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TITLE: IRAN HUMAN RIGHTS PRACTICES, 1994
AUTHOR: U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE
DATE: FEBRUARY 1995
IRAN*
The Islamic Republic of Iran was established in 1979 after a
populist revolution toppled the monarchy. The Government is
dominated by Shi'a Muslim clergymen and their lay allies.
Ayatollah Ali Khamenei is the Leader of the Islamic Revolution
and functions as the Chief of State. He is also the
Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces. President Ali Akbar
Hashemi-Rafsanjani, first elected in a popular vote in 1989,
was reelected in 1993. The Constitution, approved in l980 by
popular referendum and revised in 1989, provides for a 270-seat
unicameral Islamic Consulative Assembly, or Majles. The
Government seeks to ensure that public policy is consistent
with its view of political and socioreligious values, but
serious factional differences exist within the leadership. The
Government reinforces its power by arrests, summary trials and
executions, and various forms of intimidation.
Several government agencies are responsible for internal
security, including the Ministry of Intelligence and Security,
the Ministry of Interior, and the Revolutionary Guards, a
military force established after the revolution which is
coequal with the regular military. These organizations
regularly commit such abuses such arbitrary arrests and torture.
Iran has a mixed economy. The Government owns the petroleum
and utilities industries and the banks. Oil exports are the
primary source of foreign exchange. The economy is still
recovering from the disruptions of the 1979 revolution and the
destruction from the Iran-Iraq war. Iran remains isolated from
international financial markets. Economic performance is
adversely affected by corruption and government mismanagement.
Unemployment in 1994 was estimated at 30 percent, and the
annual rate of inflation was about 50 percent.
The Government continues to be a major abuser of human rights.
There was no evidence of improvement in 1994. In March, the
United Nations Commission on Human Rights (UNHCR) concluded
that the Government's "continuing" abuse of human rights
justifies international scrutiny. The United Nations extended
for another year the mandate of Reynaldo Galindo Pohl, its
Special Representative on Human Rights in Iran. Systematic
abuses include arbitrary arrests and detentions, widespread use
*The United States does not have an embassy in Iran.
Accordingly, it draws heavily on non-U.S. Government sources,
of torture, lack of fair trials, summary executions, and
repression of the freedoms of speech, press, and association.
A prominent social critic and historian, Ali Akbar
Saidi-Sirjani, died in detention in November, 10 months after
his arrest on improbable criminal charges. The Government
claims Saidi-Sirjani died of a heart attack but did not permit
an independent autopsy. The Government failed to provide
adequate protection for three Evangelical Christian leaders who
were murdered in 1994. Women face legal and social
discrimination, important worker rights are restricted, and the
Government continues to persecute the adherents of the Baha'i
faith. There is a lively and open debate on political issues
but the ruling clerics effectively control the electoral
process, thereby denying the people the right to change their
government. The Government conceals its abuses and obstructs
the activities of human rights monitors.
RESPECT FOR HUMAN RIGHTS
Section 1 Respect for the Integrity of the
Person, Including Freedom from:
a. Political and Other Extrajudicial Killing
Given the lack of basic procedural safeguards in political
trials, most of the executions ordered in such cases amount to
summary executions. The U.N. Special Representative on Human
Rights in Iran has cited the Government's "extensive" use of
the death penalty. Although the domestic press stopped
reporting most executions in 1992, executions appear to
continue at a rate of several hundred a year. Exiles and human
rights monitors report that many of those executed for alleged
criminal offenses were actually political dissidents.
On February 25, the Government executed Faizullah Makhubat, 78,
a Jew who had been detained under harsh conditions for 22
months at Evin Prison in Tehran. A leading member of Iran's
Jewish community, Makhubat was convicted of espionage and
sabotage. After taking delivery of the body, Makhubat's family
members discovered that the eyes had been gouged out, the teeth
broken, and contusions and bruises covered the body.
