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TITLE: IRAQ HUMAN RIGHTS PRACTICES, 1994
AUTHOR: U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE
DATE: FEBRUARY 1995
IRAQ*
Political power in Iraq is concentrated in a repressive
one-party apparatus dominated by Saddam Hussein. The
provisional Constitution of 1968 stipulates that the Arab
Ba'ath Socialist Party governs Iraq through the Revolutionary
Command Council (RCC), which exercises both executive and
legislative authority. President Saddam Hussein, who is also
Prime Minister, Chairman of the RCC, and Secretary General of
the Regional Command of the ABSP, wields decisive power.
Ethnically and linguistically, the Iraqi population includes
Arabs, Kurds, Turcomans, Yazidis, and Armenians. The religious
mix is likewise varied: Shi'a and Sunni Muslims (both Arab and
Kurdish), Christians (including Chaldeans and Assyrians), and
Jews. Ethnic divisions have resulted in civil uprisings in
recent years, especially in the north and the south. The
Government has reacted against these peoples with extreme
repression.
The Government's security apparatus includes militias attached
to the President, the Ba'ath Party, and the Interior Ministry.
Security forces have been responsible for widespread and
systematic human rights abuses. They play a central role in
maintaining the environment of intimidation and fear on which
government power rests.
The Government controls Iraq's oil-based economy and owns all
major industries. Damaged by the Gulf War and subjected to
United Nations sanctions as a result of Iraq's 1990 invasion of
Kuwait, the economy continues to deteriorate. The sanctions
ban all exports and imports except food, medicine, and
materials and supplies for essential civilian needs. The
Government's failure to comply with U.N. Security Council
resolutions has led to repeated extensions of the sanctions.
The Government's abysmal record on human rights did not improve
in 1994, and worsened in several areas. Systematic violations
continued in all categories, including mass executions of
political opponents, widespread use of torture, extreme
repression of ethnic groups, disappearances, denial of due
process, and arbitrary detention. Tens of thousands of
political killings and disappearances remain unresolved from
previous years. Human rights abuses are difficult to document
because of the Government's efforts to conceal the facts.
*The United States does not have an embassy in Iraq. This
report draws to a large extent on non-U.S. Government sources.
Citizens do not have the right to change their government, and
the freedoms of expression and association do not exist, except
in Kurdish-controlled areas in the north under the protection
of international forces.
The regime deliberately targeted civilians in military
operations against Shi'a Arabs living in the southern marshes.
In the north, the regime maintained an internal embargo on the
importation of food, medicine, and other humanitarian goods to
Kurdish areas. It imposed additional electricity cut-offs in
Dohuk governorate, exacerbating the electrical crisis it had
initiated there in late 1993. Elsewhere, the regime diverted
humanitarian supplies to its own supporters and to the
military. As socioeconomic conditions deteriorated in 1994,
the regime introduced new forms of torture for persons accused
of economic crimes and military desertion.
In violation of U.N. Security Council resolutions, the
Government persisted in its flagrant interference with the
international community's provision of humanitarian
assistance. It harassed and intimidated relief workers and
targeted them for assassination. A German journalist covering
the relief effort and her Kurdish bodyguard were shot to death,
execution-style. Several other international personnel,
including United Nations guards and journalists, were
critically injured in bomb and shooting attacks. New
information came to light indicating that the Government
offered rewards for killing international relief personnel.
RESPECT FOR HUMAN RIGHTS
Section 1 Respect for the Integrity of the Person, Including
Freedom from:
a. Political and Other Extrajudicial Killing
The regime has a long record of executing perceived opponents.
In his October report to the U.N. General Assembly, the U.N.
Special Rapporteur (hereafter referred to as the Special
Rapporteur) stated that the Government's "aim of killing is a
political one, with the objective of silencing dissent and
suppressing opposition."
As in previous years, there were numerous credible reports that
the regime had executed a number of persons allegedly involved
in plotting against Saddam Hussein, including some members of
his family and tribe. High-ranking civilian, military, and
tribal leaders were reported among those executed.
On April 12, an opposition figure, Talib Suhayl Al-Tamimi, was
assassinated in Beirut, Lebanon. Lebanese security officials
arrested two Iraqi diplomats assigned to Beirut and charged
them with the murder. The suspects admitted their guilt but at
year's end there was no movement toward a trial.
The Government continued to provide safe haven and logistical
and military support to several terrorist groups and
individuals. These include the Mojahedin-e Khalq, which is
opposed to the Government of Iran; elements of the Abu Nidal
Organization, based in Lebanon; Abu Abbas' Palestine Liberation
Front (PLF); and the notorious bomb-maker Abu Ibrahim. Both
Abbas and Ibrahim enjoyed sanctuary in Iraq.
In July the prominent oppositionist, Taki Al-Khoei, and two
other members of his family and their driver were killed under
suspicious circumstances in an automobile crash in southern
Iraq, near Al Najaf. Strong circumstantial evidence pointed to
the Government's involvement. The Government had long targeted
the Al-Khoei family for harassment and abuse. The family is
renowned in Shi'a circles for its religious leadership and
outspoken condemnation of the regime's human rights record (see
Section 1.b.).
The Special Rapporteur noted in his February report several
cases of political killing dating from 1993. These included
mass executions of Shi'a Arabs at the Al-Radwaniyah and Abu
Ghraib prisons in central Iraq. According to the Special
Rapporteur, some of those killed had been involved in the
uprising against the Government in the spring of 1991.
In November 1993, the Special Rapporteur reported that the
Government had executed several Turcomans whose bodies were
mutilated before being returned to their families.
As in past years, the Special Rapporteur noted the frequent use
of the death penalty for such political offenses as "insulting"
the President or the Ba'ath Party. His February report
summarized several RCC decrees that stipulate the death penalty
for political and civil offenses (see Section 1.e.).
As in previous years, authorities arrested and placed in
detention centers in central Iraq numerous Shi'a inhabitants of
the south. Shi'a witnesses who survived detention later
reported that some of their comrades had been executed (see
Section 1.g.). As the Government strictly controls the
movement of international personnel in the southern marshes,
information is not available to confirm the number of persons
killed.
