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TITLE: TAJIKISTAN HUMAN RIGHTS PRACTICES, 1994
AUTHOR: U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE
DATE: FEBRUARY 1995
TAJIKISTAN
The Government of Supreme Soviet Chairman and Head of State
Emomili Rahmonov, composed of a coalition dominated by Tajiks
from the Kulyab region who were victorious in the 1992 civil
war, continued in power. Fraud and intimidation marred the
presidential election on November 6; the Government declared
Rahmonov the winner with 58 percent of the vote. Also on
November 6, a new Constitution, a significant improvement over
the Soviet-era document, was overwhelmingly approved in a
popular referendum.
The opposition coalition of nationalists and Islamic groups
defeated in the 1992 civil war boycotted the election and
continued to wage a bloody insurgency along the Tajikistan-
Afghanistan border and in the southeastern district of
Tavildara. Under United Nations auspices, the Government and
the opposition engaged in several rounds of talks which led to
a prisoner exchange, a provisional cease-fire, and
establishment of joint commissions to monitor refugee issues
and the cease-fire and a United Nations Mission of Observers to
Tajikistan (UNMOT). The cease-fire began on October 20 and
remained in effect through the end of the year, although
several alleged violations were reported by both sides.
Internal security is the responsibility of the Ministries of
the Interior, Security, and Defense. The Russian Army's 201st
Motorized Rifle Division, part of a Commonwealth of Independent
States (CIS) peacekeeping force established in 1993, remained
in the country. This unit and the Border Guards, composed of
forces from Tajikistan and several CIS members but dominated by
Russian border forces, were responsible for guarding
Tajikistan's border with Afghanistan. Significant regions of
the country, however, remained effectively outside the
Government's control in 1994. Opposition military units,
supported by an increasing number of Afghan and Arab Islamic
mercenaries, used parts of the Gorno Badakhshan Autonomous
Region for training and as a base for launching their September
offensive against the Tavildara district. The September
fighting was the fiercest since the formal end of the civil war
in 1992 and produced a large number of refugees.
The economy, which is centrally planned and highly dependent on
cotton, virtually collapsed, with up to 70 percent of industry
standing idle by year's end. Despite a series of loans from
Russia, the Government fell months behind in paying salaries
and pensions. There were critical shortages of fuel for
heating, transport, and industry. Uzbekistan periodically
suspended natural gas sales to Tajikistan for nonpayment of
bills. Shortages of wheat and flour led to social unrest in
Dushanbe, the capital, and other cities in October and November.
Both Government and government-related forces committed
widespread human rights abuses, including scores of brutal
political assassinations and the torture and beating of
detainees and prisoners. Progovernment forces allegedly killed
several mullahs with ties to the Islamic Revival Party (IRP).
There were credible reports that progovernment militia forces,
notably the loosely controlled "Faisali Brigade," terrorized
noncombatants in Tavildara district, beating, raping, and
killing civilians and looting their homes. The Government
prosecuted no one for political or extrajudicial killings in
1994, and the Procurator General's office closed all cases in
which alleged murderers were from the same region as the ruling
Kulyabis. Opposition forces reportedly murdered several
Russian army officers and attacked buses carrying dependents of
Russian military personnel. Both sides executed prisoners.
The Government severely restricts freedom of speech and press
freedom and completely controls the electronic media. No
genuine opposition media appeared during the year. Three new
political parties were allowed to register in 1994; four
opposition parties affiliated with the armed opposition
remained suspended. The Government allowed Human Rights
Watch/Helsinki and the Conference on Security and Cooperation
in Europe (CSCE) to open offices in Dushanbe.
RESPECT FOR HUMAN RIGHTS
Section 1 Respect for the Integrity of the Person, Including
Freedom from:
a. Political and Extrajudicial Killing
There were a substantial number of extrajudicial killings, but
fewer than in 1993. Newspaper reports and international
agencies put the number at between 80 and 100. The primary
culprits are the paramilitary groups which were not disarmed or
disbanded after the war. While the Government has attempted to
incorporate these groups into the recently created Ministry of
Defense, many groups operated well outside government control
as informal militias and private armies. According to credible
reports, these groups operated with the tacit approval of some
high-ranking officials within the Government, including the
Minister of the Interior and officials at the Ministries of
Defense and Security. No government or security official, the
majority of whom are ethnic Kulyabis, was prosecuted for an
extrajudicial killing. If the alleged perpetrator of a crime
was of Kulyabi origin, the procurator's office dropped all
charges and closed the cases.
The Faisali Brigade, a militia group consolidated within the
Ministry of Defense after the war, killed civilians in the
Tavildara district during the height of fighting between
government and opposition forces. The death toll eventually
reached several score. The Government withdrew the Brigade in
September (see Section 1.g.).
Conflict between political rivals and factions within the
ruling coalition is believed responsible for numerous killings
of prominent businessmen and political figures. In February a
deputy chairman of the Council of Ministers, M. Nazershoev, a
Pamiri, was murdered near his home ostensibly for supporting
negotiations with the opposition. He was to have been a member
of the delegation to the first round of talks. In April
unknown assailants, possibly representing hardline government
elements, riddled the home of the Foreign Minister with
automatic weapons fire in an unsuccessful attempt on his life.