In November, Ali Akbar Saidi-Sirjani, a leading intellectual
dissident, died in detention 8 months after his arrest on the
improbable charges of drug trafficking and espionage.
Authorities claimed the cause of death was a heart attack, but
members of Saidi-Sirjani's family maintain that he had no history of heart disease or drug problems. The Government did
not allow an independent autopsy.
A best selling author, Saidi-Sirjani was a prominent advocate
of abolishing censorship. He emphasized Iran's pre-Islamic
tradition of respect for individual rights and of fighting
tyranny. He was arrested on March 14 with journalist Niazi
Kermani, reportedly because they had published a work
questioning the principles of the 1979 revolution. Iranian
newspapers published their alleged confessions to crimes of
moral turpitude.
Five members of the outlawed Kurdish Democratic Party of Iran
were reportedly executed in February at Diselabad Prison in
Kermanshah for engaging in unspecified political activity. The
victims, who were allegedly tortured prior to execution, were:
Hossein Sobhani, Rauf Mohammadi, Bahman Kosravi, Ghaderi
Moradi, and Adel Abdollahi.
Three Evangelical Christian ministers were murdered by unknown
assailants. The Government had accused them of seeking
converts among Muslims. The Rev. Mehdi Dibaj, a pastor of the
Assemblies of God church, was arrested in 1993 and sentenced to
death for apostasy. He was released from prison in January
after his case received international publicity, but was
abducted and murdered. His body was discovered on a Tehran
street in July.
The Rev. Haik Hovsepian-Mehr, who served as Chairman of the
Council of Protestant Ministers and Secretary General of the
Assemblies of God church, was abducted in February and found
dead a few days later. Prior to his murder, Rev.
Hovsepian-Mehr reportedly refused to sign a declaration from
the then Ministry of Islamic Guidance stating that Iranian
Christians enjoyed full constitutional rights. The Rev. Tateos
Michaelian, the pastor of St. John Presbyterian Evangelical
Church in Tehran, and acting chairman of the Council of
Protestant Ministers (a position he assumed after the abduction
of Rev. Hovsepian-Mehr), was abducted in June. According to
the Government, the Rev. Michaelian's body was discovered in
July, stuffed into a large freezer, with bullet wounds in the
throat and the back of the neck.
In response to an inquiry from the U.N. Special Representative,
the Government in October claimed that the ministers were
murdered by operatives of the Mojahedin-e Khalq, an opposition
group seeking the Government's overthrow. Although there is no
evidence that the Government was involved in the killings, it
bears responsibility for trying the Rev. Dibaj for apostasy and
fostering an atmosphere of religious intolerance.
In February security forces reportedly killed a number of Sunni
Muslims who staged a demonstration in the city of Zahedan to
protest the Government's destruction of a local mosque. In
August a large spontaneous demonstration broke out in the city
of Qazvin after the Majles rejected a proposal to designate the
city as a separate province. The Government dispatched troops
to quell the disturbance, which reportedly attracted up to
100,000 demonstrators. During their efforts to restore order,
the troops reportedly killed dozens of demonstrators and
wounded hundreds.
The Government continued to assassinate political opponents
abroad. On January 4, a member of the Revolutionary Command of
the Kurdish Democratic Party of Iran, Taha Kermani, was
assassinated in Corum, Turkey. Prior to his murder, Mr.
Kermani was designated a refugee by the U.N. High Commissioner
for Refugees (UNHCR). On March 10, a member of the Kurdish
Democratic Party of Iran was assassinated in Sulaymaniyah,
Iraq. A member of the Mojahedin-e Khalq, Ahmad Sadi Lahijani,
was assassinated in Ghalebeih, Iraq, on May 29. On June 24, a
member of the Revolutionary Command of the Kurdish Democratic
Party of Iran, Osman Mohamad Amini, was murdered in his
apartment in Copenhagen. On November 14, a monarchist
opposition figure, Ali Mohammed Assadi, was stabbed to death in
Bucharest.