Political killings and terrorist actions were frequent in the
north and directed against civilians, foreign relief workers,
journalists, and opposition leaders. German journalist Lissy
Schmidt and her Kurdish bodgyguard, Aziz Kader Faraj, were shot
to death on April 3 in an ambush near Suleymaniya. Kurdish
authorities arrested several suspects who reportedly confessed
that the Government had paid them to commit the murders.
The U.S. Government announced in April it had information
indicating that the Government of Iraq had offered monetary
"bounties" to anyone who assassinates United Nations and other
international relief workers.
Amnesty International (AI) reported that three Kurdish
political parties in northern Iraq--the Patriotic Union of
Kurdistan, the Kurdish Democratic Party, and the Islamic Party
in Iraqi Kurdistan--had committed scores of deliberate and
arbitrary killings against each other in 1993. Press reports
indicated that the Kurdish parties continued to commit
arbitrary killings against each other in 1994.
In 1994 additional information came to light concerning the
so-called Anfal Campaign ("Spoils") of 1988, in which tens of
thousands of Kurds reportedly lost their lives. The campaign
is the most prominent example of political killing. During the
campaign, government forces arrested thousands of Kurds who
have never been seen again. They are presumed to have been
died in custody (see Sections 1.b. and 1.g.).
In his February report, the Special Rapporteur concluded that
the Government's policies against the Kurds--in particular,
against the Barzani tribe--"raise issues of crimes against
humanity and violations of the 1948 Genocide Convention." He
noted "significant similarities" between the Government's past
policies toward the Kurds and its current policies toward Shi'a
civilians living in the southern marshes. The Special
Rapporteur recommended that "further consideration be given to
establish the facts and responsibilities associated with
atrocities committed against the Kurdish population."
b. Disappearance
In February the Special Rapporteur reported that he continued
to receive "reports on the widespread phenomenon of
disappearance." He stated that the U.N. Working Group on
Enforcement on Involuntary Disappearances had conveyed to the
Government 10,570 names of disappeared persons and planned to
convey another 5,000.
The United Nations has documented 16,000 cases of disappeared
persons. According to the Special Rapporteur, most of the
disappearances occurred during the Anfal Campaign. However, he
estimates that the total figure for disappeared Kurds during
Anfal could number in the tens of thousands. Middle East Watch
estimates the total at between 70,000 and 100,000, and AI at
more than 100,000. The Special Rapporteur noted that persons
continue to disappear, mainly in the southern marshes, where
the Government is conducting counterinsurgency operations.
New information came to light regarding the Barzani arrests of
1983, in which security forces detained thousands of relatives
and tribesmen of the late Kurdish nationalist hero Mustapha
Barzani. None of these detainees were ever seen again. The
Special Rapporteur observed in February that the regime's
treatment of the Barzani tribe may constitute violations of the
Genocide Convention.
The Special Rapporteur and various human rights groups
continued to make inquiries with the Government regarding its
arrest in 1991 of the late Grand Ayatollah Abdul Qasim Al-Khoei
and 108 of his associates. The Ayatollah died while under
house arrest in Al-Najaf, and only two of the persons arrested
with him can be accounted for. The regime has not responded to
queries regarding the others arrested with Al-Khoei.
The Government failed to return, or account for, a large number
of Kuwaiti citizens and third-country nationals detained during
the Iraqi occupation of Kuwait. It denies having any knowledge
of the missing persons. U.N. Security Council Resolution
(UNSCR) 687 requires the Government to "facilitate" the search
for and the repatriation of those still missing. In his
October report, the Special Rapporteur noted that the
Government's failure to account for the missing persons
violates provisions of the various Geneva Conventions, to which
Iraq is a party.
Middle East Watch estimated that, apart from the tens of
thousands of persons who have disappeared and are presumed
dead, another 10,000 to 12,000 persons were being held without
charge in prisons and detention centers.
c. Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading
Treatment or Punishment
Although the Government is a party to international conventions
against torture, and the Constitution prohibits the practice,
the security services routinely torture detainees. The Special
Rapporteur continues to note the Government's "systematic" use
of physical and psychological torture. According to former
detainees, torture techniques include electric shocks
administered to the genitals and other sensitive areas,
beatings, burnings with hot irons, suspension from ceiling
fans, dripping acid on the skin, rape, breaking of limbs,
denial of food and water, and threats to rape or otherwise harm
relatives. The tormentors kill many torture victims and
mutilate their bodies before delivering them to the victims'
families.
The authorities introduced new forms of torture in September,
including the amputation of ears and the branding of foreheads
for certain economic crimes and for desertion from the
military. Large numbers of persons reportedly bled to death
from such punishments. Opposition media reported that the
regime's use of ear amputations sparked a large antiregime
demonstration in Mosul on September 8. Opposition media also
reported that the authorities executed several doctors who had
refused to carry out the amputations.
The regime also introduced the traditional Islamic law
punishment for thievery--amputation of the right hand. It
subsequently stipulated branding of the forehead as the
punishment for thieves whose hands already had been amputated
and the death penalty for certain categories of thievery. An
official newspaper reported on September 9 that the authorities
amputated the right hand and branded the forehead of a person
convicted of stealing a television set.
In his October report, the Special Rapporteur condemned the
amputations and brandings. He stated that the practices
constitute "flagrant and determined violations of Iraq's
international human rights obligations insofar as they
prescribe cruel and unusual punishments and insofar as
implementation of the decrees compounds these violations by the
conduct of torture." The relevant obligation in this regard is
Article 7 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political
Rights, to which Iraq is a party. The U.N. General Assembly
likewise condemned what it termed "mutilations" in a December
resolution.
Certain prisons are notorious for routine mistreatment of
prisoners. Al-Rashidiya Prison, on the Tigris River north of
Taji, reportedly contains torture chambers in its basement.
