| The State Department web site below is a permanent electronic archive of information released prior to January 20, 2001. Please see www.state.gov for material released since President George W. Bush took office on that date. This site is not updated so external links may no longer function. Contact us with any questions about finding information. NOTE: External links to other Internet sites should not be construed as an endorsement of the views contained therein. |
TITLE: RUSSIA HUMAN RIGHTS PRACTICES, 1994
AUTHOR: U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE
DATE: FEBRUARY 1995
RUSSIA
The Russian Constitution establishes democratic governance
through three branches of power with checks and balances: the
Presidency and the Government, headed by the Prime Minister; a
bicameral legislature, or Federal Assembly, consisting of the
State Duma and Federation Council; and the courts. The
Constitution also lays a comprehensive groundwork for
observance and enforcement of human rights set forth in the
Universal Declaration of Human Rights.
The constitutional referendum of December 1993, which was
concurrent with parliamentary elections, strengthened President
Boris Yeltsin's position vis-a-vis the legislature. He
continued to proclaim his commitment to political reform and
the transition to a modern market economy. Nevertheless, the
process of institutionalizing democracy and a modern market
economy lagged due, in part, to the slow enactment of laws and
development of regulatory institutions, widespread
unfamiliarity with democratic and market principles, and a
reaction against "democrats" and free market advocates because
of social dislocation.
The Federal Counterintelligence Service (FSK) is responsible
for internal security issues, including foreign intelligence
activity in Russia, drugs, terrorism, and state corruption.
The Federal Border Service is broadly responsible for the
security of Russia's external borders. The Ministry of
Interior (MVD) is responsible for the police, prison system,
and paramilitary forces used to maintain public order.
Legislative oversight of these organizations is tenuous at
best, and some MVD prison and police personnel have committed
human rights abuses.
Russia is a vast country with a wealth of natural resources and
a diverse industrial base. It made significant progress in
1994 in its ongoing transformation from a centrally planned
economy to a market-based one. Over 70 percent of enterprises
are now privatized, and the majority of workers are employed
outside the state sector or in both the private and state
sectors. However, by official measurement, gross domestic
product continued to fall and unemployment to rise, and the
Government continued to battle inflation and deficit spending.
The overall human rights record in Russia in 1994 remained
uneven. The concept of the rule of law has yet to be
institutionalized and implemented. In his desire to combat
rapidly increasing crime, President Yeltsin signed two decrees
in June, which contradict constitutional rights to protection
against arbitrary arrest and illegal search, seizure, and
detention. The Constitutional Court, the only body having the
authority to settle constitutional disputes, remained
inoperative because of governmental inability to fill
vacancies. Courts of general jurisdiction, with several
notable exceptions, remained timid in asserting their
authority. Moreover, judges generally feel uncomfortable with
the idea of having the duty and responsibility to declare
actions taken by the executive branch and regional authorities
as unconstitutional.
In August Sergey Kovalev, the Human Rights Commissioner, (a
position provided for in the Constitution), published a highly
critical report on the human rights situation in 1993, noting
that law enforcement officials reportedly beat and physically
abused detainees; military officers failed to discipline those
who engaged in "dedovshchina," the violent hazing of
conscripts, which led to numerous deaths and injuries; and
prison officials appeared unable to correct life-threatening
situations in pretrial detention centers.
Claiming the need to prevent Chechnya's secession from Russia,
Russian troops crossed into the Russian Federation's Republic
of Chechnya on December 11. Beginning in late December
following major Chechen resistance, there was massive aerial
and artillery bombardment of Chechnya's capital, Groznyy,
resulting in a heavy loss of civilian life and hundreds of
thousands of internally displaced persons. These actions were
in conflict with a number of Russia's international obligations,
including those concerning the protection of civilian
noncombatants and notification of troop movements. In late
December, Human Rights Commissioner Kovalev accused Russian
troops of violating human rights on a "massive scale" in
Chechnya. The international community and human rights
nongovernmental organizations (NGO's) called upon both parties
to respect international humanitarian law and the human rights
of noncombatant civilians.
Although freedom of speech and press is widely respected, there
were physical attacks on journalists by unknown persons and at
least one killing. Journalists reporting on the conflict in
Chechnya were harassed and threatened. Other human rights
abuses include official and societal discrimination against
people from the Caucasus, some continuing societal
discrimination against Jews, violence against women, lack of
attention to the welfare of children and the handicapped, and
bureaucratic obstacles to the development of independent labor
unions.
RESPECT FOR HUMAN RIGHTS
Section 1 Respect for the Integrity of the Person, Including
Freedom from:
a. Political and Other Extrajudicial Killing
There were no known political killings by agents of the
Government, but the line between politically motivated killings
and criminal activities has become difficult to distinguish.
Dmitriy Kholodov, an investigative reporter for the newspaper
Moskovskiy Komsomolets who was to testify in the State Duma on
corruption in the Russian army in East Germany, was killed on
October 17 when he opened a package allegedly containing
documents on the army's illegal arms sales. Many journalists
charge complicity in the killing by high-level Defense Ministry
officials (see Section 2.a.).
Law enforcement authorities have been unable to stem an upsurge
in contract killings and extortions aimed at Russian businessmen
(especially bankers). These criminal activities are in part a
result of the ongoing struggle for commercial and financial
markets in which there is deep Mafia (and sometimes Mafia and
government) involvement. On December 2, elements of the
President's Security Service staged a raid on the headquarters
of "Most" bank in central Moscow, injuring several bank
security guards. While results of the Government's inquiry
into this incident were pending at year's end, businessmen
expressed concern about the authorities' inability to provide
protection and stability and to curb Mafia intimidation.
The violent hazing and cruel treatment of new recruits by
soldiers [dedovshchina] continued to cause a number of deaths
which the Committee of Soldiers' Mothers, a human rights group,
asserts have been covered up by military authorities as
suicides or accidental deaths (see Section 1.c.).
At year's end, Russian military forces attacking the city of
Groznyy, the capital of the breakaway Russian Republic of
Chechnya, utilized disproportionate force and inflicted heavy
civilian casualties. (See Section 1.g. for a fuller
description of violations of humanitarian law regarding
internal conflicts.)
b. Disappearance
There were no reports of disappearances.
c. Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading
Treatment or Punishment
Article 20 of the Constitution specifically prohibits torture
and other cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment or
punishment. A series of laws passed since 1991 establish
internationally accepted standards for the treatment of persons
suspected of crimes.
Practices and conditions worsened in the prison system
(including both pretrial detention centers and prison camps)
because of overcrowding and the failure to expand capacity, the
Government's lack of sufficient funds for the care and feeding
of inmates, inadequate supervision by law enforcement and
correctional facility personnel, and the lack of individual or
institutional accountability for violations. The lack of
funding has also resulted in many prison personnel not being
paid, exacerbating prison conditions, particularly in rural
areas. The Government is considering transferring
responsibility for administration of the prison system from the
MVD to the Ministry of Justice. The Duma has created a
committee to investigate abuses in prisons, including those
that occur during pretrial detention.