Investigations of Iranian state-sponsored terrorism abroad
continued in 1994. In December a court in France convicted
three Iranians of the 1991 assassination of former Prime
Minister Shahpour Bakhtiar and his assistant, Katibeh
Fallouch. Defendents Ali Vakili Rad and Massoud Hendi were
sentenced to life and 18 years, respectively. The prosecutor
said the crime was organized from "within the heart of the
Islamic Republic of Iran."
In 1993 the Government of Switzerland requested the extradition
from France of two Iranians indicted in the 1991 murder in
Geneva of Karem Rajavi, the brother of the leader of the
Mojahedin-e Khalq, Masud Rajavi. Instead, the French
Government expelled the suspects to Iran on December 29, 1993.
The two were among 13 Iranians indicted by the Swiss Government
for the murder; the other 11 were at large at the time of the
indictments.
The trial of Kazem Darabi, an Iranian citizen charged with
murdering four Iranian Kurdish dissidents in Berlin in 1992
under instructions from the Iranian Government, continued in
Germany.
b. Disappearance
No reliable information is available on the number of
disappearances in 1994. However, in 1994 the UNCHR conveyed to
the Government in 1994 the names of 506 missing persons. In
the period immediately following arrest, many detainees are
held incommunicado, a situation that amounts to temporary
disappearance.
c. Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading
Treatment or Punishment
Credible reports indicate that security forces continue to
torture detainees and prisoners. Common methods include
suspension for long periods in contorted positions, burning
with cigarettes, and most frequently, severe and repeated
beatings with cables or other instruments on the back and the
soles of the feet. Reports of flogging, stoning, amputations,
and public executions also are common.
Some prisoners are held in solitary confinement or denied
adequate rations or medical care to force confessions. Female
prisoners have reportedly been raped or otherwise tortured
while in detention. In the past, prison guards have
intimidated the family members of detainees and have sometimes
tortured detainees in their presence.
A German engineer, Helmut Szimkus, was released from Evin
prison in Tehran on July 1 after serving 5 1/2 years for
alleged spying. Szimkus later told reporters that he was
tortured in prison and claimed he had witnessed guards torture
children in the presence of their parents to extract
confessions from the adults.
In September the International Committee of the Red Cross
(ICRC) issued a report on "unresolved humanitarian issues" from
the Iran-Iraq war. The ICRC noted that the Government violated
the Third Geneva Convention by failing to identify combatants
killed in action and exchange information on those killed or
missing. According to the report, the fate of almost 19,000
Iraqi prisoners of war (POW's) in Iran "remained unknown." The
report criticized the Government for obstructing ICRC efforts
to register and repatriate POWs.
d. Arbitrary Arrest, Detention, or Exile
Although the Constitution prohibits arbitrary arrest and
detention, there is reportedly no legal time limit on
incommunicado detention, nor any judicial means to determine
the legality of detention. Suspects may be held for
questioning in jails or local Revolutionary Guard offices.
The security forces often do not inform family members of a
prisoner's welfare and whereabouts. If known, the prisoner
still may be denied visits by family and legal counsel. In
addition, families of executed prisoners do not always receive
notification of the prisoner's death. The family of Bahman
Samandir, a Baha'i exeucted by the Government in 1992, has
still been unable to recover his body.
In August security forces arrested some 3,000 persons in
Qazvin, after army troops had quelled disturbances in that city
(see Section 1.a.). Credible reports indicated that many of
the detainees were released only after they signed a false
confession indicating they were members of the Mojahedin-e
Khalq.
Adherents of the Baha'i faith continue to face arbitrary arrest
and detention. One Baha'i, Ramazan Ali Zolfaqari, was
convicted of apostasy, imprisoned, and released on Janury 6.