The Al-Shamma'iya Prison, located in east Baghdad, holds the
mentally ill and is reportedly the site of both torture and
disappearances.
The Al-Radwaniyah Prison (see Section 1.a.) is a former
prisoner-of-war facility near Baghdad and reportedly the site
of torture and arbitrary killings, including mass execution by
firing squad. This prison was the principal detention center
for persons arrested following the civil uprisings of 1991.
Many persons taken into custody in connection with the
uprisings have not been seen since. Middle East Watch
estimated in 1994 that the Al-Radwaniyah Prison holds between
5,000 and 10,000 detainees.
The Special Rapporteur, Middle East Watch, and AI cited the
Al-Radwaniyah Prison and the Abu Ghraib Prison, located in
Baghdad, as principal sites where torture and disappearances
continue to occur. According to opposition reports, in late
1994 authorities at the Abu Ghraib Prison amputated the hands
of persons convicted of theft.
The security forces allegedly raped captured civilians during
the Anfal Campaign and the occupation of Kuwait and the Gulf
War. The Special Rapporteur noted in his February report that
he had interviewed numerous women who continue to suffer severe
depression after they were raped in official custody. The
Government has never acknowledged or taken any action to
investigate reports of rape by its officials.
Kurdish authorities in northern Iraq also employed torture. AI
reported in 1994 that these authorities and Kurdish opposition
groups used torture on political opponents and criminal
suspects in 1993.
d. Arbitrary Arrest, Detention, or Exile
Although the Constitution and Legal Code explicitly prohibit
arbitrary arrest and detention, the authorities routinely
engage in these practices. In his February report, the Special
Rapporteur described "widespread arbitary arrest and detention,
in violation of Article 9 of the Universal Declaration of Human
Rights," primarily in the southern part of the country. He
stated that the military and security services, rather than the
ordinary police, carried out most cases of arbitrary arrest and
detention.
Opposition sources reported in July that the regime had
detained 320 people during military operations in the Al-Amarah
marshes in June (see Section 1.g.) The opposition conveyed the
names of the reported detainees to the Special Rapporteur.
The Special Rapporteur reported that the regime continued to
target the Shi'a Muslim clergy for arbitrary arrest and other
abuses. In March international news media reported that the
regime had forcibly expelled from Iraq the families of the more
than 100 Shi'a clerics who had disappeared in 1991 after their
arrests with the late Grand Ayatollah aI-Khoei (see Section
1.b.). Many of these clerics and their families are of foreign
nationality, primarily Iranian and Pakistani.
According to AI and Middle East Watch, several foreigners
arrested arbitrarily in previous years remained in detention.
The Government's refusal to allow tens of thousands of Kurds
and Turcomans to return to their homes in Kirkuk and Mosul
amounts to a policy of internal exile (see Section 2.d.).
e. Denial of Fair Public Trial
There are two parallel judicial systems: the regular courts,
which try common criminal offenses; and special security
courts, which try cases involving national security. However,
the security courts try many criminal cases. The President may
override any court decision. There are no checks on his
power. The Special Rapporteur noted in his February report
that the executive interferes regularly in "all aspects of
normal judicial competence in matters ranging from property and
commercial law, to family law and criminal law."
The procedural rules applicable in the regular courts
theoretically provide many basic protections. However, the
regime often assigns to the security courts cases which, on
their merits, would appear to fall under the jurisdiction of
the regular courts. Trials in the regular courts are public,
and defendants are entitled to counsel--at government expense
in the case of indigents. Defense lawyers have the right to
review the charges and evidence brought against their clients.
There is no jury system: panels of three judges try cases.
Defendants have the right to appeal to the Court of Appeal and
then to the Court of Cassation, the highest Court.
The Special Rapporteur reported that the regular courts often
assign penalties that are "disproportionate" to the offense
(see Section 1.c.). Decree 13 of 1992 imposes the death
penalty for automobile theft. In 1994 the Government announced
the death penalty would be invoked for automobile smuggling,
various categories of thievery, and solicitation for the
purposes of prostitution. As of late 1994, the penalty for
possession of stolen goods was life in prison.
Similarly, the Government shields certain groups from
prosecution for alleged crimes. A 1992 decree grants immunity
from prosecution to members of the Ba'ath Party and the
security forces who may cause death while in the pursuit of
army deserters. A 1990 decree grants immunity to men who kill
their mothers, daughters, and other female family members who
have committed "immoral deeds."
There are no Shari'a, or Islamic law, courts as such. Regular
courts are empowered to administer Islamic law in cases
involving personal status, such as divorce and inheritance. In
1994 the regime introduced Shari'a punishments for some types
of criminal offenses and for military desertion (see Section
1.b.).
Special security courts have jurisdiction in all cases
involving espionage and treason, peaceful political dissent,
smuggling, currency exchange violations, and drug trafficking.
According to the Special Rapporteur, military officers or civil
servants with no legal training head these tribunals, which
hear cases in secret. Authorities often hold the defendants in
incommunicado detention and do not permit them to have contact
with their lawyers. The courts admit confessions extracted by
torture which often serve as the basis for conviction.
Although defendants may appeal their sentences to Saddam
Hussein, many cases appear to end in summary execution shortly
after trial.
Because the Government rarely acknowledges arrests or
imprisonments, it is difficult to estimate the number of
political prisoners. Many of the tens of thousands of persons
who have disappeared or been killed in recent years were
originally held as political prisoners.
f. Arbitrary Interference with Privacy, Family, Home, or
Correspondence
The Government frequently disregards the constitutional right
to privacy, particularly in cases in which national security is
alleged to be involved. The law defines security offenses so
broadly that authorities are virtually exempt from the legal
requirement to obtain search warrants. In 1994 the authorities
subjected the Shi'a religious clergy, Shi'a Muslim inhabitants
of the southern marshes, and various ethnic minorities to
searches without warrants (see Section 1.g.). The regime
routinely ignores the constitutional provisions safeguarding
the confidentiality of mail and telegraphic correspondence and
telephone conversations.