In several instances, paramilitary leaders escaped even the
nominal control of the Government and became warlords,
maintaining private armies and battling over territory and
economic riches. At the urging of the international community,
the Government successfully disarmed one warlord in Hissar who
had been terrorizing local residents, stealing, beating, and
killing those who protested. In the two districts of Gorno
Badakhshan controlled by the opposition, warlords also operated
independently. One warlord hijacked convoys of humanitarian
aid provided by international nongovernmental organizations,
killing several drivers. Others fought among themselves or
with Russian border guards in defiance of orders from the
opposition's external political leadership.
In late May and early June, a series of assassinations of
ethnic Russian military officers in Dushanbe left six officers
dead. Many within the Government claim that opposition forces,
using terror tactics, were responsible for at least some
deaths. In June opposition elements fired a rocket launcher at
a bus carrying the wives and children of Russian border guards,
killing one pedestrian. In October they launched a rocket-
propelled grenade into a Russian military bus, killing one
officer and wounding several others. Also in October, Deputy
Prime Minister Munavvarsho Nazriyev was killed in his home
district of Garm when his car ran over a land mine, probably
placed by an opposition group.
In September, according to some credible reports, members of
the Faisali Brigade tortured and killed Mullah Eshon Said
Ashraf Shah Abdullohadov in Kurgan Tyube prison. Mullah
Ashraf, in prison for allegedly supporting those seeking to
overthrow the Government, was on the opposition's list of 52
prisoners whom the Government had agreed to release under the
September 17 prisoner exchange agreement. The Procurator
General's office said that the sexagenarian Mullah Ashraf had
died in prison on September 21 as a result of a heart attack.
However, his body was never given to the family for burial, nor
was an impartial autopsy allowed.
Another prisoner on the opposition list scheduled for exchange,
Mullah Ajik Aliev, was executed in prison, allegedly on
September 15. There is strong suspicion, however, that he was
killed after the September 17 signing of the cease-fire and
prisoner exchange agreement. Aliev, former IRP chairman in the
Khatlon district, had been sentenced to death on August 25,
1993, for terrorism, treason, and conspiring to overthrow the
Government.
Progovernment forces are credibly believed to be responsible
for the murders in February of Mullah Imkomuddin and Mullah
Abdul Rahim. Both were active in the IRP, and Imkomuddin, who
had returned to Dushanbe after hiding in Komsomolobad, died of
wounds sustained during a severe beating.
b. Disappearance
The disappearance of Garmi- and Pamiri-origin men continued,
although at a lower rate than in 1993. The number of returned
refugees who disappeared greatly decreased. In many cases,
those thought to have disappeared had in fact been conscripted
as part of a government policy actively pursued in August and
September in response to increased fighting both on the
Tajikistan-Afghanistan border and in the Tavildara district.
Young men were rounded up on the streets and in night raids on
their homes. Several Dushanbe newspapers estimated that at
least 60 men and women had disappeared, aside from any
conscripted, in the first half of 1994.
The Government has been unwilling to investigate claims of
disappearances seriously, asserting that the Procurator
General's office does not have sufficient resources for the
purpose.
In December 1993, unknown assailants abducted Tagobek Shukurov,
a sitting judge and Supreme Soviet member from Kolkhozobod, who
had been a member of the People's Front during the war and had
supported the return of Tajik refugees from Afghanistan. He
remained missing throughout the year and is now presumed dead.
The 1993 disappearance of Dr. Ayniddin Sadykov, a noted surgeon
and chairman of the Dushanbe branch of the Democratic Party,
remained unsolved throughout 1994.
c. Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading
Treatment or Punishment
Security officials, particularly those in the Ministry of the
Interior, regularly beat detainees in custody. Security forces
were responsible for the widespread use of systematic beatings
and, in some instances, the torture of prisoners and
detainees. Human rights groups reported that, in some cases,
mistreatment increased if victims made formal allegations of
abuse.
Female detainees were frequently subject to rape or the threat
of rape. For example, one woman, detained for the alleged
distribution of antigovernment leaflets, was beaten while in
custody and eventually forced to confess on threat of being
raped in front of her young daughter. Credible sources
reported that the members of the Faisali Brigade raped women in
villages under its control during the Tavildara campaign, in
one instance beating, raping, and then burning one woman to
death.
Prison conditions in Tajikistan declined markedly, primarily
due to a shortage of government resources. Food, never
plentiful, became even more scarce, leading to an increase in
malnutrition and disease among prisoners. Visitors to one
prison found officials well-intentioned but hopelessly
ill-equipped to care for the prisoners. A followup visit to
the same prison found conditions improved, due to an amnesty
which relieved overcrowding and medicines donated by
international relief groups.
d. Arbitrary Arrest, Detention, or Exile
The Criminal Code has not been significantly amended since
independence, and it therefore retains many of the defects
inherited from Soviet times. The system allows for lengthy
pretrial detention and provides few checks on the power of
procurators and police to arrest persons. The Government
continued to arrest political opponents arbitrarily and is
widely known to hold prisoners in incommunicado detention.
Public order, which broke down during the civil war, has yet to
be fully restored, and the virtual immunity from prosecution of
armed militia groups has further eroded the integrity of the
legal system.