Overcrowding is becoming severe. A Moscow prison built with a
capacity for 8,500 inmates now houses well over 17,000 and is
still considered better than most prisons in the regions. Many
prisons were built in the 1930's and have never been
renovated. According to Russian and international human rights
groups, many are unfit for human habitation as a result of
deterioration and lack of sanitation systems adequate for the
number of prisoners housed.
Observers claim that some prisons have stopped feeding prisoners
for months at a time, relying on inmates' friends and relatives
to bring in rations which are shared among all inmates.
According to the Society for the Guardianship of Penitentiary
Institutions, the lack of funding has also led to a crisis in
which inmates receive medical care and medications only when
they are suffering from a life-threatening condition.
Prisoners with infectious diseases are sometimes not separated
from more healthy inmates, and tuberculosis is widespread.
Conditions in Russian pretrial detention centers are
particularly bleak. One such facility in Moscow, Butyrskiy
prison, was originally built in the 18th century. MVD
personnel have publicly warned that overcrowding and inhuman
conditions undermine the Ministry's ability to guarantee
security in such institutions. In some cases, detainees lack
even the room to sit down, must stand shoulder to shoulder, and
sleep in two or three shifts. Many detainees suffer from
infectious diseases. Many of the most severe reported cases of
beatings occur in pretrial detention centers where officials
resort to extreme measures to punish minor infractions of the
rules as a means to ensure discipline and guarantee their own
personal safety.
Detainees in pretrial detention centers face much worse
conditions than convicted criminals in prison camps. Moreover,
although existing law allows authorities to hold suspects up to
18 months in investigative detention, in practice, thousands
are held for much longer periods. In some cases, the time a
detainee serves in pretrial detention is as long as the term he
would have served in prison if found guilty. Given these
circumstances, some detainees choose to confess to crimes they
did not commit in order to escape the harsh conditions of
pretrial detention centers.
There are widespread, credible reports of beatings by law
enforcement officials during arrest and by prison personnel
during detention and incarceration. Pressure on law
enforcement officials from the central Government, local
government, and society to deal with the rapidly increasing
crime rate in Russia has led officials to overlook heavyhanded
practices during arrest and incarceration. Russian human
rights monitors claim that law enforcement officials are
rewarded for bringing cases to quick closure and thus routinely
deny suspects their right to an attorney and beat and
intimidate them during questioning to extract a quick
confession to a crime. Autopsies are rarely performed to
determine the cause of prison deaths.
The Moscow Center for Prison Reform has spoken with prisoners
who have witnessed abuse and rape of female detainees, but rape
and abuse victims seldom register official complaints.
Police, labor camp, and prison officials harass and abuse
persons on the basis of sexual orientation. Gay men are
particularly targeted for abuse in prisons and labor camps.
The Society for the Guardianship of Penitentiary Institutions
claims there are approximately 1,000 gay men in Moscow pretrial
detention centers who have not been formally charged with
crimes. The Society also alleges that gay men are subjected to
sexual and nonsexual physical abuse on the part of fellow
inmates and prison officials and are routinely given low
priority in access to services such as medical care.
While the law does not criminalize lesbian relations, it is
widely regarded as a form of mental illness, and police
frequently place lesbians against their will into psychiatric
hospitals after receiving requests from family members or
friends to commit the "patient" to an institution for
treatment. The Moscow Society for Lesbians, Literature, and
Art alleges that medical textbooks in Russia still include
materials on clinical treatments for homosexuality as a mental
illness. In psychiatric hospitals, chemical treatments are
prescribed, and lesbians are sometimes beaten if they refuse
treatment, according to the Society which claims the only way
to be discharged is to renounce their sexual orientation. (See
Section 1.e. for a discussion of gay men who continue to be
imprisoned even though the sodomy laws were repealed in 1993.)
Officers of the armed forces continue to permit, even encourage,
dedovshchina, the violent and cruel hazing of young recruits
which, at best, involves forcing recruits to perform menial
tasks, often outside official duties, and, at worst, leads to
beatings, murder, and suicide. The national military leadership
made no moves to implement training and education programs
systematically to combat dedovshchina, nor has the concept of a
military police force advanced much past the discussion phase.
The Committee of Soldiers' Mothers in Moscow and other human
rights groups note with grave concern that dedovshchina--viewed
during the Soviet era as a rite of passage--remains a key form
of discipline for some military officers. Widespread publicity
and human rights groups' efforts to eliminate dedovshchina have
been successful in individual cases and are very much dependent
on local commanders. Without effective leadership training and
a viable noncommissioned officer corps, dedovshchina can be
expected to persist. Given current financial difficulties,
unit officers are often too preoccupied maintaining barely
adequate living conditions (or taking second jobs to make ends
meet) to devote much attention to their troops. The Committee
claims that the military often covers up deaths due to
dedovshchina as suicides or accidental deaths. During the
first half of 1994, according to a July report by Ministry of
Defense officials to the Russian legislature, 518 deaths were
recorded in the armed forces, including 74 officers. Of these,
57 percent were due to "violations of safety regulations";
5 percent to "barracks violence"; 8 percent to "premeditated
murder"; and 25 percent were determined to be suicides.
In addition, the military leadership has yet to address the
worsening problems of dangerous sanitary conditions, poor food
rations, and the use of conscript labor for personal or private
gain. There is credible evidence that inhumane care and
treatment of soldiers, including lack of suitable housing or
shelter, poor nutrition, and unsanitary conditions have
resulted in outbreaks of disease, notably hepatitis and
dysentery.
Officers have subjected soldiers to inhuman and cruel
punishment. Acting Prosecutor General Aleksey Ilyushenko
described to the press in September one incident in which the
commander of the Northern Fleet cruiser "Admiral Gorshkov"
punished violators of discipline by locking them into a metal
pit, some for as long as 370 days. Seven sailors, who had been
incarcerated in a room measuring 4 square meters, were killed
when a steam pipe burst in February. This makeshift brig was
not monitored, and no one else on the ship was aware of the
accident until it was too late to rescue those confined.
There have also been allegations of forced labor in the armed
forces inuring to the private gain of corrupt senior officers.
Young conscripts appear to be often used as forced labor by
senior officers on personal building and construction
projects. Moreover, the Committee of Soldiers' Mothers claims
to have assisted several families whose sons were sold into
servitude during their military service. In one case, Mikhail
Fedotov, a Russian soldier serving in the Russian army in
Uzbekistan, was allegedly "sold" by a superior officer to local
Uzbek inhabitants and forced to work from December 1992 to
April 1993, after which he was hospitalized for psychiatric
reasons.
d. Arbitrary Arrest, Detention, or Exile
Article 22 of the Constitution states that arrest, taking into
custody, and detention of persons suspected of crimes are
permitted only by judicial decision. Criminal suspects must be
arraigned before a judge within 48 hours of their arrest.