The security services and the Ba'ath Party maintain pervasive
networks of informers to deter dissident activity and instill
fear in the public. As the Special Rapporteur noted in his
February report, "the fear of informers and subsequent severe
reprisals have prevented virtually the entire population from
expressing genuinely held opinions which are not consistent
with those of the Government."
g. Use of Excessive Force and Violations of Humanitarian
Law in Internal Conflicts
In 1994 as in previous years, the armed forces conducted
deliberate artillery attacks against civilians in the southern
marshes. The marshes historically have been inhabited mostly
by Shi'a Muslims, but in recent years they have also become a
refuge for army deserters and displaced civilians. As a
result, the marshes are the site of guerrilla resistance. The
Gulf War allies imposed a "no-fly zone" over southern Iraq in
1992. It continues to deter aerial attacks on the marsh
dwellers, but does not prevent artillery attacks or the
military's large-scale burning operations.
Ongoing military operations have destroyed the traditional way
of life of the marsh Arab Shi'a. Credible reports describe a
continuing process of large-scale environmental destruction in
the marshes caused by the Government's burning, draining, and
water-diversion projects. The army has constructed canals,
causeways, and earthen berms to divert water from the
wetlands. Hundreds of square kilometers of marsh areas have
been burned, imperiling the marshes' ecosystem.
The Government claims the drainage is part of a land
reclamation plan to increase the acreage of arable land, spur
agricultural production, and reduce salt pollution in the
Tigris and Euphrates. However, the evidence of large-scale
humanitarian and ecological destruction appears to belie this
claim. Aerial and satellite photography made public by the
U.S. Government in 1994 depicted the almost total destruction
of the marshes. Moreover, the regime's diversion of supplies
in the south limited the population's access to food, medicine,
drinking water, and transportation.
As the marshes dried, military units launched land-based
attacks on villages. On March 4, the military began the
largest search-and-destroy operation in the marshes in 2
years. The offensive included the razing of villages and
burning operations concentrated in the triangle bounded by
Nasiriyah, Al-Qurnah, and Basrah. The magnitude of the
operation caused the inhabitants to flee in several
directions: deeper into the marshes, to the outskirts of
southern Iraqi cities, and to Iran.
According to opposition sources, military forces in late June
attacked several marsh villages in Nassiriya province. Sources
said that army engineers burned the village of Al-Abra,
containing about 80 homes, to the ground. After the operation,
the army transported the village's inhabitants from the scene.
According to opposition sources, security forces in early July
stormed the villages of Al-Sajiya and Al-Majawid in Al-Chibaish
district, near the main road leading into the marshes.
Simultaneously, armor units supported by heavy artillery
attacked the village of Al-Kheyout in the district of Al-Madina.
Also in July, the military conducted large-scale artillery
bombardment in the Jindala area of the Al-Amarah marshes.
Opposition sources said the bombardment destroyed several homes
and injured several individuals. Security forces reportedly
detained 15 youths and transported them from the area.
Simultaneously, the military caused destruction and arrested
inhabitants in Al-Hashriya, Al-Wasdiya, and Al-Malha.
In September opposition sources reported that military forces
used incendiary bombs and launched an armored attack against
the area of Al-Seigel in the Al-Amarah marshes. The army later
set fire to the entire area.
In 1994 military operations caused an undetermined number of
civilian casualties in the marshes. More than 10,000 refugees
from the marshes fled to Iran, where they joined between 50,000
and 60,000 who had fled in previous years.
In January the European Parliament (EP) passed a resolution
characterizing the marsh Arabs as a persecuted minority "whose
very survival is threatened by the Iraqi Government." The EP
resolution described the Government's treatment of the marsh
inhabitants as "genocide."
According to Middle East Watch and U.S. Government researchers,
government files captured by Kurdish rebels in 1991 contain a
military plan for the destruction of the marshes and the people
living there. The plan appears to have been approved at the
highest levels of the Government. It is being implemented by
Minister of Defense Ali Hassan Al-Majid, the military leader
who supervised the Anfal Campaign.
The Special Rapporteur continues to note the similarity between
the Government's "genocide-type operations" against the Kurds
and its operations in southern Iraq. He stated in his February
report that the extent of violations against the marsh
inhabitants "places the survival of this indigenous population
in jeopardy."
In August the Special Rapporteur dispatched two of his
assistants to the Iran-Iraq border to interview refugees
fleeing the marshes. He reported in October that the refugees
are generally in poor physical and psychological condition,
having suffered extreme deprivation of food and medicine. He
reiterated his "concern over the survival" of the marsh
inhabitants "as a community."
Regarding the Kurds, the Special Rapporteur reported in
February that he also holds the Government responsible for
"serious breaches" of the 1925 Geneva Protocol on the
Prohibition of the Use in War of Asphyxiating, Poisonous or
other Gases, and of Bacteriological Methods of Warfare. He
observed that these breaches may demonstrate the Government
liable under the 1948 Genocide Convention. According to the
Special Rapporteur, the activities of the Government during the
Anfal Campaign "left virtually no Iraqi Kurd untouched." He
concluded that "serious violations of human rights committed
against the civilian population of Iraq both in times of war
and peace involve crimes against humanity committed under and
pursuant to the commands of Saddam Hussein and Ali Hassan
al-Majid."
The Special Rapporteur reported that he continued to receive
accounts of mass graves in southern Iraq. Observers believe
these graves contain the remains of persons killed following
the civil uprising of March 1991. As the Government does not
permit international visitors into these areas, forensics
experts have not yet investigated the grave sites.
However, forensics experts continued to develop information
obtained from mass grave sites in northern Iraq. These graves
contain the remains of hundreds of persons presumed killed in
the Anfal Campaign. According to opposition sources, a new
mass grave, containing up to 250 bodies, was found in April
near the Al-Sharqat district of Mosul. Sources said that the
graves were discovered when heavy rains washed away the
covering soil.