His conviction is still in effect. As of August, about eight
Baha'is were imprisoned because of their beliefs. The
Government appears to adhere to a practice of detaining a small
number of Baha'is at any time. Two Jews are believed to be in
prison because of their religion, and a Christian leader named
Beni Paul is also reportedly in detention.
e. Denial of Fair Public Trial
Iran has two court systems: the traditional court system,
which adjudicates civil and criminal offenses; and the Islamic
Revolutionary Courts, which were established in 1979 to try
"political" offenses, narcotics crimes, and "crimes against
God." Many aspects of the prerevolutionary judicial system
survive in the civil and criminal courts. For example,
defendants have the right to a public trial, may choose their
own lawyer, and have the right of appeal. Trials are
adjudicated by panels of judges. There is no jury system. In
the absense of post-revolution laws, the Government advises
judges to base their decisions on Islamic law. Moreover, these
courts are not fully independent. The revolutionary courts may
consider cases normally in the jurisdiction of the civil and
criminal courts and also may overturn their decisions.
Assignment of cases to either system of courts appears to be
haphazard. The Supreme Court has limited authority to review
cases.
Defendants tried in the revolutionary courts are not granted
fair trials. These defendants are often held in prolonged
pretrial detention without access to attorneys, and their
attorneys are rarely afforded sufficient time to prepare their
defense. Defendants are often indicted for such vague offenses
as "moral corruption," "antirevolutionary behavior," and
"siding with global arrogance." Defendants do not have the
right to confront their accusers or the right to appeal.
Summary trials of 5 minutes are common and some trials are
conducted in secret. Others are show trials intended to
highlight a coerced public confession. Two highly publicized
show trials occurred in 1994: one for a person accused of
bombing a religious shrine in Mashhad; the other for a person
accused of bombing Ayatollah Khomeini's tomb near Tehran. The
Government accused the charged individuals with membership in
the Mojahedin-e Khalq. Rather than conduct a genuine
investigation into the bombings, the Government linked them to
the murders of the Evangelical Christian clerics (see Section
1.a) and characterized all of these events as a Mojahedin plot.
In August the Majles approved a law reorganizing the court
system. Among its provisions, the law authorizes judges to act
as prosecutor and judge in the same case. The rights of
defendents are further eroded by the fact that many judges
retired after the revolution, and others were disbarred for
ideological reasons. The Government has replaced them with
judges who are regarded as politically acceptable to the regime.
There are no available estimates on the number of political
prisoners. However, the Government often arrests persons on
trumped-up criminal charges when their actual "offenses" are
political. In October the U.N. Special Representative issued a
report which noted that he had requested the Government to
provide information on 78 reported political prisoners.
f. Arbitrary Interference with Privacy, Family, Home, or
Correspondence
The Constitution states that "reputation, life, property, (and)
dwelling(s)" are protected from trespass except as "provided by
law." However, security forces enter homes and offices,
monitor telephone conversations, and open mail without court
authorization. The wife of writer Saidi-Sirjani reported that,
after her husband's arrest in March, the Anti-Vice Department
of the Revolutionary Prosecutor's office raided her home,
seized her husband's papers, and sealed the library (see
Section 1.a.).
Paramilitary volunteer forces known as the Basiji and other
security forces monitor the social activities of citizens.
Such organizations may harass or arrest women whose clothing
does not cover the hair and all of the body except hands and
face, or those who wear makeup. Enforcement of such standards
of public morality varies with the political climate and the
jurisdiction.
Section 2 Respect for Civil Liberties, Including:
a. Freedom of Speech and Press
The Constitution provides for the freedom of the press, except
when published ideas are "contrary to Islamic principles, or
are detrimental to public rights." In practice, the Government
controls most publications. Newspapers are generally
associated with various factions in the Government. They
reflect different views and criticize the Government but are
prohibited from criticizing the concept of the Islamic Republic
or promoting the rights of ethnic minorities.