Detainees have the right to have an attorney present during
questioning following arrest and throughout proceedings up to
and including arraignment. Detainees have the right to request
a court evaluation of the legality of detention. If the court
finds the detention illegal, the judge has the power to order
immediate release.
Nevertheless, police make arrests without judicial warrants and
detain persons without judicial permission beyond the 48-hour
time period. In September a member of the President's legal
advisory board estimated that several thousand people had been
arrested illegally over the previous 2 years, that one out of
every three persons arrested was denied the right to legal
services, and that 70 percent of detainees were held for terms
three to five times longer than necessary while awaiting
sentencing. To strengthen the law enforcement authorities'
ability to combat organized crime, President Yeltsin issued two
decrees in June, giving them power to detain suspects without
charges and without access to a lawyer for 30 days, and to
conduct warrantless searches and seizures. Law enforcement
authorities are credibly reported to rely on these decrees to
avoid abiding by relevant constitutional provisions.
The present judicial and criminal investigative systems lack
the resources to deal with the continuously increasing number
of cases. According to the Society for the Guardianship of
Penitentiary Institutions, due to the Government's inability to
implement a functioning system of release on bail, by the end
of 1994 authorities held a total of 250,000 people in pretrial
detention centers. This amounted to 25 to 30 percent of the
total prison system's population.
The constitutional right to judicial review of detention within
48 hours of arrest is frequently ignored. Russian human rights
monitors have documented evidence from interviews with
detainees that the few who are aware of their rights and
complain of violations are subjected to beatings.
Nevertheless, about one in six cases of arrest is now appealed
to the courts, and judges release one in six of these on
grounds of insufficient evidence or breach of procedure.
The Constitution provides for legal assistance for the
indigent, but in practice the indigent receive little
assistance. Local governments lack sufficient funds to pay for
trial attorneys representing the indigent.
e. Denial of Fair Public Trial
In the last 3 years, the Government made substantial efforts to
reform the criminal justice system and judicial institutions.
Despite these efforts, judges are only now beginning to throw
off the Soviet legacy to assert their constitutionally mandated
independence from other branches of government.
The courts of general jurisdiction, or civil courts, are
undifferentiated as to function and consider criminal, civil,
and juvenile cases, although a separate court system dealing
with commercial cases exists. Civil courts are organized on
three levels: district courts, which try the overwhelming
majority of cases; regional courts, which operate at the
provincial level; and a Supreme Court centered in Moscow. All
may act as a court of first instance, depending on the nature
and seriousness of the crime.
While the Constitution prescribes the separation of powers and
the complete independence of the judiciary, judges in practice
are totally dependent on the Ministry of Justice for court
infrastructure and financial support and on local authorities
for their housing.
Prosecutors, like the courts, are organized into offices at the
district, regional, and federation levels. They are ultimately
responsible to the Prosecutor General, who is nominated by the
President and confirmed by the Federation Council. Aleksey
Ilyushenko, twice nominated by the President for the position,
was denied confirmation by Parliament in 1994 but nevertheless
continued to serve in an acting capacity. Apart from regions
where adversarial jury trials have recently been introduced,
prosecutors remain very influential in the conduct of court
proceedings. Prosecutors supervise criminal investigations,
which are usually conducted by the MVD.
Criminal cases at the district and regional court levels are
tried by a panel consisting of 1 judge and 2 lay assessors,
or--in the 9 (out of 89) regions where by year's end
adversarial jury trials have been introduced--defendants in
serious criminal cases may elect to have their cases tried by a
jury. Trials are public except when government secrets are at
issue. (See Section 2.d. regarding Mirzayanov case.)
Defendants are required to attend their trials unless they have
been accused of a minor crime not punishable by imprisonment.
They may confront witnesses and present evidence. The court
appoints an attorney for any defendant who needs one.
Although the former Supreme Soviet and the present Parliament,
with active encouragement of the President's staff, enacted
many legal reforms, both the Government of the Russian
Federation and regional governments failed to fund their
implementation adequately. According to a Ministry of Justice
official, only one-third of the $600,000 (1.5 billion rubles)
promised in 1994 for judicial reforms was allocated, and
inflation turned the rest into "a pile of kopeks." As a
result, the widespread reintroduction of adversarial juries is
not taking place according to schedule because courts are not
being renovated, judges are not receiving necessary training,
and insufficient funds are available to pay for jurors'
stipends.
There are also a few instances in which laws have been reformed
or changed, but persons previously convicted continue to be
imprisoned. The Society for the Defense of Convicted
Businessmen and Economic Freedoms is aware of a number of
prisoners incarcerated for economic crimes, although the number
in 1994 is much less than in 1993, when there were tens of
thousands of such people. The Criminal Codes are still in the
process of being revised, but already such crimes as
bribe-taking, currency speculation, and embezzlement carry
penalties far less strict than the severe consequences,
including the death penalty, in effect until 1991.
The Society for the Guardianship of Penitentiary Institutions,
which compiles relatively reliable statistics, believes there
are few, if any, persons still imprisoned for sodomy since the
repeal of the sodomy law in 1993 and the enactment of Article
54 of the Russian Constitution which states in part "if
liability for an offense has been lifted or mitigated after its
perpetration, the new law shall apply." Nevertheless, the
Society added that many homosexuals were imprisoned for crimes
other than or in addition to sodomy and, therefore, were not
released when the law was repealed (though their prison terms
may have been reduced, as permitted under Article 54.)
In the 80 regions where juries have not yet been introduced,
criminal procedures are still weighted heavily in favor of the
prosecution. For example, the constitutionally mandated
presumption of innocence is often disregarded, and defendants
are expected to prove their innocence rather than prosecutors
proving guilt. Moreover, rates of conviction remain above 99
percent, as opposed to the 16-percent acquittal rate among
juries. Judges--fearing that an outright acquittal will result
in a prosecutorial appeal--frequently send cases back to the
prosecutor for "additional investigation." This greatly
increases defendants' time spent in pretrial detention.
The right to an attorney during pretrial questioning is often
overlooked. Many defendants refute testimony given in pretrial
questioning, stating that they were denied access to an
attorney, or that they were threatened or beaten and only said
what they thought the authorities wanted to hear (up to a full
confession) so that the abuse would stop. Nevertheless,
Russian human rights monitors have documented cases in which
convictions were obtained on the basis of the original, illegal
testimony (after the defendant refuted that testimony in
court), and even in the absence of other proof of guilt.