Based on forensic evidence and government documents seized by
the Kurds in 1991, Middle East Watch and Physicians for Human
Rights estimate that between 70,000 and 100,000 Kurds were
killed, and up to 4,000 villages destroyed, during the Anfal
Campaign. The evidence suggests that government efforts to
eliminate Kurdish communities were widespread, systematically
planned, and ruthlessly implemented.
The most flagrant example of current discrimination against the
Kurds is the Government's ongoing internal embargo on the
north, which includes necessities such as food, medicine, and
other humanitarian supplies. Since August 1993, the embargo
also has included massive electric power cut-offs in specific
areas, causing the spoilage of medicines, breakdowns in local
water-purification systems, and the loss of certain hospital
services. A disaster was averted only by the prompt action of
the United Nations and donor governments, who imported and
installed temporary generators to alleviate the crisis.
Additional electricity cut-offs were imposed in August 1994.
The embargo of the north has impacted not only Kurds but
various other minorities such as Turcomans, who also live in
the area.
Operation Provide Comfort--the joint U.S., British, French, and
Turkish command--continued in 1994 to inhibit government aerial
attacks in the northern "no fly zone." However, the military
forces continued intermittent, sometimes heavy shelling of
northern villages by long-range artillery. On October 26,
opposition media reported that shelling of villages in the
Shawan region had resulted in several civilian casualties, one
fatal.
Attacks on humanitarian relief efforts in northern Iraq
continued throughout 1994. Two persons were killed in an
execution-style shooting (see Section 1.a.). Several other
international workers involved in the relief effort, including
six United Nations guards, were injured in bombing and shooting
attacks in March and April. On March 27, Iraqi security forces
permitted a crowd in Mosul to attack and damage a U.N.
helicopter attempting to airlift wounded guards to safety. Two
Swedish journalists were injured in Aqrah on March 14 when a
bomb exploded under their automobile.
Some terrorist incidents pointed to government involvement, but
there was insufficient information to determine the
responsibility for other attacks.
Innocent civilians were the victims of fighting between the
guerilla forces of the two main Kurdish political parties--the
Kurdish Democratic Party (KDP) and the Patriotic Union of
Kurdistan (PUK). Heavy fighting between the two parties broke
out in May, in August, and again in December, producing several
hundred civilian casualties.
In 1994 civilians near the Turkish border were caught in raids
by Turkish military forces on suspected hideouts of the
extremist Kurdistan Workers' Party (PKK). On August 8, Turkish
planes bombed a camp near Zakho containing 10,000 Kurdish
refugees from Turkey. Although the refugees suffered no
casualties, 10 Iraqi guards were reported killed and 7
wounded. The Turkish Government claimed that PKK terrorists
were hiding in the camps.
On August 23, Turkish planes attacking a PKK camp in Zele
bombed the nearby village of Bidewan village, wounding 7 Iraqi
Kurdish civilians. On September 8, Turkish planes again bombed
the large concentration of Turkish refugees near Zakho. No
injuries were reported, but several tents were destroyed.
Kurdish villages along the Iranian border were subjected to
shelling by the Iranian military, as well as to sporadic
Iranian military incursions into Iraqi territory. Opposition
media reported that Iranian artillery shelled civilian areas in
As-Suleymaniyah province the night of April 17-18. Iranian
forces were also reportedly involved in fighting between the
two main Iraqi Kurdish parties in August and December.
The Iranian military conducted attacks on Iranian opposition
camps based in Iraq. On November 6, it launched a SCUD missile
attack on a Mojahedin E-Khalq base located some 30 miles north
of Baghdad. On November 9, Iranian jets bombed an Iranian
Kurdish Democratic Party base in the town of Koi-Sanjaq in
northern Iraq.
Land mines in northern Iraq continued to kill or maim
civilians. Many of the mines were laid during the Iraq-Iraq
War, but the army has failed to clear them. The mines appear
to have been haphazardly planted in civilian areas. The
Special Rapporteur has repeatedly reminded the Government of
its obligations under the Land Mines Protocol, to which Iraq is
a party, to protect civilians from the effects of mines.
Based on interviews with victims and eyewitnesses, the U.S.
Government has concluded that the Iraqi regime engaged in war
crimes--willful killing, torture, rape, pillage,
hostage-taking, unlawful deportation, and related
acts--directly related to the Gulf War. The U.S. Government
urged the U.N. Security Council to create an international
commission to study evidence of a broader range of war crimes,
as well as crimes against humanity, and possible genocide.
At the end of 1994, Middle East Watch was preparing a charge of
genocide that it hopes governments will bring against the
Government of Iraq before the International Court of Justice in
the Hague. Middle East Watch reported that its case was based
on a thorough review of evidence obtained from mass graves,
government documents, and interviews with eyewitnesses.
Section 2 Respect for Civil Liberties, Including:
a. Freedom of Speech and Press
Freedom of speech and of the press do not exist in areas under
the Government's control, and political dissent is not
tolerated in those areas. The Government and the Ba'ath Party
own all print and broadcast media and operate them as
propaganda outlets. They do not report opposition views.
The Special Rapporteur noted in his February report the extent
to which the Government has criminalized most forms of personal
expression. A 1986 decree stipulates the death penalty for
anyone insulting the President or other high government
officials. Section 214 of the Penal Code prohibits "singing a
song likely to cause civil strife." Press Act 206 (1968)
prohibits the writing of articles on 12 specific subjects,
including those detrimental to the President.
The Government periodically jams news broadcasts, including
those of opposition groups, from outside Iraq.
Various Ba'ath Party and presidential decrees define political
dissent as encompassing a wide range of activities. Persons
suspected of engaging in dissent are routinely imprisoned
without charge or trial or after trials that do not meet
minimum standards of fairness.
