad, or who remain outside the occupied
territories for over 3 years, to resume their residency. Such
persons are permitted to return only as tourists and are
sometimes denied entry entirely.
Israeli authorities also place restrictions on family
reunification. Most Palestinians who were abroad before or
during the 1967 war (estimated at one-fourth of the Palestinian
population at that time) or who have lost their residence
permits for other reasons, are not permitted to reside
permanently with their families in the occupied territories.
The CIVAD usually denies permanent residency in the occupied
territories to the foreign-born spouses and children of
Palestinian residents, and to nonresident mothers. The
Government usually issues temporary residency permits to
persons in these categories.
The CIVAD liberalized its family reunification policy in 1994,
allowing relatives who entered the territories prior to
September 1993 to remain pending approval of their applications
for permanent residence. The CIVAD also increased the number
of approvals for family reunification cases. The PA has also
presented the Israeli Government with 2,000 new cases, which
the Government currently have under review. In June the
Minister of Interior permitted female Palestinian residents of
Jerusalem to apply for family reunification for their
nonresident husbands.
The PA does not restrict the travel of Palestinians in Gaza and
Jericho. However, travel between Gaza and Jericho is subject
to a future agreement with the Government of Israel as
travelers must transit Israeli territory. By year's end, these
arrangements were not yet concluded.
Section 3 Respect for Political Rights: The Right of Citizens
to Change Their Government
Palestinians in the West Bank, Gaza, and Jericho have not yet
been afforded an opportunity to exercise this right. The DOP
provides for an election for a Palestinian Council. The
Government of Israel and the PA are negotiating an agreement
for such elections. The PA is now responsible for a wide range
of governmental functions in Gaza and Jericho. In the West
Bank, the functions in five areas (health, education, culture
and social welfare, tourism, and taxation) have been
transferred to the PA.
Most Palestinians in East Jerusalem do not recognize the
jurisdiction of the Jerusalem municipality; less than 7 percent
of Jerusalem's Palestinian population voted in the November
1993 municipal elections. No Palestinian resident of East
Jerusalem sits on the city council.
Section 4 Governmental Attitude Regarding International and
Nongovernmental Investigation of Alleged Violations
of Human Rights
Many local groups--Israeli, Palestinian, and mixed--monitor the
Government's human rights practices. The Israeli Government
generally cooperates with human rights organizations; officials
normally agree to meet with human rights monitors. The
Government permits them to publish and hold press conferences.
However, some groups maintain that the Government does not
adequately respond to their inquiries and sometimes does not
respond at all.
Security forces arrested a fieldworker from the human rights
organization Al-Haq in March and again in June during apparent
roundups of suspects associated with the Popular Front for the
Liberation of Palestine (PFLP). Al-Haq claimed that the
fieldworker was arrested and placed under administrative
detention because of his human rights work. The Israeli
Government claimed that the fieldworker was connected with
violent activities undertaken by the PFLP.
Following the Hebron massacre, Israel and the PLO agreed to
accept the presence of 121 international monitors in Hebron.
The monitors arrived in May and left on schedule in August.
In the areas under the PA's jurisdiction, the Palestinian
Independent Commission for Citizens' Rights (PICCR) was
established in 1993. PICCR is independently funded and its
board of directors is drawn from Palestinians without official
connections to the PA. PICCR reportedly has access to PA
officials and records. It was one of the few Palestinian
organizations to protest the PA's ban of An-Nahar newspaper.
In areas outside the PA's jurisdiction, other Palestinian
groups, including the Mandela Institute, the Palestine Human
Rights Information Center, and Al-Haq, cover human rights
issues.
The PA has a cooperative relationship with the ICRC and the ILO.
Section 5 Discrimination Based on Race, Sex, Religion,
Disability, Language, or Social Status
Women
Palestinian women living under military occupation face human
rights problems similar to those of men. In addition, women
endure various forms of social prejudice and repression within
their own society. While there is an active women's movement
in the West Bank and Gaza Strip, attention has only recently
shifted from nationalist aspirations to women's issues like
domestic violence, employment, and marriage and inheritance
laws.
There are no laws providing for women's rights in the
workplace. Many Palestinian women work outside the home and
some are prominent in such professions as medicine, law, and
teaching. Personal status law for Palestinians is based on
religious law. For Muslim Palestinians, personal status law is
derived from Shari'a (Islamic) law. Women have certain rights
regarding marriage and divorce, inheritance, property
ownership, and custody of children. However, women's rights
advocates believe that many Palestinian women are not aware of
their legal rights.