Criminal defendants, and prosecutors in nonjury trials, have
the right of appeal. In practice, however, superior courts
lack the authority to overturn decisions of a lower court and
may only mandate that the case be retried. The lower court can
retry the case on the same evidence, reach the same decision,
and--since there is no legal limit to the number of
appeals--the dissatisfied party can appeal again. The system,
however, is heavily weighted against appeals because (1) the
prosecution and the courts have a vested interest in clearing
the backlog of cases, and (2) defendants prefer prisons, where
better conditions prevail, over pretrial detention centers.
(See Section 1.c. for a description of conditions in prisons
and pretrial detention centers.)
In a notable assertion of judicial authority, in what is
believed to be the first time in Russian history, a Russian
court awarded an individual compensation for an arbitrary act
committed against him by the State. In March charges of
revealing state secrets were dismissed against Vil Mirzayanov
who had passed information to the Western press concerning
Russian violations of international chemical weapons
conventions. In June a court heard Mirzayanov's suit for
damages against the Russian Government and ordered the
prosecutor's office and Mirzayanov's former employer to pay him
about $15,000 (30 million rubles) in damages because of
malicious prosecution.
This victory was short-lived, however, as a Moscow city court
in July overturned the decision to award damages. After more
legal maneuvering between the two courts with jurisdiction over
the case, the Moscow Chief Prosecutor, according to Mirzayanov,
refused to hear the case again on appeal, citing, inter alia,
technicalities such as the lack of a readily identifiable
defendant in the case. In October the research institute which
formerly employed Mirzayanov sued him for 33 million rubles
(about $11,000 at the October rate of exchange) in damages,
accusing him again of fabricating information. Mirzayanov
expects the court to try the case in January 1995. (See
Section 2.d. regarding Mirzayanov's desire to travel abroad.)
The case concerning Semyon Livshits demonstrates continuing
problems. Livshits, a naval officer, was arrested on April 23,
1990, after applying for an exit visa for Israel. Initially,
he was accused of conspiring with Mossad, the Israeli
intelligence service, to turn the submarine on which he was
serving over to the Israeli Government. These charges were
later dropped. He was also accused of group rape and robbery,
for which he was tried, convicted, and given a 10-year sentence
by a Vladivostok military court. In October 1992, the Supreme
Court struck the sentence, finding insufficient evidence and
violations of judicial procedure. From March 1993 to April
1994, Livshits was retried by a Vladivostok court, which again
found him guilty and resentenced him to 10 years in prison.
Livshits plans to reappeal his case to the Military Collegium
of the Supreme Court. By year's end, defense attorneys had
presented all required documents for the appeal to the court in
Vladivostok, which in turn was preparing the final documents to
be sent to Moscow.
The Constitution provides for a Constitutional Court, and
Parliament adopted a law establishing one. But by year's end,
the Federation Council failed to confirm all the President's
nominees, leaving one vacancy on a consequently inoperative
Court.
There were no known political prisoners. In exercise of its
constitutional prerogative, the State Duma declared an amnesty
for all those detained by law enforcement authorities in the
aftermath of the October 1993 crisis, including Ruslan
Khasbulatov, Chairman of the former Supreme Soviet, and
Alexander Rutskoy, former Vice President.
f. Arbitrary Interference with Privacy, Family, Home, or
Correspondence
Article 25 of the Constitution states that the right to privacy
in the home may be violated only on the basis of a court
decision or in accordance with federal laws. In practice, law
enforcement organs and internal security forces fail to do this
and continue to observe the Soviet-era requirement of informing
the prosecutor's office of intent to enter private premises.
Article 23 of the Constitution provides for privacy of
correspondence and electronic communications, except in cases
in which a judge issues a warrant. Many Russians believe
electronic monitoring of residences and telephone conversations
continues, even if at reduced levels in comparison to the
Soviet era.
Refugee organizations claim that law enforcement officials
routinely use informer networks to track the whereabouts of
persons from the Caucasus, whether resident in Russia legally
or illegally. General societal discrimination against people
from the Caucasus area and reports of harassment against these
people by law enforcement officials lend credence to such
assertions.
g. Use of Excessive Force and Violations of Humanitarian
Law in Internal Conflicts
The Russian Federation's Republic of Chechnya in the northern
Caucasus declared itself independent from the Russian
Federation in 1991. In the summer, the Russian Government
intensified its charges against the government of secessionist
President Dzhokar Dudayev, accusing it of repressing political
dissent, of corruption, and of involvement in international
criminal activities. Meanwhile, several armed opposition
groups financially and militarily supported by Russian
government entities sought to overthrow President Dudayev. In
August they bombed a telephone station and the Moscow-Baku
railroad line. The Dudayev government blamed the acts on the
political opposition and introduced a state of emergency,
followed in September by martial law. Restrictions included a
curfew, limits on exit and entry procedures, and restrictions
on travel by road in some areas. The opposition launched a
major offensive on November 26 with the covert support of
"volunteers" from several elite regular Russian army units.
The operation failed to unseat Dudayev.
By December, Russian military forces were actively working to
overthrow the Dudayev regime. Russian military aircraft bombed
both military and civilian targets in Groznyy, the capital of
the republic. Russian military officials initially denied any
official involvement in the conflict. Regular army and MVD
troops crossed the border into Chechnya on December 10 to
surround Groznyy. Air strikes continued through the month of
December and into January, causing extensive damage and heavy
civilian casualties. Beyond the large number of civilians
injured and killed, most residential and public buildings in
Groznyy, including hospitals and an orphanage, were destroyed.
These actions were denounced as major human rights violations
by Sergey Kovalev, President Yeltsin's Human Rights
Commissioner, and by human rights NGO's. The United Nations
High Commissioner for Human Rights, Jose Ayala Lasso,
reiterated his profound preoccupation at the reports of
violations of human rights and humanitarian law in Chechnya,
characterized by a large number of civilian victims. The
Russian Government announced on December 28 that Russian ground
forces had begun an operation to "liberate" Groznyy one
district at a time and disarm the "illegal armed groupings."
Dudayev supporters vowed to continue resisting and to switch to
guerrilla warfare. (See Section 2.a. for a description of the
harassment of journalists reporting on the conflict in
Chechnya.)
Section 2 Respect for Civil Liberties, Including:
a. Freedom of Speech and Press
During 1994 freedom of speech and press was generally
respected. The print media, most of which are independent of
the Russian Federation Government and many of which are
privately owned, functioned largely unhindered and represented
a wide range of opinions.
The Russian Government has placed intermittent restrictions on
Russian and foreign press covering the war in Chechnya,
claiming the need to protect military secrets and to ensure
journalists' safety. Duma deputy and Human Rights Ombudsman
Kovalev, who was in Groznyy for most of the war, reported that
the Russian Government has "continually hindered the activity
of correspondents in the war zone... and force has been used to
interfere with reporters (including) instances of mistreatment,
death threats, and confiscation of material." He also alluded
to government pressure on the Moscow press, including threats
to dismiss state television chief Oleg Poptsov for airing news
broadcasts critical of the Chechnya operation.