In northern Iraq, which is protected by international forces
and is administered by a local de facto government, several
newspapers have appeared over the past 3 years, as have
opposition radio and television broadcasts.
b. Freedom of Peaceful Assembly and Association
Except in northern areas under the protection of international
forces, the citizens may not legally assemble or organize for
any political purpose other than to express support for the
regime. By law, the Government controls the formation of
parties, regulates their internal affairs and closely monitors
their activies. Several parties are specifically outlawed, and
membership in them is a capital offense. A 1974 law prescribes
the death penalty for anyone "infiltrating" the Ba'ath Party.
c. Freedom of Religion
The Government severely limits this freedom. The Provisional
Constitution of 1968 states that "Islam is the religion of the
State." The Ministry of Endowments and Religious Affairs
monitors places of worship, appoints the clergy, and approves
the publication of religious literature.
Although Shi'a Muslim Arabs, who are between 60 and 65 percent
of the population, are the largest ethnoreligious group, Sunni
Arabs, who comprise only about 12 to 15 percent of the
population, have traditionally dominated economic and political
life. Despite legal guarantees of sectarian equality, the
Government has in recent years repressed the Shi'a clergy and
followers of the Shi'a faith. Security forces have wantonly
desecrated Shi'a mosques and holy sites, particularly in the
aftermath of the 1991 civil uprisings.
The following government restrictions on religious rights
remained in effect throughout 1994: a ban on the Muslim call
to prayer in certain cities; a ban on the broadcast of Shi'a
programs on government radio or television; a ban on the
publication of Shi'a books, including prayer books; a ban on
funeral processions; and the prohibition of certain processions
and public meetings commemorating Shi'a holy days. Moreover,
the Government also continued to insist that its own appointee
replace the late Grand Ayatollah Abul Qasim Al-Khoei, formerly
the highest ranking Shi'a clergyman, who died in Government
custody in 1992 (see Section 1.b.). The Shi'a religious
establishment refuses to accept the Government's choice.
The Government also continued to harass and threaten members of
the late Ayatollah Al-Khoei's family. Circumstantial evidence
pointed to the regime's involvement in the July deaths of
several members of the Al-Khoei family (see Sections 1.a. and
1.b.).
The Special Rapporteur reports that the Government has engaged
in various abuses against the Christian Assyrian community,
which numbers about 350,000. Most Assyrians have traditionally
lived in the north, and the Government often has suspected them
of "collaborating" with Kurds. Military forces destroyed many
Assyrian churches during the Anfal Campaign, and reportedly
tortured and executed many Assyrians (see Section 4).
d. Freedom of Movement Within the Country, Foreign
Travel, Emigration, and Repatriation
The Government controls movement within the country of citizens
and foreigners. Persons who enter sensitive border areas and
numerous designated security zones are subject to arrest (see
Section 1.d.). Police checkpoints are common on major roads
and highways.
The Government requires citizens to obtain expensive exit visas
for foreign travel. Citizens may not make more than two trips
abroad annually. The Goverment reportedly prohibits some
citizens from all international travel. Before traveling
abroad, citizens are required to post collateral with the
Government which is refundable only upon their return to Iraq.
There are restrictions on the amount of currency that may be
taken out of the country. Women are not permitted to travel
outside Iraq alone; male relatives must escort them.
The Government continued to pursue its discriminatory
resettlement policies, including demolition of villages and
forced relocations of Kurds, Turcomans, and other minorities.
Middle East Watch reported that the Government was continuing
to force Kurdish residents of Mosul to move to
Kurdish-controlled areas in the north. However, the Government
directed most of its resettlement efforts in 1994 at residents
of the southern marshes. According to the Special Rapporteur,
security forces relocate marsh inhabitants detained during the
course of military operations to the main southern cities.
They were later transferred to detention centers and prisons in
central Iraq, primarily in Baghdad.
Opposition sources reported in September that the Government
had relocated more than 300 families from the marshes to a
detention area in Diwaniya province. The authorities
reportedly returned other families who had taken refuge in
Baghdad to the province of Amara.
Large numbers of Shi'a refugees from southern Iraq fled to
Iran, particularly after the escalation in military activity in
March. It was difficult to estimate the number of persons
displaced by these operations, due to the lack of international
monitors in the area. However, in late 1994 the U.N. High
Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) estimated that more than
10,000 refugees from the marshes were in camps in Iran. Amar
Appeal, a charitable organization operating several of the
camps, placed the number at more than 35,000. U.S. Government
analysts estimated in September that more than 200,000 of the
250,000 former inhabitants of the marshes had been driven from
the area since 1991 (see also Section 1.a.).
In February 1994, the Special Rapporteur noted that the
Government in 1993 had expelled several "Faili," or Shi'a,
Kurdish families. Faili Kurds, who have traditionally lived in
the mountainous region bordering Iran, were the victims of mass
deportations in the 1970's and 1980's.
The Special Rapporteur reported that in recent years the
Government may have expelled a total of more than 1 million
persons suspected of being "Persian sympathizers." According
to the Special Rapporteur, about 500,000 of these displaced
persons are believed to live in Iran.
According to the UNHCR, hundreds of thousands of Iraqi refugees
remained abroad--mainly in Iran, Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Syria,
Turkey, Pakistan, and Jordan. Apart from those suspected of
sympathizing with Iran, most fled after the Government's
suppression of the civil uprising of 1991; others are Kurds who
fled the Anfal Campaign of 1988. The UNHCR assists many
refugees, notably in Kuwait, Syria, and Turkey.
Of the 1.5 million refugees who fled following the 1991
uprising, the great majority, particularly Kurds, have
repatriated themselves to northern Iraq, in areas where the
allies have prohibited overflights by Iraqi aircraft. Several
hundred thousand Kurds remain unsettled in northern Iraq
because political circumstances do not permit them to return to
their former homes in Government-controlled territory.
Moreover, northern Iraq is host to about 10,000 recently
arrived Turkish Kurds, who have fled civil strife in
southeastern Turkey (see the report on Turkey), in response to
the Turkish government's counterinsurgency campaign against the
PKK. The UNHCR is treating these displaced persons as refugees
until it reaches an official determination on their status. In
late 1994, the UNHCR relocated the Turkish Kurds to protect
them from periodic raids by Turkish military aircraft (see
Section 1.g.).