Legally, police may detain persons arbitrarily and without a
warrant for a period of 72 hours, and the procurator's office
may do so for a period of 10 days after which the accused must
be officially charged. At that point, the Criminal Code
permits pretrial detention for up to 15 months. The first 3
months of detention is at the discretion of the local
procurator, the second 3 months must be approved at the
regional level, and the Procurator General must sanction the
remaining time in detention. The Criminal Code maintains that
all investigations must be completed 1 month before the
15-month maximum in order to allow the defense time to examine
government evidence. There is no requirement for judicial
approval or for a preliminary judicial hearing on the charge or
detention. In criminal cases, detainees may be released and
restricted to their place of residence pending trial.
Allegations abounded of illegal government detention, well
beyond the maximum allowed by law. In one well-known example,
security forces arrested four journalists in January 1993--
Mirbobo Mirakhimov, Khurshed Nazarov, Khayriddin Kasymov, and
Akhmadsho Komilov--and held them for 18 months before their
trial began in May 1994. The trial was never completed as the
four were among those released in the November 12 prisoner
exchange; the charges against them were presumably dropped.
Once a case is entered for trial, the law states that it must
be brought before a judge within 28 days. However, it is
common for cases to languish for many months before the trial
begins. For example, the ongoing case of Oynihol Bobonazarova,
placed under house arrest in 1993 pending resolution of the
continuing investigation of alleged antigovernment activities
during 1992, has not yet been concluded.
The Government routinely uses arbitrary detention against those
expressing views contrary to official policy. Security forces
routinely rounded up members of opposition political parties
for questioning. In most cases, they do not obtain arrest
warrants and do not bring charges. In August security forces,
allegedly looking for opposition sympathizers, cordoned off
streets and conducted house-to-house searches in the Yuzhni and
Avoul districts of Dushanbe, detaining eight young men (see
also Section 1.f.). One remains in government custody, charged
with possession of two hand grenades allegedly found during a
warrantless search; six were released; and the last, Dashtov
Ismanbek, died in detention. Security forces alleged that he
died while trying to escape by jumping out of a third-story
window. Those released claimed they were mistreated and beaten
during their detention.
In August security forces detained two journalists, Makhsoud
Huseinov and Muhammad Rahim Saidar, for allegedly distributing
the pro-opposition newspaper Charoghi Ruz. Huseinov and Saidar
were informed that distribution of Charoghi Ruz was illegal,
although the Government had never officially banned it. While
in detention, Huseinov was reportedly beaten. Neither man was
ever charged with a crime, and both were released after several
days (see Section 2.a.).
Opposition sources maintain that security forces detained
hundreds of persons unlawfully without charge. As Tajikistan
law precludes visits to persons in pretrial detention, it is
virtually impossible for any independent organization to
estimate the number of persons detained.
The International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) has not
been allowed access to all prisoners falling within its mandate
according to its standard criteria since the authorities
claimed, on legal grounds, that they could not guarantee access
to all nonconvicted prisoners. Nevertheless, the ICRC was
able, in a specific context, to register and hold private talks
with 23 detainees held by the Government and 27 detainees held
by the opposition who were about to be liberated simultaneously
in the framework of an agreement achieved under the auspices of
the United Nations.
The Government proclaimed two amnesties which generally had a
limited scope and did not affect those detained for political
crimes. Article 19 of the new Constitution states that no one
can be exiled without a legal basis; no laws have been passed
so far setting out any legal basis for exile. Forced exile is
not known to be used.
e. Denial of Fair Public Trial
The court system remains unmodified from the Soviet period.
There are several tiers of courts: city, district, regional,
and republic levels, with a separate but parallel military
tribunal. Higher courts serve as appellate courts for lower
ones. Local, regional, and republic-level judges are, for the
most part, poorly trained and lack an understanding of
independent judicial function. Judicial officials at all
levels of the court system are under constant heavy influence
from both the political leadership and, in many instances,
armed paramilitary groups. The new Constitution establishes
additional courts, including a Constitutional Court, and states
that judges are independent and subordinate only to the
Constitution and the law; it prohibits interference in their
activities. Provisions of the new Constitution concerning the
judicial system had not yet been implemented at the end of 1994.
According to the law, trials are public, except in certain
cases involving national security or the protection of minors.
The court will appoint an attorney for those who do not have
one. A defendant may choose his or her own attorney but may
not necessarily choose among court-appointed defenders.
Arrested persons are often denied prompt, and in some cases
any, access to an attorney.
The procurator's office is responsible for conducting all
investigations of alleged criminal conduct. In theory, both
defendant and counsel have the right to review all government
evidence, to confront witnesses, and to present evidence and
testimony. No groups are barred from testifying, and all
testimony is theoretically given equal weight, regardless of
ethnicity or gender. Ministry of Justice officials maintain
that defendants benefit from the presumption of innocence,
despite the unmodified Soviet legal statute which presumes the
guilt of all brought to trial.
The pressure exerted on the judicial system by armed
paramilitary groups and vigilantes who operate outside of
government control often leads to the dismissal of charges and
the dropping of cases. A judge in Kurgan Tyube, Pamiri by
origin, was forced to flee with his family for attempting to
try the case of an armed band accused of beatings, murder, and
robbery. The Procurator General's order closed the case. The
Deputy Procurator General closed another case when it turned
out that the defendant, a member of a group accused of robbery
and the murders of 18 people, had fought for the Government
during the civil war. While crimes allegedly committed by
progovernment groups go uninvestigated or unprosecuted, even
minor infractions by those whom the Government views as in
opposition are vigorously prosecuted.
Estimates of the number of political prisoners vary widely.