The press law requires that mass media publications be licensed
by the State Committee for the Press. Its former chairman,
Boris Mironov, who favored tight regulation of the media, was
dismissed by the President in September for allegedly asserting
he was a Fascist. His successor, Sergey Gryzunov, announced in
December the closure of the newspaper Al-Kods (an anti-Zionist
Palestinian publication generally critical of Palestine
Liberation Organization leader Yasser Arafat) because of
noncompliance with a provision of the press law barring
non-Russian citizens from founding newspapers. Gryzunov also
stated he would issue official warnings and begin legal
proceedings against about 100 newspapers he considered to be
Fascist or inciteful of ethnic and racial enmity.
Regional political authorities resorted to various devices to
close down critical newspapers. The Glasnost Defense Fund,
which monitors press freedom throughout the former Soviet
Union, recorded dozens of such incidents. Perhaps the best
known case occurred in early 1994 when Governor Nazdratenko of
Primorskiy Kray (Vladivostok) fired the mayor of Vladivostok
and closed down two newspapers which had criticized the
governor's actions. A radio reporter was also fired and then
beaten by unknown attackers in September after criticizing the
administration.
Regional political authorities also cited unpaid printing bills
or other debts as a pretext for closing newspapers that were
too critical. Many media organizations are liable to pressure
by such authorities because they occupy city-owned premises or
receive subsidies. In towns dominated by a single industrial
enterprise, the leaders of that enterprise have sufficient
power to suppress investigative reporting and discussion of
embarrassing topics, such as environmental pollution or
privatization schemes benefiting management.
Organized crime is increasingly able to exert pressure on the
media either because of the dire financial straits in which
most newspapers find themselves or because of the corruptibility
of underpaid journalists willing to write articles favorable to
particular companies, products, or individuals. In addition,
opponents of the Government and journalists have alleged
involvement by military officials in the murder of an
investigative reporter. On October 13, one of Moskovskiy
Komsomolets' journalists, Dmitriy Kholodov, was notified by
telephone by one of his contacts that a package of very
important documents on illegal arms sales by the Russian army
was waiting to be picked up at the Kazanskiy train station. He
retrieved the package and, when he opened it in the newspaper
building, it exploded, killing him. Known for investigative
pieces on corruption in the military and intelligence agencies,
he was scheduled to testify in the State Duma on alleged
corruption in the Western Group of Forces, formerly stationed
in East Germany. Since Kholodov's death, some journalists
covering corruption in the military claim to have received
anonymous threatening telephone calls.
In September a well-known television journalist and two
executives of St. Petersburg's Channel 5 television network
were beaten and robbed in a 1-week period. The attacks are
widely considered to have had political motives, although the
attackers remain unknown.
Broadcasters have a weaker legal basis for freedom in broadcast
programming and are potentially subject to much greater
government control due to the Government's monopoly of
transmission facilities and the expense involved in
establishing and maintaining independent stations. However,
stations such as NTV, a privately financed Moscow television
station, TV6, and other smaller private stations are beginning
to provide competition to state broadcasting in Moscow and
other large urban centers.
Television studios at the regional level, formerly part of the
central broadcasting system during the Soviet era, now operate
more or less independently. They function as affiliates,
opting to use programs from state-owned sources and producing
local news programming independently. Local authorities
sometimes subject these affiliates to pressure. All
broadcasters and cable networks, both public and private, use
foreign broadcast material.
In connection with the Russian military action in Chechnya in
December, both Russian and foreign journalists reported
efforts, including harassment and threats of force, by Russian
officials and military personnel to prevent journalists from
entering certain areas or to influence their reporting.
Although formal censorship procedures were not established, nor
was access to areas of conflict categorically forbidden, the
Russian Government did not repudiate such efforts by individual
elements within the military and the Interior Ministry to
control or suppress media coverage of events in Chechnya.
The breadth of academic freedom in Russia continues to expand.
Virtually all institutions of higher learning, from universities
to research institutes, enjoy increased autonomy. While many
university rectors and department heads are still appointed by
the Ministry of Education, a growing number of senior university
administrators are now selected by secret ballot in free and
open elections. Curriculums and textbooks are continuously
being revised and updated, and many institutions have developed
relations with Western counterparts. The entrenched academic
nomenklatura (privileged bureaucracy) nonetheless continues to
exert influence through its control of some resources and
privileges.
b. Freedom of Peaceful Assembly and Association
The Constitution provides for freedom of assembly and
association, and the Government generally respects these
freedoms.
Organizers of demonstrations must apply for permission to local
authorities between 15 and 10 days in advance, and officials
must respond at least 5 days before the scheduled event.
Participants in unauthorized demonstrations are subject to
civil and criminal penalties, including fines, 15-day jail
sentences, and stiffer punishment. In December Moscow police
briefly detained members of the human rights organization
Memorial for holding an unauthorized protest in front of the
Presidential Administration building against the bloodshed in
Chechnya. The authorities routinely issued permits for
demonstrations throughout Russia in October to mark the first
anniversary of the violent confrontation between forces loyal
to President Yeltsin and members of the former Supreme Soviet
(legislature). In 1994 there were many public demonstrations,
few of which were marred by violence.
All public associations must register their bylaws and the
names of their officers with the Ministry of Justice.
Political parties must also present 5,000 signatures and pay a
fee to register. There are now over 300 social and political
organizations, and the authorities are not known to have
refused arbitrarily to register any organization.
c. Freedom of Religion
The Constitution provides for freedom of religion, and the
Government respects this freedom.
The Russian Orthodox Church continues to gain influence
throughout society, including within the Government. The head
of the Church, Patriarch Aleksiy II, has asserted the Church's
belief in complete religious freedom but has been reluctant to
condemn openly anti-Semitic pronouncements by Metropolitan
Ioann of St. Petersburg.
Bureaucratic obstacles to complete religious freedom still
exist because the 1990 Soviet law on religion requires
religious groups of 10 or more persons to register with local
authorities. Some groups view the requirement itself as
contradicting their beliefs and refuse to register. Failure to
register precludes organizations from the right to establish
schools, own property, or engage in social work. The
registration process is open to bureaucratic obstructionism,
such as lost or delayed applications or denial of adequate
facilities. In Vladivostok, city authorities tried to block
the registration of a Roman Catholic parish, reportedly after
pressure from local Orthodox clergy.
In Krasnodar, after the son of a Pentecostal minister was
murdered, the local authorities claimed a church member killed
him and shut the church down. There were credible reports that
Russian Orthodox believers prevented Pentecostals and other
evangelical groups from meeting. (See Section 5 for a
discussion of religious discrimination.)
d. Freedom of Movement Within the Country, Foreign
Travel, Emigration, and Repatriation
Citizens are generally free to travel within Russia. All
adults are issued internal passports which they must carry
while traveling and use to register with local authorities
visits of more than 3 days. Travelers not staying in hotels
usually ignore this requirement.