Students abroad who refuse to return are required to reimburse
any expenses paid by the Government. Each student wishing to
travel abroad must provide a guarantor. The guarantor and the
student's parents may be liable if the student fails to return.
Foreign spouses of citizens who have resided in Iraq for 5
years are required to apply for nationality. The requirement
is 1 year of residence for the spouses of Iraqi citizens
employed in government offices. Many foreigners thus have been
obliged to accept citizenship and are subject to official
travel restrictions. The penalties for noncompliance include
loss of job, a substantial financial penalty, and repayment for
any governmental educational expenses.
The Government prevents many citizens who also hold citizenship
in another country--especially the children of Iraqi fathers
and foreign-born mothers--from visiting the country of their
other nationality.
Section 3 Respect for Political Rights: The Right of Citizens
to Change Their Government
Citizens do not have the right to change their government. The
only free and open local elections have been held in
Kurdish-controlled areas in northern Iraq. Full political
participation at the national level is confined to members of
the Ba'ath Party, estimated at about 8 percent of the
population. The National Assembly is completely subordinate to
the executive branch.
Saddam Hussein wields decisive power over all instruments of
government. Almost all powerful officials are either members
of the President's family or longtime family allies from his
home town of Tikrit.
Opposition political organizations are illegal and severely
suppressed. Membership in certain political parties is
punishable by death (see Section 2.b.). In 1991 the RCC
adopted a law that theoretically authorized the creation of
political parties other than the Ba'ath, but in practice, the
law reinforced the preeminent position of the Ba'ath Party by
prohibiting parties that do not support Saddam Hussein and the
present Government. New parties must be based in Baghdad and
are forbidden to have any ethnic or religious character.
The Government does not recognize the various political
groupings and parties that have been formed by Shi'a Muslims,
as well as the Kurdish, Assyrian, and Turcoman communities.
These political groups continued to attract support
notwithstanding their illegal status.
In northern Iraq, all central government functions have been
performed by local administrators--mainly Kurds--since the
Government withdrew its forces from the area after the 1991
uprising. In May 1992, political parties in the north
participated in elections to choose representatives to a
regional parliament. The elections also produced de facto
local government administrators, who manage the affairs of the
security zone--which is protected by allied military
forces--and adjacent areas.
Section 4 Governmental Attitude Regarding International and
Nongovernmental Investigation of Alleged Violations
of Human Rights
The Government does not permit the establishment of independent
human rights organizations. It operates an official human
rights group which routinely denies allegations of abuses.
Citizens have established several human rights groups abroad
and in northern areas not under government control.
As in 1993, the Government did not allow the Special Rapporteur
to visit Iraq. It failed to respond to his requests for
information on particular human rights cases and condemned his
recommendation that human rights monitors be stationed
throughout Iraq. For the third consecutive year, the UNHRC
called on the U.N. Secretary General to send human rights
monitors to "help in the independent verification of reports on
the human rights situation in Iraq." The U.N. Subcommission on
Prevention of Discrimination and Protection of Minorities
adopted a resolution reiterating the UNHRC request for the
deployment of monitors. In December the U.N. General Assembly
once again endorsed the request of the Human Rights Commission
for monitors for Iraq.
The Special Rapporteur dispatched members of his staff--in late
December 1993 to Turkey and in August 1994 to Iran--to
interview victims of Iraqi human rights abuses. The U.N. Human
Rights Centre hired another part-time employee in 1994 to
assist the Special Rapporteur who nevertheless asserted that he
needs further resources to carry out his mandate.
Several major human rights organizations, including Middle East
Watch and AI, released new reports on Iraq during the year.
The Amar Appeal, a London-based charitable organization which
assists Iraqi refugees from the southern marshes, issued a
study detailing the ecological destruction of the marshes and
its consequences for the marsh inhabitants. The U.S.
Government also issued a report on that subject.
The Iraqi Government continued to defy various calls from
United Nations bodies to allow the Special Rapporteur to visit
the marshes and interview refugees. In 1994 the U.N. Human
Rights Commission, the U.N. Subcommission on Prevention of
Discrimination and Protection of Minorities, and the U.N.
General Assembly all adopted resolutions condemning the
Government's human rights violations.
The Government failed to comply with the provision of UNSCR
688, which insists that the Government afford immediate,
unrestricted access by humanitarian workers to all those in
need of assistance in all parts of Iraq. Throughout 1994, the
Government threatened, harassed, and assaulted employees of the
United Nations and nongovernmental organizations (see Section
1.g.).
Throughout 1994 the Government refused to implement UNSCR
Resolutions 706 and 712, which would allow it to sell oil and
purchase humanitarian goods, the equitable distribution of
which the United Nations would monitor. The Special Rapporteur
noted in his February report that the Government failed to
provide for the basic humanitarian needs of its civilian
population and that it is obligated to do so as a signatory to
the United Nations Charter. The Special Rapporteur reported
that in September the Government cut food subsidies by
one-third. He once again called on the Government to implement
UNSC Resolutions 706 and 712.
Section 5 Discrimination Based on Race, Sex, Religion,
Disability, Language, or Social Status
Women
The Government claims that it is committed to equality for
women, who make up about 20 percent of the work force. It has
enacted laws to protect women from exploitation in the
workplace and from sexual harassment; to permit women to join
the regular army, Popular Army, and police forces; to require
education for female children; and to equalize women's rights
in divorce, land ownership, taxation, suffrage, and election to
the National Assembly. It is difficult to determine to what
extent these protections are afforded in practice. Reports
indicate, however, that the application of these laws has
declined as Iraq's political and economic crisis persists.
Familial violence against women, such as wife beating and rape,
is known to occur, but little is known about its extent. Such
abuse is customarily addressed within the tightly knit family
structure. There is no public discussion of the subject, and
the Government issues no statistics. Spousal violence
constitutes grounds for divorce and criminal charges, but suits
brought on these charges are believed to be rare.