The armed opposition submitted a list of 29 political prisoners
at the Tehran round of the U.N.-sponsored inter-Tajik peace
talks in June. It later expanded its list to 52 at a September
session of talks in which both sides agreed to an exchange of
prisoners for prisoners of war (POW's). In accord with a later
agreement reached on November 1, the Government exchanged 27
political prisoners for 27 POW's captured by the armed
opposition. According to an international human rights
organization, scores of political prisoners remain in
government custody.
f. Arbitrary Interference with Privacy, Family, Home, or
Correspondence
Articles 22 and 23 of the new Constitution and the Criminal
Code provide for the inviolability of the home and prohibit
interference with correspondence, telephone conversations, and
postal and communication rights, except "in cases prescribed by
law." Police may not enter and search a private home without
the approval of the procurator. In some cases, police may
enter and search a home without permission, but they must then
inform the procurator within 24 hours. Police are permitted to
enter and search homes without permission if they have
compelling reason to believe a delay in obtaining a warrant
would impair national security. There is no judicial review of
police searches conducted without a warrant. In September the
penalties for the violation of the privacy of correspondence
were increased to several years in prison. Also in September,
the Supreme Soviet raised the maximum sentence for invasion of
privacy of the home from between 2 and 5 years to between 5 and
8 years in prison.
Numerous examples of arbitrary illegal search and seizure by
government forces included the August raid by Interior Ministry
forces against a predominantly Garmi and Pamiri neighborhood in
the Yuzhni district of Dushanbe. Security forces presented no
warrants as they rounded up young men, apparently at random,
and took them away.
g. Use of Excessive Force and Violations of Humanitarian
Law in Internal Conflicts
The lower level of conflict in Tajikistan during 1994 provided
a commensurate lowering of the level of allegations of
excessive force. However, the August-September campaign in
Tavildara saw many excesses committed by both sides in the
abuse of civilian populations and the confiscation of
humanitarian aid. Neither government forces nor the opposition
have complete control over all elements ostensibly loyal to
them. Government forces, most notably the Faisali Brigade,
swept the countryside in Vanch and upper Garm, according to one
witness, "like an army of occupation," looting, confiscating
crops, and beating and killing inhabitants allegedly
sympathetic to the opposition forces then active in the area.
On the other hand, government forces (other than the Faisali
Brigade) who operated further to the west maintained good
discipline, leaving the homes and property of evacuees largely
untouched. Casualties among civilians were lower in 1994 as
the Government made efforts to evacuate civilians in areas of
its operations.
Hostilities in the Garm/Tavildara districts closed the only
road through the area several times, blocking convoys of
humanitarian aid and the return of refugees and internally
displaced persons. Forces loyal to the opposition continued
indiscriminate raids on convoys of humanitarian aid destined
for refugees and internally displaced persons in Gorno
Badakhshan. A notorious opposition leader named Jumah raided
convoys of food and medicine belonging to the Aga Khan
Foundation, World Food Program, Medicins sans Frontieres, and
the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) in
September and October.
Section 2 Respect for Civil Liberties, Including:
a. Freedom of Speech and Press
Despite Article 30 of the new Constitution and the 1991 law
protecting freedom of speech and press, the Government severely
restricts freedom of expression in practice. Journalists,
broadcasters, and individual citizens who disagree with
government policies cannot speak freely or critically. The
Government exercises complete control over the media both
overtly through legislation and less obviously through the
dismissal of journalists and broadcasters for their political
or ethical convictions and the closing of independent
journals. The Government also controls the printing presses
and the supply of newsprint and broadcasting facilities, and
subsidizes virtually all publications and productions. Editors
fearful of reprisals by armed elements loyal to the Government
exercise careful self-censorship.
Journalists remained prime targets for violence by both the
Government and opposition. Progovernment forces are believed
to be responsible for the death of Haydarsho Khushvakt, the
strongly progovernment editor at the newspaper Jumhuriyat.
Although strongly progovernment himself, Khushvakt had written,
but not yet published, a series of articles on the
political-criminal mafia in Dushanbe which upset other
progovernment elements. Opposition forces were probably
responsible for the murder in August of Davlatali Rakhmonov,
director of programming at the State Television and Radio
Committee and a strongly partisan Kulyabi. In November the
editor in chief of the Uzbek-language weekly Haq Suz was
murdered at the entrance to his apartment building, probably in
connection with an internal Uzbek community dispute. In yet
another instance, a grenade was thrown into the home of the
editor in chief of the Uzbek-language Communist Party paper,
wounding several members of his family. The Government
informed the Committee for the Protection of Journalists in
September that investigations had been opened into all of the
deaths of journalists during 1992-94.
The Ministry of Security detained two journalists, Makhsoud
Huseinov of Sadoi Mardum and Muhammad Rahim Saidar, accusing
them of distributing the pro-opposition newspaper Charoghi Ruz
in August. It also questioned several other alleged
distributors in connection with their activities relating to
Charoghi Ruz, which the Government has never officially
banned. Huseinov and Saidar, against whom formal charges were
never brought, claimed that they were beaten while in custody
in an effort to extract information from them.