The right to choose one's place of residence freely, although
provided in Article 27 of the Constitution, is still restricted
in practice. Under the "propiska" system, all citizens must
obtain a residence permit. A law passed in July 1993 attempted
to change the character of the system from one in which the
authorities grant permission for a citizen to reside in a given
location to one in which the citizen simply registers to inform
the authorities of his place of residence. The law came into
force on October 1, 1993, but has not been implemented. The
authorities of larger cities enforce the existing propiska
system selectively, often targeting those who are not Russian,
primarily persons from the Caucasus and Central Asia. In a few
cases, individuals have appealed propiska refusals in court and
won, but such instances are rare. Human rights monitors cite
these cases as the absurd lengths to which citizens must go to
enforce observance of basic constitutional rights.
Some officials have called for abolition of the propiska system,
stating that it is unconstitutional. However, officials in
major cities, especially Moscow, staunchly defend the system,
predicting widespread crime and homelessness if it were abolished. Citing this as justification, Moscow city
authorities on July 1 imposed a system under which nonresidents
must pay a daily fee to visit the capital. Furthermore,
Russian citizens from within the Russian Federation who wish to
change their residence to Moscow must pay a fee equal to 500
times the monthly minimum wage to purchase a permit, while
persons from the countries of the Commonwealth of Independent
States must pay 1,000 times the monthly minimum wage and those
from all other countries must pay 1,500 times the monthly
minimum wage. The authorities also enforce this system
selectively, especially harassing persons from the Caucasus and
Central Asia.
Russian citizens also have the constitutional right to
emigrate. Under the May 1991 Soviet law on emigration and
foreign travel, which officially came into force on January 1,
1993, exit permits and formal invitations from abroad are no
longer required of travelers who are not emigrating. Emigrants
need only show an invitation from any relative abroad or
permission to enter the country to which they are immigrating.
The law, however, continues to restrict the emigration of
persons with access to state secrets. Special travel
regulations apply to some Russian scientists wishing to travel
abroad temporarily.
An interagency government commission reviews individual
passport applications denied on secrecy grounds. Persons have
the right to present their case and to call expert witnesses to
challenge the continued secrecy of the information in
question. Since the commission began reviewing cases in June
1993, the overwhelming majority of passport denials on grounds
of secrecy have been overturned. The most famous case of a
refusal of a passport for foreign travel, that of Vil
Mirzayanov, a Russian scientist incarcerated several times for
revealing to a U.S. journalist that Russia continued to violate
international agreements on chemical weapons production, was
overturned by the commission on August 31.
The 1991 law also retains the requirement that those intending
to emigrate obtain permission from close relatives in Russia to
leave the country. If unable to obtain this permission, the
intending emigrant may pursue a resolution of the problem in
the courts. In 1994 Russian courts for the first time began to
accept such cases for review. At least two such cases were
resolved in favor of the intending emigrant.
Before the events of December in Chechnya, estimates of the
number of refugees and forced migrants in Russia differed
widely, with some stating a total of 3.5 million. Forced
migrants or resettlers are generally persons with Russian
citizenship who lived permanently in other states of the former
Soviet Union and fled due to economic hardship or
discriminatory laws. There are three categories of refugees in
Russia: (1) ethnic Russians fleeing conflict areas, such as
Tajikistan, who are considered refugees by the Russian
Government and in some cases under the internationally accepted
definition of refugee; (2) nonethnic Russians, such as
Armenians and Azerbaijanis of mixed marriages, who would face
persecution in either Armenia or Azerbaijan and who might be
eligible for refugee status; (3) third-country refugees, mainly
Somalis, Afghans, Iraqis, and Kurds, who could not safely
return home. The U.N. High Commissioner for Refugees estimates
there to be about 50,000 people in this third category.
Many forced migrants resettled to rural areas complain that
housing is inadequate, job opportunities are scarce, and they
are unprepared to work in agriculture. Many areas have refused
to accept refugees resettled by the Federal Migration Service
(FMS). Human rights monitors allege that the FMS also places
unnecessary bureaucratic obstacles in the way of processing
applications of persons from the states of the former Soviet
Union and sometimes expels newly arrived refugees, who may have
valid claims to refugee status, across Russia's southern
borders.
Section 3 Respect for Political Rights: The Right of Citizens
to Change Their Government
Pursuant to the Constitution, the Russian people have the right
to change their government at both the federation and regional
levels, although this right under the provisions of the 1993
Constitution has not yet been tested in practice. In December
1993, concurrent with voting on the constitutional referendum,
voters elected representatives to the Federal Assembly in
national parliamentary elections. This body consists of a
450-seat lower house, the State Duma, and an upper house, or
Federation Council, comprising two representatives from each of
the federation's 89 constituent regions. (The breakaway
Republic of Chechnya refused to participate in the elections.)
The next parliamentary and presidential elections at the
federation level are scheduled to take place in late 1995 and
1996, respectively, although many prominent politicians have
called for their postponement.
President Yeltsin was democratically elected to an exceptional
5-year term in 1991. After he prorogued the Supreme Soviet in
October 1993, he emerged in a stronger position politically
vis-a-vis the legislature. In order to avoid legislative
delays in the Federal Assembly and to overcome political
opposition in Parliament to bills proposed by the Government,
the President makes heavy use of his constitutional power to
issue decrees. Although presidential decrees may not
contradict the Constitution or the Federal Assembly's statutes,
the constitutionality of many decrees is openly questioned in
the Government and the press. With the Constitutional Court
not yet in operation, there is no entity which may definitively
determine the constitutionality (and hence the validity) of
either presidential decrees or legislation of the Federal
Assembly.
In contrast to national political institutions, most executive
branch leaders at the regional level have yet to be elected by
voters. For example, almost all sitting regional governors
were appointed by the President and have not yet stood for
popular election, although, by contrast, almost all heads of
ethnically based republics within the Russian Federation have
been properly elected. Most regional legislatures, disbanded
by presidential decree in 1993, had been reactivated by year's
end.
The Constitution provides for equal rights and freedoms for men
and women, but women do not occupy many leading positions in
politics and government. However, the Women of Russia bloc
received around 8 percent of the seats in the State Duma
through proportional balloting. Women hold 8 of the 170 seats
in the Federation Council and 59 of 450 seats in the State
Duma. Although members of Russia's ethnic and religious
minorities face no legal limitations on political
participation, some ethnic and religious minorities face
societal discrimination that makes it difficult for their
members to be elected. Most major ethnic and religious groups,
however, do have some representation in Parliament.
Section 4 Governmental Attitude Regarding International and
Nongovernmental Investigation of Alleged Violations
of Human Rights
Numerous local human rights groups were active during the year,
including the Moscow Helsinki Group, Memorial, the Center for
Human Rights Research, and the Union of Councils. They
investigated and publicly commented on human rights issues,
generally without government interference or restriction.