The Special Rapporteur has commented on the high incidence of
rape committed by the armed forces and security services (see
Section 1.b.). He noted that an unusually high percentage of
the northern population is female, due to the disappearances of
tens of thousands of Kurdish men in the Anfal Campaign. The
Special Rapporteur has reported that the widows, daughters, and
mothers of Anfal victims are economically dependent on their
relatives or villages because they may not inherit the property
or assets of their missing family members. Other reports
suggest that economic destitution has forced many women into
prostitution.
Evidence concerning the Anfal Campaign of 1988 indicates that
the Government killed many women and children, including
infants, by firing squads and in chemical attacks.
Children
No information is available on whether the Government has
enacted specific legislation to promote the welfare of
children. However, the Special Rapporteur and several human
rights groups have collected a substantial body of evidence
pointing to the Government's continuing disregard for the
rights and welfare of children.
The Government failure to comply with relevant U.N. Security
Council resolutions has led to a continuation of economic
sanctions. As a result, general economic and health conditions
throughout Iraq have deteriorated dramatically. Children have
been particularly susceptible to the decline in the standard of
living. Increases in child mortality and disease rates have
been reported.
The Special Rapporteur has observed that, under these
circumstances, the Government has special obligations to ensure
that the most vulnerable groups in the population have adequate
food and health care. The Special Rapporteur stated in his
February report that Iraq's refusal to implement U.N. Security
Council Resolutions 706 and 712, which would permit a one-time
sale of oil in order to finance the import of humanitarian
goods, has had an adverse effect on vulnerable populations,
including children.
In October the Special Rapporteur reported that "the obvious
imbalance between military expenditure and resources allocated
to the fields of health care and education clearly illustrates
the priorities of the Government." The Special Rapporteur has
repeatedly observed that the ongoing bombardment of civilian
settlements in the southern marshes has resulted in the deaths
of many innocent persons, including women, children, and the
elderly.
National/Racial/Ethnic Minorities
The cultural, religious, and linguistic diversity of society is
not reflected in the country's political and economic
structure. Sunni Arabs, a small minority of the population,
have effectively controlled Iraq since independence in 1932.
Shi'a Arabs, the overwhelming majority of the population, have
long been economically, politically, and socially
disadvantaged. Like the Sunni Kurds of the north, the Shi'a
Arabs of the south have been targeted for particular
discrimination and abuse, ostensibly because of their
opposition to the Government.
The security forces in 1994 reportedly were still encamped in
the shrine to Imam Ali at Al-Najaf, one of Shi'a Islam's
holiest sites, using it as an interrogation center. The former
Shi'a theological school in Al-Najaf, which the Government
closed following the 1991 uprising, was used as a public market
in 1994. Security forces continued to expel foreign Muslim
clerics from Al-Najaf, under the pretext that the clerics'
visas had expired. Other aspects of government repression of
the Shi'a are discussed in Section 2.c. and various parts of
Section 1.
The Kurds, who make up approximately 20 percent of the
population, historically have suffered political and economic
discrimination, despite the token presence of a small number in
the national Government (see Sections 1.a., 1.b., and 1.g.).
Assyrians are an ethnic as well as religious group (see Section
2.c.), and speak a distinct language--Syriac. Public
instruction in Syriac, which was to have been allowed under a
1972 decree, has never been implemented. In 1994 the Special
Rapporteur stated that in late 1993 the Government dismissed or
expelled hundreds of Assyrian teachers and students from
universities and public positions.
Citizens considered to be of Iranian origin must carry special
identification and are often precluded from desirable
employment. Over the years, the Government has deported
hundreds of thousands of citizens of Iranian origin (see
Section 2.d.).
People with Disabilities
No information is available on the Government's efforts to
assist people with disabilities.
Section 6 Worker Rights
a. The Right of Association
Although Iraq is a party to the 1919 Constitution of the
International Labor Organization (ILO), which guarantees the
freedom of association, trade unions independent of government
control do not exist in Iraq. The Trade Union Organization Law
of June 2, 1987, prescribes a monolithic trade union structure
for organized labor.
Workers in private and mixed enterprises and cooperatives--but
not public employees or workers in state enterprises--have the
right to join local union committees. The committees are
affiliated with individual trade unions, which in turn belong
to the Iraqi General Federation of Trade Unions. The General
Federation is linked to the Ba'ath Party, which uses it to
promote party principles and policies among union members. The
General Federation also is affiliated with the International
Confederation of Arab Trade Unions and the formerly
Soviet-controlled World Federation of Trade Unions.
The Labor Law of 1987 restricts the right to strike. No strike
has been reported over the past two decades.
b. The Right to Organize and Bargain Collectively
The right to bargain collectively is not recognized. Salaries
for public sector workers (the majority of the employed) are
set by the Government. Wages in the much smaller private
sector are set by employers or negotiated individually with
workers.
The Labor Code does not protect workers from antiunion
discrimination, a failure that has been criticized repeatedly
by the ILO's Committee of Experts. There are no export
processing zones in Iraq.
c. Prohibition of Forced or Compulsory Labor
Compulsory labor is theoretically prohibited by law. However,
the Penal Code stipulates prison sentences, including
compulsory labor, for civil servants and employees of state
enterprises accused of breaches of labor "discipline,"
including resigning from the job. According to the ILO,
foreign workers in Iraq have been prevented from terminating
their employment to return to their native countries because of
government-imposed penal sanctions on persons who do so.
d. Minimum Age for Employment of Children
Employment of children under age 14 is prohibited except in
small-scale family enterprises. Many children are encouraged
to work to support their families. The law stipulates that
employees between the ages of 14 and 18 work fewer hours per
week than adults.
e. Acceptable Conditions of Work
Theoretically, most workers in urban areas work a 6-day,
48-hour workweek. Hours for government employees are set by
the head of each ministry. In practice, the rate of
absenteeism was abnormally high in 1994, as socioeconomic
conditions deteriorated.
Working hours for agricultural workers vary according to
individual employer-employee agreements.
Occupational safety programs are in effect in state-run
enterprises. Inspectors theoretically inspect private
establishments, but enforcement varies widely. (###)
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