The Government may harass or shut down independent publishing
houses that are overly critical of public policy. Nonetheless,
some independent publishers out of favor with the Government
continue to survive. In October a bimonthly newspaper, Asr-e
Ma (Our Era), was launched by a former government minister. It
has called for the establishment of political parties.
Those whose comments offend the Government risk arrest and
summary punishment. In 1994 Azizollah Amir Rahimi, a former
general, distributed open letters and gave interviews to the
foreign media in which he called on President Rafsanjani to
step down and organize free elections. Rahimi and his son were
reportedly detained on November 1 for his comments. No
information on the status of their cases was available at
year's end.
In October 134 prominent writers distributed an open letter
protesting excessive official censorship. In response,
Ayatollah Ahmad Jannati delivered a sermon on November 11 in
which he warned that Muslims might take some unspecified
"action" against the writers. The semiofficial Tehran Times
cautioned against freedom of speech, editorializing that such
freedom does not permit publication of "unsocial, immoral and
seditious articles."
The Ministry of Islamic Culture and Guidance ensures that books
do not contain offensive material prior to publication. It
inspects foreign printed materials prior to their release on
the market. However, some books and pamphlets critical of the
Government are published without reprisal.
In March the Government reaffirmed as binding and irrevocable
the 1989 religious decree condemning to death British author
Salman Rushdie for his book, "The Satanic Verses." The
Government considers the book blasphemous. It made no public
move to repudiate its promise of a cash award to any person who
kills Rushdie.
The Government owns all broadcasting facilities, and their
programming reflects its political and socioreligious
ideology. In June officials reportedly seized 1,995 satellite
receiving dishes and videotapes in the port of Bandar Abbas.
The Majles passed a law in January 1995 banning the import and
distribution of satellite dishes and calling for the removal of
existing satellite dishes. But the law had been declared
unconstitutional by the Council of Guardians at press time, so
its enforcement is uncertain.
Academic censorship persists, even though restrictions on
academic freedom have eased since the immediate
postrevolutionary period. However, in May Supreme Leader
Khamenei said in a speech at the Islamic Open University that
the university's atmosphere "must be protected from the
penetration of poisonous and anti-Islamic thoughts" and that
the university's administration "is justified in preventing the
expression of any remarks against Islamic and revolutionary
values."
Government informers are said to be common on university
campuses and monitor classroom material. Admission to
universities is politicized; all applicants must pass
"character tests" in which officials screen out applicants
critical of the Government's ideology. To achieve tenure,
professors reportedly must cooperate with government
authorities over a period of years.
b. Freedom of Peaceful Assembly and Association
The Constitution permits assemblies and marches "provided they
do not violate the principles of Islam." Numerous unplanned
demonstrations occurred throughout Iran in 1994 (see Section
1.a.).
The Constitution also provides for the establishment of
political parties, professional associations, and religious
groups provided they do not violate the principles of "freedom,
sovereignty, (and) national unity" or question Islam or the
Islamic Republic. In practice, most independent organizations
are banned, co-opted by the Government, or moribund.
In February the Ministry of Interior granted licenses to some
80 political and professional organizations out of an
estimated 400 applications. No major opposition faction was
evident among the licensed groups. Authorities continue to
monitor the activities of the Freedom Movement, a political
group founded in 1961 and declared illegal in 1991.
c. Freedom of Religion
The Constitution declares that the "official religion of Iran
is Islam and the sect followed is Ja'fari Shi'ism." It also
states that "other Islamic denominations shall enjoy complete
respect." Religion is almost inseparable from government. The
President and many top officials, including the Speaker of the
Parliament and many parliamentary deputies, are mullahs
(Islamic clergymen).
Approximately 90 percent of the population are Shi'a Muslims.
Aside from slightly over 1 percent who are not Muslims, the
rest of the population are Sunni Muslims who include Kurds,
Arabs, Turkomans, Baluchis, and other ethnic minorities.