Although the issues of rape, domestic violence, and violence,
as related to "family honor" have gained greater prominence,
public discussion is generally taboo. Victims are often
encouraged by relatives to remain quiet and are themselves
punished or blamed for the "shame" which has been brought upon
them and their family. While women's groups seek to educate
women on these issues, women's rights advocates claim that few
resources are available to shelter the victims of violence.
They also maintain that society has not been receptive to
attempts to provide counseling or outreach services to victims.
Children
There is no pattern of societal abuse of children, either among
Israelis or Palestinians.
National/Racial/Ethnic Minorities
Israeli settlers are treated more favorably under Israeli law
and practices than Palestinians under the complex mixture of
the laws and regulations that apply to the occupied
territories, Gaza and the Jericho area. This includes the
right to due process, residency rights, freedom of movement,
sales of crops and goods, land and water use, and access to
health and social services. Travel restrictions are not
applied equally (see Section 2.c.). Similarly, the Government
treats Israeli settlers involved in security violations more
leniently than Palestinians guilty of similar offenses (see
Section 1.a.).
The Government traditionally had subjected Palestinians to
higher rates of income tax than Israeli settlers. While these
rates are not appreciably higher than those for Israeli
citizens, Palestinian tax assessments are generally more
arbitrary. The PA has assumed tax authority over Palestinians
in the West Bank and Gaza Strip and is in the process of
establishing full responsibility for this function following
the conclusion of appropriate arrangements with the Government
of Israel.
People with Disabilities
There is no mandated accessibility to public facilities in the
occupied territories under either Israeli or Palestinian
authority. There are some Palestinian institutions that care
for and train disabled persons; these efforts, however, are
chronically underfunded.
Section 6 Worker Rights
a. The Right of Association
Labor affairs in the West Bank are governed by Jordanian Law 21
of 1965, as amended by Israeli military orders and, more
recently, for Jericho, decisions by the PA. The law permits
workers to establish and join unions without government
authorization. However, Israeli authorities in the West Bank
require all proposed new unions to apply for a permit. One new
union was established in 1994, and two others applied for
registration. Israeli authorities have licensed 31 of the
approximately 125 union branches. There are approximately 15
trade unions in the West Bank registered with the Israeli
Government and 6 trade unions in the Gaza Strip.
PA officials are drafting a new labor law which reportedly
provides for the right to establish unions, the right to
collective bargaining, the right to strike, a minimum wage,
minimum working hours, minimum age employment restrictions, and
health and safety regulations.
Palestinian workers in East Jerusalem are governed by Israeli
labor law. They are free to establish their own unions.
Although the Government prohibits East Jerusalem unions from
joining the West Bank trade union federation, this restriction
has not been enforced. Palestinian workers in East Jerusalem
may simultaneously belong to unions affiliated with a West Bank
federation and the Israeli Histadrut Labor Federation.
West Bank unions are not affiliated with the Histadrut
federation. West Bank and Gaza labor leaders met formally with
Histadrut officials for the first time in 1994. The Government
prohibits Palestinian workers who are not resident in Israel or
East Jerusalem from being full members of Histadrut.
Nevertheless, Palestinian workers in Israel are required to
contribute 1 percent of their wages to Histadrut. Negotiations
between Histadrut and West Bank union officials to return part
of this fee began in 1994 but are not yet complete.
Palestinians who work in Israel are also required to contribute
to the National Insurance Institute (NII) which provides
unemployment insurance and other benefits. Palestinian workers
are eligible for some, but not all, NII benefits. Israeli
authorities maintain that the Civil Administration (CIVAD)
provides Palestinian workers with tax allowances and other
benefits that amount to adequate compensation. According to
the Gaza-Jericho Agreement, Palestinians working in Israel will
continue to be insured for injuries occurring in Israel, the
bankruptcy of a worker's employer, and allowances for maternity
leave.
The Government has agreed to transfer the NII fees collected
from Palestinian workers to the PA which will assume
responsibility for the pensions and social benefits of
Palestinians working in Israel. Implementation of this change
will be made by a joint Israeli-Palestinian economic committee.
The great majority of West Bank unions belong to the General
Federation of Trade Unions in the West Bank (GFTU) or the
General Federation of Trade Unions in the West Bank-Workers'
Unity Bloc (WUB). In the fall, the GFTU, the WUB, and the Gaza
unions merged informally to create a single union, the
Palestinian General Federation of Trade Unions (PGFTU).