In September the regional executive committee in the northern
city of Leninabad closed the independent newspaper Ittihod for
allegedly printing several articles critical of the
Government. The Government did not issue a formal ban but
simply cut off all supplies of newsprint. Many journalists who
displeased the Government were fired. Lack of pay forced those
who could to find work elsewhere. The economic situation
allowed the Government to hold the newspapers hostage. The
Government used the press freely as a vehicle to propagandize
on its own behalf and discredit its opponents. For example, a
two-page article lambasting former Prime Minister Abdulmalik
Abdullajanov for alleged corruption was printed at the behest
of anti-Leninabad elements within the Government.
In direct contradiction to the 1991 law, the Supreme Soviet
passed a decree in February suspending the activity of all
independent electronic media until it adopted a new law on the
media. The ban was ostensibly due to the unregulated amounts
of violence and pornography being shown on independent
television, but the effect was to muzzle the independent media
during a time of political change in the country. All but 2 of
the 10 to 15 independent television stations, most of which are
sponsored either by large enterprises or local executive
committees, adhered to the ban and remained off the air for
most of 1994. This precluded virtually any independent
television coverage of the inter-Tajik negotiations, the
military situation, or the election campaign.
Academic expression is limited to a certain extent by fear of
violent reprisals, but much more so by the complete reliance of
scientific institutes upon government funding. Three
professors from Tajik State University remain either in hiding
or under arrest, although one, Oynihol Bobonazarova, former
dean of the law faculty, has been allowed to teach classes.
b. Freedom of Peaceful Assembly and Association
Article 29 of the new Constitution provides for freedom of
peaceful assembly. However, the Government suspended that
right by the imposition of a state of emergency in all
districts of Tajikistan except for Leninabad province. Thus,
all public demonstrations and gatherings were banned until the
state of emergency lapsed in August 1994.
Freedom of association is further circumscribed by the
requirement, in the law on nongovernmental associations, that
all organizations must first register with the Ministry of
Justice. This process is often slowed by the cumbersome
necessity to submit all documents in both Russian and Tajik.
The Ministry of Justice's verification of the text inevitably
delays the final granting of registration. In practice, the
authorities exercise strict control over organizations and
activities of a political nature, while free assembly and
association are permitted for nonpolitical associations,
including trade unions.
Once registered, an organization must apply for a permit from
the local executive committee in order legally to organize any
public assembly or demonstration. No permits were issued in
1994. In the spring, two work actions, not sanctioned by
either the trade union or the local executive committee,
occurred to protest the Government's failure to pay salaries
and poor work conditions. The Government's response to these
actions was for the most part conciliatory, and the workers
soon returned to their jobs.
The four political parties suspended in 1993--the IRP, the
Rastokhez National Movement, the Lali Badakhshan Movement for
the Autonomy of the Pamirs, and the Democratic Party--remained
suspended. Senior government officials stated that new
political parties, including ones with the same names as those
which were suspended, could be formed provided their charters
do not conflict with the Constitution and laws of Tajikistan.
Opposition members were not inclined to form new political
parties, lest this be interpreted as an admission of guilt or
wrongdoing by their suspended parties. Three new political
parties were registered in 1994, one of which is associated
with defeated presidential candidate Abdullajanov. According
to the law, a political party must have at least 500 members to
register.
c. Freedom of Religion
Church and state are separate in Tajikistan, and neither the
law nor the Government place restrictions on religious
worship. However, according to the law on freedom of faith,
the Committee on Religions under the Council of Ministers
registers religious communities and monitors the activities of
the various religious establishments. While the official
reason given is to ensure that they are acting in accordance
with the law, the practical purpose is to ensure that they do
not become overtly political.
d. Freedom of Movement Within the Country, Foreign
Travel, Emigration, and Repatriation
The Government has stipulated that Tajikistan citizens and
foreigners alike are prohibited from traveling within a
25-kilometer zone along the Republic's borders with both China
and Afghanistan without permission from the Ministry of Foreign
Affairs. In practice, however, international aid workers and
diplomats travel freely in these regions without prior
government authorization.
Residents of Dushanbe and those travelers wishing to remain
longer than 3 days no longer need to receive a permit, although
they must still register with central authorities. Due to the
state of emergency which was in place until August, all
citizens were obliged to carry their identification cards at
all times. There are no legal restrictions on changing
residence or workplace. Current regulations require
registration at the local Interior Ministry office upon arrival
and departure. Tajikistan nationals who wish to travel abroad
must obtain an exit visa. There is no evidence that these are
withheld for political reasons.
Tajikistan does not yet have a law on emigration. Currently,
those wishing to migrate within the former Soviet Union notify
the Ministry of the Interior of their departure. Persons
wishing to emigrate beyond the borders of the former Soviet
Union must receive the approval of the relevant country's
embassy in order to obtain their international passport.
Persons who settle abroad are required to inform the Tajikistan
interests section of the nearest Russian embassy or consulate.
Persons who wish to return to Tajikistan after having emigrated
may do so freely by submitting their applications to the
Tajikistan interests section of the nearest Russian embassy or
consulate. The Government adjudicates requests on a
case-by-case basis. There is no indication that persons, other
than those who fled Tajikistan for political reasons after the
civil war, are not freely permitted to return.
A refugee law passed in June guarantees a person granted
refugee status the right to work and move freely throughout the
country. Following implementation of the law, the Government
created a central department for refugees, under the Ministry
of Labor, which worked actively with the UNHCR. One unresolved
issue pertains to the right of returnees who married in
Afghanistan to bring their spouses with them to Tajikistan.
Credible reports claimed that the Government maintained an
unofficial policy of denying residence permits to Afghan
spouses of returnees, thereby allowing the Government to deny
any official status to these persons or their children.