There was one reported incident in which a human rights group
was denied access to several prisons for the purpose of
conducting inspections, although other groups gained access and
reported extensively on prison conditions.
It is perhaps too early to assess the impact of events in
Chechnya on the effectiveness of human rights organizations in
Russia. On one hand, several organizations (for example, the
Committee of Soldiers' Mothers, Memorial, Glasnost Defense
Fund) have gotten considerable exposure and recognition both at
home and abroad for their stand against the incursion. On the
other hand, one official government response to reports of
human rights abuses in the theater of conflict criticized
"biased" political figures and human rights organizations who
fail to see that the situation in Chechnya "has made human
tragedies and losses actually inevitable."
President Yeltsin late in 1993 established a special Commission
on Human Rights headed by Sergey Kovalev, a former dissident
and political prisoner widely respected in human rights
circles. By the end of June 1994, the Commission had drafted
an unprecedented, highly critical report on human rights
practices in Russia in 1993 which was leaked to the press and
then published in full by an official government newspaper.
While openly critical of his style and many of his policies,
human rights monitors gave the President high marks for
creating Kovalev's Commission. However, the Government's
dialog with human rights organizations broke down as a result
of the Russian military operation in the Chechen republic.
Activists, including Commissioner Kovalev, charged the
Government with indiscriminate use of force, disseminating
disinformation, and attempting to muzzle critical reporting in
the mass media.
Section 5 Discrimination Based on Race, Sex, Religion,
Disability, Language, or Social Status
Article 19 of the Constitution prohibits discrimination based
on race, sex, religion, language, social status, or other
circumstances. Both official and societal discrimination still
exist.
Women
Although women are entitled to the same legal rights as men, in
practice they are subject to considerable discrimination, both
official and unofficial. Women are often paid less than men
for equal work and frequently are the first to be laid off as
enterprises reduce staff because of a societal bias in favor of
male employment as the primary income for the family. While
methodologically reliable statistics are difficult to compile,
the Center for Gender Studies in Moscow has stated that in 1991
women earned on average 75 percent as much as men, while in
1994 that figure had dropped to 40 percent, and unemployment
was three times higher among women than among men. Men still
disproportionately occupy positions of influence and prestige
in both the Government and the economy.
Although the Government maintains no statistics, there is
considerable anecdotal evidence that violence against women,
including rape and spousal abuse, is both substantial and
growing. Russian human rights monitors allege that police
often do not take an interest in cases of violence against
women, particularly cases of domestic violence. Incidents
often go unreported because of the belief that the authorities
will do little about the matter and because of the victim's own
shame. In the case of spousal abuse, there are no specific
legal provisions against wife beating, and legal recourse such
as bringing charges of assault is unlikely to be successful and
seldom exercised.
Anecdotal evidence also indicates that rape and sexual
exploitation and harassment in the workplace have grown
substantially. According to the Sexual Assault Recovery
Center, thousands of unrecorded and uninvestigated rapes take
place. Police reportedly are reluctant to deal with rape
complaints because investigating them is time-consuming, often
unsuccessful, and increases the unsolved crime statistics. To
prove rape, the victim must have a mass of evidence including
material evidence of resistance and medical records. Many
doctors are also reportedly uncooperative, fearing
time-consuming mandatory court appearances.
Statistics on crime rates do not disaggregate cases of
trafficking in women, and reliable estimates on the extent of
the problem are not available. There were few instances of
persons being prosecuted for such activity in 1994.
The "Women of Russia" electoral bloc focused its campaign on
the need for guaranteed health care, education, and social
welfare.
Children
The Constitution assigns the Government some responsibility for
safeguarding the rights of children. However, the Government's
efforts to develop an effective social safety net are severely
hampered by its failure to allocate sufficient resources. In
particular, living conditions in orphanages are deteriorating,
and adoptions by Russian families are declining. Statistics
from human rights organizations state that about 20 percent of
Russian orphans commit crimes and are sent to prisons as
minors, and 10 percent commit suicide. There are indications
that orphans and other disadvantaged children are becoming
instruments of organized criminal organizations.
Indigenous People
The State Committee for the Development of the North, based in
Moscow, is tasked with representing and advocating the
interests of indigenous peoples. With only a tiny staff, its
influence is limited. Local committees have been formed in
some areas to study and make recommendations regarding the
preservation of the culture of indigenous people. Indigenous
leaders criticize these committees as lacking political
influence.
National/Racial/Ethnic Minorities
Discrimination against people from the Caucasus and Central
Asia increased in the middle of 1994 concurrently with new
measures at both the federal and local levels to combat crime.
With wide public support, law enforcement authorities targeted
dark-complexioned people for harassment, arrest, and
deportation from urban centers. According to Russian human
rights monitors, some were dragged from automobiles in traffic,
harassed, extorted, and beaten in broad daylight on the
streets.
Human rights groups in Moscow criticized the discriminatory
procedures under which thousands of persons were forced to
leave the capital after the June crime decrees. However, the
crackdown was generally applauded by Muscovites, who blame much
of the crime in the city on people from the Caucasus and
Central Asia. Vendors and merchants in Moscow's many markets,
and in city markets throughout Russia, were also targets of
discrimination. Concentrating on persons who by appearance
seemed to be from the Caucasus or Central Asia, Moscow police
forced many to halt their business, confiscated their wares,
and subjected them to physical abuse.
Religious Minorities
Muslims comprise about 10 percent of the Russian population,
and there were no reports of official discrimination against
them. The Russian Government last year facilitated travel on
the hajj to Saudi Arabia. Between 4,000 and 6,000 Russian
Muslims made the pilgrimage. There have been tensions between
Muslims and Christians in some areas, particularly Chechnya.
The Government of Russia does not condone anti-Semitism.
During the January 1994 Moscow Summit, President Yeltsin joined
President Clinton in a statement promoting human rights
observance that included specific condemnation of religious
intolerance and prejudice, including anti-Semitism.
Jewish leaders have increased efforts to revive the Russian
Jewish community and have received assistance from both local
and federal authorities in obtaining buildings to reopen
synagogues and Jewish schools. The Russian "black book" on the
Holocaust, which was sponsored by Stalin and then suppressed,
was published with help from U.S. nongovernmental organizations
and released in September.
Nevertheless, anti-Semitism continues to exist and is
manifested in acts of vandalism and verbal assaults on persons
who appear to be Jewish. On December 30, 1993, fire destroyed
one of Moscow's three synagogues. The Jewish community
believes, and authorities suspect, that arson was the cause of
the blaze. The results of the investigation by year's end were
still inconclusive. In October a crude explosive or incendiary
device was found in the Moscow Choral Synagogue during an
evening choir rehearsal. Authorities removed the device, which
caused no injuries or damage.