The Constitution recognizes Christianity, Judaism, and
Zoroastrianism. Members of these religions elect
representatives to reserved Parliamentary seats. They are free
to practice their religion and instruct their children, but the
Government interferes with the administration of their schools.
Harassment by government officials is common (See Section 5).
Non-Muslims may not proselytize Muslims. Three Evangelical
Christian ministers were killed in 1994. One, who had
converted to Christianity in 1983, had been sentenced to death
for apostasy in December 1993 and released in response to an
international appeal (see Section 1.a.).
The Government regards the Baha'i community, the largest
non-Muslim minority with 300,000 to 350,000 members, as a
"misguided sect." It prohibits Baha'is from teaching their
faith and maintaining links with coreligionists abroad.
In October 1993, the Majles approved legislation that prohibits
government workers from membership in groups that deny the
"divine religions." The Government uses such terminology to
describe members of the Baha'i faith. The law also stipulates
penalties for government workers who do not observe "Islamic
principles and rules."
d. Freedom of Movement Within the Country, Foreign
Travel, Emigration, and Repatriation
Citizens may travel to any part of Iran, although there have
been travel restrictions to Kurdish areas during times of heavy
fighting. People may change their place of residence without
obtaining official permission. The Government requires exit
permits for draft-age males and citizens who are politically
suspect. Some Iranians, particularly those whose skills are in
short supply and who were educated at government expense, must
post bonds to obtain exit permits.
The Government permits Iranian Jews to travel abroad, but often
denies them the multiple-exit permits normally issued to other
citizens. The Government does not normally permit all members
of a Jewish family to travel abroad at the same time.
The Government and the UNHCR estimate that there were
approximately 1.7 million Afghan refugees in Iran in late
1994. The majority have been integrated into local society.
Others live seminomadic lives or reside in government
settlements. The UNHCR repatriated more than 110,000 refugees
to Afghanistan in 1994 and is supervising the repatriation of
many more. Tens of thousands of Iraqi Kurdish and Shi'a Muslim
refugees, displaced by the aftermath of the Gulf War, remained
in Iran in 1994. The Government of Iran provided assistance to
these refugees.
Section 3 Respect for Political Rights: The Right of Citizens
to Change Their Government
Iran is ruled by a group of religious leaders and their lay
associates who share a belief in the legitimacy of a theocratic
state based on Ayatollah Khomeini's interpretation of Shi'a
Islam. There is no separation of state and religion. The
clerics dominate all branches of government completely. The
Government represses any movement seeking to separate state and
religion, or to alter the State's existing theocratic
foundation. The selection of candidates is effectively
controlled by the ruling clerics, consequently depriving
citizens of the right to change their government.
Regularly scheduled elections are held for the President,
members of Parliament (the Majles), and members of the Assembly
of Experts, a body responsible for selecting the successor to
the Leader of the Revolution. The Majles exercises a
considerable amount of independence from the executive branch,
but its decisions are reviewed by the Council of Guardians (see
below). Vigorous parliamentary debates take place on various
issues, and in some cases the Majles has defeated laws proposed
by the executive branch. Most deputies are associated with
powerful political and religious officials, but often vote
independently and shift from one faction to another.
The Constitution provides for a Council of Guardians composed
of six Islamic clergymen, and six lay members who review all
laws for consistency with Islamic law and the Constitution.
The Council also screens political candidates for ideological
and religious suitability. It accepts only candidates who
support a theocratic state, but clerics who disagree with
government policies have also been disqualified.
Women are underrepresented in government. They hold 9 out of
270 Majles seats, and there are no female Cabinet members.
Section 4 Governmental Attitude Regarding International and
Nongovernmental Investigation of Alleged Violations
of Human Rights
The Government represses local human rights groups and in
general is uncooperative with foreign groups. The Government
continued to refuse in 1994 the repeated requests by the U.N.
Special Representative to visit Iran.