Due to better cooperation with the Government and an increased
level of security, the UNHCR increased the rate of return among
Tajik refugees in Afghanistan in 1994, leaving only
approximately 22,000 refugees there and another estimated
16,000 internally displaced persons in Gorno Badakhshan.
Representatives of the armed opposition in Afghanistan
continued their efforts to dissuade Tajiks from returning,
using threats and disinformation in the refugee camps.
One of the significant impediments to refugee repatriation
remained the occupation of returnees' homes by those loyal to
the victorious special battalions, special battalion members,
and ethnic Kulyabis. The Government is working slowly to evict
occupiers. Several factors limited progress on this issue,
including lack of will among local officials, fear of revenge
by those who protest, and lack of power among officials to act
against often armed or well-connected occupiers.
There is no legal basis for forcible repatriation, nor is there
any evidence to suggest that it was practiced in 1994.
Section 3 Respect for Political Rights: The Right of Citizens
to Change Their Government
The Government severely limits the right of citizens to change
their government peacefully and freely. The Government is
dominated by a coalition composed of Kulyabi regional political
interests. The four main opposition parties remained
suspended, and the majority of their leaders and party
activists remained either jailed or in exile abroad, although a
few Democratic Party leaders have returned to Tajikistan.
Two candidates were nominated in the presidential election
scheduled for September: parliamentary Chairman Emomili
Rahmonov and former Prime Minister Abdulmalik Abdullajanov.
Both waged strong campaigns throughout Tajikistan. Most
observers viewed the speed with which the Government called for
elections in July as a transparent ploy to exclude the
opposition from nominating candidates. Under a combination of
Russian and Uzbek pressure, widely supported by the
international community, the Government postponed the election
from September 25 to November 6 ostensibly to allow greater
time both for the Government to organize fairer procedures and
for the opposition to nominate candidates. The opposition,
however, refused to take part in any elections, claiming that
free and fair elections were impossible under the Rahmonov
Government.
Although the Government invited international observers to
monitor the polls and lifted the state of emergency, people
remained fearful of free expression. The ban on the
independent electronic media remained in force prior to and
during the election. The Government controlled all aspects of
the planning for the election and openly favored the
incumbent. Voter registration lists did not fully take into
account the massive dislocation caused by the civil war.
Refugees outside Tajikistan were unable or afraid to register,
thereby effectively excluding a large number of persons who
might have opposed the government candidate at the polls. The
election was marked by open intimidation by government security
forces who, in some locations, threatened to kill anyone voting
for Abdullajanov. The stuffing of ballot boxes and the
substitution of entire boxes was reported at a number of
polling stations. Vote-count rigging was also strongly
suspected.
No parliamentary elections have been held since independence.
The Government has scheduled elections for February 1995 when
the term of the present Parliament expires. The Supreme Soviet
adopted a new parliamentary election law in December,
incorporating some suggestions by the CSCE. While the new law
was somewhat better than the presidential election law, many
outside observers believe the law still allows undue government
influence in the electoral process.
There are no barriers to female participation in the electoral
process, although since the removal of Soviet-era quotas the
number of female deputies has declined. At year's end, there
were eight female deputies in the Supreme Soviet, a female
deputy prime minister, and seven women serving in positions
with the rank of minister or deputy minister.
Section 4 Governmental Attitude Regarding International and
Nongovernmental Investigation of Alleged Violations
of Human Rights
The Government's record on dealing with international and
nongovernmental investigation of alleged human rights abuses
ranged from poor to mixed. Fear of persecution by government
or extragovernmental elements has all but precluded efforts by
Tajikistan citizens to form their own human rights
organizations. Nonetheless, one indigenous group has begun to
work its way through the labyrinthine process of government
registration. One official organization, formed at the end of
1993 by the head of the Writer's Union, works with the
Government's blessing and serves primarily as a rubber stamp
for government actions.
The Government worked closely with the UNHCR on behalf of
refugees and internally displaced persons and with the UNMOT
and the U.N. Secretary General's special representative in the
course of the inter-Tajik talks. The UNHCR reported that,
while there had been no convictions of individuals accused of
crimes against refugees, the Government's responsiveness was
greater than in 1993. Those cases which the UNHCR brought to
the attention of local authorities were investigated, albeit
with varying degrees of enthusiasm (see Section 5).
In February the CSCE opened an office in Dushanbe, and in April
a permanent representative of Human Rights Watch/Helsinki
arrived. These organizations and the ICRC reported a mixed
level of cooperation from the Government. The ICRC has not yet
obtained access to all prisoners but has found the military
responsive to its program of education on the tenets of the
Geneva Convention. The CSCE believed that the Government
ignored many of its suggestions for the new Constitution and
the electoral law. Although it obtained access to the Justice
and Interior Ministries and the procurator's office, Human
Rights Watch/Helsinki reported that access did not always lead
to government responsiveness.
Section 5 Discrimination Based on Race, Sex, Religion,
Disability, Language, or Social Status
Women
The participation of women in the work force and in institutes
of higher learning is one of the more positive legacies of the
Soviet era. There is no formal discrimination against women in
employment, education, or housing, and in urban areas women can
be found throughout government, academic institutes, and
enterprises. However, in rural areas, women tend to marry
young, have large families, and only rarely receive university
education. Due to the prevalence of large families, women in
rural areas are also much less likely to work outside the
home.