Pending elections, scheduled for spring 1995, the PGFTU is
acting as an informal coalition in negotiations with
Histadrut. When completed, the reorganization of unions under
the PGFTU should enable the West Bank unions, now joined with
Gaza unions, to better represent the interests of union members.
Union membership has declined continuously since the intifada,
in part because the periodic closures of the occupied
territories has restricted the number of work permits issued to
Palestinians. An estimated 85,000 workers are members of the
GFTU, the largest union bloc. There are approximately 25,000
union members in Gaza. The GFTU participates in meetings of
the International Confederation of Arab Trade Unions (ICATU),
although it is not affiliated. Both the GFTU and the WUB have
applied for membership in the International Confederation of
Free Trade Unions (ICFTU).
Union organizations in the West Bank are associated with
various Palestinian political factions. Israeli authorities
tended to view Palestinian unions as political organizations
and occasionally inhibited their activities in the West Bank
and Gaza. The International Labor Organization (ILO) and the
ICFTU have observed that fear of intimidation and arrest for
labor activities inhibited the development of unions in the
territories in the past.
Palestinian labor organizations are subject to disciplinary
measures for engaging in political activities. The CIVAD must
approve all meetings of 10 or more non-Israeli citizens in the
territories. The ILO reported that the CIVAD permitted it to
hold a conference in Nablus, although Israeli authorities did
not grant travel permits for union organizers to meet in
Jerusalem.
According to the CIVAD, Islamists were permitted to establish
one union in 1994, with two branches, in contrast to none in
1993. The union represents workers in several Islamic
enterprises.
West Bank unions held no elections in 1994. Israeli military
order 825 of 1980 requires Palestinian unions to provide the
CIVAD with the names of candidates for union office 30 days
before union elections. The order authorizes the CIVAD to
remove from the lists any candidate convicted of a felony,
including those sentenced for security offenses.
There has been no dissolution of unions by administrative or
legislative action. Under prevailing labor law, unions have
the right to strike only after submitting a complaint to the
CIVAD for mandatory arbitration. Approximately 10 strikes
occurred in the West Bank in 1994. Israeli authorities did not
interfere with them. There are no laws in the territories that
specifically protect the rights of striking workers, and, in
practice, such workers have little or no protection from
employers' retribution.
The Gaza-Jericho Agreement provides that Palestinians employed
in Israel will have the right to bring labor disputes before
the Israeli labor courts.
b. The Right to Organize and Bargain Collectively
A majority of workers in the occupied territories are
self-employed or unpaid family helpers in agriculture or
commerce. Only 40 percent of employment in the territories
consists of wage jobs, most in services provided by the CIVAD,
the United Nations Relief and Works Agency (UNWRA), or
municipalities. Collective bargaining is protected. The CIVAD
does not record collective agreements because it does not
recognize some unions and union leaders. Nonetheless, Israeli
authorities honor such agreements and do not interfere in
them. About 60 labor agreements are in force in the West Bank.
Labor disputes are reportedly adjudicated by committees of 3 to
5 members in businesses employing more than 20 workers. The
Center for Trade Union Rights, headquartered in Bethlehem, and
European and U.S. unions have recently conducted seminars on a
spectrum of labor issues, including labor dispute resolution.
Existing laws and regulations do not offer real protection
against anti-union discrimination. There are no export
processing zones in the occupied territories.
c. Prohibition of Forced or Compulsory Labor
There is no forced or compulsory labor in the occupied
territories.
d. Minimum Age for Employment of Children
The minimum working age in the West Bank, Jericho and Gaza area
is 14. This order is not effectively enforced, and underage
workers are employed in agriculture and in some West Bank and
Gaza factories. Work hours for young workers are not limited.
e. Acceptable Conditions of Work
There is no minimum wage in the West Bank, Jericho or Gaza
area. In the West Bank, Jordanian law allows for a maximum
workweek of 48 hours with a required 24-hour rest period,
except for certain hotel, food service, and cinema employees,
whose workweek is 54 hours. In Gaza, Israeli authorities
amended this law to provide for a 45-hour workweek for day
laborers and a 40-hour workweek for salaried employees. There
is no effective enforcement of maximum workweek laws.
The Israeli Ministry of Labor's Office of Inspection Services
is responsible for enforcing health and safety standards in the
West Bank and Gaza. It maintains that it has undertaken
several inspections, but health and safety conditions in some
factories do not meet international standards.
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