Popular expression of anti-Semitism is particularly evident in
politics. Street protestors opposed to President Yeltsin often
refer to him pejoratively as a Jew, and antigovernment graffiti
often contains anti-Semitic imagery. Subtle suggestions of
Jewish heritage manifested through mispronunciation of
politicians' names or ways they are printed in the press are
used as a means to discredit them. The number of extreme
nationalist and outright Fascist publications which openly
promote anti-Semitic views and sold publicly is increasing.
The governmental agency responsible for regulating the print
media, the Russian Committee for the Press, in December
announced its intention to take legal action to stop the
publication of some 100 periodicals it considered Fascist.
(See Section 2.a. for a fuller description.)
Certain political and religious circles, led by Metropolitan
Ioann, the Russian Orthodox bishop of St. Petersburg,
disseminate strong anti-Semitic views. Patriarch Aleksiy II,
the leader of the Russian Orthodox Church, censured
Metropolitan Ioann for his anti-Semitic statements.
Nonetheless, Ioann's followers continue to express such views.
Section 6 Worker Rights
a. The Right of Association
Both the 1993 Constitution and the Labor Code provide for the
right of workers to form or join trade unions. However, the
full exercise of this right is limited in practice. Labor
unions are required to register with local authorities, which
in the past have used this requirement to discourage or block
the formation of new unions. However, independent trade unions
have become more effective in countering obstruction by local
authorities.
Until October 1993, the Federation of Independent Trade Unions
of Russia (FNPR), the successor to the Soviet-era All-Union
Central Council of Trade Unions, was the principal obstacle to
the exercise by workers of their right to leave the FNPR and
join new independent unions. It controlled the social
insurance fund which provides worker benefits, such as
disability and maternity payments, sick leave, and vacations.
Hence, many workers were reluctant to leave the FNPR and openly
join an independent union.
As of October 1993, the Labor Ministry began officially
administering the fund, but FNPR employees continue to manage
the day-to-day operations of local offices. As a result,
discrimination and the threat of discrimination continue. A
leading independent labor union allows workers to join without
compelling them to resign from the FNPR.
About 70 percent of Russia's 75 million workers are now members
of labor unions. The FNPR, which had claimed a membership of
65 million, now admits that its membership has dropped to about
50 million workers. Independent unions account for
approximately another 3 million workers.
Labor unions are independent of the Government and political
parties. The FNPR was officially allied with the Civic Union,
but that relationship disintegrated in late 1993 because of the
FNPR's decision to support the opposition to President Yeltsin
during October 1993 and the Civic Union's poor showing in the
December 1993 elections.
Although the Russian Federation Labor Code provides that
workers have the right to strike, it also contains numerous
restrictions that severely limit the exercise of that right.
The Labor Code prohibits strikes for political reasons, strikes
that pose a threat to people's lives or health, and strikes
that might have "severe consequences," interpreted so as to
include the defense industry, communications, civil aviation,
and railroads. The Labor Code requires a multistage process of
notification and negotiation before a strike is permitted.
Despite these restrictions, strikes are numerous in Russia.
According to the Labor Ministry, there were nearly 400 strikes
in the first 9 months of 1994, compared to 264 strikes in all
of 1993. Several strikes were declared illegal, including a
nationwide strike of airline pilots.
The Government makes little effort to protect trade union
leaders and strikers from management retribution. In numerous
instances in 1994, enterprise managers fired workers for their
union activities. For example, during a strike at the Avtovaz
Automobile Factory, management first tried a lockout and then
unilaterally declared the strike illegal, bringing in police to
end the strike. Forty workers involved in the strike were
fired for violations of "worker discipline." The independent
labor union that organized the strike is appealing to senior
government officials and is contemplating court action to
reinstate the fired workers.
Independent labor unions continued to seek redress for labor
law violations from the Russian courts, with increasing rates
of success. They have established two labor law centers to
help unions and their members enforce their rights in the
courts.
Unions are permitted to form or join federations or
confederations and may participate in international bodies.
(###) b. The Right to Organize and Bargain Collectively
Collective bargaining is protected by law but is not practiced
widely. The managements of many enterprises refuse to
negotiate collective bargaining agreements, and many of those
that are concluded are not the product of genuine collective
bargaining because of the close subordinate relationship of the
FNPR to enterprise management and because of management
personnel's membership in the FNPR. Independent unions,
however, have been aggressive in demanding genuine collective
bargaining, and one of them boasts of concluding 2,000
collective bargaining agreements.
In several sectors of the economy, labor unions, management,
and government representatives in a tripartite commission
negotiate industrywide wages, benefits, and general conditions
of work. This arrangement reinforces the workers' tendency to
rely on the Government to establish wages and other workplace
conditions.
The Labor Code does not explicitly prohibit antiunion
discrimination by employers although it is implied in several
sections. Discrimination against one union in preference for
another continues to occur throughout Russian industry. Under
current law, there is no mechanism for resolving labor
disputes.
Russia has several foreign enterprise zones. There is no
evidence that worker rights are more restricted in these zones
than elsewhere in the country.
c. Prohibition of Forced or Compulsory Labor
The Labor Code prohibits forced or compulsory labor. The
Committee of Soldiers' Mothers alleges that some military
conscripts were sold into servitude during their military
service (see Section l.c.). Government enforcement is
ineffective.
d. Minimum Age for Employment of Children
The Labor Code does not permit the regular employment of
children under the age of 16. In certain cases, children aged
14 and 15 may work in intern or apprenticeship programs. The
Labor Code regulates the working conditions of children under
the age of 18, including prohibiting dangerous work and
nighttime and overtime work. However, there is anecdotal
evidence to suggest that the working conditions of children
under 18 violate Labor Code standards. The responsibility for
the protection of children at work is shared by the Labor
Ministry and the Ministry for Social Protection, but government
enforcement is largely ineffective.
e. Acceptable Conditions of Work
The Federal Assembly sets the minimum wage, which applies to
all workers. The current monthly minimum wage, set in July,
was 20,500 rubles (or about $6 at the December rate of
exchange) and was insufficient to provide a decent living for a
worker and family. However, very few workers actually receive
the minimum wage. Its primary purpose is to serve as a
baseline for computing benefits, pensions, and some wage scales
(primarily in civil service positions).
The Labor Code provides for a standard workweek of 40 hours,
which includes at least one 24-hour rest period. The law
requires premium pay for overtime work or work on holidays.
Russian law establishes minimum conditions of workplace safety
and worker health, but these standards are widely ignored, and
government enforcement of safety and health regulations is
inadequate. Industrial deaths and accidents continue to rise
dramatically. The Labor Ministry reported that each day 30
workers die as a result of workplace accidents, while another
50 are injured.
[end of document]
Return
to 1994 Human Rights Practices report home page.
Return to DOSFAN
home page.
This is an official U.S. Government source
for information on the WWW. Inclusion of non-U.S. Government links
does not imply endorsement of contents.