Conservative Muslim traditions, especially in rural areas,
resulted in an unknown number of cases of wife beating going
uninvestigated. There is no evidence that police officials and
government organs do not responsibly prosecute those complaints
that are filed. No official data are available on the
prevalence of spousal abuse, nor are there nongovernmental
organizations that monitor this problem.
The threat of rape is widespread, and rape or the threat of
rape is sometimes used as a means of coercion of women
detainees. Women rarely go out alone and almost never at
night. In the countryside, particularly in Khatlon, women
seldom leave the security of their cooperative farm to venture
out unaccompanied.
Children
The extensive government social security network for child
welfare continued to deteriorate. Women are provided 3 years
of maternity leave and monthly subsidies for each child. All
health care is free. However, the Government's lack of
financial resources left it unable to fulfill many of its
obligations for the provision of subsidies and care for mother
and child health.
National/Racial/Ethnic Minorities
After the civil war, over 90,000 people of primarily Garmi and
Pamiri origin fled to Afghanistan to avoid reprisals by
progovernment forces. The repatriation of Tajiks continued
during 1994, and the Government encouraged their return. While
making a good faith effort to assist with the repatriation of
refugees, particularly those from Afghanistan, the Government
did not fulfill many of its pledges, including the payment of
reconstruction fees for returning refugee families. However,
in general security for returnees was adequate, and the UNHCR,
with which the Government cooperated, accelerated the rate of
repatriation.
In southern Tajikistan and in Dushanbe, Kulyabi-origin Tajiks
continued to displace other ethnic groups in local government
positions and, most notably, in the security forces. Local
procurators who attempt to investigate militia members
suspected of the harassment or murder of refugees do not have
sufficient qualified staff, resources, or political support.
In many cases, fear of reprisals and threats result in the
withdrawal of information and allegations. The UNHCR reported,
however, that local officials actively investigated a number of
cases which the UNHCR brought to their attention and made
several arrests.
With the exception of the trilingual (Tajik/Uzbek/Russian)
school structure, neither the Uzbek nor the Russian language is
afforded any official status in Tajikistan, despite the large
numbers these ethnic minorities represent. In practice,
Russian is still widely used in government, although it is not
an official language. Uzbek speakers represent approximately
26 percent of the population, and Russian speakers an estimated
2 percent. The nonofficial status of the Russian language
contributed to the steady exodus of Russian speakers from
Tajikistan. Those remaining see little future for themselves.
While the Government has repeatedly expressed its desire for
the Russian-speaking population to remain, economic conditions
provide little incentive for them to do so. Russian-language
schools claimed that they were routinely shortchanged in the
apportionment of government funds.
During May, June, and July, the Government initiated a campaign
to disarm the local militias operating outside its control in
southern Tajikistan. Kulyabi security forces, who were
conducting the campaign, engaged in numerous beatings and
illegal searches aimed mainly at the Uzbek minority. Human
rights groups protested, charging that the security forces were
employing inhumane tactics in searching for weapons and that in
reality Kulyabi forces were using the campaign to disarm their
ethnic rivals, the Uzbeks. Another disarmament campaign was
launched in December after the presidential election, but it
did not target Uzbeks in particular and relied on voluntary
surrendering of weapons.
The Rahmonov Government, like governments before it,
discriminated against Afghan nationals by not giving Afghans
who are the victims of criminal elements even minimal police
protection. Although the Government signed the 1951 Convention
on Refugees and passed a national law on refugees in 1994,
international groups, in particular the UNHCR, charged with the
protection of Afghan refugees in Tajikistan, lodged frequent
protests with the Government over its treatment of Afghan
refugees. The UNHCR registered some 600 Afghans as refugees in
Tajikistan during 1994. An unresolved problem stems from the
unofficial government policy of denying official status to the
Afghan spouses of returning Tajik refugees (see Section 2.d.).
People with Disabilities
The Law on Social Protection of Invalids adopted in 1992
stipulates the right of the disabled to employment and adequate
medical care. In practice, however, the Government does not
require employers to provide physical access for the disabled.
The absence of basic technology or the financial means to
implement the technology available to assist the disabled
results, in practice, in high unemployment and widespread
discrimination. There is no law on accessibility for the
disabled.
Section 6 Worker Rights
a. The Right of Association
The Law on Social Organization and the Law on Trade Union
Rights and Guarantees provide all citizens with the right of
association. This includes the right to form and join
associations without prior authorization, to organize
territorially, to form and join federations and affiliate with
international organizations freely, and to participate in
international travel.
The Confederation of Trade Unions, a holdover from the
Communist era, remains the dominant labor organization,
although it has since shed its subordination to the Communist
Party. The Confederation consists of 20 professional trade
unions and currently claims 1,500,000 members--virtually all
nonagricultural workers. The separate Trade Union of Private
Enterprise Workers has registered 3,241 small and medium-sized
enterprises, totaling 60,000 members, some of whom have dual
membership in the Confederation. The Council of Ministers
formally consults both labor unions during the drafting of
social welfare and worker rights legislation.
The Law on Tariff Agreements and Social Partnerships mandates
that arbitration take place before a union may legally call a
strike. Depending on the scale of the labor disagreement,
arbitration can take place at the company, sector, or
governmental level. In the event that arbitration fails,
unions have the right to strike, but both labor unions have
publicly disavowed the utility of strikes in a period of
deepening economic crisis and high unemployment and espoused
compromise between management and workers.