In November 1994, the Government hosted a German-Iranian Human
Rights Seminar in Tehran. It permitted the German participants
to visit a prison in Esfahan, and permitted a second visit by
journalists to Evin prison in Tehran. The Government also has
established a human rights committee in the Majlis and a human
rights commission in the judiciary, but observers believe they
lack independence. Government officials state repeatedly that
Iran should be judged by Islamic, rather than Western, human
rights principles.
Section 5 Discrimination Based on Race, Sex, Religion,
Disability, Language, or Social Status
Women
Discrimination against women has increased since the
revolution. On January 31, Mina Kalout was reportedly stoned
to death in Evin Prison. Kalout, a married woman, was accused
of committing adultery with her cousin, Abdol-Hussein, who was
executed for the offense. On February 22, Homa Darabi, a
pediatrician, reportedly immolated herself to protest the
Government's discriminatory policies. Prior to her death,
Darabi had been dismissed from an academic position for failing
to adhere strictly to the Islamic dress code. On March 2,
Tahereh Ghan'e, a married woman with children, was reportedly
stoned to death in Qom for alleged adultery. On May 5, a
female student of medicine and women's activist at Beheshti
University was found strangled to death. Her arm had been
broken, as well. Although the Government claimed the student
had committed suicide, 1,000 female students staged a sit-in on
May 9 to protest what they believed to be her murder.
Although domestic violence is known to occur, little is known
about its extent. Abuse in the family is considered a private
matter and seldom discussed publicly. There are no official
statistics on the subject.
In general, women suffer discrimination in the legal code,
particularly in family and property matters. It is difficult
for many women, particularly those residing outside large
cities, to obtain any legal redress. Although women may be
educated and employed in the professions, social constraints
tend to inhibit their educational and economic opportunities.
Illiteracy and the lack of university degrees also affect their
standing. The enforcement of conservative Islamic dress codes
has varied considerably since the death of Ayatollah Khomeini
in 1989. Nonetheless, such dress codes persist and are
enforced arbitrarily.
Under legislation passed in 1983, women have the right to
divorce, and regulations promulgated in 1984 substantially
broadened the grounds on which a woman may seek a divorce.
However, a husband is not required to cite a reason for
divorcing his wife. In 1986 the Majles passed a 12-article law
on marriage and divorce that limited the privileges accorded to
men by custom and traditional interpretations of Islamic law.
The 1986 law also recognized divorced women's rights to a share
of the property couples aquire during their marriage and
increased alimony rights.
The Government's views on women's rights were exemplified in
1994 by an open letter to the U.N. Special Representative from
the President's Special Advisor on Women's Affairs, Shailia
Habibi. In the letter, Habibi explained that legal
restrictions on a women's freedom to travel--a woman needs
permission from a close male relative to obtain a passport--are
"consensual" because such restrictions "are designed to
preserve the unity and sanctity of the family." She also
accused "Western emancipation" of causing "corruption,
prostitution, Lesbianism, and widespread venereal disease."
Children
There is no known pattern of child abuse.
National/Racial/Ethnic Minorities
The Kurds seek greater autonomy and continue to suffer
government prosecution. In August the Government reportedly
razed 17 Kurdish villages.
Religious Minorities
The Christian, Jewish, Zoroastrian, and Baha'i minorities
suffer varying degrees of officially sanctioned discrimination,
particularly in the areas of employment, education, and public
accommodations. Muslims who convert to Christianity also
suffer discrimination.
University applicants are required to pass an examination in
Islamic theology. Although public-school students receive
instruction in Islam, this requirement limits access of most
religious minorities to higher education. Applicants for
public-sector employment are similarly screened for their
adherence to Islam.
Religious minorities suffer discrimination in the legal system,
receiving lower awards in injury and death lawsuits, and
incurring heavier punishments than Muslims. Sunni Muslims
encounter religious discrimination at the local level.