The state of emergency, in place in all regions of Tajikistan
except Leninabad until August, restricted the right of workers
to strike. While there were no official, union-sanctioned
strikes, several wildcat strikes occurred. A combination of
government capitulation and intimidation quickly settled two
walkouts in April. Newspaper workers and journalists and,
separately, the teachers in one secondary school refused to
enter their workplaces to protest the lack of materials and
salary payments. The Government met quickly with the newspaper
workers, reaching a compromise in which the workers were back
at their jobs the next day. Several teachers reported that
Interior Ministry officials had ordered them back to work under
threat of reprisal, although the Ministry also made
conciliatory efforts with the teachers, who soon returned to
work.
Since the expiration of the state of emergency, teachers again
walked off the job in September, this time in much larger
numbers. Teachers in the Frunze district of Dushanbe refused
to continue classes in protest over salaries that had not been
paid in more than 6 months. The teachers formed a strike
committee independent of the union, and the Government
negotiated with it about a return to work. Also in September,
some local residents in the southern town of Nizhni Pyanj
refused to pick cotton until the local bakery provided them
with bread.
None of the strikes have had the sanction of the labor unions
and were, hence, illegal. Despite the unsanctioned nature of
the September strike, the union intervened with the Government
on behalf of the teachers to prevent any from being fired. The
Ministry of Labor recognized that nonpayment of salaries to
workers was a violation of International Labor Organization
regulations.
b. The Right to Organize and Bargain Collectively
The right to organize and bargain collectively is codified in
the Law on Trade Union Rights and Guarantees, the Law on Social
Partnerships and Collective Contracts, and the Law on Labor
Protection. Participating in collective bargaining at the
company level are employees, members of the trade union, and
management. Negotiations involving an industry sector include
officials from the relevant ministry and members of the union's
steering committee for that particular sector. As the economic
situation worsens, it is becoming increasingly difficult for
enterprises to engage in effective collective bargaining.
The law prohibits antiunion discrimination or the use of
sanctions to dissuade union membership, nor may a worker be
fired solely for his or her union activity. Any complaints of
discrimination against a labor union or labor union activist
are first considered by a local labor union committee and, if
necessary, raised to the level of the Supreme Court and
investigated by the Ministry of Justice. The law compels an
employer found guilty of firing an employee based on union
activity to reinstate the employee.
There are no export processing zones.
c. Prohibition of Forced or Compulsory Labor
Neither the Law on Labor Protection nor the Law on Employment
specifically prohibits forced or compulsory labor. The Soviet
practice of compelling students to pick cotton was officially
banned in 1989. However, due to the lack of fuel and
mechanical harvesting equipment, in the fall students were
again sent to the fields to pick cotton, as they were in 1993.
In parts of Khatlon province, press gangs randomly dragooned
people on the streets and sent them to the cotton fields.
There were also credible reports that young men of families who
had returned to Khatlon were forced to work on the private farm
plots of ethnic Kulyabis.
d. Minimum Age for Employment of Children
According to labor laws, the minimum age for the employment of
children is 16, the age at which children may also legally
leave school. With the concurrence of the local trade union,
employment may begin at the age of 15. Workers under the age
of 18 by law work no more than 6 hours a day and 36 hours per
week. However, children as young as 7 years of age participate
in agricultural work, which is classified as "family
assistance." Trade unions are responsible for reporting any
violations in the employment of minors. Cases not resolved
between the union and the employer may be brought before the
Procurator General, who may investigate and charge the leader
of the enterprise with violations of the Labor Code.
e. Acceptable Conditions of Work
The President, on the advice of the Ministry of Labor and in
consultation with trade unions, sets the minimum monthly wage,
which in 1994 was approximately $3.20 (8,000 rubles) at the
rate of exchange in late 1994. This wage falls far short of
providing a decent standard of living for a worker and family.
In January, in response to the continuing economic crisis and
the shortage of banknotes, the Government introduced a maximum
monthly salary of $25.60 which could be paid in cash. The
remainder of all workers' salaries are paid on account, meaning
a credit that the worker could then theoretically use to
purchase goods at any state-run shop.
Tajikistan's economy virtually collapsed in 1994, with 60 to
70 percent of its industry standing idle by the end of the
year. As factories and enterprises shut down, workers were laid
off or put on compulsory vacation for weeks and months on end.
Some establishments, both governmental and private, compensated
their employees in kind with food commodities or the output of
that particular concern for which the employee worked. The
employee could then sell those products in local private
markets.
The legal workweek for adults (over age 18) is 40 hours, with a
weekly 48-hour rest period. Overtime payment is mandated by
law, with the first 2 hours of overtime to be paid at one and
one-half times the normal rate and the rest of the overtime
hours at double time.
The Government has established occupational health and safety
standards, but these fall far below accepted international
norms, and the Government does not actively enforce them in
practice. The enforcement of work standards is the
responsibility of the State Technical Supervision Committee
under the Council of Ministers. While new statistics were not
available, it is virtually certain, given the continuing
economic decline, that 1993 statistics, which reported that
over one-fifth of the population worked in substandard
conditions, greatly underreport the number working in
substandard conditions in 1994. Workers can leave their jobs
with 2 months' notice but, given the bleak employment
situation, few choose to do so.
(###)
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