In 1993 the U.N. Special Representative reported the existence
of a government policy directive on the Baha'is. According to
the directive, the Supreme Revolutionary Council reportedly
instructed government agencies to block the progress and
development of the Baha'i community; expel Baha'i students from
universities; cut the Baha'is' links with groups outside Iran;
restrict the employment of Baha'is; and deny Baha'is "positions
of influence," including those in education. The Government
claims the directive is a forgery. However, it appears to be
an accurate reflection of current government practice.
The persecution of Baha'is persisted unevenly in 1994. The
Government continued to return some property previously
confiscated from individual Baha'is, although the amount
returned is a fraction of the total seized. Property belonging
to the Baha'i community as a whole, such as places of worship,
remains confiscated. Other government restrictions have been
eased, so that Baha'is may currently obtain food ration
booklets and send their children to public schools. However,
the prohibition against the admission of Baha'is to
universities appears to be enforced. Thousands of Baha'is
dismissed from government jobs in the early 1980's receive no
unemployment benefits and have been required to repay the
Government for salaries or pensions received from the first day
of employment. Those unable to do so face prison sentences.
People with Disabilities
There is no available information regarding whether the
Government has legislated or otherwise mandated accessibility
for the disabled.
Section 6 Worker Rights
a. The Right of Association
Although the Labor Code grants workers the right to establish
unions, there are no independent unions. A national
organization known as the Worker's House, founded in 1982, is
the sole authorized national labor organization. It serves
primarily as a conduit for government control. The leadership
of the Worker's House coordinates activities with Islamic labor
councils which are organized in many enterprises. These
councils also function as instruments of government control,
although they have frequently been able to block layoffs and
dismissals. Moreover, a network of government-backed guilds
issues vocational licenses, funds financial cooperatives, and
helps workers find jobs.
The Government does not tolerate any strike deemed to be at
odds with its economic and labor policies. In 1993 the
Parliament passed a law which prohibits strikes by government
workers. It also prohibits government workers from having
contacts with foreigners and stipulates penalties for failure
to observe Islamic dress codes and principles at work.
b. The Right to Organize and Bargain Collectively
Workers do not have the right to organize independently and
negotiate collective bargaining agreements. It is not known
whether labor legislation and practice in the export processing
zones differ from the law and practice in the rest of the
country. No information is available on mechanisms used to set
wages.
c. Prohibition of Forced or Compulsory Labor
Section 273 of the Penal Code provides that the Government may
require any person who does not have work to take suitable
employment. This provision has been criticized frequently by
the International Labor Organization (ILO) as contravening ILO
Convention 29 on forced labor.
d. Minimum Age for Employment of Children
The labor law prohibits employment of minors under 15 years of
age and places special restrictions on the employment of minors
under 18. Education is compulsory until age 11. The law
exempts workers in agriculture, domestic service, and some
small businesses. By law, women and minors may not be employed
in hard labor or, in general, night work. Information on the
extent to which these regulations are enforced is not available.
e. Acceptable Conditions of Work
The Labor Code empowers the Supreme Labor Council to establish
annual minimum wage levels for each industrial sector and
region. It is not known if the minimum wages are adjusted
annually or enforced. The Labor Code stipulates that the
minimum wage should be sufficient to meet the living expenses
of a family and should take inflation into account.
Information on the share of the working population covered by
the minimum wage legislation is not available.
The Labor Code establishes a 6-day workweek of 48 hours
maximum, with one weekly rest day, normally Fridays, and at
least 12 leave days of paid annual leave and several paid
public holidays.
According to the Labor Code, a Supreme Safety Council, chaired
by the Labor Minister or his representative, is responsible for
promoting workplace safety and health. The Council has
reportedly issued 28 safety directives and oversees the
activities of 3,000 safety committees established in
enterprises employing more than 10 persons. It is not known
how well the ministry's inspectors enforce regulations.(###)
[end of document]
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